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A comparison study of meat eaters and non-meat eaters on mind attribution and moral disengagement of animals
Appetite 136 (2019) 80–85
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A comparison study of meat eaters and non-meat eaters on mind attribution and moral disengagement of animals
T
Chin-Siang Anga,∗, Nee-Nee Chanb, Lavanya Singhc a
School of Psychology, TMC Academy, Singapore Faculty of Social Sciences, Quest International University Perak, Malaysia c School of Social Sciences, The University of Northampton, United Kingdom b
A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Animals that humans consume Mind attribution Moral disengagement Pet animals
This study aims to investigate how the distinction between animals that humans consume (AHCs) and pet animals influence meat eaters' and non-meat eaters’ perceived mind attribution on animals and moral disengagement. Following this, a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the type of animals being slaughtered and type of eaters was conducted. For meat-eaters, perceived mental capacity ratings for AHCs were lower than pet animals. For non-meat eaters, the difference between these animals was negligible. In addition, meat eaters had higher levels of moral disengagement in comparison to non-meat eaters. Further analysis showed that meat eaters who reported lower perceived mental capacities of AHCs appeared to feel such animals were more edible and were less likely to perceive killing them for food as morally wrong. Moral disengagement was also negatively associated with mental capacity of AHCs as food, suggesting that there was a higher moral disengagement among meat eaters who tend to view AHCs as lacking in mental capacities.
With the upsurge of vegetarian lifestyles, eating meat is increasingly seen as a personal choice rather than a mere necessity for survival. While meat is an incredibly versatile and flavourful source of food for many (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012), the paradox that exists is that most people are also fond of animals and do not wish to see harm befall them. Loughnan, Haslam, and Bastian (2010) described this phenomenon as the ‘meat paradox’ to explain the inconsistency that came from the concern for animals and the meat consumption behaviours among human beings. As such, meat eaters are in the uncomfortable position of justifying their consumption of certain meats and yet abstaining from other animal meats. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014) has identified four major types of meats that are consumed mostly around the world: bovine meat derived from cattle; ovine meat derived from sheep; pig meat derived from pigs; and poultry meat derived from chicken, ducks, geese and turkey (Nam, Jo, & Lee, 2010; York & Gossard, 2004). Other domestic animals that most people do not consume are usually those they associate with pets, trained animals in sports or shows such as dogs, horses or cats although this practice varies among different cultures (Poole, 2015; Ursin, 2016). Studies that were conducted to understand the psychology of eating animals examined the denial of minds to animals reared for human consumption (Bastian et al., 2012) and the moral disengagement
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strategies used by meat-eaters to justify their eating of animals (Bilewicz et al., 2011). Bilewicz et al. (2011) found that vegetarians ascribed more human emotions and characteristics to animals while omnivores attributed less emotions to edible pigs than non-edible dogs. Hence, omnivores sought a justification for their consumption of pigs through the dehumanization of the latter. Other studies further investigated an animal's perceived mind as a key factor in influencing people's willingness to eat it (Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan, Bastian, & Haslam, 2014). However, scant attention has been given to the unique characteristics of the eaters (people) and eaten (animals) probably because too few studies included pertinent data. Hence, this present study aims to measure and analyse the perceived mental capacities of the eaten for the purpose of exploring how eaters justify their consumption or non-consumption of meat. Animals that humans consume (AHCs) in this paper are defined as animals reared or hunted for food. Animals who provide companionship or special services are termed as pet animals. Individuals who consume meat and animal products alongside products of plant origin, are widely known as omnivores. Those who adhere to a diet of mainly plant origins together with some animal products like eggs and milk are usually characterised as vegetarians. Those who abstain from meat and animal products and consume a diet based solely on plants, are usually termed as vegans. Pescatarians are individuals who mainly consume meat from fish and other seafood
Corresponding author. School of Psychology, TMC Academy, 250 Middle Road, 188983, Singapore. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (C.-S. Ang).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2019.01.019 Received 25 April 2018; Received in revised form 16 January 2019; Accepted 21 January 2019 Available online 24 January 2019 0195-6663/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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attributes, diminishes their inherent value in human minds and excludes them from the circle of moral consideration (Loughnan et al., 2014). In contrast, non-meat eaters choose a plant-based diet founded on their perceptions of animal intelligence, appearance, capacity for suffering and pain, and similarity to humans (Loughnan et al., 2010; Ruby, 2008, 2012).
alongside consuming foods from plant. In this paper, omnivores and pescatarians are defined as meat eaters whereas, vegetarians and vegans are classified as non-meat eaters (Nam et al., 2010). 1. Animal welfare and sentience debate Advocates for animal rights such as Tom Regan (2004) proposed that animals which had ‘subjects of a life’, had features such as their own intelligence, sentience, and memories. Hence, such animals should be given rights at the same level as humans. Ryder (1989) argued that animals who had the capacity to feel pain and suffering, were thus entitled to rights and moral worth similar to humans. These advocates cited philosophical principles as the basis for vegetarianism and the abstinence from eating meat. Singer (1979) had a slightly differing view of animal rights: while he questioned human mistreatment of animals, his ethical philosophy was practical and followed utilitarian principles. Utilitarian principles have been used to argue for and against animal rights, as sentience alone is not enough for animals to earn moral status (Hsiao, 2015). The best resolution to a moral problem is the one with the greatest possible results for the majority concerned. Hence, there can be moral justification if there is relatively little harm to a few beings to minimise a greater harm to more beings. According to Singer (1979), some humans or animals could be experimented on (but not killed) to save the lives of many more humans or animals but it would be wrong to kill or cause severe pain to the many to save a little distress to the few. The perception of animals as lacking mental capacities is a significant approach in which people rationalise the practice of animals for instrumental purposes (Regan, 1997; Ryder, 1971; Singer, 1990).
