- Email: [email protected]
Are there no consequences of open Marxism?
Rejoinder
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI
Are There No Consequences of Open Marxism?
1. General Remarks
My critics, Professors Arthur A. Cohen, Richard T. De George, Alfred G. Meyer, and Gerhart Niemeyer, have applied their acute minds to exhibit the shortcomings of my model for the analysis of Marxisms. It appears to me that their criticism was made from the standpoint of a certain conception of Marxism which they consider “good” Marxism. Of course, not the same in all cases.But each of them seemsto assume that Marxism is stilla viable proposition. It is this very assumption that I question. Marxism, more than any philosophy in the nineteenth century, was based on hope. Its philosophical program was based on hope. Its social program was based on hope. Its eschatological program was based on hope. Its ideological-political program was based on hope.
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN MARXISM
49
Its philosophical program was based on hope becausethe materialistic world view was meant to embrace all aspectsof reality : ontological, social and psychological. It was hoped that with the aid of science all the remnants of idealism would be eradicated and materialism would shine in its full metaphysical glory. This never came about. Its social program was based on hope becausethere was no society in the history of civilization which conducted itself for any length of time according to the communist principles. It was hoped that once a communist society was established as a state, the social model that Marxism advocates would be improved and made compatible with humanist ideals. After over half of a century of “improvement” of Marxism as a social model, it is further away from humanistic ideals than ever before. Marxism’s eschatological program was based on hope because the doctrine of individual salvation, which is implicitly assumed in Marxism, was to come true once the communist society would relieve man of the chains and constraints which the capitalist society imposed on him. Man is born free, but everywhere we see him in chainsRousseau was echoed in Marxist teaching. Once we relieve him of these chains, he will be free again, redeemed. The redemption of the individual in the communist societies is, so far, nonexistent. And the ideological-political program of Marxism was based on hope because there was no state in the history of civilization based on Marxist ideological-political principles. True, the communist state became a reality. The ideological-political aspect of Marxism found its concrete embodiment in the shape of the Soviet Union, but only at the price of becoming in time an oppressive totalitarian regime. The most important point is this: for a long time the shortcomings of Marxism as a philosophy, as a model for society, as an eschatology, and even as a state, were tolerated and treated with indulgence because it was contended that Marxism must have a chance to prove itself. So, we have been waiting, while Marxism was proving itself. There were those who sharply separated the state from society, who condemned, in other words, the state and its rulers as an organ of oppression, and yet were willing to wait and see how the communist society would evolve in time. For it appeared that in spite of its abuses by the inept and tyrannical rulers, in spite of many of its defects, Marxism as a model of society offered a viable alternative. Indeed, it offered a better alternative (if sufficiently improved) than any of the variety of capitalist systems.
50
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
The time has come to reflect on this assumption. The time has come to realize that existing tests of Marxism as a social system have been sufhcient. Is there any reason whatsoever to still wait and see,still hope that there is a “potential” in Marxism which, given appropriate circumstances,will lead to a humane society? It does not seemso. In natural science, we entertain a hypothesis and then test it against phenomena. Usually, the hypothesis is clearly defined and tests are clearcut. If the hypothesis proves unsatisfactory, does not stand up to the tests-if, in other words, the tests indicate that the hypothesis is not what it was meant to be-we reject the hypothesis. The process of testing the hypothesis is not so crisp and clear in social science. And yet we do form hypotheses, theories, and models in social science as well. What is Marxism as a model for society if not a social theory? It has been tested on innumerable occasions, and it has failed the tests so many times. There have been many who found extenuating circumstancesfor these failures. Indeed, there were extenuating circumstances. But after the theory fails some cntcial tests, we have every reason to consider it invalidated. It seems that, for all intents and purposes, Budapest in 1956and Prague in 1968 (Prague in particular!) were these crucial tests. These tests should make us aware that the model is not only somehow defective, but that it is inherently