Climate change, conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of the effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water variability

Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66

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Climate change, conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of the effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water variability Shlomi Dinar a, *, David Katz b, Lucia De Stefano c, Brian Blankespoor d a

Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 525, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, United States University of Haifa, Israel Complutense University of Madrid, Spain d World Bank, United States b c

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Available online

Climate-driven water variability is a natural phenomenon that is observed across river basins, but one that is predicted to increase due to climate change. Environmental change of this kind may aggravate political tensions, especially in regions which are not equipped with an appropriate institutional apparatus. Increased variability is also likely to challenge regions with existing institutional capacity. We argue that our best attempts to assess the ability of states to deal with variability in the future rest with considering how agreements have fared in the past. In this paper, we explore treaty effectiveness, or treaty resilience, by investigating whether particular water allocation and institutional mechanisms help mitigate inter-country tensions over shared water. We use water-related events from the Basins at Risk events database as a dependent variable to test particular hypotheses regarding the impact of treaty design on conflict and cooperation over time. A broad set of climatic, geographic, political, and economic variables are used as controls. The analysis is conducted for the years 1948e2001 using the country dyad as the level of observation. Findings pertaining to our primary explanatory variables suggest that country dyads governed by treaties with water allocation mechanisms exhibiting both flexibility and specificity evince more cooperative behavior. Country dyads governed by treaties with a larger sum of institutional mechanisms likewise evince a higher level of cooperation, although certain institutional mechanisms appear to be more important than others. © 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Water variability Climate change International water treaties Water allocation mechanisms Institutional mechanisms Conflict Cooperation Treaty effectiveness

Introduction Annual and seasonal variability in river flow is well known and well documented by riparian communities, scientists, engineers and policy makers (Milliman, Farnsworth, Jones, Xu, & Smith, 2008; Milly, Dunne, & Vecchia, 2005). Yet, the projected effects of climate change may render future river flow variability outside the bounds of previously observed runoff events (IPCC, 2007: 31; Milly et al., 2008). These effects may be particularly salient in international river basins where several riparians are affected. For example, rivers such as the Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates in the Middle East are expected to experience reductions in stream flow, likely increasing * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 305 348 6958; fax: þ1 305 348 6562. E-mail addresses: dinars@fiu.edu (S. Dinar), [email protected] (D. Katz), [email protected] (L. De Stefano), [email protected] (B. Blankespoor).

water shortages and salinity, while other basins such as the Congo in equatorial Africa and the La Plata in South America will experience increases in flow, adding to the salience of issues such as floods and inundation (Arnell, 1999; 2004; Milly et al., 2005). Climate change and water variability are also expected to intensify security concerns within international river basins (Brown, 1989; Gleick, 1989; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). A report titled National Security and the Threat of Climate Change claims that one of the most destabilizing impacts from climate change will be in the form of reduced access to freshwater (CNA, 2007: 13e16). Despite the often cited claim that ‘water is a source of cooperation, rather than violent conflict’ (Wolf & Hamner, 2000), some observers have stressed that, be it in the form of heightened political tensions or more extreme violent exchanges, climate change and the projected increase in water variability may further complicate existing shared water management strategies and may have

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.003 0962-6298/© 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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significant economic, social, environmental, and political conse€m, 2005; quences (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstro Walker et al., 2006). Given the links between climate change, water variability, and inter-state tensions, the role of institutions in assuaging potential conflicts between states seems paramount (Salehyan, 2008: 317). In the realm of international water, treaties often constitute the main governing apparatus and have been shown to assuage conflict and promote cooperation (Brochmann, 2012). Yet, beyond the mere existence of a treaty, the design of the agreement is also important for understanding the treaty's ability to deal with water variability (Zentner, 2012). That is, different mechanisms codified in a given treaty should impact differently on treaty effectiveness in promoting cooperation and reducing conflict. Guided by recent research exploring treaty effectiveness in the area of international water (particularly, De Stefano et al., 2012; Drieschova & Fischhendler, 2011; Drieschova, Giordano, & Fischhendler, 2008; Stinnett & Tir, 2009), this paper empirically examines the influence of specific water allocation and institutional mechanisms specified in treaties on conflict and cooperation within basins. Below we examine in more detail the relationship between climate change, water variability, and security. We then discuss the various allocation and institutional mechanisms that may promote institutional effectiveness. Following that, we explain our methodology and propose hypotheses regarding the effects of the different allocation and institutional mechanisms on conflict and cooperation. We also describe our dataset and choice of variables, including climatic, geographic, and socio-economic variables that may likewise impact conflict and cooperation. Next, we present and discuss our results and close the article with conclusions and policy implications. Climate change, water variability and security One of the most forceful links made between climate change and water variability came out of a 2008 Technical Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change claiming that increased precipitation intensity and variability is projected to increase the risks of flooding and drought in many areas, affecting food stability as well as exacerbating many forms of water pollution (Bates et al., 2008). These hydrological changes will in turn increase the vulnerability of certain regions and communities and present substantial challenges to water infrastructure and services (IPCC, € ro € smarty, 2007; Kabat, Schulze, Hellmuth, & Veraart, 2002; Vo Green, Salisbury, & Lammers, 2000). According to Barnett, climate change may have indirect negative effects that can undermine the legitimacy of governments, threaten individual and collective economic livelihood, and affect human health (2003). Regions comprised of developing countries, which may lack the capacity to deal with and adapt to climate change impacts and are more reliant on climate sensitive resources, may fare even worse (Barnett & Adger, 2007). The increase in future water variability forecasted by most climate change scenarios is, therefore, one form of change that may alter current hydropolitical balances. Already, changes in mean water flows have been observed (Dai, Qian, Trenberth, & Milliman, 2009). In addition, the beneficial impacts of increased annual runoff in some areas are likely to be tempered by negative effects of increased precipitation variability and seasonal runoff shifts on water supply, water quality and flood risk (IPCC, 2007). According to Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Thiesen (2008), climate-induced events such as floods and droughts are expected to constitute a large threat to human security and the prospects of sustained peace. In this context, climate change may further act as a ‘threat multiplier’ exacerbating existing economic, social, and political problems

