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Belief in a just world: support for independent just world and unjust world dimensions
Personality and Individual Differences 33 (2002) 703–711 www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Belief in a just world: support for independent just world and unjust world dimensions Robert Loo* Faculty of Management, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada T1K 3M4 Received 1 June 2001; received in revised form 29 August 2001
Abstract The study determined if Furnham’s proposed Just World and Unjust World subscales (1985. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 363–366) could be recovered from Rubin and Peplau’s Just World Scale (JWS) (1973. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73–93; 1975. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 65–89). The study also examined the psychometric properties of the JWS, in particular, the factor structure, internal consistency reliability, relation to social desirability, and concurrent validity of this long-established scale. Findings from a sample of 253 Canadian management undergraduates revealed strong support for the uncorrelated two-factor solution, just and unjust world dimensions, but continuing concerns over the low scale and subscale reliabilities. JWS scores were independent of social desirability scores as measured by the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960. Journal of Consulting Pschology, 24, 349–354). Results suggest that researchers use the just and unjust world scores in addition to overall scores. # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Just World Scale; Factor analysis
1. Introduction Belief in a just world is a theory of justice based on the hypothesis that people have a need to believe that they live in a world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (e.g. Lerner, 1979, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Belief in a just world may be viewed as a positive illusion in that it encourages people to see the world in a predictable and meaningful way thus likely contributing to subjective well-being by seeing the world as fair (e.g. Hafer & Olson, 1989).
* Tel.: +1-403-329-5148; fax: +1-403-329-2038. E-mail address: [email protected] 0191-8869/02/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S0191-8869(01)00185-4
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Research has shown that people who have a stronger belief in a just world tend to rationalize inequalities, to be less sympathetic towards the disadvantaged, and to be more likely to derogate victims of social injustice (e.g. Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Research has shown that people who have a stronger just world belief tend to be more authoritarian, religious, trusting, and internally controlled as well as endorsing tenets of the Protestant Ethic (e.g. Wagstaff, 1983; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977). Two critical reviews on self-reported just world beliefs have been published by Lerner and Miller (1978) and Furnham and Procter (1989). The Furnham and Procter review of the individual differences literature showed belief in a just world was associated with higher authoritarianism, greater religious beliefs for some religions, greater belief in the Protestant work ethic, political conservatism, and an internal locus of control among other relationships. 1.1. Rubin and Peplau’s Just World Scale (JWS) Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) developed a 16-item belief in a Just World Scale and later retained 13 of the original items but added seven items based upon factor analyses to form their widely-used 20-item scale. Their instrument has a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (6) where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Unfortunately, Rubin and Peplau did not provide detailed psychometric data on their scale but users have typically assumed that the scale is unidimensional and valid. Other researchers have evaluated this scale over the years and results provided a mixed assessment of the scale. For example, several factor analytic studies reported two- to five-factor solutions, thus, suggesting that the scale is multidimensional rather than unidimensional (Ahmed & Stewart, 1985; Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Hyland & Dann, 1987; O’Quin & Vogler, 1990; Whatley, 1993). However, factors do not appear to replicate across studies except for the orthogonal two-factor solution where items tended to split between belief in a just world (11 items) and belief in an unjust world (nine items), a split proposed by Furnham (1985) and supported in other studies (Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lupfer, Doan, & Houston, 1998; Mohr & Luscri, 1995; Stowers & Durm, 1998). According to Furnham (1985), the just world view reflects an orderly and fair world where the deserving are rewarded and the guilty punished while the unjust world belief reflects an unjust world where the innocent are punished, the deserving go unrewarded, and the guilty escape punishment. Thus, these two views are not simply the extremes on a single continuum but two quite different world views. Rubin and Peplau (1975) reported a split-half reliability of 0.81 for the 20-item scale. Other studies have usually found the internal consistency reliability of the scale, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, to be low to marginally acceptable, that is, in the 0.50–0.75 range (Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Couch, 1998; Mohr & Luscri, 1995; O’Quin & Vogler, 1990; Whatley, 1993). Similarly, low reliabilities (0.57) have been reported in two studies using Furnham’s (1985) Just World and Unjust World subscales (Mohr & Luscri, 1995; Stowers & Durm, 1998). These low reliabilities indicate a heterogeneous rather than homogeneous scale and, therefore, the likelihood that factor analyses would yield more than a single general factor; this was clearly the case as already discussed. Generally, no sex differences have been found when overall scores were examined (e.g. Couch, 1998; Feather, 1991; Furnham, 1985; MacLean & Chown, 1988; Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Wagstaff,
