Cross-national election surveys: A French pre-test

Pergamon

Electoral Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 513-528, 1996 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0261-3794/96 $15.00+0.00

S0261-3794(96)00014-5

Electoral Inquiry Cross-national Election Surveys: A F r e n c h Pre-test MICHAEL S LEWIS-BEcK

Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, U,SA In common with scholars in other leading democracies, election researchers of France and the United States rely heavily on a survey research methodology; but their respective national election surveys do not pose many of the same questions, and the dominant research paradigms in each country offer opposing explanatory models of vote choice. Herein are reported preliminary results from a joint effort of US and French researchers, which seeks to include numerous cross-national items in the French National Election Study (for 1995). The following American National Election Study (ANES)-type items receive attention: candidate feeling thermometers, job approval ratings, economic evaluations, seven-point proximity measures on social issues and party identification. Inclusion of these measures in French surveys may allow an important cross-nation extension of voting models thought to be peculiar to one political culture, such as the US. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

I n c o m p a r a t i v e p o l i t i c a l studies, t h e r e always s e e m s to be a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a n d specificity. O n t h e o n e h a n d , w e aim for a n e x p l a n a t i o n that s t r e t c h e s across c u l t u r e s , a n a c c o u n t of d e p e n d e n t variable, 'Y', a p p l i c a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of w h a t n a t i o n v a r i a t i o n in Y o c c u r s . For e x a m p l e , in e x p l a i n i n g v a r y i n g levels of c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a d e m o c r a c y , w e m a y seek a m o d e l that serves for Britain, t h e US, S w e d e n , or a n y o t h e r a d v a n c e d d e m o c r a c y . O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e realize t h a t s p e c i f i c n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s m a y r e q u i r e a l t e r a t i o n s of t h e m o d e l or, at least, alter t h e m o d e l c o e f f i c i e n t s . For e x a m p l e , race may i n f l u e n c e c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the US, b u t it m a k e s n o s e n s e to i n c l u d e race in a n e x p l a n a t i o n for a racially h o m o g e n e o u s c o u n t r y like S w e d e n . T h u s , the t e n s i o n in c r o s s - c u l t u r a l p o l i t i c a l m o d e l - b u i l d i n g . W h i l e s e e k i n g to find a set of i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s c o m m o n across n a t i o n s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of variables u n i q u e to a p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l c o n t e x t c a n n o t b e i g n o r e d . A c o m p a r i s o n of F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n v o t i n g m o d e l s is telling. Both n a t i o n s are a d v a n c e d W e s t e r n i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c i e s w i t h m u c h shared history, in particular a p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n system. By a n d large, c a n o n e basic m o d e l b e utilized w i t h e q u a l s u c c e s s to e x p l a i n n a t i o n a l vote c h o i c e in e i t h e r c o u n t r y ? T h e a n s w e r is 'No', if o n e j u d g e s the electoral r e s e a r c h literature. In e a c h c o u n t r y , g r o u p s of e l e c t i o n scholars have a v i g o r o u s p r o g r a m of e l e c t i o n survey research. O u t of this w o r k , w h a t are the d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m s to have e m e r g e d ? As m e n t i o n e d , generalization always risks n e g l e c t of the specific differences. H o w e v e r , u s i n g a b r o a d

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b r u s h , I w o u l d s u g g e s t t h e f o l l o w i n g g l o b a l m o d e l s f r o m t h e literature, r e s p e c tively: M o d e l I: v o t e = f(party, c a n d i d a t e s , issues) M o d e l II: v o t e = f ( l e f t - r i g h t i d e o l o g y , social cleavages) T h e s e m o d e l s i m p l y different e x p l a n a t i o n s o f v o t e c h o i c e . In Model I, an explan a t i o n w i d e l y a p p l i e d to t h e US case, v o t e a p p e a r s as a f u n c t i o n o f p a r t y identification, c a n d i d a t e e v a l u a t i o n a n d issue assessments. Such variables are a b s e n t f r o m M o d e l II, at least in any d i r e c t way. In France, m o s t s c h o l a r l y analysts see t h e v o t e as a f u n c t i o n o f i d e o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t to t h e left o r t h e right, p l u s social cleavages, n a m e l y religion a n d class. T h e s e are variables that m a y n o t e v e n a p p e a r in routine American voting equations. If M o d e l I is a c c e p t e d for t h e US a n d M o d e l II for France, t h e case for crosscultural g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s e e m s h o p e l e s s . O n e is s t u c k w i t h t h e n o t o r i o u s ' e x c e p t i o n a l i s m ' o f e a c h case. As Stanley H o f f m a n (1992, p. 25) p u t it, "the t w o features that t h e F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n political t r a d i t i o n s h a v e b e e n a l l e g e d to share are a b e l i e f in e a c h c o u n t r y ' s b e i n g an ' e x c e p t i o n ' " . T h e s t r u c t u r e s o f e l e c t o r a l c h o i c e in A m e r i c a a n d F r a n c e are far f r o m T w i d d l e d e e a n d T w i d d l e d u m ; b u t a unified m o d e l ing effort a c r o s s t h e s e t w o c u l t u r e s m i g h t b e a r fruit. T h e o b s t a c l e to successful generalization, to date, resides m o s t l y in t h e fact that r e s e a r c h e r s o n e i t h e r side o f t h e Atlantic have i n c l u d e d different m e a s u r e s in t h e i r surveys a n d in t h e i r m o d e l s . In o t h e r w o r d s , c o m m o n t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l s , e s t i m a t e d o n c o m m o n m e a s u r e s , have y e t to b e tried. T h e f o l l o w i n g is p a r t o f an a t t e m p t to d o just that. We--a team of French researchers and myself--have proposed more inclusion o f A m e r i c a n National Election Study (ANES)-type i t e m s into t h e F r e n c h National Election Study (FNES) a n d vice-versa. At this p o i n t , t h e F r e n c h leg o f t h e p r o j e c t is farther forward, because of the electoral calendar and funding opportunities. We h a v e p r e - t e s t e d i t e m s o n a 1994 s a m p l e o f F r e n c h voters. T h e s e pre-test results s e r v e d as a basis for i t e m s i n c l u d e d in t h e 1995 F r e n c h National Election Study, n o t y e t r e l e a s e d ) T h e r e p o r t at h a n d p r e s e n t s t h e k e y results f r o m this formative 1994 F r e n c h pre-test. Below, I discuss r e c e n t q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n t e n t in F r e n c h e l e c t i o n surveys. Then, I lay o u t t h e March 1994 s u r v e y items. F o l l o w i n g that is an i t e m analysis. Finally, I offer a m o d e l i n g e x e r c i s e w h i c h utilizes t h e s e n e w measures.

