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Environmental protection in Hong Kong: From theory to practice
ENVIRON IMPACT ASSESS REV 1990;10:247 252
2 4 "7
VIEWPOINT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
ROBIN BIDWELL
In Stockholm, 1972, the historic UN Conference on the Human Environment was held, with consequences that are still being played out. Throughout the world there is a growing awareness of the risks posed by pollution to health, amenity, and the natural environment. In Hong Kong, the Governor established an advisory committee that in its first report clearly identified the pollution problems facing the territory, and the action required. In 1974, the Hong Kong government hired an independent consulting firm, Environmental Resources Limited, London, to undertake a detailed 3-year review of the environmental problems facing the territory. The review team's mission was to provide recommendations for legislative and technical controls; suggest a structure for implementation: and develop an action program that would be feasible and affordable. Preliminary agreement on the results of the first stage of the review was reached in October 1975 and implementation began in July 1977, with the appointment of a Environment Protection Adviser.
The Context The 1975 review included an examination of all aspects of the Hong Kong environment and predicted the changes likely to occur over the following 10 years if no action were taken. The report noted that the population (then around
Address requests for reprints to: Dr. Robin Bidwell, Environmental Resources Limited, 106 Gloucester Place, London, W1, England.
© 1990 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010
0195-9255,'90/$350
248
ROBIN BIDWELL
four million) was growing at a rate of approximately 100,000 per year and that 80 percent of the population lived in the urban areas of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. Not surprisingly, the environmental problems arose from the quantity of wastes produced each day and the impact that a large number of activities (industrial, commercial, transport, etc.) had on other and on the community at large. Specific problems at that stage included: pollution of coastal waters (Tolo Harbour, North West Kowloon, Victoria Harbour and the beaches were noted); pollution of the New Territories (in particular from agricultural wastes and industrial discharges; pollution of the urban areas by vehicles and the overall impact of increasing levels of sulphur dioxide; and the disruption and nuisance caused by conflicting activities (e.g. schools under airplane flight paths). Hong Kong was at that time (and still is) justly proud of its economic achievements. During the 10 years prior to 1974 the economy had been growing at an annual rate of nine percent (measured as GDP in constant prices). The Hong Kong government was perhaps ahead of its time in so far as its policy on good economic housekeeping was concerned. It balanced its annual budget and was generally opposed .to any increase in the Civil Service. The downturn in the world economy in 1975 led to rigorous enforcement of restrictions on the public sector. It was made clear to the review team that proposals for action should neither interfere with industry or other~vise impair potential economic growth.
The Framework for Control The review team's recommendations included several key elements: A flexible system of control. Specifically, this meant no sudden introduction of rigid environmental standards. It was felt that in the short term, such an approach would be unenforceable and politically unacceptable. Rather, government should establish environmental objectives, set priorities, and introduce controls as required. The proposed legislation provided for that flexibility. ,Environmental planning as a priority. It was argued that a major plank in any program to improve the environment in Hong Kong was to separate the people from the polluting activities. In the short term this meant better siting decisions, and in the longer term, relocation. This priority was seen as essential to avoiding future problems and health risks which would be much more expensive to remedy than to prevent. A focus on the control of new industry. All new dischargers and emitters were to be required to comply with as high a standard of cleanliness as practicable given the technology available. Existing industry was to be allowed to continue existing practices unless these posed a health risk. A central authority. Approximately eight executive departments had some responsibility for pollution control. Some form of centralization was recommended. (See discussion.)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG
249
An emphasis on waste management. It was clear that urgent action was required to improve the planning for the disposal of all types of waste. The report recommended centralized planning for treatment and disposal facilities for all forms of solid, oily, and toxic waste. The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). Finally, the review proposed that the PPP should be adopted. In practical terms, this meant that the government would not subsidize or compensate those affected by the introduction of controls. The overall aim of this framework was to ensure that the situation did not deteriorate further (through planning and discharge controls on all new activities) while at the same time tackling the key problems, particularly waste management. Over the subsequent 2 years, the review team elaborated proposals for implementing these principles into a detailed program of action.