defective. Defective beyond repair. If there were genuine possibilities in Marxism to provide a basis for a humane society, the Czech experiment should have succeeded. It has not! Is Yugoslavia an exception? Perhaps. Or is Yugoslavia an exception that proves the rule: a buffer zone between two hostile systems that kindly tolerate it? Many have assumed that the model was viable but defective. Given time it would cure itself. It is time to realize that the model was inherently defective from the start, that the potentiality with which it was endowed was an expression of hope. I thus contend that we are in an altogether different historical situation, that whatever potential there was in Marxism has burned itself out, that it is now dead as a social philosophy. If there is to be a “Marxist” analysis of contemporary society, indeed of the contemporary world, this analysis will have to be done in an altogether different set of categories, in an altogether different conceptual framework from that of nineteenth-century Marxism. A “Marxist” approach to the world of the 1970s will have to be quite non-Marxist and in many instances anti-Marxist (if by Marxist without quotes we understand
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN MARXISM
51
nineteenth-century Marxism). Our world has outgrown the confines of Marxist categories. Our world has outgrown the confines of Marxist categories also in a more profound sense.Marx considered himself an enemy of bourgeois society. And this he was. He wanted to establish a New Society. However, he-did not perceive that he wanted to establish this New Society within the confines of the same civilization that produced the bourgeois society. He did not question the civilization. In this respect, he was much less revolutionary than Rousseau. For Rousseau had questioned not only society but civilization as well. Marx accepted the fundamentals of our civilization. Indeed, he was the optimistiotechnological rationalist of the nineteenth century par excellence. He accepted wholly the rational heritage of modern science.And also Bacon’s idea that “knowledge is power”: the power to dominate nature and use her to man’s advantage. In short, Marxism is a variation on the same theme: the salvation of man through rationality, technology, a rational reform of society. Marx was the last grand rational reformer of society, sharing the assumption of the post-Renaissance civilization which produced modern science, modern technology, and modern capitalism. Now, from the perspective of a century, and from the perspective of the present ecological crisis, we can see that Marxism was not the beginning of a new milennium, but an expression of the impending doom of a civilization. It took us another century to realize that the trouble was not so much with the structure of our society, but with the structure of our scientific, technological civilization. We can clearly see that if this civilization goes, Marxism, whatever its form, also goes becauseit is an intrinsic part of this civilization. And this civilization is crumbling. Rationality, science and technology are under continuous fire: as the forces which meant to bring liberation and possible salvation to man, and instead have brought the nightmare of the technological world. We must be aware that Marxism was a part of the rational tradition of Western civilization, that Marx questioned only a part of this civilization, but accepted other parts. Above all, we must be aware that in the 1970sMarxism is an anachronism: (1) becauseit discredited itself utterly in suppressing in 1968 (in Czechoslovakia) an emerging Communist society “with a human face.” This suppression cannot be regarded as yet another “mistake,” but must be regarded as a manifestation of the inherent defects of Marxism as a model for society; (2)
52
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
because our scientific-technological civilization is in crisis, and Marxism, being a part of this civilization, must share its fate. My critics seemto be oblivious to this new situation. They behave as if nothing had happened during the last few years. My critics seem to assumethat there is a “good” Marxism and therefore what is needed is a “right” interpretation. My model attempts to show that in a certain historical situation, the search for “good” Marxism must invariably lead us out of the framework of the traditional variety of Marxisms. If by Marxism is meant not a set of dogmas or a set of doctrines derived from the writings of Karl Marx, but an attitude of critical reflection upon society with an eye to improve the human lot via the reform of society, via the reform of socio-economic relationships and institutions of society, then a critical reflection of this sort in our times must lead us outside the scope of traditional Marxist doctrines. One of the unexpected conclusions of our analysis is that research institutes on Soviet and Communist affairs should now study the vicissitudes of contemporary science, and particularly the contemporary technological society, becausehere lies the key to the crisis of our civilization, and indirectly the key to an understanding of the collapse of Marxism as a part of rational-scientific-technological civilization. 2. Specific Replies
