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A clarification of selective exposure
JOURNAL
OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
14, 132-139
PSYCHOLOGY
A Clarification
of Selective
The Impact
Mannheim,
Exposure
of Choice
DIETER Universitiit
(1978)
FREY
Federal
Republic
of Germany
AND ROBERT
A.
University
of Texas
Received
WICKLUND at Austin
December 14. 1976
Selective exposure as a reaction to cognitive dissonance has long eluded researchers working in the realm of dissonance theory. It is proposed here that the difficulties in selective exposure paradigms have resulted from inadequate designs, and more particularly, it is likely that many of the previous findings are due to confoundings. The present experiment manipulates the variable of choice with the intent of controlling for a variety of possible confounds. The experiment shows a simple, theoretically predicted effect: Selective exposure, favoring supporting over nonsupporting information, increases to the degree that an onerous task is undertaken with volition.
The collected literature on selective exposure offers an imposing array of inconsistent results. Selective exposure was originally set forth as one of the primary effects of dissonance arousal (Festinger, 1957), but it is easy to demonstrate that such effects are unusual (e.g., Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears, 1968). The more common measure of dissonance reduction, attitude change, has shown more consistent results. According to Wicklund and Brehm (1976) there is an important difference between evaluative change (e.g., attitude change) and selective exposure: Evaluative change does not demand of the individual any new behaviors or learning experiences. In essence, the dissonance reduction process is generated from within. Selective exposure on the other hand This research was supported in part by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to the Sonderforschungsbereich 24, Sozial- und wirtschaftspsychologische Entscheidungsforschung (Universitat Mannheim; Chairman, Professor Martin Irle). Rolf Klingel and Volker Bell deserve credit for their highly competent work as experimenters. Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert A. Wicklund, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712. 0022-1031/78/0141-0132$02.00/O Copyright 0 1978 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
132
CLARIFICATION
OF
SELECTIVE
EXPOSURE
33
does ask the person to embark on a potential learning experience, in the sense that a task of reading or listening to novel information is almost always required. In short, dissonance reduction via selective exposure necessitates a considerable input from the environment, whereas evaluative change necessitates nothing but a change in one’s own cognitions. What is the impact of this difference? Given that additional behaviors are required in selective exposure, it is likely that factors other than cognitive dissonance would have an impact on exposure. This is because the behaviors relevant in exposure are somewhat unfamiliar, and certainly are subject to the influences that are usually present when a person is about to move in an unexplore direction. What are these factors ? (a) Curiosity can be responsibly for results either contrary to or favorable to the selective exposure thesis. For example, the committed smoker may be unfamiliar with certain kinds of antismoking literature, and the opportunity to examine this literature could easily engage his curiosity. The results would ostensibly be contrary to the selective exposure principle. (b) Intellectual honesty would also weaken potential selective exposure results, in that the individual may sometimes attempt to treat all sides of an issue with fairn and in so doing would fail to manifest the bias predicted by sonance theory. (c) Sometimes dissonant information is more useful team consonant information; thus we have a third factor that would interfere with dissonance effects (cf. Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965). (d) A fourth factor, perhaps not as general as the first three, has to do with t attractiveness of choice alternatives. Independent of dissonance arousal person may generally be more interested in reading or hearing abou attractive alternative than an unattractive alternative. Depe attractiveness of the chosen alternative relative to other about which there is information, almost any pattern af res predicted. This problem has been addressed directly by Mills (19 (e) Finally, there is a form of selective exposure that implies opposite to what is commonly expected: If a person is sufficiently co in his ability to refute counterarguments, he may seek out information in an attempt to refute it. Such effects have been strated by Kleinhesselink and Edwards (1975) and Lowin (1967; 1969), who found a preference for choice-inconsistent information when subjects had some basis for feeling able to counterargue. Given the likely interference of these several intruding factors, is is not surprising that the literature on selective exposure shows a general confusion. Even when investigators have tried to control for some oft intluences, other confounding factors are an ever-present thre research designs. There is a special and pervasive reason why these problems have played such a great role in prior research: The parad have been limited primarily to a comparison of subjects who
