Conscience and courage — a critical examination of professional conduct

Conscience and courage — a critical examination of professional conduct

NursrEducahn Today (1990) 10.3-9 0 Longman Group UK Ltd 1990 0260 69 17/90/00 Conscience and courage of professional conduct IO-0003/$10.00 a crit...

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NursrEducahn Today (1990) 10.3-9 0 Longman Group UK Ltd 1990

0260 69 17/90/00

Conscience and courage of professional conduct

IO-0003/$10.00

a critical examination

Ruth A Schrbck

The roots of professional power and authority lie in the claim to a specific kind of knowledge, the ‘knowledge that’ and the ‘knowledge how’. These kinds of knowledge are included in the notion of ‘science’. ‘Knowledge why’ - the justification for a professional action - demands a moral argument in terms of what is known and can be done (taking ‘scientific’ knowledge into account) but most importantly asking whether it ought to be done. It is important to ask how a nurse acquires the ‘knowledge why’ and thereby the means to justify his/her conduct in moral terms. This paper considers the norms of professional conduct, the professional mandate and the determination of what is, to the best of the professional’s knowledge and conscience, the right act. The question is raised whether an appeal to the individual conscience can be a reliable guide to a morally justifiable action. An exploration of moral perceptions, moral reasoning and moral argument needs to be part of a professional education which requires a certain kind of courage on part of both teachers and students.

A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY It has been suggested that one of the roots of professional authority and power lies in the claim to a specific kind of knowledge which is to be used without discrimination for the benefit of those who are in need of it (Schrock 1982, pp104-105.) While reminding ourselves that the knowledge which professions suggest they have is often not anything as unique, inaccessible or general as the public has been led to believe, common sense would expect that people who

Ruth A Schdck MA PhD DNS(Educ) SRN RMN RNT, Professor of Nursing and Social Sciences, Fachhochschule Osnabriick, Albrechtstrasse 30,450O Osnabriick, Germany (Requests for offprints to RAW Manuscript accepted 1 June 1989

study in a particular field over a number of years ought to know something that others do not know. Personal experience, if nothing else, also tells us that knowledge is indeed power. Anyone who knows little of the workings of a car engine and who ‘needs’ the knowledge which a car mechanic can offer, will be able to attest to his or her vulnerability, or at least to that of their purse. It is self-evident that people can get hurt by the misuse of knowledge which they expected another person to acquire and use for their benefit rather than to their detriment. It is an essential part of higher education, and its main function, to create and develop knowledge, to teach others how to do likewise and how to use knowledge effectively and responsibly. The academic teacher will emphasise such criteria as the

reliability

know,

insist

and

validity

on a balanced

of what

we claim

presentation

to

a.nd 3

4

NURSE EDUCATION

TODAY

intellectual honesty, and even convince the student that it is essential to know what we do not

that all knowledge

is somehow

and derived

‘science’,

know. All these endeavours

perceived are rightly

emphasised

sciences.

throughout the student’s progress towards the chosen goal but are largely restricted to a particular kind of knowledge.

No doubt, irreparable

the property

where

to be synonymous a justification,

is known

and

possibly of

of

‘science’

is

with the empirical

An answer to the question

constitute what

from

what

‘why’ would in terms

can

be

of

done.

However,

what is possible in terms of (narrowly

scientific)

knowledge

harm could befall a patient who relied on the nurse’s knowledge of passing a tube into his

same as what ought to be done.

In the offered

stomach so that he could receive nourishment

example,

to pass a tube

a safe and adequate unable to breathe trachea

way and then found himself

as the tube had ended up in his

due to the practitioner’s

Of course,

in

the nurse

well how to perform

ignorance.

this procedure,

very

and the skill

required may have been founded on sound, systematic knowledge and both theoretical and He could

practical

understanding.

negligent

or might have allowed his knowledge

to be used for evil purposes torture.

like punishment

nurse was in fact knowledgeable justify would

have been or

If the latter were the case, that is, the

or by adopting

but negligent,

values which may in his mind

punishments

or torture,

be no use in increasing

clearly

there

his knowledge

how

to perform this procedure. Neither would there be much point in adding to his knowledge that the relevant particular

anatomy structures

and physiology and processes.

whether

a degree

justified All

of negligence

professions

have

create and develop practical knowledge titioner

or punishment

1987, pp8-21)?

the

responsibility

relevant theoretical which permits the

to utilise in his work whatever

to and prac-

can be

known at any given time; but when we add that what he knows and can do must be used only to the patient’s

or client’s

benefit,

we express

a

moral principle. A special responsibility is laid on the profession collectively and carried by each practitioner individually which requires certain kinds of conduct

and prohibits

through

trachea

and cause fluid to pass

it. It certainly can be done but few of us that it ought

to be done.

