Canada-India nuclear cooperation

SUMMA

There

is probably

developing manding

country

no more

dramatic

acquiring

an industrial

the highest

rial skills,

than that of the Indian of a nuclear

cern

expressed

has been

proliferation

an example

resulting

nuclear

from

de-

and manageindustry.

device by India,

that

of a

capability

levels of technological

the detonation

RY

With

much

con-

this is a case of nuclear

an aid programme

of a west-

ern state (Canada). This study

demonstrates

gramme,

Canadian/Indian

mutually

beneficial

India

that

not

and

with

that

a consequence

grammes.

an aid prohas been

It is also shown Canada

of the links

and Indian

between nuclear

tions of these differences

In fact,

in the development

broken

the detonation

Differences

Canadian

partner

technology.

were no agreements Government

than

cooperation

to both coun tries’industries.

was a full risk-sharing

of the CANDU

rather

nuclear

of the device

between the

was

the two pro-

structures

industries

to broader

that there

by the Indian

of

the

and the implica-

national

policies

are

discussed. The paper the

offers a basic criteria

‘appropriateness’

to commercial

of a technology

nuclear

result in a very gradual In

discussing

paper

identifies

between

the

transfer new

Research Policy

7/l 978) 220-238

process

transfer,

a certain

the

level of development

the two

nations

will be between

capability

would

of this technology.

technology

relative

of

if applied

reactors,

suggests that the most likely

in the future

acquired

of

of

which,

generating

proliferation

an optimal

technological

already

power

the industries

This relationship

for the determination

and other

concerned. pattern

LOGS that LDCs

of

wish a

that have

level of competence.

North-Holland

canada-india

nuclear

cooperation

by George BINDON Science and Human Quebec,

Affairs

Programme,

Concordia

University,

Montreal,

Canada

and

Sitoo MUKERJI Department

of Liberal

Manchester,

UK

Studies in Science,

University

of Manchester,

There has been a great deal of comment on the termination of nuclear cooperation between Canada and India. Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been directed to the interaction between the two countries’ nuclear programmes. Canada’s role has been characterized as that of an aid-giver whose assistance has permitted a technologically backward India to enter the nuclear ‘club’ prematurely and dangerously. This somewhat patronizing picture does not bear up under inspection. The reality is more that of two equal partners sharing in the establishment of a high technology industry, with India financing and making possible a crucial element of the development process. Without India’s participation the eventual success and acceptance of the CANDU system as a viable commercial product would have been less likely. The impression that India has broken a trust with Canada by exploding a nuclear device has entered the lexicon of popular Canadian myths*[20, 37 511. In fact no agreements have been broken by the Indian government and from the beginning its position has been clear. Rather, it is Canada that has unilaterally

broken contracts

with India. The suggestion is frequently

offered

that the Canadian action is an expression of ethical consistency. Yet the new policy is rendered meaningless in the light of the repetition of Canada’s past behaviour in her current relationships with the nuclear programmes of other developing nations.

Furthermore,

sion raises a number

of disturbing

the Canadian questions

response to the Indian explo-

about Canada’s perceptions

and

* The title of Gillette’s

article declares the bias. From Stewart: ‘For Canadians the crucial fact is that we have led India by the hand into the age of the Bomb.’ The MontrealStar [35], when referring to India’s nuclear detonation, said ‘. . that double-dealing Asian nation .‘.

Research Policy

7(1978)

220-238

North-Holland

222

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

policies in relation to less developed countries. Canadian

and Indian

nuclear

programmes

Finally, an examination

offer interesting

of the

insights into the

process of technology transfer, technology choice (appropriateness of a technology) and development policy. The use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been an oft-repeated policy of the Indian government. As early as 1955, Dr. Homi Bhabha spoke of the economic advantages for India of using plutonium bombs in place of conventional explosions for major engineering projects[ 1, 421. In 1964 India built a plutonium separation plant and in 1966 declared before the General Assembly of the United Nations that there could be ‘. . . peaceful use of nuclear explosions’[S 11. In 1967 Prime Minister Gandhi expressed concern about the Chinese nuclear weapons capability saying ‘. . . we may find ourselves having to take a nuclear decision any moment’[l]. Again, in 1970 at the Lusaka Conference, India declared ‘. . . the right of non-aligned nations to take due advantage of nuclear technology including the staging of nuclear explosions . . .‘[44]. India has consistently refused to sign the Non-Proliferation (of nuclear weapons) Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that it maintained a monopoly of nuclear power by the ‘major’ economically and militarily developed countries without any effective assurances of a halt or reduction of the explosive expansion of those nations’ atomic weapons arsenals [42]. With such indications of India’s intentions, the questions must be asked: why did Canada wait to cut off nuclear cooperation until the stated Indian policy manifested itself in the actual detonation, and what is the significance of the delay? Close scrutiny of the Canadian and Indian nuclear programmes not only demonstrates how exaggerated was Canada’s surprised reaction to India’s explosion, but also suggests that the detonation was, to an extent, predictable. During the formative period of Canada-India nuclear cooperation important developments were taking place in Canadian military policy. August 1958 had seen the creation of a cabinet-level Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence. On 20 February 1959 the decision was taken to cancel the Avro Arrow jet interceptor, a completely Canadian designed weapons system[58]. On 14 July 1959 the United States Congress ratified an agreement with Canada for the ‘. . . transfer of information needed to train personnel in the handling of nuclear weapons’[l 11. The same year saw the establishment of the Defence Production Sharing Agreement between Canada and the United States. On 16 August 1963 the Hyannisport Agreement was announced for the acquisition of ‘special ammunition (read nuclear weapons) by Canada under a ‘two-key’ United States-Canada control system. On 31 December 1963 the first weapons arrived at La Macaza, Quebec for installa-

