An end to abortion? A feminist critique of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion

Women's Studies International Forum 31 (2008) 263–269

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Women's Studies International Forum j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / w s i f

An end to abortion? A feminist critique of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion Sarah Langford The Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

s y n o p s i s This article is concerned with the challenges ectogenesis, or the potential artificial womb, pose for feminists concerning the abortion debate. Some sources have welcomed ectogenesis, claiming it could spell the end of the abortion debate. Ectogenesis, however, has not received much attention from feminists. Should feminists welcome the creation of the artificial womb as providing a solution to Australia's alleged ‘abortion epidemic’? This article outlines the latest developments made in ectogenetic technology. It is argued that the philosophic position that ectogenesis provides a viable alternative to pregnancy termination is flawed, and premised upon a misconception about the concept and purpose of abortion. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In this article I argue from a feminist critique that the advent of ectogenesis, or the potential artificial womb, will not provide a ‘solution’ to or ‘end’ the need for abortion. Some theorists argue that, if ectogenesis could be used as an alternative to surgical or chemical abortion, both pro-choice and anti-abortion campaigners should accept it as a sensible end to the abortion debate. The idea is that, rather than performing an abortion, the foetus could be removed from a woman's uterus and placed in an artificial womb to be gestated to full development, then taken out of the artificial womb and put up for adoption. In this way, promoters of ectogenesis suggest, the woman is no longer pregnant, the foetus is granted the right to life, and a childless couple will be able to adopt the infant. However, I contend that, as streamlined as this imagined scenario may sound, ectogenesis cannot provide a solution to abortion without posing a threat to women's right to elect which abortion method they would prefer to undergo. Furthermore, I argue that the suggestion that ectogenesis might provide an end to abortion debates suffers from a lack of understanding of the very concept of abortion and, importantly, of the reasons why women have chosen to undergo abortion procedures. I put forward my argument that an ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion is non-feminist because it prioritises the life of the foetus at the expense of women's right to refuse to become a mother. 0277-5395/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2008.05.005

Abortion: A continuing debate Throughout this article I have used the terms ‘pro-choice’ and ‘anti-abortion’ to identify the two major positions within abortion debates. An in-depth analysis of these complexities falls beyond the scope of this article, although I recognise that the use of language within debates about abortion is a contentious issue. Here, I use ‘pro-choice’ to denote the view that women should have legal access to abortion services, and ‘anti-abortion’ for the opposing position. I have opted not to use the term ‘pro-life’ to describe the latter position because it implies that pro-choice advocates are not in favour of life. The term ‘pro-choice’ is also problematic, particularly for radical feminists who argue that a woman does not have an option for free choice to undergo an abortion within male-dominated society (Daly, 1973; MacKinnon, 1987; Rich, 1986). Furthermore, feminist advocates of ‘pro-choice’ are not ‘proabortion’ (Eaton, 2006). I use the term ‘pro-choice’ with the understanding that a woman who elects to undergo an abortion has made a difficult choice, based on limited options and her position as a woman within male-dominated society. A radical feminist analysis of abortion is explored later in this article. Abortion remains a pertinent issue within contemporary Western society. In Australia, debates about the ban on the so-