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1983), and when the Just World and Unjust World subscales were examined (Heaven & Connors, 1988). Recently, Ambrosio and Sheehan (1990) and Whatley (1993) reported that men scored higher on total scale scores indicating a greater belief in a just world than did women. But O’Connor and her associates (O’Connor, Morrison, & Morrison, 1996) performed a meta-analytic review of 33 studies using either Rubin and Peplau’s or Lipkus’s scales and they concluded that males and females do not differ in a substantial way. However, other research found some sex differences when factor scores were used revealing that females scored higher than males on some factors and lower than males on other factors (e.g. Caputi, 1994; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Hyland & Dann, 1987). 1.2. Dalbert, Montada, and Schmitt’s Six-Item Just World Scale Dalbert, Montada, and Schmitt (1987) developed a six-item belief in a just world scale in Germany (see Appendix for the English version). Their instrument has a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (6) where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Dalbert and her colleagues have successfully used different language versions of this scale with numerous samples in several countries to study a variety of phenomena. The internal consistency reliablility of scores on this scale ranges from acceptable levels such as 0.80 for a German sample to low levels such as 0.68 for a Hawaiian sample (Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Factor analytic studies usually find a one-factor solution for this scale (Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996; Dalbert & Yamauchi). The six-item scale demonstrates concurrent validity with other just world scales; for example, Lipkus, Dalbert, and Siegler (1996) found that this scale correlated significantly (0.63) with Lipkus’s (1991) scale. This recently developed scale provides an opportunity to examine the concurrent validity of Rubin and Peplau’s scale as well as the Just World and Unjust World subscales. A major purpose of the present study was to determine if Furnham’s (1985) proposed Just World and Unjust World subscales could be recovered in factor analyses. The other major purpose was to provide a current psychometric examination of Rubin and Peplau’s JWS, in particular, the factor structure, internal consistency reliability, relation to social desirability, and concurrent validity of this long-established scale. It was expected that this western Canadian sample would score high on the scale because this sample of management undergraduates are, with few exceptions, white, middle class, anglophone, Christians with conservative political and family values.
2. Method 2.1. Sample and procedure The sample consisted of 253 management undergraduates (male=143, female=107, no response=3) who ranged in age from 19 to 47 years (M=22.90, S.D.=4.60). These volunteer participants came from seven management classes in a small western Canadian university. They completed the 20-item version of the JWS with a six-point response scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975). Just World subscale scores were calculated by
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summing scores on the 11 just world items and Unjust World subscale scores were calculated by summing scores on the nine unjust world items after reversing the direction of the responses. Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item just world scale was also administered in-class, in a counterbalanced order, under neutral, un-timed, group conditions. This six-item scale uses a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Self-report measures are susceptible to distortion and may result in the serious problem of invalid data. The Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was developed to measure one form of response bias, social desirability or ‘‘faking good.’’ The 33-item MCSD with its ‘True’/‘False’ response scale has been widely used since its introduction in 1960. The full 33-item version was used in the present study to detect response bias as would be indicated by high scores. Participants completed the MCSD at a later class. After each administration of an instrument, participants received their scored questionnaire at the following class along with a feedback sheet explaining the instrument and its use as well as an opportunity for class discussion on the instrument and related topics.
3. Results 3.1. Confirmatory factor analyses The appropriateness of the 20-item one-factor and the two-factor, Just World and Unjust World, models were evaluated through confirmatory factor analyses using AMOS (Arbuckle, 1997), a software package for structural equation modeling. Maximum likelihood estimates were calculated from the covariance matrix and several fit indexes were computed. Although the chisquare statistic and degrees of freedom are reported, the minimum value of the discrepancy, C, divided by the degrees of freedom (CMIN/d.f.) is evaluated because the chi-square statistic is not particularly useful given that large samples will produce significant chi-square values. Various rules of thumb ranging from 2 to 5 have been suggested as cutoffs for CMIN/d.f. (e.g. Byrne, 1989; Carmines & McIver, 1981; Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). The present study used 2.00 as the cutoff such that higher values indicate an inadequate fit. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with Browne and Cudeck’s (1993) suggested cutoff of 0.08 or less to indicate a close fit was used. Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index (CFI) was also calculated where values close to 1 indicate a very good fit. The goodness of fit index (GFI) and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), which takes into account the degrees of freedom and is bounded by 1, a perfect fit, were also calculated. The confirmatory factor analysis showed that, overall, the one-factor model (2=392.74, d.f.=170) for the 20 items was a poor fit as indicated by the CMIN/d.f. (2.31), CFI (0.50), GFI (0.85), and AGFI (0.81) fit indices although the RMSEA (0.07) was acceptable. The two-factor, Just World and Unjust World, uncorrelated (2=295.41, d.f.=170) and correlated (2=293.70, d.f.=169) models yielded the same fit values, RMSEA (0.06), CMIN/d.f. (1.74), CFI (0.72), GFI (0.89), and AGFI (0.86) generally showing support for the two-factor model so the simpler, uncorrelated model was preferred.
