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Applied ethology and animal welfare
Applied Animal Ethology, 7 (1981) 3-10 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam
- Printed in The
Netherlands
3
Guest Editorial APPLIED ETHOLOGY AND ANIMAL WELFARE
R.G. BEILHARZ’ Tierhygienisches Germany)
and K. ZEEB Znstitut Freiburg, Postfach 5140,
7800 Freiburg (Federal Republic of
Applied ethologists, amongst others, have become increasingly concerned with the problem of animal welfare and the avoidance of suffering by animals (e.g. Fraser, 1975,1979a,b; Brantas, 1974; Council of Europe (U.K. delegation), 1979; Dawkins, 1976; Duncan, 1974; FGlsch, 1977; Fox, 1978; Hughes, 1979; Kiimmer, 1979; Koch and Zeeb, 1970; Lorenz, 1978a; Martin, 1975, 1979; Murphy, 1978; Rheinaubund (Graf et al.), 1977; Van Putten and Dammers, 1976; Wood-Gush, 1973; Zeeb, 1970a, b, c). Concern for animals is also high amongst lay people in many countries, and laws relating to animal protection have recently been revised in, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S.A. (Rheinaubund, 1977). Sometimes, as in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the revis& law has clearly stated the aim of ensuring the protection of animals, but has left specific details to be filled in later from the results of the research of the appropriate scientists, i.e. applied ethologists. Central to such research effort is the concept “appropriate (or necessary) for the kind or species” (“artgerecht”). Ethological research must determine the conditions required to satisfy the needs of the animal, so that suffering does not occur. The introduction and administration of such laws underline the serious responsibility which applied ethologists have. Revision of laws is often associated with political activity. Animal protection has also aroused enthusiastic emotional responses from well-meaning but often less-well-informed persons. The political activity associated with animal welfare has gone so far as to threaten the livelihood of whole groups of animal keepers, e.g. through the banning of the most common and appsrently most economically efficient form of poultry keeping. It is enough to say that the topic is important, has many practical implications and that great care should be taken to prevent the making of wrong decisions. On the other hand, all real suffering by animals should be revealed as soon as it occurs, and alleviated. There is no excuse for inaction in the face of suffering. Yet, how do we know whether apparently healthy animals are suffer1Agriculture and Forestry, University of Melbourne, Parkville,
3052 (Australia)
0304-3762/81/0000-0000/$02.25
Publishing Company
0 1981
Elsevier Scientific
4
ing? On this question even applied ethologists are divided (e.g. Council of Europe (U.K. delegation), 1979; Martin, 1979). We invite all readers of “Applied Animal Ethology” to appraise the subject critically. We begin by recalling knowledge most of us accept without reservation. During the process of evolution, all forms of life have adapted genetically to their environment. The environment of a species includes other forms of life such as food or prey species, predators, parasites and symbionts. Bizarre adaptations occur, such as in the cuckoo or in the widowbirds (Nicolai, 1970a, b) where the rearing of young of one species is done by adults of another. Many forms of parasitism occur. There is also variety in the adaptation of populations within a species (e.g. Nicolai, 1970a). Some breeds of dogs retrieve objects, others do not. Some like to go into water, others do not. Some are suitable for particular forms of hunting, or herding sheep, or guarding, others are not. All breeds of dogs differ genetically from wolves (Scott and Fuller, 1965; Zimen, 1971). Amongst the many symbionts and parasites that have evolved to coexist with other species, domestic animals have evolved to coexist with man. The relationship is probably best described as symbiotic, because neither man nor domestic animals would be as numerous as they are without the other (Zeuner, 1963). From generally accepted knowledge such as this, we can derive two important points for the ethology of domestic animals. 1. Domestic animals have changed genetically, and will continue to do so, in their adaptation to the conditions created by man. This change has occurred partly through natural selection of those genotypes whose reproduction was highest under the conditions created by man (Fox, 1968; Lorenz, 1978a; Tschanz, 1978), but also, e.g. in dogs, by man’s conscious selection of different types for different purposes (Zeuner, 1963; Fox, 1976; Beilharz, 1979). The possibility, indeed the inevitability, of genetic adaptation in our farm animals must therefore never be forgotten. 2. “Appropriate (necessary) for the kind or species” (“artgerecht”) must be understood to mean appropriate for the particular population of animals with which we are dealing. While we recognise that evolutionary biologists may have difficulties in defining species (Mayr, 1963), we must not allow such difficulties to interfere with our concern for the welfare of the particular animals in our care. In other words, although scientifically interesting, it may not be relevant to the welfare of domestic hens that jungle hens show certain behaviours in the wild which hens adapted to cages do not show. Noone expects to keep jungle fowl in battery cages. If one did, one would probably find the environment provided by cages outside the range of possible adaptation of jungle fowl, with resulting “stress” expressing itself in abnormal behaviour, injury and low or zero reproduction (Tschanz, 1978). Personal experience with mice (Beilharz and Beilharz, 1975) showed that while laboratory mice bred freely, wild-caught mice did not breed during months of experimentation in the laboratory, thus supporting the conclusion of Tschanz (1978).