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

tion on the Bomarc ground-to-air deployment interceptors,

223 missiles. This was followed by Canadian

of nuclear tipped air-to-air missiles on her home based Voodoo tactical nuclear weapons on her F-104G offensive strike aircraft

and Honest John offensive missiles in Europe [34]. The net result of these developments was the abrogation by Canada of any meaningful semblance of technological independence in the military field, and the form~ization of a quasi-satellite status for her armed forces. The agreement with the United States for the handling of nuclear weapons was signed one year before CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor and United States heavy water) began operating, and nuclear weapons were being deployed by Canada months before the loan agreement between Canada and India on RAPP I (Rajasthan Atomic Power Project) was finalized. Thus, during this period it would have been difficult

for Canada to demand

of the Indian

government rigorous assurances about that country’s freedom to acquire nuclear explosive devices. Nevertheless, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was years in the future and nuclear explosions were considered legitimate peaceful uses for nuclear energy. Finally, the weakness of Canada in the international commercial nuclear energy market and India’s dete~ned and independent policy left Canada in no position to insist on special controls if it wished to make any sales. Since independence India has placed high priority on developing a self-sufficient scientific, technological, military and industrial capability. As early as 1944 the dist~guished Indian physicist Dr. Homi Bhabha, in a letter to the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust requesting funds, mentioned the potential peaceful uses of atomic energy and the necessity of building up the scientific and industrial infrastructure to support such an endeavour[42]. In the following year the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was created. In 1948 the United Nations representative for the newly independent state of India spoke of the special need for nuclear power in energy-poor India. In August 1956 an experimental reactor (APSARA) of Indian design and construction began producing power ‘: , . and scaling up the reactor to prototype and production sizes would not (have been) beyond the capacity of Indian scientists and engineers’[44]. On 21 March of the same year the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, announced to the House of Commons 1261 the decision to join with India in the building of an experimental reactor (CIRUS) of Canadian design in India. Originally called CIR (for CanadaIndia Reactor), the reactor was of the NRX type already in operation in Canada. The name was later to be changed to CIRUS after it became necessary to acquire assistance from the United States to complete the programme* 1431. * Nucfeonics mcnts

1381 reported a contract signed between Indian and American for India to lease 15 tons of heavy water from the United States.

govern-

224 The financial

G. Bindon and S. Mukerii arrangements

under

the Colombo

mated cost of $14 million with Canada financing

Plan involved the equipment

a total estipurchased in

Canada and India paying for items locally available. For the infant Canadian reactor industry the deal offered $7.5 million of contracts, assistance in keeping the skilled teams together, and manufacturing experience that would contribute to building the industrial ‘learning curve’. The Canadian Government was anxious to see a Canadian reactor in India. Besides providing an immediate boost for the industry in Canada, CIRUS was a ‘loss-leader’ that put the Canadian toe in the door for future sales. Lester Pearson had been aware in 1956 that ‘India (had made) enquiries to several sources with a view to obtaining a research reactor’[26]. In 1959 Mr. Pearson, then the opposition member from Elliot Lake riding (a major uranium mining community that was experiencing severe economic difficulties) had voiced his concern in the House of Commons[27] that ‘. . . Canada not be left behind (in nuclear technology) since the United States and the United Kingdom are making great progress . . . in the export of their reactors and their knowledge . . . ‘. In 1959 India signed an agreement with the German company, Lindes Eismaschinen of Weisbaden, to build a heavy water plant. In April of the same year Nucleonics noted that a new plant at Trombay produced Asia’s first ‘nearly pure uranium’. The year 1959 also saw India initiating the process for calling international bids for construction of power reactors which led to a contract with General Electric International for the purchase of two light water enriched uranium reactors of 190 megawatts electrical (MWe) each[39]. Zerlina, a low power research reactor entirely of Indian design and construction[9], went into operation in 1961[40]. On 22 October 1964 Prime Minister La1 Bahadur Shastri opened a SIO million plutonium plant ‘designed and built entirely by Indian engineers with most of the equipment fabricated domestically’ [41]., In August 1961 Canada and India had agreed to undertake a study for the construction of a Douglas Point type 200 MWe reactor at a site near Delhi (Rajasthan)[4]. The following year (August 1962) the Indian government gave the go-ahead for construction of the reactor to be called RAPP 1[5]. The financial arrangements specified that approximately half the total monies were to be spent in India for purchase of the conventional components, and that the other half be financed by ‘hard’ loan from Canada of which 80% was ‘tied’ to being spent in Canada. This was a commercial sale and in no way can be considered as aid [ 1.5, 16, 50, 281. The infusion of these monies into the Canadian programme came at a crucial juncture and a close review of the actual sequence of events raises certain interesting points. In June 1959 a ‘go-ahead’ had been given for Douglas Point

