Displacement for Development? The Impact of Changing State–Society Relations

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World Development Vol. 29, No. 6, pp. 961±976, 2001 Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0305-750X/01/$ - see front matter

PII: S0305-750X(01)00024-9

Displacement for Development? The Impact of Changing State±Society Relations LAURIE A. BRAND * University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA Summary. Ð The involuntary movement of people by the state for development purposes has been repeated across the world, often with disastrous results. This article examines two factors frequently cited by analysts for project failures: the role of prevailing development paradigms and the extent of community involvement in project planning and implementation. Using two tourism-related projects from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the analysis focuses on the e€ects of changing state±society relations on such projects and, in particular, on the ways a political liberalization process may allow for a greater, if di€erential, impact of civil society organizations. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Key words Ð Middle East, Jordan, displacement, tourism, NGOs, participatory development

1. INTRODUCTION The forced or involuntary movement of people by the state for development-related purposes has been repeated across the developing and developed worlds. At times this movement has sought to settle nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, with the intent of increasing state control. In others, displacement from ancestral homes has served to make way for massive infrastructure such as dams or hydroelectric projects intended to serve ``the national interest.'' But, even a cursory examination of the historical record makes clear that a disturbing number of such projects have had a deleterious to catastrophic impact on the displaced populations, while often falling far short of the service to the national interest in whose name they were conceived. Along these lines, James Scott has demonstrated that in its quest for greater control over its territory and population, the modern state has devised numerous schemes that while ostensibly targeting improving the human condition have nonetheless ``gone tragically awry.'' 1 He contends that for development or modernization projects to result in full-¯edged disasters, four factors are necessary: the implementation of programs aimed at the simpli®cation of administration of territory and population (imposing last names, changing land tenure patterns, forcing sedentarization); the adoption by the state of ``high-modern 961

ideology,'' de®ned as an excessive self-con®dence regarding scienti®c and technical progress; the existence of an authoritarian state willing to use its full power to implement the plans born of the high-modernist ideology; and, ®nally, a civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans. 2 While such a combination of factors was certainly present in the cases Scott discusses as well as others, thousands of development plan disasters/failures have occurred in states in which less extreme versions of these four factors may be identi®ed. States vary in the intensity and extent to which they have implemented programs aimed at simpli®cation and what Scott calls the ``legibility'' of society. Similarly the con®dence and scienti®c arrogance of a state's leaders and technocrats can be placed on a continuum, as can the state's coercive capacity and its willingness to use this capacity against its own citizens. Finally, the relative

* The

author wishes to acknowledge the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences of the University of Southern California for support that made possible ®eld research in Jordan in summers 1998 and 1999. Additional thanks are due the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan University for logistical and research assistance during both of these visits. She is also grateful to Fred Lawson and two anonymous readers for criticisms and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Final revision accepted: 26 December 2000.

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strength of civil society and its willingness to counter state projects, which cannot be taken for granted even if it is strong, will vary from one country to another, but also over time. Among Scott's conclusions is that there must be a greater role for local society's knowledge and experience in the drafting and implementation of development schemes. 3 This call parallels the wisdom that gradually emerged in the international development and aid communities regarding the need for community participation. Myriad examples can be found of plans gone awry and projects poorly designed because no one thought, or believed it was worthwhile, to seek the input of those most immediately a€ected. As a result, most projects now insist (at least in their terms of reference) upon consultation with local communities. Such a shift most clearly a€ects the strength of the second (high-modern ideology) and fourth (role of civil society) of Scott's elements. The questions remain, however, as to how serious and careful the attempts to integrate local knowledge are, and what role informally or formally organized civil society could play in such a process. In other words, how could a change in the relationship between the state and civil societyÐas well as international development aid donors with bothÐcontribute to outcomes that are better, or at least less disastrous, for the local population? It is this relationship and the implications of changes in it for development planning and implementation that this paper seeks to explore. To do so, we examine two relatively modest-sized, but also clearly problematic, development projects, each of which required involuntary population movement. The focus on two cases characterized by di€erent socioeconomic bases and forms of organization is intended to increase the grounds for drawing more generalizable conclusions. Both sites are in the same country, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and hence, the general political and policy climate a€ecting the two has been the same over time; however, the similarities largely end there. One site, Petra, the kingdom's premier archaeological and tourist site, is located in the south, in a traditionally poor area, dependent on nonagricultural sources of income; the other, Umm Qays, is a secondary tourism site in the extreme northwest of the country in a largely settled, agricultural area. Jordan itself is a small, resource-poor state whose history has been shaped in large part by the various episodes and impact of the Arab±

Israeli con¯ict. With the exception of only a few months, during 1957±89 Jordan was under a martial law regime. In the summer of 1989, however, the late King Husayn launched a political liberalization process aimed at defusing mounting economic and political tensions that had exploded in economic riots the previous April. The liberalization involved substantial loosening of press and other censorship, the holding of relatively free elections, the lifting of martial law and, as a by-product, a gradual expansion of civil society. Both of the cases of forced displacement presented below have clear identi®able installments in both the martial law era and the subsequent period of political liberalization. Thus, they provide the possibility of comparing outcomes and drawing tentative conclusions about changes in the relative importance of the role of civil society's input into the development process over time. The cases to be discussed are: Umm Qays (1974±85 and 1988±99) 4 and Petra/Umm Sayhun (1975±85 and 1989±99). Before turning to the cases, we examine some speci®cs regarding displacementrelated projects. 2. DISPLACEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES As Cernea and Guggenheim have pointed out, there are important di€erences between displacement caused by development projects on the one hand and that caused by wars, natural disasters or improved life opportunities on the other. Involuntary resettlement involves little ``pull,'' being almost exclusively ``push;'' it is the result of a planned political decision, re¯ecting state choices about who will ``pay'' and who will bene®t from development; it generally involves compensation or assistance to the displaced; and unlike some of the e€ects of natural disasters or wars, displacement undertaken for development purposes is always permanent. 5 Perhaps more important here is the role that international aid agencies and their paradigms have had, for many states could not have carried out these projects without such assistance. As Cernea notes, in keeping with the arrogance associated with adoption of the ``high-modernist'' ideology, the paradigms underpinning certain policies led decision-makers to underestimate the various costs of resettlement and to privilege technical/engineering expertise over socio-political knowledge. Projects often ap-