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3.2. Exploratory factor analyses A principal components analysis (SPSS, 1996) of the 20 JWS scores was performed to determine the number of factors that could be extracted using several criteria, the eigenvalue 51 rule, the scree test, the number of salient variables on factors, and factor interpretability. Orthogonal (varimax) and oblique (oblimin) factor rotations were performed and rotated matrices examined to determine the more meaningful structure. The principal components analysis revealed that seven factors had eigenvalues 51 but the scree test revealed five substantive factors. The examination of the rotated varimax factor matrices for the two to five-factor solutions showed that the two-factor solution clearly supported the Just World and Unjust World item split. As seen in Table 1, Factor I (eigenvalue=2.83) accounted for 14.15% of the postrotational variance and loaded on the 11 Just World items while Factor II (eigenvalue=2.11) accounted for 10.53% of the variance and loaded on the nine Unjust World items. The three-factor solution revealed a splitting of the Unjust World factor into Factors II and III. The four- and five-factor solutions showed the undesirable cross-loading of several variables on two rather than just one factor. 3.3. Descriptive statistics The descriptive statistics for the 20-item JWS and for the Just World and Unjust World subscales for the total sample as well as separately for males and females are shown in Table 2. t-Tests showed that males and females did not differ on the total scale scores or Just World subscale scores but that females scored significantly higher than males on the Unjust World subscale, t(247)=2.19, P=0.03. With mean values of 75 on a 120-point scale, the sample clearly believe in a just world. 3.4. Correlations among belief in a Just World measures Scores on the Just World, r(251)=0.81, P=0.001, and Unjust World, r(251)=0.64, P=0.001, subscales correlated significantly with full scale scores. Scores on the two subscales were independent of each other, r(251)=0.06. 3.5. Internal consistency reliability Reliability analyses (SPSS, 1996) were performed to determine if the 20 items formed a homogeneous scale as would be supported by significant inter-item and item-total correlations, and high internal consistency reliabilities as measured by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Similarly, reliability analyses were performed for the 11-item Just World and nine-item Unjust World subscales. As seen in Table 2, the reliability analyses for the 20-item scale showed low alpha coefficients for the total sample (0.64) as well as for the males (0.60) and females (0.69). Reliabilities were low for the Just World (0.60–0.77) and, particularly, Unjust World (0.57) subscales. An examination of the correlation matrices of item scores for the total sample and separately for males and
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Table 1 Two-factor orthogonal solution of scores on the 20-item Belief in a Just World Scale Abbreviated Item Statement
I (Just World)
II (Unjust World)
. . .people who do their job will rise to the top When parents punish their children,. . .for good reasons. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive. . . . . .in the general course of history good wins out. . . .people deserve what they get. Crime doesn’t pay. It is rare for an innocent person to be wrongly sent to jail. People who meet with misfortune. . .brought it on themselves. Basically, the world is a just place. People who get ‘‘lucky breaks’’. . .earned their good fortune. Men who keep in shape. . .little chance of. . .a heart attack. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free. . . Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. . . .parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired. . . It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial. . . In professional sports, many fouls. . .never get called. . . The political candidate who sticks up. . .rarely gets elected. . . .a person rarely deserves the reputation he/she has. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt. . .as careless ones.
0.64 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.28 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03
0.02 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.61 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.30 0.29
Eigenvalues
2.83
2.11
Table 2 Descriptive, reliability, and social desirability statistics for the 20-item Just World Scale Group/scalea
20-Item Belief in a Just World Scale and Subscales M
S.D.
Min–Max
Total (n=253) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.02 40.88 34.00
9.02 6.99 5.32
44–106 19–61 20–50
Males (n=143) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.04 41.55 33.37
8.67 6.32 5.30
Females (n=106) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.01 39.96 34.87
9.52 7.74 5.25
a
Skew
MCSD Alpha
M
S.D.
0.18 0.38 0.06
0.64 0.69 0.57
15.95
4.82
50–102 24–56 20–50
0.31 0.17 0.22
0.60 0.60 0.57
16.14
4.67
44–106 19–61 22–46
0.04 0.42 0.16
0.69 0.77 0.57
15.69
5.04
Some respondents did not indicate their sex, thus the n subtotals do not sum to 253.
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females did not reveal any ‘bad’ items seeing all items had positive correlations with the other items in the scale and significant item-total correlations. Dropping items which had relatively low item-total correlations improved alpha coefficients by merely 0.01. 3.6. Social desirability The descriptive statistics for social desirability scores are also shown in Table 2 for the total sample and separately for each sex. Total scores on the JWS as well as on the Just World and Unjust World subscales were independent of social desirability scores in the total sample (r= 0.04–0.02) as well as for males (r= 0.07–0.09) and females (r= 0.08–0.04). 3.7. Concurrent validity The concurrent validity of the JWS was examined by correlating scores from the 20-item scale with scores from Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale. JWS scores correlated significantly, r(247)=0.61, P=0.001, with scores on the Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale (M=3.82, S.D.=0.71) thus demonstrating the concurrent validity of Rubin and Peplau’s instrument. At the subscale level, the strongest correlations were between scores on the Just World subscale (0.51–0.80, all P<0.001) and scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale while the correlations between scores on the Unjust World subscale (0.08–0.27) and scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale were low.