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

225

although its design was not yet completed and the NPD plant (Nuclear Power Demonstration) had yet to go into operation[3]. NPD in fact did not reach full power until 28 June 1962, just two months before the Indian decision was made to build RAPP 1[30]. Douglas Point is given credit for having provided operating proof of the commercial viability of the CANDU system* [53, 71. The commitment to Douglas Point in 1959 and initial construction in 1961 benefited from ‘. . . some design experience from the NPD station . . . (but). . . the station was designed without any relevant operational experience’[30]. In February 1964 J. L. Gray, President, Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL), reported that the ‘. . . major nuclear items (were) on site and installation in progress at Douglas Point’[24]. Therefore, India made a commitment to commercial CANDU before any operating experience had been gained on even the demonstration model (NPD), one half year before the nuclear components for the Douglas Point station had been delivered, and four and one half years before Douglas Point was to generate its first electricity. It should also be noted that two previous Canadian reactors, NRX and NRU, had experienced major accidents - NRX a melt-down and NRU serious contamination when a piece of radioactive fuel fell out of a fueling machine and burned. The eventual operating experience at Douglas Point was not very pleasing[57]. In fact Douglas Point was a stop-and-go operation until about 1970[ 121. An Indian commentator, in referring to the state of CANDU technology at that time, said in understatement that it ‘. . . had not been completely “debugged” . . . in the (country) of origin’ [44]. The creation of the Canadian and Indian nuclear industries can best be seen as almost parallel developments. Canadian nuclear capability was initially made possible by the importation of foreign personnel and technology to enhance an immature

domestic scientific, technological

and industrial

complex [ 131. In

return India, with a very respectable nuclear scientific establishment, joined Canada to enhance the development of her nuclear industrial capability. The CANDU technology was particularly attractive to both countries. Canada emerged from the Second World War to experience temporarily the position of being a significant power. Involvement in the Manhattan Project had placed in Canada’s hands a nuclear capability of some sophistication. There is logic that needs no explanation that led Canada initially to retain and *

The importance of the contribution made by Douglas Point to the ‘learning curve’ of the .Canadian nuclear industry appears again and again in the literature produced by Canadians. Despite the obvious significance of the work done for the Indian contract, reading the literature can leave the impression that it either did not exist or was simply an incidental business deal.

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

226

expand her activity in this area. However, the transition programme

from an experimental

that kept Canada ‘in the know’, to the historic commitment

to

develop a capacity to commercially generate electricity through nuclear power by the use of a deuterium/natural uranium reactor clearly requires elucidation. Optimistic expectations as to the demand for uranium were premature and led Canada to dramatically expand her ability to mine this abundant natural resource. An industry was created. Then the market was pulled out from under it when the United States decided to avoid developing a dependence upon any but domestic sources of the ore by imposing a total embargo on importation of uranium[33]. The question of what to do with Canada’s already realized supplies of uranium suggested an answer - burn it to create power. The experience Canada gained during the war in using heavy water as a moderator and the absence of a militarily subsidized enrichment facility led naturally to CANDU (CANadian Deuterium Uranium). Added to this initial impetus was the situation of the major electrical utility in Canada - Ontario Hydro. The projected power needs in Ontario dramatically outstripped the remaining hydro potential. Coal, the cheapest alternative conventional source of power, was imported from the United States. The negative foreign exchange implications were obvious. Ontario had what seemed at the time vast quantities of uranium and a crippled mining industry sitting on it. Therefore, it seemed that for Ontario, the industrial heartland of Canada, CANDU was a particularly desirable system. It was the only new source of power that could be found in the province other than possible ‘alternative energy’ sources which, in any event, were not given serious consideration by utilities at the time. For India, CANDU also offered some particularly attractive features. Reactors that use enriched uranium require either initial high energy and capital investment in an enrichingplant, or continuing dependence on foreign sources for supply of enriched fuel. Events have confirmed the legitimacy of India’s concern about dependence of enriched

on foreign supply of enriched fuel. The only sources

fuel in quantities

sufficient

to sustain a commercial

reactor pro-

gramme are the United States and the Soviet Union. A key to the development of all non-communist nuclear power programmes except those using CANDU had been the American assurances of supplies of enriched fuel. It has long been U.S. policy to guard its enrichment technology tightly in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability to other courtries. Accordingly the A.E.C. discouraged even other Western countries from developing their own enrichment capability by offering them

Canada-India

guaranteed

nuclear cooperation

long term enrichment

227 contracts

U.S. enrichment contracts also helped throughout the developed world [3 11.