3. Moral disengagement In addition to these beliefs and perceptions, the act of disengaging morally also enables meat-eaters to continue with their meat-eating behaviour. The term “moral disengagement” was first coined by Bandura (1999), and is conceptualized as a process of convincing the self that moral standards in a context do not apply to oneself. Killing animals for food remains morally wrong if someone accepts animals have rights, no matter how humanely an animal is treated in the domestication process (Forestell, Spaeth, & Kane, 2012). According to Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones's (2007) action based model of dissonance, cognitive dissonance refers to a situation involving contradictions between people's love for meat and caring for animals. Owing to the improvements in food processing and preservation technologies, most consumers no longer witness AHC's lives and deaths (Leroy & Praet, 2017). Being uninvolved in the domestication process, consumers seldom view the processing of meat products including beheading, removing internal organs, plucking, and cutting of animal bodies. Buying processed meat as we see them in the supermarket should therefore facilitate the process of dissociation, which make people less compassionate towards the slaughtered animals. This helps to resolve the self-contradiction between attitudes and behaviours associated with eating animals (Graça, Calheiros, & Oliveira, 2016). According to Kunst and Hohle (2016), forgetting or ignoring where the meat came from allowed people to mentally separate meat from animals, so they could overcome the moral dilemma of being responsible for the suffering and death of AHCs. The same study showed that many consumers reduced their sympathy when they saw headless AHCs. Other studies on meat consumption and meat avoidance also supported the existence of moral disengagement among meat consumers (Bastian et al., 2012; Bilewicz, Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011; Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Those studies found that the concern individuals had for animal welfare tended to disperse the instance the animal was portrayed as being utilized for human purposes. Similarly, Loughnan et al. (2010) revealed that individuals who consumed beef were likely to show less moral concern for cows. Conversely, those with ambivalent beliefs towards meat consumption were more likely to associate meat consumption with negative feelings and tended to think of meat-eating as being morally unacceptable (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004). Thus, considering the importance of the influence of mind attribution on meat eating consumption, the primary purpose of this study is to examine the nature of mind attribution between AHCs and pet animals and, to study if there is a difference between meat eaters and non-meat eaters on their responses to these animals. In addition, the second purpose is to investigate the association between mind attribution and moral disengagement between meat eaters and non-meat eaters. Thus, this study aims to test four hypotheses:
2. Attributing minds to animals People have enjoyed dining on an extensive variety of animals in different countries. It seems unlikely that all cultures would have same tastes in the selection of meat in any meal. Some might argue that our decisions often hinge on cultural choices and representations of meat products in different societies (Tian, Hilton, & Becker, 2016). While dogs and cats are deemed as pets in most parts of the world, dog flesh can be found in dining menus in China, South-Korea, and Vietnam (Bartlett & Clifton, 2003; Li, Sun, & Yu, 2017; Podberscek, 2009). Anderson (1997, pp. 80–91) found that foods in China fall mainly into two categories: heaty foods and cooling foods. A prevailing belief in China and the Chinese diaspora is that ‘heaty’ foods like dog and cat meat are beneficial for an individual during winter months as these meats have the ability to keep their bodies warm and strengthen their body immune systems. Again, while many of us may be distraught at the thought of eating monkey brains and rat meat, this is certainly not a widespread reaction and is profoundly reliant on different cultural practices and beliefs (Bastian et al., 2012; Buncombe, 2009). Despite cultural diversity, mind attribution was considered as one of the main determinants to influence people's culinary practices of eating meat (Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2015). Mind attribution of animals referred to the tendency of humans to form beliefs about animal minds (Young & Waytz, 2013). Although there were disputes as to which non-human animals had more sophisticated minds, prior studies consistently found that higher ratings were given to dogs and cats compared to sheep, cows, fish, pigs, turkeys, horses, and chicken (Bastian et al., 2012; Davis & Cheeke, 1998; Poole, 2015). In recent decades, research studies found that the attribution of mental abilities to certain species was inversely related to their edibility rating (Bastian et al., 2011). When people eat meat, they tend to view AHCs as nothing more than automata, incapable of feelings or suffering (Loughnan et al., 2010). Ruby and Heine’s (2011) study supported the presence of perceived human-like attributes: emotions and minds among animals that made the thought of eating them more disgusting. Perceiving animals as different from humans or even other “more intelligent” animals and, as lacking in mental
H1. Meat eaters' and non-meat eaters' ratings of perceived mental capacities for AHCs and pet animals would differ. H2. Meat eaters and non-meat eaters would have different scores on moral disengagement. H3. Among meat-eaters, perceptions of AHCs' minds would be negatively related to their edibility and positively related to moral concerns. H4. Among meat eaters, perceptions of AHC's minds are negatively associated with moral disengagement. 81
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4. Methods
abilities of animals– once for AHCs and once for pet animals. They were also asked to indicate their propensity to morally disengage using the Moral Disengagement in Meat Questionnaire (MDMQ; Graça et al., 2016). The 13-item MAQ (Bastian et al., 2012) was used to measure the perceived mental capacities of animals (10 items), their edibility (2 items), and moral concern (if it is morally wrong to consume animals, 1 item). All items were rated on a 7-point scale, with different options from 1 ‘definitely does not possess/very unlikely/not wrong at all’ to 7 ‘definitely does possess/very likely/very wrong’. Bastian et al. (2012) reported Cronbach's alphas ranging from 0.82 to .86 for different animals. The current study found that the 10-items for the perceived mental capacities had a good internal consistency for the pets (α = 0.83) and for the AHCs (α = 0.92). Due to different response options, the scale consisted of three different scores. The 20-item MDMQ was used to measure moral disengagement in meat consumption (Graça et al., 2016). Participants were asked to rate how much they agree or disagree with each statement on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 ‘Strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘Strongly agree’. An average score of the scale was obtained after reverse coding of some negatively worded items. In the instrument development study, the authors reported good internal consistency alpha (α = 0.89) (Graça et al., 2016). The current study found good internal consistency for the global scale of the MDMQ (α = 0.95).
