Fiction and truth, reconsidered

Poetics 11 (1982) 541-55 I North-Holland Pubhshmg Company

FICTION AND TRUTH, RECONSIDERED GOTTFRIED

GABRIEL *

The purpose of this paper is to reply to ,,ome objections to my book Fd, tton und Wahrbett (Gabriel 1975), but m doing so I also hope to pre,,ent some new aspect,, of the matter I shall begin with a ,,hort summary of the intentions of my book a,, some critics have not fully recogmzed the',e and t.rltlclzed me for positions I do not m fact hold Then I ',hall try to deal with the yarrow, objet.tJons grouping them under the following headings "flct on and hterature", "'author narrator and primary ,,peaker". "semantlt.s or pragmatlcs'~'', "methodologt,.al ~.on,,lderatlon,,~.onct.rmng formal and empmcal methods". "truth (about, m and of fiction) and knowledge'"

M a m l y , there are two k i n d s of a u t h o r w r i t i n g a b o u t fiction theoretically. A u t h o r s of the first k i n d are c o n c e r n e d with fiction as part of hterature, those of the second are c o n c e r n e d with fiction o n l y as an exotic k i n d of d i s c o u r s e to w h i c h they can a p p l y their logic ( W o o d s 1974). o n t o l o g y ( P a r s o n s 1980). s e m a n t i c s (Lewis 1978) or theory of l a n g u a g e (Searle 1975). These a u t h o r s are not really i n t e r e s t e d in the theory of h t e r a t u r e a n d m m y o p t m o n their theories. w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of Searle's speech act analysts, are not relevant for the t h e o r y of h t e r a t u r e either. If these theories have any value, then o n l y for their o w n sake. Is the s a m e n o t true of m y F r e g e a n a p p r o a c h in F t k n o n u n d W a h r h e t t ? It is true insofar as I a m n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h a theory of l i t e r a t u r e m general. M y q u e s t i o n was h o w a literary w o r k of fiction can c o n v e y truth or ( m a w i d e r sense) k n o w l e d g e or c o g n i t i o n in spite of the fact that it is fictional By a t t e m p t i n g to a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n I did n o t p r o v i d e a general a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n as to w h a t l i t e r a t u r e is; r a t h e r I tried to give a n a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n as to w h a t f u n c t i o n s ( p u r p o s e s ) l i t e r a t u r e m a y have a n d in which w a y these f u n c t i o n s are realized. In p a r t i c u l a r I tried to show that a m o n g these f u n c t i o n s t h a t of c o n v e y i n g k n o w l e d g e h a s a l e g i t i m a t e place, i n fact m y a i m w a s a n e p l s t e m o i o g t c a l defence of literature. O b v i o u s l y such a defence is not w h a t a n e m p i r i c a l theorist of l i t e r a t u r e is o c c u p i e d with. H i s subject is l i t e r a t u r e w h a t e v e r its functions m a y be; he wdl n o t e m p h a s i z e o n e tn p a r t ~ 0 lar. F r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view, as m i n e Rs, we have to pose the q u e s t i o n the o t h e r w a y a r o u n d , namely, w h a t is k n o w l e d g e a n d w h a t k m d of k n o w l e d g e are w e * Author's address Gonfned Gabriel. Dept of Phdosphy. Umver,,tty of Konstanz, PO Box 7733. D-7750 Konstanz, West Germany 0 3 0 4 - 4 2 2 x / 8 2 / 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 / $ 0 2 . 7 5 © 1982 N o r t h - H o U a n d

