Effects of Job Previews and Compensation Policy on Applicant Attraction and Job Choice

JOURNAL OF VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR ARTICLE NO.

49, 68–85 (1996)

0034

Effects of Job Previews and Compensation Policy on Applicant Attraction and Job Choice ALAN M. SAKS Faculty of Commerce and Administration, Department of Management, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

WILLI H. WIESNER School of Business, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada AND

RUSSEL J. SUMMERS Department of Management, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of job previews and compensation policy on applicant attraction and job choice. A laboratory study was conducted in which subjects were asked to choose between a job described by a realistic job preview (RJP) and a job described by a traditional job preview (TJP). The conditions varied by the compensation policy of the jobs presented in the job previews (high versus average). This resulted in the following four conditions: (1) TJP-High Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation; (2) TJP-Average Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation; (3) TJP-High Compensation, RJP-High Compensation; and (4) TJPAverage Compensation, RJP-High Compensation. The results of within conditions repeated measures analyses indicated that subjects rated the TJP job as more attractive than the RJP job only when the compensation of the RJP job was average. When the compensation of the RJP job was high, there were no differences in subjects’ ratings of attractiveness. Further, subjects indicated a greater intention to accept the TJP job and were more likely to choose the TJP job over the RJP job in all conditions except when the compensation policy of the RJP job was greater than the TJP job. The results of between conditions analyses indicated that subjects were more than twice as likely to choose an RJP job with high compensation than one with average compensation when the compensation of the TJP job alternative was average. These results suggest that the effects of RJPs on applicant attraction and job choice might depend on the compensation of the job and other job attributes. q 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

Research on realistic job previews (RJPs) has focused on the effects of job previews on post-entry outcomes and job survival (McEvoy & Cascio, 1985; Premack & Wanous, 1985; Wanous, 1992). Much less attention has been given to the effects of RJPs on recruitment and pre-entry outcomes which 68 0001-8791/96 $18.00 Copyright q 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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have tended to take a back seat to post-entry variables such as turnover (Rynes, 1991). Further, previous research on job previews has ignored the role of job attributes during recruitment. This is an important omission because job attributes might influence the effectiveness of job previews, and the effects of job previews might depend on the job itself (Rynes & Barber, 1990). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine the effects of job previews and job attributes on recruitment outcomes. In particular, we investigated the effects of job previews on applicant attraction and job choice for jobs with a high versus average compensation policy. REALISTIC JOB PREVIEWS AND APPLICANT ATTRACTION

Although the focus of realistic job previews has been on job survival, the effects of RJPs on applicant attraction and job choice has often been a secondary focus of research on the psychological effects of RJPs. Several studies, for example, have tested the effects of RJPs on job acceptance rates. In their meta-analysis of realistic job preview experiments, Premack and Wanous (1985) found some support for the hypothesis that RJPs increase the drop out rate of job candidates. However, several studies have recently found that the effects of realistic job previews on job acceptance may depend on applicants’ prior experiences and their job alternatives. For example, Meglino, DeNisi, and Ravlin (1993) found that RJP applicants had higher job acceptance rates compared to no-preview applicants for applicants without prior exposure to the job. In addition, several studies have found that the effects of RJPs on job acceptance depends on job alternatives. For example, Wiesner, Saks, and Summers (1991) and Saks, Wiesner, and Summers (1994) found that RJPs are most likely to result in lower job acceptance rates when subjects have a job alternative that was presented to them via a traditional job preview. Wiesner et al. assigned subjects to either a one job preview condition (RJP or TJP) or a two job preview condition (RJP and TJP) and found no differences in acceptance rates between the RJP job and the TJP job for subjects in the one job preview condition. However, when subjects were given a choice between an RJP job and a TJP job (two job preview condition), a significantly larger proportion of subjects chose the TJP job. Further, Wiesner et al. also found that the TJP job was rated as more attractive in the two job preview condition. Thus, Wiesner et al. demonstrated that realistic job previews are more likely to result in lower job acceptance rates when subjects have a job alternative that is presented to them via a traditional job preview. Similarly, Saks et al. (1994) found that when subjects had a choice between a job presented via a realistic job preview and an alternative that was presented via a traditional job preview, 71.4% selected the TJP job. In addition, the job and organization portrayed in the traditional job preview was also rated as more attractive. Subjects also believed that they would receive a better interview evaluation and would perform better in the TJP job compared to the

