Environmental impact assessment and new town planning in Hong Kong

253

Landscape

and Urban Planning, 14 (1987) 253-273 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND NEW TOWN PLANNING IN HONG KONG

PETER Centre

sf Urban

Studies

and Urban Planning,

HILLS

University @“Hong Kong, Pokjiilam

(Accepted for publication

Road

(Hong Kong)

1 August 1986)

ABSTRACT

be few e,xamples of the application of these methods to New Towns. The paper reports on a recent impact assessment e_xercise undertaken by a government agency in Hong Kong, in which the noise, water and air quality implications of a New Town project Hlere investigated. The paper discusses the planning context of the project, the objectives of the environmental assessment exercise and the analytical approach adopted. The main findings of the assessment exercise are summarized and their implications.for the planning and subsequent development of the New Town are discussed. The paper concludes by,focussing on some of the d(fJculties that have arisen in Hong Kong in terms of the integration of environmental factors into the overall New Town

Hills, P., 1987. Environmental impact assessment and New Town planning in Hong Kong. Landscape

Urban Plann.,

14: 253-273.

This paper _focusses on the role of environmental impact assessment in the planning of New Town development projects in Hong Kong. The scale and complexity ofsuch projects inevitably give rise to a wide-range of economic, social and environmental concerns. New Town planning appears./& the most part, however, to have reflected a preoccupation with economic and social,factors. Environmental quality issues associated with such development projects appear to have received relatively little attention, and de.spite the increasingly widespread use ofenvironmental impact assessment methods bv planners in numerous countries, there seem to

planning process.

INTRODUCTION

development projects. Although environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been interpreted and applied in various ways, it has nonetheless become a significant component of contemporary environmental planning systerns throughout the world. The emergence of

Over the past 15 years considerable experience has been gained in both industrialized and developing countries in the assessment of the environmental impacts of a wide variety of

0169-2046/87/$03.50

0 1987 Elsevier Science Publishers

B.V

254

EIA, the development of specific national systems for impact assessment and the relevant methodologies and techniques have all received considerable attention in the literature (for example, United Nations, 198 1; Clark et al., 1984) and need not be elaborated upon here. Much of the accrued experience in this field relates to major industrial, utility and transportation projects. The application of impact assessment in the planning and design of New Towns has received rather less attention. In part, this reflects the evolution of urban policy in the industrialized nations, where in the context of changing economic and demographic circumstances and a renewed emphasis on tackling the problems of older metropolitan areas in situ, the appropriateness of New Towns as a policy instrument has been increasingly called into question. Elsewhere in the world, however, especially in Africa and Asia. the New Town concept is widely used as a mechanism for the decentralization of population and employment opportunities, and remains a central element in urban and regional development strategies (see, for example, Phillips and Yeh, 1987). The present paper reports on a New Town environmental impact assessment exercise recently undertaken in Hong Kong. the setting for one of the largest and most ambitious New Town programmes in the world. As the paper will suggest, however, Hong Kong faces some formidable problems in integrating such projects into an already congested and highly stressed environment. The paper proceeds by reviewing briefly the urban context in Hong Kong and the development of the New Towns programme. The discussion then focusses on the planning context of the territory’s seventh New Town at Junk Bay, the first such project for which any detailed form of environmental assessment has been undertaken. The paper concludes by evaluating the experience gained from the Junk Bay assessment and discusses the relationship between such exercises and the overall task of

planning and managing ment projects.

New Town develop-

HONG KONG: THE URBAN CONTEXT Hong Kong is located on the east bank of the Pearl River adjoining the southern province of Guangdong in the People’s Republic of China. The territory, currently administered by the United Kingdom but due to revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. extends over an area of 1068 km’, comprising Hong Kong Island itself. the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories and some 235 other islands (Fig. 1 ). The territory’s present population is approximately 5.5 million (end 198 5 ) . Land-use data for 1985 (Table I) indicate that urban built-up and rural developed lands account for only 176 km’, or 16.5% of total land area, but this figure also includes reservoirs, railways and roads in the New Territories. A more realistic estimate of the built-up area within which the majority of the population is concentrated would probably be in the order of 130 km”. or some 120/o of the land area. The average population density is 5072 persons km’, but this obscures some enormous variations across the territory as a whole. The 1981 Census revealed that densities in the older metropolitan areas on the Island and in Kowloon averaged 28 479 persons per km’. The highest figure over 165 000 persons per km’- was recorded in the Sham Shui PO district of Kowloon (Hong Kong Government, 1986). These densities reflect the interaction of several factors. Firstly, the territory experienced rapid population growth over much of the period between 1949 and 1980. The 1985 estimate represents a 77% increase over the 3.1 million population recorded in 196 1. Much of this growth was fuelled by Hong Kong’s economic success, which acted as a magnet attracting immigrants. both legal and illegal. from the Chinese mainland. Hong Kong also experienced an influx of refugees from Vietnam during the second half of the 1970’s. but

Fig. 1,The

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territory

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ISLAND

V

l

New

BAY

Town

H

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Sheung Shul New Town

Sha

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of Hong Kong showing the location of new town projects and areas of land reclamation.

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256 TABLE

I

Land use in Hong

Kong

Class

Approximate area (km’)

(i)

Urban

built-up

(ii)

Rural

developed

(iii) (iv)

Woodlands Grass and scrub

(v)

Badlands

(vi) (vii)

Swamp Arable

(viii)

Fish ponds

Source:

Hong

lands

% of whole

102

9.6

lands

74

6.9

lands

125 625

II.7 58.6

46

4.3

I 75

0.1 7.0

21

2.0

and mangrove

lands

Kong Government,

Remarks

Main urban area of Hong Kong Island. Kowloon and six new towns in the New Territories (Tsuen Wan, Tuen Mun. Yuen Long, Fanling, Tai PO and Sha Tin) including district open space (parks and gardens) but excluding all other non-builtup land Rural market towns and villages and other developed sites in the New Territories such as reservoirs, roads and railwavs Natural and established woodlands Natural grass and scrub lands, including those within country parks Stripped of cover: denuded granite country: capable of regeneration Coastal brackish swamp and mangrove Cultivatable lands. including orchards and market gardens. under cultivation and fallow Fresh and brackish water fish farming excluding coastal marine fish farms, but including fallow farms

1986, p. 83

the number of new arrivals has dropped markedly over the past few years. Illegal immigration from China has also been substantially reduced since a change in government policy in 1980. The annual rate of population growth is now 1.3%. Population forecasts for the year 2000 have recently been revised downwards, from a figure of 7 million to 6.4 million. and this is likely to have significant implications for future patterns of urban development within the territory. Secondly, Hong Kong’s rise to prominence as a major world manufacturing centre has inevitably been associated with substantial industrial demand for land, which has served to intensify development pressures. Although there are now indications of a restructuring of the economy resulting in a greater emphasis on the tertiary, or service, sector, manufacturing still accounts for the largest share of the territory’s Gross Domestic Product (some 25%) and employs the greatest number of workers; a labour force of 850 000 workers employed in almost 48 000 factories at the end of 1985