C r o s s - n a t i o n a l Items T h e 1988 F r e n c h National Election Study ( N = 4032) w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d in face-toface i n t e r v i e w s o f a l m o s t an hour, c o n d u c t e d w i t h v o t e r s right after t h e s e c o n d ballot o f t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l contest. T h e s u r v e y i n s t r u m e n t w a s c o n s t r u c t e d b y a g r o u p o f e l e c t i o n scholars at CEVIPOF, Pails. T h e s e d a t a h a v e b e e n a n a l y z e d in several p a p e r s , c o l l e c t e d t o g e t h e r a n d p u b l i s h e d in F r e n c h a n d English (Boy a n d Mayer, 1990, 1993). C o m m e n t i n g o n this 1988 survey, C o l e t t e Ysmal (1994, p. 379) says: no questions were asked about either respondents' issue positions or their perceptions of where the candidates stood. The authors...could argue that the old forces of social class, religion and left-right identification had not declined in importance but the questionnaire design limited their ability in analysing and contesting... W h i l e this a s s e s s m e n t a p p e a r s s o m e t h i n g o f an e x a g g e r a t i o n ( r e a d t h e actual q u e s t i o n n a i r e in t h e A p p e n d i x , Boy a n d Mayer, 1990, 1993), it d o e s c o n v e y t h e

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s u b s t a n c e o f a p r o b l e m : this survey, as w e l l as e a r l i e r ones, n e g l e c t e d i t e m s measuring issues a n d c a n d i d a t e evaluations. Also, p a r t y identification, w h e n m e a s u r e d at all, has t a k e n a b a c k s e a t to l e f t - r i g h t identification. Such neglect, o f c o u r s e , m a k e s it difficult to assess rival m o d e l s . Thus, in a pre-test w e a d m i n i s t e r e d to an adult F r e n c h s a m p l e a series o f q u e s t i o n s d e s i g n e d to m e a s u r e c a n d i d a t e evaluation, issues a n d p a r t y identification, along w i t h a s t a n d a r d SES battery. T h e i n t e r v i e w s w e r e face-to-face, N = 400, a n d c a r r i e d o u t March 1994 in t h e Paris r e g i o n (Ile-de-France) by t h e p o l l i n g firm, Brulc Ville Associ~s (BVA). In f o r m u l a t i n g t h e questions, w e a t t e m p t e d r e p l i c a t i o n o f r e l e v a n t i t e m s f r o m t h e ANES. W i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f a l i m i t e d b u d g e t w e m a n a g e d useful e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h s o m e i t e m s n e w to t h e F r e n c h public. Below, I discuss t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c a n d i d a t e feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s , j o b a p p r o v a l ratings, s e v e n - p o i n t p r o x i m i t y i t e m s o n social issues, e c o n o m i c e v a l u a t i o n s and, finally, p a r t y identification. C a n d i d a t e feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s have r e c e i v e d w i d e - u s e in US e l e c t i o n survey work, despite occasional concerns about their theoretical and empirical meaning. Fiorina (1981, p. 154) has s u g g e s t e d that t h e c a n d i d a t e t h e r m o m e t e r s c o r e s "may b c o f use as c o n t i n u o u s s u r r o g a t e s for v o t e c h o i c e " . W e m i g h t ask w h e t h e r this s u g g e s t i o n w o u l d e x t e n d to France, given its larger n u m b e r o f c a n d i d a t e s , m a n y o f w h o m have almost n o p r o b a b i l i t y o f w i n n i n g . Brody (in S n i d e r m a n et al., 1991, p. 202) takes a different t a c k r e g a r d i n g t h e t h e r m o m e t e r s , saying t h e y are "an e x p r e s sion o f t h e n e t result o f s h o r t - t e r m forces and, o f course, t h e long-term effect o f p a r t y identification". In t h e F r e n c h case, if p a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is relatively low, t h e n the i m p l i c a t i o n is that t h e s e c a n d i d a t e e v a l u a t i o n s are little m o r e t h a n a c o m p o s i t e o f s h o r t - t e r m forces. T h e s e c o m m e n t s o f Fiorina a n d Brody indicate a n o t h e r ambiguity: t h e f o r m e r sees t h e t h e r m o m e t e r s c o r e as m o r e o f a d e p e n d e n t variable, the latter as m o r e o f an i n d e p e n d e n t variable. Obviously, t h e a m b i g u o u s m o d e l i n g status o f t h e t h e r m o m e t e r variable is a c o n c e r n r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e national origins o f t h e data. B e l o w is t h e w o r d i n g , English version, for the c a n d i d a t e t h e r m o m e t e r item. I am going to read to you the name of possible candidates in the presidential election. For each I would like you to tell me what is your degree of sympathy toward them, using the thermometer on the card, that goes from 0 degrees to 100 degrees. 0 degrees expresses maximum antipathy. 100 degrees maximum sympathy, 50 degrees neither sympathy nor antipathy. T h e F r e n c h p u b l i c is r o u t i n e l y a s k e d in c o m m e r c i a l o p i n i o n p o l l s to e v a l u a t e h o w t h e P r e s i d e n t ( o r P r i m e M i n i s t e r ) is d o i n g . F o r e x a m p l e , in a l m o s t e v e r y m o n t h s i n c e t h e e a r l y 1960s, t h e I n s t i t u t Franqais d ' O p i n i o n P u b l i q u e (IFOP), t h e o l d e s t F r e n c h p o l l i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n , has a s k e d a n a t i o n a l s a m p l e , "Are y o u satisfied o r d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h X as P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c ? " T h e r e s u l t s o f this a n d s i m i l a r s u r v e y s o n F r e n c h e x e c u t i v e p o p u l a r i t y are r e g u l a r l y r e p o r t e d in t h e p r e s s . F r e n c h p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s u s e t h e s e t i m e s e r i e s to t r a c k t h e c o u r s e o f presid e n t i a l p o p u l a r i t y o v e r t h e Fifth R e p u b l i c . H o w e v e r , in a c t u a l i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l F r e n c h e l e c t i o n s u r v e y s , s u c h as t h a t o f 1988, ' a p p r o v a l ' q u e s t i o n s h a v e n o t b e e n p o s e d . This o m i s s i o n m a k e s it difficult to test h y p o t h e s e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e n o t i o n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l v o t e r s ' r e w a r d ' o r ' p u n i s h ' g o v e r n m e n t s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s o f p e r f o r m a n c e in office. Also, t h e a p p r o v a l v a r i a b l e is lost as a possib l e statistical c o n t r o l , w h e n s e e k i n g to rule o u t o t h e r effects. Thus, w c t e s t e d

