- Email: [email protected]
Applying anticipatory and relational perspectives to the Nigerian delta region oil crisis
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
Short communication
Applying anticipatory and relational perspectives to the Nigerian delta region oil crisis Bolanle A. Olaniran ∗ , David E. Williams Department of Communication Studies, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-3083, United States Received 27 September 2007; received in revised form 15 October 2007; accepted 28 November 2007
Abstract This paper addresses crisis communication shortcomings of oil companies working in the Nigerian delta region. The anticipatory model of crisis communication is blended with the public relations relational perspective to demonstrate how oil companies have responded to crises in the delta region in a manner contrary to what would be consistent with these perspectives. The result has been persistent turmoil in the region and significant distrust of the organizations. Published by Elsevier Inc. Keywords: Crisis communication; Anticipatory; Relational; Nigeria; Oil; Delta region
Shell Petroleum Development Company operates a joint venture agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Bassey, 1997). Shell and other oil company operations in Nigeria have been maligned by human rights criticisms from communities around the Nigerian delta region. Allegations of pollution, inadequate compensation to Delta citizens, and corrupt business and political actions has followed oil companies working in the region for two decades. In addition to thousands of deaths among workers and citizens, the Ogoni people claim they derive no benefit from more than $30 billion worth of oil revenues from their land. Their traditional source of living (fishing and agriculture) has been destroyed by pollution. Oil companies in Nigeria constantly face shut downs from disgruntled members of host communities who want better environmental operating guidelines and development of their communities. This study of the Nigerian Ogoni people and the crisis in the delta region applies the relational perspective to the anticipatory model of crisis management to demonstrate how oil industries’ crisis responses have violated relationships with the Ogoni people. 1. Anticipatory and relational perspectives The anticipatory model (Olaniran & Williams, 2001) draws attention to the pre-crisis phase of crisis management. The model views an organization’s position within hierarchies as a condition, which has high crisis potential based on the lack of control over factors such as human resources, technologies, and relationship structure. Control, however, must be established in crisis decision-making through vigilance.
∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 806 742 3911; fax: +1 806 742 1025. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B.A. Olaniran), [email protected] (D.E. Williams).
0363-8111/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2007.11.005
58
B.A. Olaniran, D.E. Williams / Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
The anticipatory model holds prevention as a crisis management priority. Key to the model are efforts to put in place programs that foster error, disaster, and crisis prevention while also creating plans to handle any crisis. The relational perspective (Bruning & Ledingham, 2000) offers a way to preserve relationships that could be damaged in the onset of crisis. This perspective emphasizes the need for organizations to establish positive relations with their operational environment and public. The perspective shifts the focus of public relations strategies from using “communication messages” to manipulate public opinion to one where organizational strategies initially seek to build, nurture, and preserve the relationship with no hidden agenda. The combined framework has some merits. Coombs (2000) sketched the functional utility of a relational perspective in pre-crisis preparation by identifying relational history as the starting point in examining the crisis susceptibility of an organization. The greater an organization’s adherence to stakeholders’ rules and expectations, the greater its perceived legitimacy. 2. Non-relational crisis response strategies Shell has employed crisis response strategies which contradict guidelines for a relationally oriented crisis response. Assessment of crisis management strategies and public image restoration discourse finds scapegoating, denial, and evasion of responsibility as frequently used crisis response strategies (Benoit, 1995). 2.1. Scapegoating Often, the initial response in Nigerian oil spill cases is to blame the indigents for sabotage, thus avoiding damage claims (Reuters, 1998a). Shell operates in over 100 countries, but 40% of its oil spills have occurred in Nigeria (Project Underground, 1996). Shell claims sabotage whereas the World Council of Churches found Shell produced no evidence to corroborate its claims (Project Underground, 1997). A similar scapegoating attempt blamed over 1060 deaths resulting from the “October inferno” on sabotage (Reuters, 1998b). Sabotage claims get the government to send armed soldiers to clamp down on the people and protect the country’s source of economic survival even at the expense of Nigerian lives (Shoup, 1995). Sabotage as a scapegoating strategy implies an external factor to which a company could not be perceived to have control. This strategy seldom works and even when it does, it does temporarily. Accusation does not represent a prudent relational strategy. When scapegoating fails, oil companies frequently resort to denial and evasion of responsibility. 