Dissonance awareness: A test of dissonance theory versus self-perception theory

JOURNAL

OF

EXPERIMENTAL

Dissonance

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

Awareness: Versus

8, 502-517

( 1972)

A Test of Dissonance

Self-Perception MARK

SATYDER~

Stanford

University

Theory

Theory1

AND EBBE University

B.

EBBESEN

of California,

San Diego

The effects of choice, initial attitude salience, and counterattitudinal behavior salience upon attitudes were examined within a forced-compliance essay-writing paradigm. By examining the interactions between choice and each of the behavior and attitude salience variables, an attempt was made to test the relative utility of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories. Consistent with both theories, when neither initial attitudes nor behavior were salient, subjects agreed with their essays more under Choice than under No Choice conditions. In partial accord with self-perception theory but contrary to dissonance theory predictions, when initial attitudes were made salient, Choice subjects agreed less with their essays and No Choice subjects agreed more with their essays than when initial attitudes were not made salient. Both theories predict that behavior salience should increase the basic choice effect; in fact, this variable had no effect on final attitudes. A self-estimate theory was proposed to account for the relationships observed among one’s perceived choice, perceived extremity of one’s essay, and one’s final attitude.

When people are induced to behave contrary to their beliefs, they tend to change these beliefs so that they become more consistent with their behavior. Political organizers and activists have long shared the insight ‘The authors thank Daryl J. Bern for his helpful suggestions and comments on This research was conducted while the first earlier versions of this manuscript. author held a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship, and the second a NSF Graduate Fellowship. ‘Requests for reprints should be sent to Mark Snyder, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. 502 Copyright @ 1972 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

DISSONANCE

AWARENESS

503

that an hour on the picket line or an afternoon at a sit-in will influence participants far more effectively than eloquent lectures or discussions. Less obvious, however, has been the demonstration that in many situations counterattitudinal behavior most dramatically influences an actor’s attitudes when he has few reasons or minimal justification for such behavior (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Cohen, 1962; Carlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966; Helmreich & Collins, 1968). Two general theories of attitude change compete over the most appropriate interpretation of these findings: cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Aronson, 1969) and self-perception (Bern, 1965, 1967). The basic paradigms (e.g., counterattitudinal essay writing, face-toface role playing, videotaped speeches, and forbidden toys) as well as recent variations of them (e.g., Linder & Jones, 1969; Lepper, Zanna, & Abelson, 1970) are, of course, embraced by both formulations. Each theory has some advantages in as much as it can explain phenomena which the other cannot. There are some studies which support one of the two theories under conditions in which the other seems to be inapplicable. Thus several studies appear to require a motivational explanatory concept such as dissonance (e.g., Pallak, Brock, & Kiesler, 1967; Waterman & Katkin, 1967; Zimbardo, 1969). Other studies demonstrate self-perception effects in nondissonance or consonant behavior situations (e.g., Bern, 1965, 1966, 1967; Kiesler, Nisbett, & Zanna, 1969). Nonetheless, there has to date been no research in which the two theories have directly confronted each other; a crucial experimental situation about which the two theories make differential predictions is needed. The recent experiment by Bern and McConnell (1970) suggests that one way to discriminate between the two theories is to examine the roles which the salience of initial attitudes and the salience af counterattitudinal behavior play in each theory. According to theoretical analysis (Festinger, 1957; Brehm, 1962; Zimbardo, 1969) and some empirical findings ( Carlsmith et al., 1969), as the awareness or salience of cognitive dissonance increases, dissonance reduction through attitude change will increase. One way of increasing a subject’s awareness of dissonance would be to increase the salience of the cognitions which are producing the dissonance. Making both the initial attitude cognition and the counterattitudinal behavior cognition salient should produce the maximum awareness of dissonance. Making one or the other cognition salient should produce less awareness than when both are salient but more than when neither is salient. If we assume, as some have suggested (Brehm, 1962; Zimbardo, 1969), that greater awareness of dissonance will produce greater pressures to reduce