134
FREY
AND
WICKLUND
engaged in a certain dissonance-arousing behavior vs subjects who have not. For example, research has often compared smokers with nonsmokers, which is problematic because the factors just discussed are likely to apply differentially to the two groups. Smokers may be more curious about antismoking literature than nonsmokers (or vice versa), or one group may find such information more useful than the other. These are problems even when the dissonance-arousing behavior is a manipulated feature of an experimental design. These difficulties can be averted by means of a factor that has been thoroughly studied in research on evaluative change: choice. It has been consistently found that subjects who engage in a potentially dissonancearousing activity are much more likely to show dissonance-reduction efforts when they have freely (or relatively freely) chosen the activity (e.g., Cohen & Latane, 1962; Cohen, Terry, & Jones, 1959; Frey & Irle, 1972; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). The pairing of the choice variable with the selective exposure measure should virtually eliminate the extraneous effects of the several intruding factors discussed. That is, their influence will continue to be felt, but that influence should not vary as a function of choice. Accordingly, the present experiment was designed to demonstrate that the introduction of the choice variable could produce exposure results in keeping with Festinger’s (1957) original postulate. In summary, it was hypothesized that selective exposure to supportive information and concomitant avoidance of nonsupportive information would take place after a decision primarily along subjects given free choice. Five additional elements were introduced into the procedure, the first four of which were largely exploratory: (a) Some subjects indicated their interest in supportive/nonsupportive information before knowing the exact content of the information, while other subjects were first shown an abstract from each source of information. This variable was introduced to explore the possibility that selectivity is more pronounced when the person first knows something about the details of the information, thereby minimizing curiosity. (b) Some subjects were given the opportunity to reject certain classes of information. This allowed a measure of active avoidance of nonsupportive information. (c) Subjects were asked to select three or up to 10 pieces of information. This latter variation was introduced only to cover the possibility that selective exposure occurs more readily when the supply of supportive information is greater. (d) The supply of available information was varied to explore the possibility that selective exposure occurs more readily when the supply of supportive information is greater. (e) Measures of affect toward the chosen task were taken as an additional measure of dissonance reduction. This was because the choice-no choice paradigm has typically dealt with affect measures, and it was desired to demonstrate that the present paradigm was comparable to earlier dissonance-arousing procedures.
CLARIFICATION
OF SELECTIVE
EXPOSURE
135
METHOD Subjects. The subjects were 95 male high school students, ages 15-17 from Mannheim, Germany. Two of these were deleted for not following instructions. Procedure. The experimenter met with subjects individually or in groups of two. When run in groups of two, subjects were separated such that they could not communicate.’ He indicated that the research was concerned with human productivity on simple tasks. After elaborating on this theme he indicated that they would be asked to write random numbers. In order to introduce them to the nature of the task, he requested that they proceed to write several four-digit combinations of numbers as rapidly as possible. Once they knew what was involved he explained that the basic problem under study had to do with whether people are able to write numbers at random, as opposed to a nonrandom order that would follow certain natural laws. Following this introductory phase all subjects were instructed to proceed with a 3-min practice trial. This was done to ensure that they would experience the onerous quality of the task. When the 3-min period was over, the choice variable was introduced: Choice condition subjects were told that the remaining task was to write random numbers for 10 min, but that their participation would be completely voluntary. Subjects were explicitly told that they were free to decide whether or not to perform. (All subjects in this condition chose to proceed with the task.) In the No Choice condition the experimenter simply said that they would pause for a short period before proceeding with the remaining 10 min of random-number