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peared technically sound, but were in fact socially inappropriate. As for the question of the role of civil society, Cernea argues that the population groups that were a€ected were generally too weak to make their voices heard to force change. 6 There was little improvement in the way resettlement was carried out until 1980, when the World Bank adopted a formal policy regarding resettlement operations. In brief, the policy stressed that ``involuntary displacement should be avoided or minimized wherever feasible because of its disruptive and impoverishing effects'' but that where it was carried out it ``should be conceived and executed as a development program, providing sucient opportunities to assist resettlers in their e€orts to improve their former living standards and earning capacity, or at least to restore them.'' 7 3. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY The extensive literature on civil society o€ers numerous de®nitions of the concept, most of which share the notion of a network of associations, but di€er over where to draw the boundaries between such associations and the family, the state and/or the market. 8 This analysis uses Diamond's de®nition, in which civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order of set of shared rules. It is distinct from ``society'' in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state ocials accountable (emphasis in original). 9

With this de®nition it is important to stress that this autonomy from the state can never be complete, as such institutions are required to register with state authorities, are bound by laws that regulate associational activity, and may receive funding from the state, or even implement state programs. 10 Equally important is the varied role that civil society plays in or vis- a-vis the state. Here, one may discern two basic models. The ®rst sees civil society as necessary to a healthy, functioning democracy. According to this view, habits of civil and civic interaction are cultivated in the constituent associations and networks; ``reciprocity is learned and enforced,

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trust is generated, and communication and patterns of collective action are facilitated.'' 11 But this literature, most notably represented by Putnam, concerns the role of civil society in already functioning democracies. 12 Given that most of the developing world, including Jordan, from which the cases for this research were taken, lives under various types of authoritarian political systems, a second model focuses on civil society's ability to resist state repression and to channel resistance. 13 This model examines what role civil society could play in pushing for greater transparency in governmental decision-making and for representing the interests of those traditionally ignored or excluded by the system. The empirical cases examined in detail below are divided into two historical phases. In the ®rst, a repressive state allowed few legal forms of organization or free expression. The second, however, coincides with the initiation of the process of political liberalization described above. While attention is also paid to the changes in development thinking that occurred between the two phases, the primary intent is to explore the nature and impact of the increase in civil society activity allowed for by the political opening, with the goal of drawing conclusions about what role an increasingly empowered civil society could play in lobbying for development policies that take better account of the needs of local populations. 4. PHASE I (a) Umm Qays: 1974±85 The old village of Umm Qays is strategically located to the south of the Golan Heights, overlooking the northern part of the Jordan Valley and the southern shore of Lake Tiberias. Biblical Gadara and subsequently one of the cities of the Decapolis in antiquity, it attracts modest numbers of both foreign and Jordanian tourists. From the mid-20th century on, Umm Qays' residents increasingly abandoned farming for work in the civil service and the army, and a new village began to develop adjacent to the old one. In 1974, the Jordanian government approved a proposal by the Department of Antiquities (DOA) to acquire both land and houses in order to further excavate and preserve the site where a German team had been working since the mid-1960s. The government sequestered a

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total of 450 dunums (45 hectares), including houses in the old village, olive trees and wells located on and near the site of the ancient city. At the time, Jordan was under martial law, and hence there was no question of the villagers' opposing the sequestration order. The only matter open to discussion was the amount of compensation. 14 In 1976, a survey was carried out to set levels of compensation. 15 At the time, according to interviewees, the villagers felt that the compensation o€ered by the government was fair. Moreover, the government decree stipulated that people did not have to leave their houses immediately (and in fact one man stayed until his death in 1992); nevertheless, villagers were forbidden to introduce any improvementsÐno water, electricity or repairs. The only access allowed to former lands was to harvest olives, as long as equipment that might damage the ruins nearby or underground was not used. In the event, by the time the compensation was forwardedÐ1982Ðin¯ation had so raised price levels that the villagers deemed the original compensation levels unfair. As a result, a group of them wrote a letter complaining of what had happened and then, circulated it to other residents who had also been harmed by the process. The letter went to the local governor, but it was not until these problems were brought to national attention by a Jordan TV program that action was ®nally taken. Government response was not automatic or easily secured, but eventually the villagers' complaints resulted in the state's approval of a 50% upward revaluation of their property. Despite this success, however, the episode left the villagers angered by the delays and the lack of concern by the authorities. Because the government was worried that the villagers would simply take their money and move elsewhere, thus abandoning the area altogether, an alternative housing project was proposed through the government's Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC). 16 Two di€erent sized structures were o€ered, costing 12,000 and 7,500 JDs (one JD ˆ $3.00). For those who could not a€ord to pay in cash but could secure a 10% down payment, 25-year loans (at 7±10%) were available. Then, more serious issues arose. First, it became clear that the 150 structures were inappropriate for peasant farmers: the rooms were too small, there was insucient space for large and extended families, and there was no place for animals. Worse, the new ``owners'' learned

that the prices quoted to them were only for the structures; they did not include the price of the land, as the villagers had assumed or been led to believe. Thus, they were suddenly faced with an inescapable doubling of the purchase price. As a result, in the end, many of those who were eligible were not able to purchase the housing, while at the same time, alternative land on which to build that fell into the areas that enjoyed services was quite scarce and expensive. 17 Subsequently a new 88-unit project was proposed, but this time only the land and the infrastructure, not the actual housing, was provided. Priority in acquisition of housing went ®rst to those who had been hurt by the original sequestration, then to other villagers, then to government employees with limited income. Thus, gradually, the old village was abandoned and its houses, increasingly empty, deteriorated, not from archaeological excavations, but from the elements. In the meantime, the villagers, who could not return to their former houses, felt they had twice been badly mistreated (if not cheated) by the government. 18 We examine the conclusion to this story in the second half of this paper. (b) Petra: 1975±85

A despoiled, severely exploited land, long abused by the combined forces of man and the natural forces of wind, water, and gravity, this area comprising approximately 122 square kilometers is today the range of sedentary Bedouin tribes who with their goats, guns, plows, and their endless quest for antiquities are, without malice, quickly converting this area to a wasteland ultimately ®t for neither Bedouin nor tourist. 19

So the 1968 USAID Master Plan for the Protection and Use of the Petra National Park described what has become Jordan's premier archaeological site and its erstwhile residents. Indeed, the report makes numerous references to the deterioration of the antiquities and the negative impact of the Bdul tribe, the inhabitants of Petra, on the area. The plan went on to describe the resettlement of the Bdul, and the closure of the park to further settlement, livestock grazing, farming, mineral exploration, and shooting as the most urgent requirements if the government was to preserve and develop Petra as one of the world's great natural parks. 20

