- Email: [email protected]
Justice and the belief in a just world: a developmental perspective
Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803 www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Justice and the belief in a just world: a developmental perspective Louis Oppenheimer
*
Department of Psychology, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands Received 27 February 2004; received in revised form 22 October 2004; accepted 1 November 2004 Available online 22 January 2005
Abstract In the present study, the relationships among the developments of beliefs in a just world (BJW; i.e., a principle to perceive the world as orderly and just), moral development, and attitudes toward human rights were studied with Dutch adolescents. BJW were thought to be either coping cognitions or precursors of moral development that affect attitudes toward human rights. Across age such early moral conceptions were expected to be replaced by more sophisticated forms of reasoning enabling individuals to handle a world that is not orderly or just. In the study, 138 adolescents divided over three age groups participated (mean ages 13, 15, and 17 years). They were presented with the Scale for just world beliefs, the Defining Issue Test, and the Attitudes Toward Human Rights Inventory. No relationships could be demonstrated between BJW and moral development and attitudes toward human rights. The findings support the suggestion that BJW represent a coping mechanism. 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Just world beliefs; Justice; Moral development; Attitudes
*
Tel.: +31 20 525 6831; fax: +31 20 639 0279. E-mail address: [email protected]
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.11.007
1794
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1. Introduction Already early in life, children develop some fundamental conceptions of justice. One of these early concepts involves the belief that ‘‘a fault will automatically bring about its own punishment’’ (Piaget, 1965, p. 256). The belief that there is a direct relationship between what people deserve and their behavior is based on Ôimmanent justiceÕ, a characteristic of the stage of heteronomous morality (Piaget, 1965). In particular, children under the age of 10 perceive contiguity between a transgression and punishment (Karniol, 1980). Immanent causality explanations are among others prompted by an understanding of rules of justice as rigid and unalterable. For instance, parents are then perceived as absolute and omniscient authorities that define what is fair and just (Piaget, 1965; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). In the course of development, immanent causality or precausal explanations are followed by more realistic causal and relative explanations leading to a decline of beliefs in immanent justice. The purpose of the present study is to examine the developmental course for BJW, the relation of these beliefs with moral development, and how such beliefs affect attitudes towards important societal issues such as equal rights for women and men and abortion. In spite of the decline in beliefs in immanent justice, Piaget (1965) predicted that to some degree such beliefs might persist into adulthood. Karniol (1980) found support for the latter prediction by showing that a considerable number of adults perceive misfortune as deserved. Apparently, some adults ‘‘have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve’’ (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 1030). It is this ÔneedÕ that prompts BJW (Durkin, 1995; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Young childrenÕs ‘‘use of immanent justice to construct causality explanation is then perceived as a younger version of adultÕs belief in a just world’’ (Karniol, 1980, p. 128). In the literature concerning BJW (for reviews see Dalbert, 2001; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Montada & Lerner, 1998), BJW (i.e., immanent justice reasoning) are thought to be precursors of justice and moral development (e.g., Furnham & Procter, 1989) and to represent some kind of motive for just behavior (see, Dalbert, 2001). On the basis of KarniolÕs (1980) conclusion that childrenÕs use of immanent causality explanations is a younger version of adultsÕ BJW, Dalbert (2001) assumes that it is possible to differentiate between the childish belief in immanent causality and the more mature BJW (p. 40). It is not clear, however, in what way a more mature BJW differs from the childish belief. For instance, in a study of immanent justice reasoning with 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children and college students, Jose (1990) did not observe any differences between grades in the use of immanent causality explanations. For all ages positive outcomes for good motive stories and negative outcomes for bad story motives were fairer than the other two combinations (p. 1032), or as Dalbert (2001) noted ‘‘participants of all ages behaved as if motivated to defend their beliefs in a just world’’ (p. 41). These findings substantiate KarniolÕs (1980) observation and indicate an absence of any ÔqualitativeÕ change in the use of immanent causality reasoning across age. Jose (1990) noted, however, that compared to older children and college students, younger children ‘‘seemed to allow moral concerns to ÔbendÕ event causality to conform to pleasing story structure’’ (p. 1032). This finding at least suggests a negative relationship between immanent causality reasoning, as central aspect of BJW, and moral development. With an increase in the development of moral reasoning, children and adolescents will be less prone to ‘‘bend event causality’’ to maintain immanent causality reasoning when events do not permit such reasoning.
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1795
In light of the above discussion, it is of interest to realize that for Lerner and Miller (1978) the belief that the world is a just place ‘‘enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they are stable and orderly’’ (p. 1030). Similarly, Heider (1958) two decades earlier noted that BJW is a ‘‘pervasive cognitive tendency, stemming from the more general principle of cognitive balance’’ (p. 235). From these points of view, the extent to which stability and balance (i.e., BJW) relate to issues of justice and moral reasoning can be questioned (Furnham, 2003). BJW are here some anthropomorphic perception of the world as animated by some Ôconcept of justiceÕ without a differentiation between the natural and the social world. The moral idea of justice, on the other hand, relates to the social world only, includes the division between the natural and the social, and consequently, is a more cognitively complex concept. Hence, it is perhaps more correct to argue that BJW involves a coping mechanism to deal with a chaotic and unstable world rather than developmental precursors of moral development (Furnham, 2003). As such, BJW should not relate to moral development and attitudes toward social issues such as human rights. However, if BJW are more than a coping mechanism and represent early conceptions of justice (e.g., immanent justice reasoning) then a (negative) relationship between BJW and higher levels of moral reasoning is expected. Most research dealing with BJW has focused on the presence and strength of this belief and (personality) correlates (for reviews see Dalbert, 2001; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Because immanent-causality reasoning—characterizing among others BJW—is an early developmental stage in moral development, it is expected that in the course of development and at more sophisticated stages of moral reasoning individuals come to realize that the initial assumption of order and justice is incorrect. This assumption is in line with the claims of Kohlberg (1963) and Piaget (1965) that more mature forms of reasoning about justice and morality replace immanent-causality reasoning. For instance, Piaget (1965) argued that the stage of heteronomous morality in young childhood (i.e., pre-conventional morality; Kohlberg, 1963) is followed by a stage of autonomous (Piaget, 1965) or conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1963) in later childhood and young adolescence. In this stage, childrenÕs initially rigid and unalterable conceptions of justice become replaced by the awareness that such rules are based on the reciprocal force of moral rules as a consequence of cooperation (Durkin, 1995; Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 1965). During adolescence the understanding emerges that justice is based on compromise among members of a society offering all individuals equal chances (i.e., post-conventional morality or stage 5 and stage 6 moral reasoning; Kohlberg, 1963). To assess BJW, Rubin and Peplau (1973) developed the Just World Scales requiring participants to indicate to what extent they agree with a particular statement about just behavior on a six-point rating scale. Whereas, initially BJW were thought to represent a unitary dimension, later research has shown that BJW are two-dimensional (cf. Furnham, 1993) and involve a general conceptual dimension (i.e., ‘‘the world is just’’) and a personal conceptual dimension (i.e., ‘‘I am treated justly’’; Dalbert, 1999, 2001). In a series of cross-sectional studies involving adolescents from different levels of secondary education (age range from 12 to 21; Dalbert, 2001; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996), general and personal BJW were assessed. Dalbert (2001, pp. 55–63) reported that older participants demonstrated significantly lower beliefs in a general and personal just world. For all age groups, personal BJW were observed to be higher than general BJW (Dalbert, 2001). In addition, a negative association between BJW and educational level suggested that the higher the level of education (i.e., cognitive development), the lower general BJW. Personal
