Cameroon's choppy waters: The anatomy of fisheries crime in the maritime fisheries sector

Marine Policy 108 (2019) 103669

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Cameroon's choppy waters: The anatomy of fisheries crime in the maritime fisheries sector

T

Maurice Beseng Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Illegal fishing Fisheries crime Transnational organized crime Security Cameroon

This article removes the lid on fisheries crime in Cameroon by providing empirical evidence of criminal practices along the maritime fisheries value chain. To achieve this, the study relied on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected from direct observation, informal group discussions and semi-structured interviews involving state officials, coastal community groups and other civil society organisations in the west maritime district of Southwest Cameroon. The article reveals a plethora of fisheries-related crimes encompassing corruption (i.e. bribery and abuse of office), document and identity fraud, illegal exploitation of fish maws and endangered marine mammals. Other crimes associated to the fisheries sector included: smuggling of contraband goods, arms smuggling, illegal migration, illegal recruitment and abuse of workers' rights. Through these examples, this research empirically demonstrates the interrelationship of the different criminal practices and their organised and transnational dimension. The study also paints a complex picture of criminality perpetuated by a sophisticated network of both local and foreign industrial fisheries stakeholders. Consequently, addressing illicit activities in the maritime fisheries sector requires cooperation from a wide range of both state and non-state actors in investigating and analysing the nature of fisheries crime practices, the agents involved and their modes of operation. This approach is necessary to gain a better understanding of the problem and enable actors design appropriate and targeted management responses.

1. Introduction In June 2016, Cameroon Navy set up an official Facebook account aimed at informing the public of their mission and activities.1 A prominent feature on the Facebook page are posts of the Navy's response to suspected maritime incidents. As of 28th February 2019, 21 reported incidents have been posted, with 17 associated to the fisheries sector. In one of such incidents that occurred on the 8th of September 2016 the Navy intercepted a Chinese trawler-the Liao Dan Yu-fishing in a protected maritime zone off the coast of Limbe (Southwest region).2 In another similar incident on the 6th of March 2017, off the coast of Douala (Littoral region), they boarded two Nigerian flagged trawlers (Kulak III and Banarly III) which according to the Navy were “guilty of practicing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing”.3 In the night of 8th and 9th September 2018, south of the Bakassi peninsula-close to the

Nigerian border-the Navy boarded three fishing trawlers (Olokun VI, VIII and XIII) and discovered 5 automatic weapons and ammunitions, 43 suspected illegal immigrants and further investigation revealed the trawlers had no documentation.4 These cases do not only capture violations in the extraction of marine fishery resources-described as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), outlined in the 2001 International Plan of Action to Combat IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU) adopted by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 2001 [1]. They also highlight a variety of suspected criminal activities associated to the fisheries sector5 and the transnational reach of the actors involved. Since 2008, the term “fisheries crime” is used to describe the range of offences carried out within or in close association with the fisheries sector. However, while most scholarly works have focused on establishing its conceptual and legal distinction from the more established

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://www.facebook.com/pg/cameroonnavy/about/?ref=page_internal (accessed 28 February 2019). 2 https://www.facebook.com/cameroonnavy/posts/1203187836420681 (accessed 28 February 2019). 3 https://www.facebook.com/cameroonnavy/posts/1436165019789627 (accessed 28 February 2019). 4 https://www.facebook.com/cameroonnavy/videos/1100067946817379 (Accessed 28 February 2019). 5 Fisheries is considered here as the activities involved in harvesting a specie or group of species of fish or shellfish that can be classed as a unit for the purpose of its management and/or conservation [72], while the fisheries sector refers to the “entire fisheries value chain from vessel registration to the sale of the commodity’ [4]. 1

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103669 Received 2 May 2019; Received in revised form 7 August 2019; Accepted 22 August 2019 0308-597X/ Crown Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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per se and seeks to address violations of fisheries-related regulations largely as an administrative fisheries control and enforcement problem to be punished civilly and not as a criminal one. Meanwhile, in the decade leading up to efforts to develop the IPOAIUU, there were also parallel concerns of criminality in the fisheries sector both onshore and offshore. In 1998, for example, Kuperan and Sutinen referred to IUU fishing as a form of “blue water crime” and explored the relationship that deterrence and legitimacy can have on fishers' compliance behaviour relating to fisheries management policies and regulations [22]. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation went further than this conceptual analogy when, during its Eight Session in February 1999, affirmed that IUU fishing transcends fisheries management since it is directly linked to matters such as the safety of vessel, fishing fatalities and deliberate contamination of the maritime environment [23]. Similarly, in March 1999, Greenpeace and the International Transport Workers Federation further highlighted the human cost of IUU fishing when their study revealed that flag of convenience vessels are associated with “abuse of crew, virtual slave wages and extremely hazardous working conditions” [24]. However, despite the mounting evidence associating IUU fishing with criminal activities along the fisheries value chain, the 2001 IPOA-IUU does not address these concerns into its description of IUU fishing and the approach to combat the phenomenon, rightly so because criminal matters are outside FAO mandate. To broaden the debate on the increasing criminal activities associated with the fisheries sector and the response to the threat, the term “fisheries crime” was introduced at the level of the United Nations in June 2008 [25]. Gunnar Stølsvik [26] has succinctly traced the emergence of the fisheries crime concept and its gradual acceptance in the international political arena highlighting emerging consensus on its conceptualisation and approach to its response. Fisheries crime is a more encompassing concept that does not only cover illegal fishing activities as described in paragraph 3.1 of IPOAIUU but also “a wide variety of fisheries-related offences encompassing corruption (in obtaining fishing permits and licenses), document fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, kidnapping, human trafficking and drug trafficking” along the fisheries value chain [4,27]. Moreover, criminal activities along the value chain are closely interrelated and interlinked with illegal fishing and usually organised and transnational in scope; hence these activities can be effectively addressed through international criminal frameworks like the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) [28] and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) [29]. Consequently, in responding to fisheries-related criminal violations, the fisheries crime paradigm shifts focus from the actions of vessels (in the extraction of marine living resources under the mandate of the FAO) to the criminal activities of individuals or groups along the fisheries value chain [4] under the mandate of United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) [26]. While there is emerging consensus that transnational organised fisheries crime should be governed by UNTOC as the global transnational organised criminal framework, Article (2b) of UNTOC only provides definition of “serious crime” as any “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty” [28]. Moreover, fisheries crime has not been formerly brought within the legal framework of UNTOC whose associated protocols outline a series of “serious” transitional crimes thus: trafficking in persons especially women and children; smuggling of migrants (by land, sea and air); and illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms [28]. Some studies [10,11,30] have shown that, in practice, fisheries crime and its transnational manifestation, does not strictly fit into the UNTOC's definition of “serious crime” and “organised criminal group” since these concepts means different things in different contexts. In sub Saharan Africa for example, the traditional notion of