5
It follows that it need not be necessary for the welfare of domestic animals in intensive conditions for them to be able to carry out all the behaviours normally seen under extensive conditions, let alone all behaviours shown by wild animals. Unfortunately, many concerned ethologists, (e.g. Martin, 1975, 1979) have tried to use just such a comparison of frequencies of behaviours under different conditions to conclude that welfare of intensively kept animals is depressed. While it may be, this is by no means certain, particularly if the animals are genetically different. Even if animals are of the same genetic stock, the demonstration of varying frequencies of behaviour under different conditions cannot prove that welfare is depressed. All efforts in this direction are based on the model of instinctive behaviour, popularized by Lorenz (1963), which maintains that the motivation (internal drive) to perform an instinctive behaviour rises continuously until, even in the absence of appropriate stimuli, the behaviour is released spontaneously. If behaviours are prevented, or can only be released by very inadequate stimuli, as must happen to sand-bathing or nest-building by a hen in a cage, it follows from the model that the hen must be suffering. However, this model is now known to be far too simple. Lorenz (197813, p. 143) himself contrasts this “old” model with a revised model. The revised model has a slowly rising internal motivation as well as many other stimuli that, in their normal functioning, raise motivation until, eventually, one stimulus, the releasing stimulus, releases the behaviour. With this model, if a hen in a cage never sees sand or anything like it, she may only rarely .be sufficiently motivated to “want” to sand-bathe. Hassenstein (1980, p. 18) presents the model in the form of a switch diagram. In this presentation, the inevitability of a behaviour having to occur spontaneously has disappeared. On p. 208, he discusses the work of Heiligenberg (1964) and others to show that internal readiness to perform a behaviour, after an initial rise, can also drop if the behaviour is never released. Thus, current models explaining instinctive behaviours do not allow one to conclude from absence or variation in frequencies of particular behaviours that an animal is suffering. In contrast, there can be no doubt that a wounded animal is suffering. Suffering associated with wounding is likely to express itself in lowered production. The work of Fiilsch (1977), which is often quoted as evidence that wounding does not depress egg production in laying hens, actually shows that, while 13 of 26 wounded hens showed no apparent drop in production, there was a serious depression in the production of the other 13. Such a result suggests that stress caused by wounding will, on average, cause a drop in production. This is also the experience of animal breeders. How then can one decide whether or not healthy animals that are producing well are suffering? It seems very difficult to find an answer. One possibility is, of course , that such animals are not suffering at all. However much some of us may dislike seeing hens in cages, it may nevertheless be true that such hens, provided they are healthy and laying well, are not suffering. It would be foolish to dismiss the possibility.
6
Just as alteration of behavioural frequencies is not an adequate demonstration of suffering, so offering animals a choice between environments does not give clear results. With appropriate rearing and prior experience almost any familiar environment will be preferred over other environments (Dawkins, 1976; Hughes, 1977). The approach of Richards (1976), which allows an animal to indicate its requirements via conditioning tasks, seems more promising. Richards’ hens learnt to press keys to cause their ambient temperature to remain below 30°C. Our ultimate aim must be to measure the motivations of animals considered to be suffering. It is easy to make an animal peck a disk or press a bar for a food reward. The amount of such work done gives an indication of the strength of the motivation. It should be possible to build an apparatus housing animals in conditions similar to those under which they are normally kept, such as a cage for hens. This apparatus must have a device which, when pecked or pressed, allows the performance of the behaviour thought to be frustrated. The amount of pecking or pressing, in order to be allowed to perform the behaviour, will measure the motivation. If hens cannot be taught to peck a spot in order to be allowed to sand-bathe, or stretch the wings, we may conclude they have no great motivation to do these things. There are both practical and theoretical difficulties in making such pieces of apparatus. Our ingenuity will be well applied in overcoming the practical problems. The theoretical difficulties flow from the current models explaining instinctive behaviour (Lorenz, 1978b; Hassenstein, 1980). Is it possible to measure a “basic” motivation for sand-bathing without showing the hen a sand-bath and thus raising its level of motivation? If we succeed in showing that animals are suffering under particular conditions of husbandry, what is to be done? There are two approaches. Either (1) we change the animals genetically and adapt them to the environment, or (2) we improve the environment. Many people have reservations about changing animals to suit man’s purposes. These may even be innate. Lorenz (1973,1978a) discusses how man and his whole sensory apparatus have evolved in adaptation to his environment, which includes his culture. Even man’s values may reflect a genetic component predisposing him to judging the appearance of wild animals as more harmonious and pleasant than the generally weaker and fatter appearance of domestic animals. In the same works, however, Lorenz shows that the general tendency of evolution culminating in man of today is in the direction of emancipation from strict instinctive control of behaviour towards greater control through wisdom passed on by tradition (culture) and individual reason. Many others, including the writers of the biblical story of Adam and Eve being cast out of Paradise after eating fruit from the tree of knowledge, also see the same evolutionary trend towards greater non-instinctive control of man’s behaviour. No one can deny that man, because of his mental capacities, now largely controls or influences nature. Man cannot undo this situation. Whether we