writing. Once subjects were assigned to experimental conditions, they proceeded with the 10,.min task. After they had worked at it for 3 min, the experimenter interrupted them to say that they would now have an opportunity to learn more about what they were doing. It was indicated that the task would be resumed, but in fact it was not. Selective exposure measure. Subjects first received a list of titles of articles, each supposedly one page long. Half of the titles appeared supportive oftbe choice to write random numbers, and the other half appeared nonsupportive. Typical titles among the supportive list were: “Why does writing random numbers raise creativity,” “Why the writing of random numbers is connected with a relatively high scientific value,” and “Why writing random numbers raises the development of patience and the achievement of general writing abilities.” Examples of the nonsupportive titles are: “Why the writing of random numbers kills creativity,” and ‘“Why writing random numbers does not have a high scientific value.‘” Subjects were asked to select articles to read under one of the four following conditions: (a) Subjects could choose three from an array of six. (b) Subjects were first asked to read short abstracts of the six available articles, then to choose three articles to read. (c) Subjects could choose three from an array of 10. In addition, they were asked to indicate which three articles they did not want to read. (d) Subjects could choose as many as they wanted from an array of 10. Other measures.” Following the selective exposure measure subjects responded to a ques-
* Even though subjects were unable to communicate, the preferred statistical analysis would have treated each group of two as a separate individual. However, as records were not kept of which subjects were run in groups, the analysis reported here treats each person as a separate unit. 2 The wordings of these five items are approximately as follows (translated from original): (a) Freedom. “After the practice writing was complete, the experimenter gave me complete freedom in continuing the task.” 0 = definitely disagree; 10 = definitely agree. (b) Desirability-of-reading: “How much would you like to read each of the available articles?” 0 = not at all; 10 = very much.
136
FREY AND WICKLUND TABLE RELATIVEPREFERENCE
1
FORSUPPORTIVEANDNONSUPPORTIVEINFORMATION
Choice Conditions of information selection Select three from array of six Select three from array of six and read abstracts Select three from array of 10 and indicate which three were not wanted Select as many as 10 from array of 10
ka
No Choice
n
SD
k
n
SD
.I7
17
1.20
-.08
13
1.32
1.00
8
1.85
-so
8
1.41
1.63 .7.5
16 8
1.20 1.70
16 7
1.50 1.10
u Number of supportive titles chosen minus number of nonsupportive
.63 .14
titles chosen.
tion asking them how much freedom they had been given concerning whether to carry out the task. This was answered on an II-point scale. Also included were two items that were parallel to the selective exposure measure. One of these asked the subject for a desirabilityof-reading judgment about each of the articles, and the other asked for a judgment about their agreement with the articles. Then came two task evaluation measures, where subjects were asked for estimates of the attractiveness of the task and for a judgment about how much they could learn from the task.
RESULTS
It should be noted first that the choice manipulation was highly effective: There was a much higher perception of freedom in the Choice than in the No Choice condition, F(1,85) = 32.95, p < .OOl. The crucial selectivity measure consists of the number of supportive titles chosen minus the number of nonsupportive chosen. The means for this measure are shown in Table 1. The effect of choice was clearly in the predicted direction and significant, F(1,85) = 11.33, p < .OOl. There was neither an effect for the four information selection conditions (p > .lO) nor an interaction (p > . 10). The analysis is similar ifjust the number of supportive articles chosen is taken as the measure (Table 2). There is an overall effect for the four levels of information selection, F(3,85) = 3.42, p < .02. This result, however, is relatively unimportant in light of the nonsignificant interaction (p > .lO). Finally, and more central to the hypothesis, the effect for (c) Perceived agreement with articles: “How much do you expect to agree or disagree with each of the articles?” 0 = disagree; 10 = agree. (d) Task attractiveness: “How do you evaluate the task?” 0 = very boring; 10 = very interesting. (e) How much can be learned: “How much can one learn through performing the task?“ 0 = not much; 10 = very much.
CLARIFICATION
OF SELECTIVE TABLE
MEAN
137
EXPOSURE
2
NUMBER OF SUPPORTIVE TITLES CHOSEN Choice
Conditions of information selection Select three from array of six Select three from array of six and read abstracts Select three Tom array of 10 and indicate which three were not wanted Select as many as 10 from array of 10
choice is in the predicted
direction
No Choice
k
It
SD
8
m
SD
1.88
17
.6O
1.46
13
.66
2.00
8
.93
1.25
8
.7?