(Hong Kong Government, 1986). Textiles and clothing, electrical products and plastics are the territory’s most important industries. Thirdly. the territory’s steeply sloping terrain, comprising mainly granitic and volcanic hill ranges, has long posed problems for urban growth and development. Construction work is often frustrated by geotechnical factors, and site-formation costs are frequently very high. Extensive tracts of land have been reclaimed from the sea over the past 130 years. especially around Victoria Harbour, and these have made a major contribution to easing the land availability problem (see Fig. I ). Development nonetheless remains highly intensive, and Hong Kong’s character is predominantly that of a high-density, high-rise city. This observation applies to both residential and industrial areas. Some 900/o of the territory’s stock of industrial buildings consists of multi-storey (i.e. “flatted”) factories. The urban and industrial developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since 1945 have imposed enormous pressures on the territory’s

257

environment. The nature of these pressures and their impacts on environmental quality have been reviewed elsewhere (Hills, 1985). Hong Kong has experienced an increasingly severe environmental pollution problem, due largely to the fact that so much development has taken place in the absence of any coordinated policy framework for land-use planning and environmental protection. Furthermore, although various controls on both the use of land and environmental pollution of various types have existed for some time, these have not been adequately enforced. Many rivers and streams in the territory are badly polluted, and marine waters have been seriously affected by the large-scale disposal of domestic, industrial and agricultural wastes that have generally received only primary treatment (Hodgkiss and Chan, 1983; Morton and Morton, 1983; Morton, 1985). Air pollution, though somewhat reduced in recent years, remains a serious problem, especially in the major industrial areas such as Kwun Tong (Bower, 198.5; Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1985 ) . Noise pollution from road and air traffic and from construction activities is another major environmental problem affecting much of the territory (Ko, 198 1: Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1985; Wong and Mak, 1985). Although government has attempted to tackle these problems by means of new legislation and by strengthening the organizational framework for environmental protection, only limited progress has been made over the past 10 years and the Hong Kong environment remains under serious threat of further deterioration (Hills, 1985). THE NEW TOWNS

PROGRAMME

The origins of Hong Kong’s programme may be traced back to the 1950’s and the creation of an industrial satellite town at Kwun Tong (Leung, 1983). Although never formally designated as a New Town, Kwun Tong was the

territory’s first large-scale urban development project. Subsequent urban growth resulted in the satellite town being absorbed into metropolitan Kowloon. The 1960’s saw the emergence of more substantive and comprehensive attempts to decentralize population and industry to relieve congestion in the historical core area of the territory around Victoria Harbour. People and jobs were to be relocated to planned new urban centres in the New Territories. Conceptually, these centres were to reflect the influence of British New Town planning objectives. They were to be economically self-contained and socially balanced communities (Hills and Yeh, 1983). Three “first generation” New Towns were designated during the 1960’s: Tsuen Wan (1960),TuenMun (1967) andShaTin (1967). The “second generation” followed in the late 1970’s, when the three former market towns of Tai PO, Sheung Shui/Fanling and Yuen Long were designated as New Towns in 1979 (New Territories Development Department, 1985a). These six towns now provide homes for approximately 1.1 million people, or some 20% of the territory’s population. The background to the development of this programme is discussed in greater detail in Hills and Yeh (1983) and Leung (1983). The early 1980’s saw the programme move into its third phase with the designation, in 1982, of Junk Bay New Town, the main focus of the present paper. In late 1985, work commenced on the eighth planned New Town at Tin Shui Wai to the west of Yuen Long (New Territories Development Department, 1985b). Table II summarizes the area1 and population characteristics of Hong Kong’s eight designated New Towns. JUNK

BAY: PLANNING

CONTEXT

Junk Bay is a sizeable coastal inlet located approximately 8 km to the east of the Kowloon Peninsula and beyond the original industrial

258 TABLE Hong

11

Kong’s

new towns:

Town

Tsuen Wan Sha Tin Tuen Mun Tai PO FanIingSheung Yuen Long Junk Bay Tin Shui Wai

Shui

basic data Designation date

Target population (thousands)

I984 population (thousands)

Total designated (including

1960 1967 1967 1979 1979 1979 1982 1983

930 800 550 220 226 96 328 I35

700 300 238 116 88 60 I3 n/a

2700 3600 2200 3400 780 210 1400 n/a

Sources: Hills and Yeh. 1983, p. 268; Hong n/a = not applicable.

Kong Government.

satellite town of Kwun Tong. A number of settlements are located on or close to the Bay, the largest of these being Rennie’s Mill (on the south west side) and Hang Hau (on the north east side). Much smaller villages are to be found at Tseung Kwan 0, Yau Yue Wan and Chik Sha. The total population of the Bay area is currently estimated to be approximately 13 000. A number of industries are located around Junk Bay, including several ship-breakers at Hang Hau and, on the west side of the Bay, three metal-processing plants. These plants are subject to virtually no environmental controls. In late 1985, a major environmental controversy arose concerning emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and metallic dusts from two of these factories, the implications of which are discussed in a later section. Junk Bay planning studies: 195940

The Hong Kong Government has long been interested in the development potential of Junk Bay. A report dealing with opportunities for land reclamation at Junk Bay was published as long ago as 1959. This was one of series of studies focussing on potential development areas in the New Territories. Junk Bay was not selected as a major development area at that

area (ha) green belt)

1985a.

time, but three of the other locations studied - Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin and Tuen Mun - were destined to become the first-generation New Towns. The 1959 study did, however, influence the content of the 1962 Junk Bay Outline Development Plan (ODP), which allowed for some 60 ha of industrial development on reclaimed land. By 1977, some 25 ha had, in fact, been reclaimed for industrial use. During the 1960’s certain industries, including steel-rolling, were deliberately relocated to Junk Bay for both planning and operational reasons (Hong Kong Productivity Centre, 198 1). Other metal processing industries also tended to concentrate in the Bay area, a reflection of the availability of suitable sites with good marine access, urban planning considerations particularly the desire to avoid. where possible, “bad neighbout-” developments in the existing urban areas - and operational and economic linkages between various types of industrial activity. In 1975, a second study of Junk Bay’s reclamation potential was completed. This focussed on both the engineering feasibility of reclaiming land for industry, and the environmental implications of developing the Bay for heavy industry of a low-density type. Although the study concluded that land could be reclaimed within the specified cost constraints. it also