7
recognise it or not, our actions affect nature and all animals are either adapting to the changes we make or becoming extinct. Yet in this aspect we are not unique. Many other species by their presence are affecting other species, as parasites, symbionts or competitors (Zeuner, 1963). Influence of one species on another is “natural” and seems ethically neutral. Yet, for his own good, and for that of the whole of creation, should not man now accept full responsibility for the future of domestic animals, even if man is instinctively prejudiced? Full responsibility includes specifying what these animals should produce and what behavioural requirements they should have. Because, even if we fail to take this responsibility, the animals will not remain the same as they are now. It seems better to guide the changes through reason than to leave them to chance. In many cases we are already doing this and receiving everyone’s praise. One example is the breeding of guide dogs for the blind (Pfaffenberger et al., 1976; Goddard and Beilharz, 1974; Beilharz, 1979). Guide dogs are deliberately selected to be less fearful, so that their work is not inhibited by responses related to fear. At the same time, their training inhibits all instinctive distraction by other dogs, cats, etc. Dogs that cannot be trained to be so inhibited are culled. No one has ever suggested that such major modification of “natural” behaviour is anything but praise-worthy. Man lost the possibility of leaving the evolution of animals to itself many years ago, at the latest when domestication started. Consciously accepting responsibility for the future guidance of the evolution of domestic animals seems to us morally appropriate. Accepting this responsibility puts a clear duty on us to safeguard the welfare of our animals. We cannot then shrug our shoulders and look the other way. If we accept that man may change domestic animals in the best interests of all, then we should briefly consider the processes by which this change will occur. The most appropriate environment and conditions of husbandry should be defined, presumably by consensus, with working conditions, hygiene of animals and of products, economic and other aspects being fully considered. Then we should breed the animals under the defined conditions of environment and husbandry. With Tschanz (1978), we believe that reproductive performance in the widest sense will reflect their degree of adaptation. Common sense selection on production under the defined conditions should lead to adaptation to the degree that welfare can be taken as guaranteed. Welfare through adaptation cannot be guaranteed, however, if we continually change our conditions of husbandry so that the animals cannot adapt, or if we force our commercial animals into conditions different from those under which the breeders are selected. It seems impossible to adapt hens to battery cages if the birds in the breeding nuclei are housed continuously under conditions where they have much more space and a variety of stimuli not found in cages, unless the breeding birds are selected on the basis of the performance of their progeny in cages. While a case can be made for adapting animals genetically to intensive
8
housing if they are to be always indoors, the other approach must be used for animals which normally spend much of their time outside. Most dairy cows spend at least 6 months each year on pasture, performing all the typical outdoor behaviours. It would be unreasonable to house them in winter under conditions in which they could not perform their “natural” behaviour. It is unlikely that a population of cows adapted to fully intensive housing is required. Thus, for dairy cows the approach of Klmmer (1979), who measured frequencies of injuries and atypical behaviour related to lying down in boxes of different types, in order to suggest modifications, will contribute to welfare. We are convinced that a responsible and reasonable discussion, based on scientific research, of the issues raised in this article will contribute more to animal welfare than any hasty and arbitrary action, even if the latter results from the noblest motives. It seems clear that in the whole field dealing with ethology of domestic animals more research, both applied and fundamental, will be of great help in providing factual information. Factual information should help to reduce argumentation where the problems are more apparent than real. This should set us free to identify those areas where real suffering may be present. Suffering might very well be found in traditional, as well as in the modern intensive forms, of animal production. REFERENCES Beilharz, R.G., 1979. Verhaltensgenetik bei iandwirtschaftlichen Nutztieren. Tierziicht., 31: 275-278. Beilharz, R.G. and Beilharz, V.C., 1975. Observations on fighting behaviour of male mice (Mus musculus L). Z. Tierpsychol., 39: 126-140. Brantas, G.C., 1974. Das Verhalten von Legehennen - quantitative Unterschiede zwischen Kafig- und Bodenhaltung. KTBL (Kuratorium fur Technik und Bauwesen in der Landwirtschaft, e.V.) Schrift DK 591.5/351.779/636,083. Ursache und Beseitigung von Verhaltensstorungen. pp. 138-146. Council of Europe: Standing Committee of the European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (U.K. delegation) 1979. The Welfare of the Laying Hen. Strasbourg, 31 Oct. 1979, TPA/E (79) 15. Dawkins, M., 1976. Towards an objective method of assessing welfare in domestic fowl. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 245-254. Duncan, I.J.H., 1974. Welfare of housed animals. Vet. Rec., 94: 100 (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Folsch, D.W., 1977. Die Legeleistung - kein zuverlassiger Indikator fur den Gesundheitszustand bei Hennen mit Verletzungen. Tieriirztl. Praxis, 5: 69-73. Fox, M.W., 1968. The influence of domestication upon behaviour of animals. In: M.W. Fox (Editor), Abnormal Behavior in Animals. Saunders, Philadelphia, Chap. 5, pp. 64-76. Fox, M.W., 1976. Effects of domestication on prey catching and killing in beagles, coyotes and F, hybrids. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 123-140. Fox, M.W., 1978. From animal science to animal rights. Proc. 1st World Congr. Ethology Applied to Zootechnics. Madrid, Oct. 1978, Vol. l/2, pp. 557-562. Fraser, A.F., 1975. Ethology and ethics (Editorial). Appl. Anim. Ethol., 1: 211-212. Fraser, A.F., 1979a. The nature of cruelty to animals (Editorial). Appl. Anim. Ethel., 5: 1-4.
