- Email: [email protected]
Ethics and Science
J.E. Fenstad et al., eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII
0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.(1989) 49-61
ETHICS AND SCIENCE EVANDRO AGAZZI Univ. of Fribourg, Switzerland and Univ. of Genoa, Italy
The autonomy of science The modern age -historically understood as the time that followed the twilight of the Middle Ages-may be characterized as the age of the emergence of several “autonomies” in different sectors of the spiritual and practical life of man. Such autonomies had in previous centuries known perhaps only one major example, when Thomas Aquinas clearly advocated the full legitimacy of investigations through “natural” reason (i.e. philosophical investigations) as compared to “supernatural” revelation (that constitutes the basis of theology). In this spirit, Machiavelli vindicated the autonomy of politics, Galilei the autonomy of science, British liberals the autonomy of economics, Kant and the Romantics the autonomy of art, and so on. These vindications originally expressed a particular stress laid upon the specificity of the corresponding domains, which entailed the determination of purely internal criteria for the fulfilment of their restricted and specific goals. Thus, for example, Machiavelli identified politics with the art of “acquiring, maintaining and expanding the State”, Galilei conceived natural science as the “investigation of the true constitution of the world”, A. Smith presented economics as “an inquiry into the nature and causes of wealth”, Kant, and especially the Romantics, elaborated a new concept of the fine arts as a pure creation of beauty, and the consequence was that criteria were explicitly o r implicitly provided for judging when an action is politically wise, a statement scientifically correct, a behaviour economically right, and a creative work artistically valid. Of course it would be wrong to say that proposals for circumscribing and specifying the domain and features of certain disciplines or activities had been lacking before that time. What 49
50
E. AGAZZI
was new was rather the fact that the borderlines were now meant to express clear-cut “separations”, rather than simple “distinctions”, and that the consequent “autonomy” of the different fields has quickly turned into a search for a kind of “freedom” or “liberation”. The step from autonomy to freedom may be understood in the sense that the admission of autonomy led to the rejection of any form of tutelage or interference coming from “outside” the single domains. This vindication of freedom was understood in different ways and as having different degrees. In one sense it was conceived as an independence in the criteria of judgment, such that, e.g., a decision might be considered as politically sound in spite of being economically disadvantageous, a behaviour economically profitable in spite of being morally objectionable, a picture artistically beautiful in spite of being indecent. This obviously means that, in turn, no consideration of economic or moral criteria (to remain with our examples) could improve the political, economic, or artistic value of actions or productions which are negatively judged in terms of their own internal criteria. A common way of expressing this position is to say that politics, economics and art are “value-free”, and this is also and especially said concerning science. A second and much more committed sense is the claim that the said autonomy also entails independence in action. In the above examples, this would mean that one is entitled to perform a political action in spite of its being economically disadvantageous, an economic action in spite of its being morally objectionable, an artistic work in spite of its being indecent. This means that the politician “as a politician”, the business man “as homo oeconomicus”, the artist “as artist” -and we can also add the scientist “as a scientist” -are legitimated in acting according to the pure criteria of their profession, at least to the extent that they are performing within this profession. A third sense consists of not allowing controls or limitations to this performance to be exercised by external agents in the name of the protection or promotion of goals or values of a different nature. It is clear that these different meanings of the “autonomy” are in an order of succession which is not that of an entailment, since the acceptance of the first does not imply that of the second, and this does not imply that of the third. Nowadays, the tendency is clearly manifest to reconsider these points, especially since we are confronted with the outcomes of such a process of “liberation”, which has led to several intuitively unacceptable results: the autonomy of many single domains, if pushed to excess, brings them into
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
51
serious ‘conflict with other domains. Thus, the imperative of peace and the respect of fundamental human rights are now advocated as limitations to political action; the needs of protecting the environment, of avoiding technological catastrophes and regulating genetic manipulations are producing a demand for the regulation of science and technology; the promotion of social justice is imposing limitations on the unbridled search for economic profit. Therefore, the delicate problem we now confront is that of effecting a critical revision of the said points, without becoming involved in obscurantism, regressive involution, or negation of the positive aspects which are certainly contained in the claims of autonomy and freedom. It is with this problem that we shall be concerned here. We shall first try to understand in which sense those domains for which autonomy is vindicated are to be considered “value-free”. This cannot mean that they are “devoid of any value”, or that those who operate within these domains have nothing in view. Indeed no human action (if it is really “human”) is performed without a purpose, i.e. without a goal which is considered worthy of being pursued by the agent. In this sense this goal or aim represents a “value” which inspires the action. Moreover, it follows from the examples considered above that the autonomy of certain domains was actually claimed by explicitly assigning to each of them a well-determined specific aim, and by indicating the criteria for evaluating how particular facts, assertions, actions and products ought to be in order for this aim to be pursued in the most satisfactory manner. This stage corresponds to what we have called above the “independence in the criteria of judgement”, and expresses a need for analytic clarification against which it would be hardly possible to raise objections. This stage does not involve moral problems, since it is only related to action in an indirect and hypothetical way, i.e. by suggesting which course of action should be taken ifthe specific goal envisaged were the only goal. It by no means implies either that this be the unique or the supreme goal of human action in general, or that one should disregard the impact that the fulfilment of this goal might have upon the realization of other human aims or values. Those who accept this “implication” make a transition from the first to the second of the above-mentioned meanings of “autonomy”, i.e. to the meaning of “independence in action”, and become immediately involved in a specific and highly debatable ethical claim. To the extent that the third meaning is related to the second, ethical questions also exist in connection with the third sense.