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called ‘abortion pill’, known as RU486 or mifepristone, received significant media attention in 2006. The focus of public attention fell on the fact that the federal health minister, known to be an anti-abortion advocate, had the power to determine whether the drug should be introduced into Australia, rather than leaving this decision to the governmental body that is charged with regulating all other drugs, the Therapeutic Goods Administration. However, what began as a straightforward question about the boundaries of the federal health minister’s duties evolved into a passionate debate about the morality of abortion. Fundamental questions about the safety and efficacy of the drug were largely forgotten as the nation engaged in the divisive and well-trodden ground of anti-abortion versus pro-choice discussions. Despite many pro-choice advocates pushing to lift the ban on RU486 in Australia, RU486 is not a safe method of abortion (Klein, Raymond & Dumble, 1991; Klein, 2006; Lennon, 2006; McLinden, McCaffery & Lamot, 2006). This recent abortion debate in Australia demonstrated that abortion remains a heated topic in Western society. Indeed, it has been argued in a local editorial (The Age, 2006) that the controversy over the drug RU486 has divided Australians like no other since The Pill. Abortion has always attracted intense debate and, at times, violence, especially in the US where, in 1998, abortionist Dr Barnett Slepian was murdered. Abortion clinics have been targets of violence including threats, bombs, and packages laced with anthrax (Bell, 2002; CNN, 1998; Feminist Majority Foundation, 1999). Australia has also experienced a murder in an abortion clinic (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). In considering these intense and emotional debates and the conflicts between pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates, resolution of this contentious issue seems highly unlikely. However, according to some philosophers and scientists, reproductive technology could potentially provide an alternative choice for women (Freitas, 1980; Haire, 1927, pp. 81, 91; Singer & Wells, 1984, pp. 134). Currently to terminate a pregnancy requires the termination of a foetus; however, potential technologies, such as ectogenesis, have been proposed as providing viable alternatives. Ectogenesis: From science fiction to scientific reality Geneticist J.B.S. Haldane (1924) coined the term ‘ectogenesis,’ which literally means ‘external creation’ and refers to the gestation of a foetus in an artificial womb outside a woman’s body. Precursors of ectogenesis already exist: embryos can be created ex utero by in vitro fertilisation technologies and premature babies are kept in humidicribs until they are able to survive in the outside world without technological support. Attempts to replicate the functions of the female reproductive system can be traced back to the 1950s (Taylor, Kolff, Sindelar, & Cahill, 1959). A number of medical scientists have attempted to create an artificial placenta and uterus (Bulletti, Jasonni, Lubicz, Flamigni, & Gurpide, 1986; Bulletti et al., 1988; Rowland, 1992, p. 40; Squires, 1994, pp. 96–99; Corea, 1985, p. 257; ‘Japanese scientist develops artificial womb’, 1997; Gosden, 1999, p. 181; ‘Development of an artificial placenta’, 2004). The most recent attempt at ectogenesis was conducted by Helen Hung–Chung Liu at Weill Medical College, Cornell

University USA. In an interview at the American Society of Reproductive Medicine annual meeting, Helen Liu claimed that she had created a biodegradable scaffold out of chondroitin and collagen moulded into the shape of a uterus; she lined this artificial womb with uterine endometrial cells (Slikke, 2001). It is worth noting that Lui did not state from whose uterus the endometrial cells were taken for these experiments. Liu placed human embryos in the artificial womb; they attached themselves to the wall as they would have in a woman’s womb. Liu terminated the embryos in keeping with US embryo experimentation laws (Slikke, 2001). These laws do not apply to non-human embryos, thus Liu has had greater success when testing her artificial womb using the embryos of mice. She has been reported as stating that mice foetuses have grown for up to 17 days of their 21-day gestation, equal to about 31 weeks human gestation (Adam, 2005). However, the foetuses were “severely deformed” and none survived (Adam, 2005). Liu’s research is significant because it suggests the possibility of complete ectogenesis and reveals that this is an area of research that continues to be of interest to reproductive scientists. However, Liu has not published her research in scientific journals. Although she stated (personal communication, June 28, 2006) that she has presented her research at the 2001 and 2003 American Society of Reproductive Medicine annual meetings and informed the media of her findings, they have not been evaluated by peer-review. Pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates “embracing in happy harmony”? The possibility of ectogenesis has been celebrated by some feminists, ethicists, journalists, and scientists for its revolutionary potential. Writer Edward Grossman (1971) argued that artificial wombs would finally end human pregnancy and childbirth, physiological experiences he dismissed as “disturbances.” Grossman claimed ectogenesis would be man’s greatest gift to woman, like the pain-killing drugs used to pacify birthing women (Grossman, 1971, p. 40). Joseph Fletcher, a medical ethicist, welcomed a “window into the womb” in order to “protect” the unborn child from a “dark and dangerous place, a hazardous environment,” (quoted by Bowring, 2003, p. 243). The hazardous environment is a woman’s body. Socialist feminist Shulamith Firestone (1979) envisaged a feminist revolution in which ectogenesis would free women from reproductive “tyranny”, severing oppressive physical ties between women and children, thus creating equality between the sexes. Bioethicists Peter Singer and Deane Wells (1984, p. 133) proposed that ectogenesis would not only end the supposed need for surrogate motherhood, but also create betteradjusted children who would be liberated from “the burden of possessive mothering” (Singer & Wells, 1984, pp. 137–138), and enable medical science to use embryos as a source of spare parts (Singer & Wells 1984, 138). Other supposed benefits of ectogenesis include the potential for foetal immunisation, surgery and other medical attention (Grossman, 1971, p. 48; Corea 1985, p. 253), the ability for doctors to exercise greater quality control over foetal development (Corea, 1985, p. 254); the elimination of paternity doubts (Grossman, 1971, pp. 254–255); and paving the way for male pregnancy