IUU fishing concept [2–9], there is still a great dearth in empirical evidence on the nature and scope of the phenomenon. Some studies by international organisations [10–13] and scholars [4,14–16] have documented evidence of fisheries crime practices in Southeast Asia, the Southern Ocean region and South Africa. In the West and Central Africa of the Gulf of Guinea region, at best, mostly anecdotal evidence exists. The few desk studies from INTERPOL [11,17] and Standing [18–20] for example has only broadly highlighted the nature of some aspects of the problem in West Africa. In the Central African region and Cameroon in particular, there is a considerable dearth of knowledge on the nature and scope of fisheries crime as there is yet no scholarly attempt to shed light on the subject especially in relation to how threats like illegal fishing, drugs, arms and human trafficking interact and reinforces each other and their transnational dimension. This article contributes to this lacuna by providing empirical evidence of fisheries crime practices in Cameroon's maritime fisheries value chain, considered as involving the following stages: “preparing and setting vessels [and crew] to sea; catching the fish; landing the catch; processing the catch; transporting and exporting of fish and fish products; and selling of fish and fish products to consumers”.6 It will also highlight how different criminal practices interrelate, the actors involved, their modus operandi and transnational manifestation. Structurally, the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 conceptualises the study with a discussion on fisheries crime, highlighting its difference to the IUU fishing concept. Thereafter, section 3 presents the methodology by briefly discussing the case study-Cameroon's maritime fisheries sector-highlighting its vulnerability to illicit activities and a discussion on the data collection procedure. Then section 4 provides evidence and discussion on fisheries crime in these categories: fisheries-related crimes (e.g. corruption in fisheries administrative and surveillance activities, identity and document fraud, illegal recruitment and abuse fish workers' rights, illegal exploitation of fish maw and endangered marine species) and crimes associated to the fisheries sector (e.g. smuggling and trafficking of contraband goods, arms trafficking, illegal immigration). Finally, section 5 draws a conclusion. 2. Conceptualising the study: from IUU fishing to fisheries crime The concept of fisheries crime is a new addition to the vocabulary of international fisheries management [21]. Its emergence though, hinges on the more established concept of IUU fishing formally introduced by the FAO when it adopted the IPOA-IUU in 2001 [1]. According to the IPOA-IUU, IUU fishing is any fishing activity that “undermines efforts to conserve and manage fish stocks in all capture fisheries” [1]. Focusing on the act of “fishing”, the IPOA-IUU further outlines the “nature and scope” of the three individual prongs of the concept: “illegal fishing”, “unreported fishing” and “unregulated fishing”.7 In addition to this, the IPOA-IUU also proposed that to effectively combat IUU fishing, all states, flag states, coastal states, and port states should adopt a “civil sanction regime based on an administrative penalty scheme” targeting IUU fishing vessels and nationals under their jurisdiction [1]. Hence, the FAO's IUU fishing paradigm focuses largely on the fishing activity 6 Due to the complexity of the fisheries sector, the fisheries value chain is also highly complex and non-linear as stated above [73]. 7 See paragraph 2 of IPOA-IUU for a description of individual terms. The vagueness of the terms though has generated a lot of debate on a precise definition of IUU fishing and in particular the possible overlap of the three prongs of the term [74], how to quantify their cost [75] and their legal applications [76]. The FAO acknowledges that, there could be instances of unregulated and unreported fishing which do not amount to ‘contravention of national laws or [RFMO] Regional Fisheries Management Organisations conservation and management measures’ [74]. It is outside the scope of this article to engage in this debate, however, the author acknowledges that, in most instances, those involved in unregulated or unreported fishing are also involved in illegal fishing activities.