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The 1968 plan gave no thought to the economic (or other) incorporation of the Bdul or the Liyathna (the tribe resident in Wadi Musa, the village just outside the front entrance to Petra) into the site. It did recognize that the Liyathna provided horses for the tourists as well as labor for some excavations and other projects in the park, but it criticized the locals, saying it ''suspected that some of them, like the Bdul, deal in illegally excavated artifacts and at least one individual makes ceramic reproductions of Nabatean artifacts which are bought by tourists as authentic antiquities.'' 21 In late 1975, the government established a committee to deal with the resettlement of the Bdul, comprising the ministers of Tourism, Interior, and Municipal A€airs. Other government agencies such as the ministries of education and agriculture, as well as the HUDC (which would play a role in the Umm Qays ®asco) were to be involved as needed in planning and carrying out the resettlement. The committee decided upon a resettlement site on the outskirts of Wadi Musa which, according to a 1976 World Bank report, 22 was deemed acceptable by the Bdul. Bdul acceptance of the plan had been by no means a given. Indeed, at ®rst, they refused to move out of Petra. Then, they agreed, but argued about the site for the new village. Their opposition to the move and the place and type of resettlement had a number of bases. The ®rst was that their presence in PetraÐfrom which they derived their various forms of livelihoodÐ was to be controlled and organized, yet their removal was not accompanied by an economic development project. Only those with licenses for a shopÐa very small numberÐcould have access to the site and thus a large part of the informal economy, especially that of women and children, would be lost without the presentation of alternatives. While the contribution of this type of informal economic activity may seem quite small, for the families who were a€ected the impact was potentially quite severe, given the general level of poverty. The supplemental earned by women and children was critical to some families. The Bdul's second complaint concerned the houses, which were small and uncomfortable. No pens were provided for sheep and goats, nor stables for camels and horses. This was not the plan on the basis of which they had agreed to move out. Indeed, the original housing plan had been submitted by UNESCO, and had been approved by the Bdul as acceptable, given

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their needs. When the World Bank stepped in to fund the housing construction, however, it ignored the previous plans and simply devised newÐand clearly inappropriate housingÐ without consulting the Bdul. 23 Another major problem with the relocation scheme was that the new Bdul village, Umm Sayhun, was built on Liyathna territory. Under the best of circumstances this would have implied potential ownership and tribal problems. But in the case of the Bdul and the Liyathna, there was already a history of con¯ict, and hence, the potential for disputes was even greater. The site that was ®nally chosen covered 300 hectares, making it large enough for the construction of houses and for agricultural activities. The government promised agricultural land as well as farm implements and related technical assistance for those who wished to become farmers. 24 Yet this and other sedentarization projects that were so popular during this period did not take into account the fact that the Bdul were not farmers, but rather, shepherds, used to animal husbandry. (Of course, as we saw in the case of Umm Qays, even when the displaced were farmers, insucient consideration was taken of that fact in developing alternative housing.) In the case of the Bdul resettlement, the intent was precisely to force them to be farmers, to completely change their way of life. Not until the 1980s was it realized that animal breeding projects should have been included as part of the resettlement. But as noted above, even with the attempt to transform the Bdul into farmers, only houses, not other necessary auxiliary structures, were built. 25 The government did agree to give the relocated people priority in employment generated by the Tourism Development Project for Petra (the World Bank project that funded the new housing project), as well as special assistance in preparing themselves for other occupations. 26 But in the event, the economic hardship of such a move was not fully appreciated, much less compensated. No agricultural or other economic projects were initiated to ensure the Bdul could earn a living after leaving Petra. The alternative housing project was not only inappropriate, but plagued by delays and cost overruns. It was awarded to a local construction company, which received the work order on November 1, 1980 and was to complete the project by January 1, 1982. As of February 1982, however, proper equipment, materials, and workmen were still lacking, there was no

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resident engineer at the site and the oversight apparatus appointed by the HUDC was not carrying out its duties. 27 The problems with the contractor continued over the next two years. The Project Completion Report estimated that an additional 0.3 million JD ($0.9 million) would be needed to complete the housing as well as social facilities for the Bdul. Of the entire World Bank project of which this housing was a part, the most signi®cant delays were in the Bdul relocation component. According to the report, a basic cause for the delays and ultimately the cost overruns owed to insucient consultation with the concerned families, so that the ®rst tenders had to be rejected when it was learned that the Bdul had rejected the initial relocation site. The site that was ®nally accepted was farther away from Wadi Musa and hence, required heavy investments in additional roads and social facilities (the latter of which had still not been constructed at the time of the writing of the report). 28 Delays in project initiation and completion also led to an increase in the numbers of potential bene®ciaries, as natural population growth led to a rise in the number of families. 29 Although the evacuation of the Bdul had been ®rst called for in the 1968 USAID plan, as a result of all the problems and delays, the actual transfer to the new villageÐUmm SayhunÐdid not begin until 1985. The [new] village was a mixed blessing for the Bedoul, bringing access to better education and health care, but decreasing their access to traditional pastoral and agricultural lands and the cash economy of tourism. Thus many resisted the move, and continued to live in caves, rock shelters, and black tents in 1988, adhering to the traditional way of life. 30

(c) Summary These two cases contain a number of similarities: insucient consultation with the local communities about the type of housing needed; bureaucratic ineciency (and perhaps corruption) in planning and carrying out the housing construction; little indication that lessons from earlier displacements or resettlements had been taken into consideration; and little concern on the part of the government or the development agencies for new or alternative employment after the displacement. In both cases, local protest did make some impact: in the case of

Umm Qays, the initial compensation was recalculated (although only after an Amman TV personality ®lmed a report); and in Petra, the Bdul managed to reject the ®rst housing site proposed for them. Given the outcomes, however, it would be hard to characterize these as resounding victories for the local communities or examples of successful civil society participation. In neither case were there organized institutional actors in place to voice the concerns and demands of the local population. Both are examples of shabby, if not arrogant, treatment of citizens by both state and international development agencies as ``modernization'' marched along. 5. PHASE II In late summer 1988, a combination of regional and domestic developments led the Jordanian dinar to lose 50% of its value. By February 1989, the state could no longer service its external debt and the IMF was called in to assist the kingdom with rescheduling. At the same time, domestic political pressures had been building, as the country had been under martial law with only brief respites since 1957. Political parties had been illegal since that time, and the Jordanian state's internal security apparatus, the mukhabarat, had developed a well-deserved reputation for eciency in monitoring and intimidating anything resembling opposition. Civil society activity was highly circumscribed: many organizations in formation were simply never granted licenses, and those that did operate su€ered from a lack of basic freedom of expression and periodic harassment. In April 1989, the announcement of the lifting of subsidies on petroleum products ®nally triggered an explosion. Beginning in the southern city of Ma'an, rioting gradually spread to most cities in the kingdom. Although the regime blamed ``the events'' on agitators, it knew well the depths of the problem. In response, King Husayn initiated a process of gradual political opening. The liberalization began with an easing of press censorship and was followed by the announcement of the intent to hold parliamentary elections, the ®rst in 22 years. The campaign season that ensued was the liveliest and most open period the kingdom had witnessed since the mid-1950s. Moreover, by virtually all accounts, the elections were reasonably free; indeed, they introduced into