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(Gosden, 1999, pp. 173–176). Finally, commentators have suggested that ectogenesis could end women’s need for abortion (Haire, 1927, pp. 89, 91; Freitas, 1980; Singer & Wells, 1984, p. 134). Singer and Wells provocatively suggested that ectogenesis will cause anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates to “embrace in happy harmony” (Singer & Wells, 1984, p. 135; see also Wells, 1987, p. 378). Advocates of ectogenesis argue that, instead of terminating a foetus through abortion, a woman could abort her pregnancy without terminating the foetus which could be removed from her body and gestated to term. The argument that ectogenesis will end abortion dates back to the decade in which the term was coined. In 1927 Australian sexologist Norman Haire (1927, pp. 89, 911) wrote that ectogenesis would eliminate the need for infanticide and abortion. Fifty three years later Robert Freitas (1980) suggested that foetal adoption could entirely replace abortion, arguing that ectogenetic technology could enable foetuses to be “nurtured in warm, organic artificial wombs.” Freitas predicted that, as a consequence, abortion clinics could be superseded by “foetal adoption centres” that would become “guardians of life” as opposed to “death factories”. Similarly, Singer and Wells argued that feminists should be satisfied with the “ectogenetic solution” to abortion: If the feminist argument for abortion takes its stand on the right of women to control their own bodies, feminists at least should not object. Freedom to choose what is to happen to one’s body is one thing; freedom to insist on the death of a being that is capable of living outside one’s body is another. (Singer & Wells, 1984, p. 135) Most problematic for a radical feminist approach is that Singer and Wells’ definition of abortion specifically refers to a woman’s desire not to be pregnant. They argue that feminists’ primary concern within the abortion debate is ensuring that women have the legally sanctioned right to refuse to continue their pregnancies. Herein lies the fundamental issue of whether the foetus is a separate entity from the pregnant woman and, as such, entitled to individual rights, despite being unable to survive independently outside a womb. Singer and Wells appear to subordinate the rights and welfare of the pregnant woman to the foetus, arguing: We do not allow a mother to kill her newborn baby because she does not wish either to keep it or to hand it over for adoption … it is difficult to see why we should give this right to a woman in respect of a foetus she is carrying, if her desire to be rid of the foetus can be fully satisfied without threatening the life of the foetus. (Singer & Wells, 1984, pp. 135–6) Thus Singer and Wells compare the life of a foetus to the life of an infant, implying that infants and foetuses attract equal status and individual rights independent from the pregnant woman or the mother. This arouses the feminist concern that the pregnant woman will not be able to refuse to become the biological mother of a child, leading to the second problem with Singer and Well’s interpretation of abortion. Singer and Wells fail to acknowledge feminists’ desire to grant women the right to control their lives, not just their