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operations. Like the industrial sector, the small-scale sector is also dominated by immigrant fishers. A 2009 frame survey documented 34,355 fisherfolks, 78.75% are immigrants from Nigeria (71.258%), Ghana (2.99%), Benin (4.11%), Togo (0.07%) and only 21.25% Cameroonians [39] distributed unevenly in more than 300 fishing communities along the coast of Cameroon [40]. The small-scale fishing fleet is very heterogeneous characterised by simple single-person canoes operating within the creeks and near shore waters and the large 12-m long dugout canoes licensed to operate within a 3 nautical mile radius from the shoreline. Small-scale fishers mostly exploit pelagic fish species using small meshed and monofilament gillnets to catch the Bonga shad and Sardinella. However, the fishers also exploit some demersal (deep sea) species such as Croakers and Threadfins [35]. In Cameroon, there is presently no reliable data collection system for maritime fisheries. Existing statistics for small-scale fisheries for instance “are just vague estimations and extrapolations and the actual volume of fish production in this sector is unknown and ‘bycatch’ is not taken into account in the national statistics, due to lack of log books on vessels” [39]. In 2016, total national marine capture production data supplied to the FAO was estimated at 205,190 tons [41], and the industrial sector contributed approximately 8500 tons, 30% less than historical fisheries catch reconstruction data of 11,804 tons [34]. Nonetheless, maritime small-scale fisheries contributes more to national food security than the industrial sector [42]. The Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industry (MINEPIA) is responsible for fisheries management and development. Specifically, MINEPIA issues fishing authorisations and licences, checks the activities of licensed fishing vessels, promotes fisheries production and ensures fisheries laws are respected. Both inland and marine fisheries are regulated by the Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries Law No. 94/01 of 20th January 1994 [43]. Previous studies have noted that, this multisector legislation and other supplementary decrees on fisheries management are inadequate to address the challenges confronting the sector such as excess fishing effort and IUU fishing due to poor implementation, lack of resources and non-respect of national, regional and global fisheries regimes [35,38,39]. In addition, the large immigrant fisherfolks population also makes the sector prone to illegality, such as transhipment at sea and landing of catch in neighbouring countries [44].

organised crime does not apply since in a majority of cases, perpetrators are not strictly “organised criminal groups” as defined in UNTOC.8 They can either be private individuals or the state acting as key actors in shaping criminal networks or groups labelled as violent entrepreneurs, warlords or syndicates [31,32]. In an attempt to enhance the conceptual clarity around fisheries crime and its scope (including the notion of “serious crime” and “transnational organised fisheries crime”) the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) - the governing body of the UNODC, convened an expert group meeting in May 2016. Their report noted that, the seriousness of fisheries crime should be in: “reference to the extent of harm such crimes can cause to society at large; this is independent of whether or not such crimes fulfil the legal definition of “serious crime” under UNTOC” [27]. This conceptual stretching is important as it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of fisheries crime and its transnational organised dimension than the UNTOC currently provides. Thus it allows states for example with support from UNODC, to draw from relevant national and international criminal frameworks in their understanding and response to crimes along the fisheries value chain [8]. With this in mind, the following sections explore the Cameroonian context.

3. Methodology 3.1. The case study Cameroon is centrally located along the Gulf of Guinea region, bordered to the Northeast by Chad, to the East by Central African Republic, to the South by mainland Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Gabon and to the West and Southwest by Nigeria and the Atlantic Ocean respectively (Fig. 1). Cameroon's coastline extends for 402 km long, from latitude 2.30°N at Equatorial Guinean border to 4.67°N of Nigerian border. The geographical location of the maritime zone-facing Equatorial Guinea's Bioko Island to the west (Fig. 1)- limits its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to 14,693 km2 and territorial sea to 8495 km2 [33]. However, the continental shelf (up to 200 m depth) is relatively larger measuring about 13,000–14,000 km2 [34]. The coastal fringe is largely bordered by mangroves (2700 km2), interspersed by numerous estuaries that is conducive for life of fish species especially Bonga shad, catfish and crustaceans e.g. crayfish and shrimps [35]. Cameroon's maritime fisheries can be broadly categorised into industrial and small-scale (semi-industrial and traditional artisanal) fisheries. For both sectors, the fishing season which spans May to November, is at its peak from May–June and the month of November, however, fishing is done all year round due management failures in limiting access and fishing effort and the lack of biological resting period [35]. Nationally, maritime fisheries is largely dominated by immigrant fisherfolks. Industrial fishing is exploited by 70 trawlers from mostly China, Nigeria, Greece and Russia9 licensed to fish in Cameroon through a bareboat charter scheme [38]. The scheme allows foreign companies to enter into partnership with national companies or individuals. While the national manages the local administrative part of the partnership, the foreign company manages offshore fishing

3.2. Data collection and analysis This study adopted a qualitative case study strategy useful to investigate a phenomenon in its real life context through in-depth data collection using multiple sources of information [45]. A qualitative strategy was also useful for this study due to the limited data available to employ a quantitative approach [46]. Data collection relied on secondary and primary sources. Secondary data was collected from published articles, government reports, communiques and speeches and from the Navy's social media reports. Primary data was collected during fieldwork using direct observation, informal group discussions and semi-structured interviews from September–November 2016, in six fishing communities located in the west maritime district in the Southwest region of Cameroon (see Fig. 1)10. Respondents for semi-structured interviews (n = 28) were conducted with state actors (n = 12) and non-state actors (n = 16) involved in the fisheries sector in the West maritime district (see Table 1 below). In addition, two informal group discussions was conducted with CSOs members (fishers, fish entrepreneurs and leaders of non-governmental organisations). The non-state actors were randomly selected from CCGs (fishers and

8 UNTOC provides a rather rigid conception of TOC, as a “serious crime” perpetrated by an “organised criminal group” defined as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” [28]. 9 Interview AB, West Maritime District Regional Delegate of MINEPIA, 9th October 2016, Buea.

10 For administrative purposes, the Cameroon's maritime environment is divided into the west, north and south maritime districts located across three (Southwest, Littoral and South) of Cameroon's 10 administrative regions.

