Animadversions and open questions, reference, inference and truth in fiction

Poetics I 1 (1982) 553-562 North-Holland PubhshmgCompany

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A N I M A D V E R S I O N S AND O P E N Q U E S T I O N S , REFERENCE, INFERENCE AND T R U T H IN F I C T I O N J O H N WOODS *

! have long beheved that a primary datum for semantlclsts of fiction is the syntactic (rather than lexical) amblgutty of fictional sentences. After all, ~t is true, Is it not, that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street. yet also true that he did no such thing. That we seem ready to acquiesce without embarrassment ,n such apparent contradictions suggests to me that they are indeed only apparent and that the appearance can be dispatched under postulation of ambtgmty So. then, though possessed of tmportant pragmatic pecuharttles, fict,onal discourse lays strong claims upon a non-negligible semantic status, and the accommodating theories. I should think, would need to arttculate the approprmte doctrines of reference, inference and truth.

The surface 'contraditlon' that "Sherlock Holmes hved m Baker Street'" is both truc and not true requires clanflcatlon and eventual disposal in the theory of truth. If disposal is to be achieved by way of syntacttc ambtgmty, of course: but tt can also be expected to clarify the respects m which, if any. ficttonal pronouncements refer, and the manner m whtch fictional surface coptradlctlons avoid authorization of the inference of everythmg whatever. So we may suppose that the theory of truth would gtve the lead to the theory of reference and the theory of inference; truth theory would seem to be basic

In some of my earher work (Woods 1974). 1 have attempted to fmd a semantic framework for fictional discourse that answers to these various tasks It ts clear * Author's address John Woods. Prestdent and Vice-Chancellor Unt',erslt~ of Lethbndge. 4401 Umverslty Drive, Lethbndge. AIb. Canada TIK 3M4 0304-422x/82f0000-0000/$02.75 © 1982 North-Holland

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to me now, even as ,t was in 1974. that The Iogw offictwn did not give all the answers and that it was fa~ from perfect, even as far as it went and goes. It may now be timely quickly to rewew this theoretical sketch with three mare purposes in mind: ( I ) To take account of whatever virtues ~t may still possess. (2) To expose and develop ~ts ev,dent deficiencies (3) To use it as a benchmark (though manifestly an ,mperfect one) ag air'q which rival theoret,cal perspectives may be compared and assessed.

The theoretical sketch of The logic offictwn may be set out as follows. A basic semantic dictum. I have said. is that fictional sentences give rise ttJ apparent contradictions by which we are. except m deliberately theoretical moments, not m the least d,sturbed. We say that "'Sherlock Holmes hved m Baker Street" Is both true and not true. yet we do not blush There is an ambiguity somewhere that annuls the contradiction and fully justifies our c onhde nt casualness. One way of representing the ambiguity is by assigning to "'Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street". a pair of canomcal representatives S and ~,O(S),~ in an appropriate semantic metalanguage of which S can be declared not true and ~,O(S),~ true. 'O" is a (kind of) modal operator on sentence representations in the theory. Its semantics will reflect the truth theoretic pecuharltles of fictional sentences. Ordinarily the quasi-operator does not appear in surface structure, m order that fictional sentences may achieve and preserve effective venslmlhtude. The truth theory for fictional sentences (or. more precisely, for their canonical representations m theory) wdl define a satisfaction relation for sentences, from which, in turn. a truth deftmtton can be got. Initially we say that a sentence ~,O(qb),~ meets the elementary ~avso condition if the following c o n d m o n is met: (SI) oO(q~)* represents a sentence that occurs in a work of fiction And let us say that a sentence ~,O(~),~ meets the author~ savso condttwn if ($2) ~,O(,~),) meets the elementary sayso c o n d m o n or ($3) ~ is a logical consequence of ~k. ~ is consistent, and ~,O(~),> meets the author's sayso condition The basis of the defmltton of sa.sfactwu of a ~entel,ce ~p by a sequence. ~. can now be given. (1) If e# is <,O(ff),~ and ~,0(~),~ meets the sayso condition. S satisfies ~. The recurslon clauses are as follows: Given that e? does not meet I, then