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dissonance it follows that there should be least attitude change when neither the initial attitude nor the counterattitudinal behavior are salient, more attitude change when one or the other cognition is made salient, and most change when both cognitions are made salient. Contrast this view of the effects of salience with that of self-perception theory (Bern, 1967). Self-perception theory proposes that people infer their attitudes from their behavior only “to the extent that information from internal cues is weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable” (Bern & McConnell, 1970, p. 23). I n a forced compliance experiment, the internal cues which are important to the subject when he tries to label himself are his memory of his initial attitude, his behavior and the surrounding circumstances. To the extent that the initial attitude cues are salient, the subject’s postmanipulation attitude should agree with his initial one. The subject should remember what he has previously reported as his initial attitude. To the extent that the subject’s discrepant behavior is salient, his attitude should “change” and agree with his recent behavior. The subject should use his behavior to determine what his present position is rather than his memory. ‘Thus, self-perception theory predicts that when the initial attitude cues are made salient there should be less “attitude change,” but when the counterattitudinal behavior is made salient, there ought to be more “attitude change” than when neither set of cues is made salient. The exact nature of the effect that making both the initial attitude and the discrepant behavior salient is unclear in self-perception theory. It may be additive as implied by Bern ( 1964, p. 31, p. 51), resulting in more attitude change than when only initial attitudes are made salient but less than when behavior is made salient. Alternately, the process may be multiplicative such that any cue that questions the credibility of one’s behavior will serve to discount the behavioral cues and thereby eliminate attitude change (Linder & Jones, 1969; Kelley, 1971). Thus, if the multiplicative rule holds, making both the initial attitude and the counterattitudinal behavior salient would be no different from making just the initial attitude salient. Based on the above reasoning, an experiment was conducted to test the relative utility of the theories of cognitive dissonance and selfperception. Specifically, the salience of initial attitudes and counterattitudinal behavior was independently manipulated. The effects of these manipulations on final attitude statements were examined in a forced compliance paradigm in which subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under two conditions of freedom of choice. The patterns of final attitude self-report scores predicted by each theory are summarized in Table 1. In this table, “20” represents the average position of a subject before writing this essay. Higher numbers indicate greater agreement between final attitudes and the positions expressed in the counterattitudinal

DISSONANCE

HYPOTHETICAL

FINAL

505

AWARENESS

TABLE 1 ATTITUDES AS PREDICTED BY DISSONANCE SELF-PERCEPTION THEORY

Nothing salient (regular forced compliance experiment)

Attitude salient

Dissonance theory predictions Choice 30 No choice 20 No essay control 20 Self-perception theory predictions Choice 30 No choice 20 No essay control 20

Behavior salient

THEORY

Both

AND

salient

40 20

40 20

50 20

20 20

40 20

30/20 20

essay. These conventions have been chosen to facilitate comparing the predicted with the actual patterns of results. Both theories predict the basic choice effect when neither attitude nor behavior is made salient. On the other hand, dissonance theory predicts that this basic choice effect will be increased by making the initial attitude salient, while self-perception theory predicts that the basic choice effect will be decreased, or even eliminated, by the same manipulation of salience. Both theories predict that the basic choice effect should be larger when the counterattitudinal behavior is made salient. Furthermore, dissonance theory predicts that the greatest choice effect will occur when both the initial attitude and the counterattitudinal behavior are made salient while self-perception theory predicts either that the effects of the conflicting influences of attitude and behavior salience will cancel each other (assuming an additive rule) or that the effect of choice on final attitudes will be the same as in the attitude salient conditions (assuming a multiplicative rule). Finally, both theories predict that under low choice, when the external justification for engaging in the behavior is sufficient to explain the action, these salience manipulations ought to have little or no effect. METHOD All subjects participated in a forced compliance essay-writing experiment modeled after a procedure developed by Bern and McConnell ( 1970). There were two levels of choice: Choice and No Choice, and four conditions of salience: Nothing Salient, Attitude Salient, Behavior Salient, and Both Attitude and Behavior Salient, A no-essay Control group was included as a baseline. The three conditions in which neither the attitude nor the counterattitudinal behavior were made salient constitute an exact replication of the Bern and McConnell ( 1970) study. Subjects. Two hundred and twenty-eight male and female Stanford University