259

indicated that industries giving rise to air and water pollution would be unacceptable. This appears to have been the first attempt to make any assessment, however tentative, of the environmental consequences of additional industrial development at Junk Bay. Little was actually known at that time about the atmospheric and marine environments of the Bay area, or indeed of Hong Kong generally, with the result that the 1975 study could not really indicate the types of industry that would be acceptable there. The study did, however, appear to convince the government that additional heavy industry should not be located at Junk Bay. In 1976 there was a marked resurgence of interest in the more general urban development potential of Junk Bay. This was prompted by two major considerations. Firstly, there was a need to find new sites for public housing as a result of the government’s commitment to a massive public-sector housing programme launched in 1972. Secondly, there was also an awareness of the need to formulate a new policy framework for industrial development in the Bay area given that the 1975 study had effectively ruled out any additional heavy, polluting industries. Government then decided that consultants should be asked to continue the feasibility study of Junk Bay’s urban development potential on the basis of a brief that went considerably beyond the scope of the 197.5 exercise. This latter study commenced in May 1977, and a report was published in January 1978 (Government of Hong Kong, 1978). The report indicated that a population of approximately 240 000 could be accommodated at Junk Bay, which, it emphasised, appeared to be the only suitable remaining opportunity for large-scale urban development within 10 km of the centre of urban Kowloon. The report also dealt at some length with environmental conditions in the Bay area and the potential problems arising from the existing location of major heavy industries at the

head of the Bay. These, it acknowledged, would not be “good neighbours” within any planned urban development. The consultants concluded, however, that the removal of these industries would probably be politically and economically unacceptable, and proposed that they be retained but should be subject to an environmental “clean up” prior to the development of the Bay. The costs incurred should, the consultants argued, be a charge against development (Government of Hong Kong, 1978). The 1978 report gave a clear indication of the urban development potential of Junk Bay. It was then up to government to resolve the priority and, therefore, the timing of any further development in the Bay area. By mid1979, it was becoming clear that the rate of public housing production (then 35 000 units per year) could not be sustained beyond 1985-86 unless adequate land was provided at least 2 years in advance, i.e. by 1983-84. Ultimately, it was to be the need for land to meet the demands of the public housing programme that provided the key stimulus for the development of Junk Bay New Town. In early 1979, the government’s Land Development Policy Committee (LDPC) decided that further preparatory studies, coordinated by a Steering Group comprising representatives of various government departments, should be carried out to safeguard the development potential of Junk Bay. These studies were to include a geotechnical investigation, existing industry survey, water supply study and road investigation, as well as an environmental investigation by the then Environmental Protection Unit (renamed the Environmental Protection Agency in 198 1 and subsequently reconstituted as an expanded Environmental Protection Department in April 1986). In the case of the environmental investigation, it was recognised that firm conclusions would not be available until 198 1 because of the lead time required to commence the studies and the need for a suitable study period

of at least 1 year to allow for seasonal variations, especially in atmospheric conditions. In August 1979, the LDPC recommended that Junk Bay be added to the territory’s Public Works Plan and that development proceed on the basis of a target population of 243 000 with the first intake of new residents in mid1986. The planning and design exercise was to commence in late 1980 and be completed by mid-l 982. The Junk Bay New Town study 198042 Detailed planning of Junk Bay commenced in November 1980 with the appointment of consultants to prepare a draft Outline Development Plan (ODP) for the New Town. The consultants were requested to draw up plans for land use, landscape, transport and serviced land proposals. Additionally, they were to formulate proposals for development staging and programmes, and also provide forecasts of expenditure and revenue. An Interim Report was completed by August 198 1. This was considered by the Junk Bay Steering Group and the Land Development Policy Committee and approval was given by both bodies to proceed to draft and final report stage. A Draft Report on the New Town was circulated in April 1982 and this was considered by the LDPC in July of that year. The Final Report of the Junk Bay New Town Study (Junk Bay Development Office, 1982) was published in October 1982. Meanwhile, in September 1982, the Governor of Hong Kong, on the advice of the Executive Council, authorised the development of Junk Bay as a New Town. Junk Bay planning proposals: 198246 The draft Outline Development Plan presented in the Junk Bay New Town Study proposed a target population of 328 000. to be housed in two main development phases implemented over a lo-year period. The land requirements of the New Town were estimated

at 462 ha, of which some 135 ha (29%) would be allocated for permanent high-density housing. Approximately 50% of the population would live in public rental housing, with the remainder in government Home Ownership Scheme/Private Sector Participation Scheme (HOS/PSPS) projects and private housing. The consultants estimated that the first public housing units in the New Town could be occupied by 1986 if the recommendations embodied in the draft ODP were to be endorsed and implemented (Junk Bay Development Office. 1982). The basic development plan for the New Town is presented in Fig. 2. The phasing of the project reflected the relationship between the development process and the provision of external transport infrastructure as recommended by the consultants. Thus, Phase One would see the town grow to a population of 175 000, a threshold governed by the capacity of a proposed new in-tunnel road link from East Kowloon and the up-grading of the existing PO Lam Road access. Phase Two. which would take the New Town up to its target population, would require the construction of a Mass Transit Railway (MTR) extension from Kwun Tong to Junk Bay. The MTR was seen as being the major public transport facility linking the New Town with Kowloon. The landuse disposition in the draft ODP provided for a 40-m-wide MTR reserve, with the extended line entering from the north west and then passing through the three main residential districts of the town. The present paper will not elaborate further on the original Junk Bay ODP as this has undergone numerous and, in some cases quite substantial, revisions since the publication of the Final Report in 1982. In fact. when the Land Development Policy Committee considered the draft version of that document. there were already indications that development of the New Town might not proceed along the lines proposed in the consultants’ report. In July 1982. the LDPC agreed that the need to develop Junk Bay on the basis of the pro-

JUNK

BAY

NEW

JUNK

COMMERCIAL

:;:;:;:;:; :.:.:.:.> cl::. ._.:

CENTRE

HIGH

DENSITY

HOUSING

HIGH

DENSITY

HOUSING

MEDIUM

8

LOW

TOWN

PLAN

BAY

WITH

DENSITY

HOUSING

INDUSTRY

Fig. 2. Town plan for Junk Bay New Town.