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d e a h n g with. The modern emotwism in the theory of hterature is a result of a positivistic theory of knowledge oriented towards the positive sciences. To put it simply: from this point of view science ts the place of cognitive value, of knowledge and of truth. What remams l'or hterature '7 Emotions! Ever since N G o o d m a n m his Languages of art ('Goodman 1968) opposed such views of his own tradition the situation has not been tile same, nevertheless, the mainstream of the theory of knowledge ts concerned only with scientific knowledge as the paradigm of knowledge. This leads to a false view of knowledge, arts, phflosoplay, and even of the world itself. (For these further considerations cf. Gabriel (1982)) It should be noted m this connection that the G e r m a n word 1 used here ts "Erkenntms" (cogmtton) and not "Wtssen'. which corresponds more closely to the Enghsh word 'knowledge' 'Erl~enntms" does not have the same connotation of objectivity as "Wtssen'. For instance, "Erkenntms' and "Wahrm'hmung" are not opposed in the same way as 'knowledge' and 'perception' 1 treat "seeing something in a new way or hght" or seemg new aspects as a k m d of growth of 'Erl, emmus" but not as a kind of growth of "Wt~sen'. Thus. my use of the English word "knowledge' should be understood m the wider sense of the G e r m a n word "Erl, enntms" To sum up. the lettmottt: of my Ft/~tton uptd IVahlhett was the search for a non-scientific kind of knowledge which we may call "aesthetic knowledge", and to analyTe ~n this respect fictional literature seemed (and stdl seems) to me to be paradigmatic for the followmg reasons" (1) works of /,erature are hngutstlc works" they allow of the well-elaborated methods and concepts of linguistic analysts which are accepted also by those who deny the cogmtlve ~alue of arts, (2) works o f f w t t o n consist (at least partly) of fictional discourse. This fact excludes a search for the cogmttve value at the (f.cttonal) report level and forces one to look at a higher level (cf. Beardsley 1958); (3) for works of fictional hterature ("Dichtung") m particular, the (continental) tradttioa has maintained a cogmttve value by formulating the topo~ of the presentation of the general in the particular ("Darstellung des Allgememen im Besonderen") Exphcatmg this old topo~ by modern analytical methods seems to me a hopeful approach to provtdmg a modern answer to an old question. I shall now come m detail to the various objections concerning my distmcttons, method etc. The headings used here are mtended to systematize my treatment of the objections.

Fiction and literature The first step in my analysis was to provide a defimtton of "fictional discourse". This I explamed as a way of speaking "as if" The as tf relates to the dlocutlonary force of utterances and to the reference and denotation of smgular terms and predicates used m these utterances. The dlocuttonary force 1

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concentrated on was that of asserting utterances as the mare form of telhng a story is that of assertion "Fictional discourse" was then exphcated t~ta n e g a t w a t s as discourse for which the rules for assertions and the rules of reference and denotation are not to be followed (My Enghsh terminology is introduced in Gabriel 1979.) As mentioned before, a work of fiction consists (at least partly) of fictional discourse. Insofar as fictLon is a relevant kind of hterature the analysis of fictional discourse is a relevant step to any general theory of literature. Literature, however, is not identical with fiction Fictionality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for literature. There is literature which is not fictional and there is fictional discourse which is not literature. I had thought these distinctions clear from the beginning (cf. Gabriel 1975. 10f.). However, I was criticized by lhwe and Rleser (1979" 72) for confusing them I am not aware of any such confusion. Koppe (1977: 14) characterizes my position as identifying literature ~ ith the kind of fiction which presents the general in the particular It is true, that "fictional discourse" and "the presentation of the general in the particular" are the themes of my book for ~he reasons mentioned above, but they should not be taken as the defining features of "literature". Ia this respect the subtitle "Eine semantlsche Theone der Llteratur" ('A semantic theory of literature , may have been misleading for it suggests that the book contains a general theory of all kinds of literature. The following subtitle would ha~e been a more suitable one: "Eme semantlsche Analyse des Erkenntmswertes yon Literatur'" ('A semantic analysis of the cognitive value of literature') It is argued by Bruck (1978. 298) that the problem of fiction does not pla~ the central role in the reception of literature that logical-semantical analssis would have us believe. (Unfortunately Bruck develops his o ~ n functional analysis m connection with errors concerning the logical-semantical anal.',sls, cf. for instance his remarks on my treatment of empty predicates 1978: 287f ) Admittedly, the distinction between "fictional" and "non-fictional" is not the most relevant one m any case. From the point of view of a theory of narration. for example, the distinction between "narrative" and "'descriptive" may be more important (cf. Gabriel 1975 60f.). Here I should add that "'narrative" as a mode of speaking is not comparable with the mode "fictional" because "fictional" is derived from the mode "assertive", and "'narrative" and "assertive" are modes of speaking on different levels. "Narrative" in particular i: not explicable as a special kind of dlocutlonary force. It is the way in ~h,ch speech acts of different dlocutionary force are linked together that characterizes speech as narrative, and whether the dlocutionary force is real or pretended is irrelevant here. After all it is not the mode of narration etc. but the question of truth ~h,ch makes the problem of fiction relevant for the theory of literature ! ~ould concede that the question of truth is not an absolute one but arises in a situation of distance (Bruck 1978: 298f). and that the same applies to the