1796
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
BJW related positively to educational level. Finally, ‘‘gender did not have an important role in explaining just-world beliefs’’ (Dalbert, 2001, p. 88). In spite of the fact that Dalbert (2001) accepts the basic assumption that BJW are initially required to cope with ‘‘randomness and unfairness encountered in the world’’ (p. 62), she argues that a decrease in BJW has a negative effect on individualsÕ mental health, is maladaptive, ‘‘and should be avoided in normal development’’ (p. 62). Whereas Dalbert perceived the decrease in general BJW as inevitable and due to cognitive development, the ÔincreaseÕ of personal BJW is considered a developmental gain that compensates the loss of general BJW (Dalbert, 2001, p. 62). The ÔincreaseÕ of personal BJW, however, was found across different educational levels of secondary education but not across age. Hitherto, just world beliefs have been discussed as an instance of immanent-causality reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning). Issues of moral action or motives for moral behavior were excluded. In addition, because the moral concept of justice concerns a more cognitively complex dimension of morality, justice could not directly be related to BJW. According to Dalbert (2001), however, BJW involves the understanding of justice, is a precursor to more sophisticated moral reasoning, and implies a motive to behave justly as well. If these assumptions are correct then BJW should relate to the development of higher levels of moral reasoning. For instance, when higher levels of moral reasoning appear (e.g., characteristic of stages 5 and 6), lower forms of moral reasoning such as immanent-causality reasoning will become less salient (i.e., a negative relationship should be present). Moral reasoning of stages 5 and 6 is characterized by principles and values that make for a good or just society (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). At the conventional and post-conventional levels (Kohlberg, 1963, 1976), independent judgments about justice emerge when people perceive justice to be based on compromises. At stage 6, good and evil are judged on the basis of self-selected ethical views (Duriez, 1998; Kohlberg, 1976). Moral reasoning at these higher levels is assessed by the Defining Issue Test (DIT; Rest, 1974; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). In addition, if BJW involves reasoning about justice and motivates just behavior, then attitudes toward issues of human rights such as civil liberty, free opinion, and democracy (Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, & Derryberry, 1999) are expected to relate positively to such beliefs. The latter assumption is examined by relating BJW and moral reasoning to scores on the ‘‘Attitudes toward Human Rights Inventory’’ (ATHRI; Narvaez & Getz, 2001).
2. Method 2.1. Participants One hundred and thirty-eight adolescents participated in this study. All participants came from secondary schools that serve middle class neighborhoods and were derived from three grade levels: First-grade (n = 49, 26 females and 23 males; M(age) = 13.0, SD = .44); third-grade (n = 51, 29 females and 22 males; M(age) = 14.11, SD = .37); and fifth-grade (n = 38, 20 females and 18 males; M(age) = 17.1, SD = .52). The educational program of secondary education in the Netherlands consists of different educational tracks or different forms of secondary education that relate to the intellectual abilities of
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1797
pupils. Each of the tracks leads to different forms of higher education (i.e., advanced elementary education, higher general secondary education, and preparatory scientific education). In addition, the educational tracks also differ in the number of years of obligatory education (i.e., four, five, and six years, respectively). For that reason, all secondary school pupils were selected from the same, and in the present study, highest educational track in secondary education (i.e., VWO or preparatory scientific education) to permit comparisons between first-, third-, and fifth-grade pupils. 2.2. Materials and procedure The Just World Belief Scale (JWB) is a 13-item scale assessing BJW from a general and a personal perspective (Dalbert, 1999, 2001, pp. 206–207; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Participants were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a particular statement on a sixpoint Likert scale ranging from strongly agree (6) to strongly disagree (1). To assess general BJW, six items were present (e.g., ‘‘I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve’’). For personal beliefs seven items were used (e.g., ‘‘I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me’’). The reliability coefficients were .65 and .76 for the subscale assessing general and personal BJW, respectively. Moral development was assessed by the abbreviated version of the Defining Issue Test (DIT; Rest, 1974) that consisted of three moral dilemmas. Each dilemma was accompanied by 12 statements or considerations related to the dilemma and the participants were requested to indicate the importance or relevancy of each consideration on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Following this procedure, the participants were asked to order the four most relevant considerations according to their importance. With the exception of stage-1 level argumentation, each consideration represented forms of reasoning characteristic for stages 2–6 of KohlbergÕs (1963, 1976) theory of moral development. Of the two moral considerations for each developmental stage, only the one with the highest importance rating was considered. The 12 considerations for each dilemma included one or two so-called M-items (i.e., Meaningless considerations) to check for random responses. If an M-value P 6 was obtained (i.e., the participant did not seriously respond to the test) the participantÕs data were omitted from the analyses. To each dilemma a maximum score of 10 could be assigned. The four most important considerations obtained a score of 4–1 according to the stage of which it was characteristic. That is, if a consideration characteristic for stage 5 moral reasoning was considered most important, then the score of 4 was assigned to stage 5; if the second consideration in importance was characteristic of stage 4, then a score of 3 was assigned to stage 4; if the third consideration in importance was a meaningless response, then the score of 2 was assigned to the M-category, and so on. Very few participants used arguments characteristic for stage 6. Consequently, the final scoring of the DIT was based primarily on moral reasoning characterizing stages 2–5. In total, for the three dilemmas 30 (score) points were divided. The measure used for the assessment of moral development by the DIT is the P-roh value which involves the combined score for stage 5 and stage 6 moral reasoning and could range from a score of 0 to a score of 21 (i.e., 3 · 4 + 3 · 3). For the sake of completeness, also the P-roh values of stages 2–4 were included to correct for a possible developmental gap between post-conventional moral reasoning based on moral relativism (i.e., the world is not orderly and just) and BJW (i.e., the world is orderly and just or reasoning based
1798
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
on pre-conventional and conventional morality which are characteristic until the age of approximately 15 years). The Attitudes Towards Human Rights Inventory (ATHRI; Narvaez & Getz, 2001) was developed to assess attitudes toward social and societal issues such as civil liberty, free opinion, and democracy. The measure consists of 40 statements (i.e., items) of which 10 are used as control items to ascertain that participants seriously responded to the measure. Since the ATHRI is an American test, the items were translated and adapted for Dutch society. By means of a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from Ôcompletely agreeÕ (5) to Ôdo not agree at allÕ (1), participants were requested to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a statement. Examples of such statements are ‘‘Citizens should be allowed to voice their opinions if they disagree with their government’’ and ‘‘Abortion is a right of every woman’’. An a priori principal-component analysis on the adapted items (i.e., the 40 items minus the 10 control items) resulted in a one-factor structure consisting of 23 items (i.e., Eigenvalue 4.02 and an explained variance of 17.5%). A reliability coefficient of .77 was obtained for the remaining 23 items.