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(2) Neganon. If ep is ~O(3~b)~ then s sattsfies ~ tf there is a sentence ~,O(x),> that is satisfied by s and no sequence satlsfymg X* falls to satisfy ~,3~*,>, where any sentence F* is exactly hke the ~entence F save for showing a free variable wherever 1"* displays a fictional name. (3) Negatton. If ,# is ~,O(~k),~, then ~ is sattsfied by s if ,,O(~)~ ts not satisfied by s. (4) Conjunctton. lfq~ IS then g, ~s sattsfied by s if for some name or singular term a of L, free for a free variable m ~b. ~,O(S:(~k)),, ts satisfied by s. A truth-deflnluon now easdy drops out Truth is sattsfa6tton br every sequence. And truth, tt should be noted. ~s governed by a single condition of material adequacy.

(T) x ts true t r y where x ts the name of a sentence of L and y is the sentence named or a translation of It in our theory's semantic metalanguage In particular. "'O (Holmes lived in London)" is true if O (Holmes lived in London). Now, though it would be dreadfully combersome here to set forth the detads, it can be seen that my semantic sketch has, or seems to have a number of advantages.

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(a) C o n d i t i o n 9 p r o v i d e s that " M o n a r t y discovered that H o l m e s really e x i s t e d " is unsatisfiable, whereas " O {Mot(arty d i s c o v e r e d that H o l m e s really existed)'" is allo,~,ed to be satisfiable. (b) C o n d i t i o n s 8 a n d 9 allow for the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of " H o l m e s h a d tea with G l a d s t o n e " b y the h a r m l e s s ~(O(T(h.g))~). a n d of " S o m e o n e psychoa n a l y z e d G r a n d i v a ' " and " S o m e o n e loves Molly J e a v o n s " b y the also h a r m l e s s ,,:lvO(4,(v,a))~). O n the o t h e r hand. the theory wdl reject such sentences as " P i e r r e T r u d e a u waltzed w i t h M o l l y J e a v o n s " . as it rightly ~hould. Ic) C o n d i t i o n s 2 a n d 3 c o n c e r m n g n e g a t i o n p r o v i d e that ~,O(~))) a n d O(::lq,) are neither c o n t r a d l c t o r i e s nor contraries, which gives us a respec*.able m e t h o d of r e p r e s e n t i n g the i n d e t e r m i n a c y of fictional beings, if it were o u r wish to d o so, w i t h o u t d o i n g violence to the L a w of E x c l u d e d M i d d l e W h a t is more. a c a n o n i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,n the form (,O(,~&--,,~))) is justifiable, as ts its i m p h c a n d u m ~O(~ ) & O(~,~)~). Since. t,O(,~)~ d~)es not c o n t r a d i c t ~,O(~,~))~. t t t s i m p o s s i b l e to derive from (~O(~&~,~),). any sentence whatever, a n d a n a l l - i m p o r t a n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n p r o b l e m ts d i s p o s e d of (d) There are m e t h o d o l o g i c a l virtues, as well The s y s t e m of The Logic of

Ft( twn req,Jlres only, the classical truth ~alues. the semantic, rudiments of first order systems, both refetentlal and substltUllonal - such items as sets. functions, substitution instances, and the hke. a primitive ale(hie modahtv, possibility and another primitive. O. which is a "*ery"~eak modal Negatively speaklpg, for a theory of fll.tlon we do not need to depart the classical laws of "'Non-Conlradlctlon and Excluded Middle". we do not need to postulate the multlvocahty of 'lrue" or of "exists"or of 'is in the v,orld', we do no! need to abandon classical negation for ,.ome man>-,.alued inlerloper, we do not need man3,-~,alued composition logics, we do not need htsior~,-constltutlon values, the spe-,al predicate "7" or the neutral quanttflers "~' and ' I [" We can ~tlll win and Io~e bets concerning the "0.hereaboutsof Holmes "O(Holmes h~.ed m Baker Street)" wins. "'O(Holmes h'.ed in Berczy Street)" loses (Woods 1974 143) (e) And, finally, here is a theory of t r u t h that does direct a certain a m o u n t of traffic m the theories of reference a n d reference. (0 Reference. T h a t we refer fiction to fictional objects c o u l d be a c c o u n t e d for b y the legions of s e n t e n c e s m the form ~ O ( ~ v ) , ) a n d m the form ~,O:lv(~u ))~ that are a s s i g n e d the t r u t h - v a l u e T. T h a t reference does not m such cases i m p l y existence ts c o n v e y e d by the u n s a t l s f i a b d t t y of such sentences as "::Ix(Sherlock H o l m e s = x ) " . (u) Inference. G e t t i n g the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s right goes quite s o m e way, of course, in c h a r t i n g the c o u r s e of what, m fiction, follows from w h a t a n d w h a t d o e s not. C e r t a i n l y t~ne of the largest c l a i m s of the truth theory of The Logw of Fwtwn ~s that tt shows c o n v i n c i n g l y n o t o n l y how ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' can be true but also h o w they d o not s a n c t i o n t h a t classical nuisance, the inference ex falso quodhbet.