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undergraduates participated as part of their introductory psychology course. The experiment was conducted in group sessions of approximately 12 subjects each. Because the manipulations of choice and salience were contained in individual b3oklets, it was possible to assign each subject randomly to one of the eight experimental conditions and keep the experimenter ignorant of this assignment, Control subjects drawn from the same subject population were run in separate group sessions. Procedure. with the exception of the manipulations of attitude and behavior salience, the procedure was identical to that of Bern and McConnell ( 1970), including the use of the same attitude topic: Student control over university curriculum. All subjects received a booklet entitled “Psychology Department Opinion Survey” and were told that all instructions for the experiment were contained within it. The written instructions explained that the Psychology Department was conducting a project researching student views on campus issues, and that the current stage of the research involved collecting arguments for and against the various positions expressed on these issues. Subjects in the Control conditions were run in separate group sessions. Their only task was to fill out the post-test attitude measures. Manipdution of attitude salience. The following instructions then appeared in the booklets of those subjects assigned to the Attitude Salient and Both Salient conditions: Before proceeding further, take a few minutes to think about your thoughts and views on the issue of student control over courses offered by the University (i.e., should students have much or how little? If students should have some control, who the rest? What kinds of control? Why or why not?, etc.). DO CEED FURTHER UNTIL YOU HAVE FULLY ORGANIZED THOUGHTS ON THIS ISSUE.

and organize the kinds of control? how should have NOT PROYOUR

It was assumed that the manipulation instructions would cause students to consider their pro-control views, but that since they did not have to state them overtly it would not also commit them to their initial positions. Manipulation of freedom of choice. All subjects were then instructed to write a convincing essay arguing that students should have little or no control over courses offered by the University. No Choice subjects read: On the attached sheet, you are to write a one-page essay which argues convincingly as possible that “Students should have VERY LITTLE NO CONTROL over the kinds of courses offered by the University.” Choice

subjects

as or

read:

On the attached sheet, you are to write a one-page essay which argues as convincingly as possible that “Students should have complete control over the kinds of courses offered by the University” OR an essay which argues that “Students should have little or no control over the kinds of courses offered by the University.” The choice is up to you. But an “IMPORTANT NOTE” the blank sheet on which the

sheet was inserted between Choice subjects were to write

the instruction their essay:

sheet

We now find that we have enough “pro-control” arguments and we are in need of “anti-control” arguments. Therefore in this session we would appreciate it if as many of you as possible would write one-page essays which

and

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argued for the point of view that “Students should have VERY LIlTLE or NO CONTROL over the kinds of courses offered by the University.” Thank you. All experimental purpose.

subjects then wrote the essay on the blank sheet provided

for that

M~niptdution of behuuior salience. For subjects in the Behavior Salient and Both Salient conditions, a question appeared at the bottom of the sheet on which they wrote their essays asking them to rate the quality of the arguments in their essays on a 61-point scale labeled at IS-point intervals from “Strongly PRO-Student Control” to “Strongly ANTI-Student Control.” It was assumed that this rating would make salient to the subject the nature of the essay he had just written. After the counterattitudinal essays were written, all subjects completed the same dependent measure scales. Subjects stated their final attitude on the student control issue by responding to the question: “How much control should students have over the kinds of courses offered by the University?“, on a 61-point horizontal scale labeled at lo-point intervals from “No Control” to “Complete Control.” On the final page, measures of perceived freedom of choice and perceived attitude change were obtained on similar 61-point scales. All subjects were then debriefed, thanked for their cooperation, and cautioned not to discuss the experiment until the end of the academic year.

KESULTS

AND DISCUSSION

The experimental predictions of dissonance and self-perception theories concerning the effects of the salience of initial attitudes and counterattitudinal behavior on final attitudes can now be tested. Mean attitude ratings for each condition are presented in Table 2 and may be compared with the pattern predicted by each theory (in Table 1). An unweighted means 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance with an additional comparison group, performed to determine the main effects and interactions of choice, attitude salience, and behavior salience, is presented in Table 3. TABLE FINAL

ATTITUDES

TOWMLD

STUDENT

Nothing salient

2

CONTROL

OVER

At#titude salient

UNIVERSITY

Behavior salient

COURHW

Bot>h salient

Choice No choice No essay control a Range = O-60. Higher scores indicate greater agreement between final attitudes and counterattitudinal essay; t,hat is, greater inferred attitude change in t,he direction of less student control.