3. Results In Table 1, the averages for general and personal BJW (GBJW and PBJW), the DIT (i.e., P-roh values), and ATHRI are presented for each age group and gender. The scores on GBJW and PBJW were analyzed by a 3 · 2 (age group · gender) MANOVA. No significant effect for the age group by gender interaction was evident for either BJW scale. Only for general just-world beliefs the MANOVA revealed a significant effect for age on (F(2, 132) = 3.24, p < .05; g2 = .047; d = .609). The scores on the scores on the DIT and ATHRI were analyzed by separate 3 · 2 (age group · gender) ANOVAs. Again no effect for the age group by gender interaction was observed for the P-roh values. A significant effect for age was present (F(2, 132) = 8.33, p < .001; g2 = .112; d = .960) but not for gender. The age effect demonstrated a sudden increase in moral development from the age of 15 (Bonferroni p = .001; see Fig. 1). For gender only a significant effect was present on the scores of the ATHRI (F(1, 132) = 9.32, p < .01; g2 = .066; d = .858) showing females to score consistently higher than males (i.e., 3.56 vs. 3.34). Of major interest were the interrelationships among the assessed variables. Pearson-product moment correlations were calculated and revealed that BJW are not related to any of the assessed levels of moral development (DIT), nor attitudes toward social and societal issues assessed by the ATHRI. Moral development (P-roh values stages 5 + 6), on the other hand, was positively related to attitudes toward social and societal issues (r = .18, p < .05). Also when the ÔP-roh valuesÕ of the lower stages (i.e., stages 2–4) assessed by the DIT were included, no significant relationships emerged between BJW and moral development. To verify whether a pattern of relationships is present between a latent concept (i.e., factor) and the assessed variables, a principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation was initially conducted on the scores of GBJW, PBJW, DIT, and ATHRI by which a four-factor solution was requested. The resulting scree plot revealed a considerable drop in eigenvalues with the third (.812) and fourth (.608) factors as compared to the first (1.352) and second factors (1.228), suggesting that a two-factor model fits the data best. Based on this finding, a two-factor solution
Age 13
15
17
Female
Male
Total
Female
Male
Total
Female
Male
Total
GBJW SD CI
3.72 .83 3.381–4.065
3.91 .81 3.549–4.277
3.81 .82 3.568–4.068
3.57 .86 3.248–3.896
3.36 .98 2.985–3.729
3.48 .91 3.218–3.711
3.40 .97 3.010–3.790
3.34 .84 2.933–3.756
3.37 .90 3.089–3.656
PBJW SD CI
4.32 .87 4.040–4.597
4.38 .66 4.087–4.679
4.35 .77 4.148–4.554
4.14 .59 3.874–4.402
4.38 .54 4.080–4.686
4.24 .58 4.060–4.461
3.99 .96 3.668–4.303
4.35 .60 4.014–4.684
4.16 .82 3.937–4.398
P-roh SD CI
4.35 2.59 3.173–5.519
5.04 3.21 3.796–6.291
4.67 2.89 3.839–5.551
4.28 2.68 3.165–5.386
4.86 2.44 3.589–6.139
4.53 2.57 3.724–5.415
7.25 3.51 5.913–8.587
6.72 3.85 5.313–8.132
7.00 3.63 6.015–7.958
ATHRI SD CI
3.53 .24 3.365–3.686
3.42 .31 3.246–3.587
3.47 .28 3.354–3.588
3.51 .39 3.362–3.666
3.30 .55 3.121–3.470
3.42 .48 3.289–3.520
3.64 .48 3.456–3.822
3.31 .49 3.121–3.506
3.49 .50 3.343–3.609
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for general and personal beliefs in a just world (GBJW and PBJW), the DIT (i.e., Proh value; stages 5 and 6 combined), and ATHRI for each age group and gender
1799
1800
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
P-roh value; Stage 5+6 0.6
GBJW PBJW
Mean (z-score)
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4 15
13
17
Age
Fig. 1. Mean z-scores (i.e., in order to compare the measures) for the DIT (P-roh value: stages 5 and 6 combined) and general and personal just world beliefs (i.e., GBJW and PBJW, respectively). Table 2 Factor loadings, communalities, Eigenvalues, and explained variance of a principal axis factor analyses with oblimin rotation and a PCA with varimax rotation on the scores of GBJW, PBJW, DIT, and ATHRI Variables
Extraction Principal axis (oblimin rotation) Communalities
GBJW PBJW DIT ATHRI Eigenvalues % Explained variance Cumulative percentage
.420 .407 .254 .140
Factor I
Principal components (varimax rotation) Factor II
.631 .594 .502 .369 1.228 30.69
1.352 33.80 64.49
Communalities .723 .701 .605 .550
Factor I
Factor II
.824 .803 .771 .733 1.228 30.69
1.352 33.80 64.49
was selected for three principal axis factor analyses with varimax, oblimin, and quartimax rotations. The three analyses, as well as a principal component analysis resulted in the same two-factor solution with 64.5% of explained variance (see Table 2).