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bodies. Abortion, for feminists, cannot be reduced to a woman’s right to end her pregnancy. Terminating a pregnancy is but a means to an end. The end is preventing motherhood. Feminist philosopher Christine Overall (1993, p. 65) draws a distinction between two concepts of abortion. In the first, abortion involves the end of pregnancy via the removal of the foetus. In the second concept, abortion involves the end of pregnancy via the termination as well as removal of the foetus, thus preventing motherhood (Overall, 1993, p. 65). In their analysis of ectogenesis Singer and Wells accept only the first concept, that abortion is the removal of the foetus from a woman’s body. In their view the second concept of abortion is not justifiable if there is a way to end the pregnancy without ending the foetus’ life. They write: “Freedom to choose what is to happen to one’s body is one thing; freedom to insist on the death of a being that is capable of living outside one’s body is another” (Singer & Wells, 1984, p. 135). But women who make the challenging decision to have an abortion do not choose to undergo the procedure simply because they do not want to be pregnant, but also because they do not want to be mothers. Abortion cannot be reduced to a matter of removing foetal and child dependency upon a woman, otherwise adoption would have brought an end to abortion centuries ago. Granting a foetus independence from the woman carrying it cannot meet the needs of a woman seeking an abortion any more than the option of relinquishing her infant for adoption can. In the case of ectogenesis coupled with foetal adoption, as well as post-birth adoption, the end result remains the same: an individual who is the genetic offspring of that woman has been brought into the world. Feminist bioethicist Leslie Cannold’s research into women’s responses to ectogenesis support this assertion. Cannold (1995) conducted interviews with 45 Australian women about their opinions on abortion and ectogenesis. She asked these women what they would do if they discovered they were pregnant, did not wish to raise the child, and had access to ectogenesis. Women on both sides of the abortion debate rejected ectogenesis as a ‘solution’ based on similar concepts of maternal responsibility. The women in this study shared a strong sense of what being a responsible mother entailed. Abandonment was considered the worst offence a mother could commit. For women who were anti-abortion, a major objection to abortion was the idea that a “good mother” would not abandon her responsibility; as such, ectogenesis could not absolve a woman of her wrongdoing (Cannold, 1995, p. 62). In fact ectogenesis presented greater moral concern to this group than abortion, because women who chose ectogenesis over abortion not only abandoned their responsibility of raising the child but also of gestating the foetus (Cannold, 1995, p. 63). Pro-choice women shared a similar concept of ‘good’ motherhood. For these women ectogenesis could not relieve the sense of duty biological mothers would feel toward their offspring. Cannold (1998, p. 107) found that many pro-choice women rejected the ‘ectogenetic solution’ because they perceived it to be ‘early adoption’. For these women ectogenesis and adoption did not solve the pregnant woman’s problems because “by perpetuating the child’s life, its mother’s responsibility is also perpetuated” (Cannold, 1998, p. 107). Cannold quotes one woman who was pro-choice: “No matter