Know-

ledge of what ought to be done is only partially derived

from

theoretical

and

practical

know-

ledge. We must develop and accept ‘A view of knowledge the sphere

that acknowledges

of knowledge

sphere of ‘science’.

is wider

(as)

or of science.’

It is pertinent nurse

the

. . a. . . necessity, if

we are to arrive at a sane and human ourselves

that

than

(Putham

view of

1978, p5)

to ask in what way the individual

acquires

this

wider

knowledge

and

thereby the means to justify his conduct in moral terms, that is, as being right in addition to being possible.

in

by these or any other means are ever

(Downie & Calman

into a person’s

possible

consist of Where,

knowledge that and knowledge how could we look for an answer to the moral questions and torture

it is obviously

would accept

may have known

and skills is not at all the

others.

Knowledge why a nurse or any other health care worker may choose to do one thing rather than another includes knowledge that and knowledge how but it is a seriously mistaken view

NORMS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Sociologists

tell us that one of the characteristics

of a profession

is its authority

ards of behaviour cating

disputes

regulation

in setting

for its members about

their

conduct.

This

in the context of a professional

based on a number

stand-

and in adjudiself-

ethic is

of claims which include that

the profession: 1) is entitled principles

to generate its own norms and governing correct professional

conduct 2) is the only body having knowledge of what is morally required for its members 3) is the only group capable of adjudicating moral disputes related to professional conduct 4) has a responsibility for discipline on its members

imposing

moral

NURSE EDUCATION

5) is empowered to articulate its own set of moral standards usually in the form of a code.

ually exercise

that

‘The existence

of a code or set of standards a characteristic group,

is

that it can

be used to resolve disputes over whether in an occupational

those

such as accountants

or appraisers or archivists, can be termed professionals.’ (Veatch 198 1, ~83)

real

which uses a series of characteristics

that established

professions

for other

aspiring

status

to professional Suffice

An examination

argument

1987,

is a circular

of a somewhat

of historically

like medicine

(Schrock

it to say that by any standards

of logic the underlying concept

occupations

pre-eminent

idealised

professions

and law results in a set of formal

characteristics.

These

are by no means

realised

in everyday practice even by the established professions. Nonetheless, they are meant to provide a meaningful set of criteria by which to label

occupational

(Schrock This

groups

as

professions

1982). gets us no further

than

noting

profession is what I say it is. Rather more important questions the above claims to a professional determination constitutes

right and wrong.

question

must

professions conduct

by a profession surely

the professional

arise from

ethic with the

for itself of what The

be who

in general

which govern

most obvious

has authorised

to establish

principles

the relationship

worker

that a

of

between

and his or her clients?

To what extent, if any, should the general public be bound by the opinions of the council of a professional

body?

Hughes

describes

The central justification

for this mandate

ledged contract

or bargain

and equitable trol granted

benefits. to the

lies in

but acknow-

between

the profes-

resulting

in mutual

The autonomy and conprofessions over their

by the wider society

are part of this

bargain by which the professions

in turn guaran-

tee to the community

service of high

an expert

standard and by which they are compensated for the risk-taking which is inherent in the serious consequences or negligently

that a professional task inexpertly performed may have.

‘The issue of risk-taking the argument attendant

is a central

for professional

autonomy

of

point in

status with its

decision

making.

Therefore decisions need to be informed by expert knowledge with the ultimate justification for a professional

act that it is. to the best

of

knowledge

the

professional’s

science,

the right act.’ (Schrock

Although

there

are weak points

tionalist argument where

(Schrock

moment

and

in this func-

which I have examined 1987),

let us accept

this notion of a social contract

the professions

con-

1987, ~13)

and society.