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RJP job and were more likely to accept the TJP job. These differences were not found for subjects who received only one of the job previews. The results of the Wiesner et al. (1991) and Saks et al. (1994) studies suggest that the effects of job previews on recruitment outcomes may be more negative when subjects have a job alternative that was presented to them via a traditional job preview. Thus, there exists the potential for RJPs to result in the loss of qualified applicants to organizations that use traditional recruitment. Although the psychology of RJPs is based on the ability of applicants to self-select out of a job that does not match their needs, this is a process that is distinct from job acceptance rates which is simply the number of applicants who accept or reject a job offer (Wanous & Colella, 1989). Therefore, job acceptance rates are not the same as self-selection. In fact, it is possible that some applicants who reject a job offer on the basis of an RJP may actually be appropriate candidates. However, while the potential for such ‘‘adverse self-selection’’ exists (Rynes, 1991), it has not been tested. Nonetheless, that RJPs might result in lower job acceptance rates (independent of self-selection) raises some important questions: ‘‘Is it possible that the effect of RJPs on attractiveness and job choice reported in previous studies might be abated by certain job attributes (and therefore keep qualified candidates motivated to pursue a job offer?)’’, and ‘‘Does the effect of RJPs on job acceptance decisions depend on the job?’’ In other words, are there some jobs for which RJPs will not result in lower job acceptance rates? The answers to these questions can have important implications for the use of realistic recruitment. For example, Rynes and Barber (1990) have noted that many organizations avoid realistic recruitment because of the negative effects it might have on attraction. However, they noted that ‘‘this tendency may be considerably abated when vacancy characteristics compare favorably with competitors’’ (p. 298). Thus, organizations may be more likely to use realistic recruitment if they believe that it will not have negative effects on the attraction of qualified applicants. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of RJPs on applicant attraction and job choice for jobs with high versus average compensation policies. JOB ATTRIBUTES AND APPLICANT ATTRACTION

The theoretical rationale for investigating the effects of compensation in RJP research comes from recruitment research on job attributes. In her review of the recruitment literature, Rynes (1991) noted that job attributes ‘‘swamp’’ other variables as influences of job choice decisions and retention. In a study on applicant reactions to recruitment activities and job attributes, Taylor and Bergmann (1987) found job attributes to be significant predictors of applicants’ reactions at all stages of recruitment, while recruitment activities were related to applicants’ reaction only at the initial interview stage. They concluded that organizations ‘‘should make certain that the attributes of vacant

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positions are comparable to those of competitors and that substantial information about attributes is provided throughout the recruitment process’’ (p. 282). Unfortunately, although job and organizational characteristics are the dominant factors in applicant attraction, recruitment research on job attributes has been limited. According to Rynes (1991), ‘‘researchers continue to study the effects of realism, while ignoring the job characteristics on which realistic presentations are based’’ (p. 428). This is an important omission because the effects of realistic recruitment may depend on job attributes and the job itself (Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Barber, 1990). Further, according to Rynes and Barber (1990), the attractiveness of a job relative to the same kind of positions in competing organizations might influence the effects of realistic job previews. Thus, it has been recommended that research investigate the role of job and organizational attributes in applicant attraction and job choice (Rynes, 1991). Although the attractiveness of job attributes depends to some extent on individual differences and market characteristics, there is evidence that at least for recruitment purposes, the most effective and important job attribute is compensation (Jurgensen, 1978; Rynes & Barber, 1990). In fact, theory and research suggests that verifiable inducements such as compensation are effective motivators of job acceptance decisions (Rynes & Barber, 1990), and pay in particular has been found to have a significant influence on job attractiveness and job choice (Rynes, Schwab, & Heneman, 1983). Further, according to neoclassical economic theory, higher wages attract more and better qualified applicants (Rynes & Boudreau, 1986). In two recent studies on compensation system attributes and pay preferences, Williams and Dreher (1992) found that pay level was positively related to job acceptance rates of bank tellers, and Cable and Judge (1994) found that organizations that offered high pay levels were more attractive to college students. Therefore, we chose compensation as the job attribute to study the effects of job previews and job attributes on applicant attraction and job choice. THE PRESENT STUDY

The objective of this study was to examine whether compensation policy would influence the effect of RJPs on applicant attraction and job choice when subjects have a TJP job alternative. Rynes (1991) noted that we do not know whether realistic job previews work differently with ‘‘bad’’ jobs versus ‘‘good’’ jobs. In this study, we attempted to examine the effects of RJPs for high versus average compensation jobs. To accomplish this objective, we conducted a laboratory study which combines the two-job preview methodology of Wiesner et al. (1991) with a compensation policy manipulation from a study by Schwoerer and Rosen (1989). Schwoerer and Rosen (1989) demonstrated the importance of compensation for applicant attraction in a study on employment-at-will and compensation policies. They predicted that a compensation policy to pay above the industry average would offset the negative effects of an employment-at-will policy. The results indicated a significant main effect for compensation policy.