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parliament a substantial oppositional bloc composed of an assortment of Islamists and leftists. Over the following several years, the kingdom experienced a continuing relaxation of censorship, a tremendous increase in local and foreign publications, the legalization of political party activity, and the ¯owering of what can broadly be called civil society activity, in the form of the establishment of a host of new organizations addressing issues as diverse as the environment and women's rights. It is in the context of these striking and widely acknowledged changes brought by the political liberalization that the second phase in the relationship between the state and the residents of Umm Qays and Umm Sayhun must be viewed. Attempt is made below to explore how the newly found organizational and expressional freedom of Jordanian civil society may have in¯uenced outcomes in this period. (a) Umm Qays: 1988±99 It had gradually become clear that the archaeological excavations were not moving in the direction of the old village houses. 31 In this context, Thomas Weber, the director of the German Protestant Institute in Amman, which was in charge of the excavations, conceived of the idea of restoring one of the ``abandoned'' houses. Reportedly moved by expressions of concern by visiting diplomats that it was a shame that the village had become a ghost town, Weber and a young Jordanian architect drafted a proposal and an estimate for restoring the house of a prominent Umm Qays family, with the intent of then using it as a dig house for the archaeological team. The German Foreign Ministry completely funded the project at a total cost of JD 10,000 ($30,000). Most of these funds reportedly went to pay for the labor of villagers; 32 however, there is substantial evidence that local people never felt a part of the project, particularly given the history of the sequestration and housing problems. 33 This was only the beginning of the restoration and redevelopment story. Subsequently, another village house was selected, this time, to be turned into a museum. The same architect was engaged and again German money ®nanced the project, although this time it was administered by the American Center for Oriental Research, a center in Amman specializing in archaeological projects and research. Once

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more, at least ocially, great emphasis was placed on the use of local materials and labor, in order to maximize the bene®t to the local communities. 34 Next came a proposal for a resthouse in the old village. A government resthouse, just outside of Umm Qays, had been built in the 1980s, but had fallen into disrepair. 35 Work on a new resthouse, this time using a former schoolhouse in the old village, began in 1990. The resthouse was not a German, but a US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MOTA) project, with the same young architect in charge. After its completion, a prominent businessman and restaurateur based in Amman, Zayd Qsus, won the concession to manage the facility. Perhaps in part because of long-standing suspicion of Amman and its representatives, perhaps also out of jealousy, but certainly because of the way they had been treated by the government, in hindsight the people of Umm Qays are convinced that members of the Amman political and economic elite had advance knowledge that peace with Israel was coming and hence anticipated that Umm Qays would be a good investment. The new resthouse project in e€ect gave this elite a head start, but, again as the villagers view it, at their expense, since aside from a handful of jobs, it brought no direct bene®t to the village. In the meantime, like many others familiar with the site, Qsus watched with dismay the continuing decay of the other structures in the old village, and in 1993, he proposed a more extensive restoration of the old houses so that they might serve as a village-hotel resort. 36 The project began to be more fully discussed in 1995, probably because of the signing of the Jordan±Israel peace treaty in late 1994 and the expectation that tourism in Jordan would boom as a result. In order to proceed with the resort project, however, the original sequestration order had to be amended to include ``tourism'' as one of its intended goals. (The original text cited only ``archaeological'' goals.) According to Qsus, this was not a problem, 37 but the Umm Qays residents engaged a lawyer and promised to ®le a lawsuit should the order be so amended. Not surprisingly, the villagers feel the site is a potential gold mine and that they are being prevented from more fully bene®ting from its economic potential. They repeatedly express an interest in investing, but say there are obstacles, among which they mention the state (and its

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wealthy private sector allies), but not their unfortunate, but clear, lack of capital and expertise. That said, the villagers are not united in their approach to the Qsus project. Indeed, there are clearly two camps: those who, having been convinced by their recent experience with the site and by government ocials that they have no hope of anything more, want to move ahead and bene®t from whatever tourism development can be attracted; and those who want to hold out for a greater role in the developmentÐeven if they do not have the capital or the experience. 38 Qsus certainly has investment capability in his corner, but the support for the project is deeper than dinars. Both he and the locals insist that further tourism development of Umm Qays, including the proposed tourist village, is wanted by the royal family: various family members have bought land nearby, and there is a royal guesthouse as well as a helipad in the vicinity. Investors from the GulfÐQatar and BahraynÐwere also interested, but reportedly insisted on greater infrastructure development before they would commit funds. 39 The amount Qsus has been required to pay as rent also suggests that he has powerful friends in high places. His annual rent on the resthouse is only 1000 JD a year ($1,500), and what the government is requesting as part of the lease proposed for the village-resort is only 4800 JD ($7,200) a year. 40 Not surprisingly, the villagers view such arrangements as outrageous. Nonetheless, as of autumn 2000, the project remained on the Minister of Tourism's desk awaiting a ®nal signature. Qsus attributed the continuing delay to minor disagreements, but did not elaborate. Yet it is clear that the project is now on hold precisely because of the activism of some of the locals. Some argue it is a small minority, but they are organized through the Friends of Archaeology (FOA), an Ammanbased nongovernmental organization (NGO) whose local chapter president is from one of Umm Qays' leading families. Spring 1999 witnessed several discussions about the future of the proposed project, including some unpleasant exchanges between the Minister of Tourism and the locals. While the ministry continues to proclaim that such a project is on the horizon, 41 its future remains uncertain. The fact that the president of the local FOA, Talib Rusan, was elected mayor of Umm Qays in July 1999 underlined that opposition to the project would remain high. 42

In the meantime, in the context of economic crisis, since the beginning of the most recent chapter in the Arab±Israeli peace process in 1991, the village has been rocked by ups and downs, especially, in the realm of land prices. When developments are positive, prices rise, when there is a setback, they drop again. Some of those living in the new housing (civil service and army retirees) are so indebted that they have simply stopped paying their mortgages. The increase in land prices has led many to sell their property as the only way to survive. 43 Again, as was the case in Petra/Umm Sayhun, the state's actions failed to compensate properly or suciently these villagers in such a way as to ensure their economic well-being after the displacement. As has been pointed out, compensations based solely on the calculation of current property values generally fall short of providing what may be termed replacement value, and by extension of being sucient, much less fair. Although a few villagers have been employed at Qsus' resthouse, Umm Qays has realized few bene®ts from the ``development'' that has taken place. The continuing opposition of the villagers through the FOA to the proposed tourism villageÐ and that opposition's ability to date to stop the project from being approvedÐo€ers some hope that, whatever ®nal deal is agreed upon, the villagers will be ensured greater economic bene®t. (b) Petra/Umm Sayhun: 1989±99 A 1994 UNESCO report noted that despite the order to remove the Bdul from Petra, some 30 families were still living in the caves and negatively a€ecting the site: tarnishing the monuments and overgrazing, thus, contributing to the erosion process; using cisterns and caves to dispose of trash; sheltering herds of sheep and goats inside the caves or other monuments, and so on. 44 Certainly, one reason for the continued presence of the Bdul in Petra was the condition of their resettlement village of Umm Sayhun, which was described in a 1996 report in the following terms: The existing urban area comprises a mix of generally low standard dwellings many of which are unpainted or still under construction. Some are vacant, being used as animal pens or being vertically extended. . . It is not possible to change the situation in Umm Sayhun without both the approval and positive assistance

DISPLACEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT? of the residents and a regime of strong and possibly unpopular controls on development. From evidence here and elsewhere in the Petra region, it is clear that controls will be dicult to enforce and administer; moreover, it will be dicult to demand that local inhabitants begin to change their standards of living and cultural practice in any e€ort to establish a showcase for tourists. However, the fear that the residents may feel resentful if improvements are not made is sucient encouragement to attempt to improve the village and avoid its possible transition into a Bedouin ghetto projecting a negative image of this part of the National Park. 45

This multivolume document, the Petra Priority Action Plan (PPAP), was prepared by a local engineering consulting ®rm for the MOTA as part of an e€ort to establish priorities and projects to preserve, develop and manage Petra and its immediate vicinity. It suggested three possible scenarios for the future of Umm Sayhun. The ®rst was continued development within existing boundaries. The main concern implicit in this scenario, however, was that the village would expand vertically and eventually come within (unsightly) view of the Petra sanctuary. 46 The second scenario envisaged an expansion of the existing settlement. This would have established the permanency of the Bdul community on the site, just as it would have increased the area to allow for improvement in living conditions, and the removal of animals from the existing built-up areas. Such a proposal was likely to gain the support of the Bdul, but it would certainly have generated further con¯icts over land with the Liyathna, thus complicating implementation. Serious negative environmental side effects were also a consideration in this scenario. The third scenario, however, envisaged a second displacement of the Bdul. The advantage of this scenario, according to the PPAP, was that it would remove ``the need for cosmetic treatment to the village and seek to start again in a more appropriate way''Ðthus, explicitly acknowledging the mistakes of the previous resettlement. It was argued that the subsequent reuse of the site would allow for ®nancial returns to those who required compensation, just as it would enable the existing unacceptable development to be removed and more environmentally appropriate development to be established. The plan admitted that such a move might not have great appeal to the localsÐcertainly an understatementÐbut if it were part of an economic package that would

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o€er further opportunities for involvement in tourism it might be acceptable. It did caution that no sort of action should be taken without full consultations between all parties involved. 47 In the end, the Petra Regional Planning Council (PRPC), a governmental body established in 1995 as a superauthority for the Petra region, opted for the status quo scenario, not a new displacement, to which the Bdul were strongly opposed. This constituted a major victory for the Bdul, although additional housingÐanother Bdul demandÐwas not part of the proposal. 48 Shortly after the PPAP was released, the World Bank crafted a ``Second Tourism Development Project'' for Jordan, with components covering Petra, as well as two other sites in the south (Kerak and Wadi Rum) and Jerash, just north of the capital. For each of the sites various projects relating to infrastructure improvement, site management, and environmental protection were proposed. Among the stated development objectives were ``tourismrelated employment and income-generation potential.'' 49 Indeed, referring to it as a lesson from previous Bank work in the tourism sector, the report notes that ``Urban regeneration, including the delivery of better infrastructure, coupled with enforcement of land use plans, would improve not only the experience for tourists but also the quality of life for the local population at Petra (about 20,000)'' and the other three sites. 50 The project document lists and evaluates previous Bank-®nanced projects in Jordan, including the 1976 development project discussed in Section 4, although it makes no mention of the Bdul housing ®asco. 51 It stresses that a participatory approach was to be followed, in various stages of the project, and lists the various bene®ciaries/ community groups, intermediate NGOs and other institutions, and the level and type of their involvement. 52 Yet interviews with locals and with NGO representatives painted a much less de®nitive picture of extent of local participation. 53 Moreover, while noting that the towns of Wadi Musa and Umm Sayhun, as well as the PRPC, would bene®t from this project the plan added: there are parties that will likely lose in¯uence and power under the project. The most important of these are those private sector interests that wish to increase their activities inside or adjacent to Petra. . .without regulatory restriction. Pressure is especially likely to be brought on the PRPC by these groups, because

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the private sector is in the midst of a major development e€ort in this location. Limiting uncontrolled growth will be a challenge for the PRPC and may effect the project's sustainability over time. 54

The analysis was correct. Just after the Jordanian±Israeli peace in 1994, wealthy outside investors had begun to buy land and build hotels in expectation of a tourism peace dividend. Eager not to lose out, however, Wadi Musa residents began to build as well, gradually turning the hillsides around the entrance to the Petra sanctuary into wall-to-wall one, two and three star hotels. When outside NGOs, especially the Petra National Trust (PNT), established in 1990, lobbied with the Ministry of Tourism to have a moratorium placed on new hotel construction, the locals called foul, complaining that they were being prevented from bene®ting from the site as outsiders had. Those who owned horses that carried tourists into Petra were also extremely unhappy: arguing environmental, safety, and aesthetic concerns, the PNT and others succeeded in banning horses from entering the Siq, the long narrow entrance that opens onto the Khazna, the ®rst site inside Petra. Within the sanctuary itself, the Bdul objected to the PRPC's forcing the small ``restaurateurs'' to group together into a cooperative, as well as to plans to move souvenir sellers outside of the sanctuary and locate them all in a traditional souq (market) area in Wadi Musa. Hence, in the case of policies implemented based on both the PPAP and the World Bank plan, we have evidence of several successes, but also numerous defeats of the local communities' wishes. Nevertheless, it is clear that the level and form of involvement of the communities in the policy discussions was quite different from what had characterized Section 4 of the Petra story. Several factors explain the changes that had had taken place since the 1975±85 episode. One obvious change was a shift in development thinking, of which the 1994 UNESCO report on Petra is a clear example. Unlike its various predecessors, this document expresses concern, not just about the sustainability of development of and around the site, but also regarding the ``opposing interests'' of those seeking to preserve and protect Petra, and those of the tourism industry, which was mesmerized by the potential for a boom by commercializing the fragile site. 55 The UNESCO document is the ®rst to take seriously not only the Bdul and