I shall consider first De George’s remarks, interestingly entitled “Marxism and Anti-Marxism.” De George basically agrees with my methodological approach and shows how my model could be extended, and yet he denies that it can be used as a criterion for deciding “who is a Marxist.” His ingenious arguments run as follows: (1) In order to determine what position a man takes with regard to history, etc., we must know that he is a Marxist; if we do know that a person is a Marxist, what do we need the scheme for? (2) We may insist, on the other hand, that a person is not a Marxist ‘unlesshe deals with certain topics in a certain way. In this case “unless and until we can justify the completeness of the scheme, it cannot be used to identify someone as a Marxist.” Before I reply to these arguments, I shall parenthetically observe that if these arguments were valid, then De George’s own model, which he suggestsin the course of his paper, also would be invalidated. However,
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES OF OPEN MARXISM
53
I shall save De George’s model, and my own, by showing that these arguments are defective. The first argument states that we must know that a person is a Marxist in order to find out what his position is with regard to history, etc. This is not so. Many American economists and sociologists are concealed Marxists. They would deny, if asked, that they were Marxists. Yet, a careful analysis of their assumptions would reveal that they are in profound agreement with what is essential for the Marxist approach to economics or sociology. The forte of my scheme is that it not only allows us to recognize caseswhich actually depart from Marxism, while preaching allegiance to it, but it also enables us to identify cases which are a part of Marxist thought although they recognize no allegiance to it. De George’s second argument states that we must prove the completeness of the schemein order to use it as a criterion. The point is that the scheme does not have to be “complete,” let alone prove its completeness, in order to be employed as a useful methodological tool. De George confuses the concept of the necessarycondition with that of the sufficient condition. I have suggesteda number of necessary conditions for a thinker to be called a Marxist, or for a doctrine to be called Marxism. I have never attempted to give the suficient conditions. One wonders what it would entail to give the sufficient conditions for Marxism. Might it not turn out that the sufficient conditions of Marxism are the entire corpus of Marx’s writing; nothing less or more? In such a case, there would be only one Marxist-Marx himself. Is this what Professor De George wishes to suggest? De George further contends that “underlying Skolimowski’s interpretation seemsto be a static view of Marxism which a priori precludes its being applied to an analysis of social problems in the second half of the twentieth century.” But this contention is refuted by De George himself when he analyzes the relation between Variant C Marxism and the New Left. The most controversial part of my model, so it appears from the comments of my critics, is linking the New Left with Variant C. No one would deny that the New Left is a manifestation of the profound social problems of the second half of the twentieth century. It thus follows that a methodological model that attempts to account for the New Left vis-a-vis Marxism is acutely relevant for our times. The New Left is a movement of rebellion: not so much against society, but against the whole scientific civilization. Because of this, the label “the New Left,” which suggestspolitical and ideological affiliation, is
54
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
grossly inadequate. And for the same reason, the attempts of the New Left to find in Marxism support and justification are bound to fail. A rebellion against the status quo seeks sustenance in earlier rebellions against the status quo. This is understandable. But, as I have argued before, Marxism is going down the drain with the entire rationalscientific-technological civilization and a movement (it does not matter whether it is called the New Left or something else) which wants to bring about a new civilization, cannot be much helped by traditional Marxism. This is what my analysis of Variant C and the New Left intended to convey. I entirely agree with De George’s final statement that “a comparative study of Marxisms is interesting, timely, and worth pursuing.” But 1 fail to see what his alternative approach is to this study. De George’s idea of “break[ing] down the Marxian corpus into its smallest declarative [whatever that means] components,” methodologically speaking, is not so far from my scheme. I hope that in the future Professor De George will spell out in some detail his alternative methodological model. I shall now turn to Professor Meyer. The thrust of his remarks is that