508

SNYDER

ANALYSIS

OF VARIANCE:

FINAL

Source Between conditions Attitude salience Behavior salience Choice (C) AxB BXC

(A) (B)

CxA AXBXC All experimental Within conditions

groups error

vs control

AND

EBBESEN

TABLE 3 ATTITUDES

TOWARD

STUDENT

(1.f

MS

8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 219

333.6s 60.29 12.72 589.53 202.20 147.02 1484.74 32.05 140.93 96.09

CONTROL

F 3.47** 0.63 0.13 6.14* 2.10 1.53 15.45*** 0.33 1.47

*p < .05. ** p < .Ol.

***p

< .OOl.

To highlight the relevance of these results to dissonance and selfperception theories, it is helpful to examine the effects of the choice manipulation on final attitudes under each of the four conditions of salience; that is, a column-by-column analysis of the results of Table 2. The first column of Table 2 provides a test of the effect of choice on attitudes when neither the initial attitude nor the conflicting behavior is made salient. In fact, these three conditions are an exact replication of the Bern and McConnell (1970) f orced-compliance experiment. Both their findings and the classic forced-compliance effect predicted by both theories have been replicated. An unweighted means one-way analysis of variance on these three conditions reveals a significant overall effect [F(2,87) = 5.43, p < .Ol]. More specifically, subjects in the Choice condition indicated that students should have less control over courses, thereby agreeing more with their essays, than did subjects in the combined No Choice and Control conditions [F( 1,87) = 7.33, p < .Ol]. There was no difference between the No Choice and Control conditions

(F < 1). The effects of choice on final attitudes for those subjects who had thought about their attitudes on student control before writing a counterattitudinal essay are indicated in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. Dissonance theory predicts that attitude salience should increase the basic choice effect of Column 1. Self-perception theory predicts that making the initial attitude salient should decrease or eliminate this effect. Both theories agree that attitude salience should not influence the final attitudes of the No Choice subjects. These alternative predictions can be

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AWARENESS

tested by examining the interaction between attitude salience and choice in the three-way analysis of variance in Table 3. This interaction was highly significant [F( 1,219) = 15.45, p < .Ol]. When subjects thought about their attitudes before essay-writing (Attitude Salient and Both Salient conditions), Choice and No Choice subjects did not differ on final attitudes. However, when the initial attitude was not salient, choice had a large effect on final attitudes. At first sight, this interaction appears to confirm the self-perception theory expectation and to refute dissonance theory. However, the specific nature of that interaction (Fig. 1) cannot be fully explained by self-perception theory. Although Attitude SalientChoice subjects did agree less with their essays than did Attitude Not Salient-Choice subjects [F( 1,219) = 4.65, p < .05], Attitude Salient-No Choice subjects agreed more with their essays than did Attitude Not Salient-No Choice subjects [F( 1,219) = 10.62, p < .OlJ. In other words, making the initial attitude salient affected No Choice subjects as we11 as subjects with high choice. This effect on No Choice subjects is neither predicted nor explained by self-perception theory. The No Choice subjects ought to have been unaffected by the attitude salience manipulation. The effects of choice on final attitudes for subjects who had their counterattitudinal behavior made salient can be seen in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Both dissonance and self-perception theories predict that making one’s counterattitudinal behavior salient should increase the effect of choice upon final attitudes. However, in the present study, be-

Some C0ntrli

Much COntrOl

Freedom FIG.