. . . The attractive

to spread

terms of

L.W.R. technology

The United States has now suspended signing contracts for supply of enriched uranium and has ‘retroactively classified as ‘conditional’ enrichment contracts for 45 foreign reactors scheduled to begin operation in the early 1980’s . . .’ [ 181. India is poor in energy and capital but rich in pride and independence. As such, a major commitment to enriched uranium technology was not attractive. In contrast CANDU used natural uranium, a commodity that could be bought on the world market. In addition, the fuel for CANDU is considerably cheaper per unit energy than enriched uranium and thus does not present the same degree of long range strain on her capital resources and balance of payments as would the production or purchase of enriched uranium. India has very little proven uranium reserves, although sufficient to support her programme up to this point, and the possibility of having to import the ore made a natural uranium technology attractive. Finally, the much touted ‘growth potential’ of the CANDU system into a thorium fuel cycle suggests a compelling explanation for the long range attractiveness of Canadian-Indian cooperation in developing the CANDU technology *. India has the world’s largest reserves of this rare earth and Canada can only realize significant domestic supply as a by-product of the refinement of uranium ore [.59,46]. The contribution that the Indian contract made toward the development of the Canadian nuclear industry was crucial. At the time of the Indian purchases the ‘design’ of the Canadian nuclear industry had difficult structural inadequacies. We emphasize the term irzdustry as opposed to capability. By capability we mean mastery of the basic scientific ‘know-how’ and technical skills required to produce a device. The ability to extrapolate this capability into an economically viable industry involves another magnitude of difficulty. An indication of how the Canadian nuclear industry perceived its own development was offered in a paper presented to the Canadian Nuclear Association Annual Conference in 1969 by L. R. Haywood, Vice-President, Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). He measured the scale of the different sectors of the Canadian nuclear industry and compared their projected growth with a minimum size required for maturity: *

Morrison and Page [37]: ‘With the blessing of the U.S. and Britain, Canada made the shipment in the hope that it would insure future Western access to India’s thorium supplies.’ As early as 1955 Dr. Bhabha spoke of the attractiveness of the thorium cycle for India [IO].

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

228

. . . a distinction is made between a business and an industry, particularly in the cases of equipment and material supply. A business involves simply the provision

of goods and/or services by one or more persons or organiza-

tions. For an equipment or materials industry to exist, there should be two or more organizations competing for the provision of ten million dollars worth of goods per annum . . . Each should be engaged in or responsible for, a full scope of the functions required for the provision of a product development, design, direct shop or plant activity, all necessary indirect shop and manufacturing engineering activities, marketing, sales and the making of profits. On the above basis, there are currently no nuclear industries in Canada (our emphasis) [25]. He then went on to forecast when different sectors of the Canadian nuclear business would mature into viable industries. Based on domestic needs alone the equipment industry was expected to reach this level by 1977-78 and the special nuclear materials business, i.e. Da0 (heavy water) and fuel, by 1972. It must be noted that these projections were based on domestic needs alone. In addition, the criteria of at least two fully integrated suppliers provides a very conservative basis for judgement. Competition does aid cost control. However, in that the CANDU system is measured on the world market against the designs of other nations, one fully integrated supplier may be adequate if not preferable. The Indian purchases, coming when they did, contracted the time toward maturity and provided continuity of development. There is no question that AECL and the Canadian nuclear industry have demonstrated an impressive technological management capacity through the surety displayed in being able to overlap successive reactor generations. ‘Go’ decisions were made for the next generation reactor designs in the confidence (deserved as time has shown) that the experience acquired throughout the development stage of one reactor could almost immediately be transferred and successfully applied in the development of the following reactor. Nevertheless, one must wonder whether

Ontario

Hydro would have had the confl-

dence necessary to make such an early commitment to Pickering, Bruce and the whole nuclear programme in Ontario if it had had only the experience that would have been generated within the industry from fabricating components for one commercial size reactor (Douglas Point). And if the decision had been taken without the RAPP contracts on line, it is questionable whether the dramatic improvement in operating reliability seen between Douglas Point and Pickering would have been realized. Therefore, by the RAPP contracts, India offered an important subsidization to the building of the ‘learn-

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

ing curve’ of the Canadian nuclear industry

229 and was a full risk-sharing partner

in CANDU technology*. As for the Indian programme ‘. . . the import content of RAPP I. . . was 5870, of RAPP II. . . 4070, and of MAPP (Madras Atomic Power Project) . . . 24%’ [ 81. Canada imports about 20% of the prime components for her domestic programme - not significantly different than the situation attained by India **. The achievement of industrial viability based on domestic contracts within Canada, the attainment by India of effective self-sufficiency and detonation of a nuclear ‘device’, coincide. The device was exploded at a point when Canada could afford to act indignant and India would be little affected by Canadian self-righteous posturing. The pattern now repeats itself with sales to Argentina. That country has not signed either the NPT or Partial Test Ban Treaty, has a plutonium separation plant and openly debates the nuclear weapons option. With diversified sources of nuclear technology, including an agreement with India, and a respectable nuclear establishment of her own, a study of the timetable for development of the Argentinian nuclear industry should indicate the approximate timing of her first nuclear detonation***[18]. We can assume by the decision about her relations with India that Canada has given notice that she will cease cooperation with other nations when, and if, they explode a device. In fact the only effect of Canada breaking agreements with India, has been to de-control those reactors on which a control agreement has been established. Interestingly, India announced on 21 June, 1976, just three weeks after final abrogation by Canada of the cooperation agreement, plans to construct two new plutonium separation plants and the upgrading of the capacity of an existing facility[54]. Suddenly, presented with the availability of the two spent fuel ‘plutonium