Marxism, as represented by its various representatives, is much more versatile a phenomenon than my scheme allows for, and that “Marx himself turns out to be unclassifiable, because he held, at one time or another, all the twelve positions summarized in the table.” I quite agree with this. The scheme by definition is schematic. However, in spite of its schematism, it enables us to “see” that Marx held all these positions. Further, it allows us to distinguish these positions. Still further, it allows us to compare these positions. Can we require more of a scheme? Professor Meyer argues “Thus Engels, and perhaps also Marx, have been classified as right-wing Marxists, a conclusion which makes the entire scheme ludicrous.” Does it? Why? If Marx did represent all the twelve positions, as Meyer says he did, then he represented (at one time or another) Variant A (right-wing). We know, however, that in his 1844 Manuscripts he represented Variant C (left-wing). So what is ludicrous about that? As for Engels, it is up to Professor Meyer to demonstrate that, so far as the main tenor of Engels’ philosophy is concerned, he was not a representative of Variant A (right-wing). Professor Meyer’s main objection, as far as 1 can see, is that my scheme is “~nhistoricul. ” But of course it is unhistorical; it is purposely ahistorical. It is a methodological scheme. As such, it can be applied to
ARE
THERE
NO
CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN
MARXISM
55
various historical doctrines, but not to the internal development of a given doctrine. An alternative approach is to study every doctrine in its development. If we accept the consequencesof this approach, we shall have to accept a fantastic proliferation of Marxisms, as produced at various times by various protagonists of Marxism. And then shall we not have to resort in the final analysis to some methodological scheme in order to comprehend what unites and what differentiates these various doctrines? I agree with most of Professor Niemeyer’s opening remarks about the purity of Marxism versus elements extrinsic to Marxism. I consider these remarks supplementary to my ideas. Now, Marxism was not created deus ex machina. There are components of various philosophies in it. But after a time it did acquire Some homogeneity. Marxism is neither a conglomerate composed of other philosophies, nor is it a monolith. I think it reasonable to treat it as a set of doctrines, rather than as one homogeneous corpus. And I think it unreasonable to demand the existence of one “pure” Marxism. This is what Professor Niemeyer demands when he says “when Skolimowskipresents his table of variants he never doesraise the question which of the twelve could be called ‘purely’ Marxian.” And also when he asks: “Where, then, is this true Marxism?” He says that I suggest that we must look for it in the nineteenth century rather than in our time. I do not think I would suggest such a thing. Mainly because,for reasons given above, I do not think the question to be a valid one. 1 find it astonishing that Professor Niemeyer would say: “I had not been aware that Marx ‘worked out solutions’ to any social problems.” Is Professor Niemeyer serious here? If so, what was Marx doing? One wonders what Das Kapital represents if not an analysis of, and some solutions to, social problems. Is it not also true of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, and in a different way, of The Communist Manifesto? Were these solutions bad, inadequate? Perhaps. But many astute scholars have suggestedthat in sheer brilliance of analysis and in the boldness of his alternative solutions to social problems, Marx was unrivaled in the nineteenth century. As far as Mr. Cohen’s comments are concerned, though I find these comments interesting, I am at a loss to seetheir relevance to my paper. Mao’s philosophical thought is no doubt a fascinating subject. But I cannot agree with Cohen that Mao’s piece Where Do Man’s Correct Ideas Come From? represents, as Cohen puts it, “shallowness of thought.. .similar to Stalin’s writing on philosophy.” Considering the
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difficulty of the subject and the extreme brevity of this essay, one is impressed with Mao’s skill in not committing some serious blunders. This is not to say that the essay is profound; which it is not. One final point. My critics have justly exhibited certain weaknessesof my model. But I am afraid that their alternative did not go very far. Perhaps the early stage of the discussion on comparative Marxism is the reason. I should like to return to my initial question. Are there no consequences of open Marxism? Is it not the case that given the scope of Marxism, and the nature of its problems, “Marxism” for our times would have to be quite un-Marxist? In this context, it is quite clear that the New Left is not attempting to “improve” or refine Marxism, although it occasionally thinks so. The New Left is attempting to work out the ideology for a post-technological society. And a post-technological society will also be a post-Marxist society.