2.31
16
16
8
.60 .89
1.31
2.25
2.57
.75 1.72
and significant,
7
F(1,85) = 5.
< .03.
Tn one condition (the third one listed in Tables 1 and 2), subjects were asked not only which three items they wanted, but also which three they definitely did not want. If there had been an active avoidance process underway, Choice subjects might have been expected to show a particularly strong aversion to nonsupportive information. An overall avoidance index was computed, consisting of the number of nonsu portive titles avoided minus the number of supportive titles avoided. With this measure, Choice subjects did show a stronger avoidance tendency (8 = 1.50) than No Choice subjects (z = .24), t(30) = 2.03, p < .OS). Thus, there is suggestive evidence here for an active avoidance process. The two questionnaire items that paralleled the selectivity measure were also supportive of the hypothesis. On the desirability-of-reading measure, ratings of the nonsupportive items were subtracted from ratings of supportive, and on this index Choice subjects were higher than Choice subjects, F(1,85) = 3.69, p < .06. A similar item on percei agreement with the articles produced similar? and slightly stronger, results, F(1,85) = 9.35, p < .Ol. Finally, the two evaluation measures supported the thesis that C subjects would evidence a relatively high evaluation of the task task attractiveness measure showed a significant choice effect, F(1,85) = 12.05, p < .OOl, and so did the item that asked subj how much they could learn from the task, F(1,85) = 4.17, p < .05. s, the paradig emonstrated phenomena comparable to those found in numerous earlier forced-compliance experiments. DISCUSSION
The results were consistent with the hypothesis and were not affected by the particular conditions under which information was made available.
138
FREY AND WICKLUND
More particularly, the effects were not mediated by either prior familiarity with the types of arguments or the possibility of selecting a large number of articles. In short, our conclusion is a simple one: Selective exposure to supportive over nonsupportive information occurs to the degree that subjects are initially given choice to participate in an onerous task. Selective exposure is a much more complex measure than evaluative change, in the sense that it is subject to a diverse array of influences that have nothing to do with cognitive dissonance. These influences include curiosity, usefulness, attractiveness of decision alternatives, and others. The direction of their influence varies and the intrusion of these variables into the usual exposure paradigm may be largely responsible for the current state of inconsistent results. Choice manipulations allow the investigator to cut through the factors that are extraneous to dissonance, for even though such factors continue to operate, their effects should not vary as a function of choice. REFERENCES Canon, L. K. Self-confidence and selective exposure to information. In L. Festinger, Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. Pp. 83-95. Cohen, A. R., & Latanb, B. An experiment on choice in commitment to counterattitudinal behavior. In J. W. Brehm & A. R. Cohen, Explorations in cognitive dissonance. New York: Wiley, 1962. Pp. 88-91. Cohen, A. R., Terry, H. I., & Jones, C. B. Attitudinal effects of choice in exposure to counterpropaganda. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 388-391. Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. Freedman, J. L. Confidence, utility, and selective exposure: A partial replication. Journal of Personality
and Social
Psychology,
196.5, 2, 778-780.
Freedman, J. L., & Sears, D. 0. Selective exposure. Zn L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentalsocialpsychology. New York: Academic Press, 1965. Vol. 2, pp. 58-98. Frey, D., & Irle, M. Some conditions to produce a dissonance and an incentive effect in a “forced-compliance” situation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1972, 2, 45-54. Kleinhesselink, R. R., & Edwards, R. E. Seeking and avoiding belief-discrepant information as a function of its perceived refutability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 787-790. Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 245-254. Lowin, A. Approach and avoidance as alternate modes of selective exposure to information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, l-9. Lowin, A. Further evidence for an approach-avoidance interpretation of selective exposure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 265-271. Mills, J. Avoidance of dissonant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 589-593. (a)
CLARIFICATION
OF SELECTIVE
EXPOSURE
13
Mills, J. Effect of certainty about a decision upon postdecision exposure to consonant and dissonant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, %? 749-752. (b) Sears, D. 0. The paradox of de facto selective exposure without preferences for supportive information. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories ofcognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. Pp. 777-787. Wicklund, R. A., & Brehm, J. W. Perspectives on cognitive dissonance. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976.
OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
14, 132-139
PSYCHOLOGY
A Clarification
of Selective
The Impact
Mannheim,
Exposure
of Choice
DIETER Universitiit
(1978)
FREY
Federal
Republic
of Germany
AND ROBERT
A.
University
of Texas
Received
WICKLUND at Austin
December 14. 1976
Selective exposure as a reaction to cognitive dissonance has long eluded researchers working in the realm of dissonance theory. It is proposed here that the difficulties in selective exposure paradigms have resulted from inadequate designs, and more particularly, it is likely that many of the previous findings are due to confoundings. The present experiment manipulates the variable of choice with the intent of controlling for a variety of possible confounds. The experiment shows a simple, theoretically predicted effect: Selective exposure, favoring supporting over nonsupporting information, increases to the degree that an onerous task is undertaken with volition.
The collected literature on selective exposure offers an imposing array of inconsistent results. Selective exposure was originally set forth as one of the primary effects of dissonance arousal (Festinger, 1957), but it is easy to demonstrate that such effects are unusual (e.g., Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears, 1968). The more common measure of dissonance reduction, attitude change, has shown more consistent results. According to Wicklund and Brehm (1976) there is an important difference between evaluative change (e.g., attitude change) and selective exposure: Evaluative change does not demand of the individual any new behaviors or learning experiences. In essence, the dissonance reduction process is generated from within. Selective exposure on the other hand This research was supported in part by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to the Sonderforschungsbereich 24, Sozial- und wirtschaftspsychologische Entscheidungsforschung (Universitat Mannheim; Chairman, Professor Martin Irle). Rolf Klingel and Volker Bell deserve credit for their highly competent work as experimenters. Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert A. Wicklund, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712. 0022-1031/78/0141-0132$02.00/O Copyright 0 1978 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
132
CLARIFICATION
OF
SELECTIVE
EXPOSURE
33
does ask the person to embark on a potential learning experience, in the sense that a task of reading or listening to novel information is almost always required. In short, dissonance reduction via selective exposure necessitates a considerable input from the environment, whereas evaluative change necessitates nothing but a change in one’s own cognitions. What is the impact of this difference? Given that additional behaviors are required in selective exposure, it is likely that factors other than cognitive dissonance would have an impact on exposure. This is because the behaviors relevant in exposure are somewhat unfamiliar, and certainly are subject to the influences that are usually present when a person is about to move in an unexplore direction. What are these factors ? (a) Curiosity can be responsibly for results either contrary to or favorable to the selective exposure thesis. For example, the committed smoker may be unfamiliar with certain kinds of antismoking literature, and the opportunity to examine this literature could easily engage his curiosity. The results would ostensibly be contrary to the selective exposure principle. (b) Intellectual honesty would also weaken potential selective exposure results, in that the individual may sometimes attempt to treat all sides of an issue with fairn and in so doing would fail to manifest the bias predicted by sonance theory. (c) Sometimes dissonant information is more useful team consonant information; thus we have a third factor that would interfere with dissonance effects (cf. Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965). (d) A fourth factor, perhaps not as general as the first three, has to do with t attractiveness of choice alternatives. Independent of dissonance arousal person may generally be more interested in reading or hearing abou attractive alternative than an unattractive alternative. Depe attractiveness of the chosen alternative relative to other about which there is information, almost any pattern af res predicted. This problem has been addressed directly by Mills (19 (e) Finally, there is a form of selective exposure that implies opposite to what is commonly expected: If a person is sufficiently co in his ability to refute counterarguments, he may seek out information in an attempt to refute it. Such effects have been strated by Kleinhesselink and Edwards (1975) and Lowin (1967; 1969), who found a preference for choice-inconsistent information when subjects had some basis for feeling able to counterargue. Given the likely interference of these several intruding factors, is is not surprising that the literature on selective exposure shows a general confusion. Even when investigators have tried to control for some oft intluences, other confounding factors are an ever-present thre research designs. There is a special and pervasive reason why these problems have played such a great role in prior research: The parad have been limited primarily to a comparison of subjects who