Its essential

else-

for

the

between feature

that the privileges and power gained are necessary for the professional in order to use his or her expertise all members

unhindered

and to the benefit

of the community

expresses

which many of us would wish to see realised the greatest

of

an ideal to

possible extent. Neither would many of the

public

find

anything

in the moral principles

really

articulated

in professional codes of conduct. However, the decision of what is ‘to the best of the professional’s knowledge and conscience, the right

MANDATE

one of the mainsprings

to

. .’ (Hughes

the idea that there is an unwritten

objectionable

profession’s authority as the ‘professional date’ in the following terms:

do

1971, p298)

members

THE PROFESSIONAL

(presuming)

tell society what is good and right.

members

are believed to poss-

ess, as a set of criteria ~~12-15).

. . . (and) . . . individ-

sions and society in general

This is not the place to examine in detail the fundamental fallacy of the ‘trait’ or ‘inventory’ approach

mandate

a licence to do things others

not do (as well as) collectively

seen as so essential

one.

‘Professions, perhaps more than other kinds of occupation . . . claim a broad legal, moral and intellectual

Veatch observes

5

TODAY

of a man-

act’ can only ever be an individual one. The code of professional conduct for the nurse, midwife and health visitor published by

6

NURSE EDUCATION

the

United

TODAY

Kingdom

Nursing,

Midwifery

stresses,

for example,

Central

and Health

Council Visiting

privileged residence

allowed

obviously

tells them

relationship and of the

to their

property,

or workplace.’

that what they

did was wrong. Appeals to conscience

with patients/clients

access

conscience

the need to

‘Avoid any abuse of the privileged which exists

for

(1984)

subjective.

They

ment of rightness by

personal

authority

are clearly personal and

are founded

on a prior judg-

and wrongness

sanction

(Benjamin

rather

& Curtis

and motivated than

external

198 1, p96).

The person who feels guilty and who has a bad

This clearly does not tell the nurse what to do. The decision not to misappropriate a patient’s

conscience

belongings

maxim ‘don’t drink and drive’ as right. To put it

must be made by the individual nurse

in her own ‘knowledge

and conscience’

that this

is the right act which finds its justification only in the above statutory

another

1981, p96).

that exhorts

us not to

steal.

and driving has before

this

action

way - our conscience

of rightness

eral moral commandment

of

accepted

the

does not tell us

what is right or wrong, ‘it mustfollow ajudgment

by her

articulated

after drinking

commission

body but also in the gen-

principle

professional

not

the

or wrongness’

(Benjamin

& Curtis

Campbell (1984, ~23) has succinctly summarised this dilemma. ‘It seems that conscience is a powerful force in controlling the actions of most individuals . . .

THE APPEAL TO CONSCIENCE An explicit conscience

appeal

to the professional

is an integral

of the professional’s ~76) observes

person’s

part of the justification

autonomy.

Etzioni

(1964,

that

‘Students of the professions have pointed out that the autonomy granted to the professionals who are basically responsible consciences fessional

. . . is necessary

to their

for effective

pro-

work.’

The notion that the individual’s consicence is the final arbiter in deciding what it is right or wrong to do in a professional glance to be persuasive. only the individual

context

seems

at first

Having insisted that it is

who can and, indeed,

must

But although powerful, it may not always be right . . . After all, if everyone’s conscience always gave totally correct statements of the right actions in situations,

not two consciences

would ever differ. Yet, unless we support that everyone with different views from our own is either

totally ignorant

pulous, genuine

or completely

we know that disagreements

the guidance

of my conscience

may be right

for me, but not right for somebody Apart

from

the fact that

unscru-

there can be many of conscience. Thus

‘following

else.’ our con-

science’ may leave us with a disturbing sense of the relativity of all values, it would obviously be impractical

to provide

a coherent

service

for

decide what, to the best of his or her conscience,

people on this basis. There is a danger, in my view, that the uncritical appeal to one’s con-

the right act is, it then seems inescapable that it is our own conscience which directs our actions. The individual conscience as a guide to moral

science may on occasion be a form of self-indulgence. The values which we have internalised become an important constituent part of our

action may, however,

personality, contribute inform our self-esteem.

present

us with a difficult

problem. Our own experiences show that not everyone’s conscience directs its owner in the same way. Some people’s

conscience

tells them

that it is quite all right to drink and drive or to cheat the Inland Revenue. Other people, having driven home after a party or having failed to declare

an item of income,

feel guilty.