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what you thought, there’s life there, and you are responsible. You’ve put another person on the planet and you will always be responsible for them” (Cannold, 1998, p. 107). Abortion was therefore seen by these women as a form of motherhood prevention. Like adoption, ectogenesis could not prevent the creation of someone whom these women believed was their inescapable responsibility (Cannold, 1998, p. 59). The results of Cannold’s study suggest that an individual’s position on abortion is bound to their parenting preferences, including if, how, and when she would like to become a mother. For a number of women in Cannold’s study ectogenesis, like adoption, cannot meet their needs, because removing the foetus from her body, as opposed to preventing the foetus from becoming an infant, results in the birth of a child whom those women perceived to be their maternal responsibility. Furthermore, while appearing to advance Western society, the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion could be retrograde, taking women back to an era when forced adoption was thought to be a viable ‘solution’ to abortion. At that time women were forced to give birth to their offspring in convents and clinics, where the infants were taken straight from women’s bodies to adoption agencies. If the ectogenetic solution to abortion becomes socially accepted it is possible that it could become legally enforced. This could result in current methods of abortion being outlawed, leaving women who would have chosen to undergo an abortion with ectogenesis and post-birth adoption, or illegal ‘backyard’ abortions, as their only options. In addition to the fundamental issues of preventing motherhood there is also the matter of a woman’s right to refuse medical treatments and procedures. Currently suction aspiration is the most common method of abortion (James, 1987, p. 87; Better Health Channel, 2006). This involves the removal of the contents of the uterus via an aspirator. The foetus cannot remain intact using this method of extraction and therefore an alternative procedure would need to be employed for the purpose of transporting the foetus from a woman’s body to an ectogenetic chamber. Philosopher David N. James (1987, p. 87) suggests that the alternative method would resemble a procedure similar to a caesarean section. James argues that the latter procedure would be far more invasive and could pose more risks to women’s health than suction aspiration. Research already shows that caesarean sections expose women to risks (Kitzinger, 2005, pp. 85–88) including a 20% chance of infection (Wagner, 2000); accidental injuries caused to internal organs during surgery (Wagner, 2000); and decrease in bowel function for days after the procedure, which can lead to distension, bloating and discomfort (Childbirth.org., 1998). Blood clotting can occur (Murphy, 1996-2006), as can negative reactions to anaesthesia, future mispositioning of the placenta (Darby, 2005), increased chance of experiencing future infertility (Goer, 1995, p. 23), and the risk of requiring additional surgeries such as hysterectomy or bladder repair (Childbirth.org, 1998) as a result of this major abdominal surgery. Australian physician Sarah Buckley (2005, p. 221) states that up to 40% of women experience uterine, wound, or urinary tract infections postoperatively. According to James ectogenesis technology will not end abortion because women maintain the right to choose between different medical procedures and, given the greater

risks involved in foetal removal via caesarean as opposed to suction aspiration, they are unlikely to choose the ectogenetic solution (James, 1987, p. 87). A radical feminist response to the “ectogenetic solution” A number of (predominantly radical) feminists have criticised ectogenesis. Gena Corea (1985, pp. 250–259, 283–317) argued that the desire to create artificial wombs stemmed from a distrust of women’s bodies to adequately create life and a desire to possess women’s experiences of continuity in procreation. Elsewhere I have suggested that the male desire for ectogenesis comes from men’s longing to have greater control over women’s bodies and the reproductive process (Eaton, 2005). Robyn Rowland (1992, p. 288) has described artificial wombs as the “ultimate” and final phase of patriarchal control of reproduction. The desire for ectogenesis could also be read as an expression of womb envy in contemporary Western society (Kittay, 1984; Corea, 1984, pp. 283–302). I argue that a feminist analysis of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion demonstrates that there is minimal regard for women within this concept. Before addressing a radical feminist response to the ‘ectogenetic solution’, it is important to consider the radical feminist analysis of abortion. Mary Daly (1973) questioned the assumption that legalised abortion signified the “final triumph” for feminists. She asked, “Why should women be in situations of unwanted pregnancy at all?” (Daly, 1973, p. 112). For Daly abortion offers little to women, because it cannot create conditions where women are able to control their bodies and their lives; it is merely a band-aid ‘solution’ to the much bigger problem of male domination. Adrienne Rich (1986) supports this assertion. Rich argued that no woman would ‘choose’ abortion, if she lived in a society where she had control over how, when, and with whom she had sex, and access to 100% effective and non-harmful contraception (Rich, 1986, p. 268). For both Daly and Rich, abortion is a consequence of patriarchal society where women’s sexuality is determined and their bodies controlled by men. In a similar vein to Daly and Rich, Catherine MacKinnon (1987) observed that non-feminist advocates of abortion are actually concerned with enabling women to have sex with men “on the same terms as men: ‘without consequences’.” (MacKinnon, 1987, p. 98). According to MacKinnon, most participants in the abortion debate ignore the inequalities between men and women, and that abortion ultimately serves men’s interests: So long as women do not control access to our sexuality, abortion facilitates women’s heterosexual availability… The availability of abortion removes the one remaining legitimized reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the headache. As Andrea Dworkin put it, analyzing male ideology on abortion, “Getting laid was at stake.” (MacKinnon, 1987, p. 99) MacKinnon argued that women’s need for abortion stems from their oppressed position within patriarchy. This is a context where women are not only physically forced to submit to heterosexual intercourse through rape, but where they are also psychologically, often unconsciously, forced to