4. Discussion Because Furnham and Procter (1989) noted that the ‘‘just world hypothesis . . . draws on various writings in the area of morality, ethics and justice’’ (p. 365), it has been thought that BJW
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1801
concerns reasoning about morality and justice (Dalbert, 2001). From a developmental point of view BJW (i.e., immanent justice reasoning) are perceived as precursors of justice and moral development (cf. Furnham & Procter, 1989) or as some kind of motive for just behavior (see, Dalbert, 2001). In the present study the assumption that BJW relates to the development of moral reasoning was examined. About the extent to which BJW (causally) determines moral development (i.e., are a true precursor of higher levels of moral reasoning) only indirect inferences can be made. On the basis of the correlational assumption, BJW were expected to be replaced by other more advanced and sophisticated levels of reasoning about justice and morality and a decrease in just world reasoning (i.e., immanent causality reasoning) to be paralleled by an increase in moral development or justice reasoning across age. The findings did not offer any support for the assumption of a relationship between BJW and moral development, as assessed by the Defining Issue Test (Rest, 1974; Rest et al., 1999). Neither were BJW associated with adolescentsÕ attitudes towards issues of human rights, while these attitudes were positively related to moral development. In spite of the absence of any association between BJW and moral development, a gradual decrease of general, but not personal just world beliefs was observed from the age of 12 onward, while from the age of 15 stage-5/6 moral reasoning increased sharply. The absence of any support for the assumptions that BJW involve knowledge about social justice and represent a motive for just behavior (Dalbert, 2001; Lerner, 1975) suggests that BJW do not serve any significant function in moral development or in attitudes toward societal issues (see Furnham, 2003). It is here argued that BJW do not refer to ÔjustÕ in terms of justice but rather to order in a chaotic environment. That is, our findings indicate that BJW are early developmental ÔbeliefsÕ (Subbotsky, 2000) that are functional as coping cognitions (Furnham, 2003) as long as developmental progress requires stability and order in an apparently chaotic phenomenal world (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Subbotsky, 2000). When such stability and order is no longer required, or becomes doubted and questioned (James, 1890), BJW should disappear to be replaced by more sophisticated (moral) reasoning that permits the acceptance of a world that is neither orderly nor just. The maintenance of personal BJW as a coping mechanism, in spite of higher levels of moral reasoning, may then reflect older adolescentsÕ inability to deal with the world that is not orderly or just. The latter may be most pronounced for the way the self is treated by which personal BJW obtain an individual functionalism to manage personal pathology and experience (Furnham, 1998, p. 158). Of interest was to note that attitudes towards human rights did not change across age. In addition, adolescentsÕ attitudes toward human rights issues associate positively to moral development. Additional research is needed to verify at what age attitudes towards human rights develop and whether and when they start to play a role in judgments about justice and injustice. For our finding that femalesÕ attitudes toward human rights issues are more pronounced than those of males no satisfactory explanation is available. In summary, the present study indicated that BJW as assessed by the Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1999; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994) are not concerned with justice or justice motives but are a coping mechanism (Furnham, 2003) to achieve stability and order in a rather chaotic phenomenal world (Subbotsky, 2000). BJW may then not only be a ‘‘fundamental delusion’’ (Lerner, 1980), by which a just world comes to be understood in terms of the belief that good people are rewarded and bad people punished (Lerner, 1980; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), but rather a belief that prompts
1802
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
the justification of injustice rather than motives to behave justly (i.e., Ôjustice motiveÕ; Lerner, 1975, 1980). Acknowledgment Thanks are due to Myrna Over, Anna Pires, Marthe Straatemeier, Marijn Sweijs, and Rosalie Talstra for collecting the data of this study. I would like to express my gratitude to Eugene Subbotsky, Dr. Eysenck, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. References Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (Eds.). (1987). The measurement of moral judgment (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press. Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the Personal Belief in a Just World ScaleÕs validity. Social Justice Research, 12, 79–98. Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource: Dealing with challenges and critical life events. New York: Plenum Press. Dalbert, C., & Yamauchi, L. (1994). Belief in a just world and attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers: A cultural comparison between Hawaii and Germany. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 1612–1626. Duriez, B. (1998). De ontwikkeling van het moreel denken: de ideologische bias in de theorie van L. Kohlberg [The development of moral thought: The ideological bias in L. KohlbergÕs theory]. Leuven, Belgium: Centrum voor Godsdienstpsychologie. Durkin, K. (1995). Developmental social psychology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Furnham, A. (1993). Just World Beliefs in twelve societies. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 317–329. Furnham, A. (1998). Measuring the beliefs in a just world. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world (pp. 141–162). New York: Plenum. Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: research progress over the past decade. Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 795–817. Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: Review and critique of the individual difference literature. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 365–384. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jose, P. E. (1990). Just-world reasoning in childrenÕs immanent justice judgments. Child Development, 61, 1024–1033. Karniol, R. (1980). A conceptual analysis of immanent justice responses in children. Child Development, 51, 118–130. Kohlberg, L. (1963). The development of childrenÕs orientation toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 6, 11–33. Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues (pp. 31–53). New York: Holt. Lerner, M. J. (1975). The justice motive of social behavior: Introduction. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 1–19. Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum. Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030–1050. Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I. C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a just world for self versus others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 666–677. Montada, L., & Lerner, M. J. (1998). Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. New York: Plenum Press. Narvaez, D., & Getz, I. (2001). Guide for using the Attitudes toward Human Rights Inventory (ATHRI). University of Minnesota: Center for the Study of Ethical Development.
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1803
Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press. Rest, J. (1974). Manual for the Defining Issues Test: An objective test for moral judgment development. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Moral Research Project. Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (1999). DIT2: Devising and testing a new instrument of moral judgment. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91, 644–659. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1973). Belief in a just world and reactions to anotherÕs lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73–93. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1975). Who believes in a just world? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 65–89. Subbotsky, E. (2000). Phenomenalistic perception and rational understanding in the mind of an individual: A fight for dominance. In K. S. Rosengren, C. N. Johnson, & P. L. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in children (pp. 35–74). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Thoma, S. J., Narvaez, D., Rest, J. R., & Derryberry, P. (1999). Does moral judgment reduce to political attitude or verbal ability? Educational Psychology Review, 11, 324–342.