52
E. AGAZZI
Considering the ends
Let us now consider science. The above mention of science along with politics, economics and art was made with a purpose, but this purpose was not to put them on an equal footing. Indeed, certain questions of principle concerning the relations of these various domains to ethics, are common to all of them, but each domain also has its own characteristic features. As to science, it is useful to distinguish pure from applied science, not because a clear-cut separation is always possible or recommendable in concrete cases, but because these notions constitute two “ideal types” which should not be confused. Both can be considered as endeavours to provide knowledge, but in the case of pure science the goal of this knowledge is (to put it briefly) the discovery of truth, in the sense of establishing “how things are”, while in applied science this goal is the realization of some action or practical result. Admitting the specific aim of pure science to be the search for truth, it is clearly immune from moral objections in itself (i.e. it constitutes a perfectly legitimate value). The effort of approaching truth by means of sound and reliable knowledge in different specialized fields -a knowledge which may be characterized by the qualities of objectivity and rigour -has given rise to certain prescriptions concerning the activity of the scientist. They constitute what is usually called “scientific methodology”, but have no ethical meaning at all, being simply instrumental to the achievement of the cognitive aim of science, i.e. as means for evaluating whether statements, hypotheses or theories may be credited with the ability of providing sound and objective knowledge. Even those who challenge the rules of methodology, e.g. by advocating some form of methodological anarchism, usually justify their position by the claim of its allegedly being beneficial to the progress of scientific knowledge. Yet some kind of truly moral requirement seems to be implied by pure science, such as the obligation not to manipulate data, the readiness to accept criticism, recognize one’s errors, credit other people’s priorities, or the devotion to hard work. However, these are not specific virtues of science proper, but rather human virtues in a general sense (such as intellectual integrity and self-discipline), which find in scientific practice a privileged opportunity of being exercised. In other words, a scientist who manipulates data in order to credit himself with a fictitious discovery is condemnable not so much as a bad scientist, but simply as someone who has cheated, who has tried to reach a personal advantage (whatever it may be) through dishonest means. This is why scientific “deontology”, in
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
53
matters of this kind, is not really relevant to the relations between science and ethics, since its rules simply reinforce the fulfilment of the specific and internal aim of science, and do not come into conflict with it. Quite different is the situation of applied science. Here the search for truth is only a secondary end, the primary being some practical realization, and this fact immediately implies the possible existence of ethically relevant issues, depending on the particular ends any single enterprise of applied science envisages. The point is sufficiently clear in itself not to deserve extended discussion. To put it briefly: while it is in principle morally acceptable to know everything, and there are no morally prohibited truths, not everything that can be done is acceptable, and there exist morally prohibited actions. To deny this would be tantamount to denying the existence of ethics and morality, a position which we must consider alien to a discourse like this, which investigates the relations between ethics and science (admitting by that, that ethics exists no less than science). Hence, from the point of view of its en&, pure science does not raise ethical problems (and is always morally acceptable), while applied science raises ethical problems: the problems connected with the goals of the different applications, goals to which applied science is essentially instrumental and, as such, cannot be morally indifferent. It would lead us too far to consider examples, which in any case would deserve very careful scrutiny. Considering the means
It would be too hasty a conclusion to say as a consequence of the above considerations, that pure science can never be morally objectionable. This was said from the point of view of its ends, but the question of means must also be considered, and the general principle that the end does not justify the means, also holds for science. Of course, when saying this we are not thinking of those cases in which a scientist might try to take advantage of some dishonest tools for facilitating his work. We are rather addressing the question whether the acquisition of pure knowledge might sometimes require the use of certain means, the moral legitimacy of which could be questionable. The answer is yes. In fact, at least in the case of the experimental sciences, truth cannot be discovered simply by thinking, or by watching, but requires the performance of operations, which implies the manipulation of the object that is submitted to investigation. This is not an accidental feature, but the very condition for the
54
E.AGAZZI
existence of any objective experimental knowledge, which always requires the isolation of certain very specific aspects of reality, through an appropriate creation of artificial conditions of observation and testing. The production of these artificial conditions is what is called here “manipulation” in a quite neutral sense. However, manipulation is action and not knowledge, and even when the acquisition of knowledge is its explicit aim, it may well happen that a particular manipulating action not be morally admissible in itself. This fact was not very well perceived when the object of manipulation was nature, since any manipulation of nature seemed to be morally acceptable (nowadays there are quite different views on this point not only regarding the manipulation of animals, but also of inanimate nature). However, it became evident when experimental research on man inevitably implied manipulating man (the paradigmatic case being that of medical