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Subjects were more attracted to an organization with a high rather than an average compensation policy. Although the interaction between the employment-at-will policy and the compensation policy was not significant, the results were in the predicted direction. Subjects reacted most negatively when the organization had an employment-at-will policy combined with average compensation. Schwoerer and Rosen concluded that ‘‘it appears that generous compensation packages may be necessary to offset the negative reactions of recent college graduates to employment-at-will policies’’ (p. 656). In the present study, we applied the Schwoerer and Rosen (1989) logic that compensation policy might offset other negative factors, in this case, the negative effects of realistic job previews on applicant attraction and job choice in those situations where subjects have a job alternative that is presented to them via a traditional job preview. Therefore, we replicated the Wiesner et al. (1991) two-job preview condition such that all subjects were provided with two job alternatives: one presented via an RJP and one presented via a TJP. Second, we included Schwoerer and Rosen’s high versus average compensation and benefits policy manipulation in the job previews. It is important to realize that this does not result in a 2 1 2 design since all subjects received both job previews. Although a 2 1 2 design of preview type 1 compensation policy is a more common design, it does not adequately address the main questions we are asking in this study; namely, how does compensation influence the effects of a realistic job preview on applicant attraction and job choice when subjects have a TJP job alternative. We believe this is an important question because many organizations avoid realistic recruitment for fear of the negative effects it might have on attraction (Rynes & Barber, 1990). This is especially likely to be of concern when other organizations are using traditional or marketing recruitment strategies. Therefore, to adequately answer this question, the design of this study consists of four separate two-job preview conditions in which the compensation policy manipulations of the two job previews are varied. This results in the following four conditions: (1) TJP-High Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation; (2) TJP-Average Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation; (3) TJP-High Compensation, RJP-High Compensation; and (4) TJP-Average Compensation, RJP-High Compensation. The main advantage of this design is that it enables us to conduct repeated measures analyses within each condition which allows comparisons to the Wiesner et al. (1991) and Saks et al. (1994) studies as well as comparisons across conditions (i.e., between groups analyses). That is, not only is it possible to test the effects of RJP and TJP job alternatives with different compensation policies, it is also possible to test the effects of high versus average compensation policies across conditions. Thus, the effects of compensation for one type of preview can be tested by holding the compensation of the other preview constant. For example, the effects of compensation policy for RJPs can be tested by comparing an RJP job with high versus average compensation when the

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alternative is a TJP job with high compensation (conditions 1 versus 3) and when the alternative is a TJP job with average compensation (conditions 2 versus 4). Similarly, the effects of compensation policy for the TJP job can be tested when the alternative is an RJP job with high or average compensation. A TJP job with high versus average compensation policy can be compared when the alternative is an RJP job with high compensation (conditions 3 versus 4) and when the alternative is an RJP job with average compensation (conditions 1 versus 2). Based on the findings of Wiesner et al. (1991) and Saks et al. (1994), we hypothesized that for the repeated measures analyses subjects will rate the TJP job as more attractive and will be more likely to accept and choose the TJP job when the compensation is either higher for the TJP job (group 1) or is the same as the RJP (i.e., both are average as in group 2 or both are high as in group 3). However, we hypothesized that subjects will rate the RJP job as more attractive and will be more likely to accept and choose the RJP job when the compensation is higher in the RJP job than the TJP job (group 4). In other words, we expected subjects to favor the RJP job only when the compensation of the RJP job exceeds that offered by the TJP job. We expected similar results for the between conditions analyses. That is, compensation policy is only expected to influence the effect of the RJP when the compensation of the RJP job is greater than the compensation of the TJP job. According to expectancy theory, subjects are more likely to be attracted to a TJP job than an RJP job (Wiesner et al., 1991; Saks et al., 1994). However, the attractiveness of an RJP job is likely to increase when the compensation policy is high. Because a high compensation policy associated with a TJP job will also increase the attractiveness of the TJP job, the TJP job will continue to have higher expectancy ratings compared to the RJP job. Thus, the compensation of the RJP job is only expected to be a factor in subjects’ ratings of attractiveness, acceptance, and choice when the compensation of the TJP job is average. Similarly, the compensation of the TJP job is only expected to be a factor when the compensation of the RJP job is high. As a result, the expected difference between a high and average compensation policy is confined to two conditions. First, we hypothesized that the high compensation RJP job would fare better than the average compensation RJP job (higher ratings of attractiveness, stronger intentions to accept, and greater likelihood to choose) only when the compensation of the TJP job is average. The compensation for the RJP job is not expected to be a factor when the compensation of the TJP job is high. In other words, when the compensation of the TJP job is high, the TJP job will again be the more attractive alternative irrespective of the compensation of the RJP job. Thus, all else equal, the TJP job will be the more attractive alternative. Second, we hypothesized that the high compensation TJP job would fare better than the average compensation TJP job (higher ratings of attractiveness, stronger intentions to accept, and greater likelihood to choose) only when the