Justice and the belief in a just world: a developmental perspective Louis Oppenheimer
*
Department of Psychology, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands Received 27 February 2004; received in revised form 22 October 2004; accepted 1 November 2004 Available online 22 January 2005
Abstract In the present study, the relationships among the developments of beliefs in a just world (BJW; i.e., a principle to perceive the world as orderly and just), moral development, and attitudes toward human rights were studied with Dutch adolescents. BJW were thought to be either coping cognitions or precursors of moral development that affect attitudes toward human rights. Across age such early moral conceptions were expected to be replaced by more sophisticated forms of reasoning enabling individuals to handle a world that is not orderly or just. In the study, 138 adolescents divided over three age groups participated (mean ages 13, 15, and 17 years). They were presented with the Scale for just world beliefs, the Defining Issue Test, and the Attitudes Toward Human Rights Inventory. No relationships could be demonstrated between BJW and moral development and attitudes toward human rights. The findings support the suggestion that BJW represent a coping mechanism. 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Just world beliefs; Justice; Moral development; Attitudes
*
Tel.: +31 20 525 6831; fax: +31 20 639 0279. E-mail address: [email protected]
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.11.007
1794
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1. Introduction Already early in life, children develop some fundamental conceptions of justice. One of these early concepts involves the belief that ‘‘a fault will automatically bring about its own punishment’’ (Piaget, 1965, p. 256). The belief that there is a direct relationship between what people deserve and their behavior is based on Ôimmanent justiceÕ, a characteristic of the stage of heteronomous morality (Piaget, 1965). In particular, children under the age of 10 perceive contiguity between a transgression and punishment (Karniol, 1980). Immanent causality explanations are among others prompted by an understanding of rules of justice as rigid and unalterable. For instance, parents are then perceived as absolute and omniscient authorities that define what is fair and just (Piaget, 1965; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). In the course of development, immanent causality or precausal explanations are followed by more realistic causal and relative explanations leading to a decline of beliefs in immanent justice. The purpose of the present study is to examine the developmental course for BJW, the relation of these beliefs with moral development, and how such beliefs affect attitudes towards important societal issues such as equal rights for women and men and abortion. In spite of the decline in beliefs in immanent justice, Piaget (1965) predicted that to some degree such beliefs might persist into adulthood. Karniol (1980) found support for the latter prediction by showing that a considerable number of adults perceive misfortune as deserved. Apparently, some adults ‘‘have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve’’ (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 1030). It is this ÔneedÕ that prompts BJW (Durkin, 1995; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Young childrenÕs ‘‘use of immanent justice to construct causality explanation is then perceived as a younger version of adultÕs belief in a just world’’ (Karniol, 1980, p. 128). In the literature concerning BJW (for reviews see Dalbert, 2001; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Montada & Lerner, 1998), BJW (i.e., immanent justice reasoning) are thought to be precursors of justice and moral development (e.g., Furnham & Procter, 1989) and to represent some kind of motive for just behavior (see, Dalbert, 2001). On the basis of KarniolÕs (1980) conclusion that childrenÕs use of immanent causality explanations is a younger version of adultsÕ BJW, Dalbert (2001) assumes that it is possible to differentiate between the childish belief in immanent causality and the more mature BJW (p. 40). It is not clear, however, in what way a more mature BJW differs from the childish belief. For instance, in a study of immanent justice reasoning with 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children and college students, Jose (1990) did not observe any differences between grades in the use of immanent causality explanations. For all ages positive outcomes for good motive stories and negative outcomes for bad story motives were fairer than the other two combinations (p. 1032), or as Dalbert (2001) noted ‘‘participants of all ages behaved as if motivated to defend their beliefs in a just world’’ (p. 41). These findings substantiate KarniolÕs (1980) observation and indicate an absence of any ÔqualitativeÕ change in the use of immanent causality reasoning across age. Jose (1990) noted, however, that compared to older children and college students, younger children ‘‘seemed to allow moral concerns to ÔbendÕ event causality to conform to pleasing story structure’’ (p. 1032). This finding at least suggests a negative relationship between immanent causality reasoning, as central aspect of BJW, and moral development. With an increase in the development of moral reasoning, children and adolescents will be less prone to ‘‘bend event causality’’ to maintain immanent causality reasoning when events do not permit such reasoning.
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1795
In light of the above discussion, it is of interest to realize that for Lerner and Miller (1978) the belief that the world is a just place ‘‘enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they are stable and orderly’’ (p. 1030). Similarly, Heider (1958) two decades earlier noted that BJW is a ‘‘pervasive cognitive tendency, stemming from the more general principle of cognitive balance’’ (p. 235). From these points of view, the extent to which stability and balance (i.e., BJW) relate to issues of justice and moral reasoning can be questioned (Furnham, 2003). BJW are here some anthropomorphic perception of the world as animated by some Ôconcept of justiceÕ without a differentiation between the natural and the social world. The moral idea of justice, on the other hand, relates to the social world only, includes the division between the natural and the social, and consequently, is a more cognitively complex concept. Hence, it is perhaps more correct to argue that BJW involves a coping mechanism to deal with a chaotic and unstable world rather than developmental precursors of moral development (Furnham, 2003). As such, BJW should not relate to moral development and attitudes toward social issues such as human rights. However, if BJW are more than a coping mechanism and represent early conceptions of justice (e.g., immanent justice reasoning) then a (negative) relationship between BJW and higher levels of moral reasoning is expected. Most research dealing with BJW has focused on the presence and strength of this belief and (personality) correlates (for reviews see Dalbert, 2001; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Because immanent-causality reasoning—characterizing among others BJW—is an early developmental stage in moral development, it is expected that in the course of development and at more sophisticated stages of moral reasoning individuals come to realize that the initial assumption of order and justice is incorrect. This assumption is in line with the claims of Kohlberg (1963) and Piaget (1965) that more mature forms of reasoning about justice and morality replace immanent-causality reasoning. For instance, Piaget (1965) argued that the stage of heteronomous morality in young childhood (i.e., pre-conventional morality; Kohlberg, 1963) is followed by a stage of autonomous (Piaget, 1965) or conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1963) in later childhood and young adolescence. In this stage, childrenÕs initially rigid and unalterable conceptions of justice become replaced by the awareness that such rules are based on the reciprocal force of moral rules as a consequence of cooperation (Durkin, 1995; Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 1965). During adolescence the understanding emerges that justice is based on compromise among members of a society offering all individuals equal chances (i.e., post-conventional morality or stage 5 and stage 6 moral reasoning; Kohlberg, 1963). To assess BJW, Rubin and Peplau (1973) developed the Just World Scales requiring participants to indicate to what extent they agree with a particular statement about just behavior on a six-point rating scale. Whereas, initially BJW were thought to represent a unitary dimension, later research has shown that BJW are two-dimensional (cf. Furnham, 1993) and involve a general conceptual dimension (i.e., ‘‘the world is just’’) and a personal conceptual dimension (i.e., ‘‘I am treated justly’’; Dalbert, 1999, 2001). In a series of cross-sectional studies involving adolescents from different levels of secondary education (age range from 12 to 21; Dalbert, 2001; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996), general and personal BJW were assessed. Dalbert (2001, pp. 55–63) reported that older participants demonstrated significantly lower beliefs in a general and personal just world. For all age groups, personal BJW were observed to be higher than general BJW (Dalbert, 2001). In addition, a negative association between BJW and educational level suggested that the higher the level of education (i.e., cognitive development), the lower general BJW. Personal