the Liyathna as social and economic actors, but also the reality that ``development'' of the site would necessarily involve a number of likely incompatible interests. Important institutional changes had taken place as well. Most signi®cant was the establishment of the PRPC, which came in 1995 in response to a 1994 UNESCO plan recommendation and after a great deal of lobbying with the king and queen. Sta€ed (although not directed) largely by localsÐLiyathna, however, not BdulÐit comprises representatives from the MOTA, the Ministry of Public Works and the NGO sector, and has absolute power over building permits, land usage, implementation of regulatory plans, and infrastructure, as well as an independent budget (a line item in the MOTA budget) rati®ed by the cabinet. There are still many agencies, governmental and nongovernmental, based in Amman, all of which have interests in and responsibilities for Petra in one way or another, but the establishment of the PRPC helped to unify and localize decision-making. Until that time, the frequent changes in ministersÐcabinet reshuf¯es are a regular feature of the Jordanian political systemÐhad meant little continuity in policy-making or implementation. Moreover, local ocials tended to be weak, so the pervasiveness of patronage politics meant that permission to ``develop'' various sites was given without thought to potential damage, environmental or otherwise. Since the establishment of the PRPC, if land is to be con®scated, the owners are informed and they have a chance to protest. The same is true if an application for a building permit is rejected. There is now one institution to which appeal or complaint can be made, rather than the plethora of competing ministries and bureaus of the previous period. Moreover, the changed political climate in the kingdom gives the area's residents greater freedom to voice and pursue their complaints than was the case before. There is no question that the Liyathna and Bdul have stinging criticisms of the PRPC (as well as the MOTA and other government agencies) because of some decisions and policies which they view as running counter to their interests. The di€erence today, however, is that the cacophony of local voices has fora in which it may be heard and through which it may have an impact. This was far from the case in Phase I. Last, but not least in the list of important changes, is the emergence and activity of the

DISPLACEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT?

NGO sector. In the case of Petra, the PNT is the most prominent of a group of NGOs (including the FOA, which we saw in the case of Umm Qays) concerned with archaeology, cultural heritage and the environment. It addition to its successes noted above, it lobbied to ensure that NGOs would have a voice in the implementation of the World Bank plan, helped to secure Bdul representation on the PRPC, and was instrumental in assisting the Bdul in obtaining deeds to ``their'' land in Umm Sayhun. 56 Nevertheless, although the PNT played a critical role in trying to increase e€ective local participation in decision-making, it also supported the proposals by the state, the PPAP, and the World Bank to regulate carefully land use, horse routes, and souvenir selling, all of which drew the ire of the local community. Because of its high pro®le, Petra/Wadi Musa/ Umm Sayhun continues to receive the lion's share of the government's tourism development attention. Thanks to state, local community and NGO e€orts, the most notable example of government±community interaction in Jordan on development questions was initiated in spring 1999, in the form of a series of meetings and workshops between representatives of all the interested parties: the government, Ammanbased NGOs and representatives of Wadi Musa and Umm Sayhun. A capstone meeting was subsequently held in a hotel just outside of Petra (i.e., not in the capital), at which each group was able to present a summary of its needs and preferences. This was then followed by discussions with representatives from various government oces in order to determine what proposals and ideas were feasible. In this way, all parties were able to confront the potential con¯icts, but also imagine possible compromises and solutions. Continuing consultations and meetings among all the parties were planned to continue, both to best serve the area and to further develop this novel (for Jordan) model of state, local community, and NGO consultation. 57 6. CONCLUSIONS While it is clear that neither of the cases examined above reached the scale and depth of the disastrous projects examined by Scott, each nonetheless contains clear manifestations of the four elements he argues are required for development project failure. What this article has tried to examine is how those four elements

971

may change over time, particularly using the introduction of major political reformÐa political liberalization processÐas a dividing point, and using civil society activity as an indicator. During the martial law period in Jordan, the ®rst factor, the engagement of the state in the processes of simpli®cation of population and territorial control, is clearly present in the processes of sedentarization and land registration, among others. The adoption of high modernism as a state ideology, factor number two, is not as clear as it is in many other country examples, although Jordanian bureaucrats and technocrats certainly demonstrated their arrogance and lack of concern for local inhabitants on numerous occasions. What did have an impact, however, was the kingdom's continuing interaction with a number of international development agencies, most notably the World Bank, but also USAID and others, which had internalized a modernization paradigm that privileged technical, ``scienti®c'' expertise over local knowledge. Factor three, the authoritarian state's willingness to bring to bear its full coercive power to implement development projects, is also present in only muted form in Jordan. Neither of the development projects examined here was of such importance to the state as to be viewed as a security issue. The Jordanian state's greatest concern during this period was the threat of war from across the river and the threat of domestic discontent from within. While Jordan's security apparatus was certainly capable of applying massive deadly force (witness the September 1970 civil war), it instead mastered lower levels of sustained coercion, not those associated with the repression required for the massive projects Scott discusses. Finally, as for the strength or vitality of civil society, during 1957±89, the state closely monitored the operation of existing and plans for new civil society institutions. Many institutions were refused permission to register, some struggled within the small margin of freedom of maneuver they were allowed, and others were forced to close. With all the elementsÐif not as pronouncedÐin place, one should not be surprised that the developments at Umm Qays and Petra/Umm Sayhun fall into the ``failed projects'' category. What changed following 1989? Certainly not the state's interest in controlling or administering its people and territory. In addition,

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although there was certainly a retreat in the state's use of its coercive apparatus, the potential remained, as was demonstrated in the cases of several riots (e.g., the disturbances in Kerak in 1996). It is in factors two and four, the acceptance of high-modernism (in this case by development agencies) and the strength of civil society that Jordan seems to o€er interesting lessons though the experiences of Umm Qays and Petra/Umm Sayhun. There is no question that the changes Cernea claims began to appear in World Bank thinking made their way into project documents for Petra. One ®nds repeated references to the need to consult with the locals or claims that such consultations had taken place, although as discussed above, practice was not always in keeping with rhetoric. Nevertheless, while many of the Bdul and Liyathna are not pleased with the way that the PRPC has handled certain aspects of the Petra region's development, there is no question that there is more local representation that was the case in the past, and that there is at least a single, identi®able mechanism in place to hear people's complaints about land use decisions. It also appears that some learning took place as a result of the 1976±85 Bdul resettlement scheme. Almost allÐBdul, Liyathna and local ocialsÐ agree that the project was a major failure from virtually any perspective (except that of those who felt that moving the Bdul out in and of itself was an important achievement). Yet no one wanted to right a wrong with another wrong; that is, by advocating another resettlement of the Bdul out of Umm Sayhun. The opposition of the Bdul has been a major, although not the only, factor in arriving at this conclusion. In the case of Petra, the activities of a number of NGOs, including most notably because of its royal backing, the PNT, were able to catch the attention of the royal family and unquestionably played a role in turning the tide of unchecked and unexamined ``development'' at the site. Of course, it is worth asking whether these NGOs would have been as successful had they chosen an issue in which royalty were less interested or to which they were opposed. But what is important here is that in the post-1989 atmosphere a number of NGOs have emerged in key sectors and have been able to have an impact on policy in a way that at least in some instances defended the rights and interests of the local inhabitants. This is also clearly borne out in the case of Umm Qays, where the ac-