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Fraser, A.F., 1979b. Conclusions and recommendations of the F&t World Congress on Ethology Applied to Zootechnics, Madrid, Spain. Oct. 1978, Appl. Anim. Ethol., 5: 301-303. Goddard, M.E. and Beilharz, R.G., 1974. A breeding programme for guide dogs. Proc. 1st World Congr. Genetics Applied to Livestock Production, Madrid, Vol. 3: 547551. Hassenstein, B., 1980. Instinkt, Lernen, Spielen, Einsicht, Einfiihrung in die Verhaltens biologie. Piper, Miinchen. Heiligenherg, W., 1964. Ein Versuch zur ganzheitsbezogenen Analyse des Instinktverhaltens eines Fisches (Pelmatochromie subocellatus). Z. Tierpsychol., 21: l-52 (cited in Hassenstein, 1980). Hughes, B.O., 1977. Selection of group size by individual laying hens. Br. Poultry Sci., 18: 9-18 (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Hughes, B.O., 1979. The assessment of welfare in fowls in battery cages (abstract). Appl. Anim. Ethol., 5: 295. Kiimmer, P., 1979. Untersuchungen zur Tiergerechtheit und ihrer Bestimmung bei Boxenlaufstallhaltung von Milchkiihen in der Schweiz. Diss., Univ. Bern. Koch, G. and Zeeb, K., 1970. Ethologisch-Gkologische Aspekte bei der Haltung von Hausrindern unter verschiedenen Bedingungen. Z. Tierz. Ziichtungsbiol., 86: 232-239. Lorenz, K., 1963. Das sogenannte Bose. Borotha-Scholer, Wien. Lorenz, K., 1973. Die Riickseite des Spiegels. Piper, Miinchen. Lorenz, K., 1978a. Zivilisationspathologie und Kulturfreiheit. In: K. Lorenz (Collected papers), Das Wirkungsgefige der Natur und das Schicksaal des Menschen. Piper, Miinchen pp. 324-355. Lorenz, K., 1978b, Vergleichende Verhaltensforschung. Springer, Wien. Martin, G., 1975. Uber Verhaltensstijrungen von Legehennen im Kiifig. Ein Beitrag zur Kliirung des Problems tierschutzgerechter Hiihnerhaltung. Angew. Ornithol., 4: 145176. Martin, G., 1979. Zur KEfighaltung von Legehennen. Eine Stellungnahme aus der Sicht der Verhaltenswissenschaft. In: G.M. Teutsch, E. von Loeper, G. Martin and J. Miiller (Editors), Intensivhaltung von Nutztieren aus ethischer, rechtlicher und ethologischer Sicht. Birkhauser, Basel, pp. 101-122. Population, Species and Evolution. Belknap. Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. Mayr, E., 1963. Murphy, L.B., 1978. A Review of Animal Welfare and Intensive Animal Production. Queensl. Dept. Primary Ind., Brisbane, Australia. Nicolai, J., 1970a. Der Brutparasitismus der Viduinae als ethologisches Problem. In: J. Nicolai (Editor) Elternbeziehung und Partnerwahl im Leben der Vogel. Piper, Miinchen, pp. 159-258. Nicolai, J., 1970b. Der Brutparasitismus der Witwenvogel. In: J. Nicolai (Editor), Elternbeziehung und Partnerwahl im Leben der Vogel. Piper, Miinchen, pp. 148-158. Pfaffenberger, C.J., Scott, J.P., Fuller, J.L., Ginsburg, B.F. and Bielfeldt, S.W., 1976. Guide Dogs for the Blind: Their Selection, Development and Training. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Rheinaubund (Priisidium: Graf, K., Akerst, E., Uehlinger, A.; Arbeitsgruppe Tierschutz), 1977. Wortlaut und Ziel im Abschnitt “Tierhaltung” des Eidgeniissischen Tierschutzgesetzes. Natur und Mensch, 19: 11 pp. Richards, S.A., 1976. Behavioural temperature regulation in the fowl. J. Physiol., 258: 122P-123P. Scott, J.P. and Fuller, J.L., 1965. Genetics and the Social Behaviour of the Dog. Univ. Chicago, Chicago. Tschanz, B., 1978. Reaktionsnormen und Adaptation. In: W.H. Weike (Editor), Das Tier im Experiment. Hans Huber, Bern, pp. 33-49. Van Putten, G. and Dammers, J., 1976. A comparative study of the well-being of piglets reared conventionally and in cages. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 339-356.
10 Wood-Gush, D.G.M., 1973. Animal welfare in modern agriculture. Br. Vet. J., 129: 167173. (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Zeeb, K., 1970a. Massentierhaltung und angewandte Ethologie. Zentralbl. Veterinarmed., 17: 86-90. Zeeb, K., 1970b. Angewandte Ethologie bei der Haustierhaltung. Dtsch. Tieriirztl. Wochen schr., 77: 125-126. Zeeb, K., 1970~. Verhaltensbiologische Gedanken zum Problem Rinderlaufstall. Tierziicht., 22: 573-579. Zeuner, F., 1963. A History of Domesticated Animals. Hutchinson, London. Zimen, E., Wolfe und Kiinigspudel. Piper, Miinchen.