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compensation of the RJP job is high. The logic behind this is simply that, all else equal, TJP jobs are preferred compared to RJP jobs, regardless of the compensation of the TJP job. However, when the compensation of the RJP job is high, according to expectancy theory, the attractiveness of the RJP job will approach that of the TJP job, unless the compensation of the TJP job is also high in which case the TJP job will again be the preferred alternative. Thus, for the TJP job, compensation is only predicted to have an effect when the compensation of the RJP job is high. In sum, because TJP jobs have been found to be the preferred alternative in comparison to RJP jobs (Saks et al., 1994; Wiesner et al., 1991), we predicted that compensation policy will only make a difference for the RJP job when the compensation of the TJP job is average. For the TJP job, we predicted that compensation policy will only make a difference when the compensation of the RJP job is high. Method Subjects. Participants in this study were 125 commerce and administration students. Fifty-three percent of the subjects were female. The average age was 24 years. Subjects reported working in an average of four previous jobs. Study design. The study was a repeated measures design in which subjects received an RJP and a TJP based on Wiesner et al. (1991) and Saks et al. (1994). Because we are interested in only those situations where subjects receive an RJP and a TJP, subjects in all conditions received two job alternatives: one was presented via an RJP and the other was presented via a TJP. In addition, compensation policy was also manipulated by including a statement in the job previews based on a manipulation used by Schwoerer and Rosen (1989). Schwoerer and Rosen manipulated compensation policy by indicating that compensation either was well above industry averages (high compensation) or was comparable to the average compensation in the industry (average compensation). In the present study, the compensation policy manipulation was inserted into the Wiesner et al. job previews. The high compensation policy manipulation indicated that ‘‘the compensation package is highly competitive and well above industry averages with a generous and balanced benefit package.’’ The average compensation policy manipulation indicated that ‘‘the compensation package is comparable to the average compensation in the industry with a balanced benefit package.’’ In sum, the study consisted of four two-job preview conditions with all combinations of high versus average compensation policies. Thus, in condition 1, the compensation was high for the TJP job and average for the RJP job. In condition 2, the compensation was average for both the TJP job and the RJP job. In condition 3, the compensation was high for both the TJP job and the RJP job. Finally, in condition 4, the compensation was average for the TJP job and high for the RJP job. Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They were instructed to assume that after graduation they applied for two

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different product specialist jobs, each in the marketing division of a different toy manufacturer. For one of the jobs they received the TJP, and for the other job they received the RJP. Subjects in all conditions read the TJP first followed by the RJP. The order of previews was not randomized as previous research using the same job previews did not find any order effects when the ordering of the previews was reversed (Wiesner et al., 1991). After subjects had read both job previews they completed the study questionnaire. Job previews. In order to compare the study findings with those of Wiesner et al. (1991) and Saks et al. (1994), the same job previews were used in this study. Wiesner et al. designed a realistic and traditional job preview based on campus recruitment materials and several job previews. Both previews described a product specialist job in the marketing division of a toy manufacturer. The traditional job preview only described the positive features of the job while the realistic job preview described both positive and negative features. The positive features included working for a successful toy manufacturer, comprehensive training in marketing and advertising, rewarding learning and work experiences. The negative features of the job included tough and demanding work that can be stressful, weekend and evening hours, stringent deadlines, and tough competition for promotions. In contrast, the promotion opportunities discussed in the traditional job preview did not indicate the level of competitiveness involved, that the challenging opportunities can also be tough and demanding, working evenings and weekends may be required, or that the job can be stressful. It is important to realize that the information described in the job previews was based on campus recruitment materials and on job previews used in other studies (Dean & Wanous, 1984; Saks & Cronshaw, 1990). The job preview information is realistic in the sense that it is true to many jobs of the kind described in the previews and is not any more negative than what is usually included in RJPs. Measures. After reading both job previews, subjects completed a questionnaire in which they answered questions about the two jobs. The questions measured attraction to the job and organization, intention to accept a job offer, and job choice decision. For attraction and job acceptance intention, subjects responded using five-point Likert-type scales. Attraction to the job and organization was measured by five items adapted from measures used in previous research on job previews and recruitment (Liden & Parsons, 1986; Macan & Dipboye, 1990; Rynes & Miller, 1983; Wiesner et al., 1990). The results of a factor analysis indicated that for both the realistic and traditional job preview, all five items loaded on one factor with loadings ranging from .73 to .93 for the TJP (alpha Å .92), and .69 to .92 for the RJP (alpha Å .91). Job acceptance intention was measured by the following item: ‘‘What is the probability that you would accept a job offer from the organization?’’, with anchors (1) Extremely Unlikely to (5) Extremely Likely. Job choice was measured by the following item: ‘‘If you received a job offer for both jobs and had to choose one of the two job offers, which one would you choose?’’. Manipulation checks. The job preview and compensation policy manipula-

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tions were found to be effective in previous studies. For example, Wiesner et al. (1991) found that the RJP was perceived as more realistic than the TJP, and Schwoerer and Rosen (1989) reported that subjects correctly identified the compensation policy manipulation. However, since these two manipulations were combined in the present study, we collected additional data to test the effectiveness of both manipulations. The four job previews (RJP or TJP with high or average compensation policy) were randomly distributed to 90 undergraduate commerce students as a voluntary in-class exercise. This resulted in the more common 2 1 2 design of preview type (RJP or TJP) by compensation policy (High or Average). Subjects were asked to evaluate only one of the job previews because it was felt that this would provide a more conservative test of the manipulations than if subjects were asked to rate more than one preview in which case the manipulations would be much more salient. To test the job preview manipulation, we used Gaugler and Thornton’s (1990) four-item manipulation check (alpha Å .74). To test the compensation policy manipulation, we designed three-items for this study (alpha Å .88). The results of a 2 1 2 ANOVA indicated that the realistic job preview was rated as more realistic than the traditional job preview, F Å 86.60 (1, 88), p õ .001, and the high compensation policy was rated higher than the average compensation policy, F Å 276.24 (1, 88), p õ .001. Thus, both manipulations were highly effective even in the absence of respondents’ awareness of the alternative form of each manipulation. Results Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of subject ratings of attractiveness and job acceptance intention for the RJP job and TJP job by condition. Repeated measures analyses. As indicated, it was predicted that the differences between the RJP job and the TJP job would depend on the condition. In particular, we hypothesized that subjects would rate the TJP job as more attractive and be more likely to accept and choose the TJP job in those conditions in which the compensation of the TJP job was either higher (condition 1) or the same as the RJP job (conditions 2 and 3). However, we expected subjects to rate the RJP job as more attractive and to be more likely to accept and choose the RJP job when the compensation was higher for the RJP job (condition 4). Because this involves testing differences in subjects’ ratings of each job preview within each of the four conditions, we performed repeated measures ANOVAs for job attractiveness and job acceptance intention. A chi-squared test was used to test for differences in subjects’ job choice across the four conditions. First, for condition 1 (TJP-High Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation), the results were significant for attractiveness, F Å 13.72 (1, 31), p õ .001, and job acceptance intention, F Å 11.35 (1, 31), p õ .01. As predicted, subjects rated the TJP job as more attractive and were more likely to accept the TJP job.