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the f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l i t e m s i n t h e p o p u l a r i t y of the P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e P r i m e Minister: 1. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the actions of the President of the Republic? 2. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the actions of the Prime Minister? E c o n o m i c s is o n e o b v i o u s set of issues w h i c h m a y p u s h voters to a p p r o v e or d i s a p p r o v e of g o v e r n m e n t . T h e w o r k o n e c o n o m i c s a n d e l e c t i o n s i n France has largely c o n f i n e d itself to aggregate time series analyses, relating m a c r o e c o n o m i c s to a n a t i o n a l o u t c o m e m e a s u r e (Lafay, 1991). F r e n c h individual-level e l e c t i o n surveys s o m e t i m e s c o n t a i n a n i t e m or t w o that c o u l d b e t a k e n to m e a s u r e e c o n o m i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; h o w e v e r , t h e y have n e v e r i n c l u d e d a standard b a t t e r y of e c o n o m i c e v a l u a t i o n items. O n e survey that did w a s the 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 EuroB a r o m e t e r s (nos 21 a n d 22), w h i c h Lewis-Beck (1988) u s e d in a c o m p a r a t i v e analysis of m a j o r W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d e m o c r a c i e s . A difficulty w i t h that work, for p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , is that these Euro-Barometers w e r e n o t actual e l e c t i o n surveys, as the dates m a k e clear. Still, the Lewis-Beck (1988, p. 56) results for the F r e n c h s u b s e t i m p l y that e c o n o m i c e v a l u a t i o n s decisively i n f l u e n c e actual electoral choice. I n e c o n o m i c v o t i n g t h e o r y at least t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s c a n b e distinguished based o n the locus of assessment: p e r s o n a l versus collective, retrospective versus prospective, simple versus c o m p l e x . The first involves w h e t h e r voters e x a m i n e their o w n p e r s o n a l e c o n o m i c well-being, or that of the n a t i o n as a whole. The s e c o n d addresses the time h o r i z o n of the evaluation; i.e. does the v o t e r look at past perform a n c e or future p e r f o r m a n c e ? T h e third c o n c e r n s h o w explicitly the voter links g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y to the e c o n o m i c o u t c o m e . W i t h these d i m e n s i o n s in m i n d , w e pre-tested the following battery of eight e c o n o m i c evaluation items. At the e n d of each item, the d i m e n s i o n s t a p p e d are s u m m a r i z e d in p a r e n t h e s e s . 1. Over the last 12 months, have you felt that your financial situation has gotten better, worse or stayed the same? (Personal Simple Retrospective). 2. Over the next 12 months, do you feel that your financial situation is going to get better, worse or stay the same? (Personal Simple Prospective). 3. Over the last 12 months, have you felt that government policy has bettered your financial situation, made it worse or not changed it? (Personal Complex Retrospective). 4. Over the next 12 months, do you feel that government policy is going to make your financial situation better, worse or not change it? (Personal Complex Prospective). 5. Over the last 12 months, do you feel that the economic situation of the country has gotten better, worse or stayed the same? (Collective Simple Retrospective). 6. Over the next 12 months, do you feel that the economic situation of the country is going to get better, worse or stay the same? (Collective Simple Prospective).

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7. Over the last 12 months, do you feel that government policy has made the economic situation of the country better, worse or not changed it? (Collective Complex Retrospective). 8. Over the next 12 months, do you feel that government policy is going to better the economic situation of the country, make it worse or not change it? (Collective Complex Prospective). Resources did n o t p e r m i t as e x t e n s i v e an e x p l o r a t i o n of social issue items. Still, n o a t t e m p t at an 'issues' e x p l a n a t i o n of vote choice in France s h o u l d lack consideration of key n o n e c o n o m i c c o n c e r n s . As a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n , w c e m p l o y e d s e v e n - p o i n t p r o x i m i t y m e a s u r e s o n topics j u d g e d i m p o r t a n t to the F r e n c h p u b l i c - - t h e role of w o m e n , the state, i m m i g r a n t s a n d crime. 1. Could you place yourself on this scale going from '1' to '7'? '1' means that you feel yourself completely in agreement with the opinion indicated on the left-hand side. '7' means that you feel yourself completely in agreement with the opinion indicated on the right-hand side. The other numbers serve to measure your judgement. [Interviewer shows card, with one opinion written on the left, the other on the right. Below the opinions is the seven-point scale. The interviewer reads the following opinions.] a. Some think that women should have responsibilities equal to men in society, others think that the place of women is in the home. (Women) b. Some think that the state intervenes too much in social and economic life, others think that the state doesn't intervene enough. (State) c. Some think that the government should help immigrants, others think that they should make it on their own. (Immigrants) d. Some think that the fight against crime comes before the rights of the accused, others think that the rights of the accused come before fighting crime. (Crime) Perhaps n o m e a s u r e m e n t issue in French election studies is more burning, at least for US scholars of France, than h o w to measure party identification. French election scholars have generally taken the stance that left-right ideological identification, not party identification, is the long-term, standing c o m m i t m e n t that anchors the French voter. As s u m m e d u p by Florence Haegel (1993), "party attachment has never b e e n very strong in France .... the structuring d i m e n s i o n shaping political attitudes has generally b e e n identification with the left or right". However, some American researchers have made serious efforts to measure French party identification and chart its consequences. Over the Fifth Republic, party identification has b e e n measured at various times. Estimates of the percentage of identifiers in the electoral ranges from a low of 42 per cent (in 1988) to a high of 76 per cent (in 1968). (Haegcl, 1993, p. 152; Inglehart and Hochstein, 1972, pp. 352-353). These differences are not simply a matter of different time points. Rather, they are essentially due to different instrumentation. For example, Inglehart found a 76 p e r cent figure for 1968 using a closed-ended item listing parties. In contrast, Converse and Pierce estimated only 50 per cent for that same year, using an o p e n - e n d e d item asking the r e s p o n d e n t to n a m e the party he or she felt closest to. (See a review of these issues in Lewis-Beck, 1984, pp. 428-433). Clearly, h o w important you think party identification is d e p e n d s critically o n h o w you measure it. (Of course, this is true for the US as well. See, for example, Niemi et al., 1991.)

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In a current exchange, b e t w e e n Converse and Pierce (1993), and Fleury and Lewis-Beck (1993a,b), the French party identification debate has b e e n pressed further. The latter found that the scope and impact of party identification was limited, at least w h e n c o m p a r e d to left-right ideology. The former disagreed with this conclusion. Interestingly, each team focused on the same data-set (the 1967 French Election Study), and each used essentially the same measure of party identification. For the p u r p o s e s here, it is valuable to examine that measure with care. In the 1967 study, w h i c h Converse and Pierce (1986) directed, the party identification question read as follows: What is the party you habitually feel closest to? Utilizing this o p e n - e n d e d item, they r e c o r d 59.5 p e r cent of the respondents identify w i t h a party (Converse and Pierce, 1986, p. 75). The C o n v e r s e - P i e r c e item is clearly different from, say, the standard American National Election Study item of: Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? A first major difference is that in the ANES item the response categories are fLxed and provided. A s e c o n d major difference is that the Converse-Pierce item assumes that the r e s p o n d e n t "feels closest to" some party. As Barnes et aL (1988) have shown, this particular formulation of the question generates m u c h higher levels of partisanship than the traditional response format. A third major difference is that the ANES item directly allows for a nonpartisan response, in the form of "Independent, or what?" Johnston (1992, p. 552), in a Canadian experiment, indicates that including a nonpartisan p r o m p t - - " n o n e of t h e s e " - - a t the end of a party question makes a big difference in the overall p e r c e n t a g e of identifiers. Thus, in an effort to enhance cross-national m e a s u r e m e n t comparability and to avoid an u p w a r d partisan bias, w e e x p e r i m e n t e d with the following format in our pre-test: 1. In general, do you feel yourself rather Communist, Socialist, Ecologist, UDF, RPR, National Front, close to another party, close to no party. [The interviewer, after reading the question, showed the respondent a card listing these six partisan choices]. As can be seen, the item is closed-ended, does not assume that the r e s p o n d e n t is close to any party, and explicitly permits a nonpartisan response. The performance of this item, along with the others, is discussed below. Item Performance