(CNA, 2007). Consequently, inter-state tensions and instances of conflict may rise as water variability increases (Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012). Climate change, water variability and treaty capacity Studies have demonstrated that institutions help prevent and assuage disputes between countries (Mitchell & Keilbach, 2001). According to Chayes and Chayes (1993), treaties alter states' behavior, their respective relationships, and their expectations of one another creating a framework for extended interaction and cooperation. Specific to water, evidence suggests that the likelihood of political tensions is related to the interaction between variability, or rates of change within a basin, and the absence of institutions (particularly treaties) to absorb that change (Stahl, 2005; Wolf, Stahl, & Macomber, 2003). Treaties that govern river basins constitute an important means for managing transboundary water resources thereby preventing the emergence or escalation of disputes (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). In turn, water agreements can promote wider cooperation and enhance basin security more generally (Brochmann, 2012; Conca & Dabelko, 2002; Dinar, 2011; Intelligence Community Assessment, 2012). Despite the role of water agreements in assuaging conflict (Brochmann, 2012; Brochmann & Hensel, 2009), some scholars have suggested that the mere presence of an international water regime does not provide any guarantee that it will ultimately contribute towards sustained cooperation (Dombrowsky, 2007). In regions already governed by a water treaty, climate change and variability could affect the ability of basin states to meet their water agreement commitments and effectively manage transboundary waters (Ansink & Ruijs, 2008; Drieschova et al., 2008; Goulden, Conway, & Persechino, 2009). This may be particularly salient in the case of agreements that are not appropriately designed to deal with environmental change and similar forms of uncertainty. Increased variability may thus raise serious questions about the adequacy of many existing transboundary arrangements even in areas that have exemplified cooperation in the past (Cooley et al., 2009: 28). As such, administrative instruments for transboundary basins, and specifically the mechanisms codified in treaties should be assessed for their ability to address potential impacts of climate change (Alavian et al., 2009: 24; WDR, 2011: 230). Treaty design and treaty capacity are, therefore, directly related to the ability of the treaty to assuage tension (Young & Levy, 1999). As the existing qualitative literature points out, the presence of particular allocation and institutional mechanisms may suggest which treaties are more effective under conditions of water variability and climatic change (Gleick, 2010; Odom & Wolf, 2008). Various mechanisms can potentially mitigate grievances and enhance cooperation over water, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the treaty over time (Cooley et al., 2009; Fischhendler, 2008b). This study seeks to contribute to existing empirical research on international water treaty design (De Stefano et al., 2012; Tir & Stinnett, 2012) by examining an array of water allocation and institutional mechanisms. We discuss these treaty instruments below in the context of the extant literature. In the case of water allocation mechanisms, in particular, it is noteworthy that no systematic empirical work has been conducted to scrutinize their effectiveness in a comparative fashion. Allocation mechanism design Examining the relationship between allocation mechanisms and water variability, Drieschova et al. (2008) concluded that an allocation mechanism's flexibility determines its capacity to deal with climate change and increased water variability. Such a

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characteristic becomes particularly relevant when considering treaties that are distributive in nature, allocating water among the parties. If the allocation mechanism codified in the agreement is rigid and inflexible, the parties are less capable of honoring their treaty commitments once water availability changes due to environmental conditions. The authors enumerate several allocation mechanisms. First, the authors consider direct allocation mechanisms, which clearly stipulate how the water is to be divided. One type, a ‘direct flexible’ allocation mechanism, divides the resource by percentages. A flexible mechanism may also include provisions that allow countries to average a particular allocation over a given set of time or make-up transfers of water which they owe their fellow riparian from a previous period in a following period (McCaffrey, 2003). Mechanisms that recognize that water allocations may have to be reduced due to water availability also indicate flexibility, as do mechanisms that specify that an upstream riparian deliver a minimum flow to a downstream riparian (Cooley et al., 2009). Such types of allocation arrangements are preferable in situations of high water variability since the same stock amounts of water that were available when the treaty was negotiated are unlikely to be available uniformly throughout time.1 A ‘direct fixed’ allocation mechanism, on the other hand, divides resources by absolute volumes and effectively ignores the uncertainty that may arise given climatic change (Drieschova & Fischhendler, 2011: 12). Drieschova et al., also consider ‘indirect flexible’ allocation mechanisms and general principles such as ‘consultations between the parties’ and ‘prioritization of uses’ as well as ‘equitable utilization’ and ‘needs-based’ approaches, respectively. While these exhibit flexibility they are also open-ended, which may be problematic in the context of climate change, when clearer direction is required under conditions of uncertainty. According to the authors, it is specific, or direct, mechanisms that “ensure credibility and action, which appear to have a number of advantages for variability management” (2008: 7).

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resolution mechanisms to deal with commitment problems as well as informational problems that arise from ambiguous treaties. Furthermore, a conflict resolution mechanism provides a forum for discussing concerns not originally envisioned in the treaty (Drieschova et al., 2008). Another mechanism that further signals that the treaty is more institutionalized and may help to overcome environmental challenges across time is a joint commission or committee. Such a body enables treaty signatories to confront environmental uncertainties as they arise or manage technical information (Allan & Cosgrove, 2002; McCaffrey, 2003). In addition to being mandated with proposing plans and projects for implementation, the commission may also have a monitoring and conflict resolution mandate (Dombrowsky, 2007; Gerlak & Grant, 2009). In her study of the Indus Basin, for example, Zawahri (2009) finds that the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) has played an invaluable role in the treaty's implementation since 1960. Zawahri attributes a large part of the stable cooperation witnessed since the treaty's inception to the success of the PIC to negotiate, monitor, and manage the basin.

Adaptability mechanisms De Stefano et al. (2012) argue that treaties that codify tangible adaptability mechanisms create a means for dealing with water variability. Pertaining to water allocation treaties, in particular, adaptation mechanisms for dealing with drought or flooding may be highly pertinent. The literature points to a number of specific mechanisms treaties may employ so as to deal with drought. Combined with some of the allocation mechanisms discussed above, authors have pointed to: ‘immediate consultations between the respective states’, ‘stricter irrigation procedures’, ‘specific reservoir releases’, and ‘data sharing’ (McCaffrey, 2003; Turton, 2003). Arrangements that provide for desalination, wastewater reclamation and increased storage capacity have also been touted as important for augmenting supplies of water in times of drought (Dziegielewski, 2003: 324; Iglesias, Garrote, & Flores, 2007).