4.1. Participants Initial attempts were made to potential participants using passive strategies such as distributing research invitations via our social networks. As responses were limited, a more proactive approach was used by going to high access areas frequented by potential participants. We targeted high foot-traffic areas such as train stations, and headed to a nearby building, Fortune Centre, an area with a dense of vegan and vegetarian population. The rationale and key information about the study was explained. Interested volunteers were asked to approach the research team directly or allowed us to initiate contact and provide additional information about the study. A 10-min telephone phone call was subsequently conducted, during which participants were subjectively judged as to whether they met the inclusion criteria. Potential participants were included in the participant group if they were above 18 years, fluent in English (English Language is a second language of Singaporeans and used as a lingua franca among the different ethnic groups), and agreed to participate in research activities. Their dietary habits were also checked during that time using standardized questions: Do you eat meat? Do you eat fish? Do you eat any eggs? Do you eat any dairy products? Do you eat pet? (Davey et al., 2002). On the basis of these questions, we were able to cover each of two dietary habit quotas that we defined-one with meat-eaters, and the other with non-meat eaters. Selected participants were then asked to watch videos and fill out questionnaires at a psychology laboratory in a university college in Singapore. This was to ensure that data collection occurred in an optimal and ‘controlled’ environment. An expense allowance (S$15) was given to participants who took part in the research project. By the cut-off date for data collection, 467 phone calls were made. Of these 467 calls, 423 met the selection criteria; 308 were self-reported as meat eaters and 115 were non-meat eaters. Based on power analysis, the minimum sample size for this study was 86 or 43 in each dietary group using an expected medium effect size of 0.25 and p < .05 (Cohen, 1992). However, we selected 80 participants in each group to accommodate the dropout rate. To minimise selection bias, all potential participants were assigned numbers from 1 to N (the total number of subjects) and then a computer's random number generator was used to select the participants. Only 130 participants who turned up on the experimental day were recruited. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 years, with a mean age of 32.68 years (SD = 11.57). The sample consisted of 44 males and 86 females. Of the total sample, 45.4% of the participants were pure vegans (86.4% female), 7.7% were reported to be vegetarian (30% female), 45.4% were reported to eat an omnivorous diet (52.5% female), and 1.5% were pescatarians (50% female). None of the participants ate pet animals. For subsequent analysis, participants were categorized into meat eaters (N = 61) and non-meat eaters (N = 69).
4.3. Procedure This research conformed to the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society and was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Division of the University of Northampton (this university college has a franchise agreement with the University of Northampton). Upon obtaining their consent, each participant started the experimental activity with their assigned grouping. Immediately after viewing the videos, participants were asked to fill in the MAQ for AHCs and pet animals separately and the MDMQ. Upon completion, participants received a S$15 expense allowance and a debriefing form about the study. 4.4. Data analysis IBM SPSS software (version 20.0) for Windows was used to analyse the data. An independent sample t-test and Pearson correlations were performed. In addition, a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the type of animals being slaughtered was conducted on mind attribution. For all analyses, the significance level was set at 0.05. 5. Results 5.1. Assumptions testing
4.2. Design and materials
Normality checking was conducted for each variable. Analyses of kurtosis and skewness found that normality was met for all variables (range of skewness = −0.94 to −0.20; range of kurtosis = −1.09 to 0.19).
This study used a mixed quasi-experimental design. In particular, the within-subjects variable was the type of animal being slaughtered, which consists of two types: AHCs and pet animals; and the betweensubjects variable was dietary habit, which comprised two categories, meat eaters and non-meat eaters. There were two dependent variables included: mind attribution and moral disengagement. During experiments, participants were presented with two 10-min video clips in which either AHCs or pet animals were slaughtered for human consumption. These videos were shown to allow participants to see the production of meat from animals (Hopkins & Dacey, 2008; Tian et al., 2016). The order of the videos –slaughter of AHCs followed by pet animals-was randomised. Following this, the participants were asked to complete the Mind Attribution Questionnaire (MAQ; Bastian et al., 2012) twice to rate the extent to which they perceived cognitive
5.2. Type of animal being slaughtered and animal's perceived mental capacities differences between dietary habit groups To examine Hypothesis 1, a mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effect of the type of animals being slaughtered and dietary habits, as well as the interaction effect between the type of animal slaughtered and dietary habit on animal's perceived mental capacities. There was a significant main effect of type of animal being slaughtered, F (1, 128) = 25.69, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.27. This effect tells us that if we ignore the dietary habit of the participants, perceived mental capacities of pet animals were still rated significantly higher 82
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Fig. 1. Changes in perceived mental capacities for pet animals and AHCs among meat eaters and non-meat eaters.
than AHCs. There was also a significant main effect of dietary habit, F (1, 128) = 68.78, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.50. Non-meat eaters' ratings of animals' perceived mental capacities were generally higher than meat eaters. As predicted and as illustrated in Fig. 1, there was a significant interaction effect of type of animal being slaughtered and dietary habit on perceived mental capacity, F (1, 128) = 17.32, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.20. For meat-eaters, perceived mental capacity ratings for AHCs (M = 4.10, SD = 1.35) were lower than pet animals (M = 5.32, SD = 0.89). For non-meat eaters, the difference was negligible (Mmeat animals = 6.13, SD = 0.73; Mpet animals = 6.25; SD = 0.66). Thus, the first hypothesis is supported.
Table 1 Pearson correlation between perceived mind, edibility, and moral concern among meat eaters. Variables
Mental Capacity of AHCs r
Edibility Moral Concern Moral Disengagement
-.37 ** .36 ** -.68 ***
Note.— **p < .01; ***p < .001.