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6306$$1512 3.36a .93 3.28a 1.20

4.07a .84 4.13a 1.10

4.13b 1.12

4.15b .89

3.45b 1.12

3.40b .84

TJP-averagea RJP-averagec (n Å 31)

Note. Means with the same superscript differ significantly at p õ .01. a TJP-high versus TJP-average when RJP is average. b RJP-high versus RJP-average when TJP is high. c RJP-high versus RJP-average when TJP is average. d TJP-high versus TJP-average when RJP is high.

Attractiveness M SD Job acceptance intention M SD

Variable

TJP-higha RJP-averageb (n Å 32)

4.10c 1.11

3.96 .78

3.58c 1.23

3.65 .90

TJP-highd RJP-highb (n Å 31)

Compensation manipulation

TABLE 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Study Variables by Condition

3.61 .99

3.83 .78

3.61 1.23

3.60 .81

TJP-averaged RJP-highc (n Å 31)

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For condition 2 (TJP-Average Compensation, RJP-Average Compensation), the results were also significant for attractiveness, F Å 15.97 (1, 30), p õ .001, and for job acceptance intention, F Å 10.47 (1, 30), p õ .01. As predicted, subjects rated the TJP job as more attractive and were more likely to accept the TJP job. For condition 3 (TJP-High Compensation, RJP-High Compensation), the results were not significant for attractiveness, F Å 3.13 (1, 30), p õ .10, but were significant for job acceptance intention F Å 6.56 (1, 30), p õ .05. Thus, in this condition the results only supported the hypothesis for job acceptance intention as subjects were more likely to accept the TJP job; however, their ratings of attractiveness were not significantly different. For condition 4 (TJP-Average Compensation, RJP-High Compensation), the results were not significant for attractiveness, F Å 1.39 (1, 30), n.s., nor for job acceptance intention, F Å 00 (1, 30), n.s. Thus, the hypothesis that subjects would prefer the RJP job when the compensation is greater than the TJP job was not supported. However, the results do support the basic notion that compensation would mitigate the negative effects of the RJP when the compensation policy of the RJP job is greater than the TJP job. That is, subjects’ ratings of attractiveness and job acceptance intention for the RJP and TJP jobs were not significantly different. Finally, to test for differences in subjects’ job choice decision, a chi-square test was performed. The result of the chi-square test was significant, x2 (3, n Å 125) Å 9.57, p õ .05. In all conditions except for condition 4 (TJPAverage Compensation, RJP-High Compensation), a significantly greater number of subjects chose the TJP job. However, in condition 4, just over half of the subjects chose the RJP job. Thus, when subjects had a choice between an RJP job with a high compensation policy versus a TJP job with an average compensation policy, they chose the RJP job just as often as the TJP job. Further, it is interesting to note that the percentage of subjects choosing the RJP job over the TJP job showed a steady increase from condition 1 to condition 4 (19, 23, 29, and 52%, respectively). In sum, the results provide some support that the negative effects of an RJP on subjects’ ratings of attractiveness, job acceptance intention, and job choice are somewhat abated when the compensation policy of the RJP job exceeds that of a TJP job alternative. Although subjects never actually rated the RJP job with the high compensation policy as more attractive or preferable than the TJP job, they did come to perceive it as an equally attractive alternative. Between conditions analyses. As indicated earlier, between conditions comparisons for the effects of compensation policy are possible by holding constant the compensation of the alternative job preview. Thus, the effects of compensation for the RJP job can be tested when the compensation of the TJP job is either high or average, and the effects of compensation for the TJP job can be tested when the compensation of the RJP job is high or average. In order to test the effects of compensation, between groups ANOVAs were conducted for attractiveness and job acceptance intention, and chi-