tivities of and dogged opposition to the Qsus project by the local FOA branch appears to have been a major factor in putting the tourist village project on hold. Before celebrating the increasing role of NGOs, however, it is important to keep in mind that except in the instance of the FOA in Umm Qays, it was Amman-based NGOs that served to spotlight issues and channel the voices of locals to the capital. That is all well and good for the furthering of locals' interests as long as Amman-based groups' interests and their's coincide. But there is no reason to assume that this will always be the case, or that it should be. The displeasure of some in Wadi Musa with the land use policies advocated by the Petra National Trust was noted above. Indeed, many Liyathna and Bdul resent the continuing role of outsiders, whether governmental or nongovernmental. Therefore, one cannot automatically view the activities of Amman-based NGOs as the means either to strengthen civil society elsewhere in the kingdom or to e€ectively articulate local interests. NGOs based in the capital can and do ®ght local interestsÐalthough not participationÐ when such interests run counter to the NGOs' preferences. In the meantime, cases such as that of Umm Qays may become more common. In an atmosphere in which there is greater freedom of expression, local versions of institutions from the ``center'' may be used or captured by community interests to play a role in interest articulation. Fieldwork made clear that it was the Umm Qays branch of the Friends of Archaeology, and not the Amman parent that was playing the major role in working against the tourist-village project. The presence of a long-established branch of the FOA in Amman certainly gave the Umm Qays group more of an audience and voice, but it is not the case that FOA-Amman is solidly behind the northern branch's activities. (Indeed, some of the prospective investors in the resort project are members of the Amman FOA branch.) The post-1989 atmosphere clearly o€ers more possibilities for villagers to express themselves and even to make more e€ective use of the judicial system to defend their interests. The changed atmosphere has also meant that private investors cannot count on locals to be intimidated into silence. Hence they need to be concerned that lack of cooperation from locals may result in the failure of their projects.

DISPLACEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT?

The picture painted by the cases is one of a complex set of interactions among a variety of state, civil society (both local and Ammanbased), and private sector actors. Prior to 1989, most of the currently active civil society institutions did not exist (e.g., PNT) or had a much lower pro®le (e.g., FOA), rarely engaging in lobbying on policy issues. In the phase prior to 1989, decisions were made by members of the central government in Amman, many of whom had little knowledge of or interest in the sites (or the locals) that were to be a€ected. This is not to say that civil society has ¯ourished unimpeded since 1989. The process of political opening has not been linear. Nor is the playing ®eld level. Most of the civil society actors that have come to enjoy a certain in¯uence since the beginning of the liberalization are those that are run by individuals who were prominent and powerful before and/or who enjoy a certain access to interested members of the royal family. Hence, although the lines of expression and communication may be expanding and widening, the ®rst bene®ciaries are those who were already in an advantaged position. It is these relatively privileged institutions that have then opened the way for the traditionally excluded. The increased opening is positive and signi®cant. It played a major role in making local voices heard in both of the cases examined above, but it is not a guarantee for the future. Nor is it a guarantee that if local associational networks are strengthened, local interests will inexorably increasingly win in their battles with the state. Nor should they necessarily. Delineating development policy as required for ``the national interest'' is a highly political process. People of good will and intentions on various sides of an issue will di€er over what is required; but ultimately, decisions must be made and such decisions generally involve losers as well as winners. For example, all of the lobbying in the world on the part of the to-be-displaced will not change a society's need for a dam to help regulate agriculture and provide hydroelectric power. In other cases, the local population is part of the problem in attempts at cultural heritage site preservation: while many disapprove of the way the resettlement has taken place, most of the people familiar with Petra believe that the government had no choice but to remove the Bdul if the site was to be preserved. In such cases, one can argue that broader, national development or preservation interests require

973

that the preferences of the local community be set aside. It is clear that such cases, in which a larger ``good'' should trump local wishes, will continue to arise. The question then is how determine when this is the case and then how to deal with its rami®cations. The importance of proper representation for the a€ected community(ies) is unchanging and basic. Meetings such as those described above regarding the future of Petra/Wadi Musa/Umm Sayhun in which all concerned parties are properly represented and can make their needs and fears known are critical. Such hearings may help to prevent unnecessary displacements. Even short of preventing the displacement, they arguably could have led to a di€erent outcome in Umm Qays, where now, instead, the situation is characterized by anger, suspicion and polarization. Emphasis must be placed on proper representation. Governments and international development institutions must be far more careful about who they recruit or accept as representative voices. These Jordanian cases make clear that in societies in which family, clan and tribe are so important, an unexamined selection of token locals can be as damaging or delegitimizing as no representation at all. There continues to be considerable room for improvement on this front. Finally, even once policy decisions have been made, those populations likely to be adversely a€ected must continue to be properly represented in discussions shaping the outlines of displacement and resettlement policy. Cernea has discussed in detail the impoverishment risks and reconstruction (IRR) model, which focuses on the sources of potential impoverishment as a result of displacement and proposes means to eliminate or mitigate these risks. Among the factors he mentions is the need for continuing communication between the local community and the state. 58 The stronger the associational network among the a€ected populations and those concerned with their future, the more likely that such exchanges will be fruitful in the sense of leading to a safeguarding of local interests. The development of civil society institutions does not and should not mean the end to projects involving population displacement. What it can mean, however, is a more e€ective voice for those most a€ected and potentially most at risk, and hence, a greater likelihood that some of the most destructive e€ects of such projects can be minimized or avoided.

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NOTES 1. Scott (1998, p. 4).