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI
Are There No Consequences of Open Marxism?
1. General Remarks
My critics, Professors Arthur A. Cohen, Richard T. De George, Alfred G. Meyer, and Gerhart Niemeyer, have applied their acute minds to exhibit the shortcomings of my model for the analysis of Marxisms. It appears to me that their criticism was made from the standpoint of a certain conception of Marxism which they consider “good” Marxism. Of course, not the same in all cases.But each of them seemsto assume that Marxism is stilla viable proposition. It is this very assumption that I question. Marxism, more than any philosophy in the nineteenth century, was based on hope. Its philosophical program was based on hope. Its social program was based on hope. Its eschatological program was based on hope. Its ideological-political program was based on hope.
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN MARXISM
49
Its philosophical program was based on hope becausethe materialistic world view was meant to embrace all aspectsof reality : ontological, social and psychological. It was hoped that with the aid of science all the remnants of idealism would be eradicated and materialism would shine in its full metaphysical glory. This never came about. Its social program was based on hope becausethere was no society in the history of civilization which conducted itself for any length of time according to the communist principles. It was hoped that once a communist society was established as a state, the social model that Marxism advocates would be improved and made compatible with humanist ideals. After over half of a century of “improvement” of Marxism as a social model, it is further away from humanistic ideals than ever before. Marxism’s eschatological program was based on hope because the doctrine of individual salvation, which is implicitly assumed in Marxism, was to come true once the communist society would relieve man of the chains and constraints which the capitalist society imposed on him. Man is born free, but everywhere we see him in chainsRousseau was echoed in Marxist teaching. Once we relieve him of these chains, he will be free again, redeemed. The redemption of the individual in the communist societies is, so far, nonexistent. And the ideological-political program of Marxism was based on hope because there was no state in the history of civilization based on Marxist ideological-political principles. True, the communist state became a reality. The ideological-political aspect of Marxism found its concrete embodiment in the shape of the Soviet Union, but only at the price of becoming in time an oppressive totalitarian regime. The most important point is this: for a long time the shortcomings of Marxism as a philosophy, as a model for society, as an eschatology, and even as a state, were tolerated and treated with indulgence because it was contended that Marxism must have a chance to prove itself. So, we have been waiting, while Marxism was proving itself. There were those who sharply separated the state from society, who condemned, in other words, the state and its rulers as an organ of oppression, and yet were willing to wait and see how the communist society would evolve in time. For it appeared that in spite of its abuses by the inept and tyrannical rulers, in spite of many of its defects, Marxism as a model of society offered a viable alternative. Indeed, it offered a better alternative (if sufficiently improved) than any of the variety of capitalist systems.
50
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
The time has come to reflect on this assumption. The time has come to realize that existing tests of Marxism as a social system have been sufhcient. Is there any reason whatsoever to still wait and see,still hope that there is a “potential” in Marxism which, given appropriate circumstances,will lead to a humane society? It does not seemso. In natural science, we entertain a hypothesis and then test it against phenomena. Usually, the hypothesis is clearly defined and tests are clearcut. If the hypothesis proves unsatisfactory, does not stand up to the tests-if, in other words, the tests indicate that the hypothesis is not what it was meant to be-we reject the hypothesis. The process of testing the hypothesis is not so crisp and clear in social science. And yet we do form hypotheses, theories, and models in social science as well. What is Marxism as a model for society if not a social theory? It has been tested on innumerable occasions, and it has failed the tests so many times. There have been many who found extenuating circumstancesfor these failures. Indeed, there were extenuating circumstances. But after the theory fails some cntcial tests, we have every reason to consider it invalidated. It seems that, for all intents and purposes, Budapest in 1956and Prague in 1968 (Prague in particular!) were these crucial tests. These tests should make us aware that the model is not only somehow defective, but that it is inherently defective. Defective beyond repair. If there were genuine