1796
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
BJW related positively to educational level. Finally, ‘‘gender did not have an important role in explaining just-world beliefs’’ (Dalbert, 2001, p. 88). In spite of the fact that Dalbert (2001) accepts the basic assumption that BJW are initially required to cope with ‘‘randomness and unfairness encountered in the world’’ (p. 62), she argues that a decrease in BJW has a negative effect on individualsÕ mental health, is maladaptive, ‘‘and should be avoided in normal development’’ (p. 62). Whereas Dalbert perceived the decrease in general BJW as inevitable and due to cognitive development, the ÔincreaseÕ of personal BJW is considered a developmental gain that compensates the loss of general BJW (Dalbert, 2001, p. 62). The ÔincreaseÕ of personal BJW, however, was found across different educational levels of secondary education but not across age. Hitherto, just world beliefs have been discussed as an instance of immanent-causality reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning). Issues of moral action or motives for moral behavior were excluded. In addition, because the moral concept of justice concerns a more cognitively complex dimension of morality, justice could not directly be related to BJW. According to Dalbert (2001), however, BJW involves the understanding of justice, is a precursor to more sophisticated moral reasoning, and implies a motive to behave justly as well. If these assumptions are correct then BJW should relate to the development of higher levels of moral reasoning. For instance, when higher levels of moral reasoning appear (e.g., characteristic of stages 5 and 6), lower forms of moral reasoning such as immanent-causality reasoning will become less salient (i.e., a negative relationship should be present). Moral reasoning of stages 5 and 6 is characterized by principles and values that make for a good or just society (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). At the conventional and post-conventional levels (Kohlberg, 1963, 1976), independent judgments about justice emerge when people perceive justice to be based on compromises. At stage 6, good and evil are judged on the basis of self-selected ethical views (Duriez, 1998; Kohlberg, 1976). Moral reasoning at these higher levels is assessed by the Defining Issue Test (DIT; Rest, 1974; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). In addition, if BJW involves reasoning about justice and motivates just behavior, then attitudes toward issues of human rights such as civil liberty, free opinion, and democracy (Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, & Derryberry, 1999) are expected to relate positively to such beliefs. The latter assumption is examined by relating BJW and moral reasoning to scores on the ‘‘Attitudes toward Human Rights Inventory’’ (ATHRI; Narvaez & Getz, 2001).
2. Method 2.1. Participants One hundred and thirty-eight adolescents participated in this study. All participants came from secondary schools that serve middle class neighborhoods and were derived from three grade levels: First-grade (n = 49, 26 females and 23 males; M(age) = 13.0, SD = .44); third-grade (n = 51, 29 females and 22 males; M(age) = 14.11, SD = .37); and fifth-grade (n = 38, 20 females and 18 males; M(age) = 17.1, SD = .52). The educational program of secondary education in the Netherlands consists of different educational tracks or different forms of secondary education that relate to the intellectual abilities of
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1797
pupils. Each of the tracks leads to different forms of higher education (i.e., advanced elementary education, higher general secondary education, and preparatory scientific education). In addition, the educational tracks also differ in the number of years of obligatory education (i.e., four, five, and six years, respectively). For that reason, all secondary school pupils were selected from the same, and in the present study, highest educational track in secondary education (i.e., VWO or preparatory scientific education) to permit comparisons between first-, third-, and fifth-grade pupils. 2.2. Materials and procedure The Just World Belief Scale (JWB) is a 13-item scale assessing BJW from a general and a personal perspective (Dalbert, 1999, 2001, pp. 206–207; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994). Participants were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a particular statement on a sixpoint Likert scale ranging from strongly agree (6) to strongly disagree (1). To assess general BJW, six items were present (e.g., ‘‘I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve’’). For personal beliefs seven items were used (e.g., ‘‘I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me’’). The reliability coefficients were .65 and .76 for the subscale assessing general and personal BJW, respectively. Moral development was assessed by the abbreviated version of the Defining Issue Test (DIT; Rest, 1974) that consisted of three moral dilemmas. Each dilemma was accompanied by 12 statements or considerations related to the dilemma and the participants were requested to indicate the importance or relevancy of each consideration on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Following this procedure, the participants were asked to order the four most relevant considerations according to their importance. With the exception of stage-1 level argumentation, each consideration represented forms of reasoning characteristic for stages 2–6 of KohlbergÕs (1963, 1976) theory of moral development. Of the two moral considerations for each developmental stage, only the one with the highest importance rating was considered. The 12 considerations for each dilemma included one or two so-called M-items (i.e., Meaningless considerations) to check for random responses. If an M-value P 6 was obtained (i.e., the participant did not seriously respond to the test) the participantÕs data were omitted from the analyses. To each dilemma a maximum score of 10 could be assigned. The four most important considerations obtained a score of 4–1 according to the stage of which it was characteristic. That is, if a consideration characteristic for stage 5 moral reasoning was considered most important, then the score of 4 was assigned to stage 5; if the second consideration in importance was characteristic of stage 4, then a score of 3 was assigned to stage 4; if the third consideration in importance was a meaningless response, then the score of 2 was assigned to the M-category, and so on. Very few participants used arguments characteristic for stage 6. Consequently, the final scoring of the DIT was based primarily on moral reasoning characterizing stages 2–5. In total, for the three dilemmas 30 (score) points were divided. The measure used for the assessment of moral development by the DIT is the P-roh value which involves the combined score for stage 5 and stage 6 moral reasoning and could range from a score of 0 to a score of 21 (i.e., 3 · 4 + 3 · 3). For the sake of completeness, also the P-roh values of stages 2–4 were included to correct for a possible developmental gap between post-conventional moral reasoning based on moral relativism (i.e., the world is not orderly and just) and BJW (i.e., the world is orderly and just or reasoning based
1798
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
on pre-conventional and conventional morality which are characteristic until the age of approximately 15 years). The Attitudes Towards Human Rights Inventory (ATHRI; Narvaez & Getz, 2001) was developed to assess attitudes toward social and societal issues such as civil liberty, free opinion, and democracy. The measure consists of 40 statements (i.e., items) of which 10 are used as control items to ascertain that participants seriously responded to the measure. Since the ATHRI is an American test, the items were translated and adapted for Dutch society. By means of a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from Ôcompletely agreeÕ (5) to Ôdo not agree at allÕ (1), participants were requested to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a statement. Examples of such statements are ‘‘Citizens should be allowed to voice their opinions if they disagree with their government’’ and ‘‘Abortion is a right of every woman’’. An a priori principal-component analysis on the adapted items (i.e., the 40 items minus the 10 control items) resulted in a one-factor structure consisting of 23 items (i.e., Eigenvalue 4.02 and an explained variance of 17.5%). A reliability coefficient of .77 was obtained for the remaining 23 items.