6. Discussion 5.3. Moral disengagement differences between dietary habit groups The purpose of this study is to explore how the distinction between depictions of the slaughtering of AHCs and pets influences the mind attribution and moral disengagement among meat eaters and non-meat eaters. Based on the proposed research hypotheses, there are four major findings of this study. Compared to non-meat eaters, meat eaters ascribed animals as possessing lower mental capacities. Specifically, meat-eaters gave lower mental capacity ratings to AHCs than to pet animals. Non-meat eaters perceived no difference between AHCs and pet animals. This is aligned with Kunst and Hohle’s (2016) study which found that when animals are presented as food for human consumption, meat eaters attributed lesser mental capacities to either pet animals or AHCs than non-meat eaters. The reduction in mental capacities attribution shows the lack of moral concern for an animal, which is labelled as food (Bratanova et al., 2011). Similar findings were also reported by Loughnan et al. (2014) and Ursin (2016), which suggest that lesser mind attribution of AHCs among meat eaters is important to facilitate meat eating behaviour. Nevertheless, meat eaters still tended to attribute higher mental capacities scores to pets like dogs and cats as compared to AHCs like chicken and cows (Bastian et al., 2012). The findings for non-meat eaters were aligned to some prior research studies (Bilewicz et al., 2011; Loughnan & Bastian, 2011; Loughnan, Bratanova, & Puvia, 2012; Tian et al., 2016) which supported the fact that there was no significant difference in attribution of mental states to AHCs and pet animals among non-meat eaters. Previous studies found that meat eaters and non-meat eaters believed AHCs felt primary emotions (pain and pleasure), but non-meat eaters ascribed more secondary emotions (grief and guilt) to AHCs than meat eaters did (Bastian et al., 2012; Bilewicz et al., 2011; Graça et al.,
To examine Hypothesis 2, an independent samples t-tests was conducted to compare moral disengagement between meat eaters and nonmeat eaters. There was a significant difference in moral disengagement between meat eaters and non-meat eaters; t (128) = −14.57, p < .001, supporting the second hypothesis. The results suggested that meat eaters (M = 2.93, SD = 0.77) had higher levels of moral disengagement in comparison to non-meat eaters (M = 1.33, SD = 0.40). Thus, the second hypothesis is supported.
5.4. Correlations between mind attribution subscales and moral disengagement among meat eaters on AHCs To examine Hypotheses 3 and 4, Pearson correlations were conducted to assess the relationship between perceived mental capacities of AHCs and their edibility, moral concern for consumption of meat, and moral disengagement among meat eaters. Both hypotheses are supported. The extent to which an AHC was thought to possess mental capacity was negatively correlated with edibility and positively correlated with moral concern. These findings (see Table 1) show that meat eaters who perceived lower mental capacities of AHCs appeared to feel such animals were more edible and were less likely to perceive killing them for food as morally wrong. In addition, moral disengagement was negatively associated with perceived mental capacity of AHCs as food, suggesting that there was a higher moral disengagement among meat eaters who tend to view animals as lacking in mental capacities.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
2016; Loughnan et al., 2010). These studies reported higher moral disengagement among meat eaters than non-meat eaters. This study further extends the knowledge with the finding that moral disengagement was negatively associated with perceived mental capacity of AHCs as food. This suggests that meat eaters most likely convince themselves that moral standards do not apply to them in meat eating, so as to diminish unpleasant affective emotions associated with consumption. This strategy would thus, make them appear less immoral. With regard to the predictions made about the perceived mental capacities of ACHs and moral reasoning among meat-eaters, both Hypotheses 3 and 4 are supported. Firstly, meat eaters who ascribed higher mental capacities to ACHs tended to perceive the animals as less edible, and they also had strong feelings that it was morally wrong to consume them. These findings support the results in some prior studies (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011) in which labelling animals as food among meat eaters reduced the perceived capacity of AHCs to experience pain and suffering, thus also diminishing meat eaters’ moral concerns. Secondly, meat eaters with higher scores on moral disengagement also have higher tendencies to deny mental capacities to AHCs. Despite meat playing a key role in the diet of the majority of people due to culinary gratifications, most people care about animals and do not want to see them harmed (Piazza et al., 2015; Ruby, 2008). Mentally separating meat from its animal origins reduces cognitive dissonance and guilt from the meat paradox, which also obscures personal accountability and disregards the injurious effect inflicted on ACHs, thus enabling meat eaters to continue with their meat consumption (Bastian et al., 2012). To our knowledge, the findings of this study are the first to compare mind attribution of pet animals and ACHs among meat eaters and nonmeat eaters, as well as its linkage with moral disengagement. However, it should be noted that the current study investigated mind attribution and moral disengagement without going into specificities. In terms of the generalizability of our results, a sample of 130 participants is too small to generalize results. We think that at best, it supports some results and further extend some findings. Since Singapore is an Asian culture, it shows that despite our Eastern education, societal norms, Singaporeans in this study appear to utilize the same moral disengagement strategies as their Western counterparts. Another interesting finding is none among 130 participants reported that they eat pet animals. It could be explained that such cultural norm or practice is slowly diminishing in a more modern society that frowns on such ancient/ traditional practice in modern Singapore. The current study has a few shortcomings. First, the study did not include religion as one of the variables. In some religions like Hinduism and Buddhism, it is against their practices to consume beef (Nasir & Pereira, 2008; Vranken, Avermaete, Petalios, & Mathijs, 2014). Thus, research studies focusing on various cultural groups in a different cultural context should be considered. Second, the study did not examine in depth on the differences in each of the 10 perceived mental capacities from the MAQ and each of the 5 different subscales from the MDMQ. Investigating which mental capacities are rated higher or lower than others could uncover channels for future studies. Lastly, future research with larger samples may also consider gender differences in appetitive motivation for meat and non-meat foods. According to data presented in the current study, the gender divide is severe when it comes to vegans, suggesting that gender differences are likely an important consideration for future work. To conclude, the findings from this study can be used to develop research in areas that focus on the different cognitive mechanisms that may be used by meat eaters to disengage. These disengagement techniques could provide a better understanding of how open meat eaters are to alternatives and if they could be persuaded in the direction of consuming less meat and choosing alternatives to combat environmental, health and moral issues related to the consumption of meat. Future research should focus on how moral disengagement mechanisms are used in the denial of mind to animals meant for consumption.