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Fig. 1. Cameroon maritime zone showing data collection sites. Table 1 Profile of respondents. (Source: author’s field notes). Type of Stakeholder

Sub-type

N0.

State actors

Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), The Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) Ministry of Fisheries & Animal Industries (MINEPIA)- Regional &, divisional delegations, Fisheries Control Centres and Posts Ministry of Finance (MINFI)- Divisional & sub-Divisional delegation of Customs Ministry of Transport (MINTRANS)- Divisional & District Merchant Marine service Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MINRESI)- Institute for Research and Development Coastal community groups (CCGs) Other civil society organisations

1 5 2 2 2 12 4 28

Non-state actors Total

fish entrepreneurs) and other civil society organisations. This was necessary to eliminate bias and give every non-state actor an equal choice of being involved in the study [45]. However, state officials were purposively selected from the following administrations: fisheries, transport (merchant marine), customs and defence forces (army and navy) in order to include those that are not only directly involved but are also command a wealth of experience in efforts to govern illicit fishing in Cameroon and the West maritime district in particular [47]. The semi-structured interviews focused on the current state of IUU fishing, evidence of fisheries-related crime, actors involved and their transnational networks. Twenty-six respondents consented to their interviews being recorded and all generated primary data was transcribed and coded, followed by an inductive thematic analysis to identify themes in line with research objectives [48,49].

4. Results and discussion 4.1. Documenting fisheries-related crimes 4.1.1. Corruption Data from this study show, corruption manifested in the form of bribery11 and extortion12 is common in both small-scale and industrial fisheries and in almost every stage of the fisheries value chain. Responding to revelations by artisanal fishers that when it comes to matriculating and licensing fishing vessels, state officials are more interested in receiving bribes and/or extorting money from artisanal fishers, a senior officer at the Merchant Marine department responsible for

11 Transparency International (TI) defines bribery as the act of either “offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust” and such inducements can include “gifts, loans, fees, and rewards, as well as advantages regarding taxes, services, donations and favours”. 12 TI define extortion as “the unlawful use of one's position or office to obtain money through coercion or threats”.

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has implicated some people, even myself. So, you can fight left, you fight right, you can go out on the campaign to have every vessel to be identified, but you will discover that there are some places that only some particular people can do this or that, and they would divert you here and there and prevent you from doing your job.16 Clearly, the officer is suggesting that, the service cannot carry out its functions effectively because some government officials or (influential) elites are obstructing the matriculation and licensing of vessels thus making accountability difficult. Fisheries administrators are also implicated in receiving bribes in exchange for overlooking their monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) functions. An artisanal fisher noted that, “… even the Merchant Marines who sometimes conduct patrol at sea, if they come across a suspected vessel they will be given fish and the vessel will be left alone”.17 During fieldwork, the researcher observed that at fish landing sites, fisheries control officers would receive special packages prepared by artisanal fishermen when they returned to port. An artisanal fishing entrepreneur attempted an explanation of why this happens: The only people who can help us are the Merchant Marine and local fish doctors [local fisheries inspectors], but they don't control the industrial fishers since they are only looking for places where they can get their own food. Instead of controlling the industrial fishers so that we could be able to bring fish to the local people, they don't do that. Instead, they would come and want to claim even the small fish that we have brought to shore.18 Hence, similar to cases elsewhere [53,54], this seems to suggest poorly paid fisheries control officers and poverty is a major factor pushing both fishers and administrators to engage in corruption resulting in lack of effective MCS of fisheries operations. With regard to the industrial sector, in which fishing vessels are caught at least once a month for flouting fisheries regulations [55] it was evident from interviews that influential elites with shares in the industrial fishing companies have been bending the rules to protect their business interests. In one interview, a traditional ruler echoed the growing influence of elites in the industrial fishing sector thus: You know with the corruption syndrome in our government, we complained about illegal fishing but the people who have the money will go to Yaoundé [the seat of government] and they bribe their way and continue to worry our people [the artisanal fisherfolks] along the coast. And we discovered that some of our senior elites who are even shareholders in these companies that are doing industrial fishing were bluffing, knowing pretty well that they are protected by the people in Yaoundé. People cannot be stubborn like that. When you see a bird dancing on the road, know that there is somebody in the bush protecting it.19 The above analogy evokes the image of a corrupt elite who after colluding with other state officials at the highest echelon of government, feels protected and is able to go about his or her activities with impunity, knowing that there are people in high offices who will cover their atrocities [56]. This sense of protection is evident in other stages of the fisheries value chain, such as in processing, landing and sale of catch. Indeed, most artisanal fishers interviewed for this study were of the view that they are being exploited for the benefit of a few industrial fishers. This is because, since sub-national fisheries inspectors are unable to fully control industrial fishers, they have focused their attention on artisanal fishers since they are a softer target. Consequently, these more vulnerable fishers are harassed even at port by custom officers as well as coerced into giving bribes by merchant marines or fisheries