initial

1. The attitudes.

effects

of

choice

upon

final

of Choice

attitude

as a function

of

salience

of

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havior salience had neither main nor interaction effects on final attitudes, suggesting that neither dissonance nor self-perception theory is adequate. The Behavior Salient conditions do not differ from the Nothing Salient conditions; the Both Salient conditions do not differ from the Attitude Salient conditions. It should be pointed out that the results of Column 4 (Both Salient conditions) are partially consistent with the self-perception multiplicative rule for combining the effects of attitude and behavior salience. However, the theory cannot explain the absolute level of the means in these conditions. Thus, neither the predictions from dissonance theory nor those from self-perception theory have been confirmed, with regard to the manipulation of behavior salience. To summarize thus far, the pattern of results predicted by dissonance or self-perception theories do not fit the observed results adequately. While each, and particularly self-perception theory, accounts for some portion of the results, each leaves much unexplained, Specifically, neither theory can explain the exact nature of the interaction between choice and initial attitude salience, which accounts for over half the systematic (between conditions) variance. In fact, the residual variance unexplained by this interaction is not statistically significant [F( 7,219) = 1.76, n~].~ ‘Originally, 257 subjects were run in this experiment. Twenty-nine of the original subjects (11%) wrote proattitudinal rather than the counterattitudinal essays required by the forced compliance paradigm and were thus eliminated from the analysis. These subjects distributed themselves across conditions as follows: ChoiceNothing Salient, 4; No Choice-Nothing Salient, 4; Choice-Attitude Salient, 6; No Choice-Attitude Salient, 0; Choice-Behavior Salient, 6; No Choice-Behavior Salient, 2; Choice-Both Salient, 5; No Choice-Both Salient, 2. This subject loss problem was unexpected as previous usage of this paradigm both by the present authors and by Bem and McConnell (1970) had not resulted in any attrition, It is unfortunately possible that the results may be an artifact of differential subject loss across conditions. Several facts, however, strongly argue against this hypothesis. Although there were more noncompliers in the Choice conditions than in the No Choice conditions (which suggest that the choice manipulation was effective), there was no differential subject loss in the Choice-Nothing Salient and No Choice-Nothing Salient conditions, which showed the greatest difference in attitude of any two condition, in the experiment. Thus the effect of choice on attitudes probably exists independently of differential subject loss. Nor can the subject-loss hypothesis explain the interaction between choice and attitude salience. Ten subjects were lost in Choice-Attitude Not Salient conditions, 11 in Choice-Attitude Salient, 6 in No Choice-Attitude Not Salient. and 2 in No Choice-Attitude Salient. This difference is not significant [x2( 1) = 2.06, ns]. In fact, it is not even in the right direction to have produced this interaction. Furthermore, and this is the strongest argument of all, if the 29 noncompliers are there is still a highly significant included in the analysis of final attitude ratings, interaction between choice and attitude salience [F( 1,268) = 13.88, p < .OOl] which accounts for over ?j of the systematic between-conditions variation. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that our results were caused by differential subject loss across conditions.

DISSONANCE

TABLE

Choice No choice

PERCEIVED

FREEDOM

Nothing salient

Attitude

22.6 9.5

511

AWARENESS

4 OF CHOICE

salient

26.3 4.6

RATINGS~

Behavior salient

Both salient

29.3 4.5

35.0 4.3

a Range = O-60. Higher scores indicate greater perceived freedom of choice.

There are a number of hypotheses which might explain the failure of this experiment to unequivocally distinguish between the opposing theories. It is possible that the specific operations which were used to control the amount of perceived choice, initial attitude salience, and discrepant behavior salience were inadequate or ineffective. Consider first the subject’s self-rating of freedom in choosing which side of the issue to argue (Table 4). Subjects in the Choice conditions reported significantly more freedom of choice than subjects in the No Choice conditions [F( 1,177) = 100.79, p < .OOl]. Thus the experimental manipulation of choice was more than adequate. Perhaps having subjects think about their thoughts and views on an issue (the manipulation of initial attitude salience) actually commits them to their initial positions, thus making impossible any attitude shifts. Conceptually, this seems unlikely because commitment usually involves some externality: one states one’s attitude publically, one records it in writing, at least one other person knows one’s attitude, etc. The manipulation employed here required only covert activity; there is no way that anyone, including the experimenter, could gain information about the subject’s attitude. One might argue that the manipulation of behavior salience was ineffective. However, though no effect of this manipulation was found on final attitudes, it did affect other dependent variables in ways consistent with either or both theories. Thus, as predicted by dissonance theory, subjects in the Behavior Salient and Both Salient conditions showed greater differences in perceived freedom of choice between the No Choice and Choice conditions than did subjects who were not made to attend to their essays [F( 1,177) = 5.14, p < .05]. There was also a tendency for subjects in the Behavior and Both Salient conditions to perceive themselves as changing their attitudes less than the subjects whose behavior was not made salient, as predicted by self-perception theory [F( 1,177) = 3.67, .05 < p < .lO]. These results suggest that the behavior salience manipulation was effective. An interesting and compelling verification of the effectiveness of all three manipulations is provided by a detailed examination of the per-