- Printed in The
Netherlands
3
Guest Editorial APPLIED ETHOLOGY AND ANIMAL WELFARE
R.G. BEILHARZ’ Tierhygienisches Germany)
and K. ZEEB Znstitut Freiburg, Postfach 5140,
7800 Freiburg (Federal Republic of
Applied ethologists, amongst others, have become increasingly concerned with the problem of animal welfare and the avoidance of suffering by animals (e.g. Fraser, 1975,1979a,b; Brantas, 1974; Council of Europe (U.K. delegation), 1979; Dawkins, 1976; Duncan, 1974; FGlsch, 1977; Fox, 1978; Hughes, 1979; Kiimmer, 1979; Koch and Zeeb, 1970; Lorenz, 1978a; Martin, 1975, 1979; Murphy, 1978; Rheinaubund (Graf et al.), 1977; Van Putten and Dammers, 1976; Wood-Gush, 1973; Zeeb, 1970a, b, c). Concern for animals is also high amongst lay people in many countries, and laws relating to animal protection have recently been revised in, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S.A. (Rheinaubund, 1977). Sometimes, as in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the revis& law has clearly stated the aim of ensuring the protection of animals, but has left specific details to be filled in later from the results of the research of the appropriate scientists, i.e. applied ethologists. Central to such research effort is the concept “appropriate (or necessary) for the kind or species” (“artgerecht”). Ethological research must determine the conditions required to satisfy the needs of the animal, so that suffering does not occur. The introduction and administration of such laws underline the serious responsibility which applied ethologists have. Revision of laws is often associated with political activity. Animal protection has also aroused enthusiastic emotional responses from well-meaning but often less-well-informed persons. The political activity associated with animal welfare has gone so far as to threaten the livelihood of whole groups of animal keepers, e.g. through the banning of the most common and appsrently most economically efficient form of poultry keeping. It is enough to say that the topic is important, has many practical implications and that great care should be taken to prevent the making of wrong decisions. On the other hand, all real suffering by animals should be revealed as soon as it occurs, and alleviated. There is no excuse for inaction in the face of suffering. Yet, how do we know whether apparently healthy animals are suffer1Agriculture and Forestry, University of Melbourne, Parkville,
3052 (Australia)
0304-3762/81/0000-0000/$02.25
Publishing Company
0 1981
Elsevier Scientific
4
ing? On this question even applied ethologists are divided (e.g. Council of Europe (U.K. delegation), 1979; Martin, 1979). We invite all readers of “Applied Animal Ethology” to appraise the subject critically. We begin by recalling knowledge most of us accept without reservation. During the process of evolution, all forms of life have adapted genetically to their environment. The environment of a species includes other forms of life such as food or prey species, predators, parasites and symbionts. Bizarre adaptations occur, such as in the cuckoo or in the widowbirds (Nicolai, 1970a, b) where the rearing of young of one species is done by adults of another. Many forms of parasitism occur. There is also variety in the adaptation of populations within a species (e.g. Nicolai, 1970a). Some breeds of dogs retrieve objects, others do not. Some like to go into water, others do not. Some are suitable for particular forms of hunting, or herding sheep, or guarding, others are not. All breeds of dogs differ genetically from wolves (Scott and Fuller, 1965; Zimen, 1971). Amongst the many symbionts and parasites that have evolved to coexist with other species, domestic animals have evolved to coexist with man. The relationship is probably best described as symbiotic, because neither man nor domestic animals would be as numerous as they are without the other (Zeuner, 1963). From generally accepted knowledge such as this, we can derive two important points for the ethology of domestic animals. 1. Domestic animals have changed genetically, and will continue to do so, in their adaptation to the conditions created by man. This change has occurred partly through natural selection of those genotypes whose reproduction was highest under the conditions created by man (Fox, 1968; Lorenz, 1978a; Tschanz, 1978), but also, e.g. in dogs, by man’s conscious selection of different types for different purposes (Zeuner, 1963; Fox, 1976; Beilharz, 1979). The possibility, indeed the inevitability, of genetic adaptation in our farm animals must therefore never be forgotten. 2. “Appropriate (necessary) for the kind or species” (“artgerecht”) must be understood to mean appropriate for the particular population of animals with which we are dealing. While we recognise that evolutionary biologists may have difficulties in defining species (Mayr, 1963), we must not allow such difficulties to interfere with our concern for the welfare of the particular animals in our care. In other words, although scientifically interesting, it may not be relevant to the welfare of domestic hens that jungle hens show certain behaviours in the wild which hens adapted to cages do not show. Noone expects to keep jungle fowl in battery cages. If one did, one would probably find the environment provided by cages outside the range of possible adaptation of jungle fowl, with resulting “stress” expressing itself in abnormal behaviour, injury and low or zero reproduction (Tschanz, 1978). Personal experience with mice (Beilharz and Beilharz, 1975) showed that while laboratory mice bred freely, wild-caught mice did not breed during months of experimentation in the laboratory, thus supporting the conclusion of Tschanz (1978).