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squared tests were conducted to test for differences in subjects’ job choice. First, it was predicted that a high compensation RJP job would be rated more favorably than an RJP job with average compensation when the compensation of the TJP job alternative is average. The results indicated that although the means were higher for the high compensation RJP job for attractiveness (3.60 versus 3.40) and for job acceptance intention (3.61 versus 3.45), the ANOVAs were not significant. When the compensation of the TJP job alternative was high, the means were once again higher for the high compensation RJP job for attractiveness (3.65 versus 3.36) and for job acceptance intention (3.58 versus 3.28). The ANOVAs, however, were not significant. Second, it was predicted that the TJP job would be rated more attractive, and subjects would be more likely to accept and choose the TJP job with high compensation only when the compensation of the RJP job is high. As indicated in Table 1, when the compensation of the RJP job was high, the means for the high compensation TJP job were higher than the average compensation TJP job for attractiveness (3.96 versus 3.83) and for job acceptance intention (4.10 versus 3.61). However, only the ANOVA for job acceptance intention approached significance, F Å 3.33 (1, 60), p Å .07. When the compensation of the RJP job alternative was average, the mean was slightly higher for the TJP job with average compensation for attractiveness (4.15 versus 4.07), and the means were identical for job acceptance intention (4.13). The ANOVAs were not significant. Finally, in order to test for differences in subjects’ job choice, chi-squared tests were conducted. These results indicated that subjects were more likely to choose the high compensation RJP job (52%) compared to the average compensation RJP job (23%), when the compensation of the TJP job was average, x2(1, n Å 62) Å 5.60, p õ .05. However, as predicted, subjects were not more likely to choose the high compensation RJP job (29%) than the average compensation RJP job (19%), when the compensation of the TJP job was high, x2(1, n Å 63) Å .92, n.s. For the TJP job, the results indicated that as predicted, subjects were more likely to choose the high compensation TJP job (71%) compared to the average compensation TJP job (48%), when the compensation of the RJP job was high, x2(1, n Å 62) Å 3.28, p õ .07. Subjects were not, however, more likely to choose the high compensation TJP job (81%) than the average compensation TJP job (77%), when the compensation of the RJP job was average, x2(1, n Å 63) Å .14, n.s. In sum, the results of the between conditions analyses were only significant for subjects’ job choice. As predicted, subjects were more likely to choose the high compensation RJP job only when the compensation of the TJP job was average. Subjects were only more likely to choose the high compensation TJP job when the compensation of the RJP job was high. Discussion The results of this study extend previous research on subjects’ reactions to realistic and traditional job previews by investigating the effects of compen-

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sation. Previous research found that RJPs had a negative effect on applicant attraction and job choice when subjects had an alternative job that was presented to them via a traditional job preview (Saks et al., 1994; Wiesner et al., 1991). The results of this study suggest that a qualification be added to this finding; that is, subjects’ reactions to realistic job previews depend in part on the compensation policy of the job in question. In this study, the realistic job preview resulted in lower ratings of attractiveness when the compensation policy was average for both jobs or was higher for the TJP. Similar effects were found for job acceptance intention, except that subjects also indicated a greater likelihood of accepting the TJP job even when the compensation policy for both jobs was high. These findings are consistent with the results of previous research which found that subjects responded less positively to jobs presented via a realistic job preview when an alternative job was presented via a traditional job preview. However, the results of this study extend previous findings by demonstrating that subjects’ negative reactions to the RJP job depend in part on the compensation of the job and that subjects’ reactions to TJP and RJP jobs were similar when the compensation policy of the RJP job was higher than the TJP job. In fact, the differences in subjects’ ratings of attractiveness became nonsignificant in the two conditions in which the compensation of the RJP job was high, and the difference in job acceptance intention became nonsignificant when the compensation was higher for the RJP job. With respect to job choice, subjects were more likely to choose the TJP job in all conditions except when the compensation of the RJP job was higher, in which case subjects were just as likely to choose the RJP job. The results of the between conditions analyses indicated that subjects were more likely to choose the RJP job with high compensation than the RJP job with average compensation only when the compensation of the TJP job was average. Similarly, subjects were more likely to choose the high compensation TJP job only when the compensation of the RJP job was high. These results suggest that the effects of RJPs on job choice depend in part on the compensation of the job in question and that subjects are more likely to choose an RJP job with high compensation than average compensation when the compensation policy of the TJP job is average. This lends some credence to Rynes and Barber’s (1990) proposition that realistic recruitment is more likely to be used for attractive jobs where it is less likely to result in negative applicant reactions. Although it was expected that an RJP job with a high compensation policy would be most effective when compared to a TJP job with average compensation, it was surprising that the RJP job with high compensation had a similar effect on subjects’ ratings of attractiveness even when the TJP job was associated with a high compensation policy. Thus, when the compensation was average for both jobs, the TJP job was rated as more attractive, but when the compensation was high for both jobs, there were no differences in subjects’ ratings of attractiveness. This finding suggests that what is important is not