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A comparison study of meat eaters and non-meat eaters on mind attribution and moral disengagement of animals
T
Chin-Siang Anga,∗, Nee-Nee Chanb, Lavanya Singhc a
School of Psychology, TMC Academy, Singapore Faculty of Social Sciences, Quest International University Perak, Malaysia c School of Social Sciences, The University of Northampton, United Kingdom b
A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Animals that humans consume Mind attribution Moral disengagement Pet animals
This study aims to investigate how the distinction between animals that humans consume (AHCs) and pet animals influence meat eaters' and non-meat eaters’ perceived mind attribution on animals and moral disengagement. Following this, a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the type of animals being slaughtered and type of eaters was conducted. For meat-eaters, perceived mental capacity ratings for AHCs were lower than pet animals. For non-meat eaters, the difference between these animals was negligible. In addition, meat eaters had higher levels of moral disengagement in comparison to non-meat eaters. Further analysis showed that meat eaters who reported lower perceived mental capacities of AHCs appeared to feel such animals were more edible and were less likely to perceive killing them for food as morally wrong. Moral disengagement was also negatively associated with mental capacity of AHCs as food, suggesting that there was a higher moral disengagement among meat eaters who tend to view AHCs as lacking in mental capacities.
With the upsurge of vegetarian lifestyles, eating meat is increasingly seen as a personal choice rather than a mere necessity for survival. While meat is an incredibly versatile and flavourful source of food for many (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012), the paradox that exists is that most people are also fond of animals and do not wish to see harm befall them. Loughnan, Haslam, and Bastian (2010) described this phenomenon as the ‘meat paradox’ to explain the inconsistency that came from the concern for animals and the meat consumption behaviours among human beings. As such, meat eaters are in the uncomfortable position of justifying their consumption of certain meats and yet abstaining from other animal meats. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014) has identified four major types of meats that are consumed mostly around the world: bovine meat derived from cattle; ovine meat derived from sheep; pig meat derived from pigs; and poultry meat derived from chicken, ducks, geese and turkey (Nam, Jo, & Lee, 2010; York & Gossard, 2004). Other domestic animals that most people do not consume are usually those they associate with pets, trained animals in sports or shows such as dogs, horses or cats although this practice varies among different cultures (Poole, 2015; Ursin, 2016). Studies that were conducted to understand the psychology of eating animals examined the denial of minds to animals reared for human consumption (Bastian et al., 2012) and the moral disengagement
∗
strategies used by meat-eaters to justify their eating of animals (Bilewicz et al., 2011). Bilewicz et al. (2011) found that vegetarians ascribed more human emotions and characteristics to animals while omnivores attributed less emotions to edible pigs than non-edible dogs. Hence, omnivores sought a justification for their consumption of pigs through the dehumanization of the latter. Other studies further investigated an animal's perceived mind as a key factor in influencing people's willingness to eat it (Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan, Bastian, & Haslam, 2014). However, scant attention has been given to the unique characteristics of the eaters (people) and eaten (animals) probably because too few studies included pertinent data. Hence, this present study aims to measure and analyse the perceived mental capacities of the eaten for the purpose of exploring how eaters justify their consumption or non-consumption of meat. Animals that humans consume (AHCs) in this paper are defined as animals reared or hunted for food. Animals who provide companionship or special services are termed as pet animals. Individuals who consume meat and animal products alongside products of plant origin, are widely known as omnivores. Those who adhere to a diet of mainly plant origins together with some animal products like eggs and milk are usually characterised as vegetarians. Those who abstain from meat and animal products and consume a diet based solely on plants, are usually termed as vegans. Pescatarians are individuals who mainly consume meat from fish and other seafood
Corresponding author. School of Psychology, TMC Academy, 250 Middle Road, 188983, Singapore. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (C.-S. Ang).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2019.01.019 Received 25 April 2018; Received in revised form 16 January 2019; Accepted 21 January 2019 Available online 24 January 2019 0195-6663/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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attributes, diminishes their inherent value in human minds and excludes them from the circle of moral consideration (Loughnan et al., 2014). In contrast, non-meat eaters choose a plant-based diet founded on their perceptions of animal intelligence, appearance, capacity for suffering and pain, and similarity to humans (Loughnan et al., 2010; Ruby, 2008, 2012).
alongside consuming foods from plant. In this paper, omnivores and pescatarians are defined as meat eaters whereas, vegetarians and vegans are classified as non-meat eaters (Nam et al., 2010). 1. Animal welfare and sentience debate Advocates for animal rights such as Tom Regan (2004) proposed that animals which had ‘subjects of a life’, had features such as their own intelligence, sentience, and memories. Hence, such animals should be given rights at the same level as humans. Ryder (1989) argued that animals who had the capacity to feel pain and suffering, were thus entitled to rights and moral worth similar to humans. These advocates cited philosophical principles as the basis for vegetarianism and the abstinence from eating meat. Singer (1979) had a slightly differing view of animal rights: while he questioned human mistreatment of animals, his ethical philosophy was practical and followed utilitarian principles. Utilitarian principles have been used to argue for and against animal rights, as sentience alone is not enough for animals to earn moral status (Hsiao, 2015). The best resolution to a moral problem is the one with the greatest possible results for the majority concerned. Hence, there can be moral justification if there is relatively little harm to a few beings to minimise a greater harm to more beings. According to Singer (1979), some humans or animals could be experimented on (but not killed) to save the lives of many more humans or animals but it would be wrong to kill or cause severe pain to the many to save a little distress to the few. The perception of animals as lacking mental capacities is a significant approach in which people rationalise the practice of animals for instrumental purposes (Regan, 1997; Ryder, 1971; Singer, 1990).