2.2. Denial and evasion of responsibility Shell has employed these strategies in managing the delta region crisis. A World Bank study (defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta, 1995) shows that approximately 76% of all natural gas from petroleum production in Nigeria is flared compared to 0.6% in USA, 4.3% in UK, and 21% in Libya (Ake, 1996). The flaring, however, creates serious hazards. Ake (1996) notes that because of flaring and the release of methane, Nigerian oil fields contribute more in global warming than the rest of the world together” (p. 34). Oil corporations, including Royal/Dutch Shell, Texaco, and Chevron look to the government for protection in the oil-rich delta region while denying responsibility for extensive environmental damage (Ude, 1998). There is evidence linking Shell to military government involvement. An Internal Nigerian Military memo dated 12 May 1994 indicates that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence.” A report (Action Alert 115, 1995) also accused Shell of making payoffs to government officials. Mobil Corp (now part of ExxonMobil) also used evasion in its 1998 oil spill. After a 40,000 barrel spill in the southeastern coast of Nigeria, Mobil claimed on 18 January 1998 that its team of biologists had found no evidence to support claims that oil had killed large quantities of fish and destroyed fishing nets. Mobil also claimed that most of the spill was cleaned up before it reached the shoreline (BBC, 1998). However, upon pressure from environmentalists, Mobil changed its story a few days later and reluctantly, apologized and promised to pay compensation to individuals affected (BBC, 1998). Neither Shell nor Mobil’s strategy is in accordance with the relational model. When oil companies accept responsibility for oil spills, the crisis management strategy is predominantly based on monetary compensation. This strategy is reactive and shows evidence of prior crisis planning. Oil companies
B.A. Olaniran, D.E. Williams / Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
59
write checks to victims which in reality offer inequitable compensation. According to Ms. Nwawo (a victim) “the company believed that a little over $100 was fair compensation for each lost net” (Cohen, 1998). The same report suggests that Mobil believed that most validated claims should be settled for less than $600. The compensation plan was wholeheartedly rejected by most claimants. Even when not evading responsibility, oil companies severely underestimate their level of responsibility and appropriate compensation. Oil company crisis response strategies in the delta region have been predominantly characterized as denial, evasion of responsibility, and scapegoating. These strategies are counter to strategies which could foster a proactive relationally oriented crisis response strategy (e.g. apology, accepting responsibility, full compensation). Crisis management managers in large multi-national organizations should consider the use of more relationally oriented crisis response strategies. References Action Alert 115 (1995, December). Remember Saro-Wiwa: Embargo Nigeria’s bloody oil. Rainforest Action Network. Available: http://www.ran.org/info center/aa/aa115.html. Ake, C. (1996, January 29). Shelling nigeria ablaze. Tell, 34. BBC News Online (1998, January 21). Mobil says sorry for Nigerian oil spill. http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/africa/. Bassey, N. (1997, November 27). Back to shell game. Available: http://www.moles.org/ProiectUndereround/motherlode/shell/nig.html. Benoit, W. L. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bruning, S., & Ledingham, J. A. (2000). Perceptions of relationships and evaluations of satisfaction: An exploration of interaction. Public Relations Review, 26(1), 85–95. Cohen, R. (1998, September 20). High claims in spill betray depth of Nigerian poverty. New York Times., p. 3 & 6 Coombs, W. T. (2000). Crisis management: Advantages of a relational perspective. In J. A. Ledingham & S. D. Bruning (Eds.), Public relations as relational management (pp. 73–94). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum. Olaniran, B. A., & Williams, D. E. (2001). Anticipatory model of crisis management: A vigilant response to technological crises. In R. L. Heath & G. Vasquez (Eds.), Handbook of Public Relations (pp. 487–500). CA: Sage. Project Underground (1996). The Flames of Shell: A fact sheet, Berkeley, CA. USA. Project Underground and Rainforest Action Network (1997). Human Rights and Environmental Operations Information on the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies: 1996–1997 Independent Annual Report. Reuters (1998a, November 26). Nigerian Paper says thousands sick after oil spill. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news. Reuters (1998b, October 23). New leak in Nigerian oil products pipeline after fire. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news. Shoup, C. (1995, December). Moravian AI’s Campaign for human rights in Nigeria. Forum Newspaper, Vol. II(2). Ude, O. (1998, October, 23). Two die in fresh clashes in Nigerian oil town. Reuters News. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news.
Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
Short communication
Applying anticipatory and relational perspectives to the Nigerian delta region oil crisis Bolanle A. Olaniran ∗ , David E. Williams Department of Communication Studies, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-3083, United States Received 27 September 2007; received in revised form 15 October 2007; accepted 28 November 2007
Abstract This paper addresses crisis communication shortcomings of oil companies working in the Nigerian delta region. The anticipatory model of crisis communication is blended with the public relations relational perspective to demonstrate how oil companies have responded to crises in the delta region in a manner contrary to what would be consistent with these perspectives. The result has been persistent turmoil in the region and significant distrust of the organizations. Published by Elsevier Inc. Keywords: Crisis communication; Anticipatory; Relational; Nigeria; Oil; Delta region
Shell Petroleum Development Company operates a joint venture agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Bassey, 1997). Shell and other oil company operations in Nigeria have been maligned by human rights criticisms from communities around the Nigerian delta region. Allegations of pollution, inadequate compensation to Delta citizens, and corrupt business and political actions has followed oil companies working in the region for two decades. In addition to thousands of deaths among workers and citizens, the Ogoni people claim they derive no benefit from more than $30 billion worth of oil revenues from their land. Their traditional source of living (fishing and agriculture) has been destroyed by pollution. Oil companies in Nigeria constantly face shut downs from disgruntled members of host communities who want better environmental operating guidelines and development of their communities. This study of the Nigerian Ogoni people and the crisis in the delta region applies the relational perspective to the anticipatory model of crisis management to demonstrate how oil industries’ crisis responses have violated relationships with the Ogoni people. 1. Anticipatory and relational perspectives The anticipatory model (Olaniran & Williams, 2001) draws attention to the pre-crisis phase of crisis management. The model views an organization’s position within hierarchies as a condition, which has high crisis potential based on the lack of control over factors such as human resources, technologies, and relationship structure. Control, however, must be established in crisis decision-making through vigilance.
∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 806 742 3911; fax: +1 806 742 1025. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B.A. Olaniran), [email protected] (D.E. Williams).
0363-8111/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2007.11.005
58
B.A. Olaniran, D.E. Williams / Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
The anticipatory model holds prevention as a crisis management priority. Key to the model are efforts to put in place programs that foster error, disaster, and crisis prevention while also creating plans to handle any crisis. The relational perspective (Bruning & Ledingham, 2000) offers a way to preserve relationships that could be damaged in the onset of crisis. This perspective emphasizes the need for organizations to establish positive relations with their operational environment and public. The perspective shifts the focus of public relations strategies from using “communication messages” to manipulate public opinion to one where organizational strategies initially seek to build, nurture, and preserve the relationship with no hidden agenda. The combined framework has some merits. Coombs (2000) sketched the functional utility of a relational perspective in pre-crisis preparation by identifying relational history as the starting point in examining the crisis susceptibility of an organization. The greater an organization’s adherence to stakeholders’ rules and expectations, the greater its perceived legitimacy. 2. Non-relational crisis response strategies Shell has employed crisis response strategies which contradict guidelines for a relationally oriented crisis response. Assessment of crisis management strategies and public image restoration discourse finds scapegoating, denial, and evasion of responsibility as frequently used crisis response strategies (Benoit, 1995). 2.1. Scapegoating Often, the initial response in Nigerian oil spill cases is to blame the indigents for sabotage, thus avoiding damage claims (Reuters, 1998a). Shell operates in over 100 countries, but 40% of its oil spills have occurred in Nigeria (Project Underground, 1996). Shell claims sabotage whereas the World Council of Churches found Shell produced no evidence to corroborate its claims (Project Underground, 1997). A similar scapegoating attempt blamed over 1060 deaths resulting from the “October inferno” on sabotage (Reuters, 1998b). Sabotage claims get the government to send armed soldiers to clamp down on the people and protect the country’s source of economic survival even at the expense of Nigerian lives (Shoup, 1995). Sabotage as a scapegoating strategy implies an external factor to which a company could not be perceived to have control. This strategy seldom works and even when it does, it does temporarily. Accusation does not represent a prudent relational strategy. When scapegoating fails, oil companies frequently resort to denial and evasion of responsibility. 