The items fall into the following areas: feeling thermometers, job approval, e c o n o m i c issues, social issues, party identification. I n o w consider the performance of each type, in turn. Table 1 gives univariate and bivariate statistics on the feeling thermometers, as a p p l i e d to 11 candidates. The univariate results suggest that the measure has several desirable characteristics. First, virtually all interviewed w e r e able to assign a degree of feeling (out of 400, n o n r e s p o n s e only ranged from four to 10 interviewees, d e p e n d i n g on the candidate). Further, as the standard deviation scores suggest, responses arc well spread along the 0-100 continuum. Moreover, 10 of these 11 variables are essentially normal (as assessed by the skewness statistics). The e x c e p t i o n is for Le Pen, w h o received such a large n u m b e r of "0 degree"

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TABLE 1. Pre-test results on the candidate feeling thermometers Possible candidate

Mean

Standard deviation

1993 Legislative vote correlation (r)

Laguiller Lajoinie Rocard Delors Kouchner Lalonde Waechter Giscard Balladur Chirac Le Pen

30 degrees 23 41 47 46 35 31 38 46 43 14

28 24 29 26 28 26 25 26 29 29 24

-0.38 -0.36 -0.58 -0.35 -0.29 -0.16 -0.13 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.28

s c o r e s that t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n is far f r o m n o r m a l ( s k e w n e s s = 1.9). This c o n f i r m s w h a t is g e n e r a l l y k n o w n , that m a n y v o t e r s e x p r e s s e x t r e m e a n t i p a t h y to Le Pen a n d his National Front. T h e feeling t h e r m o m e t e r a p p e a r s to ' w o r k ' to sort F r e n c h political o p i n i o n . Generally, t h e m e a n s c o r e s u n d e r l i n e that s o m e c a n d i d a t e s are v i e w e d m u c h m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y t h a n others. T h e rank o r d e r o f s y m p a t h y for t h e s e c a n d i d a t e s is in global a c c o r d w i t h t h e n e w s p a p e r p o p u l a r i t y polls o f t h e p e r i o d . Note, especially, t h e c l o s e rivalries o f Socialists R o c a r d (41) a n d Delors (47) o n t h e left, a n d Gaullists Balladur (46) a n d Chirac (43) o n t h e right. (See, for c o m p a r a b l e rankings, Journal du Dimanche, 29 Mai 1994, p. 6, analyzing April data). T h e s e m e a s u r e s d o a g o o d j o b o f linking u p e m p i r i c a l l y w i t h c a n d i d a t e preferences. W h a t , m o r e theoretically, is t h e i r c o n t e n t ? A clue c o m e s f r o m s t u d y i n g t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s o f t h e 1993 legislative v o t e r e p o r t w i t h c a n d i d a t e feeling, in t h e last c o l u m n o f Table 1. (1993 v o t e is c o d e d 1 = E x t r e m e Left, 2 = C o m m u n i s t , 3 = Socialist-Movement o f t h e Left Radicals (MRG), 4 = Diverse Left, 5 = Ecology G e n e r a t i o n o r Greens, 6 = U n i o n for F r e n c h D e m o c r a c y (UDF) o r Rally for t h e R e p u b l i c (RPR), 7 = Diverse Right, 8 = National Front.) To s o m e e x t e n t , at least, the c a n d i d a t e t h e r m o m e t e r s c a p t u r e v o t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s . Favoring c a n d i d a t e s o n t h e left (e.g. Laguiller, Lajoinie, Rocard, Delors) c o r r e l a t e s clearly w i t h v o t e d e c l a r a t i o n s for p a r t i e s o n t h e left. T h e s a m e c a n b e said for c a n d i d a t e s o n t h e right. T h e s t r o n g e s t c o r r e l a t i o n s are for ex-Prime Ministers R o c a r d a n d Chirac (at - 0 . 5 8 a n d 0.59). G i v e n t h e c e n t r a l p l a c e o c c u p i e d b y R o c a r d a n d Chirac in, r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e Socialist a n d Gaullist parties, t h e s e results also suggest that t h e t h e r m o m e t e r m e a s u r e s c a n tap heavily into p a r t y identification. Findings for the n e x t set o f items, o n j o b approval, are r e p o r t e d in Table 2. Only a small p e r c e n t a g e o f r e s p o n d e n t s c o u l d offer no o p i n i o n w h e n asked to evaluate the actions o f President Mitterrand o r the Prime Minister Balladur. E x p r e s s e d opinion, positive o r negative, is a b o u t evenly b a l a n c e d for e a c h executive. T h e s e distributions are similar to a nation-wide poll c o n d u c t e d at t h e same time. An IFOP national survey gave 45 p e r c e n t 'satisfied' w i t h Prime Minister Balladur a n d 44 p e r c e n t 'satisfied' w i t h President Mitterrand. (See Journal du Dimanche, 14 March 1994, p. 4). O n e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n is that the w o r d ' a p p r o v e ' , u s e d in the pre-test, w o r k s in a fashion similar to t h e t e r m 'satisfied', c o m m o n l y e m p l o y e d b y IFOP.

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TABLE 2. Pre-test results on approval ratings

President

Prime Minister

Approve % Disapprove % No answer %

47.0 40.0 13.0

44.0 45.5 10.5

Total % (N=400)