vessel matriculation countered: These people [fishers] prefer to surprise you one Friday morning to say Chief, this is my small fish that I have reserved for you.13 Take this little one. They prefer to behave like that with you, even if that fish cost about 100,000 CFA francs [∼USD184]. You understand? But for them to come and pay 60,000 CFA Francs [∼USD 110] for their vessel matriculations which will permit them to work 365 days without problems they don't want to do this. To even come with 25,000 CFA francs [∼USD46] to come and renew their license which will permit them to fish 365 days they can't do this. They find it so hard! Sometimes when they are coming back from their country [foreign fishers] they even come with an electricity generator and they say Chief, you are very good. Chief, but you never come to visit us as you always like us to come to see you in your office. Look, this is an [electricity] generator that we brought for you. When you ask the price of that generator they would say 1.5 million CFA francs [∼USD 2765]. But they only need 25,000 CFA francs [∼USD 46] to register their vessel or renew their licence which is very difficult.14 The above statement paints a compelling picture of the nature of corruption in the artisanal fisheries sector. It reveals that, some artisanal fishers would prefer to offer bribes worth two or 60 times more than is required to matriculate or license a fishing vessel for a year. The reason behind this is to ensure that their vessel or fishing activities are exempt from any further fisheries control action thus maximising the long-term benefit. Section 134 of Cameroon's Penal Code describes such behaviour as “passive corruption” punishable by 1–5 years imprisonment and a fine of approximately US$ 200-2000 [50]. This goes to confirm that, understanding social factors that shape the behaviour of fishers is critical in efforts to strengthen fisheries management [51]. The industrial fishery sector is not exempt. Law No.94/01/of 20th January 1994, stipulates that, to engage in industrial fishing in Cameroon, a prospective fisher needs to first obtain a fishing authorisation from the Prime Minister before obtaining an industrial fishing license from the Minister in charge of MINEPIA. The authorisation and fishing permits are only issued to nationals either to private individuals or companies [52] who then form partnerships with foreign industrial fishing companies. Cameroonian nationals engaging with foreign companies appears to be beneficial to the state through earnings derived from taxes, however the problem is with the secrecy around the partnerships. Indeed, an industrial fishery stakeholder noted “the terms of my agreement with my foreign Chinese expert is private and even the Prime Minster or Minister who issued my fishing permits have no information”15. Considering that all 70 industrial fishing vessels permitted to fish in Cameroon are foreign-owned, it means there are 70 private-foreign partnerships veiled in secrecy and administrative corruption. Such acts that are detrimental to a government department or any state authority relates to what Sections 137, 140 and 142 of Cameroon's Penal Code referred to as “indulgence against the state”, “abuse of function” and “undue demand”, respectively and it is punishable with imprisonment of between 2 and 10 years and a fine of between US$ 400–4000 [50]. The corruption involved in matriculating and licensing fishing vessels has rendered accountability difficult as a senior officer of the Merchant Marine service noted: Here [area under my jurisdiction], we cannot relent in our effort to have these vessels identified. But unfortunately, the non-identification of some of these vessels benefits some people in administration, which

13 The term, “Chief”, is largely used in Cameroonian context to show deep respect for an individual especially those in high offices, rich or in position of responsibility. 14 Interview (Z) with District Officer of Merchant Marine, 8th November 2016. 15 Interview (F) with president of Cameroon Society of Industrial Fishers, 21st October 2016 in Tiko.

16 Interview (Z) with District Officer of Merchant Marine, 8th November 2016, in Tiko. 17 Interview (I) with president of artisanal fisher's union 6th November 2016 in Batoke. 18 Interview (H), semi-industrial fisher, 3rd November 2016, Idenau. 19 Interview (E), Community Chief on 21st November 2016, Limbe.

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officers before they matriculate their vessels, obtain their fishing licenses or process their catch for sale. Corruption in the fisheries sector is therefore a major criminal practice and epitomises the corruption landscape in the country. According to Freedom House, in Cameroon “corruption is systemic and bribery is commonplace in all sectors”20. Infact, in 1998 and 1999, Cameroon topped Transparency International's ranking of the most corrupt country in the world and two decades later, it is still amongst the top 30 most corrupt of 180 countries in the world [57]. While for decades, literature on corruption has focussed on issues like elections, judiciary, forestry and wildlife (animals) exploitation [58–60], our knowledge of corruption in the maritime fisheries sector had remained poor. These findings have lift the lid on the extent of the problem.

ailments [62]. Most of maws traded in Asia comes from two critically endangered fish species (the Totoaba and Vaquita) native to the Gulf of Mexico, but tighter regulations by US and Mexican authorities has pushed dealers to seek for alternative sources for fish maws [62]. In Africa, although trade in fish maw has been happening for many years, few African countries are only realising the value of the trade. A recent study shows that the trade in the Nile perch maw is a booming industry in Lake Victoria with Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya collectively earning US$ 86 million in 2017 [63]. Uganda alone earned $40 million and is the largest exporter in the region prompting the Ugandan government to describe it as “water gold” [64]. Cameroonian authorities are yet to tap into the benefits of this “aquatic gold” which is currently illicitly exploited by Chinese industrial fishers. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) “RedList” categorises the Pseudotolithus moori-common in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean of the Gulf of Guinea as “Least Concern”23meaning its taxon or species group has been evaluated against the RedList criteria24 and does not qualify as Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable or Near Threatened [65].25 However, the earliest detail survey in the region was in 2006 and the IUCN concedes that given that fishing effort is increasing and more than half of the fish's depth range is found within current trawling and artisanal fishing ranges, the specie should be carefully monitored and spawning depths should be identified [66]. Thus, the current status of Pseudotolithus moori is unknown and mindful of the harmful fishing practices that are characteristics in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean of the Gulf of Guinea were the fish is common, it could be either vulnerable or near threatened.