3. Results In Table 1, the averages for general and personal BJW (GBJW and PBJW), the DIT (i.e., P-roh values), and ATHRI are presented for each age group and gender. The scores on GBJW and PBJW were analyzed by a 3 · 2 (age group · gender) MANOVA. No significant effect for the age group by gender interaction was evident for either BJW scale. Only for general just-world beliefs the MANOVA revealed a significant effect for age on (F(2, 132) = 3.24, p < .05; g2 = .047; d = .609). The scores on the scores on the DIT and ATHRI were analyzed by separate 3 · 2 (age group · gender) ANOVAs. Again no effect for the age group by gender interaction was observed for the P-roh values. A significant effect for age was present (F(2, 132) = 8.33, p < .001; g2 = .112; d = .960) but not for gender. The age effect demonstrated a sudden increase in moral development from the age of 15 (Bonferroni p = .001; see Fig. 1). For gender only a significant effect was present on the scores of the ATHRI (F(1, 132) = 9.32, p < .01; g2 = .066; d = .858) showing females to score consistently higher than males (i.e., 3.56 vs. 3.34). Of major interest were the interrelationships among the assessed variables. Pearson-product moment correlations were calculated and revealed that BJW are not related to any of the assessed levels of moral development (DIT), nor attitudes toward social and societal issues assessed by the ATHRI. Moral development (P-roh values stages 5 + 6), on the other hand, was positively related to attitudes toward social and societal issues (r = .18, p < .05). Also when the ÔP-roh valuesÕ of the lower stages (i.e., stages 2–4) assessed by the DIT were included, no significant relationships emerged between BJW and moral development. To verify whether a pattern of relationships is present between a latent concept (i.e., factor) and the assessed variables, a principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation was initially conducted on the scores of GBJW, PBJW, DIT, and ATHRI by which a four-factor solution was requested. The resulting scree plot revealed a considerable drop in eigenvalues with the third (.812) and fourth (.608) factors as compared to the first (1.352) and second factors (1.228), suggesting that a two-factor model fits the data best. Based on this finding, a two-factor solution
Age 13
15
17
Female
Male
Total
Female
Male
Total
Female
Male
Total
GBJW SD CI
3.72 .83 3.381–4.065
3.91 .81 3.549–4.277
3.81 .82 3.568–4.068
3.57 .86 3.248–3.896
3.36 .98 2.985–3.729
3.48 .91 3.218–3.711
3.40 .97 3.010–3.790
3.34 .84 2.933–3.756
3.37 .90 3.089–3.656
PBJW SD CI
4.32 .87 4.040–4.597
4.38 .66 4.087–4.679
4.35 .77 4.148–4.554
4.14 .59 3.874–4.402
4.38 .54 4.080–4.686
4.24 .58 4.060–4.461
3.99 .96 3.668–4.303
4.35 .60 4.014–4.684
4.16 .82 3.937–4.398
P-roh SD CI
4.35 2.59 3.173–5.519
5.04 3.21 3.796–6.291
4.67 2.89 3.839–5.551
4.28 2.68 3.165–5.386
4.86 2.44 3.589–6.139
4.53 2.57 3.724–5.415
7.25 3.51 5.913–8.587
6.72 3.85 5.313–8.132
7.00 3.63 6.015–7.958
ATHRI SD CI
3.53 .24 3.365–3.686
3.42 .31 3.246–3.587
3.47 .28 3.354–3.588
3.51 .39 3.362–3.666
3.30 .55 3.121–3.470
3.42 .48 3.289–3.520
3.64 .48 3.456–3.822
3.31 .49 3.121–3.506
3.49 .50 3.343–3.609
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for general and personal beliefs in a just world (GBJW and PBJW), the DIT (i.e., Proh value; stages 5 and 6 combined), and ATHRI for each age group and gender
1799
1800
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
P-roh value; Stage 5+6 0.6
GBJW PBJW
Mean (z-score)
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4 15
13
17
Age
Fig. 1. Mean z-scores (i.e., in order to compare the measures) for the DIT (P-roh value: stages 5 and 6 combined) and general and personal just world beliefs (i.e., GBJW and PBJW, respectively). Table 2 Factor loadings, communalities, Eigenvalues, and explained variance of a principal axis factor analyses with oblimin rotation and a PCA with varimax rotation on the scores of GBJW, PBJW, DIT, and ATHRI Variables
Extraction Principal axis (oblimin rotation) Communalities
GBJW PBJW DIT ATHRI Eigenvalues % Explained variance Cumulative percentage
.420 .407 .254 .140
Factor I
Principal components (varimax rotation) Factor II
.631 .594 .502 .369 1.228 30.69
1.352 33.80 64.49
Communalities .723 .701 .605 .550
Factor I
Factor II
.824 .803 .771 .733 1.228 30.69
1.352 33.80 64.49
was selected for three principal axis factor analyses with varimax, oblimin, and quartimax rotations. The three analyses, as well as a principal component analysis resulted in the same two-factor solution with 64.5% of explained variance (see Table 2).