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It ts pleasant to have one's critics speak well o! one's work and to take it seriously But an altogether more beneftcml outcome of Cntlosm ~s the d~sclosure of problems and perplexmes. Here are some that have been unearthed by critics of The Logw of Fiction. (a) Robert Howell (pets comm and 1975). The semantic theory of The Logic of Fwtton does m fact provide thai "inconsistent fiction, contrary to fact. does narrate everything". Proof. To show that if <,O(ep& -,g,)~> is ,n a gwen story, then so is <,O(--,(-~k)),>, for arbitrary ~k- Let <,O(~&~ep),> be in the story. hence it meets the elementary sayso condition and ts satisfied by s. To show that <,O(--,(--,~,)),> is also satisfied by s. we use Negation rule 2 as follows There is a sentence <,O(ep&--,#?),> that is satisfied by s. at~d (vacuously) no sequence satisfying <,(ep&~e~),> fails to satisfy. ~,~(~ff ),~. for any ~b. So <,O(~(~k)),> is satisfied by s. (b) R:chard Routley (1979) Consider an self-contradiction represented a~ <,O(e~ & ~ ) ~ . "l,'en the story containing such a sentence yellds 0(~). for arbitrary ft. ~roof. Since <<(,~&~,~) -- (ff&-,d?),> is a classical tautology, we have it by t!',e m o d a h t y of ' O ' that <+O ( ~ & ~ ) , > if and only if <,O( if& ~ ),> Thus we also have <,O ( ~ & ~ k ) * , hence, by &-distribution. ~,~.( ff ),). where ~k is any sentence you please. (c) Terence Parsons (1978). Formula ~,3,O(t~t~, a),> are t , k e n to represent such fictional-real world truths as that "Someone psychoanalyzed (3radlva". The semantical rules of The Logic of Fiction provide that such a formula ~s (in the particular case before us) satisfied ff and only ff (l) t~ knows that 0 someone, w, is Gradlva. (n) c believes that v psychoanalyzed Gradtva (re)for all w and u, that w psychoanalyzed u is equivalent to w beheve~ that w psychoanalyzed u. But It Is not true. in particular, that +'a psychoanalyzed b'" is equivalent to " a believes that a psychoanalyzed b" It could have happened that Freud psychoanalyzed Gradlva and yet was immediately thereafter struck down with irreversible amnesia: or he might have died More importantly, however, the rules utterly fall to account for such sentences as "A certain fictional detective is more famous than an~ real detective". Here is a bet-sensitive, indeed winning, asseveration, but it contains nothing even resembhng an lntenslonal verb, as required by rule 8In).