Institutional mechanisms Beyond the allocation mechanism, the type or design of institutional arrangements codified in agreements is also likely relevant to determining treaty effectiveness and stability (Barrett, 2003). In fact, treaties governing highly contentious issues, such as water quantity, tend to include such institutional provisions (Tir & Stinnett, 2011). Thus, a comprehensive analysis of treaty effectiveness and design should examine not only the type of allocation arrangements included in the treaty but likewise account for the institutional mechanisms. Below we discuss four major institutional mechanisms that have been investigated in previous empirical research (enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution and joint commission). We identify two additional mechanisms that have not been systematically investigated in large-n studies (adaptability and self-enforcement mechanisms). Enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution and joint commission Enforcement mechanisms are imperative as they provide states the power to punish defectors (Susskind, 1994: 99e121), and thus make agreements more robust, effective, and credible. Enforcement may be facilitated by the presence of monitoring mechanisms since states often fear that other parties to an agreement may cheat or free-ride (Keohane & Martin, 1995). In addition, monitoring mechanisms potentially provide a means through which the parties can scrutinize each other's behavior or a medium for regularly inspecting the overall condition of the river basin. The presence of a conflict resolution mechanism could also prove invaluable. According to Koremons and Betz (2013), states require dispute

Self-enforcement mechanisms: side-payments, benefit-sharing and issue-linkage Side-payments and cost-sharing arrangements, benefit-sharing schemes, and issue-linkage are often utilized by parties to foster formalized cooperation (Bernauer, 1996; Dinar, 2006; Katz & € Fischhendler, 2011; Phillips, Daoudy, McCaffrey, Ojendal, & Turton, 2006; Weinthal, 2002; Wolf & Hamner, 2000). This is particularly relevant in asymmetric negotiations where incentives need to be created so that parties perceive benefits from an agreement (Folmer, van Mouche, & Ragland, 1993). Yet, the same strategies that facilitate treaty formation can also be utilized to foster treaty stability once the treaty has been negotiated. A treaty that restructures the incentives of the parties to engage in sustained cooperation is more effective and self-enforcing. All three strategies may be used to broaden cooperation and further bind the parties to the agreement's tenants by making it costlier to defect (Barrett, 2003). Examples of treaties codifying such strategies include the 1973 Helmand River Agreement between Iran and Afghanistan (financial transfers for additional water allocations), 1986 Orange River Agreement between South Africa and Lesotho (hydropower generation as part of the water allocation agreement), and 1998 Framework Agreement among various Central Asian countries (oil and fuel supplies in exchange for timely water releases). Issue linkage, however, can be a double-edged sword, also allowing for exogenous factors to interfere with treaty functioning (Katz & Fischhendler, 2011). Thus, its impact on cooperation cannot be assumed a priori.

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Methodology In this study, we seek to assess the efficacy of various allocation and institutional mechanisms in assuaging conflict and promoting cooperation under conditions of water variability. Below we present a description of the database and variables used to conduct our empirical analysis. Based on the theoretical discussion above, we include hypotheses regarding the expected impact of the allocation and institutional arrangements. A number of control variables are also included, ranging from climate variability to a variety of sociopolitical and economic factors. Description of dataset and variables We assembled a cross-sectional database of all treaties ratified between 1948 and 2001 taking the riparian country pairs (dyads) as our unit of observation.2 Treaties, and their texts were taken from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD, 2012) treaty bank. The database covers 221 dyads representing 89 different countries in 65 different basins. Our analytical framework considers long-term trends and, therefore, uses long range mean values over the period covered. A similar cross-sectional approach used to investigate environmental treaty formation or examine international water treaties has been adopted by Neumayer (2002a), Dinar et al. (2010), Dinar et al. (2011), and De Stefano et al. (2012). Dependent variable Resilience and hydropolitical stability can be evidenced when riparians evince more cooperative behavior relative to conflictive behavior, which can be achieved through effective water treaties governing the basin (Brochmann, 2012; Wolf, 2007). In order to measure treaty effectiveness, we utilize a combined measure of conflict and cooperation. We use this proxy because river riparians most often exhibit both types of relations throughout time (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008).3 We develop our combined conflict-cooperation indicator based on the water events data stored in the International Water Events Database at Oregon State University (OSU), created under the framework of the Basins at Risk project (BAR) (De Stefano, Edwards, de Silva, & Wolf, 2010; Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003).4 Each event includes a brief summary and source of information, and is coded by date, country dyad, basin, and issue area. Each event is also coded according to the type of event (conflictive or cooperative) and its intensity using the BAR scale, which ranges from 7, the most conflictive (war), through 0 (neutral events), and up to þ7, the most cooperative (voluntary merging of countries). To extract the events relevant to treaties examined in this study, we first re-coded the events by country-basin dyad so that we could relate the events to a specific international basin. Secondly, for each treaty, we identified which events had occurred after the signature of the agreement and, among those, which were relevant to water quantity or allocation. In cases where a treaty replaced a preexisting agreement, the relevant events were assigned accordingly. The data processing produced a database listing the number and intensity (BAR values) of all the events relevant to each country-basin dyad. In order to treat the categorical BAR values as ordinal values, we use the anti-logged equivalent for each event intensity level. This is in line with previous studies using BAR events data (e.g. Brochmann, 2012; Yoffe and Larson, 2001). We derive a measure (AvgBAR) of the mean of the anti-logged values of conflictive and cooperative relations between the countries in the dyad since treaty signature.

Explanatory variables Allocation mechanisms. A number of allocation mechanisms were identified based on a review of all available international water allocation treaties housed in the TFDD treaty databank and a joint TFDD-International Water Management Institute (IWMI) categorization. These were evaluated as to their flexibility and specificity based on the three tier typology from Drieschova et al. (2008). While these allocation methods may not be substitutable (as different contexts may warrant different mechanisms), we expect those basins governed by allocation mechanisms that display both a flexible and specific allocation regime to exhibit more cooperation in their hydro-relations. Those treaties codifying only a specific, albeit direct, allocation arrangement (such as a ‘fixed’ allocation) or only an ‘indirect flexible’ allocation arrangement (such as an allocation regime determined by ‘consultation’) are expected to elicit less cooperation. In other words, flexible allocation mechanisms promote effective variability management but they must also possess some level of specificity (e.g. an allocation regime that divides available water by a set percentage). Table 1 enumerates the various allocation methods according to these three general categories (specific, flexible, specific and flexible). Examples of treaties are also provided for each mechanism. Our statistical model includes different specifications to assess the effectiveness of the allocation mechanisms in reducing tensions and promoting cooperation. The first is a binary variable indicating whether or not an allocation method was specified in the treaty (Allocate). The other specifications assess the particular type of allocation mechanism (Specific, Flexible, and Specific*Flexible) each of which are binary dummy variables based on the categorization described above. Institutional mechanisms. In this study we also document the absence or presence of institutional mechanisms including enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution and joint commissions. These mechanisms have already been cataloged by TFDD's treaty databank. To this assortment of four mechanisms, we add the existence of adaptability and self-enforcement mechanisms. Since these two mechanisms have not been subject to systematic empirical investigation, we cataloged the information based on a reading of the treaties. Our model includes a count variable (Number of institutional mechanisms). In all cases, theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the more such mechanisms are codified in an agreement the greater the level of cooperation (and the lower the level of conflict). We also include a binary variable, indicating the presence or absence of each type of institutional arrangement in order to isolate the impact of each mechanism (Enforcement, Monitoring, Conflict Resolution, Commission, Adaptability, Self-enforcement). Control variables Water variability. While water variability is an inherent characteristic across river basins, climate change is predicted to intensify such variability. All else being equal, higher water variability has been shown to lead to political tensions between states sharing river basins (Stahl, 2005; Yoffe et al., 2003).5 Results presented in Wolf, Stahl and Macomber (2003: 1), for example, demonstrate that “extreme events of conflict were more frequent in marginal climates with highly variable hydrologic conditions, while the riparians of rivers with less extreme natural conditions have been more moderate in their conflict/cooperation relationship.” For the most part, empirical studies investigating international conflict and cooperation over water have utilized static measures of water availability. Given that this study focuses on the performance of treaties in contexts of water variability, we use a measure of past hydrological variability. In particular, we use the coefficient of