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that the compensation of the two jobs is the same, but rather, that the compensation of the RJP job is above average. However, for job acceptance intention and job choice, the elimination of job preview differences was apparent only when subjects were choosing between an RJP job with a high compensation policy and a TJP job alternative with an average compensation policy. Thus, a negative reaction to the RJP job appears least likely when the compensation of the TJP job alternative is lower than that of the RJP job. It is interesting to note that the RJP job was never actually rated more favorably than the TJP job in any of the four conditions. That is, even in condition 4 in which the compensation of the RJP job was higher than the compensation of the TJP job, subjects’ ratings were not higher for the RJP job, and half of the subjects still rejected the RJP job and chose the TJP job. Thus, while a high compensation policy eliminated the differences in subject ratings and job choice, it did not create an advantage for the RJP job. However, the results of the between conditions analyses indicated that subjects were more than twice as likely to choose a high compensation RJP job over an average compensation RJP job when the alternative was a TJP job with average compensation. These results suggest that subjects are not necessarily more likely to prefer a TJP job alternative as has been suggested in previous studies (Saks et al., 1994; Wiesner et al., 1991). The results of the between conditions analyses for attractiveness and job acceptance intention failed to support the findings of the repeated measures analyses and this requires some explanation. First, the means for the high compensation RJP job were higher than the average compensation RJP job regardless of the compensation of the TJP job alternative. While these results suggest a trend, they were not statistically significant. This may be due to the relatively low power for all of the between conditions analyses. Second, the results may simply reflect the fact that subjects may be most sensitive and responsive to differences in compensation when comparing an RJP job to a TJP job. It is, after all, in these situations when organizations that use realism may lose good applicants to competing organizations that attract applicants with traditional-marketing approaches to recruitment. This notwithstanding, the between conditions results for job choice were rather strong and dramatic. One of the implications of the Wiesner et al. (1991) study was that RJPs might be causing qualified applicants to seek employment at competing organizations. Rynes (1991) has referred to this as ‘‘adverse self-selection’’ and has suggested that applicants who accept an RJP job offer may be less qualified and have fewer job alternatives than those who reject an RJP job. Clearly, the nature and attributes of those applicants who accept versus reject a realistic job preview is still an important question that needs to be addressed in future research. However, one implication of this study is that adverse self-selection and lower job acceptance rates caused by RJPs are less likely to occur for jobs with attractive job attributes. Thus, jobs with attractive features and inducements may not be susceptible to the negative effects of realistic recruit-

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ment on applicant attraction and job choice (Rynes & Barber, 1990). This, however, should not be interpreted as an endorsement for the use of RJPs to attract as many applicants as possible. Clearly, the psychology of RJPs is based on the ability of applicants to self-select, and the lowering of unrealistic expectations (Wanous, 1992). Rather, the point is that RJPs do not necessarily have a negative effect on applicant attraction and job choice (independent of self-selection) and need not result in adverse self-selection. These effects depend, in part, on job attributes and the job. In other words, the effects of RJPs might not be the same for ‘‘good’’ versus ‘‘bad’’ jobs (Rynes, 1991), at least when good is associated with compensation. Because RJP research has ignored the job characteristics of RJP jobs, Rynes (1991) has noted that ‘‘we know nothing about whether realistic previews work better, or differently, with bad jobs than with good ones’’ (p. 30). If we consider a job with high compensation to be a ‘‘better’’ job, then the results of this study suggest that RJPs are more likely to have negative effects on applicant attraction and job choice for ‘‘bad’’ jobs. This can have further implications for the overall effectiveness of RJPs as there is some evidence that RJPs are more likely to be successful when they result in higher job acceptance rates (Meglino & DeNisi, 1987). Meglino and DeNisi have described this phenomenon as the ‘‘paradox’’ of realistic job previews because ‘‘they are least likely to reduce turnover in the situations they are needed most’’ (p. 165). The results of this study suggest that inducements or attributes that increase the attractiveness of a job can lead to an increase in job acceptance rates which, according to Meglino and DeNisi, should increase the overall effectiveness of realistic job previews. Although it has been argued that organizations that can afford to have an above average compensation policy might benefit more from the use of RJPs, not all organizations can afford to be leaders in compensation. However, it is possible that other job characteristics and inducements might have similar effects. There are many other inducements with lower direct costs that may have similar effects on applicant reactions to RJPs for organizations with a low ability to pay (Rynes & Barber, 1990). Furthermore, inducements such as employer-subsidized childcare, educational benefits, language and housing assistance, and part-time or flexible schedules might attract different applicant pools (Rynes & Barber, 1990). Thus, organizations might be able to modify the inducements they offer to applicants depending on the applicant pool of interest. The implication of this is that if such inducements exist or can be redesigned into a job, they should be communicated to applicants and included in the RJP. Given the importance of job characteristics in applicant attraction and job choice decisions (Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Barber, 1990), future research should consider the role of job attributes for the effects of RJPs. There are several limitations of this study that need to be considered with respect to the interpretation and generalization of the results. First, because this research involved a laboratory study in which student subjects responded to hypothetical jobs, the results of this study must be interpreted with caution.