134
FREY
AND
WICKLUND
engaged in a certain dissonance-arousing behavior vs subjects who have not. For example, research has often compared smokers with nonsmokers, which is problematic because the factors just discussed are likely to apply differentially to the two groups. Smokers may be more curious about antismoking literature than nonsmokers (or vice versa), or one group may find such information more useful than the other. These are problems even when the dissonance-arousing behavior is a manipulated feature of an experimental design. These difficulties can be averted by means of a factor that has been thoroughly studied in research on evaluative change: choice. It has been consistently found that subjects who engage in a potentially dissonancearousing activity are much more likely to show dissonance-reduction efforts when they have freely (or relatively freely) chosen the activity (e.g., Cohen & Latane, 1962; Cohen, Terry, & Jones, 1959; Frey & Irle, 1972; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). The pairing of the choice variable with the selective exposure measure should virtually eliminate the extraneous effects of the several intruding factors discussed. That is, their influence will continue to be felt, but that influence should not vary as a function of choice. Accordingly, the present experiment was designed to demonstrate that the introduction of the choice variable could produce exposure results in keeping with Festinger’s (1957) original postulate. In summary, it was hypothesized that selective exposure to supportive information and concomitant avoidance of nonsupportive information would take place after a decision primarily along subjects given free choice. Five additional elements were introduced into the procedure, the first four of which were largely exploratory: (a) Some subjects indicated their interest in supportive/nonsupportive information before knowing the exact content of the information, while other subjects were first shown an abstract from each source of information. This variable was introduced to explore the possibility that selectivity is more pronounced when the person first knows something about the details of the information, thereby minimizing curiosity. (b) Some subjects were given the opportunity to reject certain classes of information. This allowed a measure of active avoidance of nonsupportive information. (c) Subjects were asked to select three or up to 10 pieces of information. This latter variation was introduced only to cover the possibility that selective exposure occurs more readily when the supply of supportive information is greater. (d) The supply of available information was varied to explore the possibility that selective exposure occurs more readily when the supply of supportive information is greater. (e) Measures of affect toward the chosen task were taken as an additional measure of dissonance reduction. This was because the choice-no choice paradigm has typically dealt with affect measures, and it was desired to demonstrate that the present paradigm was comparable to earlier dissonance-arousing procedures.
CLARIFICATION
OF SELECTIVE
EXPOSURE
135
METHOD Subjects. The subjects were 95 male high school students, ages 15-17 from Mannheim, Germany. Two of these were deleted for not following instructions. Procedure. The experimenter met with subjects individually or in groups of two. When run in groups of two, subjects were separated such that they could not communicate.’ He indicated that the research was concerned with human productivity on simple tasks. After elaborating on this theme he indicated that they would be asked to write random numbers. In order to introduce them to the nature of the task, he requested that they proceed to write several four-digit combinations of numbers as rapidly as possible. Once they knew what was involved he explained that the basic problem under study had to do with whether people are able to write numbers at random, as opposed to a nonrandom order that would follow certain natural laws. Following this introductory phase all subjects were instructed to proceed with a 3-min practice trial. This was done to ensure that they would experience the onerous quality of the task. When the 3-min period was over, the choice variable was introduced: Choice condition subjects were told that the remaining task was to write random numbers for 10 min, but that their participation would be completely voluntary. Subjects were explicitly told that they were free to decide whether or not to perform. (All subjects in this condition chose to proceed with the task.) In the No Choice condition the experimenter simply said that they would pause for a short period before proceeding with the remaining 10 min of random-number writing. Once subjects were assigned