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problem of fiction In a histonc'fl perspective (of Rosier 1980) th,, view is corroborated by the fact that it was the transition from oral to written culture at the time of Aristotle which created a consciousness of the difference between hn~tory and fiction These considerations imply that the relevance of the problem of ficqon for the theory of literature is dependent on the question of trulh and knowledge. However, since thus is the question I attempted to answer it is small wonder that the problem of fiction plays such a central role in my book Consequently. the last step of the present defence will treat the question of truth it,elf (see below).

Author. i~arrator and primaD ,,peaker In my book I made a distinction between the historical author and the primary ",peaker of ,i literary text (1975: 92f ) By the primary speaker I do not mean tile figure of the narrator in a text but the speaker of the whole text (of 1975 44) a, distinct from secondary speakers who are speakers m the text. I did not ttlentnfv author and primary speaker because of well-known cases of self-misunderstandings of authors. An author may have an incorrect interpretation of hi, o~n work. The meaning of a work and thus its possible cognitive value may differ from x~hat the author later states xt to be For such cases I proposed to take ,is the primary speaker an a~sumed intentional subject of the text as distinct from the author. This distinction seems sound and necessary: however. I did oxerlook a difficulty I defined the truth claim of fictional literature by its ,tatements on the higher level of reflection (1975. 94). These statements l conceived as ~peech acts of the primary speaker The problem then is that only a real subject and not an assumed one can appear as a speaker of real speech acts (of Hamburger 1979 120). On these grounds Juhl (1980: 164f ) has argued for identifying the primary speaker with the author The argument is convincing, and we have to give up talking of truth claims when they are not claims made by the author. We may continue to talk of true statements of the text but these statements then are not speech acts of any subject: they have the ~latus of truth offers ("Wahrheitsangeboten") for the reader (cf. 1975 96). Nexertheless. I think the problem can be solved within ',he speech act analysis. if an author says something different inside and outside the text we have to ask whether our interpretation is wrong or whether he mtsimderstands himself In the problematic second case. if he makes two different, perhaps incompatible truth claims (~hxch happens m everyday discourse as well!), the reader has to decide which of the claims he agrees with Since it is in any case the reader who has to judge the truth claims (1975 95f.) a change of approach is not necessary. In connection with the problem of the primary speaker 1 would like to mention a further point where my position has changed. I would no longer

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ms,st upon the view that every text has a single primary speech act which takes the form of an assertion. This assumption causes unnecessary dtfficult,es (of. ihwe 1979: 227f ) which we can avoid by allow,ng a greater varmty ,n the number and forms of primary speech acts. The truth claiming speech acts then remain the most relevant ones for our questions as to the truth and cogn,ttve value of fiction, but the analysts of the status of fiction itself may include the constderat,on of all other kinds of speech acts as well (cf. Searle 1975) In this respect 1 would return to an earlier view of mine (cf. Gabriel 1975. 122f) which I had since given up (1975: 128). It is an added advantage of this more flexible approach that It is more su,table for texts which ace mixtures of f,ctton and nonfiction