4. Discussion A major finding is the strong support for the two independent factors comprising Furnham’s (1985) Just World and Unjust World subscales. The findings from the CFA and EFAs also strongly suggest that, while the JWS is multidimensional, only these two factors show strong factor characteristics (e.g. several salient variables on each factor and simple structure) and replication across different studies and samples so researchers can use these two independent subscales in addition to using the overall JWS score. The use of subscales scores would also help identify relationships that are masked in the overall scale score (e.g. Caputi, 1994; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Hyland & Dann, 1987). One persistent psychometric concern identified in this study as well as in past research is the low internal consistency reliability of the JWS and two subscales even though no ‘bad’ items were found. Given that the scale is multidimensional, two factors can be reliably extracted, then very high reliabilities are not expected but reliabilities in the 0.50–0.60 are uncomfortably low. Such low reliabilities likely mean that relationships between scores from these just world measures and other variables will be attentuated, thus producing an undesirable state in any research (Schmitt, 1996). The finding that the sample obtained mean scores of 75 on a 120-point scale indicated a belief in a just world, not surprising given that Canadians enjoy a high standard of living with a social net to catch those in need and a relatively safe society among other favourable social and cultural factors.
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In terms of response bias, it was reassuring to find that scores on the JWS and two subscales were independent of scores on social desirability. It was also satisfying to find concurrent validity for the JWS in the form of a significant correlation (0.61) with Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale. In addition, the fact that scores on the Unjust World subscale were independent of scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale further supports Furnham’s (1985) position that the Just World and Unjust World subscales are not just tapping extremes on a single continuum but that these two subscales reflect different world views. The just world view reflects an orderly and fair world where the deserving are rewarded and the guilty punished while the unjust world belief reflects an unjust world where the innocent are punished, the deserving go unrewarded, and the guilty escape punishment. In closing, this study found support for the two independent subscales, Just World and Unjust World beliefs, and the need to examine relationships at the subscale level in addition to the overall scale. Furthermore, it is recommended that researchers report more complete statistics to enable sample comparisons to be performed and to better evaluate the research. The literature review also found variations in the response scales used from three-point to seven-point scales; such variations make it difficult to compare results across samples.
Appendix Item statements on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) English version of the Belief in a Just World Scale: 1. 2. 3. 4.
I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice. I think basically the world is a just place. I am convinced that, in the long run, people will be compensated for injustices. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g. professional, family, politics) are the exception rather than the rule. 5. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve. 6. I think that people try to be fair when making important decisions. References Ahmed, S. M. S., & Stewart, R. A. C. (1985). Factor analytic and correlational study of just world scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 60, 135–140. Ambrosio, A. L., & Sheehan, E. P. (1990). Factor analysis of the just world scale. Journal of Social Psychology, 130, 413–415. Arbuckle, J. L. (1997). Amos user’s guide: version 3.6. Chicago: SmallWaters. Bentler, P. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238–246. Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen, & J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136–162). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Byrne, B. M. (1989). A primer of LISREL: basic applications and programming for confirmatory factor analytic models. New York: Springer-Verlag. Caputi, P. (1994). Factor structure of the just world scale among Australian undergraduates. Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 475–482. Carmines, E. G., & McIver, J. P. (1981). Analyzing models with unobserved variables. In G. W. Bohrnstedt, & E. F. Borgatta (Eds.), Social measurement: current issues (pp. 65–115). Beverly Hills: Sage. Couch, J. V. (1998). Another psychometric evaluation of the just world scale. Psychological Reports, 82, 1283–1286.
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Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349–354. Dalbert, C., & Katona-Sallay, H. (1996). The ‘‘belief in a just world’’ construct in Hungary. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27, 293–314. Dalbert, C., Montada, L., & Schmitt, M. (1987). Glaube an eine gerechte Welt als Motiv: Validierungskorrelate zweier Skalen. Psychologische Beitrage, 29, 596–615. Dalbert, C., & Yamauchi, L. A. (1994). Belief in a just world and attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers: a cultural comparison between Hawaii and Germany. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 1612–1626. Feather, N. T. (1991). Human values, global self-esteem, and belief in a just world. Journal of Personality, 59, 83–107. Furnham, A. (1985). Just world beliefs in an unjust society: a cross cultural comparison. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 363–366. Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: review and critique of the individual difference literature. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 365–384. Hafer, C. L., & Olson, J. M. (1989). Belief in a just world and reactions to personal deprivation. Journal of Personality, 57, 799–823. Heaven, P. C. L., & Connors, J. (1988). Personality, gender, and ‘‘just world’’ beliefs. Australian Journal of Psychology, 40, 261–266. Hyland, M. E., & Dann, P. L. (1987). Exploratory factor analysis of the just world scale using British undergraduates. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 73–77. Lerner, M. J. (1979). The desire for justice and reactions to victims. In J. Macaulay, & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior (pp. 205–229). New York: Academic Press. Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: a fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum. Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: looking back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030–1051. Lipkus, I. M. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just world. Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 1171–1178. Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I. C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a just world for self versus others: implications for psychological well-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 666–677. Lupfer, M. B., Doan, K., & Houston, D. A. (1998). Explaining unfair and fair outcomes: the therapeutic value of attributional analysis. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 495–511. MacLean, M. J., & Chown, S. M. (1988). Just world beliefs and attitudes toward helping elderly people: a comparison of British and Canadian university students. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 26, 249–259. Marsh, H. W., & Hocevar, D. (1985). Application of confirmatory factor analysis to the study of self-concept: firstand higher-order factor models and their invariance across groups. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 562–582. Mohr, P. B., & Luscri, G. (1995). Social work orientation and just work beliefs. Journal of Social Psychology, 135, 101– 103. O’Connor, W. E., Morrison, T. G., & Morrison, M. A. (1996). The reliability and factor structure of the Global Belief in a Just World scale. Journal of Social Psychology, 136, 667–668. O’Quin, K., & Vogler, C. C. (1990). Use of the just world scale with prison inmates: a methodological note. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 70, 395–400. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, A. (1973). Belief in a just world and reactions to another’s lot: a study of participants in the national draft. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73–93. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, A. (1975). Who believes in a just world? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 65–89. Schmitt, N. (1996). Uses and abuses of coefficient alpha. Psychological Assessment, 8, 350–353. SPSS Inc. (1996). SPSS user’s guide. Chicago: SPSS. Stowers, D. A., & Durm, M. W. (1998). Is belief in a just world rational? Psychological Reports, 83, 423–426. Wagstaff, G. F. (1983). Correlates of the just world in Britain. Journal of Social Psychology, 121, 145–146. Whatley, M. A. (1993). Belief in a just world scale: unidimensional or multidimensional. Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 547–551. Zuckerman, M., & Gerbasi, K. C. (1977). Belief in a just world and trust. Journal of Research in Personality, 11, 306–317.
Belief in a just world: support for independent just world and unjust world dimensions Robert Loo* Faculty of Management, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada T1K 3M4 Received 1 June 2001; received in revised form 29 August 2001
Abstract The study determined if Furnham’s proposed Just World and Unjust World subscales (1985. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 363–366) could be recovered from Rubin and Peplau’s Just World Scale (JWS) (1973. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73–93; 1975. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 65–89). The study also examined the psychometric properties of the JWS, in particular, the factor structure, internal consistency reliability, relation to social desirability, and concurrent validity of this long-established scale. Findings from a sample of 253 Canadian management undergraduates revealed strong support for the uncorrelated two-factor solution, just and unjust world dimensions, but continuing concerns over the low scale and subscale reliabilities. JWS scores were independent of social desirability scores as measured by the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960. Journal of Consulting Pschology, 24, 349–354). Results suggest that researchers use the just and unjust world scores in addition to overall scores. # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Just World Scale; Factor analysis
1. Introduction Belief in a just world is a theory of justice based on the hypothesis that people have a need to believe that they live in a world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (e.g. Lerner, 1979, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Belief in a just world may be viewed as a positive illusion in that it encourages people to see the world in a predictable and meaningful way thus likely contributing to subjective well-being by seeing the world as fair (e.g. Hafer & Olson, 1989).
* Tel.: +1-403-329-5148; fax: +1-403-329-2038. E-mail address: [email protected] 0191-8869/02/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S0191-8869(01)00185-4
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Research has shown that people who have a stronger belief in a just world tend to rationalize inequalities, to be less sympathetic towards the disadvantaged, and to be more likely to derogate victims of social injustice (e.g. Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Research has shown that people who have a stronger just world belief tend to be more authoritarian, religious, trusting, and internally controlled as well as endorsing tenets of the Protestant Ethic (e.g. Wagstaff, 1983; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977). Two critical reviews on self-reported just world beliefs have been published by Lerner and Miller (1978) and Furnham and Procter (1989). The Furnham and Procter review of the individual differences literature showed belief in a just world was associated with higher authoritarianism, greater religious beliefs for some religions, greater belief in the Protestant work ethic, political conservatism, and an internal locus of control among other relationships. 