Structuring a Central Authority In 1975, about eight executive departments had some pollution control function. It was proposed that a central authority should be established to develop and implement a program for environmental improvements; establish quality objectives for environmental protection; promote research into matters directly related to environmental protection; collect the information required for decision making, specifically to ensure adequate monitoring; and enforce control legislation, including enforcement through the delegation of powers. There were several good arguments for establishing a central authority. First, it would enable centralized management of the environmental control program. Furthermore, central planning of all forms of waste disposal would ensure that all decisions would reflect the multifaceted nature of many waste control problems. Thus, centralized management would minimize the costs of pollution control to the community. Second, because a number of the departments were also polluters, it was argued that powers enforcing environmental protection should be separated from those responsible for discharges. In the words of the review document: "If control is by a department which itself generates some of the pollution in question, the conflict of interest between inexpensive operation and environmental protection is resolved within the department. There is then no guarantee to the public that the case for environmental protection has been presented as clearly as it might have been." The review group felt that a centralized authority would be best equipped to implement environmental impact assessment procedures. Finally, bringing monitoring and enforcement within one organization would eliminate duplication of efforts, particularly in the back-up services. This streamlining of the system would also reduce the need for dischargers to deal with a range of pollution control officers. Following discussions with the government, two options for a centralized system were found. The first was to establish a new department which would
250
ROBIN BIDWELL
take over the executive functions (and to some extent the staff) of the other departments. The second was to establish a policy unity with no monitoring or enforcing officers of its own that would exercise control through the eight existing departments concerned with pollution. Given budgetary constraints and the strongly expressed concerns of the individual departments, the second option was selected. The Director was to be authorized to establish his own monitoring and inspection teams if this appeared necessary. The final report of the review team noted that: In the longer term, the "central authority" may feel it needs its own monitoring and research staff in order to exercise its functions effectively. Alternatively, if the Secretary to the Environment finds that the proposed structure is not satisfactory, there remains the option of forming a new Environmental Protection Department which could be formed by detatching the relevant units from the existing departments.
Progress In July 1977, the Central Authority (known at that time as the Environmental Protection Unit, or EPU) consisted of the Environmental Protection Adviser. He was joined within the succeeding 12 months by four principal environmental protection officers responsible for air, water, noise, and waste. The Environment Protection Adviser's responsibilities included environmental impact assessment. Twelve years later, the Environmental Protection Department (a direct descendant of EPU) includes over 500 staff members divided into 10 functional groups, plus a public relations section. The transition from the initial unit to the present Environmental Protection Department occurred in two stages. It was clear that environmental protection activities were hampered by lack of information and to some extent by lack of cooperation between the departments. The first stage of transition to the current structure was to increase staff resources to enable EPU to carry out environmental monitoring programs; implement more effectively its environmental impact assessment responsibilities; and further develop environmental legislation. A new organization, the Environmental Protection Agency, was established in 1981 and by 1983 had about 100 staff members. The second stage of reorganization was to implement the first of the options originally proposed, i.e. to give responsibility for environmental law enforcement to a single department, and to strengthen its control over planning waste treatment and disposal activities. The new Environmental Protection Department was created in 1986. Staff and resources from six government departments were brought together under a Director of Environmental Protection. It might be argued that the initial decision to create the central authority as a policy unit was wrong because it was given inadequate resources to carry out its assigned responsibilities of planning, developing new controls, and ensuring that these could be implemented. This may be the reason why progress in other
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG
251
areas has been less rapid than expected. Was there a viable alternative at the time? Was the proposal that the Environmental Adviser should act through the resources of the individual departments doomed from the start? In terms of developing legislation, there were advantages to having the EPU located within the government secretariat, the policy branch of government. Equally important, this placement reduced by one layer the levels of bureaucracy through which the legislation needed to be argued. In addition, leaving executive powers within the existing departments had some advantages in terms of career structures, management and "integration" of environmental thinking into different branches of government. However, it would perhaps have been better to argue more strongly for a central, executive agency from the start. Hindsight reveals two key omissions in the responsibilities of the initial authority. First, the waste management planning role was limited to solid, toxic, agricultural, and industrial wastes. It should also have covered the planning of sewage treatment and disposal. This omission was rectified only in 1986. Second, it failed to include the responsibility for major environmental hazards (e.g. large-scale storage of LPG) within the Authority's remit. It is presently still unclear where this responsibility lies.