Semantics or pragmatics? 1 chose to present my approach as a semantic one because it ,s opposed to ontological approaches (19'75: 11). In respect of the relationship betwe • semantics and pragmatlcs I agree with lhwe (1979: 216, note 3). Sasse (1979, and Frlcke (1982), who state that my "semantic" approach may also be called "pragmatic" according to the usual terminology as ,t includes speech act analysts, lhwe then goes a step further and presents the opinion that semantic aspects do not play a role at all m my approach. This view is not correct. What I maintained (1975: 30f.) is that there are no semantic criteria by which we can decide whether a given text is fictional or not; rather, what ,t means to write or to read a text as fiction is described by me in terms of speech act analysis and sehmntics In the narrow sense lhwe was not the only crmc to misunderstand my conception Elhs (1978' 232f.) says that 1 presented here an objection to my own approach without noticing it. He argues. " I f taken seriously this insight would lead h~m [Gabriel] in an entirely different d,.rectlon. Instead of investigating the characteristics of utterances, he would have to examine the conventions wlth, n a society which allow identical utterances to he taken in radically different ways". This argument (a similar one ts to be found m lhwe and Raeser (1979. 68)) again neglects the fact that my purpose was not a general empirical theory of literature and its recepuon but to answer the question as to the cognitive value of literature. With the mtenuon of flndmg out where we should look for this cognmve value, 1 asked wluch rules of non-fictional discourse are suspended to w n t m g a work of fiction and reading a work of hterature as ficuon. What Ellis reqmres may be the next step (cf. Meyer-Mmnemann 1979: 364f.) but not the first one, and the next step only m empirical research and not tn a phdosophtcal analysts of the posstbd,ty of non-scientific, especially aesthetic, cogmtton (or knowledge). For my own next step in the direction of aesthetic cogmtton cf Gabriel (1982).

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In conclusion, the relation of pragmatlcs and semantics can be put as follow,,: the rules for assertion and their suspen,,ion concern speech act analy,,is and therefore pragmatlcs, but the rules of reference and denotation and their suspension concern semantics in the narrow sense Thus I agree with Sa,,,~e (1980). who argues for an integration of the semantic and pragmatic a,,pects in the theory of fiction

Methodological considerations concerning formal and empirical methods Whereas Elhs (1978) criticizes me for using too many formal tools. Ihwe (1979) call,, for more In principle I would agree with Elhs rather than with Ihwe, though on the whole I do not fred Elhs' crmctsm fair in my case. For instance, Elhs ts qmte right when he states that my everyday formulation of the definition of fictional discourse (Gabriel 1975. 28) is clear without the use of logical symbols (In my fist formulation), but 1 do not understand how he can doubl the relevance of logical analysis as an instrument of criticism in the field of on~tologs. Ihwe, on the other hand, goes so far as to deny the solid semantic fundament of my approach because he misses the introduction of a formal language (lhwe 1979 226), especially the introduction of the predicate calculus (1979: 248) Good old Frege. founder of this calculus, is your foundation of semantics in "'Uber Stnn und Bedeutung" not sohd because it is not formal! o The answer to this question can be found m Frege (1976: 153) himself: ""F, srmal' ist eros yon den Wortern. die s,ch gerne da elnstellen, wo Begriffe fehlen." Besides "formal". another key-word of modern sc,enttftc ideology ts "empirlcar'. I remarked earlier that 1 do not claim to have presented a general empirical theory of literature, lhwe (1979'' 238ff.) seems to beheve that theoretical statements about literature which are not empirical cannot be relevant (cf the pertinent criticism made by Z i m m e r m a n n (1980: 138)). But in good empirical theories of literature there is a great deal of n o n - e m p m c a l analytical work as v, ell (cf F n c k e 1982). On the other hand, what does the d e m a n d that something be "emplrtcar' actually mean for such theories '~ b,!othmg other than that they must deal with paradigms of the complete factual corpus of literature, i e. the variety of literature "lhls demand, however, cannot ,nean that we are to be concerned wit.I" ;he factual, possibly ~,,'rong, reception of literature as the f u n d a m e n t of our d~stlnctions, as 'awe (1979. 240) presupposes. In a harmless, unscientific sense of the wold "empirical" every theory of literature has to be e m p m c a l insofar as acquaintance with hterature and its history is required, i.e. empirical knowledge is the starting point but it does not have to be the end. A n d in no way is this knowledge a meta-knowledge about the reception of literature. W h a t readers in fact do w~th hterature is surely inte;esttr, g from an exlrinslc, e.g. sociological point of view, but from an

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intrmstc point of view what readers can do with (at least some sort of) literature may be much more interesting, for example extend their knowledge, experience etc. W h a t for ihwe seems to be a normative c o m p o n e n t which he likes to locate in empirical no m a n ' s land (ibld), is nothing other than a legitimate 'principle of choice', namely to look for examples of literature whi~.h m a y have cognitive value.