512

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ceived freedom of choice ratings (Table 4). Dissonance theorists (Brehm & Cohen, 1962, pp. 201-206) have stressed volition or perceived freedom of choice as a direct index of the magnitude of dissonance present at any given moment. If the manipulations were affecting the amount of dissonance experienced, and if perceived choice is a reasonable index of dissonance, then the manipulations should produce the pattern of results predicted by dissonance theory for final attitudes (Table 1) on the measure of perceived choice. If this were not the case, then it might be reasonable to assume that the manipulations were inadequate. As noted in Table 4, the pattern of mean ratings of perceived choice conforms to this expectation, thus implying that the manipulations were, in fact, effective. A contrast (Edwards, 1968, pp. 135-141; Snedecor & Cochran, 1968, pp. 268-270) indicates that the pattern of means almost exactly matches that predicted by dissonance theory [F( 1,177) = 107.5, ‘p < .OOOl]. This match accounts for over 97% of the between cells variance. Thus the manipulations and procedure in this experiment were adequate to test predictions from both theories. One can only conclude that neither theory provides a completely adequate explanation of forcedchoice essay-writing situations. In search of a model which might explain the present results, we examined several additional sources of data from this study. Recall that subjects in the Behavior Salient and Both Salient conditions rated the position of their essays on a scale ranging from “Strongly Pro-Student Control” to “Strongly Anti-Student Control.” This manipulation rating also provided data concerning each subject’s perception of the extremity or discrepancy of his counterattitudinal behavior. Mean ratings are presented in Table 5. A 2 X 2 analysis of variance of these data indicated that subjects in the Choice conditions rated their essays as more prostudent control than did subjects in the No Choice conditions [F( 1,89) = 5.005, p < .OS]. No other effects were significant. In other words, subjects given low freedom of choice perceived their essays as more extremely counteradditional and more discrepant from their initial position than did subjects given high freedom of choice. This same effect occurs as a TABLE PERCEIVED

DISCREPaNCY

5

OF COUNTERATTITUDINAL

Behavior Choice No choice a Range = O-60. 0 = strongly student-control arguments.

BEHAVIOR:

salient

Both

student-control

~TINGS~

salient 47.2 52.9

46.0 49.0 pro

ESSAY

argunlents;

60 = strongly

anti

DISSONANCE

AWARENESS

513

within-conditions correlation: The more choice a subject felt he had, the more pro-student control, and therefore the less discrepant he rated his essay [r(88) = .40, p < ,011. Interestingly, the perceived position of the essay and final attitude position were also related. In those conditions in which attitudes were not made salient, the more pro-control a subject perceived his essay, the more anti-control he rated his final attitude [r( 42) = .33, p < .05]. Thus as the perceived extremity of the essay increased, the extremity of the inferred attitude decreased. When attitudes were made salient, essay ratings and final attitude position were not related [r( 44) = .02, ns]. Furthermore, the effect of choice on final attitudes was only observed in those conditions in which the perceived position of one’s essay and one’s final attitude were related (namely, the Nothing Salient and Behavior Salient conditions). This suggests that perceptions of the extremity of one’s own counterattitudinal behavior may mediate the classical forcedcompliance effect of choice on attitudes. If, indeed, perceived extremity of one’s own essay mediates the infllience of choice on final attitudes, then one must account for the relationships between choice and essay ratings, essay ratings and final attitudes, and the interaction of these relationships with manipulated attitude salience. The self-estimate model to be presented attempts to do just that. Why does increasing one’s feelings of freedom of choice cause the discrepant essays one writes to appear less extreme? This result can be interpreted in terms of how people have learned to make judgments relevant to their own actions. Bern (1967) has proposed that individuals learn to label their inner states on the basis of their behavior and the circumstances surrounding that behavior. It is only a slight extension of this theory, and one recently suggested by Nisbett and Valins (1971)) to propose that the circumstances surrounding the behavior might also affect perceptions of the behavior itself. Thus, low choice subjects would judge their actions as more compliant (i.e., more discrepant) because in the past high pressures (low choice) to comply have been followed by more compliance than low pressure (high choice) to comply. This reasoning explains why people with high choice see their essays as less extreme than do people with low choice. It does not, however, explain why these same individuals then state final attitudes which agree more with their essays than do low choice subjects. Nor does it explain why these final attitude differences occur only for individuals who have not previously thought about their attitudes on the topic. Within the present self-estimate model, a simple explanation is available. When a person is asked to state his attitude, he utilizes the information most immediately relevant and salient. If he has recently thought about the