research), that moral criteria should guide this very delicate practice, since a very general moral principle prohibits treating a man simply as a tool (quite independently of the more elementary requirement not to harm those who are submitted to the experiment). In fact, the moral reflection concerning experiments on humans has been developed for several decades and has produced the elaboration of certain widely recognized and accepted norms. At present, experiments on human embryos and genetic manipulations for pure research purposes, are widely discussed issues that are interesting to consider here because they show that moral problems may arise in the field of pure science, and may imply restrictions of its freedom, in spite of its aims being morally unobjectionable. It is very easy to recognize that these considerations about the ethical relevance of the means may also be transferred without modification to applied science; the moral acceptability of the goal of a particular applied research does not free us from considering the moral acceptability of the means used in performing this research. Considering the conditions Our discussion about means has already called attention on the fact that science (even pure science) is not merely knowledge, since it is necessary to “do something” in order to produce this knowledge, and this fact immediately inscribes science within the domain of action, and not simply of reflection. Among the factors which are usually involved in moral considerations
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
55
regarding human actions, the conditions of the action also have special importance. They are similar to the means, but differ from them mainly in that the means are tools for directly reaching the end as a terminus of a certain action, while the conditions are something which makes the action itself possible, and thereby serve the end only indirectly. This distinction is useful in order to understand that an action seeking the realization of a morally legitimate goal through the adoption of morally acceptable means still remains open to moral questioning until its conditions have been analyzed. The most familiar example of this kind of problem, which has been discussed with reference to science in the past few years, is that of the allocation of funds for research. Several questions might emerge in this context. One might concern the provenance of the funds: e.g. would it be morally admissible to accept from a “benefactor” funds which we seriously suspect to be the product of criminal activities, such as narcotic trafficking or kidnapping? Problems also exist in much more normal situations: scientific research is fed throughout the world by great supplies of public money, but public money is always insufficient to fully satisfy all the needs of the community. Hence the money allocated to science is necessarily subtracted from other possible destinations such as, say, hospitals, schools, social security and environmental protection. Since the satisfaction of these needs corresponds to the existence of several aims or values, which it is not only legitimate, but even dutiful to pursue, we easily see that a problem of moral choice inevitably surfaces, a problem whose solution implies determining priorities and also limiting or cutting certain scientific projects. Several other problems, besides that of the allocation of funds, obviously surface when we consider the question of the “conditions” for the existence of pure and applied science; these problems are not treated here. It would be question-begging to say that in these cases the decision criteria are of a social rather than of an ethical nature, for in any case they should serve to determine what ought to be done, and this is the typical feature of any ethicaI question. To rely upon social motivations for answering the question simply means that, in certain cases, we accept that social values play the role of moral standards (which is by no means incorrect, provided we are aware that there should be other moral standards as well). Let us remark that in the special example considered above, the solution of the moral problem may be easier in the case of applied science than in the case of pure science, for it is usually easier to show how an applied research could “compensate” through its expected
56
E. AGAZZI
results the sacrifices made by the community, while it might prove more difficult to show the same, in the case of the simple acquisition of knowledge. This shows, among other things, how superficial the idea is that ethical problems are typical of applied science while hardly being of concern to pure science. Considering the consequences
The last point of this analysis concerns the possible consequences of scientific research. It is an obvious moral principle that one is responsible for the consequences of one’s actions, and therefore has the duty of trying to foresee them to the extent possible. We mean, of course, the unintended consequences, for those that are intended are simply to be numbered among the goals of the action. This problem has come to the focus of ethical discussions regarding science, owing to the dramatic impact of certain unexpected tragic consequences of technological development, and of the generalized concern about the potentially enormous dangers of an uncontrolled growth of this development. The problem is not new in ethics, however, and has led to the formulation of the so-called “double effect principle” in the tradition. This principle strictly applies to those cases in which the intended end of an action necessarily entails morally unacceptable consequences; but in a more or less stringent way it also applies to those cases in which such consequences are to be expected only with high probability. In such cases the first thing to do is to examine whether it is possible to renounce pursuit of the goal-in order to avoid the unacceptable consequences -and if this is possible, it is also morally dutiful to renounce. Here we have a kind of counterpart of the principle “the end does not justify the means”, since it is said that “the end does not justify the consequences”; both statements express a criticism of the thesis that all that matters in ethics is one’s intention in performing an act. However, there are situations in which pursuing the goal has the connotations of a moral obligation. In these cases one has to compare the importance of the two values (the value that is served by the action, and the value that is violated by the consequences of the action), and sacrifice the one that is less important or, to put it differently, to “choose the lesser of two evils”. A classical case in which this principle is advocated is that of the “therapeutic abortion”, where omitting a certain therapy would mean exposing the life of the mother to a serious risk, while