2.2. Denial and evasion of responsibility Shell has employed these strategies in managing the delta region crisis. A World Bank study (defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta, 1995) shows that approximately 76% of all natural gas from petroleum production in Nigeria is flared compared to 0.6% in USA, 4.3% in UK, and 21% in Libya (Ake, 1996). The flaring, however, creates serious hazards. Ake (1996) notes that because of flaring and the release of methane, Nigerian oil fields contribute more in global warming than the rest of the world together” (p. 34). Oil corporations, including Royal/Dutch Shell, Texaco, and Chevron look to the government for protection in the oil-rich delta region while denying responsibility for extensive environmental damage (Ude, 1998). There is evidence linking Shell to military government involvement. An Internal Nigerian Military memo dated 12 May 1994 indicates that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence.” A report (Action Alert 115, 1995) also accused Shell of making payoffs to government officials. Mobil Corp (now part of ExxonMobil) also used evasion in its 1998 oil spill. After a 40,000 barrel spill in the southeastern coast of Nigeria, Mobil claimed on 18 January 1998 that its team of biologists had found no evidence to support claims that oil had killed large quantities of fish and destroyed fishing nets. Mobil also claimed that most of the spill was cleaned up before it reached the shoreline (BBC, 1998). However, upon pressure from environmentalists, Mobil changed its story a few days later and reluctantly, apologized and promised to pay compensation to individuals affected (BBC, 1998). Neither Shell nor Mobil’s strategy is in accordance with the relational model. When oil companies accept responsibility for oil spills, the crisis management strategy is predominantly based on monetary compensation. This strategy is reactive and shows evidence of prior crisis planning. Oil companies
B.A. Olaniran, D.E. Williams / Public Relations Review 34 (2008) 57–59
59
write checks to victims which in reality offer inequitable compensation. According to Ms. Nwawo (a victim) “the company believed that a little over $100 was fair compensation for each lost net” (Cohen, 1998). The same report suggests that Mobil believed that most validated claims should be settled for less than $600. The compensation plan was wholeheartedly rejected by most claimants. Even when not evading responsibility, oil companies severely underestimate their level of responsibility and appropriate compensation. Oil company crisis response strategies in the delta region have been predominantly characterized as denial, evasion of responsibility, and scapegoating. These strategies are counter to strategies which could foster a proactive relationally oriented crisis response strategy (e.g. apology, accepting responsibility, full compensation). Crisis management managers in large multi-national organizations should consider the use of more relationally oriented crisis response strategies. References Action Alert 115 (1995, December). Remember Saro-Wiwa: Embargo Nigeria’s bloody oil. Rainforest Action Network. Available: http://www.ran.org/info center/aa/aa115.html. Ake, C. (1996, January 29). Shelling nigeria ablaze. Tell, 34. BBC News Online (1998, January 21). Mobil says sorry for Nigerian oil spill. http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/africa/. Bassey, N. (1997, November 27). Back to shell game. Available: http://www.moles.org/ProiectUndereround/motherlode/shell/nig.html. Benoit, W. L. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bruning, S., & Ledingham, J. A. (2000). Perceptions of relationships and evaluations of satisfaction: An exploration of interaction. Public Relations Review, 26(1), 85–95. Cohen, R. (1998, September 20). High claims in spill betray depth of Nigerian poverty. New York Times., p. 3 & 6 Coombs, W. T. (2000). Crisis management: Advantages of a relational perspective. In J. A. Ledingham & S. D. Bruning (Eds.), Public relations as relational management (pp. 73–94). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum. Olaniran, B. A., & Williams, D. E. (2001). Anticipatory model of crisis management: A vigilant response to technological crises. In R. L. Heath & G. Vasquez (Eds.), Handbook of Public Relations (pp. 487–500). CA: Sage. Project Underground (1996). The Flames of Shell: A fact sheet, Berkeley, CA. USA. Project Underground and Rainforest Action Network (1997). Human Rights and Environmental Operations Information on the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies: 1996–1997 Independent Annual Report. Reuters (1998a, November 26). Nigerian Paper says thousands sick after oil spill. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news. Reuters (1998b, October 23). New leak in Nigerian oil products pipeline after fire. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news. Shoup, C. (1995, December). Moravian AI’s Campaign for human rights in Nigeria. Forum Newspaper, Vol. II(2). Ude, O. (1998, October, 23). Two die in fresh clashes in Nigerian oil town. Reuters News. Available: http://www.reuters.com/news.