1.1. Rubin and Peplau’s Just World Scale (JWS) Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) developed a 16-item belief in a Just World Scale and later retained 13 of the original items but added seven items based upon factor analyses to form their widely-used 20-item scale. Their instrument has a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (6) where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Unfortunately, Rubin and Peplau did not provide detailed psychometric data on their scale but users have typically assumed that the scale is unidimensional and valid. Other researchers have evaluated this scale over the years and results provided a mixed assessment of the scale. For example, several factor analytic studies reported two- to five-factor solutions, thus, suggesting that the scale is multidimensional rather than unidimensional (Ahmed & Stewart, 1985; Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Hyland & Dann, 1987; O’Quin & Vogler, 1990; Whatley, 1993). However, factors do not appear to replicate across studies except for the orthogonal two-factor solution where items tended to split between belief in a just world (11 items) and belief in an unjust world (nine items), a split proposed by Furnham (1985) and supported in other studies (Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lupfer, Doan, & Houston, 1998; Mohr & Luscri, 1995; Stowers & Durm, 1998). According to Furnham (1985), the just world view reflects an orderly and fair world where the deserving are rewarded and the guilty punished while the unjust world belief reflects an unjust world where the innocent are punished, the deserving go unrewarded, and the guilty escape punishment. Thus, these two views are not simply the extremes on a single continuum but two quite different world views. Rubin and Peplau (1975) reported a split-half reliability of 0.81 for the 20-item scale. Other studies have usually found the internal consistency reliability of the scale, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, to be low to marginally acceptable, that is, in the 0.50–0.75 range (Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Couch, 1998; Mohr & Luscri, 1995; O’Quin & Vogler, 1990; Whatley, 1993). Similarly, low reliabilities (0.57) have been reported in two studies using Furnham’s (1985) Just World and Unjust World subscales (Mohr & Luscri, 1995; Stowers & Durm, 1998). These low reliabilities indicate a heterogeneous rather than homogeneous scale and, therefore, the likelihood that factor analyses would yield more than a single general factor; this was clearly the case as already discussed. Generally, no sex differences have been found when overall scores were examined (e.g. Couch, 1998; Feather, 1991; Furnham, 1985; MacLean & Chown, 1988; Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Wagstaff,
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1983), and when the Just World and Unjust World subscales were examined (Heaven & Connors, 1988). Recently, Ambrosio and Sheehan (1990) and Whatley (1993) reported that men scored higher on total scale scores indicating a greater belief in a just world than did women. But O’Connor and her associates (O’Connor, Morrison, & Morrison, 1996) performed a meta-analytic review of 33 studies using either Rubin and Peplau’s or Lipkus’s scales and they concluded that males and females do not differ in a substantial way. However, other research found some sex differences when factor scores were used revealing that females scored higher than males on some factors and lower than males on other factors (e.g. Caputi, 1994; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Hyland & Dann, 1987). 1.2. Dalbert, Montada, and Schmitt’s Six-Item Just World Scale Dalbert, Montada, and Schmitt (1987) developed a six-item belief in a just world scale in Germany (see Appendix for the English version). Their instrument has a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (6) where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Dalbert and her colleagues have successfully used different language versions of this scale with numerous samples in several countries to study a variety of phenomena. The internal consistency reliablility of scores on this scale ranges from acceptable levels such as 0.80 for a German sample to low levels such as 0.68 for a Hawaiian sample (Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Factor analytic studies usually find a one-factor solution for this scale (Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996; Dalbert & Yamauchi). The six-item scale demonstrates concurrent validity with other just world scales; for example, Lipkus, Dalbert, and Siegler (1996) found that this scale correlated significantly (0.63) with Lipkus’s (1991) scale. This recently developed scale provides an opportunity to examine the concurrent validity of Rubin and Peplau’s scale as well as the Just World and Unjust World subscales. A major purpose of the present study was to determine if Furnham’s (1985) proposed Just World and Unjust World subscales could be recovered in factor analyses. The other major purpose was to provide a current psychometric examination of Rubin and Peplau’s JWS, in particular, the factor structure, internal consistency reliability, relation to social desirability, and concurrent validity of this long-established scale. It was expected that this western Canadian sample would score high on the scale because this sample of management undergraduates are, with few exceptions, white, middle class, anglophone, Christians with conservative political and family values.
2. Method 2.1. Sample and procedure The sample consisted of 253 management undergraduates (male=143, female=107, no response=3) who ranged in age from 19 to 47 years (M=22.90, S.D.=4.60). These volunteer participants came from seven management classes in a small western Canadian university. They completed the 20-item version of the JWS with a six-point response scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975). Just World subscale scores were calculated by
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summing scores on the 11 just world items and Unjust World subscale scores were calculated by summing scores on the nine unjust world items after reversing the direction of the responses. Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item just world scale was also administered in-class, in a counterbalanced order, under neutral, un-timed, group conditions. This six-item scale uses a six-point response scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ where higher scores indicate a stronger belief in a just world. Self-report measures are susceptible to distortion and may result in the serious problem of invalid data. The Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was developed to measure one form of response bias, social desirability or ‘‘faking good.’’ The 33-item MCSD with its ‘True’/‘False’ response scale has been widely used since its introduction in 1960. The full 33-item version was used in the present study to detect response bias as would be indicated by high scores. Participants completed the MCSD at a later class. After each administration of an instrument, participants received their scored questionnaire at the following class along with a feedback sheet explaining the instrument and its use as well as an opportunity for class discussion on the instrument and related topics.