4. Discussion Because Furnham and Procter (1989) noted that the ‘‘just world hypothesis . . . draws on various writings in the area of morality, ethics and justice’’ (p. 365), it has been thought that BJW
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1801
concerns reasoning about morality and justice (Dalbert, 2001). From a developmental point of view BJW (i.e., immanent justice reasoning) are perceived as precursors of justice and moral development (cf. Furnham & Procter, 1989) or as some kind of motive for just behavior (see, Dalbert, 2001). In the present study the assumption that BJW relates to the development of moral reasoning was examined. About the extent to which BJW (causally) determines moral development (i.e., are a true precursor of higher levels of moral reasoning) only indirect inferences can be made. On the basis of the correlational assumption, BJW were expected to be replaced by other more advanced and sophisticated levels of reasoning about justice and morality and a decrease in just world reasoning (i.e., immanent causality reasoning) to be paralleled by an increase in moral development or justice reasoning across age. The findings did not offer any support for the assumption of a relationship between BJW and moral development, as assessed by the Defining Issue Test (Rest, 1974; Rest et al., 1999). Neither were BJW associated with adolescentsÕ attitudes towards issues of human rights, while these attitudes were positively related to moral development. In spite of the absence of any association between BJW and moral development, a gradual decrease of general, but not personal just world beliefs was observed from the age of 12 onward, while from the age of 15 stage-5/6 moral reasoning increased sharply. The absence of any support for the assumptions that BJW involve knowledge about social justice and represent a motive for just behavior (Dalbert, 2001; Lerner, 1975) suggests that BJW do not serve any significant function in moral development or in attitudes toward societal issues (see Furnham, 2003). It is here argued that BJW do not refer to ÔjustÕ in terms of justice but rather to order in a chaotic environment. That is, our findings indicate that BJW are early developmental ÔbeliefsÕ (Subbotsky, 2000) that are functional as coping cognitions (Furnham, 2003) as long as developmental progress requires stability and order in an apparently chaotic phenomenal world (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Subbotsky, 2000). When such stability and order is no longer required, or becomes doubted and questioned (James, 1890), BJW should disappear to be replaced by more sophisticated (moral) reasoning that permits the acceptance of a world that is neither orderly nor just. The maintenance of personal BJW as a coping mechanism, in spite of higher levels of moral reasoning, may then reflect older adolescentsÕ inability to deal with the world that is not orderly or just. The latter may be most pronounced for the way the self is treated by which personal BJW obtain an individual functionalism to manage personal pathology and experience (Furnham, 1998, p. 158). Of interest was to note that attitudes towards human rights did not change across age. In addition, adolescentsÕ attitudes toward human rights issues associate positively to moral development. Additional research is needed to verify at what age attitudes towards human rights develop and whether and when they start to play a role in judgments about justice and injustice. For our finding that femalesÕ attitudes toward human rights issues are more pronounced than those of males no satisfactory explanation is available. In summary, the present study indicated that BJW as assessed by the Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1999; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994) are not concerned with justice or justice motives but are a coping mechanism (Furnham, 2003) to achieve stability and order in a rather chaotic phenomenal world (Subbotsky, 2000). BJW may then not only be a ‘‘fundamental delusion’’ (Lerner, 1980), by which a just world comes to be understood in terms of the belief that good people are rewarded and bad people punished (Lerner, 1980; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), but rather a belief that prompts
1802
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
the justification of injustice rather than motives to behave justly (i.e., Ôjustice motiveÕ; Lerner, 1975, 1980). Acknowledgment Thanks are due to Myrna Over, Anna Pires, Marthe Straatemeier, Marijn Sweijs, and Rosalie Talstra for collecting the data of this study. I would like to express my gratitude to Eugene Subbotsky, Dr. Eysenck, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. References Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (Eds.). (1987). The measurement of moral judgment (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press. Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the Personal Belief in a Just World ScaleÕs validity. Social Justice Research, 12, 79–98. Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource: Dealing with challenges and critical life events. New York: Plenum Press. Dalbert, C., & Yamauchi, L. (1994). Belief in a just world and attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers: A cultural comparison between Hawaii and Germany. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 1612–1626. Duriez, B. (1998). De ontwikkeling van het moreel denken: de ideologische bias in de theorie van L. Kohlberg [The development of moral thought: The ideological bias in L. KohlbergÕs theory]. Leuven, Belgium: Centrum voor Godsdienstpsychologie. Durkin, K. (1995). Developmental social psychology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Furnham, A. (1993). Just World Beliefs in twelve societies. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 317–329. Furnham, A. (1998). Measuring the beliefs in a just world. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world (pp. 141–162). New York: Plenum. Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: research progress over the past decade. Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 795–817. Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1989). Belief in a just world: Review and critique of the individual difference literature. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 365–384. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jose, P. E. (1990). Just-world reasoning in childrenÕs immanent justice judgments. Child Development, 61, 1024–1033. Karniol, R. (1980). A conceptual analysis of immanent justice responses in children. Child Development, 51, 118–130. Kohlberg, L. (1963). The development of childrenÕs orientation toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 6, 11–33. Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues (pp. 31–53). New York: Holt. Lerner, M. J. (1975). The justice motive of social behavior: Introduction. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 1–19. Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum. Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030–1050. Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I. C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a just world for self versus others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 666–677. Montada, L., & Lerner, M. J. (1998). Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. New York: Plenum Press. Narvaez, D., & Getz, I. (2001). Guide for using the Attitudes toward Human Rights Inventory (ATHRI). University of Minnesota: Center for the Study of Ethical Development.
L. Oppenheimer / Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 1793–1803
1803
Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press. Rest, J. (1974). Manual for the Defining Issues Test: An objective test for moral judgment development. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Moral Research Project. Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (1999). DIT2: Devising and testing a new instrument of moral judgment. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91, 644–659. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1973). Belief in a just world and reactions to anotherÕs lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73–93. Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. A. (1975). Who believes in a just world? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 65–89. Subbotsky, E. (2000). Phenomenalistic perception and rational understanding in the mind of an individual: A fight for dominance. In K. S. Rosengren, C. N. Johnson, & P. L. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in children (pp. 35–74). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Thoma, S. J., Narvaez, D., Rest, J. R., & Derryberry, P. (1999). Does moral judgment reduce to political attitude or verbal ability? Educational Psychology Review, 11, 324–342.