possibilities in Marxism to provide a basis for a humane society, the Czech experiment should have succeeded. It has not! Is Yugoslavia an exception? Perhaps. Or is Yugoslavia an exception that proves the rule: a buffer zone between two hostile systems that kindly tolerate it? Many have assumed that the model was viable but defective. Given time it would cure itself. It is time to realize that the model was inherently defective from the start, that the potentiality with which it was endowed was an expression of hope. I thus contend that we are in an altogether different historical situation, that whatever potential there was in Marxism has burned itself out, that it is now dead as a social philosophy. If there is to be a “Marxist” analysis of contemporary society, indeed of the contemporary world, this analysis will have to be done in an altogether different set of categories, in an altogether different conceptual framework from that of nineteenth-century Marxism. A “Marxist” approach to the world of the 1970s will have to be quite non-Marxist and in many instances anti-Marxist (if by Marxist without quotes we understand
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN MARXISM
51
nineteenth-century Marxism). Our world has outgrown the confines of Marxist categories. Our world has outgrown the confines of Marxist categories also in a more profound sense.Marx considered himself an enemy of bourgeois society. And this he was. He wanted to establish a New Society. However, he-did not perceive that he wanted to establish this New Society within the confines of the same civilization that produced the bourgeois society. He did not question the civilization. In this respect, he was much less revolutionary than Rousseau. For Rousseau had questioned not only society but civilization as well. Marx accepted the fundamentals of our civilization. Indeed, he was the optimistiotechnological rationalist of the nineteenth century par excellence. He accepted wholly the rational heritage of modern science.And also Bacon’s idea that “knowledge is power”: the power to dominate nature and use her to man’s advantage. In short, Marxism is a variation on the same theme: the salvation of man through rationality, technology, a rational reform of society. Marx was the last grand rational reformer of society, sharing the assumption of the post-Renaissance civilization which produced modern science, modern technology, and modern capitalism. Now, from the perspective of a century, and from the perspective of the present ecological crisis, we can see that Marxism was not the beginning of a new milennium, but an expression of the impending doom of a civilization. It took us another century to realize that the trouble was not so much with the structure of our society, but with the structure of our scientific, technological civilization. We can clearly see that if this civilization goes, Marxism, whatever its form, also goes becauseit is an intrinsic part of this civilization. And this civilization is crumbling. Rationality, science and technology are under continuous fire: as the forces which meant to bring liberation and possible salvation to man, and instead have brought the nightmare of the technological world. We must be aware that Marxism was a part of the rational tradition of Western civilization, that Marx questioned only a part of this civilization, but accepted other parts. Above all, we must be aware that in the 1970sMarxism is an anachronism: (1) becauseit discredited itself utterly in suppressing in 1968 (in Czechoslovakia) an emerging Communist society “with a human face.” This suppression cannot be regarded as yet another “mistake,” but must be regarded as a manifestation of the inherent defects of Marxism as a model for society; (2)
52
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
because our scientific-technological civilization is in crisis, and Marxism, being a part of this civilization, must share its fate. My critics seemto be oblivious to this new situation. They behave as if nothing had happened during the last few years. My critics seem to assumethat there is a “good” Marxism and therefore what is needed is a “right” interpretation. My model attempts to show that in a certain historical situation, the search for “good” Marxism must invariably lead us out of the framework of the traditional variety of Marxisms. If by Marxism is meant not a set of dogmas or a set of doctrines derived from the writings of Karl Marx, but an attitude of critical reflection upon society with an eye to improve the human lot via the reform of society, via the reform of socio-economic relationships and institutions of society, then a critical reflection of this sort in our times must lead us outside the scope of traditional Marxist doctrines. One of the unexpected conclusions of our analysis is that research institutes on Soviet and Communist affairs should now study the vicissitudes of contemporary science, and particularly the contemporary technological society, becausehere lies the key to the crisis of our civilization, and indirectly the key to an understanding of the collapse of Marxism as a part of rational-scientific-technological civilization. 2. Specific Replies