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submit to heterosexual intercourse through the institution of compulsory heterosexuality. For radical feminists such as Daly, Rich, and MacKinnon, abortion is made necessary by patriarchy, where women lack control over their lives as a result of male domination. Thus, for radical feminists, an end to the abortion debate can only be achieved as a result of a feminist revolution and the abolition of male dominance. As such, it is my argument that ectogenesis will not end women’s need for abortion. The suggestion that there could be an ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion ignores the realities of women’s position within patriarchy, and their motivations for undergoing abortion procedures, such as the desire to prevent motherhood. Therefore the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion is non-feminist and merely serves to perpetuate patriarchal society. Echoing Gena Corea’s concern that advocacy for ectogenesis illustrates distrust of women, philosopher Ann Donchin (1989, p. 44) asked: “on what ground can we assume that laboratory technicians are likely to do a more competent job of gestation than pregnant women?” This question not only highlights the patriarchal fear that women cannot be trusted to gestate their foetuses adequately, but also draws attention to the unavoidable dependence of the foetus. While proponents of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ see ectogenesis as granting the foetus independence from a woman’s body and thereby enabling it to live, they fail to question their trust in medical experts. Regardless of where or by whom the foetus is gestated, it remains dependent upon someone. From this perspective, theorists who celebrate ectogenesis would simply prefer that the foetus depend upon scientists and laboratory technicians rather than mothers. Thus advocates of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion are essentially creating independent options for something that cannot be independent. Furthermore, it is worth noting that an ectogenetic pregnancy can provide a foetus with only a clinical environment. Women’s bodies are not static foetal containers, they provide growing foetuses with comfort and sensory stimulation. The foetus can hear the mother’s heartbeat and learns to recognise her voice (Kisilevsky et al., 2003). A woman’s uterus also provides the foetus with changing rhythms as she moves. Hence, there are a number of experiences that the foetus may fail to benefit from if removed from the pregnant woman’s body. The argument that ectogenesis can ‘solve’ the abortion ‘problem’ promotes the patriarchal notion that pregnant women are foetal incubators rather than people, as it is assumed that the foetus can simply be transferred from one incubator (a woman) to another (a fake womb) (Rowland, 1992, pp. 118–155). This illustrates that reproductive technologies, such as ectogenesis, turn pregnancy into a process in which foetal survival is the sole concern of doctors and philosophers, rather than the experiences and health of women. By focusing on the fact that ectogenesis enables the foetus to survive outside of the woman’s body, advocates of ectogenesis overlook the woman’s desire to prevent the birth of a child that is biologically hers. Ensuring the survival of the foetus is the primary concern of theorists who advocate an ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion. In a similar vein to right-to-life arguments, the theory that ectogenesis can replace abortion pits the foetus against the woman whom the foetus is inside. The foetus is the focus of