Barriers to Implementation A detailed program of environmental controls was proposed for the Territory by the review team. At that time, 1976, it was envisaged that within about 5 years the program would have been fully implemented. To achieve this, the Secretarial prepared a schedule for the enactment of the legislation; all the relevant ordinances were to be in place by March 1977. In practice it was not until 1980 that the first of the enabling ordinances was enacted (Water Pollution Control). Even then, not until 1987 were regulations in force that allowed implementation to proceed. The Air Pollution Control framework legislation was enacted in 1983 along with some key implementing regulations; others were not enacted until 1987. The Noise Control bill was enacted in July 1988. Why has the process taken so much longer than originally expected'? There are three major reasons. First, there is the issue of political will. Even though in 1976 draft legislation had been largely agreed upon at the departmental level, there had been little public consultation nor had all the details been negotiated. Environmental legislation, even though it had been crafted to reflect the special needs of the Territory, was bound to run into opposition. To force the pace would have required the exertion of considerable political will from the most senior level of government. Second, it is possible that the enacting of legislation prior to establishing the coordinating authority was putting the cart before the horse. The newly appointed officials wanted to work on the proposed legislation themselves, and this brought about delays. Third, if the authority had been
252
ROBIN BIDWELL
established from the outset as an implementing authority, greater priority might have been given to getting the legislative framework in place.
Conclusion The original proposals for an environmental protection unit in Hong Kong has faced many pitfalls on its way to complete implementation. The Hong Kong experience demonstrates the difficulty of converting environmental rhetoric and policy making into achievement. In the years since Stockholm, almost every country of the world has claimed environmental protection as an important policy objective. The focus for the future must be to provide the institutional mechanisms to realize policy aims.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Smart Reed, Director, and members of the staff of the Environmental Protection Department for their assistance. He would also like to acknowledge the work of the original ERL Review Team. The views expressed in this paper are, however, entirely his own responsibility.
2 4 "7
VIEWPOINT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
ROBIN BIDWELL
In Stockholm, 1972, the historic UN Conference on the Human Environment was held, with consequences that are still being played out. Throughout the world there is a growing awareness of the risks posed by pollution to health, amenity, and the natural environment. In Hong Kong, the Governor established an advisory committee that in its first report clearly identified the pollution problems facing the territory, and the action required. In 1974, the Hong Kong government hired an independent consulting firm, Environmental Resources Limited, London, to undertake a detailed 3-year review of the environmental problems facing the territory. The review team's mission was to provide recommendations for legislative and technical controls; suggest a structure for implementation: and develop an action program that would be feasible and affordable. Preliminary agreement on the results of the first stage of the review was reached in October 1975 and implementation began in July 1977, with the appointment of a Environment Protection Adviser.
The Context The 1975 review included an examination of all aspects of the Hong Kong environment and predicted the changes likely to occur over the following 10 years if no action were taken. The report noted that the population (then around
Address requests for reprints to: Dr. Robin Bidwell, Environmental Resources Limited, 106 Gloucester Place, London, W1, England.
© 1990 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010
0195-9255,'90/$350
248
ROBIN BIDWELL
four million) was growing at a rate of approximately 100,000 per year and that 80 percent of the population lived in the urban areas of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. Not surprisingly, the environmental problems arose from the quantity of wastes produced each day and the impact that a large number of activities (industrial, commercial, transport, etc.) had on other and on the community at large. Specific problems at that stage included: pollution of coastal waters (Tolo Harbour, North West Kowloon, Victoria Harbour and the beaches were noted); pollution of the New Territories (in particular from agricultural wastes and industrial discharges; pollution of the urban areas by vehicles and the overall impact of increasing levels of sulphur dioxide; and the disruption and nuisance caused by conflicting activities (e.g. schools under airplane flight paths). Hong Kong was at that time (and still is) justly proud of its economic achievements. During the 10 years prior to 1974 the economy had been growing at an annual rate of nine percent (measured as GDP in constant prices). The Hong Kong government was perhaps ahead of its time in so far as its policy on good economic housekeeping was concerned. It balanced its annual budget and was generally opposed .to any increase in the Civil Service. The downturn in the world economy in 1975 led to rigorous enforcement of restrictions on the public sector. It was made clear to the review team that proposals for action should neither interfere with industry or other~vise impair potential economic growth.