Truth (about, in and of fiction) and knowledge As stated above in the section "fiction and literature" my treatment of fiction is governed by the question of truth and knowledge (which is after all related to the philosophically motivated quest f o r truth and knowledge). Tbts interest implies that it is not truth about or truth m fiction but the truth o f fi~.tlon which is important. Truth about fiction concerns, for instance, true ~:ssertlons which readers make about works of fiction. Simply speaking, these assertions are verified by going back to the content of the corresponding works of fiction. Truth m fiction concerns the true statements (not assertions t) occurring m works of fiction, especially those statements on the report level which correspond to historical or geographical facts, for example. Truths hke these ~ere seen already by Aristotle as not answering the question of truth in the case of fiction. This means, that works of fiction are neither criticized for not contaming such truths nor praised for contatmrlg them Even a historical novel wdl be considered "true" by sensible readers not because of its various true historical statements but because of its adequate presentation of a complex historical situation as a whole On the grounds of these distinctions contributions like those of Woods (1974), Lewis (1978) etc can be excluded from consideration here because the truths they are concerned with are not those which authors and readers have in mind when they talk about the truth of fiction, namely the truths that fiction ts expected to convey In defence of my own approach l have to counter two different criticisms: the general argument of Hamburger (1979), who maintains that the concept of truth ts not applicable to literature, and the argument of Gebauer (1979). ~ h o accepts this application on principle but not my application. (Others ~ h o are sceptical about my treatment of truth claim are Kunne-lbsch (1976) ,.~ho agrees with me otherwise, and Hermer~n (1977)) What Hamburger and Gebauer have in c o m m o n is that they underestimate my distinction of different functions of literature (cf. Gabriel 1975. 98), especially the dlstmctton 1 made in the field of cognmve values Though l stressed the point that l did not want to reduce the functions ot literature to conveying truths, Hamburger imputes to me the assertion that fictional hterature "has to make" true statements (Hamburger 1979 121). [A curious misunderstanding I fred m Hermer~n (1977' 366). who understands mx

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own (obviously justified} efforts not to be read as a reducttomst m the following way' that ! wanted to ctmctze other, s for reducing the functions of literature to claiming truth.] The next step in Hamburger's simplification of my po',mon is that she misunderstands my defence of the truth of fiction as a defence of truth m fiction. She identifies the so-called "theses" of a work of fiction as explicit statements on the reflection level in the text (1979: 123). Then she argues that we cannot take these reflections in a text as true theses Of course we cannot, and this for two reasons, first, a thesis is a result of an interpretation of the whole text and an explicit reflection ts a truth-claiming thesis only if it can stand such interpretation (cf. my definition of truth claim 1975. 94), and second, the truth claim may fall. i.e. the theses may be false. It seems to me that Hamburger does not notice the difference between truth d a o n and truth. Otherwise she could not presuppose (1979. 122) that my definition of "truth claim" functions as a "speech act theoretical definition" of the concept "'truth" itself (whatever such a d e f m m c n may be) When Hamburger misses a satisfying definition of "(aesthetic) truth" she is right insofar as I never tried to define such a concept The difference 1 stated between science and fiction ~as not a difference in the concept of truth (scientific truth versus aesthetic truth) but a difference in the way the truths are conveyed (saying ~ersus shov, mg) Hamburger's reading is guided by her intention to prove that there can be no such concept as "aesthetic truth". In fact her own position is. a,,tomshmgly enough, comparable to that of the positivists. She reserves the concept of truth for statements of fact (cf. 1979 45. 129. 132, 138, 143. analytical truths she does not mention) and her sympathy towards emotlvlsm. though not stated explicitly, is evident (of 1979' 139) As a result of her fixation on the concept "truth" Hamburger only considers my use of the word "'true" and neglects the context in which it occurs This might be the right place to answer a question concerning the discharging ( " E m l o s u n g ' ) of truth claims by the readers Hermer~n (1977: 366) asks "'Could it not be the case that two readers with different background knowledge and life experiences take a different stand as to the truth of the thesis of a no~el '~ Does this mean that the thesis is both true and false at the same time '~ If not. ~hv not?" My answer is: why should we call any statement true a n d false on13 because two persons differ in judging its truth-value '~ If we ourselves do not agree with one of these persons we should simply say that we do not know. and this on the possible grounds that we are still hesitating or that we do not feel competent (with regard to our "Befmdhchkeit'). Hermer~n seems wrongly to believe that the question of truth as far as statements are concerned is legitimate only if we are in a position to decide whether these statements are true or not. This vlew is stated explicitly by Hamburger. Looking at the arts. Hamburger (1979. 138) declares that :n the field of interpretation ( " D e u t u n g ' ) there is no place for the conc.ept of truth It is clear from the context that she Is confounding two qt,,:StlOnS of truth here. the question as to whether lnterpreta-