100

100

T h e s e j o b a p p r o v a l m e a s u r e s are f o u n d to c o r r e l a t e w e l l w i t h v o t e intention. T h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e asked, "If n e w legislative e l e c t i o n s t o o k p l a c e n e x t Sunday, w h i c h c a n d i d a t e w o u l d y o u have t h e m o s t c h a n c e o f v o t i n g for? C o u l d y o u c h o o s e that c a n d i d a t e f r o m this list?" ( R e s p o n d e n t is s h o w n a list o f c a n d i d a t e s for e i g h t parties, s c o r e d 1 = E x t r e m e Left, 2 = C o m m u n i s t , 3 = Socialist-MRG, 4 = Ecology G e n e r a t i o n , 5 = Greens, 6 = UDF, 7 = RPR, 8 = National Front.) P r i m e Minister p o p u l a r i t y c o r r e l a t e s w e l l w i t h this v o t e i n t e n t i o n m e a s u r e , r = - 0 . 5 5 , i n d i c a t i n g that t h o s e w h o d i s a p p r o v e o f his a c t i o n s are clearly m o r e likely to favor a p a r t y o n t h e left. Presidential p o p u l a r i t y c o r r e l a t e s 0.44, suggesting that t h o s e w h o d i s a p p r o v e o f his a c t i o n s are m o r e likely to v o t e for a p a r t y o n t h e right. T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s s u p p o r t t h e a r g u m e n t that individual v o t e r s d e c i d e o n t h e basis o f p e r f o r m a n c e evaluations. Below, I l o o k m o r e specifically at evaluations o f e c o n o m i c perform a n c e , a n d its e l e c t o r a l c o n n e c t i o n . T h e e i g h t e c o n o m i c issue i t e m s e x h i b i t e d h e a l t h y univariate statistics. N o n r e s p o n s e w a s m i n i m a l ( m e a n = 5.7 p e r cent). Further, t h e r e s p o n s e s s h o w e d g o o d s p r e a d a c r o s s t h e t h r e e c h o i c e categories. Bivariate results w e r e also e n c o u r aging. As e x p e c t e d g i v e n t h e c o m m o n e c o n o m i c t h e m e , t h e i t e m s e x h i b i t e d s o m e i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n ( m e a n r = 0.46). H o w e v e r , t h e p a t t e r n o f i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n also s h o w s a g o o d a m o u n t o f linear i n d e p e n d e n c e . This suggests t h e y are t a p p i n g t h e t h r e e different c o n c e p t u a l d i m e n s i o n s ; i.e. w h e t h e r t h e e v a l u a t i o n is p e r s o n a l ( p o c k e t b o o k ) o r c o l l e c t i v e ( t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e ) , r e t r o s p e c t i v e (past) o r p r o s p e c tive (future); a n d s i m p l e ( g o v e r n m e n t n o t e x p l i c i t l y m e n t i o n e d ) o r c o m p l e x (government explicitly mentioned). D o e s t h e F r e n c h v o t e r r e w a r d o r p u n i s h t h e i n c u m b e n t o n t h e basis o f e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e , a c c o r d i n g to t h e s e p r e l i m i n a r y data? At t h e t i m e o f t h e survey, t h e i n c u m b e n t c o a l i t i o n w a s c o m p o s e d o f t h e RPR a n d t h e UDF, l e d b y Gaullist P r i m e Minister Balladur. T h e a b o v e v o t e i n t e n t i o n variable, w h e n e x p r e s s e d as an incumb e n c y v o t e variable, a c q u i r e s t h e r e c o d e 1 = RPR o r UDF, 0 = o p p o s i t i o n parties. Looking at Table 3, o n e o b s e r v e s that i n c u m b e n c y v o t e is c o r r e l a t e d in the e x p e c t e d d i r e c t i o n w i t h e c o n o m i c evaluations, across all e i g h t items. H o w e v e r , the p e r s o n a l , p o c k e t b o o k effects a p p e a r faint. F o r e x a m p l e , t h o s e w h o have e x p e r i e n c e d a w o r s e n i n g financial situation o v e r t h e p a s t y e a r s e e m little, if at all, m o v e d to v o t e against t h e g o v e r n i n g c o a l i t i o n ( r = - 0 . 1 2 ) . T h e g e n e r a l w e a k n e s s o f p e r s o n a l e c o n o m i c v o t i n g o b s e r v e d in t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s parallels A m e r i c a n findings. (The literature is vast; see, especially, Kiewiet, 1983.) Collective j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t t h e national e c o n o m y , in contrast, g e n e r a t e m o d e r ate to s t r o n g correlations. F o r e x a m p l e , t h o s e w h o p e r c e i v e that g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y is g o i n g to h a r m t h e c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m y are quite a bit m o r e likely to e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s against t h e ruling coalition ( r = - 0 . 5 4 ) . (Again, this parallels A m e r i c a n

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TABLE3. Pre-test results on economic issues (Correlation of each issue with vote intention) Economic item

r

Personal simple retrospective Personal simple prospective Personal complex retrospective Personal complex prospective Collective simple retrospective Collective simple prospective Collective complex retrospective Collective complex prospective

-0.12 -0.22 -0.25 -0.28 -0.36 -0.49 -0.48 -0.54

findings; see, for starters, Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981.) Further, one observes that w h e n question format is the same except for the time horizon, the absolute magnitude of the prospective assessments always edges out the retrospective ones (i.e. 0.22 > 0.12, 0.28 > 0.25, 0.49 > 0.36, 0.54 > 0.48). While these differences are small, it seems safe to conclude that, at least at the bivariate level, prospective judgments are about as important as retrospective judgments. The importance of prospective economic judgments for government support has also been reported in US work (Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen et al., 1992; Lewis-Beck, 1988, Chpt 8). The success of the economic items battery was not matched by the social items battery, w h i c h admittedly was less extensive. Almost all respondents did place themselves on the seven-point scale. (Out of the 400, the response sample size ranged from 371 for the crime question, to 395 for the question on rights of women.) The variables showed good spread along the range of values on three of the four questions. Responses on the role of w o m e n item were very skewed, with half the respondents placing themselves at the '1' value, indicating they were completely in favor of an equal role for women. Perhaps this is true, or perhaps there is a 'social desirability' factor at work. The issues do correlate in the expected direction with vote intention (scored as above, 1 -- incumbent, 0 = opposition); but these correlations, at least three of them, are small: for the role of w o m e n variable, r - - 0 . 1 3 ; for the rights of accused and crime variable, r = -0.16; for the state intervention variable, r = -0.17; for the help for immigrants variable, r -- 0.23. The largest correlation, that for the immigrant scale, indicates that those w h o have a 'hardline' attitude toward immigrants are more likely to support the ruling right-wing government. Certainly, the seven-point scale merits further exploration. The Immigrant item appears worth keeping, the Rights of W o m e n item should perhaps be rephrased, and other i t e m s - - s u c h as those on jobs, welfare, and foreign policy or defense considered for addition. Our success in measuring party identification was mixed. The findings, reported in Table 4, are informative; but they also raise questions which could not be answered within the pre-test. Taking the results at face value, the percentage of party identifiers = 76.4. [That is, 100.0-20.3 (no party) -3.3 (no a n s w e r ) = 76.4.11 This number agrees almost exactly with Inglehart's earlier estimate, w h e n he had asked "Would you tell me to which political party you feel closest, with the help of this card [which lists the parties]?" (Inglehart and Hochstein, 1972,. 37). Thus, we help establish that closed-ended items containing an immediate listing of the parties p r o m p t a high estimate of party identifiers.