The Framework for Control The review team's recommendations included several key elements: A flexible system of control. Specifically, this meant no sudden introduction of rigid environmental standards. It was felt that in the short term, such an approach would be unenforceable and politically unacceptable. Rather, government should establish environmental objectives, set priorities, and introduce controls as required. The proposed legislation provided for that flexibility. ,Environmental planning as a priority. It was argued that a major plank in any program to improve the environment in Hong Kong was to separate the people from the polluting activities. In the short term this meant better siting decisions, and in the longer term, relocation. This priority was seen as essential to avoiding future problems and health risks which would be much more expensive to remedy than to prevent. A focus on the control of new industry. All new dischargers and emitters were to be required to comply with as high a standard of cleanliness as practicable given the technology available. Existing industry was to be allowed to continue existing practices unless these posed a health risk. A central authority. Approximately eight executive departments had some responsibility for pollution control. Some form of centralization was recommended. (See discussion.)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG
249
An emphasis on waste management. It was clear that urgent action was required to improve the planning for the disposal of all types of waste. The report recommended centralized planning for treatment and disposal facilities for all forms of solid, oily, and toxic waste. The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). Finally, the review proposed that the PPP should be adopted. In practical terms, this meant that the government would not subsidize or compensate those affected by the introduction of controls. The overall aim of this framework was to ensure that the situation did not deteriorate further (through planning and discharge controls on all new activities) while at the same time tackling the key problems, particularly waste management. Over the subsequent 2 years, the review team elaborated proposals for implementing these principles into a detailed program of action.
Structuring a Central Authority In 1975, about eight executive departments had some pollution control function. It was proposed that a central authority should be established to develop and implement a program for environmental improvements; establish quality objectives for environmental protection; promote research into matters directly related to environmental protection; collect the information required for decision making, specifically to ensure adequate monitoring; and enforce control legislation, including enforcement through the delegation of powers. There were several good arguments for establishing a central authority. First, it would enable centralized management of the environmental control program. Furthermore, central planning of all forms of waste disposal would ensure that all decisions would reflect the multifaceted nature of many waste control problems. Thus, centralized management would minimize the costs of pollution control to the community. Second, because a number of the departments were also polluters, it was argued that powers enforcing environmental protection should be separated from those responsible for discharges. In the words of the review document: "If control is by a department which itself generates some of the pollution in question, the conflict of interest between inexpensive operation and environmental protection is resolved within the department. There is then no guarantee to the public that the case for environmental protection has been presented as clearly as it might have been." The review group felt that a centralized authority would be best equipped to implement environmental impact assessment procedures. Finally, bringing monitoring and enforcement within one organization would eliminate duplication of efforts, particularly in the back-up services. This streamlining of the system would also reduce the need for dischargers to deal with a range of pollution control officers. Following discussions with the government, two options for a centralized system were found. The first was to establish a new department which would
250
ROBIN BIDWELL
take over the executive functions (and to some extent the staff) of the other departments. The second was to establish a policy unity with no monitoring or enforcing officers of its own that would exercise control through the eight existing departments concerned with pollution. Given budgetary constraints and the strongly expressed concerns of the individual departments, the second option was selected. The Director was to be authorized to establish his own monitoring and inspection teams if this appeared necessary. The final report of the review team noted that: In the longer term, the "central authority" may feel it needs its own monitoring and research staff in order to exercise its functions effectively. Alternatively, if the Secretary to the Environment finds that the proposed structure is not satisfactory, there remains the option of forming a new Environmental Protection Department which could be formed by detatching the relevant units from the existing departments.