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tions can be true and the question as to whether works of art can be true. The same happens with respect to interpretation and theses of works of fiction (1979. 12If.. note 1251. To make tt clear then, any interpretative assertion which states the thesis of a work of fiction is different from this thesis Itself Hamburger starts off from the above m e n u o n e d m~sunderstandmg when she argues against the application of the concept of truth to the arts by pointing to the well-known divergencies b,ztween interpretations. She maintains that speakm g of truth d e m a n d s "Unwldersprechhchkeit" m the sense that any counterargument or contradiction is excluded (1979 138) Theses could hardly fulf, I such an exaggerated reqmrement, but that is not really a problem, all the less so because statements of fact, which are Hamburger's Iruth-candldates. do not fulfd such a requirement eithel and - because Hamburger at the end of her book herself gives a striking example of a thesis m my sense Whereas the disagreement with Hamburger seems to me fundamental, this is not the case with Gebauer Gebauer (19791 argues against my attempt to conceive the truth of fiction as the truth of statements. However. he fails to notice that the concept of literary truth which he himself advocates is also taken into account by me (1975: 107ff.), namely, different from truth, as knowledge ("Erkentnis"). My supposition that the dlfference~ Gebauer stresses arc less fundamental than coat agreements is confirmed by his later book (Gebauer 1981), though it does not convince me in detail. Here Gebauer (of 1981: 232, 266) himself uses the concept of knowledge ("Erkenntms") in my sense instead of the concept of truth A comparison with my articles (Gabriel 1978 and 19821, concerning h'~erary form and hterary meaning, would underline the similarity of our positions. When Gebauer insists that we can grant the novel "The Turn of the Screw" by Henry James "a truth-content for the analysis of the relations between uncertainty, imagination, and the behavlour resulting from it" (Gebauer 1979. 1371. though it is impossible to express the truth-content in the form of statements, it seems to me that his concept of truth-content corresponds to my concept of an adequate presentation of (a non-proposmonal) general in a particular. Gebauer continues (1979: 137t-.J" "Literary authors are not philosophers, just as they are not scientists Their explicit reflections, when isolated from their contexts, m a y appear to be very simple Within the context of the literary work, however they can change so m u c h under the impact of formal elements that theft recogmtton can no longer be expressed in the form of statements. That the truth of literature ~an eAceed that o f statements explains its stgmftcance for our knowledge". T h o u g h this argument is meant as an argument against my position 1 completely agree with its pomt. I would hke to state once more (1) The cognitive value of works of fiction must not be reduced to propositional knowledge (2) In cases of propositional knowledge the theses are the result of Interpreta-

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G Gahrzel / Ft~tton andtr~4th, retonstdered

t,on o f the w h o l e text. , e. they m u s t not to be t a k e n s e p a r a t e l y . (! d o not " ' s e p a r a t e " ( G e b a u e r 1979: 135) the reflect,on level f r o m the r e p o r t level; 1 "d,sttngutsh" between them.) (3) T h e s e s d o not e x h a u s t the c o n t e n t of w o r k s o f ftction, a n d m u s t not be t a k e n as substitutes for the c o m p l e x w o r k s themselves. (4) P r o p o s l t , o n a l k n o w l e d g e is o v e r e s t , m a t e d ,n o u r w o r l d of science. T h e poss,btl,ty of relevant n o n - p r o p o s t t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e , for w h t c h I p r e f e r to a v o , d the t e r m "'truth". c a n be best s h o w n m the case ot h t e r a r y w o r k s of f, ction.