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Table 1 Allocation mechanisms categorization. Allocation mechanism

Definition

Generic example(s)

Treaty example(s)

Flexible

Specific

Fixed quantities

Refers to allocations whereby a party receives a defined volume or rate of water that does not vary.

✓

Refers to allocations that may change with approval of certain parties.

✓

X

Consultation

Refers to allocations that are determined by a third party, typically a river basin organization or technical committee, or a group of negotiators at a later date.

Agreement between His Majesty's government of Nepal and the government of India on the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project; 12/14/1959 Agreement of withdrawal of water from Lake Constance between Switzerland, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany; 4/30/1966 Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin between Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; 4/5/1995

X

Prior approval

✓

X

Prioritization of uses

Refers to allocations that meet certain needs/uses before others.

Country A gets 100 acre-feet of water every month. Country B is assured a minimum flow of 100 cubic feet per second at the border at all times. Country A requires higher water use than was agreed upon because of a new irrigation system and has to seek the consent of the other party. Joint Commission will study the needs of each country and the availability of water, then determine allocations based on their findings. Water ministers of each country will consult and agree on allocations. Country A receives enough water to fulfill domestic uses. Enough water is left instream to protect the environment. Indigenous water rights are protected first.

✓

X

Fixed quantities which vary according to water availability

Refers to allocations whereby a party receives a defined volume or rate of water that varies according to the amount of water available.

Complementary settlement to the agreement of cooperation between the government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the government of the Federal Republic of Brazil for the use of natural resources and the development of the Cuareim river basin; 5/6/1997 Treaty on the development and utilization of the water resources of the Komati River Basin between the government of the Kingdom of Swaziland and the government of the Republic of South Africa; 3/13/ 1992

✓

✓

Fixed quantities recouped in the following period

Refers to allocation whereby a party receives a defined volume or rate of water that is averaged over a set amount of time.

✓

✓

Percentage

Refers to allocations that divide water based on percentages or ratios.

Country A receives 50% and Country B receives 50% of the available water.

✓

✓

Allocation of entire rivers

Refers to allocations that are based on land/territory.

Country A gets full use of all streams that originate within its borders. Country B gets full use of all streams north of a certain geographic location.

✓

✓

Country A gets 100 acre-feet of water if there is 500 acre-feet available and 50 acre-feet of water if there is less than 500 acre-feet available. Country B is assured a minimum flow of 100 cubic feet per second during the wet season and 50 cubic feet per second in the dry season. Country A gets 100 acre-feet of water every year on a 3 year average. Year 1 could be 90 acrefeet; Year 2 could be 95 acre-feet; and Year 3 could be 115 acre-feet.

variation (CV) for precipitation in each basin. Precipitation data from the Climate Research Unit (Mitchell & Jones, 2005) downloaded at the CGIAR website6 constitute the input values for the precipitation CV. The CV is calculated to measure inter-annual precipitation over all monthly observations for the time period (1901e2001).7 Our rationale for calculating the CV as a long-term measure is based on our empirical assumption that water variability is embedded in the basin's history and that it is long-term water variability that affects conflict and cooperation over time in a given basin. Our CV measure likewise follows precedent set by previous studies (De Stefano et al., 2012; Dinar et al., 2010, 2011). All else equal, we expect basins that witness higher variability to exhibit less cooperative behavior. However, some research has found that water scarcity can facilitate treaty formation (Tir &

Exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico constituting an agreement concerning the loan of waters of the Colorado River for irrigation of lands in the Mexicali Valley; 8/24/1966 Agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union for the joint utilization of the frontier parts of the rivers Aras and Atrak for irrigation and power generation; 8/11/1957 Agreement between Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the utilization of water power on the Pasvik (Paatso) River; 12/18/1957

Ackerman, 2009), while others have identified a more nuanced relationship between water scarcity (and variability) and treaty formation, whereby formal cooperation is enhanced only up to a certain level of scarcity (and variability), after which formal cooperation is negatively affected as scarcity and variability continue to increase (Dinar, 2009; Dinar et al., 2010, 2011). Though our study evaluates treaty performance rather than treaty formation, in light of these findings, our model tests for both a linear (Precipitation CV) as well as a quadratic relationship (Precipitation CV Squared) between variability and cooperative/conflictive behavior. Geography. The physical attributes of shared rivers have long been recognized as important to understanding conflict and cooperation over transboundary water (e.g. LeMarquand, 1977; Toset, Gleditsch,

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& Hegre, 2000). In particular, empirical studies considering the river basin as the unit of analysis find that the greater the significance of the particular basin to the respective countries the higher the cooperation evinced. In addition, the more control a country has over a given river basin the less cooperation (or more conflict) is evinced because that country perceives more benefits from unilateral action (Espey & Towfique, 2004; see also Gleditsch, Furlong, Hegre, Lacina, & Owen, 2006). Similar to Espey and Towfique (2004), we expect less cooperative behavior in cases where the percentage of the basin within the boundaries of one country is higher compared to the other country. On the other hand, we expect more cooperative behavior in cases where the river basin comprises a larger percentage of the countries' territory. We derive two sets of geographic measures. The first set proxies for the level of control a given country (within the dyad) has over the basin as well as the level of control the entire country dyad has over the basin. The second set proxies for the importance of the basin to a given country (within the dyad) as well as the importance of the basin to the entire country dyad. The measure for control is derived by calculating the percentage of the total river basin within the boundaries of each country while the proxy for importance is derived by calculating the size of the river basin within the country as a percentage of the total area of the country. Two numbers are then derived for that dyad so as to gauge asymmetry and countrywide nuances: a ratio derived value and a sum derived value (Basin Control Sum; Basin Control Ratio; Basin Importance Sum; Basin Importance Ratio). The variables are derived and calculated based on data in OSU's International River Basin Register.