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A laboratory methodology was used because it provided a high degree of internal control that would be difficult at best, and perhaps even impossible to obtain in the field. Further, the use of laboratory studies to investigate psychological processes has been advocated by a number of writers (Dobbins, Lane, and Steiner, 1988; Greenberg, 1987). In fact, Olian (1986) has argued that studies designed to investigate the underlying processes of RJP effects can be conducted most effectively in the laboratory and should not be judged against an external validity standard. Rynes (1991) also suggested that laboratory methodologies be used for investigating job characteristics in recruitment research. Although the use of student subjects has often been considered inappropriate for work-related phenomena (Gordon, Slade, & Schmitt, 1986), this is less of a problem in situations in which students are asked to perform tasks that are known to them and in which they share some commonality with those involved in the activity. Thus, undergraduate students are similar to job applicants (especially recent graduates) in terms of cognitive appraisal and familiarity of pre-organizational entry phenomena (Gordon et al., 1986). They are similar to recent graduates who are looking for employment and are faced with the task of making a job choice from several alternatives. It can therefore be argued that the sample in the present study displays what Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982) have refereed to as ‘‘demographic representativeness.’’ Another limitation of this study is that it focused on only one job attribute. While there is evidence that compensation is an important factor in applicant attraction and job choice decisions, there is also evidence that applicants consider many other job attributes in making a job choice. As a result, the scenario presented to subjects in the present study was superficial and isolated from other important factors in the job choice situation. Thus, the results should be interpreted with this limitation in mind, and as suggestive of what might occur in a more realistic setting. Finally, an important threat to the validity of the results is the use of job previews that have been used in two previous studies (Saks et al., 1994; Wiesner et al., 1991). According to Cook and Campbell (1979), this is a problem of mono-operation bias which is due to the use of single operationalizations of relevant constructs and threatens the validity of the causes and effects within a study. However, because one of the purposes of this study was to replicate the two previous studies with the addition of the compensation manipulation, it was important to use the same job previews that resulted in the differences between the RJP and TJP in those studies. Nevertheless, it is important that future research develop new operationalizations of the job preview manipulation in order to triangulate on the results reported in this and the previous studies. In conclusion, while there are important implications that stem from the results of this study, further research is required to replicate these findings with a sample of actual job applicants making real job choices. At this time, however, the results of this study suggest that the effects of RJPs on applicant

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attraction and job choice may be in part a function of compensation and perhaps other job attributes. We, therefore, concur with Rynes (1991) that greater attention be given to job characteristics in future research on job previews and recruitment. REFERENCES Berkowitz, L., & Donnerstein, E. (1982). External validity is more than skin deep: Some answers to criticisms of laboratory experiments. American Psychologist, 37, 245–257. Cable, D. M., & Judge, T. A. (1994). Pay preferences and job search decisions: A person– organization fit perspective. Personnel Psychology, 47, 317–348. Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings. Skokie, IL: Rand McNally. Dean, R. A., & Wanous, J. P. (1984). Effects of realistic job previews on hiring bank tellers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69, 61–68. Dobbins, G. H., Lane, I. M., & Steiner, D. D. (1988). A note on the role of laboratory methodologies in applied behavioral research: Don’t throw out the baby with the bath water. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 9, 281–286. Gaugler, B. B., & Thornton, G. C., III (1990). Matching job previews to individual applicants’ needs. Psychological Reports, 66, 643–652. Gordon, M. E., Slade, L. A., & Schmitt, N. (1986). The ‘‘science of the sophomore’’ revisited: From conjecture to empiricism. Academy of Management Review, 11, 191–207. Greenberg, J. (1987). The college sophomore as guinea pig: Setting the record straight. Academy of Management Review, 15, 157–159. Jurgensen, C. E. (1978). Job preferences (What makes a job good or bad?). Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 267–276. Liden, R. C., & Parsons, C. K. (1986). A field study of job applicant interview perceptions, alternative opportunities, and demographic characteristics. Personnel Psychology, 39, 109– 122. Macan, T. H., & Dipboye, R. L. (1990). The relationship of interviewers’ preinterview impressions to selection and recruitment outcomes. Personnel Psychology, 43, 745–768. McEvoy, G. M., & Cascio, W. F. (1985). Strategies for reducing employee turnover: A metaanalysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 342–353. Meglino, B. M., & DeNisi, A. S. (1987). Realistic job previews: Some thoughts on their more effective use in managing the flow of human resources. Human Resource Planning, 10, 157–167. Meglino, B. M., DeNisi, A. S., & Ravlin, E. C. (1993). Effects of previous job exposure and subsequent job status on the functioning of a realistic job preview. Personnel Psychology, 46, 803–822. Olian, J. D. (1986). Staffing. In E. A. Locke (Ed.), Generalizing from laboratory to field settings, (pp. 3–9). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Premack, S. L., & Wanous, J. P. (1985). A meta-analysis of realistic job preview experiments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 706–719. Rynes, S. L. (1991). Recruitment, job choice and post-hire consequences: A call for new research directions. In M. D. Dunnette and L. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (2nd ed.). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists’ Press. Rynes, S. L., & Barber, A. E. (1990). Applicant attraction strategies: An organizational perspective. Academy of Management Review, 15, 286–310. Rynes, S. L., & Boudreau, J. W. (1986). College recruiting in large organizations: Practice, evaluation, and research implications. Personnel Psychology, 39, 729–757. Rynes, S. L., & Miller, H. E., (1983). Recruiter and job influences on candidates for employment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, 147–154. Rynes, S. L., Schwab, D. P., & Heneman, H. G. (1983). The role of pay and market pay

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