522

Cross-national Election Surveys TABLE4. Pre-test results on closed-ended party identification question Frequency distribution (%) Communist Socialist Ecologist UDF RPR National Front

5.5 25.3 11.5 8.5 22.5 1.8

Other party No party No answer

1.5 20.3 3.3

Total (N=400)

100

Do w e a c c e p t the estimate of 76 p e r c e n t as accurate? It is difficult to do so. First, it is m u c h h i g h e r t h a n a 'party closeness' estimate from the p r i o r n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n survey of 1988. I n that survey, r e s p o n d e n t s w h o said they w e r e 'very' or 'fairly' close to a party totalled only 42 p e r c e n t (Haegel, 1990, p. 154). Second, a n d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y , these pre-test r e s p o n d e n t s s e e m to act as if they understand the q u e s t i o n to b e a vote question. Recall the vote i n t e n t i o n item: "If n e w legislative e l e c t i o n s w e r e held n e x t Sunday, w h i c h candidate w o u l d y o u have the most c h a n c e of v o t i n g for? Could y o u c h o o s e that candidate from this list?" (The r e s p o n d e n t w a s t h e n s h o w n a party candidate list, 1 = Extreme Left, 2 = C o m m u n i s t , 3 = Socialist-MRG, 4 = Ecology G e n e r a t i o n , 5 = Greens, 6 -- UDF, 7 = RPR, 8 = National Front.) T h e correlation b e t w e e n this vote i n t e n t i o n variable a n d the party identification variable is a w h o o p i n g 0.94. (The c o d i n g for the party identification variable w o u l d b e as follows: 1 = C o m m u n i s t , 2 = Socialist, 3 = Ecologist, 4 = UDF, 5 = RPR, 6 -- National Front, w i t h all o t h e r r e s p o n s e s c o u n t e d as missing data.) That is, empirically, the vote item a n d the party identific a t i o n item are virtually identical. Further, it w o u l d s e e m that the a r g u m e n t that r e s p o n d e n t s conceive of the t w o q u e s t i o n s as e q u i v a l e n t is n o t far-fetched. Party identification a p p a r e n t l y n e e d s to b e m e a s u r e d in an alternative fashion. And, as J o h n s t o n (1992, p. 558) observed, "It seems clear that a straight borrowing from US usage will n o t do". O n the basis of these pre-test results, w e p r o p o s e d the following s o m e w h a t modified measure, o n e w h i c h avoids the vote tautology, b u t r e m a i n s firmly structured: 1.a. Generally speaking, is there a party or political movement which you feel close to? yes, no, no opinion. 1.b. (If 'yes' to above 1.a). Which is that? l.c. (If names a party or movement in l.b). Would you say you are very close or not very close to...? This series of party identification items w o u l d s e e m to strike the right balance. It takes into a c c o u n t the m o r e c o m p l e x partisan u n i v e r s e of France; b u t it does n o t 'feed' the r e s p o n d e n t a fixed list of choices, as in a ballot, thus p r o m p t i n g a vote response. Rather, it p r o m p t s the r e s p o n d e n t to t h i n k a b o u t party a t t a c h m e n t , b u t

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lets h i m or h e r call u p that party (or not). In particular, it avoids a s s u m i n g that the r e s p o n d e n t is close to s o m e party or other.

A M o d e l i n g E x e r c i s e B a s e d o n t h e P r e - t e s t Data As already observed, o n e v o t i n g p a r a d i g m d o m i n a t e s F r e n c h research, while a n o t h e r d o m i n a t e s US research. Perhaps the differences are real. O n e m o d e l may e x p l a i n o n e case, b u t n o t the others. However, it may be that essentially the same e x p l a n a t o r y variables c o u l d serve for a F r e n c h model, as for a US model. It has b e e n difficult to evaluate empirically this cross-cultural idea, party b e c a u s e all the potential i n d e p e n d e n t variables have n o t b e e n fully m e a s u r e d in a single survey. Fortunately, these pre-test data allow s o m e p r e l i m i n a r y s o u n d i n g s . I first estimate an i d e o l o g y - s o c i a l cleavages model, t a k e n to b e paradigmatic for the F r e n c h case. Next, I estimate a p a r t y - c a n d i d a t e - i s s u e s model, taken to be paradigmatic for the US case. The results are t h e n c o m p a r e d . In o r d e r to estimate the models, a d e p e n d e n t variable m u s t b e selected, taking into a c c o u n t the c o n t e x t of o u r survey. At the time of the pre-test, March 1994, the real vote c h o i c e s of the 1995 e l e c t i o n w e r e just over a year away. T h e r e w e r e m a n y candidates, a n d the final major party c o n t e n d e r s w e r e n o t k n o w n . For the Socialists, it still s e e m e d a battle b e t w e e n Rocard a n d Delors. For the Gaullists, the c o n t e s t was b e t w e e n Chirac a n d Balladur. Chirac w e n t o n to w i n the p r e s i d e n c y in the s e c o n d - r o u n d of balloting, b u t that result w o u l d have b e e n e x t r e m e l y difficult to foretell in spring 1994, w h e n in fact the p o p u l a r i t y n o d w e n t to Balladur (recall Table 1). In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the 'hard' electoral d e c i s i o n for voters was w h e t h e r or n o t to s u p p o r t the ruling coalition. T h e y held firm i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t political leadership. In office was a 'real' Prime Minister, Gaullist Edouard Balladur, h e a d i n g a r i g h t - c e n t r e majority g o v e r n m e n t that was m a k i n g policy. W h e n asked w h e t h e r they w o u l d s u p p o r t him, they w e r e faced w i t h a serious i m m e d i a t e test of their electoral p r e f e r e n c e s . U n d e r these c o n d i t i o n s , the favored d e p e n d e n t variable w o u l d s e e m to b e r e s p o n s e s to the question, "Do y o u a p p r o v e or disapp r o v e of the actions of the Prime Minister?" Recall that the leading F r e n c h p a r a d i g m sees electoral s u p p o r t as a f u n c t i o n of left-right ideological identification, religiosity a n d class. Here, from the pre-test data, arc ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for such a model: P = 1.99" - O.16*L + O.06*R - 0.11**C + e (10.72) (7.17) (2.03) (1.59) Adj. R 2= 0.23

N=

234

(1)

SEE = 0.44

w h e r e P = a p p r o v e of the actions of Prime Minister (1 = yes, 2 = no); L = left-right ideological self-placement o n a seven-point scale, from 1 = 'very left' to 7 = 'very right'; R = religious practice, a six-point scale r u n n i n g from 1 = 'go to mass every w e e k ' to 6 = ' n o religion'; C = social class, w h e r e 1 = head of h o u s e h o l d with middle class o c c u p a t i o n (white-collar), 0 = head of h o u s e h o l d w i t h w o r k i n g class o c c u p a t i o n (blue-collar); e = error; the figures in p a r e n t h e s e s are absolute t-ratios; * -- statistically significant at 0.05, one-tail, /t/>1.64; ** =statistically significant at 0.10, one-tail, /t/>1.28; Adj. R 2 = the coefficient of multiple d e t e r m i n a t i o n adjusted for degrees of freedom; N = sample size; SEE = standard error of estimate.