certain types of institutional mechanisms. For instance, existence of a conflict dispute resolution mechanism may be more prevalent among dyads with a history of military conflict. To measure the history of militarized disputes, we use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Militarized Interstate Disputes, v3.1). We created a dyadic count of the river riparians involved in militarized disputes (disputes could be bilateral or multilateral). The total number of recorded disputes is used for each river dyad (Military). Studies have shown that heightened trade facilitates environmental treaty formation and acts as a contract enforcing mechanism (Neumayer, 2002b; Stein, 2003). This is in line with a more general literature that claims that increased interdependence in the form of trade decreases the likelihood of militarized conflict among countries and enhances cooperative political relations (Mansfield & Pollins, 2003). Research examining international water treaties has likewise found a significant and positive relationship between cooperation and trade (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar et al., 2011; Espey & Towfique, 2004; Tir & Ackerman, 2009). We follow a similar rationale, expecting higher trade dependency within a dyad to increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior. In this framework, we adopt the finding by Vivek and Vamvakidis (2005) that relatively important trading partners tend not to change much over time, which justifies the use of long-term values. Using average annual country-level data from the Gleditsch (2012) dataset, we constructed an annual trade variable for each dyad that expresses total trade (imports þ exports) between Country 1 and Country 2 as a fraction of their combined GDP, describing the economic importance of trade to the riparians (Trade Importance).8 A similar proxy is used by Sigman (2004).

Governance and democracy. Based on the Democratic Peace Theory, scholars have claimed that political regime type should also matter for explaining conflict and cooperation over the environment. Neumayer (2002a), for example, finds that democracies tend to exhibit higher environmental commitment. Gleditsch (1998) suggests that democratic countries sharing a river should be more peaceful in their hydropolitical relations in comparison to nondemocratic countries. Brochmann and Hensel (2009), who consider conflictual river claims and their subsequent settlement, find that river claims are less likely to begin, and more likely to experience peaceful settlement attempts if claims do begin, between two democracies as opposed to dyads with less democratic forms of government. Tir and Ackerman (2009) make a similar conjecture and find that dyads with joint democracies are more likely to conclude water treaties. We follow a similar rationale and expect that, ceterus paribus, a higher level of democracy will lead to more cooperative behavior. We calculate a combined democracy score for each dyad (Democracy) based on the Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013), which ranges from 10 for institutionalized autocracies to 10 for institutionalized democracies.

Power and wealth. The literature provides a variety of views relating to the role of power in international hydropolitics. Some authors have claimed that an asymmetric inter-riparian power relationship impedes international cooperation over shared rivers (Hijri & Gray, 1998; Just & Netanyahu, 1998). Others (particularly those echoing neorealist assumptions) have argued that hegemony, or power asymmetry, facilitates cooperation especially when the stronger party is downstream and initiates and imposes a cooperative regime (Lowi, 1993). Empirical studies have likewise found evidence for the links among power asymmetry, cooperation, and reduced conflict (Song & Whittington, 2004; Tir & Ackerman, 2009; Toset et al., 2000).9 Authors associated with the neo-liberal institutionalist school of international relations have seconded the importance of hegemony for explaining international cooperation, but have argued that such asymmetry is not a necessary prerequisite for cooperation (Barrett, 2003; Keohane, 1982, 1984; Young, 1989: 353). This argument has also been confirmed in empirical works on international water treaty formation and negotiation onset, suggesting that even countries of equal power cooperate (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar et al., 2011; Espey & Towfique, 2004). Further challenging neorealist claims, examples may be cited to demonstrate that even the hegemonic downstream riparian acts in a rather benign nature whereby cooperation is not coerced or enforced, but rather encouraged and sustained (e.g. IndiaeBhutan hydropolitical relations). Cases where the upstream state is also the hegemon and cooperates willingly with an otherwise weaker downstream state can likewise be cited (e.g. 1973 Colorado River Agreement between the United States and Mexico). As Linerooth writes in the context of pollution control, “the more developed upper riparian nations may wish to create ‘good will’ with their neighbors by contributing more to pollution control while [themselves] benefiting less” (1990; see also Shmueli, 1999). Finally, and based on this latter argument regarding power asymmetry, studies have claimed that cooperation in the environmental realm may be

Overall relations: militarized history and trade. Overall political and economic relations between countries should also affect their hydropolitical relations (Brochmann & Hensel, 2009: 415; Yoffe et al., 2003: 1117). We use measures of a history of militarized disputes and trade to proxy for overall relations between states sharing a river basin. Following Hensel et al. (2008) and Brochmann and Hensel (2011), we hypothesize that countries with overall unfriendly relations (a result of a history of militarized conflict) will be more likely to experience conflictive events and less likely to experience cooperation. The intensity of these events should also be affected. Furthermore, inclusion of a history of militarized conflict variable is an important control in terms of understanding the presence of

S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66

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Table 2 Summary of variables and expected impact on treaty effectiveness and levels of cooperation. Variable Category

Measured as

Expected impact on treaty effectiveness and levels of cooperation

Allocation mechanisms

Presence of water allocation mechanism Flexible allocation mechanism Specific allocation mechanism Flexible and specific allocation mechanism Number of institutional mechanisms Individual institutional mechanism (6 separate institutional mechanisms) Precipitation coefficient of variation Precipitation coefficient of variation squared

Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive Positive Negative Initially positive but negative after a certain threshold Negative Positive Positive Negative Positive Insignificant Positive