to experimental conditions, they proceeded with the 10,.min task. After they had worked at it for 3 min, the experimenter interrupted them to say that they would now have an opportunity to learn more about what they were doing. It was indicated that the task would be resumed, but in fact it was not. Selective exposure measure. Subjects first received a list of titles of articles, each supposedly one page long. Half of the titles appeared supportive oftbe choice to write random numbers, and the other half appeared nonsupportive. Typical titles among the supportive list were: “Why does writing random numbers raise creativity,” “Why the writing of random numbers is connected with a relatively high scientific value,” and “Why writing random numbers raises the development of patience and the achievement of general writing abilities.” Examples of the nonsupportive titles are: “Why the writing of random numbers kills creativity,” and ‘“Why writing random numbers does not have a high scientific value.‘” Subjects were asked to select articles to read under one of the four following conditions: (a) Subjects could choose three from an array of six. (b) Subjects were first asked to read short abstracts of the six available articles, then to choose three articles to read. (c) Subjects could choose three from an array of 10. In addition, they were asked to indicate which three articles they did not want to read. (d) Subjects could choose as many as they wanted from an array of 10. Other measures.” Following the selective exposure measure subjects responded to a ques-
* Even though subjects were unable to communicate, the preferred statistical analysis would have treated each group of two as a separate individual. However, as records were not kept of which subjects were run in groups, the analysis reported here treats each person as a separate unit. 2 The wordings of these five items are approximately as follows (translated from original): (a) Freedom. “After the practice writing was complete, the experimenter gave me complete freedom in continuing the task.” 0 = definitely disagree; 10 = definitely agree. (b) Desirability-of-reading: “How much would you like to read each of the available articles?” 0 = not at all; 10 = very much.
136
FREY AND WICKLUND TABLE RELATIVEPREFERENCE
1
FORSUPPORTIVEANDNONSUPPORTIVEINFORMATION
Choice Conditions of information selection Select three from array of six Select three from array of six and read abstracts Select three from array of 10 and indicate which three were not wanted Select as many as 10 from array of 10
ka
No Choice
n
SD
k
n
SD
.I7
17
1.20
-.08
13
1.32
1.00
8
1.85
-so
8
1.41
1.63 .7.5
16 8
1.20 1.70
16 7
1.50 1.10
u Number of supportive titles chosen minus number of nonsupportive
.63 .14
titles chosen.
tion asking them how much freedom they had been given concerning whether to carry out the task. This was answered on an II-point scale. Also included were two items that were parallel to the selective exposure measure. One of these asked the subject for a desirabilityof-reading judgment about each of the articles, and the other asked for a judgment about their agreement with the articles. Then came two task evaluation measures, where subjects were asked for estimates of the attractiveness of the task and for a judgment about how much they could learn from the task.
RESULTS
It should be noted first that the choice manipulation was highly effective: There was a much higher perception of freedom in the Choice than in the No Choice condition, F(1,85) = 32.95, p < .OOl. The crucial selectivity measure consists of the number of supportive titles chosen minus the number of nonsupportive chosen. The means for this measure are shown in Table 1. The effect of choice was clearly in the predicted direction and significant, F(1,85) = 11.33, p < .OOl. There was neither an effect for the four information selection conditions (p > .lO) nor an interaction (p > . 10). The analysis is similar ifjust the number of supportive articles chosen is taken as the measure (Table 2). There is an overall effect for the four levels of information selection, F(3,85) = 3.42, p < .02. This result, however, is relatively unimportant in light of the nonsignificant interaction (p > .lO). Finally, and more central to the hypothesis, the effect for (c) Perceived agreement with articles: “How much do you expect to agree or disagree with each of the articles?” 0 = disagree; 10 = agree. (d) Task attractiveness: “How do you evaluate the task?” 0 = very boring; 10 = very interesting. (e) How much can be learned: “How much can one learn through performing the task?“ 0 = not much; 10 = very much.
CLARIFICATION
OF SELECTIVE TABLE
MEAN
137
EXPOSURE
2
NUMBER OF SUPPORTIVE TITLES CHOSEN Choice
Conditions of information selection Select three from array of six Select three from array of six and read abstracts Select three Tom array of 10 and indicate which three were not wanted Select as many as 10 from array of 10
choice is in the predicted
direction
No Choice
k
It
SD
8
m
SD
1.88
17
.6O
1.46
13
.66
2.00
8
.93
1.25
8
.7?