PUBLIC

SERVICES

RECREATION

RURAL

FRINGE

h LEISURE

261

262

gramme set out in the Draft Final Report should be reviewed no later than October 1983 and, furthermore. that relevant government departments should examine the implications of curtailing various elements of the proposed development and extending the overall development process over a longer time-period than that originally recommended. The LDPC’s decision almost certainly reflected a combination of concerns relating to the financial and planning implications of the project. Hong Kong had just entered a period of severe budgetary constraints occasioned by a sizeable government deficit. In addition. work was then in progress on the formulation of a territory-wide development strategy, and it is possible the LDPC felt that a premature decision on Junk Bay might frustrate that strategy. Other significant developments were to occur in September 1982 at the time of the government’s decision to develop Junk Bay as a New Town. The Executive Council, while accepting that the development should proceed subject to the provision of funds. noted, inter alia, that no commitment had been made to extend the MTR to Junk Bay and that no decision on the matter would be taken until the latest possible moment. Thus, even at this very early stage, it appeared possible that the development of the New Town might be restricted to a population of 175 000, which, of course, was the threshold level for the provision of the MTR link. Interestingly, the Council also noted that because of the likely shortfall of land for public housing in the 1980’s, a decision on whether or not to proceed with Junk Bay would have to be taken before the work on the territorial development strategy had been completed. The subsequent 1983 Development Programme Review considered by the LDPC in August of that year confirmed the essential contribution of Junk Bay to meeting public housing needs in the period up to 199 1. It also indicated that if this contribution were to be realised, decisions would have to be made

TABLE

III

Junk Bay: land use on full development

(ha)

% Total

Public housing Government home ownership scheme Private housing Commercial/ residential Industry

130 40 60 30 100 200 170

18 6 8 4 14 21 23

Public services and roads Recreation and leisure Green belt and urban fringe park

800

Area

Type

Source:

New Territories

Development

Department.

1985b.

immediately on the development of the town for a population of 175 000. This urgency stemmed from the need to resolve various contractual commitments regarding housing and water supplies. Any subsequent decisions involving growth of the New Town beyond the 175 000 population threshold could. so the Review suggested, be taken at a later stage in the light of overall strategic planning concerns and perceived housing needs. It is also noteworthy that the 1983 Review incorporated a revised ODP for Junk Bay, which set the potential population capacity within the ODP area at 380 000. The land-use allocation within the New Town when fully developed is presented in Table III. In August 1983, the LDPC decided that development of Phase One of the New Town should proceed as planned up to a population threshold of 175 000. Decisions regarding any subsequent growth would be taken in the context of the overall development strategy for the territory. The MTR reserve would be retained. but consideration would also be given to the possibility of a southern route into Junk Bay. It was also agreed that action would be taken to secure the removal of the incompatible industries located in the Head of the Bay and Hang Hau districts.

263

Although development of the New Town commenced shortly after this decision, a number of revisions have since been made to the Phase One Outline Development Plan, and these were presented to the Land Development Policy Committee for ratification in January 1986. The new ODP provides for Phase One to function independently as a town. Population capacity has been increased from 175 000 to 223 000. Work on the principal access is being limited initially to the provision of a single tube of the tunnel, which together with improvements to existing access roads would be capable of meeting the capacity requirements associated with a population of between 130 000 and 150 000. With both tubes of the tunnel in operation, and with a level of service design capacity allowing reasonable flow conditions, it now appears that a total population of 300 000-325 000 could be catered for Ltlithout the provision of an MTR extension (Junk Bay Development Office, 1985). Although the original MTR reserve has now been deleted from the ODP, the land-use disposition has been arranged to allow for an MTR extension to Junk Bay from the south. This extension could be included in the Eastern Harbour Crossing Project, which would considerably reduce the cost of providing the MTR link. The number of commercial centres serving Phase One has been reduced from two to one with the conversion of the proposed Hang Hau commercial centre to a civic centre. Various Government departments were not convinced that two centres would be viable in view of the deferred extension of the MTR. Finally, various modifications in the disposition and designation of land uses have been made, partly in response to the deletion of the MTR reserve. To date, construction has been concentrated in the Head of the Bay District located in the northern part of the designated New Town area. By mid-1986, the first blocks of public housing rental units were nearing completion

and were expected to be occupied by the end of the year, subject to the required sewage treatment facilities being operational. Subsequent development will mainly occur on the eastern side of the Bay, where large-scale reclamation schemes are currently in progress. As with the implementation of other Hong Kong New Towns, Junk Bay is being planned as a series of “development packages”, each containing public and private housing, light industry, open space and various community facilities. Head of the Bay District is expected to provide housing for a target population of 125 000 (80 000 in public housing and 45 000 in private housing). A second major development package area based on the existing village of Hang Hau will ultimately house 70 000 people. Development programme expenditure for public housing over the period 1984/89 is estimated to be in the order of HK$2.2 billion (US$l =HK$7.80), and for engineering and other works HK$l.9 billion. Expenditure on community facilities will be some HK$200 million (New Territories Development Department, 1985~). JUNK BAY: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES The responsibility for planning and implementing the Junk Bay project rests with the Junk Bay Development Office. This is staffed by a multi-disciplinary team of officers from the Territory Development Department (formerly the New Territories Development Department). Environmental studies relating to the project have, however, been undertaken or supervised by the Hong Kong Government’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), now the Environmental Protection Department (see Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). As noted above, this was, in fact, the first exercise of its type carried out for any of the territory’s New Towns and, although limited in scope, represents a significant advance in the integration of environ-

264

mental considerations into the urban planning process in Hong Kong. The environmental factors considered in the studies undertaken for Junk Bay were: (1 ) noise impacts; (2) water-quality impacts; (3) air-quality impacts. In addition, the development of the New Town was considered in the context of the formulation of a territory-wide waste management model. This will subsequently be reflected in the Waste Disposal Plan that must be prepared under the provisions of the Waste Disposal Ordinance. The three main areas of environmental analysis were directed to establishing base-line conditions for evaluating environmental quality and existing pollutant levels in the Bay area and to: (a) identifying from a pollution viewpoint the compatibility of existing industries with proposed new development; (b) obtaining data relating to the dispersive and assimilative capacities of the relevant air and water bodies, thereby providing a basis for assessing proposals for introducing significant new emission sources and developing strategies to meet the air- and water-quality objectives specified in the relevant legislation: (c) providing inputs to the planning exercise on issues such as alternative alignments for principal road access and the location of sewage treatment facilities.