Institutional mechanisms Water variability

Geography Governance and democracy Overall relations Power and wealth

Level of control of basin by riparians (ratio and sum) Level of importance of basin to riparians (ratio and sum) Combined democracy score Number of militarized exchanges Total trade as a fraction of combined GDP GDP ratio GDP per capita ratio

better encouraged and sustained using incentives rather than coercion (Barkin & Shambaugh, 1999; Young, 1994). Given the varied expectations and empirical results regarding power and conflict and cooperation over water, we do not expect power asymmetry to be an important explanatory variable. Our expectation is further supported by the argument that brute power has been largely ineffective in the realm of hydropolitics (Barnett, 2000; Wolf, 1998). However, and in line with some of the neoliberal institutionalist literature cited above, we expect differences in wealth to matter given the wealthier state's proclivity to create ‘good will’ (e.g. by providing incentives) with the less developed riparian. Consequently, we expect more cooperative behavior in economically asymmetric dyads. To reflect the economic and welfare asymmetry discussed above, we use annual country-level real GDP and per capita GDP data from Gleditsch (2012). Average values of these two variables were calculated for each of the dyad countries for the time period for which data was available. Ratios of these average values were then calculated for each dyad, with the larger value country serving as the numerator and the lesser value the denominator, such that larger values always indicate greater asymmetry. The ratio of total GDP (GDP Ratio) is a measure of overall power asymmetry, or economic power, while the ratio of the per capita GDP (GDP per Capita Ratio) is a measure of wealth asymmetry, or welfare power. By way of summary, Table 2 lists all the variables enumerated above and indicates the expected impact on treaty effectiveness and cooperation. The actual regression runs were based on the following equation:

with a BAR score and were included in the regressions. Under half (48%) of the dyads evaluated stipulated a water allocation mechanism (either specific, flexible or both). The average number of institutional mechanisms per dyad was 3.4. Few extreme conflictive events were recorded (i.e. negative BAR values in Fig. 1). In fact, no instances of war (BAR ¼ 7), and only an isolated number of instances of events more extreme than “Political-military hostile actions” (BAR ¼ 4) were recorded during the studied time frame. “Minor official exchanges” (BAR ¼ 1) were the single most common type of event.10 Regression results are presented in Table 4. Starting with Model 1, which evaluated the mere presence of an allocation mechanism and the number of institutional mechanisms, we find, counter to our expectations, the average BAR score to be negatively affected by the presence of an allocation mechanism. Our general expectation was that basins governed by treaties with an allocation mechanism should reflect a higher level of cooperation as opposed to a basin governed by a more generic treaty without an allocation mechanism (De Stefano et al., 2012). A number of reasons may explain this outcome. For one, treaties that do not anticipate problems over water allocation are less likely to include an allocation mechanism. In other words, there may be an endogeneity problem in that treaties having that type of mechanism are often negotiated between countries that anticipate allocation problems to arise. However, based on a broader assessment of our results we believe another, more plausible, explanation may be in order. In particular, the generic allocation variable does not distinguish between the various allocation mechanisms we are examining, which could further impact conflict and cooperation.

AvgBAR ¼ B0 þ B1 Allocation þ B2 Institutions þ B3 Controls þ e (1) where AvgBAR represents the dependent variable indicating level of cooperation/conflict, Allocation, Institutions and Controls represent the respective vectors of explanatory and control variables, betas represent parameters to be estimated, and e represents an error term. Higher AvgBAR scores represent higher levels cooperation. Results Descriptive statistics and regression results Descriptive statistics of the dataset are provided in Table 3. Of the 221 country dyads in the dataset, 141 had at least one event

Table 3 Summary statistics. Mean

Standard Deviation

AvgBAR 0.38 0.58 Number of Institutional 3.38 1.14 Mechanisms Per Dyad Percentage of dyads containing the following mechanisms: Allocate 0.48 0.50 Specific 0.33 0.47 Flexible 0.32 0.47 Specific*Flexible 0.18 0.38 Enforcement 0.43 0.50 Monitoring 0.82 0.39 Conflict resolution 0.70 0.46 Commission 0.96 0.19 Adaptability 0.24 0.43 Self-enforcement 0.24 0.43

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S. Dinar et al. / Political Geography 45 (2015) 55e66

Fig. 1. Total number of water events by BAR value.

In fact, it is only when our models distinguish between the categories of allocation mechanisms (models 4e6), that results suggest a more nuanced relationship between treaty design and conflict and cooperation over shared rivers. It appears that

allocation mechanisms that are either only specific in nature (such as arrangements that call on the parties to divide/share a set or fixed amount of water) or only flexible in nature (such as a mechanism that directs the parties to set up ad hoc consultations in an effort to determine water allocations at a future date) bode negatively for cooperation between states. This is distinct from an allocation mechanism that exemplifies both flexibility and specificity (like those allocation mechanisms that call on the parties to divide available water by a percentage or ratio). Results suggest a strong positive effect on levels of cooperation. In other words, mechanisms that prescribe both specific and flexible water allocation features tend to increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior among river riparians, relative to treaties with only one type of allocation feature. Our expectation that the assembly of institutional mechanisms will contribute to increased cooperation is supported and follows the findings of other scholars (Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Specifically, the greater the number of such mechanisms in a treaty, the higher the expected level of cooperation. This finding is robust with a highly significant relationship (models 1e3). When considering the institutional features individually, the self-enforcement, enforcement, and adaptability mechanisms appear to be most central for

Table 4 Water allocation/quantity agreements regression results.

Constant Allocation mechanism

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Basic treaty attributes only

Basic treaty attributes & climatic and geographic controls

Basic treaty attributes & all controls

Detailed treaty attributes only

Detailed treaty attributes & climatic and geographic controls

Detailed treaty attributes & all controls

24.925** 13.110 52.503*** 8.219

37.795 34.511 35.663*** 8.867

78.075** 35.843 36.285*** 9.731

41.854* 22.594

50.355 40.696

80.507 43.827

60.497*** 12.002 72.431*** 11.567 93.632*** 18.197

36.726*** 12.808 59.309*** 11.923 69.553*** 18.066

26.739** 13.090 61.548*** 12.181 68.425*** 17.912

50.861*** 10.256 2.759 11.456 16.989* 9.920 15.821 21.432 35.502*** 10.342 33.252*** 10.052

31.616*** 11.056 13.203 11.190 22.927** 9.380 24.029 20.007 19.439* 10.179 28.273*** 9.907 225.391*** 77.178 114.731*** 43.639 0.447*** 0.137 0.106* 0.060

0.410

0.511

30.028*** 10.691 11.793 10.766 19.465** 9.602 31.345 19.721 19.080* 10.777 29.955*** 9.983 249.631*** 84.188 120.877*** 45.540 0.446*** 0.148 0.084 0.059 0.177 1.282 2.634*** 0.789 2711.989 1788.494 0.017 0.203 3.115 2.895 0.579

Flexible Specific Flexible & specific Number of institutional mechanisms Enforcement

16.096*** 3.620

10.545*** 3.516

10.899*** 3.471

Monitoring Conflict resolution Commission Adaptability Self-enforcement Precipitation CV