3. Moral disengagement In addition to these beliefs and perceptions, the act of disengaging morally also enables meat-eaters to continue with their meat-eating behaviour. The term “moral disengagement” was first coined by Bandura (1999), and is conceptualized as a process of convincing the self that moral standards in a context do not apply to oneself. Killing animals for food remains morally wrong if someone accepts animals have rights, no matter how humanely an animal is treated in the domestication process (Forestell, Spaeth, & Kane, 2012). According to Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones's (2007) action based model of dissonance, cognitive dissonance refers to a situation involving contradictions between people's love for meat and caring for animals. Owing to the improvements in food processing and preservation technologies, most consumers no longer witness AHC's lives and deaths (Leroy & Praet, 2017). Being uninvolved in the domestication process, consumers seldom view the processing of meat products including beheading, removing internal organs, plucking, and cutting of animal bodies. Buying processed meat as we see them in the supermarket should therefore facilitate the process of dissociation, which make people less compassionate towards the slaughtered animals. This helps to resolve the self-contradiction between attitudes and behaviours associated with eating animals (Graça, Calheiros, & Oliveira, 2016). According to Kunst and Hohle (2016), forgetting or ignoring where the meat came from allowed people to mentally separate meat from animals, so they could overcome the moral dilemma of being responsible for the suffering and death of AHCs. The same study showed that many consumers reduced their sympathy when they saw headless AHCs. Other studies on meat consumption and meat avoidance also supported the existence of moral disengagement among meat consumers (Bastian et al., 2012; Bilewicz, Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011; Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Those studies found that the concern individuals had for animal welfare tended to disperse the instance the animal was portrayed as being utilized for human purposes. Similarly, Loughnan et al. (2010) revealed that individuals who consumed beef were likely to show less moral concern for cows. Conversely, those with ambivalent beliefs towards meat consumption were more likely to associate meat consumption with negative feelings and tended to think of meat-eating as being morally unacceptable (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004). Thus, considering the importance of the influence of mind attribution on meat eating consumption, the primary purpose of this study is to examine the nature of mind attribution between AHCs and pet animals and, to study if there is a difference between meat eaters and non-meat eaters on their responses to these animals. In addition, the second purpose is to investigate the association between mind attribution and moral disengagement between meat eaters and non-meat eaters. Thus, this study aims to test four hypotheses:
2. Attributing minds to animals People have enjoyed dining on an extensive variety of animals in different countries. It seems unlikely that all cultures would have same tastes in the selection of meat in any meal. Some might argue that our decisions often hinge on cultural choices and representations of meat products in different societies (Tian, Hilton, & Becker, 2016). While dogs and cats are deemed as pets in most parts of the world, dog flesh can be found in dining menus in China, South-Korea, and Vietnam (Bartlett & Clifton, 2003; Li, Sun, & Yu, 2017; Podberscek, 2009). Anderson (1997, pp. 80–91) found that foods in China fall mainly into two categories: heaty foods and cooling foods. A prevailing belief in China and the Chinese diaspora is that ‘heaty’ foods like dog and cat meat are beneficial for an individual during winter months as these meats have the ability to keep their bodies warm and strengthen their body immune systems. Again, while many of us may be distraught at the thought of eating monkey brains and rat meat, this is certainly not a widespread reaction and is profoundly reliant on different cultural practices and beliefs (Bastian et al., 2012; Buncombe, 2009). Despite cultural diversity, mind attribution was considered as one of the main determinants to influence people's culinary practices of eating meat (Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2015). Mind attribution of animals referred to the tendency of humans to form beliefs about animal minds (Young & Waytz, 2013). Although there were disputes as to which non-human animals had more sophisticated minds, prior studies consistently found that higher ratings were given to dogs and cats compared to sheep, cows, fish, pigs, turkeys, horses, and chicken (Bastian et al., 2012; Davis & Cheeke, 1998; Poole, 2015). In recent decades, research studies found that the attribution of mental abilities to certain species was inversely related to their edibility rating (Bastian et al., 2011). When people eat meat, they tend to view AHCs as nothing more than automata, incapable of feelings or suffering (Loughnan et al., 2010). Ruby and Heine’s (2011) study supported the presence of perceived human-like attributes: emotions and minds among animals that made the thought of eating them more disgusting. Perceiving animals as different from humans or even other “more intelligent” animals and, as lacking in mental
H1. Meat eaters' and non-meat eaters' ratings of perceived mental capacities for AHCs and pet animals would differ. H2. Meat eaters and non-meat eaters would have different scores on moral disengagement. H3. Among meat-eaters, perceptions of AHCs' minds would be negatively related to their edibility and positively related to moral concerns. H4. Among meat eaters, perceptions of AHC's minds are negatively associated with moral disengagement. 81
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4. Methods
abilities of animals– once for AHCs and once for pet animals. They were also asked to indicate their propensity to morally disengage using the Moral Disengagement in Meat Questionnaire (MDMQ; Graça et al., 2016). The 13-item MAQ (Bastian et al., 2012) was used to measure the perceived mental capacities of animals (10 items), their edibility (2 items), and moral concern (if it is morally wrong to consume animals, 1 item). All items were rated on a 7-point scale, with different options from 1 ‘definitely does not possess/very unlikely/not wrong at all’ to 7 ‘definitely does possess/very likely/very wrong’. Bastian et al. (2012) reported Cronbach's alphas ranging from 0.82 to .86 for different animals. The current study found that the 10-items for the perceived mental capacities had a good internal consistency for the pets (α = 0.83) and for the AHCs (α = 0.92). Due to different response options, the scale consisted of three different scores. The 20-item MDMQ was used to measure moral disengagement in meat consumption (Graça et al., 2016). Participants were asked to rate how much they agree or disagree with each statement on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 ‘Strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘Strongly agree’. An average score of the scale was obtained after reverse coding of some negatively worded items. In the instrument development study, the authors reported good internal consistency alpha (α = 0.89) (Graça et al., 2016). The current study found good internal consistency for the global scale of the MDMQ (α = 0.95).