Their

is primarily

to our sense of self and An appeal to conscience

based on a desire to preserve

one’s

integrity or wholeness as a person (Benjamin & Curtis 198 1, p95). ‘I could not live with myself, we say, or ‘I could not face myself, when we maintain a certain stance as a matter of conscience. Really?

NURSE EDUCATION

Who does not recall some incidence hood, the first conscious

in child-

lie, a few stolen apples

or an act of disobedience

which

caused

the

perpetrator a truly sleepless night because of the loud and clear voice of conscience? Somehow, lying

becomes

progressively

easier

as we get

leagues

or the

especially

fear

of student Beardshaw’s

standing

their conscience

occasionally

and regretfully aware of a certain loss of moral sensitivity, we manage to live reasonably well with ourselves moral

most of the time. This process of

desensitisation

is, as we well know, also

part of the novice’s

socialisation

sion. It is eloquently

expressed

nurse

in an example

into a profesby a psychiatric

cited by Campbell

(1984,

‘ . . the trouble

is . . . that one tends

respond immediately

not to

to one’s sense that wrong

is being done. Thus the dictates of conscience become

less clear and are eventually

the extent that self interest over patient interest.’ When

objectors

it is in our

overcome

interest,

remain undisturbed ness and thought

it seems,

care

of mentally

appeal

to it in order

to

1979, ~316).

conclusion

people

set a high

turbed.

In a conflict of consciences,

at a searching

must be that

value on remaining

examination

expressed

if they complained

told them

of what

to be wrong

ill people.

in

‘Conscientious

One

in the

comment

is

typical of many. ‘My name would be blackened tainly I would be victimised, difficult

to get promotion

complaint

and most cer-

and (it would be)

- if I had to make a

of any sort.’ (Beardshaw

anticipated

unsettling

or

experiences

actual were

198 1, ~35).

disturbing clearly

and

weighed

against the distress caused by a guilty conscience. In most cases, nurses and eventually

find it easier to bear with

silence their conscience.

we can

about (our) own acts and their

A not unreasonable

participated of

on the one

in ‘. . . a mode of conscious-

value or disvalue’ (Childress

of

takes precedence

the pangs of conscience

hand or, on the other,

stifled to

out for fears

at work’ in mental hospitals

These

Pl9)

singled Nurses’

who

nurses

( 198 1) study

a fear of reprisals,

Although

duties.

being labelled as a trouble-maker by colleagues are very real indeed. More than three-quarters

older, stolen apples turn into expected perks of the job and disobedience becomes the virtue of up for oneself.

of being

unpleasant

7

TODAY

undis-

any attempt

of the values which

have directed

our ‘conscientious’

be disturbing.

A sense of uncertainty

response

must

and unease

is inevitable

when one permits possibly long held

convictions

to be questioned.

An apprehension

that one might not be able to justify

one’s moral

A CERTAIN KIND OF COURAGE It would

be easy

unwillingness professionals which

to attribute

of nurses to confront

they experience

way to a lack of personal

the

apparent

and of many other the moral dilemmas in a more courage.

constructive However,

this

seems to me patently unjust. We would not accuse a person who does not cross the Atlantic in a sailing boat of a lack of courage,

if they had

no knowledge

no skill in

of navigation

and

sailing a boat. If such an attempt

were made by

ignorant

we would call

and unskilled

persons

except by an embarrassing cliche may unease. The individual add to one’s undoubtedly reacts to this possibility of being disturbed by trying to avoid a genuine examin-

them stupid and foolhardy. I would not consider it cowardly to avoid a disputation with a nuclear

ation of the issues involved.

Clearly we expect that physical and intellectual courage must be based on sound knowledge

stance

consistent

appeal

A determined

to conscience

achieves

and just

physicist,

if I had no knowledge

that. Similarly, a bad conscience is a disturbing and unsettling experience but so are many other

accompanied

experiences

in a coherent

like being

rejected

by one’s

col-

of physics and

knew myself to be a poor debater.

by appropriate

skills.

Similarly,

moral courage requires a rational foundation and the ability to articulate one’s moral position and logical way.

8

NURSE EDUCATION

TODAY

If it is a fundamental

aim of higher education

to create and develop knowledge and to teach others to do likewise, then, I maintain, that this endeavour

must include

moral

education,

and

especially so where the educational goal is to produce competent professionals. If professions claim that their various enterprises require

‘it takes place in the context of people trying to answer criticisms of their character, and in the context

of people trying to justify ways of life . .’ (Putnam 1978, p84)

to other people.