4.1.2. Identity fraud The inability of state officials to matriculate fishing vessels means the sector is prone to identity fraud. To illustrate its sophistication, on the 26 November 2016, the Cameroonian Navy intercepted a fishing trawler named, Lumen Christi, without flag and without a registered home port. Following further investigations, it was noted that, Lumen Christi is actually a vessel registered in Nigeria by the name of Sarkim baka which had been stolen a few months earlier. Infact data from Marine Traffic shows that Lumen Christi (IMO number 8847193) was built in France in 1984 and its current status is “decommissioned or lost”,21 while Sarkim Baka is not registered in either the FAO, IMO or Marine Traffic vessel data bases. This case shows that there is a complex transnational criminal network involved in acquiring old decommissioned fishing vessels in Europe, before transforming and deploying them for use in the Gulf of Guinea especially in Cameroon and Nigeria maritime area. This echoes the discussion above where sub-national officers are frustrated in their attempt to have all fishing vessels matriculated due to a corporate veil that affects their actions.

4.1.4. Illegal exploitation and trading in endangered and critically endangered marine mammals Sea turtles (such as the Leatherback, Hawksbill, Olive Ridley and Green turtles) and dolphins (Atlantic humpback dolphin) common to Cameroon's coast are intentionally harvested for sale in local markets and for export to foreign countries [40]. A sub-national fisheries officer stated, it is common knowledge that artisanal fishers trade in marine turtles, however, it is difficult to detect this at landing sites because when it is caught for consumption, fishers will cut them into pieces and conceal them while offshore and it becomes impossible to detect at port and sometimes their transactions are even done offshore.26 Another fisheries officer posited that, sea turtles are sought after as an exotic animal for domestication while the meat is consumed as a delicacy.27 According to one study, some 1241 turtles are caught per year by maritime fishermen in Cameroon, and although majority of these catches are unintentional, in one fishing community alone, 400 turtles were intentional caught by artisanal fishermen for sale and local consumption [40]. The IUCN RedList categorises turtles and dolphins common to Cameroon's coast as endangered and critically endangered,28,29,

4.1.3. Illegal exploitation and trading in giant croaker maw (fish bladder) In the West maritime district, the Tiko military port is the only port that receives industrial fishing vessels. Evidence collected during fieldwork shows that it is also a transit port for the maws of giant Cameroon Croaker (Pseudotolithus moorii).22 As shown in Fig. 2, Chinese industrial fishermen were observed processing about 100 kg of fish bladder under the watchful eyes of an army officer who was also the researcher's minder during the field visits. As events unfolded, while the fisheries inspector was busy checking on fish landing below the deck of the trawler, a Chinese agent alighted from a tinted-window Mercedes Benz 500 with four 24-L cool boxes. Within minutes, the maws was loaded in the car and the driver left unopposed and without the fisheries officer noticing or recording the catch. The army officer indicated that, transactions such as this has been happening for many years and the fisheries officer has never recorded them. Hence, the exploitation of the Croaker maw is not captured in official landing data. Once regarded as a waste product, the maws of some fish species like Totoaba, Vaquita, Nile perch and giant croaker are valued like gold mindful of the prices they command. In July 2018, the retail price of Totoaba maw in China was quoted at US$46/gram while the price of gold was hovering at US$40/gram [61]. The demand for fish maw in Asia has significantly increased especially in China and Hong Kong where it is highly sort after as a delicacy and as pain relief for certain

23 https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/49217654/49231299# (accessed 20th March 2019). 24 The Redlist Criteria assesses quantitatively, a group of species' risk of extinction against 5 criteria A to E, where: A is a measure of population size reduction over 10 years or 3 generations; B is the species geographic range; C, small population size and decline; D, very small and restricted population and E, a measure of its probability of extinction in the wild [65]. 25 See IUCN Redlist Criteria summary sheet for detailed explanation of how each category is derived, https://www.iucnredlist.org/resources/summarysheet (assessed 21st June 2019). 26 Interview (U), State fisheries research scientist 21st October 2016, Batoke. 27 Interview (S), Sub-district fisheries control officer, 6th November 2016, Idenau. 28 https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/46967838/46967842 (accessed 20th February 2019). 29 https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/20425/123792572 (accessed 20th February 2019).

20 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cameroon, (accessed March 20th, 2017). 21 https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:989246/ mmsi:-8847193/vessel:LUMEN%20CHRISTI (assessed 3rd March 2019). 22 The Atlantic Croaker is a fish from the family Sciaenidae. The name, ‘croaker’, is derived from the croaking sound that the fish makes from the voluntary contraction of muscles attached to its air bladder (SeafoodSource, 2014, https://www.seafoodsource.com/seafood-handbook/finfish/croaker, accessed 10th March 2018).

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Fig. 2. Chinese industrial fishers processing the giant Cameroon Croaker maw for export.

fishers to work in Cameroon's fishing industry is a criminal offence since it violates Sections 23, 24 and 25 of Cameroon's Labour Code, which guides the recruitment and contracting of workers.31 Moreover, most immigrant artisanal fisherfolks live and work in deplorable conditions, such as around creeks and estuaries, without any basic services like water, electricity, sanitation and health– violating Sections 95 and 96 of Cameroon's Labour Code.32 In addition, some artisanal fisheries entrepreneurs also engage women and children (sometimes their wives and children) to work in the fishing industry in roles such as mending nets and in processing fish, with working schedules that may extend all night, such as is the case for smoking fish. Engaging family members to work in fisheries industry is quite common because some fishers hold the view that, since their children will become fishers, it is important to get them to start the process early since they are “learning a profession”.33 Cameroon's Labour Code Sections 80-87 prohibits the recruitment of children and/or women (except those in senior management), to work between 10pm and 6am, especially in jobs involving manual labour.34 Yet as also noted by UNODC [10] such social expectation or acceptance of these crimes makes women and children vulnerable to various abuses like forced labour, working long hours and sexual exploitation.