j Wood~/ Antmadt,er~ton~and open que~tton~

Trouble indeed for the semantic account of The Logic of Fiction. perhaps even trouble enough to show that that enterprise was fundamentally misconceived and that we should pursue the semantics of fiction m very different theories, or even that we should a b a n d o n the semantic practice altogether and content ourselves with pragmatlcs Let us see ( A ) Possible **orlds ~emanncs Pavel (1975). Powerful theories exist which give the s e m a n u c s of powerful worlds True. some thinkers despair of a completely sat,sfymg account of that powerful metaphor Maximal sets of propositions have been put to the exphcational test, and some still find It wanting, what ~ith the notion of a proposition being no clearer than that of a possible world. or t h a t with proportions being explicable only in terms of possible worlds On the other hand. possible worlds semantics are certainly theoretically better-behaved than the theory of The Logt¢ of Fiction, so would it not be better, if far from ideal, to look there ~ No, I think not. For 1 take ~t, that the predicate, "Is fictional" which Holmes satisfies (e.g. " 0 3 , ~ ( x = Holmes & x is fictional)") is governed by the following condition: '.~ is fictional" entails, for some O, possibly edx and --,Ox. That is, a fictional object, x, sausfles some such modahzed inconsistent pred.cate by w r t u - of this circumstance that had the author so chosen, x would have behaved mconslstently, and the author could have so chosen. Moreover, if we allow for some standard reduction postulates for iterated modahtles, we could obtain from ~.Posslbly ~k'~ <,Necessardy (Possibly ~k),~, from which, m the particular mstance, we would have. essenually as it were. the necessary possible self-contradlctormess of fictional beings. Fictional beings would be tmposstbtha, and not intuitively plausible candidates for residency in any possible world. Now. it is quite true that a major thrust of The Logic of Fiction was to show that such fictional contradictions were only apparent. But, Howell and Routley have rather convmcmgly averred that the attempt faded. Therefore, it would fall to proponents of the possible world approach to show how the contradictoriness of fictional objects was "only" apparent, and how the d e n v a u o n of everything whatever could be avoided. W h a t is sure, they would need to show that their solutions of such contradlcuon problems could be absorbed without theoretical violence into their possible worlds semantics ,~nd, fmall'y, m order to show the advantages of their theory over m y own, it ~,ould be reqmred of them to show that their solutions of the contradiction problems could not, without theoretical violence, be absorbed into a theory of The Logic of Fiction sort. Tu quogue

J ~ ood~ / ~tllm(ldt{'r~lotl~ arid opetl que,tttm~

(B) Memongean ~emanttc~. Pat~on~ (1975, 1978h, 1980) The best treatment of Melnongean semantics is that of Terence Parsons. One of its most useful features is thai it has been very dehberately developed so as to provide an adequate theoretical home for fictional objects Hov~ever, for me there is an uncertainty about Its analysis of fictional object,+ Part of it has to do with the general notion of a Memongean object. Parsons' account prowdes that corresponding to each different non-empty set of properties there i,, a different specific object Some might find this an over-generous criterion of objecthood and others might wonder whether, say, umt sets of properties are ever property-rich enough adequately to mdlvlduate It depends I suppose on how close a connection there is between uniqueness and mdlvlduatedness. For example there is no particular reason to think that there isjust one object that ts red and has no other (nuclear) properties, but correspond|ng to the set (being red) there Is one obJect at most So we have a pr~blem ~,th umqueness Moreover, regardless of whelher the-red-only-thing is umque, it is dubious that redness ,.tlone ever makes a substantive enough contribution lo i1% bearer so as to confer genuine mdlwduahty upon It My o',~n complaint, hox~ever, ts somewhat different. All objects, fictional or otherwise, ate b,, ~,lrtue of their corresponding sets Thus fictional objects "'were objects before the~ ~ere written about; they were so to speak only identified by the author, and ~nttng about them did not confer objecthood upon them". So. then. the reqmrement that fictional objects be run-of-the-mall Memongean objects as such denies us the intumon that in a rather deep. and somewhat hteral sense, fictional objects have a hterary paternity, i e. that they are created by their authors There is also something unsetthng about the requirement that fictional objects should be incomplete m the manner of Parsons" treatment of th,s notion, that is. that they be indeterminate with respect to .In enormous range of properties that one would have supposed them capable of exemphf.~mg On the face of ,t. it is not credible to say that Sherlock Holmes neither lacked nor possessed a k,dney, ten toes. two elbows or a mother; that he went to school or not. that he dzd not comport hlmstlf with Watson and the ~,.orld in v~avs not chronicled by Doyle. Mind you. there are ever so man 3 things about Holmes that we shall never know. But it is an over-reaction to elevate these tn.sohtbtlta to ontological heights; it is a confusion of the ordo essendt ",~lth the or~h~ cogm)~cendt. Perhaps it might be thought that 1 am wrong to suppose that ,~n the Memongean analysis Holmes" incompleteness (epastemolog~call~ or ontologically rendered - it doesn't matter here) involves those properties of a fe~ hnes back Nevertheless Holmes is a man i would think that it would follo~ from this. relative to elementary zoology, that Holmes had a mother, and that relative to human anatomy, he had two elbows, a kldne_~ and a certain number of toes. 1 would also think that having shoulders and back. that either he was be-tooled or not. It may be a deficiency of sorts that Parsons" Memongean