3. Results 3.1. Confirmatory factor analyses The appropriateness of the 20-item one-factor and the two-factor, Just World and Unjust World, models were evaluated through confirmatory factor analyses using AMOS (Arbuckle, 1997), a software package for structural equation modeling. Maximum likelihood estimates were calculated from the covariance matrix and several fit indexes were computed. Although the chisquare statistic and degrees of freedom are reported, the minimum value of the discrepancy, C, divided by the degrees of freedom (CMIN/d.f.) is evaluated because the chi-square statistic is not particularly useful given that large samples will produce significant chi-square values. Various rules of thumb ranging from 2 to 5 have been suggested as cutoffs for CMIN/d.f. (e.g. Byrne, 1989; Carmines & McIver, 1981; Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). The present study used 2.00 as the cutoff such that higher values indicate an inadequate fit. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with Browne and Cudeck’s (1993) suggested cutoff of 0.08 or less to indicate a close fit was used. Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index (CFI) was also calculated where values close to 1 indicate a very good fit. The goodness of fit index (GFI) and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), which takes into account the degrees of freedom and is bounded by 1, a perfect fit, were also calculated. The confirmatory factor analysis showed that, overall, the one-factor model (2=392.74, d.f.=170) for the 20 items was a poor fit as indicated by the CMIN/d.f. (2.31), CFI (0.50), GFI (0.85), and AGFI (0.81) fit indices although the RMSEA (0.07) was acceptable. The two-factor, Just World and Unjust World, uncorrelated (2=295.41, d.f.=170) and correlated (2=293.70, d.f.=169) models yielded the same fit values, RMSEA (0.06), CMIN/d.f. (1.74), CFI (0.72), GFI (0.89), and AGFI (0.86) generally showing support for the two-factor model so the simpler, uncorrelated model was preferred.
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3.2. Exploratory factor analyses A principal components analysis (SPSS, 1996) of the 20 JWS scores was performed to determine the number of factors that could be extracted using several criteria, the eigenvalue 51 rule, the scree test, the number of salient variables on factors, and factor interpretability. Orthogonal (varimax) and oblique (oblimin) factor rotations were performed and rotated matrices examined to determine the more meaningful structure. The principal components analysis revealed that seven factors had eigenvalues 51 but the scree test revealed five substantive factors. The examination of the rotated varimax factor matrices for the two to five-factor solutions showed that the two-factor solution clearly supported the Just World and Unjust World item split. As seen in Table 1, Factor I (eigenvalue=2.83) accounted for 14.15% of the postrotational variance and loaded on the 11 Just World items while Factor II (eigenvalue=2.11) accounted for 10.53% of the variance and loaded on the nine Unjust World items. The three-factor solution revealed a splitting of the Unjust World factor into Factors II and III. The four- and five-factor solutions showed the undesirable cross-loading of several variables on two rather than just one factor. 3.3. Descriptive statistics The descriptive statistics for the 20-item JWS and for the Just World and Unjust World subscales for the total sample as well as separately for males and females are shown in Table 2. t-Tests showed that males and females did not differ on the total scale scores or Just World subscale scores but that females scored significantly higher than males on the Unjust World subscale, t(247)=2.19, P=0.03. With mean values of 75 on a 120-point scale, the sample clearly believe in a just world. 3.4. Correlations among belief in a Just World measures Scores on the Just World, r(251)=0.81, P=0.001, and Unjust World, r(251)=0.64, P=0.001, subscales correlated significantly with full scale scores. Scores on the two subscales were independent of each other, r(251)=0.06. 3.5. Internal consistency reliability Reliability analyses (SPSS, 1996) were performed to determine if the 20 items formed a homogeneous scale as would be supported by significant inter-item and item-total correlations, and high internal consistency reliabilities as measured by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Similarly, reliability analyses were performed for the 11-item Just World and nine-item Unjust World subscales. As seen in Table 2, the reliability analyses for the 20-item scale showed low alpha coefficients for the total sample (0.64) as well as for the males (0.60) and females (0.69). Reliabilities were low for the Just World (0.60–0.77) and, particularly, Unjust World (0.57) subscales. An examination of the correlation matrices of item scores for the total sample and separately for males and
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Table 1 Two-factor orthogonal solution of scores on the 20-item Belief in a Just World Scale Abbreviated Item Statement
I (Just World)
II (Unjust World)
. . .people who do their job will rise to the top When parents punish their children,. . .for good reasons. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive. . . . . .in the general course of history good wins out. . . .people deserve what they get. Crime doesn’t pay. It is rare for an innocent person to be wrongly sent to jail. People who meet with misfortune. . .brought it on themselves. Basically, the world is a just place. People who get ‘‘lucky breaks’’. . .earned their good fortune. Men who keep in shape. . .little chance of. . .a heart attack. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free. . . Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. . . .parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired. . . It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial. . . In professional sports, many fouls. . .never get called. . . The political candidate who sticks up. . .rarely gets elected. . . .a person rarely deserves the reputation he/she has. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt. . .as careless ones.
0.64 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.28 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03
0.02 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.61 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.30 0.29
Eigenvalues
2.83
2.11
Table 2 Descriptive, reliability, and social desirability statistics for the 20-item Just World Scale Group/scalea
20-Item Belief in a Just World Scale and Subscales M
S.D.
Min–Max
Total (n=253) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.02 40.88 34.00
9.02 6.99 5.32
44–106 19–61 20–50
Males (n=143) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.04 41.55 33.37
8.67 6.32 5.30
Females (n=106) Full scale Just (11 Items) Unjust (9 Items)
75.01 39.96 34.87
9.52 7.74 5.25
a
Skew
MCSD Alpha
M
S.D.