183.755** 77.462 79.241* 43.992 0.466*** 0.136 0.121** 0.062

Precipitation CV squared Basin sum (Control) Basin ratio (Importance) Democracy Military Trade importance GDP ratio GDP per capita ratio R-squared

0.286

0.417

236.509*** 82.498 100.428** 45.375 0.487** 0.149 0.123** 0.059 0.925 1.174 1.829** 0.793 3084.150* 1778.690 0.035 0.209 6.796* 2.839 0.493

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treaty effectiveness. Interestingly, the conflict resolution mechanism is both negative and significant meaning that the existence of a conflict resolution variable by itself reduced the average BAR score. While this result is counter to our expectations, it is possible that countries that codify such a conflict resolution mechanism often deal with complex cooperation problems, which the mechanism is not able to resolve (Koremenos, 2007). Alternatively, it is also possible that the conflict resolution mechanism negotiated for the treaties considered in this study are not institutionally mature because the bargaining process that saw the negotiation of these treaties was debilitated by particular transaction costs. (De Bryune & Fischhendler, 2013). To our surprise, the monitoring and commission mechanisms proved to be insignificant. This is perhaps because these two mechanisms are closely associated with the enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms, respectively. Among the control variables, most all performed as expected. Starting with the climatic variables, we find evidence that average BAR score increases as a function of water variability. While this may not be in line with common arguments regarding environmental change, international security, and conflict, it is in line with previous scholarship that has found a robust relationship among water variability, scarcity, and cooperation (Dinar et al., 2010; Tir & Ackerman, 2009). However, like the results reflected in Dinar et al. (2010), the negative coefficient on the squared CV term indicates a relationship resembling an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, beyond a certain level of variability the incidence of cooperation begins to decrease and/or the incidence of conflict increases. Thus, the proposition that very high water variability may increase the likelihood of conflict (or at least lower instances of cooperation) is still entirely viable, as high water variability makes it increasingly difficult for riparians to cooperate and honor their treaty commitments. Per the geographical variables, our results suggest that when both states in a given dyad control a large portion of the basin, the level of cooperation evinced is negatively affected. Gleditsch et al. (2006) make a similar discovery, finding that it is the absolute size of the resources (rather than the disparity in the distribution within a dyad) that is a cause for conflict and rivalry.11 As the more general environmental politics literature suggests, both states may be more inclined to engage in unilateral behavior given their increased control of the resource and consequently diminishing reliance on the other state (Young 1989, 354). However, when proxying for the importance of the basin to the individual states, our results indicate that when one state deems the basin important (compared to the other state) the level of cooperation increases. It seems that the state which considers the river basin to be more important for its needs will work to foster cooperation with the other state, which is less dependent on the basin.12 Dieperink (2011) describes a similar dynamic, specifically as it relates to the efforts of the Netherlands to foster cooperation, in the context of the Rhine Chlorides negotiations. Our political and economic variables also provided interesting results. The democracy variable was insignificant across the models tested. While somewhat surprising given earlier theoretical research on the linkages between democracy and environmental stewardship, the finding is not uncommon. Earlier empirical work on international freshwater also obtained insignificant results for the democracy variable (Brochmann & Hensel, 2011; Espey & Towfique, 2004). Focusing on Europe, Bernauer and Kuhn (2010) observe that democracy does not necessarily produce equitable international behavior, finding, for instance, that free riding incentives are strong pertaining to river pollution. Measures for overall country relations did exhibit significant results. In particular, the more incidents of militarized encounters in a given dyad the less cooperation was witnessed post-treaty. This result was robust across all models tested and suggests that while a

63

history of militarized conflict may not necessarily stifle the likelihood of treaty formation or peaceful settlements (Hensel et al., 2008; Tir & Ackerman, 2009), hydro-relations, more broadly, may very well be vulnerable to a history of protracted conflict (Yoffe et al., 2003). Trade levels between two countries as a percentage of their GDP also yielded a positive and significant result, suggesting that increased trade is associated with cooperation on water-related issues. Complementing other empirical studies on international freshwater, we find that trade performs a kind of contract enforcing role even after treaty signature (Brochmann, 2012). Finally, our expectation that welfare asymmetry (which proxies for preponderance in financial capabilities and the capacity of a richer state to incentivize less rich states to cooperate) as opposed to sheer power asymmetry, was likewise supported. Preponderance in levels of wealth between two countries may thus be conducive to cooperation and follows not only arguments made in the environmental politics and negotiation literature but also results in other empirical studies on international water (Brochmann, 2012; Dinar et al., 2011; Raustiala & Victor, 1998; Zartman & Rubin, 2000). Conclusions and policy implications Our analysis is couched in recent empirical research, which investigates the general role of treaties in reducing conflict (Brochmann, 2012; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Our investigation also contributes to a body of research that considers treaty design, particularly as it relates to whether particular allocation and institutional mechanisms contribute to the agreement's effectiveness and capacity to promote cooperative inter-state relations under conditions of water variability. Our results suggest that high water variability actually drives states to exhibit cooperative behavior. However, we find that once variability increases beyond a certain threshold, cooperative behavior is negatively affected. Thus, the claim that climate change could have potentially destabilizing effects on international river basins (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2012) is also supported. High variability is currently evidenced for river basins in transitional climate zones such as the outer tropics and sub-tropics. Africa, in particular, stands out as the continent with the largest exposure to very high variability e especially parts of the Nile, Niger, Lake Chad, Okavango, and Zambezi (De Stefano et al., 2012). In addition to Sub-Saharan and northern Africa basins, parts of the Euphrates-Tigris, Kura-Araks, the Colorado and Rio Grande, are predicted to experience very high variability and are therefore at risk of experiencing incidences of conflict and reduced cooperation in the future (De Stefano et al., 2012). Considering the allocation mechanisms, we find that only mechanisms that prescribe both flexibility and specificity contribute positively to cooperative behavior. In other words, when negotiating new treaties or revising existing treaties policy-makers should refrain from adopting allocation stipulations that are either too vague (i.e. consultation) or too rigid (i.e. a fixed allocation regime) as these do not seem to bode well for sustained cooperation, particularly under conditions of water variability. Fischhendler (2008a) finds that treaties which incorporate ambiguity, particularly as it relates to an allocation regime, allow the parties to more easily present the agreement to their domestic constituencies and respective parliaments in an effort to successfully ratify the treaty. While we recognize that ambiguous treaties may facilitate treaty formation, our own empirical results suggest that in the long-run such vagueness and ambiguity will have detrimental implications in terms of treaty implementation, a finding supported by Fischhendler (2008b). Our results for the non-allocative institutional mechanisms reveal that treaties containing these institutional mechanisms are