respectively, hence their protection and sustainable conservation is of utmost priority. In this respect, there are stipulated fines and criminal sanctions for individuals who kill or trade in protected species. For instance, section 158 of the law on forestry, wildlife and fisheries stipulates a fine from 3 to 10million CFA Francs (∼US$5000–18000) and/ or imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or both for the killing or capture of protected animals without authorisation. Thus, this makes the killing and trade of protected turtles and dolphins by fishers a fisheries crime. 4.1.5. Illegal recruitment and abuse of fish workers' rights With over ninety percent of fisherfolks in Cameroon being immigrants, the sector is prone to abuse and human rights violations. Concerning the artisanal sector, most foreign fisherfolks are brought into Cameroon by artisanal fishery entrepreneurs, mostly the boat owners. These foreign workers have no legal working contracts and entirely depend on their employers, as noted by this respondent: You know most of the fishermen here are foreigners who migrated from West Africa. You know they used to pay their resident permit and some other taxes. But these days they cannot meet up again as there is no fishing to pay for these documents and taxes. It is difficult for us. Most of the boats can't cope and they are grounded because to buy fuel and go to sea is difficult for them. It is difficult for them to go to the sea now and some of the new fishermen that we are bringing now [from West Africa] it is hard for us to look after them because there is no money. Some of them have to return. Some get into different professions in Cameroon. So, it is a problem.30 Thus, while fish scarcity affects the livelihood of migrant fisherfolks, a fundamental issue is the illegal nature of the sector that offers little or no labour and social protection. The illegal recruitment of foreign

31 Cameroon Labour Code, Law No. 92/007 of 14 August 1992 available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/31629/64867/E92CMR01. htm#p3 < accessed, 10th May 2016 > . 32 Cameroon Labour Code, Section 95 (1) (2) (3). 33 Interview (L)-President of artisanal fisherfolks union, 20th October 2016, Limbe; Interview (M), leader artisanal fisher's union, 20th October 2016, Mabeta. 34 Cameroon Labour Code, Section 82 (3).

30 Interview (P), Leader of Semi-Industrial Fishers Union (UNIPAM), 24th October 2016, Idenau.

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Table 2 Fisheries-related maritime crime in Cameron from June 2016–February 2019. (Source: compiled from Cameroon Navy’s various Facebook posts https://www.facebook.com/pg/cameroonnavy/about/?ref=page_internal, accessed 28 February 2019). Date

Crimes associated to fisheries sector

Notes

10th June 2016 24th June 2016 29th June 2016 23rd July 2016 25th August 2016 4th September 2016

Smuggling Ivory Fuel smuggling Smuggling contraband rice Smuggling assorted goods and illegal immigration Smuggling contraband rice Smuggling of fuel and protected timber

23rd September 2016 24th September 2016 16th October 2016 28th November 2016 26th October 2017 22nd January 2018 8th & 9th September 2018

Trafficking protected timber logs Smuggling contraband rice Fuel smuggling Fuel smuggling Fuel Smuggling Illegal fuel Smuggling Arms smuggling, and illegal immigration

13th October 2018 11th December 2018

Illegal migration & Contraband goods Fuel Smuggling

The Navy intercepted a canoe carrying 41 pieces of Ivory at Cape Campo The Navy intercepted a canoe carrying 112,000 L of illicit fuel. The Navy intercepted a canoe carrying 9700 bags of contraband rice each weighing 50 kg A Navy patrol boat boarded a canoe off Rio Del Rey involved in smuggling goods, counterfeiting (bank notes) and illegal migration. A canoe carrying over 5000 bags of rice intercepted in the south west region by navy Patrol team. The Navy operation HALCOMI intercepted several canoes carrying illicit diesel oil & protected timber logs. The Navy operation HALCOMI intercepted canoes carrying protected timber logs destined for export. The Navy seized about 400 bags of rice from canoes off the coast of the Southwest Region The Navy intercepted canoes carrying 20,000 L of illicit fuel off Bota in the Southwest Region. The Navy arrested a vessel carrying over 100,000 L of gasoline. The Navy intercepted a tug boat (used for fishing) selling fuel in Douala Cameroon. Nigerian flagged trawler, Fogo-Isle, caught selling illegal fuel in Cameroon's maritime zone. Three fishing trawlers (Olokun VI, VIII and XIII) caught with 5 automatic weapons and ammunitions & 43 suspected illegal immigrants. Fishing canoe caught transporting illegal immigrants and carrying contraband goods. Two boats carrying illegal fuel was intercepted off the coast of Douala …