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discussion, not the woman. This demonstrates that, as reproductive technology expands, the foetus is perceived increasingly as an individual. Simultaneously the pregnant woman becomes less visible. This has already been shown to be the case with ultrasounds. Barbara Katz Rothman (1988) noted that, once the ultrasound became routine, women began experiencing their pregnancies as tentative. (See also Petchesky, 1987, p. 72.) It was not until the radiologist performing the ultrasound confirmed that there was a living foetus that the women in Rothman’s study accepted that they were pregnant. Rothman argued that this shows that reproductive technologies such as ultrasound (and, arguably, ectogenesis) replace female ways of knowing, such as the physical sensations and feelings of pregnancy, with male ways of knowing, such as visually observing, and technologically monitoring (Rothman, 1984, p. 34; Petchesky, 1987, pp. 64–68). Similarly, political scientist Rosalind Petchesky (1987) noted that ultrasound technology aided the right-to-life agenda by personifying the foetus through visualisation. She stated that foetal “‘personhood’ (or ‘babyhood’) seem[s] verified by sonographic ‘evidence’ that it kicks, spits, excretes, [and] grows” (Petchesky, 1987, p. 76). Imagine the implications of this visualisation/personification link in the case of ectogenesis, when the foetus could be visible from conception onwards. Women may find themselves in a context where foetal personhood and foetal rights are so highly valued by society, that abortion may be harder to access. Moreover, if one considers the fact that women are often coerced, if not forced, to submit to having caesareans (Rowland, 1992, pp. 123–132; Kitzinger, 2005, pp. 85–88), it is not beyond the realm of possibility that one day women will have their foetuses taken from their bodies and put up for adoption against their will. While feminist discussions about abortion have, for the most part, been couched in terms of ‘choice’, Robyn Rowland states: what feminists really mean by “a woman’s right to choose” is a “woman’s right to control.”… Women need access to abortion in order to control their lives in a less than perfect world. We have to ask the same question with respect to reproductive technology: does it necessarily increase the control of women over their lives? (Rowland, 1992, p. 285) If ectogenesis is used as an alternative to abortion, women may lose the right to control their parenting preferences. Instead, they could be faced with the limited choice between: a) bringing their genetically related children into existence via gestation and birth, or a) bringing their genetically related children into existence via ectogenesis. As opposed to offering a choice, which should enable women to control their lives, this becomes an ultimatum. Whether women choose option a) or option b), they face the same outcome: the existence of a human being who is their genetic offspring. Thus, the ‘ectogenetic solution’ may provide women with a method of ending their pregnancies without ending the life of the foetus, but it fails to meet the needs of women who choose to have an abortion because they want to prevent the existence of their biological children and thus prevent motherhood. If the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion becomes a reality, will women be in a strong enough position to reject it? Rothman (1984, p. 27) quotes Ruth Hubbard saying “As

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‘choices’ become available, they all too rapidly become compulsions to ‘choose’ the socially endorsed alternative”. In contemporary Western society, multiple ultrasounds are performed throughout a woman’s pregnancy; ultrasound technology has been socially accepted as another aspect of maternal responsibility. Indeed, women who decide against having ultrasounds are perceived as deviant, particularly if they are deemed to be at ‘high risk’ of producing an ‘abnormal’ infant (Reist, 2006). In her analysis of the social pressure that pregnant women face to submit to ultrasounds and abort foetuses with ‘abnormalities’, Melinda Tankard Reist (2006, p. 7) asked: What does so-called ‘freedom of choice’ mean in a society where choices have become so prescribed, where there are fewer and fewer opportunities to opt out, where it is becoming harder to say ‘No’ to certain technologies and the expectations which automatically flow from their application? Reist found that there is an expectation within the medical profession that women who discover their foetuses are ‘abnormal’ will have an abortion. At diagnosis, pregnant women were often only supplied with information about abortion, rather than information about how to raise children with that condition, or being put in contact with support groups. Within this context it is not inconceivable that the same could happen for the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion, should this become socially and medically desirable. If artificially gestating the foetus becomes an option, women experiencing unwanted pregnancies may be expected to use this technology rather than have an abortion. Conclusion I have argued that the suggestion that ectogenesis could end abortion is fundamentally flawed and non-feminist. Proponents of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion focus on the foetus as a separate individual to the pregnant woman, despite the fact that the foetus cannot survive independently of her. This demonstrates that pregnant women are implicitly perceived as foetal incubators, who can be replaced by reproductive technologies such as the artificial womb, within the ‘ectogenetic solution’. Furthermore, the argument in favour of the ‘ectogenetic solution’ to abortion suggests that the foetus’ supposed right-to-life is more important than a woman’s desire to terminate her pregnancy, and prevent the birth of someone whom would be her biological child. The theory that ectogenesis will ‘solve’ the abortion problem fails to account for the very important understanding that abortion involves ending the foetus’s life as well as removing the foetus from the woman’s body, and preventing motherhood. Rather, the ‘ectogenetic solution’ is a reductionist representation of abortion as a woman’s right not to be pregnant. For feminists, abortion is not merely concerned with terminating foetal dependency upon a woman’s body, but with enabling a woman to determine if, how, and when, she becomes a mother. If ectogenesis provides a ‘solution’ to abortion, as Singer, Wells, Freitas, and Haire argue, abandonment and adoption should have already eradicated the need for abortion.

