Cruelty and silence: War, tyranny, uprising, and the Arab world

Brief Reviews Cruelty and Silence: War, ‘Qmnny, Uprising, and the Arab World By Kanan Makiya. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.367 pp. $22.95. Writing under the pseudonym Samir al-Khalil, Makiya published the single most important analysis of Saddam Husayn’s regime, Republic of Fear (reviewed in O&is, Fall 19891, as well as iTbeMonument (O&S, Summer 19911, a scathing attack on the totalitarian culture of contemporary Iraq. Makiya revealed his identity in March 1991; since then, he writes under his own name. While still primarily concerned with Iraq-Saddam Husayn’s seizure of Kuwait directly occasioned C?z&y andSiZenc+-this study represents an attempt to understand and remedy what “has gone profoundly wrong in the Arab world” as a whole. “Cruelty” takes up the first two-thirds of the book, consisting of five biographical accounts, one Kuwaiti and four Iraqi. Makiya himself sees these stories as “by far” more important than the final third, ‘Silence,” which contains his own views on how things got to this point; but a Western reader is likely to disagree. We’ve all heard the horror stories in part one many times before; but part two represents a highly informed, caustic, and original attack on the Arab intelligentsia, including such American-based figures as Edward Said, Hisham Sharabi, and Ibrahim Abu Lughod. Makiya stresses the intelligentsia’s “glaring collective failure . . . to evolve a language of rights and democracy to supplement the language of nationalism.” In an effort to begin this process, he proposes two steps: stop blaming others for one’s own failings; and adopt the aphorism “put cruelty first” as the premier political slogan. It’s sound advice for anyone, but especially so for Middle Easterners. The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand By Ghazi A. Algosaibi. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993. I56 pp. $29.95. It has the trappings of a vanity book: a Saudi big shot (currently the ambassador to Great Britain, formerly a minister of industry) publishes a slender tome of musings on the events of 1990-91 without sources, bibliography, or any pretense to offering a new interpretation. Yet, contrary to expectation, i%e Gulf Ctii.~ is a gem, full of intelligence and insights. Reading it resembles nothing so much as spending a long evening in the company of a savvy Middle Easterner who’s willing to open up and explain the world from his perspective. Algosaibi provides some new information (Saddam Husayn told King Fahd of his intent to invade Iran back in 1980 and Fahd discouraged him), but mostly it’s his even-tempered analysis that’s so enlightening. He portrays Saddam Husayn’s decision to invade Kuwait as an adventurer’s greatest wager; the Iraqi leader could not retreat because, like a gambler betting everything on one number at the roulette table, he could “only stand helpless, waiting for the wheel to stop.” Algosaibi accounts for each Arab leader’s choice to go with Saddam or against him; his analysis of Yasir ‘Arafat’s “emotional, excitable” personality and the role it plays in Palestinian politics is particularly enlightening. The chapter titled “The Unattractive ‘Bedouin’ and the Ugly ‘Arab” takes up the mutual prejudices between Arabic speakers of the cities and of the Arabian peninsula and sagely advises the latter to warm up to the former. Winter 1994 I 147