interlinked and interrelated with the traditional concept of IUU fishing conceived by the FAO in 2001 [1]. It aims to capture the range of criminal offences carried out within or in close association with the fisheries sector [3,14] as opposed to IUU fishing which treats violations on fisheries extraction and regulations as a civil matter. Although fisheries crime has been recognised at the international level as a significant threat to national, environmental and food security its true nature and scope remains difficult to assess due to the elusive nature of some practices [21,26,71]. In a developing country context, like Cameroon, knowledge of fisheries crime practices is greatly limited. To uncover criminal practices along Cameroon's maritime fisheries value chain, the study relied on primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected using direct observation, informal group discussions and semi-structured interview with state and non-state actors from the West maritime district in Southwest Cameroon. Secondary data came from existing literature and social media sources from prominent state actors involved in combatting IUU fishing such as the Cameroonian Navy. The findings reveal various fisheries crime practices along the fisheries value chain. Those classed as fisheries-related crimes including; corruption, document and identity fraud, illegal recruitment and abuse of fish workers' rights,.illegal trade in fish maws, endangered and critically endangered marine mammals, and those that use the fisheries sector as a medium: smuggling of contraband goods, trafficking in weapons and illegal immigration. Compared to the other crimes, corruption in the form of bribery and extortion was identified as a major problem in both the industrial and small-scale sectors since it enables other crimes to flourish. It is endemic in the fisheries value chain especially in preparing crew and vessels for fishing, catching, landing and processing of fish. For instance, industrial fish entrepreneurs who can obtain a fishing authorisation and license from the Prime Minister and Minister in charge of fisheries, engage in shady partnership deals with foreign industrial fishing companies. This then gives them leverage to exploit the sector with little or no check on their activities. Similarly, to also gain influence and maximise their longterm gains, artisanal fishermen offer bribes as gifts to local administrative officers to avoid MCS actions of their fishing activities. Corruption in acquiring fishing permits has thus enabled crimes like document and identity fraud to flourish in both industrial and artisanal sectors. With respect to the industrial sector, the case of the vessel named Lumen Christi caught in Cameroon whilst registered in Nigeria as Sarkim Barka, highlights the extent to which criminal networks or individuals can venture to conceal their illicit activities and the

4.2. Documenting crimes associated to the fisheries sector 4.2.1. Smuggling of weapons and other contraband goods Table 2 below captures a plethora of crimes associated to the maritime fisheries sector. It is evident that the sector is used as a medium for contraband trade especially in fuel, rice, timber and ivory, arms smuggling within Cameroon and transnationally between Cameroon, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Togo. It also shows a single fishing vessel can be involved in two or more criminal acts such as smuggling illegal diesel oil and protected timber or smuggling counterfeited notes and illegal immigration. The table also shows, there are more criminal incidents in June and September, an indication that smugglers are active in both peak and off peak fishing seasons. In fact, the trade in contraband goods and issues with illegal immigration between Cameroon and Nigeria have been a long-term problem [67] and occurs throughout the year even though the activities have seldom been associated with the fisheries sector. In addition, some studies have shown that the illegal bunkering of crude oil in Nigeria, which finds its market in neighbouring countries like Cameroon, is operated by a criminal network, with serious implications on maritime security [68,69]. 4.3. Illegal immigration As the data in Table 2 above shows, some fishing vessels smuggling contraband goods were also identified as involved in illegal immigration thereby violating immigration laws. As noted above, the illegal movement of persons has been a major issue between states in the Central Africa sub-region (e.g., Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon), as well as between Cameroon and Nigeria in West Africa. In 2013, the Maritime Multinational Coordination Centre Zone D -set up to enforce maritime security in the maritime space of Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe-reported that illegal immigration is a major issue that the service would have to deal with and by 2015, it had carried out numerous operations to intercept vessels involved in illegal immigration and repatriated many Cameroonian illegal immigrants from Equatorial Guinea and Nigerian illegal immigrants from Gabon [70]. Thus, the illicit nature of most fishing operations allow illegal immigration to flourish. 5. Conclusion Fisheries crime is a new concept that is conceptually distinct yet 8

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References

transnational networks involved. Another important revelation is the illicit exploitation of Cameroon Croaker's maw. The exploitation of the fish maw is a sophisticated transnational process involving well-established criminal networks in Cameroon and end-users in China. Similarly, the exploitation and trade in endangered turtles and dolphins is also rife especially in the artisanal sector where turtles are intentionally caught for consumption and for use as an exotic pet. The study also shows a fisheries sector that is a harbinger of other criminal activities such as the smuggling of contraband goods, arms trafficking, illegal immigration, illegal recruitment and abuse of fish worker's rights. The illicit activities captured in Table 2, portray a criminal enterprise exploiting the fisheries sector to smuggle a variety of illicit goods and enabling illegal immigration between Cameroon, Nigeria and other states in the region. The scale and frequency of their activities especially in both peak and off-peak fishing season, indicates it is well established practice that allows perpetrators to circumvent official market rules in order to carry out their illicit trade. Through these examples, the study paints a complex picture of criminality in the maritime fisheries sector, perpetuated by a sophisticated network of both local and foreign industrial fisheries operators who are focused on maximising profit. It also shows the organised and transnational nature of these crimes and the interrelationship of the different criminal practices similar to cases in Indonesia [14] and South Africa [4]. The illicit practices in Cameroon's maritime fisheries sector therefore extends far beyond the FAO's conception as the violations in the extraction of marine living resources, to include fisheries-related crimes and crimes associated to the fisheries sector that are interrelated with IUU fishing and perpetrated by various category of actors. Consequently, addressing illicit activities in the maritime fisheries sector requires cooperation from a wide range of actors in investigating and analysing the extent of national and transnational criminal practices, the actors involved and their modes of operation. This approach is necessary since it will enable actors to work together to understand for example how IUU fishing is linked to fisheries crime, thereby enabling them to design appropriate and targeted management responses which can be tested, refined and deployed at the district and national levels as well as transnationally. These actors must not only include the Navy which is leading efforts on MCS, other national maritime agencies, the judiciary, fisheries managers, local coastal community groups, human rights groups and other local governmental organisations must work cooperatively to combat fisheries crime.

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Funding Coventry University Research Studentship Awards provided the PhD funding, which helped facilitate the research captured in this article.

Acknowledgements My gratitude to all the respondents and coastal communities who graciously welcomed me and agreed to participate in this research. Special thanks to my former Ph.D. supervisors at the Research Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (Coventry University) and all the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103669. (Source: adapted by author using ArcGIS software, with datasets from ESRI [36] and Flanders Marine Institute [37]). 9

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