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Slikke, Hans Van Der, interviews Liu, Helen (2001). Engineering endometrial tissue. OBGYN.net, conference coverage from the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Orlando, Florida. Retrieved 26 June 2006 from http://www.obgyn. net/displaytranscript.asp?page=/avtranscripts/asrm2001-liu Squires, Susan Merrill (1994). Babies in bottles: Twentieth century visions of reproductive technology. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Taylor, Howard, Kolff, Willem, Sindelar, Paul, & Cahill, John (1959). Attempts to make an “artificial uterus”. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 77, 1295−1300. The Age (2006). RU486 divides Australia like no other pill since The Pill. Retrieved 20 February 2006 from http://www.theage.com.au/news/ womenshealth/ru486-divides-australia-like-no-other-pill-since-the-pill/ 2006/02/17/1140064236328.html Wagner, Marsden (2000). Technology in birth: First do no harm in today. Midwifery Today. Retrieved 13 July 2005 from http://www.midwiferytoday. com/articles/technologyinbirth.asp Well, Deanne (1987, Oct.). Ectogenesis, justice and utility: A reply to James. Bioethics, 1(4), 372−379.

Further reading Aristarkhova, Irina (2005). Ectogenesis and mother as machine. Body and Society, 11, 43−59. Bailey, Ronald (2003). Babies in a bottle: Artificial wombs and the beginning of human life. Reason. Retrieved 26 June 2006 from http://reason.com/ rb/rb082003.shtml Cica, Natasha (1998–1999). Abortion law in Australia. Research Paper 1. Parliament of Australia Website, Retrieved 29 June 2006 from http://www. aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998–99/99rp01.htm Kaczor, Christopher (2005). Could artificial wombs end the abortion debate? National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 5, 283−301. Klein, Renate (2005, 9 December). Say NO feminist urges: RU 486 is a dangerous non-choice. The Australian. McKie, Robin (2002, 10 February). Men redundant? Now we don’t need women either. The Guardian, England. Retrieved 27 May 2007 from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,648024,00. html Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), FindLaw, retrieved 29 June 2006 from http:// caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=410&invol=113 Sarin, C. L, SenGupta, A., Taylor, H. P., & Kolff, W. J. (1966). Further development of an artificial placenta with the use of mebrane oxygenator and venovenous perfusion. Surgery, 60, 754−760. Schubert, Misha (2005, 7 December). PM allows bill to thwart minister's veto of RU486. The Age, Melbourne. Retrieved 6 February 2006 from http://www. theage.com.au/news/national/pm-allows-bill-to-thwart-ministers-vetoof-ru486/2005/12/06/1133829596158.html# Shovelan, John (2006). US state tightens abortion law. Australian Broadcasting Corporation News. Retrieved 7 March 2006 from http://www.abc.net.au/ news/newsitems/200603/s1585431.htm Therapeutic Goods Administration (2006). About TGA. Retrieved 21 June 2006 from http://www.tga.gov.au/about/about.htm