Progress In July 1977, the Central Authority (known at that time as the Environmental Protection Unit, or EPU) consisted of the Environmental Protection Adviser. He was joined within the succeeding 12 months by four principal environmental protection officers responsible for air, water, noise, and waste. The Environment Protection Adviser's responsibilities included environmental impact assessment. Twelve years later, the Environmental Protection Department (a direct descendant of EPU) includes over 500 staff members divided into 10 functional groups, plus a public relations section. The transition from the initial unit to the present Environmental Protection Department occurred in two stages. It was clear that environmental protection activities were hampered by lack of information and to some extent by lack of cooperation between the departments. The first stage of transition to the current structure was to increase staff resources to enable EPU to carry out environmental monitoring programs; implement more effectively its environmental impact assessment responsibilities; and further develop environmental legislation. A new organization, the Environmental Protection Agency, was established in 1981 and by 1983 had about 100 staff members. The second stage of reorganization was to implement the first of the options originally proposed, i.e. to give responsibility for environmental law enforcement to a single department, and to strengthen its control over planning waste treatment and disposal activities. The new Environmental Protection Department was created in 1986. Staff and resources from six government departments were brought together under a Director of Environmental Protection. It might be argued that the initial decision to create the central authority as a policy unit was wrong because it was given inadequate resources to carry out its assigned responsibilities of planning, developing new controls, and ensuring that these could be implemented. This may be the reason why progress in other
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN HONG KONG
251
areas has been less rapid than expected. Was there a viable alternative at the time? Was the proposal that the Environmental Adviser should act through the resources of the individual departments doomed from the start? In terms of developing legislation, there were advantages to having the EPU located within the government secretariat, the policy branch of government. Equally important, this placement reduced by one layer the levels of bureaucracy through which the legislation needed to be argued. In addition, leaving executive powers within the existing departments had some advantages in terms of career structures, management and "integration" of environmental thinking into different branches of government. However, it would perhaps have been better to argue more strongly for a central, executive agency from the start. Hindsight reveals two key omissions in the responsibilities of the initial authority. First, the waste management planning role was limited to solid, toxic, agricultural, and industrial wastes. It should also have covered the planning of sewage treatment and disposal. This omission was rectified only in 1986. Second, it failed to include the responsibility for major environmental hazards (e.g. large-scale storage of LPG) within the Authority's remit. It is presently still unclear where this responsibility lies.
Barriers to Implementation A detailed program of environmental controls was proposed for the Territory by the review team. At that time, 1976, it was envisaged that within about 5 years the program would have been fully implemented. To achieve this, the Secretarial prepared a schedule for the enactment of the legislation; all the relevant ordinances were to be in place by March 1977. In practice it was not until 1980 that the first of the enabling ordinances was enacted (Water Pollution Control). Even then, not until 1987 were regulations in force that allowed implementation to proceed. The Air Pollution Control framework legislation was enacted in 1983 along with some key implementing regulations; others were not enacted until 1987. The Noise Control bill was enacted in July 1988. Why has the process taken so much longer than originally expected'? There are three major reasons. First, there is the issue of political will. Even though in 1976 draft legislation had been largely agreed upon at the departmental level, there had been little public consultation nor had all the details been negotiated. Environmental legislation, even though it had been crafted to reflect the special needs of the Territory, was bound to run into opposition. To force the pace would have required the exertion of considerable political will from the most senior level of government. Second, it is possible that the enacting of legislation prior to establishing the coordinating authority was putting the cart before the horse. The newly appointed officials wanted to work on the proposed legislation themselves, and this brought about delays. Third, if the authority had been
252
ROBIN BIDWELL
established from the outset as an implementing authority, greater priority might have been given to getting the legislative framework in place.
Conclusion The original proposals for an environmental protection unit in Hong Kong has faced many pitfalls on its way to complete implementation. The Hong Kong experience demonstrates the difficulty of converting environmental rhetoric and policy making into achievement. In the years since Stockholm, almost every country of the world has claimed environmental protection as an important policy objective. The focus for the future must be to provide the institutional mechanisms to realize policy aims.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Smart Reed, Director, and members of the staff of the Environmental Protection Department for their assistance. He would also like to acknowledge the work of the original ERL Review Team. The views expressed in this paper are, however, entirely his own responsibility.