2.31
16
16
8
.60 .89
1.31
2.25
2.57
.75 1.72
and significant,
7
F(1,85) = 5.
< .03.
Tn one condition (the third one listed in Tables 1 and 2), subjects were asked not only which three items they wanted, but also which three they definitely did not want. If there had been an active avoidance process underway, Choice subjects might have been expected to show a particularly strong aversion to nonsupportive information. An overall avoidance index was computed, consisting of the number of nonsu portive titles avoided minus the number of supportive titles avoided. With this measure, Choice subjects did show a stronger avoidance tendency (8 = 1.50) than No Choice subjects (z = .24), t(30) = 2.03, p < .OS). Thus, there is suggestive evidence here for an active avoidance process. The two questionnaire items that paralleled the selectivity measure were also supportive of the hypothesis. On the desirability-of-reading measure, ratings of the nonsupportive items were subtracted from ratings of supportive, and on this index Choice subjects were higher than Choice subjects, F(1,85) = 3.69, p < .06. A similar item on percei agreement with the articles produced similar? and slightly stronger, results, F(1,85) = 9.35, p < .Ol. Finally, the two evaluation measures supported the thesis that C subjects would evidence a relatively high evaluation of the task task attractiveness measure showed a significant choice effect, F(1,85) = 12.05, p < .OOl, and so did the item that asked subj how much they could learn from the task, F(1,85) = 4.17, p < .05. s, the paradig emonstrated phenomena comparable to those found in numerous earlier forced-compliance experiments. DISCUSSION
The results were consistent with the hypothesis and were not affected by the particular conditions under which information was made available.
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More particularly, the effects were not mediated by either prior familiarity with the types of arguments or the possibility of selecting a large number of articles. In short, our conclusion is a simple one: Selective exposure to supportive over nonsupportive information occurs to the degree that subjects are initially given choice to participate in an onerous task. Selective exposure is a much more complex measure than evaluative change, in the sense that it is subject to a diverse array of influences that have nothing to do with cognitive dissonance. These influences include curiosity, usefulness, attractiveness of decision alternatives, and others. The direction of their influence varies and the intrusion of these variables into the usual exposure paradigm may be largely responsible for the current state of inconsistent results. Choice manipulations allow the investigator to cut through the factors that are extraneous to dissonance, for even though such factors continue to operate, their effects should not vary as a function of choice. REFERENCES Canon, L. K. Self-confidence and selective exposure to information. In L. Festinger, Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. Pp. 83-95. Cohen, A. R., & Latanb, B. An experiment on choice in commitment to counterattitudinal behavior. In J. W. Brehm & A. R. Cohen, Explorations in cognitive dissonance. New York: Wiley, 1962. Pp. 88-91. Cohen, A. R., Terry, H. I., & Jones, C. B. Attitudinal effects of choice in exposure to counterpropaganda. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 388-391. Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. Freedman, J. L. Confidence, utility, and selective exposure: A partial replication. Journal of Personality
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Freedman, J. L., & Sears, D. 0. Selective exposure. Zn L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentalsocialpsychology. New York: Academic Press, 1965. Vol. 2, pp. 58-98. Frey, D., & Irle, M. Some conditions to produce a dissonance and an incentive effect in a “forced-compliance” situation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1972, 2, 45-54. Kleinhesselink, R. R., & Edwards, R. E. Seeking and avoiding belief-discrepant information as a function of its perceived refutability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 787-790. Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 245-254. Lowin, A. Approach and avoidance as alternate modes of selective exposure to information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, l-9. Lowin, A. Further evidence for an approach-avoidance interpretation of selective exposure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 265-271. Mills, J. Avoidance of dissonant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 589-593. (a)
CLARIFICATION
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EXPOSURE
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Mills, J. Effect of certainty about a decision upon postdecision exposure to consonant and dissonant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, %? 749-752. (b) Sears, D. 0. The paradox of de facto selective exposure without preferences for supportive information. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories ofcognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. Pp. 777-787. Wicklund, R. A., & Brehm, J. W. Perspectives on cognitive dissonance. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976.