524

Cross-national Election Surveys

O n e o b s e r v e s that t h e i d e o l o g y - s o c i a l cleavages m o d e l r e c e i v e s s u p p o r t . All coefficients are in t h e e x p e c t e d d i r e c t i o n a n d are statistically significant ( l e f t - r i g h t i d e o l o g y a n d religion at 0.05, class at 0.10). T h e overall fit o f t h e m o d e l , w h i l e n o t stunning, is satisfactory. Further, t h e s e results are c o n f i r m e d in a parallel p r o b i t analysis. 2 H o w d o t h e s e e s t i m a t e s c o m p a r e to t h o s e f r o m a p a r t y - c a n d i d a t e - i s s u e s m o d e l , t h e p a r a d i g m d o m i n a n t in US research? Measures o n t h e s e variables are available in t h e p r e - t e s t data; b u t o u r d i r e c t m e a s u r e o f p a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w a s f o u n d w a n t i n g . An alternative treats t h e Balladur feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s c o r e as a m e a s u r e o f p a r t y identification, as w e l l as c a n d i d a t e a p p e a l itself. Brody argues that t h e feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s , at least in t h e US case, are i m p o r t a n t e x p r e s s i o n s o f p a r t y identific a t i o n ( S n i d e r m a n et aL, 1991, p. 202). As a l r e a d y discussed, the varying s t r e n g t h o f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n 1993 legislative v o t e a n d c a n d i d a t e t h e r m o m e t e r s c o r e s (Table 1) are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h that a r g u m e n t . Heuristically, I e m p l o y t h e Balladur t h e r m o m e t e r as a c o m b i n e d p a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n - c a n d i d a t e a p p e a l m e a s u r e . F o r t h e issue variables, t w o e c o n o m i c i t e m s a n d o n e social i t e m are i n c l u d e d . T h e e c o n o m i c i t e m s ask t h e r e s p o n d e n t h o w t h e g o v e r n m e n t has m a n a g e d the e c o n o m y in t h e p a s t ( t h e c o l l e c t i v e c o m p l e x r e t r o s p e c t i v e variable) a n d h o w t h e g o v e r n m e n t will m a n a g e t h e e c o n o m y in t h e future (the c o l l e c t i v e c o m p l e x p r o s p e c t i v e variable). T h e social i t e m assesses t h e a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s g o v e r n m e n t aid to i m m i g r a n t s . H e r e are OLS e s t i m a t e s for s u c h a m o d e l : P = 1.67" - O.O08*B + O.05*F + O.05*T - O.02*M + e (17.11) (9.66) (2.81) (2.90) (2.34) Adj. R e= 0.52

N=

323

(2)

SEE = 0.35

w h e r e P is d e f i n e d as above, B = t h e c a n d i d a t e t h e r m o m e t e r for Balladur, s c o r e d f r o m 0 to 100; F = h o w t h e g o v e r n m e n t will i n f l u e n c e t h e e c o n o m y in n e x t 12 m o n t h s , s c o r e d 1 = b e t t e r , 3 = same, 5 = w o r s e ; T = h o w t h e g o v e r n m e n t has influe n c e d t h e e c o n o m y o v e r last 12 m o n t h s , s c o r e d 1 = better, 3 = same, 5 = w o r s e ; M = s e v e n - p o i n t p r o x i m i t y scale o n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d h e l p i n g immigrants, from 1 = g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d h e l p i m m i g r a n t s to 7 = i m m i g r a n t s s h o u l d m a k e it o n t h e i r o w n ; e = error; t h e statistics are d e f i n e d as above. This m o d e l , p r e v i o u s l y u n t r i e d in t h e F r e n c h c o n t e x t , r e c e i v e s s t r o n g statistical s u p p o r t . All c o e f f i c i e n t s arc in t h e e x p e c t e d d i r e c t i o n a n d clearly significant. M o r e o v e r , t h e s e results are c o n f i r m e d in a parallel p r o b i t analysis.3 Partisan feeling, c a n d i d a t e a p p e a l a n d issue e v a l u a t i o n s m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e for g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t . W i t h r e s p e c t to issues, e c o n o m i c s a p p e a r s i m p o r t a n t . A l t h o u g h t h e s e r e t r o s p e c tive a n d p r o s p e c t i v e e c o n o m i c j u d g m e n t s are n o t u n r e l a t e d ( r = 0.64), t h e y still m a n a g e i n d e p e n d e n t , statistically significant effects. C o n s i d e r a l i n e a r p r o b a b i l i t y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e i r coefficients. If e v a l u a t i o n o f f u t u r e e c o n o m i c p o l i c y (F) shifted f r o m ' w o r s e ' ( s c o r e d '5') to ' b e t t e r ' ( s c o r e d '1'), t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p p r o v ing o f t h e P r i m e Minister w o u l d i n c r e a s e 20 p e r cent. A similar i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a p p l i e s to a c o m p a r a b l e shift in r e t r o s p e c t i v e e c o n o m i c p o l i c y (T). A c c o r d i n g to t h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e coefficients, t h e i m p a c t - - r e t r o s p e c t i v e v e r s u s p r o s p e c t i v e - is a b o u t equal. In g e n e r a l , this p a r t y - c a n d i d a t e - i s s u e s m o d e l s e e m s to offer a fairly g o o d a c c o u n t i n g for t h e F r e n c h case. A t e m p t a t i o n is to f a v o r it o v e r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l

MICHAELS LEWIS-BECK

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ideology-social cleavages model. That conclusion w o u l d be premature. The goodness-of-fit question requires careful scrutiny. The Adj. R 2 of eq. (2) is larger than that of eq. (1). With the pseudo-R 2 from the probit analyses in the footnotes, the gap b e c o m e s s o m e w h a t less p r o n o u n c e d . A c o m p a r i s o n of the standard errors of estimate from the above equations diminishes the difference further (0.44 vs 0.35). Still, in a raw statistical sense, the party-candidate-issues model appears to hold the edge, but that edge may be due to the more subtle problem of simultaneous equation bias. Specifically, Prime Minister approval (variable P) may feed back on candidate support for Balladur (variable B), in w h i c h case the apparent impact of the feeling t h e r m o m e t e r w o u l d be inflated. To the extent this were so, the feeling t h e r m o m e t e r is serving as a dependent, rather than an independent, variable. As Fiorina (1981, p. 154) put it in the American context, feeling thermometers are then acting as ' c o n t i n u o u s surrogates for vote choice'. The ambiguous structural status of the feeling t h e r m o m e t e r - - s h o u l d it go on the right-hand or left-hand side of the e q u a t i o n ? - - d e m a n d s a cautious interpretation of its explanatory or predictive power, regardless of w h e t h e r the equation is French or American. (Unfortunately, the endogeneity problem presented by the feeling t h e r m o m e t e r measure persists if the party identification measure is used.) i Conclusion These results are by no means definitive. Rather, they are simply an experiment. When cross-national measures, similar to ANES items, are applied in a French election pre-test survey, they generally turn in a commendable performance. The respondents had virtually no problem placing themselves on freely graded candidate feeling thermometers. Further, their candidate rankings correlated as expected with other political preferences. Job approval items on the President and the Prime Minister, heretofore not included in individual-level French election surveys, appear to function much as the familiar 'satisfied' items the IFOP organization makes available in aggregated form to the press. The extensive battery of economic items show French citizens willingly make discriminating judgments about economic matters, weighing collective concerns most heavily in their vote calculation. The limited number of social issues explored revealed that the seven-point proximity scale could be useful for certain issues, such as attitudes toward immigration. Of all the items under investigation, only with party identification do consequential compromises have to be made for the French context. As Johnston (1992, p. 542) observed, "Party identification, like certain wines, is not believed to travel well". Our research team has refined the blend, in a n e w wording of the party identification item, which we hope will travel better. These pre-test items, administered along with standard SES items, allow preliminary estimation of rival cross-national voting models, w i t h i n t h e s a m e d a t a - s e t . The traditional French voter paradigm, an ideology-social cleavages model, received support as expected. In addition, the party-candidate-issues model widely used in the US received support. It would be unwise to select one of these models over the other from this small data-base. The point to be made is that a model, supposedly specific to a particular, US, political culture, can be productively applied in another political culture. The exceptionalism of the two polities might not be as great as commonly imagined.