mines’ (to use AECL ‘newspeak’) of the RAPP reactors,

India now has more material available in less time than was originally expected. In addition, the contention that the power reactors would have to be run at inefficient levels to act as efficient plutonium producers, and as such
independent

(and perhaps in

1961, at an address given in Bombay during inauguration ceremonies for the CIRUS reactor, Mr. Gray presented details of the planned Douglas Point Station with two reactors. The only two reactor 200 MWe CANDU installation to be built has been at Rajasthan [22]. ** Other sources have suggested Canadian import requirements as low as 10% [23] and as high as 30% [ 3 11. *** India and Argentina signed an agreement to ‘. co-operate in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes .’ on 30 May, 1974 [29].

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

230 some respects superior)* as if the capability

nation

in the nuclear field, has led Canada to react

was transferred

from Canada to India, then stolen

for

India’s own purposes. As we have shown, India cooperated with Canada for mutual benefit. Without any involvement with Canada, the ability to detonate a bomb would, at the most, have experienced only a marginal delay. It can be argued that, without the inconvenience of possible disruption of joint projects with Canada, the Indian bomb might have come years earlier. As early as 1958 Dr. Bhabha was reported to claim that India ‘could produce a bomb in eighteen months from the time a decision was made’[49] and Prime Minister Indira Ghandhi has said that ‘the country was in a position to detonate atomic devices as early as 1964’ [ 521. The inability of Canada to understand and accept the Indian position on the NPT, a treaty that has completely failed to modify vertical proliferation while attempting to freeze the status quo on horizontal proliferation, demonstrates a certain insensitivity to the perceptions and policies of the majority of governments in the Less Developed Countries. Between the signing of the NPT in June 1968, and the Indian detonation in May 1974, the main sponsors of the treaty (the US and USSR) have broken the spirit of article VI which stated: Each of the parties to the treaty undertake to faith on effective measures relating to cessation an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and complete disa~~lellt under strict and effective

pursue negotiation in good of the nuclear arms race at on a treaty on general and internation~ control[42].

The SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) has proven to be a farce, permitting weapons levels beyond those originally planned by the US and USSR. Even the Partial Test Ban Treaty that forced the signatories to carry out their tests underground, has been accompanied by a significant increase in the number of explosions. In addition to the contin~led quantitative growth in tests of nuclear weapons and their deployment, the great powers have undertaken a dramatic elaboration of the qualitative aspects of the delivery systems including MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vechicles), MARV (manoeuvrable reentry vehicle), cruise missiles, etc. [ 141. As such, the NPT is no longer in effect. Rather, its discri~nil~ato~ nature has served to increase the previous discrepancies between the nuclear and non-nuclear signatories, and can only undermine the possibilities for future attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. With the signing of the NPT, the Canadians * Besides operating

attempted

to reinterpret

their

heavy water, light water, and an experimental fast breeder reactor, India is dcvcloping her own FBR and is very active in thorium cycle technology [ 171.

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

231

agreements

with India to make them consistent

obligations.

Since at least 197 1, Canada has presented the Indians with redefi-

nitions

with their new international

of what they now, as a party to the NPT, considered to be legitimate

uses of atomic energy, i.e. that a nuclear explosion would be considered peaceful if it was sponsored and called peaceful by an existing nuclear weapons state. But if a nuclear device was detonated by a non-nuclear weapons state, it was impossible to differentiate between peaceful or military intent [ 561. India has always considered this position discriminatory. Nevertheless, the original agreements with India had been entered into by Canada under the concept of ‘atoms for peace’, which did not exclude the use of peaceful nuclear explosions. Those controls that did exist on CIRUS applied only to the 50% of Canadian material in the first fuel charge[44]. The Indians refused to alter their interpretation of the agreements with Canada and Indira Ghandhi reminded Mr. Trudeau that ‘. . . the obligations undertaken by our two governments are mutual and they cannot be unilaterally varied’[ 191. At the press conference announcing Canadian suspension of nuclear cooperation with India, Mitchel Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, admitted that ‘. . . the Indian government (had) not broken any agreement that it (had) entered into’[48]. The Canadian refusal to ship to India equipment already contracted for, was the realization of the concerns expressed by Mrs. Gandhi. The strategic military implications of any domestic nuclear programmes are disturbing. Conventional weapons delivered on a nuclear plant by a nonnuclear enemy can have the effect of a limited nuclear strike, and this creates a strong inducement for a country with a commercial reactor programme to develop a nuclear ‘counter-force’. Yet these arguments weigh more heavily in Western countries with their much larger commercial nuclear programmes. India has consistently lobbied in world forums for general disarmament. In the face of unrestrained proliferation and militarization, she has cautiously, although perhaps unwisely, taken the first step to ‘run with the pack’. In assessing the pros and cons of nuclear technology, more and more evidence indicates that the costs are greater than were first imagined. A fundamental re-evaluation of the nuclear option is being undertaken in many countries. Nevertheless, the commitment to widespread exploitation of the potential of nuclear fission remains. In weighing the costs and benefits, different measures should be applied in developed and developing countries. In developed countries additional energy consumption means additional wealth. In developing countries like India, availability of energy might mean, quite simply, the difference between desperate poverty and the possibility of improvement in