Reference~ Beard,Jey. M C 1958 Aesthettcs Problems m the phdosophy of crmclsm New York' Harcourt. Brace & World Bruck J 1978 Zum Begnff hteranscher Ftktlon Zeltschnft fur Germamsttsche Lmgmstlk 6 283-303 Ellis. J M 1978 Reviev* of Gabrtel (1975) The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Crmclsm 37 231-233 Frege. G 1976 Wis,,ensthafthcher Bnefv.echsel Ed by G Gabriel et al Hamburg, Fehx Memer Fncke. H 1981 Norm and Abv.elchung Eme Phdosophte der Llteratur Munchen C H Beck Frl~.ke H 1982 Semantlt.s or pragmatlcs of fict~onaht3,'~ A modest proposal Poetics II Gabriel. G 1975 FtktJon und Wahrhelt Eme semantlst.he Theone der Llteratur Stuugart/Bad Can,tart Frommann-ltolzboog Gabriel. G 1978 Loglk ab, L~!eratur~ Zur Bedeutung d,.'s Llteranschen beD Wtttgenstem Merkur 32 353-362 Gabriel G 1979 Fiction - a semanttc approach Poetl~.s 8 245-255 Gabrtel. G 1982 Uber Bede,ttung m der Literatur Zur Moghchkelt asthetlscher Erkenntms AIIgememe Zettschnft fur i'hdosophle (l'orthcommg) Gebauer. G 1979 Revlev. of Gabriel (1975) Studies m Language 3 133-138 Gebauer. G 1981 Der Emzelne und sere gesellschafthches WIssen Untersuchangen zum s~,mbollst.hen Wtssen Berhn/l~.¢v. York W de Gruyte~ Goodman. N 1968 Languages of art An approach to a theory of s~.mbols Indmnapohs/Ne'~ York Bobbs-Merrill ttamburger. K 1979 Wahrhel~ und asthetlsche Wahrheit Stuttgart Klett-Kotta Hermeren G 1977 Review of Gabrtd (1975) The Journal of Philosophy 72 362-367 lhwe. J F 1979 Sprachphdosophle. Literatur'~.lssenschaft und Ethlk Anregungen zur Diskusslon de,. Flkttonsbegrfffs ..~.msterdamerBe,trage zur neueren Germamstlk 8 207-264 lh'~.e J F and H Rleser 1979 Normative -".riddescriptive theory of hctton Some contemporary tssues Poetics 8 63-84 Juhl. P D 1¢80 Interpretation An essay m the phdosophy of hterary crmclsm Pnneeton. NJ Prmccton Umverslt3, Press Koppe. F 1977 Sprache und Bedurfms Zur sprachphdosophtschen Grundlage der Gelsteswlssenschaften Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt Frommann-Holzboog Kunne-lbscb. E 1976 Review of Gabriel (1975) D:utsche Bucher (Amsterdam) 6. 202-204 Lewis. D 1978 Truth m fiction American PhdosophJcal Quarterly 15 37-46 Meyer-Mmnemann. K 1979 Revtexl of Gabriel (1975) Nueva Revtsta Ftlologla Hlspama 27 362-365

G Gabriel / Fiction and truth, reconsidered Parsons, T 1980. Nonexistent objects. New Haven. CT Yale University Press ROsier, W 1980. Die [-ntdeckung der Fiktlonahtat m der Anttke Poetlca 12 283-319 Sasse. G 1980, 'Literatursprache" In H P AIthaus (ed). Lexlkon der germamstlschen Lmgmstlk (Second edition ) Tubmgen Nlemeyer pp 698-706 Searle. J R. 1975 The logical status of fictional discourse New Literary HI,tory 6 319-332 Woc,ds. J 1974 The logic of fiction The Hague' Mouton Zlmmermann, J 1980. Sprachanalytlsche Asthetlk Em Uberbhck Stuttgart/Bad Can~tatt, Frommann-Holzboog

Gottfrted Gabriel teaches phdosophy at the Umverslty of Konstanz (Germany) His pubhcatlon, are on the phdosophy of language, the theory of knowledge and aesthehcs