4.1. Participants Initial attempts were made to potential participants using passive strategies such as distributing research invitations via our social networks. As responses were limited, a more proactive approach was used by going to high access areas frequented by potential participants. We targeted high foot-traffic areas such as train stations, and headed to a nearby building, Fortune Centre, an area with a dense of vegan and vegetarian population. The rationale and key information about the study was explained. Interested volunteers were asked to approach the research team directly or allowed us to initiate contact and provide additional information about the study. A 10-min telephone phone call was subsequently conducted, during which participants were subjectively judged as to whether they met the inclusion criteria. Potential participants were included in the participant group if they were above 18 years, fluent in English (English Language is a second language of Singaporeans and used as a lingua franca among the different ethnic groups), and agreed to participate in research activities. Their dietary habits were also checked during that time using standardized questions: Do you eat meat? Do you eat fish? Do you eat any eggs? Do you eat any dairy products? Do you eat pet? (Davey et al., 2002). On the basis of these questions, we were able to cover each of two dietary habit quotas that we defined-one with meat-eaters, and the other with non-meat eaters. Selected participants were then asked to watch videos and fill out questionnaires at a psychology laboratory in a university college in Singapore. This was to ensure that data collection occurred in an optimal and ‘controlled’ environment. An expense allowance (S$15) was given to participants who took part in the research project. By the cut-off date for data collection, 467 phone calls were made. Of these 467 calls, 423 met the selection criteria; 308 were self-reported as meat eaters and 115 were non-meat eaters. Based on power analysis, the minimum sample size for this study was 86 or 43 in each dietary group using an expected medium effect size of 0.25 and p < .05 (Cohen, 1992). However, we selected 80 participants in each group to accommodate the dropout rate. To minimise selection bias, all potential participants were assigned numbers from 1 to N (the total number of subjects) and then a computer's random number generator was used to select the participants. Only 130 participants who turned up on the experimental day were recruited. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 years, with a mean age of 32.68 years (SD = 11.57). The sample consisted of 44 males and 86 females. Of the total sample, 45.4% of the participants were pure vegans (86.4% female), 7.7% were reported to be vegetarian (30% female), 45.4% were reported to eat an omnivorous diet (52.5% female), and 1.5% were pescatarians (50% female). None of the participants ate pet animals. For subsequent analysis, participants were categorized into meat eaters (N = 61) and non-meat eaters (N = 69).
4.3. Procedure This research conformed to the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society and was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Division of the University of Northampton (this university college has a franchise agreement with the University of Northampton). Upon obtaining their consent, each participant started the experimental activity with their assigned grouping. Immediately after viewing the videos, participants were asked to fill in the MAQ for AHCs and pet animals separately and the MDMQ. Upon completion, participants received a S$15 expense allowance and a debriefing form about the study. 4.4. Data analysis IBM SPSS software (version 20.0) for Windows was used to analyse the data. An independent sample t-test and Pearson correlations were performed. In addition, a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the type of animals being slaughtered was conducted on mind attribution. For all analyses, the significance level was set at 0.05. 5. Results 5.1. Assumptions testing
4.2. Design and materials
Normality checking was conducted for each variable. Analyses of kurtosis and skewness found that normality was met for all variables (range of skewness = −0.94 to −0.20; range of kurtosis = −1.09 to 0.19).
This study used a mixed quasi-experimental design. In particular, the within-subjects variable was the type of animal being slaughtered, which consists of two types: AHCs and pet animals; and the betweensubjects variable was dietary habit, which comprised two categories, meat eaters and non-meat eaters. There were two dependent variables included: mind attribution and moral disengagement. During experiments, participants were presented with two 10-min video clips in which either AHCs or pet animals were slaughtered for human consumption. These videos were shown to allow participants to see the production of meat from animals (Hopkins & Dacey, 2008; Tian et al., 2016). The order of the videos –slaughter of AHCs followed by pet animals-was randomised. Following this, the participants were asked to complete the Mind Attribution Questionnaire (MAQ; Bastian et al., 2012) twice to rate the extent to which they perceived cognitive
5.2. Type of animal being slaughtered and animal's perceived mental capacities differences between dietary habit groups To examine Hypothesis 1, a mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effect of the type of animals being slaughtered and dietary habits, as well as the interaction effect between the type of animal slaughtered and dietary habit on animal's perceived mental capacities. There was a significant main effect of type of animal being slaughtered, F (1, 128) = 25.69, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.27. This effect tells us that if we ignore the dietary habit of the participants, perceived mental capacities of pet animals were still rated significantly higher 82
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Fig. 1. Changes in perceived mental capacities for pet animals and AHCs among meat eaters and non-meat eaters.
than AHCs. There was also a significant main effect of dietary habit, F (1, 128) = 68.78, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.50. Non-meat eaters' ratings of animals' perceived mental capacities were generally higher than meat eaters. As predicted and as illustrated in Fig. 1, there was a significant interaction effect of type of animal being slaughtered and dietary habit on perceived mental capacity, F (1, 128) = 17.32, p < .001; ηρ2 = 0.20. For meat-eaters, perceived mental capacity ratings for AHCs (M = 4.10, SD = 1.35) were lower than pet animals (M = 5.32, SD = 0.89). For non-meat eaters, the difference was negligible (Mmeat animals = 6.13, SD = 0.73; Mpet animals = 6.25; SD = 0.66). Thus, the first hypothesis is supported.
Table 1 Pearson correlation between perceived mind, edibility, and moral concern among meat eaters. Variables
Mental Capacity of AHCs r
Edibility Moral Concern Moral Disengagement
-.37 ** .36 ** -.68 ***
Note.— **p < .01; ***p < .001.