526

Cross-national Election Surveys Notes

1.

2.

U n d e r t h e US-France Cooperative Science Program, the United States National Science Foundation issued Grant no. INT-9314100, "The N e w Voter; Franco-American Comparisons", Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Principal Investigator. On the French side, as part of this NSF/CNRS International Accord, w e r e French researchers Daniel Boy, Jean Chiche, Gdrard G r u n b e r g and N o n n a Mayer. The pre-test data analyzed h e r e are archived as "French Election Pre-Test Questionnaire, March 1994" at the Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research, Ann Arbor. Also, I wish to a c k n o w l e d g e the Camargo Foundation, Cassis, France, w h e r e I was a Senior Fellow in Residence while w o r k i n g o n this pre-test. The NSF a w a r d e d a s u b s e q u e n t grant, "The Franco-American Voter: A Cross-Cultural Model", (no. SBR-9421869), Principal Investigator, Michael S. Lewis-Beck. O t h e r Senior Personnel are Daniel Boy, Jean Chiche, Elisabeth Dupoirier, Gdrard Grunberg, N o n n a Mayer and Anne Muxel, all r e s e a r c h e r s at the Centre d ' e t u d e de la vie politique frangaise (CEVIPOF, Paris). This s e c o n d award made possible inclusion o f pre-tested items in t h e 1995 French National Election Study. Analysis o f t h e s e data are just u n d e r way. Also, efforts are afoot to secure funding for inclusion o f French election items in American surveys. Finally, I w o u l d like to thank Ross E Burkhart, Ph.D. candidate in political science at t h e University of Iowa, for his help w i t h data managem e n t and analysis. Here is a probit analysis o f eq. (1). O n e reason the pattern o f statistical significance so closely parallels that of OLS is that the d i c h o t o m o u s d e p e n d e n t variable exhibits virtually n o skewness, w i t h scores on a p p r o v e - d i s a p p r o v e split about evenly (Table 2): P = 1.33" - 0.47"L + O.17*R - 0.28"*C + e (2.31) (6.16) (2.02) (1.35) McKelvey Pseudo-R 2 = 0.34 N = 234 Log Likelihood = -130.82 Likelihood Ratio -- 61.91, 3

3.

df

w h e r e all variables and statistics are defined as w i t h eq. (1), e x c e p t P is c o d e d O = yes, 1 - - n o ; Mckelvey Pseudo-R 2, Log Likelihood and Likelihood Ratios are goodness-of-fit measures. Here is a probit analysis o f eq. (2): P = 0.74* - O.03*B + O.18*F + 0.24"T - 0.11" M + e (1.66) (7.29) (2.15) (2.90) (2.31) McKelvey Pseudo R 2 = 0.68 N = 323 Log Likelihood = -116.04 Likelihood Ratio -- 215.69, 4

4.

df

w h e r e all variables and statistics are defined as w i t h eq. (2), e x c e p t P is c o d e d as above in n o t e 2, and t h e goodness-of-fit measures o f n o t e 2 are reported. If the c l o s e d - e n d e d party identification measure r e p o r t e d in Table 4 is included in a revision o f eq. (2), it yields the following OLS results: P = 1.42" - O.O9"I + O.IO*F + O.08*T - O.04*M + e (12.52) (4.78) (5.06) (4.15) (3.09) Adj. R 2 = 0.49 SEE = 0.36 N = 258 w h e r e all the previous variables and statistics are defined as w i t h eq. (2) and I = party identification (1 -- Extreme Left, 2 = Communist, 3 = Socialist-MRG, 4 = Ecology Generation, 5 = Greens, 6 = UDF, 7 = RPR, 8 = National Front). The fit statistics are little c h a n g e d from eq. (2), and the issue variables c o n t i n u e to s h o w statistical significance. The party identification measure clearly registers statistical significance (although not as strongly as the feeling t h e r m o m e t e r variable had). A difficulty w i t h a c c e p t i n g the right-hand side inclusion o f this party identification measure is its high endogeneity. In Fiorina's (1981) phrase, it appears a "running tally" of past p r e f e r e n c e s . For France, this may be true e v e n to the point, as earlier noted, that it a m o u n t s to n o t h i n g m o r e than a n o t h e r way o f asking the vote intention question. What is n e e d e d are o t h e r m e a s u r e s to validate (or invalidate) this measure, plus formulation

MICHAEL S LEWIS-BECK

527

of multi-equation models which permit party identification, properly measured, to act as both 'cause' and 'effect'. One effort along that line is the three-equation system estimated (with two-stage-least squares) in Fleury and Lewis-Beck (1993a). Their results, based on the 1967 French National Election Survey, indicate that party identification and left-right ideology influence each other, as well as the vote itself. Further, in comparing the effect of left-right ideology and party identification on vote choice, the former appears much the stronger. A multi-equation, two-stage least squares analysis could not be conducted on these pretest data, because of the scarcity of exogenous variables necessary to build the instrumental variables. Obviously, this is an important task to carry out with the full 1995 French National Election Study itself. In such analyses, one thing that bedevils French survey data is collinearity among the core structural variables. To illustrate, here is a correlation matrix from our pre-test data among these core variables of eqs (1) and (2)-Prime Minister support (P), left-right ideology (L), religious practice (R), social class (C), feeling thermometer (B)--plus party identification (I).

B I L R C

P -0.67 -0.54 -0.52 0.28 -0.11

B 0.44 0.51 -0.24 0.03

I

0.85 -0.28 0.04

L

-0.31 -0.05

R

0.04

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Lafay, Jean-Dominique (1991) Political dyarchy and popularity functions: lessons from the 1986 French experience, in Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Jean-Dominique Lafay, (eds) Economics and Politics: The Calculus o f Support, pp. 123-140. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. (1984) France: the stalled electorate, in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, (eds) Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton University Press, Princeton. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. (1988) Economics and Elections." The Major Western Democracies. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Mackuen, Michael B., Erikson, Robert S. and Stimson, James A. (1992) Peasants or bankers? The American electorate and the U.S. economy. American Political Science Review 86, 597-611. Niemi, Richard G., Reed, David R. and Weisberg, Herbert F. (1991) Partisan commitment: a research note. Political Behavior 13(3), 213-221. Sniderman, Paul M., Brody, Richard A. and Tetlock, Philip E. (1991) Reasoning and Choice." Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ysmal, Colette. (1994) The history of electoral studies in France. European Journal o f Political Research 25, 367-385.