0.18 0.38 0.06
0.64 0.69 0.57
15.95
4.82
50–102 24–56 20–50
0.31 0.17 0.22
0.60 0.60 0.57
16.14
4.67
44–106 19–61 22–46
0.04 0.42 0.16
0.69 0.77 0.57
15.69
5.04
Some respondents did not indicate their sex, thus the n subtotals do not sum to 253.
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females did not reveal any ‘bad’ items seeing all items had positive correlations with the other items in the scale and significant item-total correlations. Dropping items which had relatively low item-total correlations improved alpha coefficients by merely 0.01. 3.6. Social desirability The descriptive statistics for social desirability scores are also shown in Table 2 for the total sample and separately for each sex. Total scores on the JWS as well as on the Just World and Unjust World subscales were independent of social desirability scores in the total sample (r= 0.04–0.02) as well as for males (r= 0.07–0.09) and females (r= 0.08–0.04). 3.7. Concurrent validity The concurrent validity of the JWS was examined by correlating scores from the 20-item scale with scores from Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale. JWS scores correlated significantly, r(247)=0.61, P=0.001, with scores on the Dalbert et al.’s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale (M=3.82, S.D.=0.71) thus demonstrating the concurrent validity of Rubin and Peplau’s instrument. At the subscale level, the strongest correlations were between scores on the Just World subscale (0.51–0.80, all P<0.001) and scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale while the correlations between scores on the Unjust World subscale (0.08–0.27) and scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale were low.
4. Discussion A major finding is the strong support for the two independent factors comprising Furnham’s (1985) Just World and Unjust World subscales. The findings from the CFA and EFAs also strongly suggest that, while the JWS is multidimensional, only these two factors show strong factor characteristics (e.g. several salient variables on each factor and simple structure) and replication across different studies and samples so researchers can use these two independent subscales in addition to using the overall JWS score. The use of subscales scores would also help identify relationships that are masked in the overall scale score (e.g. Caputi, 1994; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Hyland & Dann, 1987). One persistent psychometric concern identified in this study as well as in past research is the low internal consistency reliability of the JWS and two subscales even though no ‘bad’ items were found. Given that the scale is multidimensional, two factors can be reliably extracted, then very high reliabilities are not expected but reliabilities in the 0.50–0.60 are uncomfortably low. Such low reliabilities likely mean that relationships between scores from these just world measures and other variables will be attentuated, thus producing an undesirable state in any research (Schmitt, 1996). The finding that the sample obtained mean scores of 75 on a 120-point scale indicated a belief in a just world, not surprising given that Canadians enjoy a high standard of living with a social net to catch those in need and a relatively safe society among other favourable social and cultural factors.
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In terms of response bias, it was reassuring to find that scores on the JWS and two subscales were independent of scores on social desirability. It was also satisfying to find concurrent validity for the JWS in the form of a significant correlation (0.61) with Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale. In addition, the fact that scores on the Unjust World subscale were independent of scores on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) scale further supports Furnham’s (1985) position that the Just World and Unjust World subscales are not just tapping extremes on a single continuum but that these two subscales reflect different world views. The just world view reflects an orderly and fair world where the deserving are rewarded and the guilty punished while the unjust world belief reflects an unjust world where the innocent are punished, the deserving go unrewarded, and the guilty escape punishment. In closing, this study found support for the two independent subscales, Just World and Unjust World beliefs, and the need to examine relationships at the subscale level in addition to the overall scale. Furthermore, it is recommended that researchers report more complete statistics to enable sample comparisons to be performed and to better evaluate the research. The literature review also found variations in the response scales used from three-point to seven-point scales; such variations make it difficult to compare results across samples.
Appendix Item statements on Dalbert et al.’s (1987) English version of the Belief in a Just World Scale: 1. 2. 3. 4.
I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice. I think basically the world is a just place. I am convinced that, in the long run, people will be compensated for injustices. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g. professional, family, politics) are the exception rather than the rule. 5. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve. 6. I think that people try to be fair when making important decisions. References Ahmed, S. M. S., & Stewart, R. A. C. (1985). Factor analytic and correlational study of just world scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 60, 135–140. Ambrosio, A. L., & Sheehan, E. P. (1990). Factor analysis of the just world scale. Journal of Social Psychology, 130, 413–415. Arbuckle, J. L. (1997). Amos user’s guide: version 3.6. Chicago: SmallWaters. Bentler, P. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238–246. Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen, & J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136–162). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Byrne, B. M. (1989). A primer of LISREL: basic applications and programming for confirmatory factor analytic models. New York: Springer-Verlag. Caputi, P. (1994). Factor structure of the just world scale among Australian undergraduates. Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 475–482. Carmines, E. G., & McIver, J. P. (1981). Analyzing models with unobserved variables. In G. W. Bohrnstedt, & E. F. Borgatta (Eds.), Social measurement: current issues (pp. 65–115). Beverly Hills: Sage. Couch, J. V. (1998). Another psychometric evaluation of the just world scale. Psychological Reports, 82, 1283–1286.
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