6. Discussion 5.3. Moral disengagement differences between dietary habit groups The purpose of this study is to explore how the distinction between depictions of the slaughtering of AHCs and pets influences the mind attribution and moral disengagement among meat eaters and non-meat eaters. Based on the proposed research hypotheses, there are four major findings of this study. Compared to non-meat eaters, meat eaters ascribed animals as possessing lower mental capacities. Specifically, meat-eaters gave lower mental capacity ratings to AHCs than to pet animals. Non-meat eaters perceived no difference between AHCs and pet animals. This is aligned with Kunst and Hohle’s (2016) study which found that when animals are presented as food for human consumption, meat eaters attributed lesser mental capacities to either pet animals or AHCs than non-meat eaters. The reduction in mental capacities attribution shows the lack of moral concern for an animal, which is labelled as food (Bratanova et al., 2011). Similar findings were also reported by Loughnan et al. (2014) and Ursin (2016), which suggest that lesser mind attribution of AHCs among meat eaters is important to facilitate meat eating behaviour. Nevertheless, meat eaters still tended to attribute higher mental capacities scores to pets like dogs and cats as compared to AHCs like chicken and cows (Bastian et al., 2012). The findings for non-meat eaters were aligned to some prior research studies (Bilewicz et al., 2011; Loughnan & Bastian, 2011; Loughnan, Bratanova, & Puvia, 2012; Tian et al., 2016) which supported the fact that there was no significant difference in attribution of mental states to AHCs and pet animals among non-meat eaters. Previous studies found that meat eaters and non-meat eaters believed AHCs felt primary emotions (pain and pleasure), but non-meat eaters ascribed more secondary emotions (grief and guilt) to AHCs than meat eaters did (Bastian et al., 2012; Bilewicz et al., 2011; Graça et al.,
To examine Hypothesis 2, an independent samples t-tests was conducted to compare moral disengagement between meat eaters and nonmeat eaters. There was a significant difference in moral disengagement between meat eaters and non-meat eaters; t (128) = −14.57, p < .001, supporting the second hypothesis. The results suggested that meat eaters (M = 2.93, SD = 0.77) had higher levels of moral disengagement in comparison to non-meat eaters (M = 1.33, SD = 0.40). Thus, the second hypothesis is supported.
5.4. Correlations between mind attribution subscales and moral disengagement among meat eaters on AHCs To examine Hypotheses 3 and 4, Pearson correlations were conducted to assess the relationship between perceived mental capacities of AHCs and their edibility, moral concern for consumption of meat, and moral disengagement among meat eaters. Both hypotheses are supported. The extent to which an AHC was thought to possess mental capacity was negatively correlated with edibility and positively correlated with moral concern. These findings (see Table 1) show that meat eaters who perceived lower mental capacities of AHCs appeared to feel such animals were more edible and were less likely to perceive killing them for food as morally wrong. In addition, moral disengagement was negatively associated with perceived mental capacity of AHCs as food, suggesting that there was a higher moral disengagement among meat eaters who tend to view animals as lacking in mental capacities.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
2016; Loughnan et al., 2010). These studies reported higher moral disengagement among meat eaters than non-meat eaters. This study further extends the knowledge with the finding that moral disengagement was negatively associated with perceived mental capacity of AHCs as food. This suggests that meat eaters most likely convince themselves that moral standards do not apply to them in meat eating, so as to diminish unpleasant affective emotions associated with consumption. This strategy would thus, make them appear less immoral. With regard to the predictions made about the perceived mental capacities of ACHs and moral reasoning among meat-eaters, both Hypotheses 3 and 4 are supported. Firstly, meat eaters who ascribed higher mental capacities to ACHs tended to perceive the animals as less edible, and they also had strong feelings that it was morally wrong to consume them. These findings support the results in some prior studies (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011) in which labelling animals as food among meat eaters reduced the perceived capacity of AHCs to experience pain and suffering, thus also diminishing meat eaters’ moral concerns. Secondly, meat eaters with higher scores on moral disengagement also have higher tendencies to deny mental capacities to AHCs. Despite meat playing a key role in the diet of the majority of people due to culinary gratifications, most people care about animals and do not want to see them harmed (Piazza et al., 2015; Ruby, 2008). Mentally separating meat from its animal origins reduces cognitive dissonance and guilt from the meat paradox, which also obscures personal accountability and disregards the injurious effect inflicted on ACHs, thus enabling meat eaters to continue with their meat consumption (Bastian et al., 2012). To our knowledge, the findings of this study are the first to compare mind attribution of pet animals and ACHs among meat eaters and nonmeat eaters, as well as its linkage with moral disengagement. However, it should be noted that the current study investigated mind attribution and moral disengagement without going into specificities. In terms of the generalizability of our results, a sample of 130 participants is too small to generalize results. We think that at best, it supports some results and further extend some findings. Since Singapore is an Asian culture, it shows that despite our Eastern education, societal norms, Singaporeans in this study appear to utilize the same moral disengagement strategies as their Western counterparts. Another interesting finding is none among 130 participants reported that they eat pet animals. It could be explained that such cultural norm or practice is slowly diminishing in a more modern society that frowns on such ancient/ traditional practice in modern Singapore. The current study has a few shortcomings. First, the study did not include religion as one of the variables. In some religions like Hinduism and Buddhism, it is against their practices to consume beef (Nasir & Pereira, 2008; Vranken, Avermaete, Petalios, & Mathijs, 2014). Thus, research studies focusing on various cultural groups in a different cultural context should be considered. Second, the study did not examine in depth on the differences in each of the 10 perceived mental capacities from the MAQ and each of the 5 different subscales from the MDMQ. Investigating which mental capacities are rated higher or lower than others could uncover channels for future studies. Lastly, future research with larger samples may also consider gender differences in appetitive motivation for meat and non-meat foods. According to data presented in the current study, the gender divide is severe when it comes to vegans, suggesting that gender differences are likely an important consideration for future work. To conclude, the findings from this study can be used to develop research in areas that focus on the different cognitive mechanisms that may be used by meat eaters to disengage. These disengagement techniques could provide a better understanding of how open meat eaters are to alternatives and if they could be persuaded in the direction of consuming less meat and choosing alternatives to combat environmental, health and moral issues related to the consumption of meat. Future research should focus on how moral disengagement mechanisms are used in the denial of mind to animals meant for consumption.
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