Assessment

of noise implications

As noted, Hong Kong faces a formidable noise pollution problem. In the past, little has been done to mitigate noise impacts, and in fact virtually no attention was given to such problems in earlier New Town planning exercises. In the case of Junk Bay, however, an attempt was made to analyse the noise impacts associated with alternative principal access road

alignments for the project. The noise studies were carried out in 198 l-82 by the EPA in conjunction with the consultants responsible for the planning and design of the New Town. Subsequent noise investigations undertaken by the EPA have focussed on potential problems arising in particular development areas of the New Town and the remedial measures that might be employed to mitigate these impacts. In the original noise assessment exercise. two possible principal access road alignments were considered. These both approached the New Town from the west and reached a reclaimed area near the southern end of Head of the Bay. One option comprised a tunnel exiting at reclamation level. The second involved a combination of a shorter tunnel section and an extension on structure. The noise assessment indicated that the tunnel/extension option had disadvantages. environmental significant especially for those residential areas exposed to noise generated by heavy traffic flows on the gradient leading up to the tunnel entrance. The alternative alignments were subject to a systematic comparison using four main criteria: environmental impacts (both noise and visual intrusion); land use and accessibility impacts; programming. and capital and operating costs (Junk Bay Development Office, 1982). Although the longer tunnel option had distinct environmental advantages. particularly in terms of noise impacts, it carried a cost penalty estimated at between HK$l20 and 140m. The Junk Bay Steering Group felt that these advantages did not outweigh the cost penalty, and the shorter tunnel and extension on structure option was therefore selected as the principal access to the New Town. The Environmental Protection Agency dissented from this decision. The EPA subsequently turned its attention to the investigation of cost-effective measures that would serve to minimise the noise impacts of the principal access road and other roads in the New Town. This was later extended to include the possible MTR railway line. As far

265

as the roads are concerned, the alternatives considered have included complete enclosure and the construction of roadside noise barriers. The former was subsequently ruled out on the grounds of cost, ventilation problems, visual intrusion and because it appeared to offer protection to only a limited number of additional housing units compared with the noise-barrier option. Although barriers are usually only effective in protecting units 3-4 floors above the road surface, the Junk Bay access road will be located at a relatively high level above the ground floor of apartment blocks, and consequently the barrier option offers an opportunity for protecting a large number of dwelling units from excessive noise levels. In terms of the detailed design of the New Town, two approaches have been adopted to mitigate adverse noise impacts. Firstly, a series of guideline noise levels have been proposed for different parts of the town to aid in the process of controlling the impact of existing and proposed noise sources. In the case of traffic noise, the government has recently published a new chapter which now forms part of the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines (HKPSG), and this sets out advisory standards for traffic noise levels in relation to various types of land use and activity (Hong Kong Government, 1985b). The maximum 1 h L,,, (i.e. the noise level exceeded for 10% of the time) for dwellings should not exceed 70 dB(A), while for schools, the level is set at 6.5 dB (A). These standards should be applied in Junk Bay and all other new developments. Secondly, considerable emphasis has been placed on the adoption of basic acoustic principles in the planning of the layout of the town. These principles operate at various levels. For example, attempts have been made to locate sensitive land uses as far away from noise sources as possible. Noise-insensitive land uses are consequently located adjacent to major noise sources and also perform the function of

noise barriers protecting the more sensitive land uses behind them. Recreational and commercial land uses are, for example, used in this way. Where options do not exist to protect sensitive land uses in this way, attention has been given to the possibilities for using noise barriers, for modifying the orientation of specific structures and to the internal design of individual buildings, with noise-sensitive rooms being located on the side furthest away from the noise source (Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). Two types of model have been used by the EPA to investigate potential noise impacts. The first simple optical model utilised light sources to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative layout plans. Physical models of particular development areas of the town were constructed. Road alignments were incorporated in the model. Noise implications were then investigated by the use of various types of light source (e.g. a series of small light bulbs to represent road alignments). Those facades of the model buildings directly exposed to the light source (i.e. on which the light shone) were deemed to be exposed to a noise source. Clearly, the greater the area of sensitive land uses in shadow (i.e. not directly exposed to the noise source) then the less the likely noise problem. Using this type of model, a wide range of alternative layouts could be quickly evaluated in terms of potential noise problems. The EPA has developed this work further by utilizing a more sophisticated assessment technique in which a spark-generator is used as a noise source. The cardboard models of individual structures are retained, but this acoustical approach permits far more detailed analysis of the noise attenuation effects associated with alternative site layouts. There are, however, certain problems with this technique, particularly its ability to handle the attenuation effects of different types of building material, as these cannot easily be replicated in the simple physical models employed.

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Water-quality

implications

During 1981-82, the EPA carried out a detailed study of water quality in Junk Bay. This study identified major polluting sources, the volume of waste water discharged into the Bay and the circulatory characteristics of the Bay itself. It was found that the prevailing waste-water discharge into the Bay amounted to approximately 3.70X 10’ m3, mainly from aluminium anodizing. steel rolling and industrial gas production. This was regarded as a significant polluting load given the restricted circulation in the Bay. Unlike many other coastal waters in Hong Kong, Junk Bay was found to be characterised by slow water movement, which limits its dispersive capacity. Water quality was found to be especially poor at the head of the Bay, where slow eddying water movements were pronounced. Red tides have been recorded in the Bay on several occasions since the mid-1970’s and, indeed, in other parts of the territory. Across the territory as a whole, there is evidence to suggest that they are increasing in frequency. A total of 62 red tides were reported in 1984, 40 of which occurred in Tolo Harbour. Only 21 such events were reported during the previous year (Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1985). On-going monitoring in Junk Bay indicates that water quality has not changed significantly since the original survey in 198 l/2, although chlorophyll a concentrations have shown a tendency to greater fluctuation. The Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1984) has suggested that this symptom of environmental stress is known to be associated with reclamation, and it is expected to disappear once the work has been completed provided that possible pollution by effluents is effectively controlled. The water-quality study undertaken by the EPA resulted in a number of recommendations to the Junk Bay Development Office concerning the ways in which water pollution

impacts might be mitigated. Among the most important were: (1) the siting of the permanent sewage-treatment plant outfall well outside the entrance to the Bay. to ensure effective dispersal of pollutants: (2) re-assessing the proposal for a temporary sewage treatment works at Rennie’s Mill in view of the fact that it could present problems given the slowness of water movement in that part of the Bay; (3) declaring the Bay a Water Control Zone under the provisions of the Water Pollution Control Ordinance (1980) prior to industrial development taking place and ensuring that adequate effluent treatment facilities are incorporated in such development. Consultants subsequently considered the feasibility of a sewage outfall beyond the entrance to the Bay as part of an overall study of sewage disposal facilities for the New Town, and a location several kilometres from the sewage works site has been proposed. This is intended to ensure that effluent will not flow back towards the New Town. Air-quality

implications

The most extensive EPA study concerning Junk Bay has been an assessment of the airquality implications of the development. This study involved: (1) collection of baseline air-quality and meteorological data; (2) compilation of an existing, and forecasting of a future, emissions inventory: (3) testing an air-pollution dispersion model: (4) predicting future air quality on the basis of projected development; (5) the framing of recommendations regarding measures to protect air quality. The air-quality situation in Junk Bay is complicated by the topography of the area. The New Town site is surrounded by 300-m-high hills on three sides, with the result that air can