5
It follows that it need not be necessary for the welfare of domestic animals in intensive conditions for them to be able to carry out all the behaviours normally seen under extensive conditions, let alone all behaviours shown by wild animals. Unfortunately, many concerned ethologists, (e.g. Martin, 1975, 1979) have tried to use just such a comparison of frequencies of behaviours under different conditions to conclude that welfare of intensively kept animals is depressed. While it may be, this is by no means certain, particularly if the animals are genetically different. Even if animals are of the same genetic stock, the demonstration of varying frequencies of behaviour under different conditions cannot prove that welfare is depressed. All efforts in this direction are based on the model of instinctive behaviour, popularized by Lorenz (1963), which maintains that the motivation (internal drive) to perform an instinctive behaviour rises continuously until, even in the absence of appropriate stimuli, the behaviour is released spontaneously. If behaviours are prevented, or can only be released by very inadequate stimuli, as must happen to sand-bathing or nest-building by a hen in a cage, it follows from the model that the hen must be suffering. However, this model is now known to be far too simple. Lorenz (197813, p. 143) himself contrasts this “old” model with a revised model. The revised model has a slowly rising internal motivation as well as many other stimuli that, in their normal functioning, raise motivation until, eventually, one stimulus, the releasing stimulus, releases the behaviour. With this model, if a hen in a cage never sees sand or anything like it, she may only rarely .be sufficiently motivated to “want” to sand-bathe. Hassenstein (1980, p. 18) presents the model in the form of a switch diagram. In this presentation, the inevitability of a behaviour having to occur spontaneously has disappeared. On p. 208, he discusses the work of Heiligenberg (1964) and others to show that internal readiness to perform a behaviour, after an initial rise, can also drop if the behaviour is never released. Thus, current models explaining instinctive behaviours do not allow one to conclude from absence or variation in frequencies of particular behaviours that an animal is suffering. In contrast, there can be no doubt that a wounded animal is suffering. Suffering associated with wounding is likely to express itself in lowered production. The work of Fiilsch (1977), which is often quoted as evidence that wounding does not depress egg production in laying hens, actually shows that, while 13 of 26 wounded hens showed no apparent drop in production, there was a serious depression in the production of the other 13. Such a result suggests that stress caused by wounding will, on average, cause a drop in production. This is also the experience of animal breeders. How then can one decide whether or not healthy animals that are producing well are suffering? It seems very difficult to find an answer. One possibility is, of course , that such animals are not suffering at all. However much some of us may dislike seeing hens in cages, it may nevertheless be true that such hens, provided they are healthy and laying well, are not suffering. It would be foolish to dismiss the possibility.
6
Just as alteration of behavioural frequencies is not an adequate demonstration of suffering, so offering animals a choice between environments does not give clear results. With appropriate rearing and prior experience almost any familiar environment will be preferred over other environments (Dawkins, 1976; Hughes, 1977). The approach of Richards (1976), which allows an animal to indicate its requirements via conditioning tasks, seems more promising. Richards’ hens learnt to press keys to cause their ambient temperature to remain below 30°C. Our ultimate aim must be to measure the motivations of animals considered to be suffering. It is easy to make an animal peck a disk or press a bar for a food reward. The amount of such work done gives an indication of the strength of the motivation. It should be possible to build an apparatus housing animals in conditions similar to those under which they are normally kept, such as a cage for hens. This apparatus must have a device which, when pecked or pressed, allows the performance of the behaviour thought to be frustrated. The amount of pecking or pressing, in order to be allowed to perform the behaviour, will measure the motivation. If hens cannot be taught to peck a spot in order to be allowed to sand-bathe, or stretch the wings, we may conclude they have no great motivation to do these things. There are both practical and theoretical difficulties in making such pieces of apparatus. Our ingenuity will be well applied in overcoming the practical problems. The theoretical difficulties flow from the current models explaining instinctive behaviour (Lorenz, 1978b; Hassenstein, 1980). Is it possible to measure a “basic” motivation for sand-bathing without showing the hen a sand-bath and thus raising its level of motivation? If we succeed in showing that animals are suffering under particular conditions of husbandry, what is to be done? There are two approaches. Either (1) we change the animals genetically and adapt them to the environment, or (2) we improve the environment. Many people have reservations about changing animals to suit man’s purposes. These may even be innate. Lorenz (1973,1978a) discusses how man and his whole sensory apparatus have evolved in adaptation to his environment, which includes his culture. Even man’s values may reflect a genetic component predisposing him to judging the appearance of wild animals as more harmonious and pleasant than the generally weaker and fatter appearance of domestic animals. In the same works, however, Lorenz shows that the general tendency of evolution culminating in man of today is in the direction of emancipation from strict instinctive control of behaviour towards greater control through wisdom passed on by tradition (culture) and individual reason. Many others, including the writers of the biblical story of Adam and Eve being cast out of Paradise after eating fruit from the tree of knowledge, also see the same evolutionary trend towards greater non-instinctive control of man’s behaviour. No one can deny that man, because of his mental capacities, now largely controls or influences nature. Man cannot undo this situation. Whether we
7