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preoccupation is with ontology and not with logic Palsons says that he does not seek for a logic of fiction But if I am not to know what follows about Holmes from what, I wonder whether the ontological project can saBsfactordy proceed Let A be any property not m his representing set. Parsons elects to assign to A, and to not-A as well. the intermediate truth-value " i n d e t e r m i n a t e " , or I. This leaves us with the need to make up our minds about A or not-A. Are we to a~slgn ,: t or do we attach the classical truth-value T '~ If we make the former choice, we abandon the law of excluded middle for fictional objects If we go with the second option we tamper with the conventmnal truth-functlonahty of the law Either way. we invest our declston and the :heory which tt advance., wtth a logical slgntftcance that needs to be explained and justified. (~) P r a g m a t u s

Pur~dl (1978)

Some authors have been tempted by the notmn that the sentences actually constttuttve of a p t e c e of ftctton (as opposed to those that are , b o u t fiction, those that a literary critic mlgh! use. for example) arc pared all but the hmlts of ~emantlc slgmflcance They are not true and they ale not false, and that is about all there ~s to their semantic "theory"; the deeper truths he elsewhere in pragmatlcs. Purtdl is one who has yielded to such a temptation, but not with wholly convincing results [I]. As 1 have said, Purtlll holds that the sentences hterally consututlve of a piece of hctmn are neither true nor false, that they do not make asserttons, that (therefore) they do not make assertmns about what they would appear to be about. Such sentences m tact tell tales, and m such nonasseruve uses, they escape the burdens of all but the hmlts of semanttc ,,,igntficance. That ~,,,, they are not true and they are not f a l s e Purtfll holds that if 1 tale-tell by mean~ of a sentence. S, then S neither asserts nor denies anything, and that tt cannot be inferred etther that S t s true or that S is false Purtdl makes two claims which it is useful to dlstmgmsh: (I) In fiction sentences are forwarded nonassertlvely. (2) Any sentences forwarded nonassertlvely is non-truth-valued. It is of course, open to us to accept (1) without accepting (2). Proposition (2) is not obviously true, and some phdosophers (Frege, for example, m "The Thought") have held It Is false. In particular, if a s t a t e m e n t could be used unasserttvely, then tale-telhng could perfectly well be the nonassertive presentauon of statements; and 1 do not see why such statements couldn't be truth-valued, and why in such nonasseruve uses we can't be said to be forgtven the obhgatmns of staying on the semantics tracks. [I] Haack is another (See Haack 1976 ) Haack does not, hov,ever how the pragmaucdevelopment might proceed

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But what of what we ourselves say about fictional goings-on, by way for example of hterary crmctsm? Purtill thinks that, unhke the sentences constltutwe of the fiction ,n question, these sentences do have some positive semantic slgmficance, for they are true or false, and quite genuinely about something, of which something qmte genuinely is asserted. They have syntactic significance as well, for they are "'ellipses" for sentences that are more faithfully rendered m the form.