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only ventilate to the south. The EPA recognized from the outset that this situation itself pointed to the possibility of significant air pollution impacts following on from the rapid population and industrial build-up associated with the project unless careful planning was exercised at the outset. A 1-year monitoring study ( 198 l-82 ) using three stations in the Bay area indicated that total suspended particulate matter (TSP) concentrations were already a matter for concern. Maximum concentrations averaged over a 24h period at the three monitoring sites ranged from 140 to 175 ,ug me3. The annual geometric means ranged from 66 to 73 pugm-3. Analysis of the composition of TSP in Junk Bay indicated that the major sources were industrial activities. incineration, controlled tip fugitive emissions and natural sources, particularly marine aerosols. Monitoring at Junk Bay has continued since the original survey, and one of the original stations is now part of the EPA’s air-quality monRecently published data itoring network. indicate that TSP levels at Junk Bay have increased significantly, in contrast to the general downward trend observed elsewhere in the territory. Between October 1984 and January 1985,amaximumTSPlevelof441~gm~3was recorded. The United States primary (healthrelated) daily TSP standard of 26Opg me3 was exceeded on live occasions. These elevated TSP levels have been attributed to earth-moving, site formation and construction activity related to the New Town project. Their seasonality is probably related to the territory’s dry winter climatic conditions. Short-term concentrations of sulphur dioxide (SO?) were also investigated. Concentrations at Rennie’s Mill were found to consistently exceed those recorded at the other two monitoring stations. The highest l-h reading recorded at Rennie’s Mill was 806 pg m-3. Annual mean concentrations range between 6 and 26 ,ug m-j. As the EPA (1984) observed, these data suggest the possibility of episodic

TABLE IV Existing and projected mean air quality levels in Junk Bay (average annual concentration in pg m ‘)

Existing (contributed from existing industries and incineration) Projected average value (contributed from all projected)

CO

HC

4

38

1

34

316

24

so2

NO?

25

109’

‘Based on the use of 3% sulphur oil by new industries. Source: Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 53.

1983, p.

events in which high concentrations of SO2 may occur. Having established existing air-quality and dispersion conditions in the study area, the analysis next related existing emissions to the observed air-quality levels. After evaluating the relationship between the two, the study was then directed to estimating future air quality based on projected emissions. The EPA and the Air Pollution Control Division of the Labour Department collaborated to produce comprehensive air-pollutant emissions inventories for existing activities and projected developments. The existing inventory was used together with the air-monitoring data to calibrate an atmospheric diffusion model. This model was found to perform well for SOZ emissions but less well for suspended particulate emissions, a factor attributed to limitations in the meteorological inputs, shortcomings in the emissions inventory, and a possible background dust burden advected from outside the Bay area. The model was subsequently used to estimate air-quality conditions for the proposed New Town development scenario. The estimates yielded by the analysis (Table IV) indicated that in the absence of strict controls, SO2 emissions were likely to reach unacceptable levels. Other gaseous emissions were also likely to increase significantly. In addition, given that ambient particulate emissions were already at

a relatively high level and that enhanced gaseous emissions were likely to be associated with further increases in the concentration of particulates, it was inferred that the latter could also reach unacceptable levels. The EPA made the following recommendations on the basis of the study: (1) that industries with significant air-pollution emissions should be restricted to the industrial sites proposed for the south of the Bay and that where applicable they would need to be licensed as specified processes under the Air Pollution Control Ordinance ( 1983), and stringent conditions would need to be imposed; (2) that during all phases of the development and existence of the New Town, all practicable measures would have to be taken to minimize particulate emissions. especially those associated with land formation, road building and other construction activities; (3) that all possible efforts should be made to minimize the eventual use of road transport in the New Town to minimize emissions from that source; (4) that to prevent ambient SO1 from reaching unacceptable levels, the sulphur content of fuel oil used by new industries and extensions to existing plants should be restricted to a maximum of 1O/o. In addition, the EPA endorsed the consultants’ recommendation contained in the Final Report of the Junk Bay New Town Study that “breezeways” be incorporated as a fundamental design concept in the planning of the town. These “breezeways” are designed to channel natural air-flows through the main built-up area, either through open areas or through areas of low development located between high-rise blocks, thereby assisting in the amelioration of any local climatic defects such as increased temperatures, lack of ventilation resulting from tall structures and elevated air-pollution levels. The discussion above provides an overview of the objectives, nature and main findings of

the environmental undertaken for the paper now focuses such studies and Town planning in

studies that have been Junk Bay development. The on the relationship between the overall process of New Hong Kong.

THE JUNK BAY STUDIES AND NEW TOWN PLANNING IN HONG KONG The analyses described above do represent a significant development in the evolution of environmental planning techniques and procedures in Hong Kong. They can be seen as reflecting government’s growing recognition of the need for an explicit environmental dimension in the New Town planning process, although as the following discussion will suggest, the administration’s position with regard to environmental concerns does at times appear to be rather ambivalent. Clearly, whether or not the studies of noise, water and air pollution actually constitute a formal environmental impact assessment of the project is rather more debatable. As yet there is no statutory EIA system in Hong Kong. although proposals for relevant legislation have been under consideration since the late 1970’s. The government has, however, been able to encourage a number of intending developers to prepare impact assessments for certain major developments, including new thermal power stations and other industrial projects. Various environmental implications of the New Town project at Tin Shui Wai have also been studied by the Environmental Protection Agency. For the present, at least. it appears that government favours a non-statutory, ad hoc approach to EIA. The Junk Bay studies do, however, reveal some of the inherent weaknesses of this approach and, indeed. New Town planning generally as practised in the territory. Junk Bay was identified as a potential location for a New Town in the latter part of the 1970’s, but the environmental studies were only initiated some years later, after a decision