recognise it or not, our actions affect nature and all animals are either adapting to the changes we make or becoming extinct. Yet in this aspect we are not unique. Many other species by their presence are affecting other species, as parasites, symbionts or competitors (Zeuner, 1963). Influence of one species on another is “natural” and seems ethically neutral. Yet, for his own good, and for that of the whole of creation, should not man now accept full responsibility for the future of domestic animals, even if man is instinctively prejudiced? Full responsibility includes specifying what these animals should produce and what behavioural requirements they should have. Because, even if we fail to take this responsibility, the animals will not remain the same as they are now. It seems better to guide the changes through reason than to leave them to chance. In many cases we are already doing this and receiving everyone’s praise. One example is the breeding of guide dogs for the blind (Pfaffenberger et al., 1976; Goddard and Beilharz, 1974; Beilharz, 1979). Guide dogs are deliberately selected to be less fearful, so that their work is not inhibited by responses related to fear. At the same time, their training inhibits all instinctive distraction by other dogs, cats, etc. Dogs that cannot be trained to be so inhibited are culled. No one has ever suggested that such major modification of “natural” behaviour is anything but praise-worthy. Man lost the possibility of leaving the evolution of animals to itself many years ago, at the latest when domestication started. Consciously accepting responsibility for the future guidance of the evolution of domestic animals seems to us morally appropriate. Accepting this responsibility puts a clear duty on us to safeguard the welfare of our animals. We cannot then shrug our shoulders and look the other way. If we accept that man may change domestic animals in the best interests of all, then we should briefly consider the processes by which this change will occur. The most appropriate environment and conditions of husbandry should be defined, presumably by consensus, with working conditions, hygiene of animals and of products, economic and other aspects being fully considered. Then we should breed the animals under the defined conditions of environment and husbandry. With Tschanz (1978), we believe that reproductive performance in the widest sense will reflect their degree of adaptation. Common sense selection on production under the defined conditions should lead to adaptation to the degree that welfare can be taken as guaranteed. Welfare through adaptation cannot be guaranteed, however, if we continually change our conditions of husbandry so that the animals cannot adapt, or if we force our commercial animals into conditions different from those under which the breeders are selected. It seems impossible to adapt hens to battery cages if the birds in the breeding nuclei are housed continuously under conditions where they have much more space and a variety of stimuli not found in cages, unless the breeding birds are selected on the basis of the performance of their progeny in cages. While a case can be made for adapting animals genetically to intensive
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housing if they are to be always indoors, the other approach must be used for animals which normally spend much of their time outside. Most dairy cows spend at least 6 months each year on pasture, performing all the typical outdoor behaviours. It would be unreasonable to house them in winter under conditions in which they could not perform their “natural” behaviour. It is unlikely that a population of cows adapted to fully intensive housing is required. Thus, for dairy cows the approach of Klmmer (1979), who measured frequencies of injuries and atypical behaviour related to lying down in boxes of different types, in order to suggest modifications, will contribute to welfare. We are convinced that a responsible and reasonable discussion, based on scientific research, of the issues raised in this article will contribute more to animal welfare than any hasty and arbitrary action, even if the latter results from the noblest motives. It seems clear that in the whole field dealing with ethology of domestic animals more research, both applied and fundamental, will be of great help in providing factual information. Factual information should help to reduce argumentation where the problems are more apparent than real. This should set us free to identify those areas where real suffering may be present. Suffering might very well be found in traditional, as well as in the modern intensive forms, of animal production. REFERENCES Beilharz, R.G., 1979. Verhaltensgenetik bei iandwirtschaftlichen Nutztieren. Tierziicht., 31: 275-278. Beilharz, R.G. and Beilharz, V.C., 1975. Observations on fighting behaviour of male mice (Mus musculus L). Z. Tierpsychol., 39: 126-140. Brantas, G.C., 1974. Das Verhalten von Legehennen - quantitative Unterschiede zwischen Kafig- und Bodenhaltung. KTBL (Kuratorium fur Technik und Bauwesen in der Landwirtschaft, e.V.) Schrift DK 591.5/351.779/636,083. Ursache und Beseitigung von Verhaltensstorungen. pp. 138-146. Council of Europe: Standing Committee of the European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (U.K. delegation) 1979. The Welfare of the Laying Hen. Strasbourg, 31 Oct. 1979, TPA/E (79) 15. Dawkins, M., 1976. Towards an objective method of assessing welfare in domestic fowl. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 245-254. Duncan, I.J.H., 1974. Welfare of housed animals. Vet. Rec., 94: 100 (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Folsch, D.W., 1977. Die Legeleistung - kein zuverlassiger Indikator fur den Gesundheitszustand bei Hennen mit Verletzungen. Tieriirztl. Praxis, 5: 69-73. Fox, M.W., 1968. The influence of domestication upon behaviour of animals. In: M.W. Fox (Editor), Abnormal Behavior in Animals. Saunders, Philadelphia, Chap. 5, pp. 64-76. Fox, M.W., 1976. Effects of domestication on prey catching and killing in beagles, coyotes and F, hybrids. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 123-140. Fox, M.W., 1978. From animal science to animal rights. Proc. 1st World Congr. Ethology Applied to Zootechnics. Madrid, Oct. 1978, Vol. l/2, pp. 557-562. Fraser, A.F., 1975. Ethology and ethics (Editorial). Appl. Anim. Ethol., 1: 211-212. Fraser, A.F., 1979a. The nature of cruelty to animals (Editorial). Appl. Anim. Ethel., 5: 1-4.