I shall consider first De George’s remarks, interestingly entitled “Marxism and Anti-Marxism.” De George basically agrees with my methodological approach and shows how my model could be extended, and yet he denies that it can be used as a criterion for deciding “who is a Marxist.” His ingenious arguments run as follows: (1) In order to determine what position a man takes with regard to history, etc., we must know that he is a Marxist; if we do know that a person is a Marxist, what do we need the scheme for? (2) We may insist, on the other hand, that a person is not a Marxist ‘unlesshe deals with certain topics in a certain way. In this case “unless and until we can justify the completeness of the scheme, it cannot be used to identify someone as a Marxist.” Before I reply to these arguments, I shall parenthetically observe that if these arguments were valid, then De George’s own model, which he suggestsin the course of his paper, also would be invalidated. However,
ARE THERE NO CONSEQUENCES OF OPEN MARXISM
53
I shall save De George’s model, and my own, by showing that these arguments are defective. The first argument states that we must know that a person is a Marxist in order to find out what his position is with regard to history, etc. This is not so. Many American economists and sociologists are concealed Marxists. They would deny, if asked, that they were Marxists. Yet, a careful analysis of their assumptions would reveal that they are in profound agreement with what is essential for the Marxist approach to economics or sociology. The forte of my scheme is that it not only allows us to recognize caseswhich actually depart from Marxism, while preaching allegiance to it, but it also enables us to identify cases which are a part of Marxist thought although they recognize no allegiance to it. De George’s second argument states that we must prove the completeness of the schemein order to use it as a criterion. The point is that the scheme does not have to be “complete,” let alone prove its completeness, in order to be employed as a useful methodological tool. De George confuses the concept of the necessarycondition with that of the sufficient condition. I have suggesteda number of necessary conditions for a thinker to be called a Marxist, or for a doctrine to be called Marxism. I have never attempted to give the suficient conditions. One wonders what it would entail to give the sufficient conditions for Marxism. Might it not turn out that the sufficient conditions of Marxism are the entire corpus of Marx’s writing; nothing less or more? In such a case, there would be only one Marxist-Marx himself. Is this what Professor De George wishes to suggest? De George further contends that “underlying Skolimowski’s interpretation seemsto be a static view of Marxism which a priori precludes its being applied to an analysis of social problems in the second half of the twentieth century.” But this contention is refuted by De George himself when he analyzes the relation between Variant C Marxism and the New Left. The most controversial part of my model, so it appears from the comments of my critics, is linking the New Left with Variant C. No one would deny that the New Left is a manifestation of the profound social problems of the second half of the twentieth century. It thus follows that a methodological model that attempts to account for the New Left vis-a-vis Marxism is acutely relevant for our times. The New Left is a movement of rebellion: not so much against society, but against the whole scientific civilization. Because of this, the label “the New Left,” which suggestspolitical and ideological affiliation, is
54
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
grossly inadequate. And for the same reason, the attempts of the New Left to find in Marxism support and justification are bound to fail. A rebellion against the status quo seeks sustenance in earlier rebellions against the status quo. This is understandable. But, as I have argued before, Marxism is going down the drain with the entire rationalscientific-technological civilization and a movement (it does not matter whether it is called the New Left or something else) which wants to bring about a new civilization, cannot be much helped by traditional Marxism. This is what my analysis of Variant C and the New Left intended to convey. I entirely agree with De George’s final statement that “a comparative study of Marxisms is interesting, timely, and worth pursuing.” But 1 fail to see what his alternative approach is to this study. De George’s idea of “break[ing] down the Marxian corpus into its smallest declarative [whatever that means] components,” methodologically speaking, is not so far from my scheme. I hope that in the future Professor De George will spell out in some detail his alternative methodological model. I shall now turn to Professor Meyer. The thrust of his remarks is that Marxism, as represented by its various