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on the project had already been taken in principle. Thus, in that sense they represent a reactive response to a situation in which the emphasis had to be on reducing potentially adverse impacts within the immediate area of the town, rather than on identifying optimum New Town locations on the basis of a wide range of economic, social and environmental criteria. Opportunities for New Town development in Hong Kong appear to have been identified primarily on the basis of engineering and financial considerations. The over-riding concern has been to minimize overall development costs. The failure to undertake comprehensive assessments of a range of alternative locational opportunities is arguably one of the major shortcomings in the overall planning of Hong Kong’s New Towns. One might also suggest that more detailed consideration should have been given to development opportunities within or on the margins of the existing built-up area. Had this been done at a sufliciently early stage, which means essentially during the 1960’s, then it is questionable whether Hong Kong would have made a commitment to such a large-scale and expensive New Towns programme. There is a body of opinion in the territory which maintains that these alternative development possibilities were significantly underestimated. The Junk Bay studies, which the Environmental Protection Agency undertook at the request of the Junk Bay Development Office and the Study consultants, were carried out as discrete exercises. No attempt seems to have been made to set them within an integrating methodological framework for environmental assessment. They represent the application of specific analytical techniques to a limited range of environmental concerns. As such, they may only be regarded as a partial assessment of a major and complex development project. Given the significant changes in the Outline Development Plan for Junk Bay, it is also arguable that some of the conclusions reached on the basis of the environmental studies

should now be reappraised. It is not clear whether any form of sensitivity analysis was incorporated in the studies, but from available information one suspects that it was not. The limitations of New Town planning in the territory have also been revealed in other ways. There are a number of examples of situations that reflect shortcomings in the ability to coordinate New Town housing development with the provision of increased capacity in related facilities and services, especially public transport, on which the overwhelming majority of the population rely, and education and health services. Many of these problems reflect two striking features of the programme as a whole. The first is that it has been “housing-led”. Hong Kong has established an extremely efficient system for the planning and implementation of public housing projects and many of the problems of the New Towns, it can be argued, reflect the strengths of this implementation system and the relative weakness of the machinery for coordinating the inputs and activities of the other government departments involved in the broader process of New Town planning. Although this situation has possibly been exacerbated by the greater availability of financial resources for public housing as compared with other areas of public investment, it does nonetheless appear that the capability to implement housing schemes has to some extent outstripped the capability to plan New Towns as a comprehensive package of facilities and services. The second feature concerns the relationship between New Town planning and strategic planning within Hong Kong. The New Towns have typically been handled as development projects. Although certain key related projects, such as the New Territories Circular Road - due to be completed in the early 1990’s - do represent a strategic response to particular service requirements of the towns, it was not until the early 1980’s that urban planners in Hong Kong started to formulate a compre-

270

hensive strategic development strategy for the territory as a whole. The New Towns programme has, therefore. largely evolved in a strategic planning vacuum. one implication of which has been that analysis of the interrelationships between the towns and the older urban areas and between the towns themselves has been rather neglected. In environmental terms, little attention has been given to the trade-offs associated with a more dispersed pattern of urban development within the territory. It has been argued, for example, that the concentrated form of development that prevailed until the late 1960’s actually helped to conserve environmental quality, as the New Territories remained largely unaffected by the impact of urbanization and industrialization processes at work elsewhere in Hong Kong (Morton and Morton, 1983). It should also be emphasized that the context for New Town planning in Hong Kong has also been subject to the impact of various uncertainties, including those surrounding the political and economic future of the territory itself. the availability of public funds to support the programme and, more recently. sharply reduced estimates of future population growth. As the previous discussion has suggested, the recent history of proposals for the development of Junk Bay clearly reflects the impact of these uncertainties. The scale of the New Town project has been revised on several occasions, and the plan for the town itself has been subject to significant amendments. Uncertainty has also had a major impact on the implementation of policies concerning existing industries in Junk Bay. Reference has already been made to an environmental controversy involving two of the metal-processing plants located within the designated area of the New Town. In November 1985. these plants became a major focus of attention when it became known that plans to relocate them prior to the arrival of the New Town’s first public housing tenants had been

delayed. The Environmental Protection Agency indicated that residents of the new public housing estate, scheduled for occupation in late-l 986. would be exposed to unacceptably high levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and metallic dust emissions. and consequently that steps would have to be taken to deal with this problem as a matter of urgency. The EPA’s position received strong support from the Housing Department, which indicated that it shared the Agency’s concern about the possible health implications of exposing residents to these pollutants. As the earlier review of the various Junk Bay planning studies indicated, the compatibility of heavy, polluting industry with other types of development has been a key issue for a number of years. Although the 1978 study report (Government of Hong Kong, 1978) concluded that it would probably be unacceptable to remove existing industries and that they should therefore be “cleaned up” prior to any further urban development. this was not the view expressed in the subsequent Junk Bay New Town Study Report. The Interim Report, considered by the Land Development Policy Committee in September 198 1, recommended the earliest possible removal of certain existing industries for a combination of environmental and planning reasons. These factories were to be closed or relocated to the major industrial area located to the south of the controlled tip on the east side of the Bay. Relocation by January I986 was considered feasible. The LDPC accepted these recommendations in principle and passed the matter on to the Industrial Land Sub-Committee (ILSC) for its consideration. The ILSC endorsed the programme of action previously proposed in the Interim Report of the Junk Bay New Town Study, and also agreed on a course of action regarding one particular factory for which a firm recommendation had not previously been made. The LDPC received this proposed programme of action in July 1982. Basically, it identified six categories of existing industry. three of which were regarded

271

as being incompatible with the proposed New Town development. The two problem factories previously referred to constituted one of the categories, and it was recommended that these be relocated to the east side of the Bay. Tentative estimates put the costs involved at some HK$400m for land acquisition and compensation, and an additional HK$200m for relocation expenses. At this point, the uncertainties surrounding the scale and timing of development at Junk Bay appear to have affected progress with the industrial relocation plans. It seems that little, if anything, was achieved between July 1982 and August 1983. The main reason for this seems to have been the impending 1983 Development Programme Review, the significance of which has already been discussed. With the commitment to proceed with development at Junk Bay, albeit on a rather smaller scale than originally envisaged, attention was once again focussed on the issue of the problem industries. Following the 1983 Review, the LDPC agreed that action should be instituted to secure the resumption (i.e. compulsory acquisition of sites) or relocation of the three categories of incompatible industries, and that this should be carried out over a 4-year period. Once again, however, there followed a period of inactivity, which is probably also attributable to the continuing uncertainty surrounding the Junk Bay project. In early 1985, another review of progress with Junk Bay was undertaken. Concern was expressed about the costeffectiveness of Junk Bay and the implications for the New Town of changes in certain basic planning assumptions, especially those regarding population growth in the territory and future levels of car ownership and use. It appears that the possibility of curtailing the project was considered, but was ruled out on the grounds that more than HK$l billion had already been committed and that no suitable substitute sites for public housing were available. This review exercise also noted that slip-

pages had occurred in the industrial clearance programme. By this time. the Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken a re-assessment of the environmental impact of existing industries in the Head of the Bay district. This indicated that pollution effects would certainly be unacceptable in the longer term. Surprisingly, while the Junk Bay Development Progress Committee appears to have accepted that certain plants should be relocated on environmental grounds, it also agreed that consideration should be given to amending land-use proposals for the areas adjoining the two problem factories (which were scheduled for relocation) to minimize the need to move them, assuming that emissions of pollutants could be reduced to an “acceptable” level. It appears, however, that pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Housing Department convinced the Development Progress Committee and senior government officials that it would be inappropriate to retain the two factories in situ and that consequently relocation (or, if necessary, closure with appropriate compensation) was a necessity. Although land formation for the proposed resiting area was completed in late 1985, the slippage in the relocation programme is now such that there is actually little prospect of the two plants being completely relocated until late 1988 at the earliest. More recently, in 1986, there have been indications that only limited progress has so far been made in dealing with the relocation issue. Indeed, it may yet prove to be the case that development of the New Town proceeds with the two factories remaining in place. There is little likelihood that the new public housing units coming on-stream at the end of 1986 will remain unoccupied until the matter is resolved. Government is acutely conscious of the financial penalties that would be incurred, especially the rental income that would be foregone. This has been estimated at