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issue or stated his attitudes to others, he simply supplies the same answer again. This explains why subjects who have thought about their attitudes before writing the essay are unaffected by the choice manipulation and behave the same as subjects in the no-essay control condition. If, on the other hand, a subject has not recently formulated his opinion on a topic, his previous position may be somewhat hazy. In fact, he may even have trouble remembering what it was (Bern & McConnell, 1970). Therefore, his perception of his current position may be affected by the surrounding situation. Thus, if he perceives his recent behavior to be extreme in one direction, his present position may seem less extreme in contrast to that behavior. On the other hand, if he perceives his essay as relatively less extreme, then his present position may seem a bit more extreme in relation to his essay. The judgment process is very similar to the phenomenon of brightness contrast in which a spot of constant brightness appears lighter against a dark background than against a light background. Specifically, by contrast, the more extreme in one direction his behavior appears, the less extreme his private position will appear. Thus, when an initial position is not salient, the effects of choice upon the perceived position of the essay are translated into attitude differences. High choice subjects see their essays as less extremely anticontrol than do No Choice subjects. They subsequently judge their present attitudes, by contrast, to be more extremely anticontrol than do No Choice subjects. The self-estimate explanation presented above is very similar to selfperception theory and therefore some of their similarities and differences should be explored. Both approaches regard attitudes as self-judgments which are made at the time a subject is asked to state his attitude. Both approaches propose that information about behavior is used in the judgment process to the extent that more direct information from internal cues (recalled actions and feelings) is not available. The role of information about the context in which the behavior is displayed is different in the two approaches. In self-perception theory, perception of the behavior is a constant and choice is thought to determine the relevance of the behavior to the attitude judgment. In the present approach, perception of the behavior is not constant. Instead, choice determines perception of the behavior which in turn determines the attitude estimate. Thus, choice mediates perception of behavior rather than (or possibly in addition to) perception of attitude. To test the difference between self-perception theory and the present theory one would have to manipulate perceptions of the discrepancy of forced-compliance actions while holding constant justification. If perceived discrepancy does mediate self-estimates of attitude in the manner proposed above, then the greater the perceived discrepancy, the less the

DISSONANCE

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resultant attitude change. Furthermore, the effects of perceived discrepancy of one’s own behavior may be a special case of the effects of communicator discrepancy in interpersonal persuasion (cf., Bern, 1965, 1966). Specifically, there ought to be a positive relationship, as predicted by self-perception theory, between perceived discrepancy and attitude estimates only when the person feels that he is a credible communicator. If he feels that he is not a credible communicator, then discrepancy ought to be nonmonotonically related to attitude estimate. Up to a certain point, greater discrepancy should produce a more extreme attitude estimate. If the individual perceives his behavior as more discrepant than some crucial point, then greater discrepancy should be followed by less extreme attitude estimates (Aronson, Turner, & Carlsmith, 1964). It is likely that subjects in the present experiment were writing essays well beyond the crucial point. They may also have felt that they were neither expert nor trustworthy when writing a counterattitudinal essay about student control over University courses. Thus, it is possible that the present negative relationship between perceived discrepancy and attitudes will occur only when a subject believes himself to be a low credibility communicator. To test these predictions would, of course, require that self-credibility as well as perceived discrepancy be manipulated. The present self-estimate model may be seen as an initial attempt to specify, in more detail, some of the general suggestions made by Nisbett and Valins (1972) in their recent discussion of attribution theory. They rightly point out that the range of dependent variables which have been examined in dissonance and self-perception research have been far too limited. Most studies ask subjects to report their final attitude positions and nothing else. It is quite probable that complex manipulations, such as those in the present study, have effects on how the subject views his own behavior, how he views the situation in which his behavior occurs, how he views his present and past attitude position, how he views other people’s attitude positions, and so on. In short, the standard attitudechange paradigm has only scratched the surface of the many judgmental adjustments which might be produced by traditional attitude change attempts. If nothing else, the present study demonstrates how many of our prior conceptions of self-judgment have been too simplistic in conception. REFERENCES

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(Ed.),

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in

AcademicPress,1969.Pp.

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ARONSON, E., TURNER, JUDY A., & CARLSMITH, J. M. Communicator

Vol.

4. New credibility

York: and

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communication

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