Z ~ (Doyle, his reader~, "'Holme~ solved the case of the Speckled Band"), where , z ~ , is a quasi-operator with, as arguments, an author, the author's audience Or readership, and the non-truth-valued, semantically bereft sentences with which the author makes his magic In this particular example, we have more or less obvious facts to take into account. (1) In this fashion, Doyle has tale-told us that Holmes solved the case of the Speckled Band. (2) Statement I ts true ("straightforwardly true" as Purtdl might say). (3) The sentence "Holmes solved the case of the Speckled Band" makes a false assertion. (4) What was tale-told would make a false assertion; that is, what Doyle tale-tells, but does not assert, would make a false assertion. Consider now the following inconsistent set (0 W h a t Doyle tale-told ts X. (u) W h a t Woods (say) nonelhpttcally asserted ~s Y. (,n) W h a t Doyle tale-told ts neither true nor false. (iv) What Woods nonelhptically asserted is false. (v) " X ' = ' Y " I think that we can quickly agree that PurtiIl is committed to the rejection of (v). for he would appear expressly to hold (0-(iv). Suppose then that (v) ts rejected Then, though ' X ' and ' Y ' are the same sentence. "X" was pt.t to nonassertive, non-truth-valued purposes, and "Y' to assertive, truth-valued purposes. The similarity is syntactic only But, ff so, it is unsurpa.,smgly unclear (to me at least) whether the predicate tn ' X ' and ' Y ' predicates the same thing, and unclear, as well, whether their c o m m o n subject te~'m has any, never mind whether it be the same, semantic role (e.g.. does it refer to Holmes?). What, Ihen, accounts for the urge In us all to think that the author's " H o l m e s scolded W a t s o n " and the critic's "Holmes scolded W a t s o n " show a c o m m o n concern, namely for Watson 9 The principle utility of Purttll's views, perhaps like my own in The Logw of Fiction, is that they rather quickly prove unconvincing. 1 do not, however for a

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that the pragmatic

approach

~s w r o n g m p r , n c t p l e [2]. I do,

I,owever, thmk that the possible world and Meinongean approaches are wrong m p r , n c ~ p l e , a n d a b o u t t h e a p p r o a c h o f T h e L o g i c o f Fiction I r e m a i n , f o r t h e time bemg at least, undecided and more baffled than 1 care to admit

References |l,~a,.k, Su,,an 1976 Crmcal nott~.e of the "The logic of fu.tlon' The Canadian Journal of Phdo,,ophv 6 303-32P Ih~'~ell Robert 1975 Re,tier. o f ' T h e Ioglt of fittlon' Journal of Aesthetic,, and Art Cntlcl~,m 34 354-355 P,u',on,~. Teren~.e 1975 A Memongean anal~,,t,, of fictional obje~.t,, Grazer Phdo,,ophl,;the Studlen 11975l 13-86 Par*,on,, Terem.e 1978a Re,tier. of "The IogJt. of fiction' Svnthese 39 155-164 Par,,on,,. Terence 1978b Nuclear and extranudear propertie~. Memong and Lelbma, Nou,, (1978) 137-152 Par,,on', Ferem.e 1980 Non-ext,,tent oble4.t,, Nev. Haven, CT Y ~1,: Um'~ersity Pre,,,, Pa'.el Thoma,, 1975 Po~,,ihle v.orld,, in Ilterar~ .,emantlc,. J:,urnal of Ae,,thetlt.S and Art CrltlcP, m 34 16'~- 176 Purtdl, R L 1978 Telhng the tale Caaadlan Journal of Phdo,,ophv 8 Routle', Rt~.hard 1979 The ,,emantlc ,,tru~.ture of fictmnal dtscour,,e Poetic,, 8 3-30 Routlev Rn.hard 1980 Exploring Memcng'sjungle Canberra Au,,trahan National Untver,,fl'~ Wood,,, John 1974 The logic, of fiction a phdo,,ophteal ,,oundmg of deviant ]ogit. The Hague Mouton

John llood~ (b 1937) is a graduate of The Unt~.erstt~, of Toronto He received his P h D m phdo,,ophy from Tht Um,.erslt', of Mtthlgan He has held appomtmeat,, at several umversttJe,, m d u d m g Toronto. Ml~.hlgan. Stanford and also Calgary. v.here he wa~ Dean of the Faculty of Humamtle', Currentl~ Pre'qdent and Vn.e-Chancellor of The Umverslty of Lethbndge. he spetlalt,'e', m the log,;, of the fallacies, His publu.atlons include, as v.ell as The logic offi(twn, Proof and truth (Toronto Peter Martin A~sooate,, 1974). Engineered death aborlton, sulfide, euthana~l~ and wne(~de (Ottawa Um,.er,,it~, of Ottav.a Pres',. 1978). at, ' ,~'~th Douglas Walton) Argument the h,gt~ of the falla~w~ (Toronto and Nev, York McGraw-Hal 1982)

[2} It ~, interesting thdt Routley as so impressed by ti~e dominant pragmatl~, features of fa~hona] dl,,tour,,e Hv, mo,,t re~.ent vtcv, s of the matter are developed m Rout]ey (1980)