272

HK$l76m if occupation of the flats were to be deferred until late 1988. This suggests that the first group of new residents, 10 000- 12 000 in number, could be exposed to these pollutants for a period of up to 2 years, assuming the factories are indeed relocated. The government has now decided to use certain anti-pollution measures as a short-term response to the problem. The Environmental Protection Department has proposed that the plants be required to switch from burning fuel oil to the use of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG). This would largely resolve the SO? problem. In addition, it appears that restrictions will be imposed on the operation of the plants during the summer months, from May to October, when their emissions would be most likely to create unacceptable conditions. The cost of these measures is believed to be in the order of HK$l 1.5m, a sum to be borne by the government. The situation described above illustrates how sound environmental planning objectives can be frustrated by uncertainty and indecision in related areas of public policy-making. This type of situation is common enough in planning systems throughout the world and is by no means unique to Hong Kong, but in the territory’s case it might be argued that it also reflects a particular context for environmental policy and planning in which government’s own position appears at times to be ambivalent if not contradictory. Despite the fact that it was acknowledged as long ago as 198 1 that the factories should be relocated, it appears that government has been reticent in making a firm commitment to this course of action. Although this may in part be a reflection of uncertainties surrounding the development of the town itself, it would also seem to reflect government’s unwillingness to take a firm line on environmental pollution problems and its desire to minimize resource commitments to pollution abatement. The fact that government has decided to take action to reduce the polluting emissions of the two factories is largely due to

pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency and Housing Department. and to extensive media coverage of the problem in late 1985. Notwithstanding these recent developments, one is left with the distinct impression that government has moved only grudgingly to tackle an obvious and potentially serious pollution problem. The work of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Junk Bay Development Office and the New Town planning consultants has shed considerable light on potential environmental problems in Junk Bay, and has alerted those responsible for implementing the project to some possible steps that might be taken to mitigate adverse impacts of the project and improve overall environmental quality in the town. The extent to which the problems identified in the development of Junk Bay can be overcome remains to be seen, but the studies referred to in this paper are a significant step forward in the Hong Kong context and are indicative of the type of assessment work that may be required in other geographical settings. REFERENCES Bower. J., 1985. Air quality monitoring in Kwun Tong, Hong Kong. In: M.W.H. Chart. R.W.M. Hoare. P.R. Holmes. R.J.S. Law and S.B. Reed (Editors), Pollution in the Urban Environment. POLMET 85. Elsevier Applied Science, London. pp. 178-l 83. Clark, B.D., Gilad. A., Bisset. R. and Tomlinson. P. (Edi1984. Perspectives on Environmental Impact tors), Assessment. Reidel, Dordrecht. Government of Hong Kong, 1978. Junk Bay Urban Dcvelopment Feasibility Study. (Maunsell Consultants Asia m association with Yuncken Freeman Hong Kong.) 3 Vols., Hong Kong Hong Kong Government. Hills, P.. 1985. Environmental protection in a laissez-faire economy. Built Environ., 12: 268-28 1. Hills, P. and Yeh. 4.G.O.. 1983. New town developments in Hong Kong. Built Environ., 9: 266-277. Hodgkiss. I.J. and Chan, B.S.S.. 1983. Pollution studies on Tolo Harbour. Hong Kong. Marine Environ. Res.. IO: I-44. Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency. 1983. Environmental Protection in Hong Kong: 1982-83. Government Printer, Hong Kong. Hong Kong Environmental Protection .Agency. 1984. Environmental Protection in Hong Kong: 1983-84. Govcrnment Printer. Hong Kong.

273 Hong Kong Environmental Protection Agency, 1985. Environment Hong Kong: 1985. Government Printer, Hong Kong. Hong Kong Government, 1985a. Hong Kong 1985. Government Printer, Hong Kong. Hong Kong Government, 1985b. Environmental Guidelines for Planning in Hong Kong. Government Printer, Hong Kong. Hong Kong Government, 1986. Hong Kong 1986. Government Printer, Hong Kong. Hong Kong Productivity Centre, 198 1. Junk Bay Survey. Hong Kong Productivity Centre, Hong Kong. Junk Bay Development Office, 1982. Junk Bay New Town Study: Final Report. (Maunsell Consultants Asia, Shankland Cox Partnership, Brian Clouston and Partners.) 2 Vols., NTDD, Hong Kong. Junk Bay Development Office, 1985. Junk Bay Review Background Study, NTDD, Hong Kong. Ko, N.W.M., 198 1. Further analysis of traffic noise in a highrise city. Appl. Acoustics, 11: 225-239. Leung, W.T., 1983. The new town programme. In T.N. Chiu and CL. So (Editors), A Geography of Hong Kong. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, pp. 2 1O-227. Morton, B.. 1985. Marine pollution induced environmental

changes in Hong Kong - the To10 Harbour case study. In M.W.H. Chan, R.W.M. Hoare, P.R. Holmes, R.J.S. Law and S.B. Reed (Editors), Pollution in the Urban Environment. POLMET 85. Elsevier Applied Science, London, pp. 548-558. Morton, B. and Morton, J., 1983. The Sea Shore Ecology of Hong Kong. University of Hong Kong Press, Hong Kong. New Territories Development Department, 1985a. Fanling. NTDD, Hong Kong. New Territories Development Department, 1985b. NorthWestern New Territories. NTDD, Hong Kong. New Territories Development Department, 1985~. Junk Bay. NTDD, Hong Kong. Phillips, D.R. and Yeh, A.G.O. (Editors), 1987. New Towns in Asia: Planning and Development. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong. United Nations (Economic Commission for Europe), 198 1. Environmental Impact Assessment. Pergamon Press, Oxford. Wong, W.H. and Mak, F.J.T.H., 1985. Planning for the control of community noise in Hong Kong. In: M.W.H. Chan, R.W.M. Hoare, P.R. Holmes, R.J.S. Law and S.B. Reed (Editors), Pollution in the Urban Environment. POLMET 85. Elsevier Applied Science, London, pp. 395-402.