And this, undoubtedly,

to

such

of

an

enquiry

intellectually skilled and mature people, then they need no less morally skilled and mature

courage.

members,

of some complex

The degree

to which a person can be

can be a painful experi-

ence. To expose oneself, as teacher or student, requires

a special

One’s inability to grasp the finer points biochemical

one’s

rational,

the person and some reasonable

and responsible

~~359-361). An autonomous

person

(Kay

1975,

has a secure sense of

unwillingness

process

considered morally mature depends on the degree to which he or she is autonomous, altruistic

usually

be found

become

expert

seen as extraneous

They are rational

willingness obligations

to

discuss

in so far as there is a

reasonably

of interdependent

fessional relationships

personal

and sufficient

abstract moral principles tarian data including

the

moral

and pro-

flexibility to

from a mass of authori-

those offered

by the pro-

fession. Students care

on the path towards one of the health

professions

deveioping revealing objects

may have

a high

degree

a concern

for

and considering

little

difficulty

of moral people

other

in

altruism

rather

than

people’s needs to

They are external

argument

essentially

a self-examination.

the discomfort

altruism which

with a sense alone

coherent courageous

of moral

and

responsibility

In order to avoid

of this learning

experience,

it is

hardly less painful to suggest that one might be content to remain a moral moron. In studying the relevant literature now generally (although

described

as health

ethics), it is remarkable

ethics

that in only a minority of

these texts the word ‘conscience’ index.

in what is care

some cling to the older title of medical appears

in the

I have not found one in 20 years which

In a world where knowledge

rationality,

be

concerned with vital aspects of our very identity and consciousness. It is and must be quite

as such is not necessarily

of autonomy,

moral

can hardly

in the same sense since it is

listed ‘courage’

is the co-existence

to can

have to

of moral perceptions,

and moral

be at least as important as their own. It is vital, however, to remember that the altruistic person a mature moral agent. It

explanation

why not all people

Any examination

independently conduct.

or even

not necessarily

biochemists.

reasoning

guides to ‘good’

to try are

seen as defects of character.

identity and can rely on the validity of his or her and reach a conclusion moral judgments of heteronomous

kind

among its key words.

This is both perplexing

and deeply worrying. that and knowledge

how have brought

us to the brink

destruction,

medical

where

expertise

of nuclear has been

can lead to valid, consistent and moral decisions and morally

and still is used to torture and kill people efficiently, where sick, deprived and destitute

actions.

people

cannot

be adequately

provided

for by

The development of moral courage is not only a legitimate but also a necessary aim of higher

nations which are conquering outer space, and where professions of all kinds observe the inter-

education.

ests of the powerful

Endeavours

to reach

this

aim

in

themselves require a fair amount of courage. A rational dicussion of ‘how to live’ is clearly possible and even necessary. If most people blocked any enquiry should conduct our lives, such notions ality would become meaningless. But moral reasoning Cartesian vacuum,

how we as mor-

does not take place in a

of the powerless,

rather than serve the needs

conscience

and courage

seem

to be of a premium. But as unfounded courage is foolhardy, so are unreasoned convictions dangerous. No student should leave college without a sound foundation for knowing that, knowing how, knowing why and the ability to reason tently.

coherently

and consis-

NURSE EDUCATION

It is my conviction can find the courage conscientious

Edinburgh,

and students

to be and to become

and courageous

This paper Professor

that teachers

professionals.

is based on the lecture

SchrGck at Queen

truly

Margaret

Scotland on 26 November

given by College, 1987.

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Downie R S Calman K C 1987 Healthv respect: health care. Faber and Faber, Londbn ’ Etzioni A 1964 Modern organisations. Prentice

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Holmks McDougail/Tie Open U&ersity Press, Edinburgh, ~~248-257 Kay W 1975 Moral education. George Allen and Unwin, London Putnam H 1978 Meaning and the moral sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Schriick R A 1982 Is health visiting a profession? Health Visitor 55. 3: 104-106 Schrijck R A 1987 Professionalism - a critical examination in - Hockey L (ed) Recent advances in nursing: current issues Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh, pp 12-24 Veatch R M 1981 A theory of medical ethics. Basic Books Inc Publishers, New York United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting 1984 Code of professional conduct for the nurse, midwife and health visitor. UKCC, London.