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Fraser, A.F., 1979b. Conclusions and recommendations of the F&t World Congress on Ethology Applied to Zootechnics, Madrid, Spain. Oct. 1978, Appl. Anim. Ethol., 5: 301-303. Goddard, M.E. and Beilharz, R.G., 1974. A breeding programme for guide dogs. Proc. 1st World Congr. Genetics Applied to Livestock Production, Madrid, Vol. 3: 547551. Hassenstein, B., 1980. Instinkt, Lernen, Spielen, Einsicht, Einfiihrung in die Verhaltens biologie. Piper, Miinchen. Heiligenherg, W., 1964. Ein Versuch zur ganzheitsbezogenen Analyse des Instinktverhaltens eines Fisches (Pelmatochromie subocellatus). Z. Tierpsychol., 21: l-52 (cited in Hassenstein, 1980). Hughes, B.O., 1977. Selection of group size by individual laying hens. Br. Poultry Sci., 18: 9-18 (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Hughes, B.O., 1979. The assessment of welfare in fowls in battery cages (abstract). Appl. Anim. Ethol., 5: 295. Kiimmer, P., 1979. Untersuchungen zur Tiergerechtheit und ihrer Bestimmung bei Boxenlaufstallhaltung von Milchkiihen in der Schweiz. Diss., Univ. Bern. Koch, G. and Zeeb, K., 1970. Ethologisch-Gkologische Aspekte bei der Haltung von Hausrindern unter verschiedenen Bedingungen. Z. Tierz. Ziichtungsbiol., 86: 232-239. Lorenz, K., 1963. Das sogenannte Bose. Borotha-Scholer, Wien. Lorenz, K., 1973. Die Riickseite des Spiegels. Piper, Miinchen. Lorenz, K., 1978a. Zivilisationspathologie und Kulturfreiheit. In: K. Lorenz (Collected papers), Das Wirkungsgefige der Natur und das Schicksaal des Menschen. Piper, Miinchen pp. 324-355. Lorenz, K., 1978b, Vergleichende Verhaltensforschung. Springer, Wien. Martin, G., 1975. Uber Verhaltensstijrungen von Legehennen im Kiifig. Ein Beitrag zur Kliirung des Problems tierschutzgerechter Hiihnerhaltung. Angew. Ornithol., 4: 145176. Martin, G., 1979. Zur KEfighaltung von Legehennen. Eine Stellungnahme aus der Sicht der Verhaltenswissenschaft. In: G.M. Teutsch, E. von Loeper, G. Martin and J. Miiller (Editors), Intensivhaltung von Nutztieren aus ethischer, rechtlicher und ethologischer Sicht. Birkhauser, Basel, pp. 101-122. Population, Species and Evolution. Belknap. Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. Mayr, E., 1963. Murphy, L.B., 1978. A Review of Animal Welfare and Intensive Animal Production. Queensl. Dept. Primary Ind., Brisbane, Australia. Nicolai, J., 1970a. Der Brutparasitismus der Viduinae als ethologisches Problem. In: J. Nicolai (Editor) Elternbeziehung und Partnerwahl im Leben der Vogel. Piper, Miinchen, pp. 159-258. Nicolai, J., 1970b. Der Brutparasitismus der Witwenvogel. In: J. Nicolai (Editor), Elternbeziehung und Partnerwahl im Leben der Vogel. Piper, Miinchen, pp. 148-158. Pfaffenberger, C.J., Scott, J.P., Fuller, J.L., Ginsburg, B.F. and Bielfeldt, S.W., 1976. Guide Dogs for the Blind: Their Selection, Development and Training. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Rheinaubund (Priisidium: Graf, K., Akerst, E., Uehlinger, A.; Arbeitsgruppe Tierschutz), 1977. Wortlaut und Ziel im Abschnitt “Tierhaltung” des Eidgeniissischen Tierschutzgesetzes. Natur und Mensch, 19: 11 pp. Richards, S.A., 1976. Behavioural temperature regulation in the fowl. J. Physiol., 258: 122P-123P. Scott, J.P. and Fuller, J.L., 1965. Genetics and the Social Behaviour of the Dog. Univ. Chicago, Chicago. Tschanz, B., 1978. Reaktionsnormen und Adaptation. In: W.H. Weike (Editor), Das Tier im Experiment. Hans Huber, Bern, pp. 33-49. Van Putten, G. and Dammers, J., 1976. A comparative study of the well-being of piglets reared conventionally and in cages. Appl. Anim. Ethol., 2: 339-356.
10 Wood-Gush, D.G.M., 1973. Animal welfare in modern agriculture. Br. Vet. J., 129: 167173. (cited in Council of Europe, 1979). Zeeb, K., 1970a. Massentierhaltung und angewandte Ethologie. Zentralbl. Veterinarmed., 17: 86-90. Zeeb, K., 1970b. Angewandte Ethologie bei der Haustierhaltung. Dtsch. Tieriirztl. Wochen schr., 77: 125-126. Zeeb, K., 1970~. Verhaltensbiologische Gedanken zum Problem Rinderlaufstall. Tierziicht., 22: 573-579. Zeuner, F., 1963. A History of Domesticated Animals. Hutchinson, London. Zimen, E., Wolfe und Kiinigspudel. Piper, Miinchen.