representatives, is much more versatile a phenomenon than my scheme allows for, and that “Marx himself turns out to be unclassifiable, because he held, at one time or another, all the twelve positions summarized in the table.” I quite agree with this. The scheme by definition is schematic. However, in spite of its schematism, it enables us to “see” that Marx held all these positions. Further, it allows us to distinguish these positions. Still further, it allows us to compare these positions. Can we require more of a scheme? Professor Meyer argues “Thus Engels, and perhaps also Marx, have been classified as right-wing Marxists, a conclusion which makes the entire scheme ludicrous.” Does it? Why? If Marx did represent all the twelve positions, as Meyer says he did, then he represented (at one time or another) Variant A (right-wing). We know, however, that in his 1844 Manuscripts he represented Variant C (left-wing). So what is ludicrous about that? As for Engels, it is up to Professor Meyer to demonstrate that, so far as the main tenor of Engels’ philosophy is concerned, he was not a representative of Variant A (right-wing). Professor Meyer’s main objection, as far as 1 can see, is that my scheme is “~nhistoricul. ” But of course it is unhistorical; it is purposely ahistorical. It is a methodological scheme. As such, it can be applied to
ARE
THERE
NO
CONSEQUENCES
OF OPEN
MARXISM
55
various historical doctrines, but not to the internal development of a given doctrine. An alternative approach is to study every doctrine in its development. If we accept the consequencesof this approach, we shall have to accept a fantastic proliferation of Marxisms, as produced at various times by various protagonists of Marxism. And then shall we not have to resort in the final analysis to some methodological scheme in order to comprehend what unites and what differentiates these various doctrines? I agree with most of Professor Niemeyer’s opening remarks about the purity of Marxism versus elements extrinsic to Marxism. I consider these remarks supplementary to my ideas. Now, Marxism was not created deus ex machina. There are components of various philosophies in it. But after a time it did acquire Some homogeneity. Marxism is neither a conglomerate composed of other philosophies, nor is it a monolith. I think it reasonable to treat it as a set of doctrines, rather than as one homogeneous corpus. And I think it unreasonable to demand the existence of one “pure” Marxism. This is what Professor Niemeyer demands when he says “when Skolimowskipresents his table of variants he never doesraise the question which of the twelve could be called ‘purely’ Marxian.” And also when he asks: “Where, then, is this true Marxism?” He says that I suggest that we must look for it in the nineteenth century rather than in our time. I do not think I would suggest such a thing. Mainly because,for reasons given above, I do not think the question to be a valid one. 1 find it astonishing that Professor Niemeyer would say: “I had not been aware that Marx ‘worked out solutions’ to any social problems.” Is Professor Niemeyer serious here? If so, what was Marx doing? One wonders what Das Kapital represents if not an analysis of, and some solutions to, social problems. Is it not also true of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, and in a different way, of The Communist Manifesto? Were these solutions bad, inadequate? Perhaps. But many astute scholars have suggestedthat in sheer brilliance of analysis and in the boldness of his alternative solutions to social problems, Marx was unrivaled in the nineteenth century. As far as Mr. Cohen’s comments are concerned, though I find these comments interesting, I am at a loss to seetheir relevance to my paper. Mao’s philosophical thought is no doubt a fascinating subject. But I cannot agree with Cohen that Mao’s piece Where Do Man’s Correct Ideas Come From? represents, as Cohen puts it, “shallowness of thought.. .similar to Stalin’s writing on philosophy.” Considering the
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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
difficulty of the subject and the extreme brevity of this essay, one is impressed with Mao’s skill in not committing some serious blunders. This is not to say that the essay is profound; which it is not. One final point. My critics have justly exhibited certain weaknessesof my model. But I am afraid that their alternative did not go very far. Perhaps the early stage of the discussion on comparative Marxism is the reason. I should like to return to my initial question. Are there no consequences of open Marxism? Is it not the case that given the scope of Marxism, and the nature of its problems, “Marxism” for our times would have to be quite un-Marxist? In this context, it is quite clear that the New Left is not attempting to “improve” or refine Marxism, although it occasionally thinks so. The New Left is attempting to work out the ideology for a post-technological society. And a post-technological society will also be a post-Marxist society.