232

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

living conditions. Clearly the qualitative aspects on the benefits side are fundamentally different in the two situations. Developing countries have a more credible argument for the use of nuclear power than do developed countries, and this case was made by Prime Minister Nehru speaking before the Lok Sabha (Indian Lower House) on 10 May, 1954: . . . the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India whose power sources are limited than for . . an industrially advanced country [42]. Considering the eventual character of the NPT, the recent decisions about supply of enriched fuel by the US, the increasing effectiveness of the antinuclear advocates in developed countries, the greater room for manoeuvre that ‘excess flab’ provides the industrialized nations, and of course the actions taken by Canada, Nehru was prescient when he said in the same speech: . . if the developed countries have all the powers they may well stop the use of atomic energy everywhere including in their own countries, because they do not need it so much, and in consequence we might suffer [42]. By the year 1990 Canada, with a population of perhaps 28 million, expects to have between 22 000 and 29 000 MWe nuclear installed domestically[2]. India, with a population by the year 2000 of almost one billion, plans only 4300 MWe nuclear [47]. For Canada nuclear energy will represent only 20% of total electricity, whereas India expects to rely on nuclear for at least 30%. In other words, by 1990 Canada will produce about twice the electricity by nuclear generation alone than the total electrical output in India by the year 2000, and Canada’s total electrical production will be about nine times India’s total projected output in 2000. This discrepancy in per capita electric energy consumption is disturbing. It could be argued that the threat of war is exacerbated more by this kind of inequitable development pattern than by India acquiring nuclear weapons. And the many possible dangers inherent in massive commercial nuclear programmes will certainly exist in direct proportion to the number of reactors built, whereas nuclear war is only a frightening but avoidable possibility. In this most dangerous of possible worlds, our best hope is in greater equality between the rich and poor nations. A more credible policy for Canada would be to declare nuclear fission as a stopgap technology and undertake a major effort to develop alternative sources of energy. She could then encourage countries buying CANDU technology to take a similar stance and join in cooperative programmes to pool resources for the development of post-nuclear energy technologies. This policy would only be persuasive in the context of a clearly limited domestic

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

nuclear programme

in Canada, and a strong commitment

233 to the development

of less onerous energy technologies, accompanied by a progressive reorientation of her ‘aid and trade’ relations with developing countries. Unfortunately the mandate, and thus the mentality of AECL, mitigates against such an approach. The Canadian nuclear industry, with AECL at its core, is a highly effective technological management team that is ‘straight-jacketed’ in a ‘monocular’ nuclear mandate. In a mature high technology industrial enterprise, management seeks to acquire the maximum value-added from its human and physical resources, and secures its future through horizontal diversification and vertical integration. Cautious about even appearing to compete with the private sector, the government confines AECL to a single area of activity - nuclear engineering design and contracting. This has led the industry to a single-minded, inward-looking and fearfully protective stance that may prove to be disastrous in a changing future. In contrast, the Indian programme is more diversified and therefore should be able to transcend the nuclear option to develop alternatives. Unlike AECL, DAE (Department of Atomic Energy, India) has a broad integrative approach to the relationship and significance of the building of a nuclear industry to the whole spectrum of questions around development. The Indian programme involves a wide-ranging policy (including the development of agro-industrial complexes, space research, and multi-faceted industrial innovation applications) with the scientific, technological and management capability created for the nuclear programme acting as a base. The work being done in agro-industrial complexes illustrates in a striking way the long-range planning of the Indians. An agro-industrial complex involves the integrated development of vast areas. Large nuclear plants will power desalination plants, phosphorus and other fertilizer plants, aluminium smelters and fabrication plants, common salt plants, caustic soda and hydrochloric acid plants, and the support of mechanized and bullock farming by providing power for tube wells. Such a development strategy for India has strongly suggested the use of nuclear power, since domestically available fossil fuel energy is limited. These schemes display a mixed approach including the creation of the most sophisticated technologies and industries down to the upgrading of traditional agriculture [ 551. DAE is undertaking research in support of all the key elements of these programmes including the building of pilot plants and, if successful, could lead to a dramatic ‘bootstrap’ uplift for both the Indian farmers and the effectiveness of the industrial sector. Concerted efforts have been made to transfer technological ‘know-how’ from DAE into industry, including non-nuclear sectors. DAE is also a vast school, offering summer institutes for colleges, developing new curriculum material