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likely to witness heightened cooperation. This is to be expected since a treaty that is increasingly institutionalized and includes more mechanisms (so as to bind the parties to the agreement) tends to be more stable in the long run. However, particular mechanisms matter more than others and should perhaps take precedence by treaty negotiators and policy makers. In particular, treaties that codify and employ a direct enforcement measure, an adaptability mechanism, and a self-enforcement clause, evince higher levels of cooperation. This suggests that compared to conflict resolution, monitoring, and international commission clauses, the enforcement, self-enforcement, and adaptability mechanisms better bind the parties to the treaty. Enforcement and selfenforcement mechanisms, respectively, provide clear repercussions for defection and incentivize cooperative behavior by altering the parties' pay-off structure. Adaptability mechanisms often prescribe the building of some infrastructural project to augment or control water supplies thus further compelling the parties to invest in the agreement and its success (Global Water Partnership, 2000). For instance, reflecting on the importance of an adaptability mechanism, Salman and Uprety (2002) underscore that the 1996 Ganges Treaty did not include water augmentation or flood mitigation instruments. Consequently, the agreement lacked recourse to deal with water variability which, according to the authors, explains the heightened tensions between India and Bangladesh in the post-treaty period. Results for our political, economic, and geographic variables also provide important implications for policy. For example, a history of militarized incidents within a dyad negatively affects cooperation suggesting that a history of political conflict reduces cooperative relations over water. Enhanced trade has the opposite effect, increasing the likelihood of water-related cooperation after a treaty has been signed. Accordingly, increased trade can be used to boost relations over water. Asymmetries across countries, both in economic and spatial terms, also seem to bode positively for cooperation. Richer states are in a position to promote cooperation by providing incentives to less rich states. This is likely accomplished through financial transfers or other forms of economic carrots. In terms of geography, a state that deems the basin as more important to its needs is likely to press or incentivize the other state to honor the agreement, thus facilitating cooperation. We conclude with some suggestions for future research. For one, new variables and measures are needed to explore treaty performance in the context of water variability. To date, studies related to international conflict and cooperation over water measure only the presence of a treaty or an institutional provision codified in the treaty. Thus, data assessing the actual implementation of treaties, and their respective mechanisms, would prove useful. Another path for further research can examine the actual resilience of the basin to climate change and water variability based on the presence of a treaty and its associated mechanisms. Our study examines the relationship between a set of treaty mechanisms, conflict and cooperation in a given basin. Arguably, such an approach provides a type of proxy for basin resilience (if conflict is reduced and cooperation promoted one can argue that the basin is more peaceful and increasingly resilient to water-related political tensions). However, examining how treaties and associated mechanisms decrease the impact of water variability, say, on the basin population or mitigate any other socio-economic effects may provide a better proxy for basin resilience. This type of analysis will require further development of global datasets measuring impacts of events related to high water variability (floods and droughts). Finally, and for reasons of data availability, our dataset extends only to 2001. Treaty design has evolved over time, with newer treaties containing more specified mechanisms. As data becomes available, these more recent treaties can help validate and refine the findings of the present study.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge the Research Support Budget of the World Bank for the funding provided for this project. We are grateful to Thomas Bernauer for his comments on a prior version of this paper. Olivia Odom, Amy McNally, and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya contributed to an early version of this project. Endnotes 1 This distinction is likewise echoed in the Third Assessment Report. It was argued that “one major implication of climate change for agreements between competing users (within a region or upstream versus downstream) is that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different” (IPCC, 2001: 225). 2 Our study extends only to 2001 because one of our control variables, the military exchanges variable, ceases to report data beyond 2001. In line with standard statistical practice, our analysis could not go beyond 2001. 3 Such a measure provides a comprehensive assessment of hydropolitical relations in the basin, which could potentially be inaccurate if one only considered conflictive or cooperative behavior alone. For the sake of completeness, however, we also ran separate regressions using only cooperative events and only conflictive events. Results from these regressions were not qualitatively different from those obtained using the combination of both types of events. 4 Other databases utilized in large-n studies pertaining to conflict and cooperation over water include the Correlates of War (used by Tir & Stinnett, 2012) and Issues Correlates of War (used by Brochmann & Hensel, 2009). Despite their merits, the Correlates of War database pertains to all forms of militarized conflicts (so the reason for the conflict may not necessarily be water related) and the Issues Correlates of War only pertains to conflicting claims (contentious events) and research is still underway to collect claims data for basins/countries in Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe. 5 According to the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (2008) “climate change could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially contributing to intra- or, less likely, inter-state conflict, particularly over access to increasingly scarce water resources. 6 Accessed online on 23 June 2012 at: http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/uea-cru-ts-v310-01-historic-climate-database. 7 Using run-off data provides another way to measure variability but run-off data is not consistently available on a yearly basis like the precipitation data, which is also available across a much longer time frame. See World Bank Water and Climate Change Project (World Bank, 2009) and CLIRUN-II (Strzepek et al., 2008). 8 Given that exports from Country 1 to Country 2 were not always equal to imports by Country 2 from Country 1, due to discrepancies in national accounting, we took the average of the two for each dyad. 9 It is important to note that these results and arguments could also be supporting the ‘hydro-hegemony’ school of thought which argues that the most powerful state in the basin is able to determine the outcome of basin interactions, including cooperation, assuming the most powerful state will benefit from such a policy (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). 10 In the TFDD Water Events database, events are coded according to the following scale: 7 Formal declaration of war; extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs; 6 Extensive military acts; 5 Small scale military acts; 4 Politicalemilitary hostile actions; 3 Diplomaticeeconomic hostile actions; 2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction; 1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction; 0 Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation; 1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressionsdmild verbal support; 2 Official verbal support of goals, values or regime; 3 Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic); 4 Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement; 5 Military economic or strategic support; 6 International freshwater treaty; major strategic alliance (regional or international); 7 Voluntary unification into one nation. 11 In fact, our variable measuring the percent of the basin within a country (i.e. ratio/proxying for one state that has comparative control of the basin) came out insignificant. Similarly it was highly correlated with another geographical variable. In all, we removed it from the analysis. 12 Our variable measuring the size of the river basin within the country as a percentage of the total area of the countries (i.e. sum/proxying for the importance of the basin to both states) also came out insignificant and highly correlated with another geographical variable. Thus, it was removed from the statistical analysis.

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