19. USAID (1968, p. 22).

2. Scott (1998, pp. 4±5).

20. USAID (1968).

3. Scott (1998, Chapter 9).

21. USAID (1968, p. 12).

4. Brand (2000).

22. World Bank (1976, pp. 7, 25).

5. Guggenheim and Cernea (1993, pp. 3±4). 6. Cernea (1993, pp. 19±20).

23. Personal correspondence with Anna Paolini, a UNESCO architect familiar with the project, July 7, 1999.

7. Cernea (1993, pp. 17, 24±26).

24. World Bank (1976, p. 26).

8. Foley and Edwards (1996, pp. 38±39) and Janoski (1998, p. 13).

25. SECA (1994, p. 76).

9. Diamond (1994, p. 5). 10. Janoski (1998, pp. 12±16). See also NGOs (2000, pp. 25±27). 11. Foley and Edwards (1996, p. 41). 12. See Putnam (1993, 1995). For critiques of Putnam, see Edwards and Foley (1998) and Berman (1997). 13. Foley and Edwards (1996, pp. 39, 42). 14. Much of the background information on Umm Qays and its story is taken from an interview with Umm Qays mayor Ahmad Salim al-`Umari, municipal engineer Salih Malkawi, and head of the local boys school, Husni Sawalha, in addition to a number of other Umm Qays residents who happened to pass through the mayor's oce during the course of the four-hour group interview session, July 17, 1998. Hereafter, Umm Qays group interview.

26. World Bank (1976, p. 7). 27. Diwan al-Muhasiba (1983, pp.142, 145). 28. World Bank (1985, p. 1). The Bdul housing was part of this project. 29. The de®nitive administrative census and consultation with the Bedouin undertaken in October 1983 to establish criteria for allocating housing units determined that there were 111Ðthe number in 1976 had been only 96Ðeligible families, that there were 128 wives in the 109 male-headed families, and that two housing units would be allocated to families which had two or more wives and eight or more family members. World Bank (1976, pp. 6±7). 30. Simms and Kooring (1996, p. 23). The name of the tribe is written in a variety of ways: Bdul, Bedul, Bidul, etc. 31. Shraydeh discussion.

15. All the speci®cations as well as the levels of compensation for the sequestered property may be found in al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah (Ocial Gazette, 2,764, March 24, 1978, pp. 669±744).

32. Jordan Times, March 27, 1988.

16. Discussion with Sultan Shraydeh, retired inspector, Department of Antiquities, Irbid District, Jordan, June 19, 1999, during a site visit to Umm Qays.

34. Jordan Times, March 27, 1988.

17. Umm Qays group interview. 18. Umm Qays group interview.

33. This became clear in the course of the interviews and site visits.

35. Interview with head of the Umm Qays Friends of Archaeology, Talib Rusan, July 4, 1999, in Umm Qays. Rusan insisted that there were people from Umm Qays who had been interested in running this resthouse but had not been given the chance because of collusion

DISPLACEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT? between the village leadership at the time and those who already at the time had plans for another resthouse; others contended that the villagers had had no real interest in tourists or tourism until the resthouse in the old village was constructed.

47. Dar al-Handasa (1996). 48. Interview with the director of the Petra Regional Planning Council, Dr. Kamil Mahadin, July 26, 1998, in Wadi Musa.

36. Interview with Zayd Qsus, August 3, 1998, in Amman.

49. World Bank (1997, p. 2).

37. Qsus interview.

50. World Bank (1997, p. 3).

38. Interview with former Minister of Tourism `Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib, June 13, 1998, in Amman; interviews at Umm Qays.

51. World Bank (1997, p. 6).

39. Umm Qays group interview. 40. Al-Dustour article, undated, from FOA-Umm Qays ®les. 41. Jordan Times, August 31, 1999.

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52. World Bank (1997, p. 11). 53. Evaluations by interviewees of the extent and representativeness of participation varied widely. In research on Wadi Rum similar problems were reported. See Brand, forthcoming. 54. World Bank (1997, Annex 4, p. 8).

42. Al-Ra`i, 16 November, 1999.

55. SECA (1994, p. 120).

43. Discussion with Christine Janke, German researcher who worked in and on Umm Qays. August 3, 1998, in Amman. 44. SECA (1994, p. 130).

56. Interview with Director of the PNT, Aysar `Aqrawi, July 15, 1998.

45. Dar al-Handasa (1996, pp. 4±15).

57. Interview with Dr. `Atef Nusayr, Director of Studies, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, July 18 1999, in Amman.

46. Dar al-Handasa (1996, pp. 4±22).

58. Cernea (2000, pp. 41±42).

REFERENCES Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics, 49(3), 401±429. Brand, L. A. (2000). Resettling, reconstructing and restor(y)ing: archaeology and tourism in Umm Qays. Middle East Report, 214. Brand, L. A. (forthcoming). Development in Wadi Rum?: State Bureaucracy, External Funders and Civil Society. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Cernea, M. M. (1993). Anthropological and sociological research for policy development on population resettlement. In S. E. Guggenheim, & M. M. Cernea (Eds.), Anthropological approaches to resettlement: Policy practice and theory (pp. 13±38). Boulder: Westview. Cernea, M. M. (2000). Risks, safeguards, and reconstruction: a model for population displacement and resettlement. In M. M. Cernea, & C. McDowell (Eds.), Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of

resettlers and refugees (pp. 1±50). Washington, DC: The World Bank. Handasa, Dar al- (1996). Petra priority action plan study. Amman, Jordan: Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities. Diamond, L. (1994). Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 5(7), 4±17. Diwan al-Muhasibah (Accounting Oce). Al-Taqrir alSanawi li-Diwan al-Muhasiba (Annual Report), 1982±85. Amman, Jordan: Diwan al-Muhasiba. Edwards, B., & Foley, M. (1998). Civil society and social capital beyond Putnam. American Behavioral Scientist, 42(1), 124±139. Foley, M., & Edwards, B. (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal of Democracy, 7(7), 38±52. Guggenheim, S. E., & Cernea, M. M. (1993). Anthropological approaches to resettlement: policy, practice and theory. In S. E. Guggenheim, & M. M. Cernea

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(Eds.), Anthropological approaches to resettlement: Policy practice and theory (pp. 1±12). Boulder: Westview. Janoski, T. (1998). Citizenship and civil society. NewYork: Cambridge University Press. NGOs. (2000). Sins of the Secular Missionaries. The Economist, January 29, 25±27. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65±78. Scott, J. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Simms, S., & Kooring, D. (1996). The Bedul Bedouin of Petra, Jordan: traditions, tourism and an uncertain future. Cultural Survival Quarterly, 22±25.

Societe d'Eco-Amenagement (SECA). (1994). Jordan: Petra National Park Management Plan. Amman, Jordan: UNESCO. USAID. (1968). United States Agency for International Development. Master plan for the protection and use of the Petra National Park. Washington, DC: USAID. World Bank. (1976). The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: appraisal of a tourism project. Report No. 1069a-JO. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (1985). Project completion report: Jordan tourism project (Credit 639-JO). Report No. 5729. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (1997). Project appraisal document on a proposed loan of US$32 million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for a second tourism development project. Report No. 16485-JO. Washington, DC: The World Bank.