G. Bindon and S. Mukerji

234 for the public schools, giving orienting and training

scientists

are some in India

courses for teachers from rural areas

from other developing

countries* [6]. Althou~

who would iike to see more emphasis

there

on ‘appropriate’

technology [45], a Canadian observer marvels at the ‘extensive programmes of solar energy research and development . . (in India). . . too numerous to mention’[32]. This does not suggest that the particular mix of nuclear and other energy research and development in India is the best possible. There are real inherent dangers that the nuclear ~rogramme may bias development unduly toward capital-intensive, elitist, centralized and bureaucratized structures. In determining the appropriateness of particular technologies for individual developing countries, the key criterion is the ability of a country to absorb effectively and to independently ltlaintain, produce and develop the technology. By this measure, nuclear technology is clearly appropriate for India, although not for most other developing countries. The advocates of ‘small’ or ‘soft’ technology as the only appropriate strategy for developing countries offer a very compelling case. -Yet it must be remembered that the only modern societies that have created wealth have gone the heavy industry, big technology route. And China. the only alternative model and one on which the final judgement is far from clear, has a very mixed approach of both large and small technologies. The Canada-India nuclear relationship was an important example of development cooperation and illustrates an interesting phenomenon that suggests what might be the pattern of dissemination of nuclear technology in the developing world, and the future of Canadian sales. India’s ‘payoff for dealing with the Canadian nuclear industry at an early point, low on the ‘learning curve’, was to gain access to and involvement

in the ‘learning-by-doing’

pro-

cess before maturity made this key knowledge unatta~able and proprietary. Once a complex industrial process has l~atured, the great bulk of its ‘knowhow’ is contained in the ‘culture’ of the industry and thus cannot be set down in manuals and becomes extremely difficult to transfer. In a high technology area such as commercial nuclear power, the numerous equipment sub-contractors become very reticent about reveaiing hard-gained knowledge that may be crucial in maintaining a position of market advantage. Even the best intentioned attempts to make manufacturing methods available to developing nations will be frustrated by the natural consequences of a developed industrial system. * DAt: is also involved in the production of commercial TV sets, designs and antennas for ~ontmercial radio and military uses. products oscilloscopes, etc.

develops

Canada-India

nuclear cooperation

235

As we have shown, India’s commitment to CANDU involved considerable risk-sharing and required a nearly equivalent capability so as to be able fully to realize the benefits of joint development. By entering the CANDU programme before Canadian industry had developed knowledge that could be withheld, when Indians could participate in and ‘look over the shoulders’ of the growing Canadian nuclear establishment and could trade experience from their own developing industry, India gained advantages that cannot be repeated. Now that the learning curve of the Canadian industry has flattened out, it is going to prove more difficult to effectively transfer know-how. Developing countries dealing with Canada and interested in CANDU technology may tend to buy the first few reactors from Canada but subsequently deal with nations lower in their industrial learning curve, because they offer fewer impediments to access to technology. The Canada-India, CanadaArgentina, India-Argentina cooperation in nuclear technology indicates the most likely pattern in the future. In the long term it is probable that Canada will attempt to normalize her relations with the Indian nuclear programme - perhaps to gain access to thorium technology and reserves. While Canada has shelved further research into organic cooled variants of the CANDU system, India continues her research[36]. Unfortunately, the uniquely compatible relationship that existed in the past between India and Canada will be very difficult to re-establish. It is likely that in the future India will be particularly cautious before tying herself intimately to Canadian industry. Other areas, such as the development of communications sat:llites, might have been subjects of fruitful cooperation between Canada and India along the same lines as nuclear technology. Undoubtedly note has been taken by other developing countries of Canada’s actions on this matter, and Canada’s ability to exert influence on Indian policy has been undermined. REFERENCES [ 11 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

K. S. Anderson

and B. Morrison, Power from Power: A New Scenario Emerges for India’s Scientists, Science Forum 42 7 (December 1974) 11. An Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for Self-Reliance (Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Ottawa, 1967) p. 68. Annual Report (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1959-60). Annual Report (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1961-62). Annual Report (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1963-64). Annual Report of the Department of Atomic Energy (Sanj Vartaman Press, Bombay: 1972-73) esp. pp. 11, 173. J. H. Armstrong (Ontario Hydro), Operating Experience at Douglas Point G. S. , Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Conference, Canadian Nuclear Association, Paper No. 72-CNA-301 (Ottawa) (June, 1972) p. 1.

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I81 D. L. S. Bate, P. 1’. Maycs and W. S. Philip, Costing of Canadian Nuclear Power Plants, Paper No. A/Conf. 49/A/149, from papers presented by Canada at the Fourth U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, 6-16 September 1971, reprinted (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1971) p. 13. 191 L. Bcaton and J. Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Chatto and WinduT, London, 1962) p. 139. [lo] H. Bhabha, Atomic Po\\cr for India, International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1st Conference, Vol. 1 (Gcncva, 1955) p. 104. [ 111 Congress and the Nation: 1945-I 964 (Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington D. C., 1965) p. 305. [ 121 J. J. Durand and S. G. Horton (Ontario Hydra), Bruce Nuclear Power Development, Nuclear Energy and the Public, 74-CNA-600 (1974) pp. 3-4. [13] W. Eggleston, Canada’s Nuclear Story (Irwin and Company Limited, Toronto, 1965). [ 141 W. Epstein, The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Scientific American 232 (April 1975) 24. [ 151 External Assistance (Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Govcrnmcnt of India, New Delhi, 1964) p. 18. [16] External Assistance (Ministry of Finance, Department of I
w

Canuda~~nd~

nuclear cooperation

237

[30] Into the Age of Nuclear Power, Atoms for Development (Geneva), Reprinted as AECL 3861 (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1971). [31] LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-1990 Commercial, Economic and Security Implications, A report prepared for the Energy Research and Development Adm~istratioll Division of International Security Affairs by Richard 3. Barber Associates, Inc., E.R.D.A.-52, IV-32 (1975) p. 33. [32] T. A. Lewand, International Activities in the Field of Solar Energy, The Potential of Solar Energy for Canada (Ottawa) (1975) VII-17. [33] A. F. Lowell, Implications of Energy Policy on the Use of Canadian Resources With Reference to Uranium, Paper presented to the 10th Annual International Confcrence of the Canadian Nuclear Association (Toronto) May. Reprinted as paper no. 70-CNA-636 (1970). Mr. Lowell, then Vice-President, Minerals Marketing, Rio Algoma Mines Ltd. [34] J. B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963 (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1967) pp. 193-212. [35] Montreal Star (26 July, 1976) 6. [36] J. J. Mooradian, Fission, Fusion and Fuel Economy, Energy Resources (The Royal Society of Canada, Ottawa, 1973) p. 206. 1371 13. Morrison and D. M. Page, India’s Option: The Nuclear Route to Achieve Goal as World Power, rnternationa~ Perspectives (July-August 1974) 23-24. 1381 Nucleonics (August 1959) 27. [39] Nucleonics (September 1959) 30. [40] Nucleonics (August 1962) 118. 1411 Nucleonics (September 1965) 26. f42] R. L. M. Patil, India - Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (National Publishing House, Delhi, 1969) p. 20. [43] W. C. Patterson, Nuclear Power (Penguin Books Ltd., Harmonds~~orth, 1976) pp. 159-60. [44] R. R. Rao, India’s Nuclear Progress - A Balance Sheet, India Quarterly XXX (October-December 1974) 248. [45] A. K. N. Reddy, Alternative Technology: A Viewpoint from India, Social Studies of Science 5 (August 1975) 33 1. 1461 0. J. C. Runnals, The Changing Role for Nuclear Fuets, C&A. 13th Annuat Infernational Conference, June 17-20, 1973, V&me 4, Future Patterns for Nuclear Scene in Canada, C.N.A. ‘73-604 (1973) p. 6. [47] V. A. Sarabhai, K. T. Thomas, V. N. Meckoni and K. S. Parikh, Impact of Nuclear Technology in Developing Countries, A/Conf. 49/P/742, in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Yolume 6, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference, Geneva, 1971 (United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972) p. 382. (481 M. Sharp, Press Conference of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 May. 1974. [49] E. B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967) p. 42. [SO] W. J. Smith, Rajasthan Atomic Power Project, The Eleventh AECL Symposium on Atomic Power, AKL-2486 (Toronto) (October 1966) p. 9. 1511 W. Stewart, How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Sell the Bomb: All Sales Could Be Final, Maclean’s (November 1974) 32. 1521 S. Swamy, A Weapons Strategy for a Nuclear India, India QuarterZy XXX (October-December 1974) 271.

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[53] The Canadian Nuclear Power Programme, A brief submitted to the Science Council of Canada by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Reprinted as AECL 4767 (December 1972) p. 8. [54] The Globe and Mail (21 June, 1976). ]55] K. T. Thomas, N. S. Sundar Rajan and M.P.S. Ramani (Bhabha Atomic Centre), Prospects and Planning for Nuclear-Powered Agro-Industrial Complexes in India, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Proceedings of the Fourth International Confcrence, Vol. 6 (Geneva, 1971). 1561 P. E. Trudeau, Prime Minister, Letter to Prime Minister I. Gandhi (1 October, 1971). [57] Twelfth AECL Symposium on Atomic Power, AECL 3077, Scientific Distribution Office (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Chalk River, 1968) pp. S-10. [58] J. W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (New Press, Toronto, 1970) p. 238. 1591 R. M. Williams, H. W. Littlc, W. A. Gow and R. M. Berry, Uranium and Thorium in Canada, A/Conf. 49/P/154, and K. K. Dar, K. M. V. Jayaraman, D. V. Bhatnagar, R. K. Garg and T. K. S. Murthy, Uranium and Thorium Resources and Development of Technology for their Extraction in India, A/Conf. 49/P/531, in Peaceful Uses ofAtomic Energy: Volume 8, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference, Geneva (1971) (United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972) pp. 37-55 and 99-l 11.