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
57
implementing it would imply the death of the foetus: losing the foetus is considered as the “lesser evil” (a situation not to be confused with that of killing the foetus as a means of saving the mother). Situations of the kind envisaged here are not rare in the field of applied science, and in many cases they may be treated not as questions of “all or nothing”, but rather in terms of a balance of “costs and benefits”, which enables one to reduce the risk or the impact of the negative consequences, by reducing the measure of realization of the goal. However, discourse about costs and benefits is possible and correct when the alternatives are homogeneous and allow a common unit of measure, but it is much more difficult or even impossible when we are confronted with a real conflict of values. In these cases the problem appears to be inevitably of an ethical nature. Even though consideration of the consequences is chiefly a problem for applied science, it is not totally alien to pure science, since not so much the discovery of truth as its communication may raise moral questions. Already in everyday life it could be said that “telling the truth” may not always be a moral obligation, due to its consequences. For example, it might be right not to tell a sick man the truth about the severity of his illness, if this would seriously lessen his chances of recovery. Or, a man submitted to torture by the secret police of a dictator, who denies having accomplices (to avoid their being persecuted or killed) is not morally blamed as a liar, but is highly esteemed. The analogy with scientific truth is not that dramatic, yet it is not unusual that scientific discoveries or theories be communicated to the public in a sensationalistic way, accompanied by superficial and gratuitous interpretations, with possible negative impacts on people’s ways of thinking, and on their appreciation of life and values. This is not always a fault of the media, but sometimes also of more or less distinguished scientists, who indulge in superficial popularization or even in a partisan interpretation or extrapolations of the content of science. At a time when science has attained such high prestige and has such a tremendous influence on the thoughts and feelings of men, the honest and morally scrupulous dissemination of scientific truth has become a major ethical imperative. The plurality of values A common denominator of the reflections presented here is the recognition of the existence of a plurality of values, none of which can
58
E. AGAZZI
pretend to be “absolute” (in the sense of being totally disconnected from the others and worthy of being pursued for its own sake above any other consideration); however no “relativism” is entailed by this claim, since values are not said to depend upon the different situations, but simply to apply to these situations in different ways. Ethics must start with this awareness, which is simply the projection of the evidence that men are pushed to action by a great variety of motivations, which they consider to be legitimate in themselves, while spontaneously admitting that not everything is permitted in following these motivations, so that valuejudgments are necessary at every point in order to determine the right course of action. Making one single value absolute (be it pleasure, wealth, power, family, fatherland, friendship, beauty, truth, love, religion) would amount to admitting that in pursuing this value anything is permissible. This would simply mean that the truly moral attitude is suspended in that sphere, since no value-judgments in a proper sense would be adopted for directing the course of action, but simply “efficiency-judgments’’ concerning the best means to be employed to fulfill the pre-established value. Hence, a subhuman way of acting would characterize this sphere. The correctness of this statement is not suspended even if one admits a hierarchy of values (e.g. that which is implicitly presented in the ordering of the above list). Indeed we have been accustomed to concede that one acts at a subhuman level when one is oriented exclusively to, for example, the search of pleasure or wealth. This is true, but does not depend essentially on the fact that these are values of lower rank; it depends rather on the fact that these are promoted (consciously or unconsciously) to the position of absolute values. To be persuaded, it suffices to remember how many morally condemnable facts have been or could be the consequence of making the higher-ranking values absolute as well. Hence our conclusion is that science too does not constitute an exception to this general rule. If we limit ourselves to considering science as a system of knowledge (i.e. if we consider only its contents), science has no ethical relevance. However, as soon as we consider its also being a human activity, i.e. the activity which aims at producing this knowledge, we must conclude that it cannot help being subject to the general conditions of any human activity, that of being guided by choices inspired by valuejudgments, which must take the plurality of values into consideration. From this awareness follows what we said about the evaluation of ends, means and consequences in the case of pure and applied science.
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
59
The regulation of science Some corollaries derive from the considerations developed thus far. The first is that specifically ethical limitations and regulations may concern the practice of scientific research. In fact, as soon as we admit that moral principles must govern human actions, we are obliged to accept that everything is not permissible, and that, at the extremities of the interval of what is permissible, there is what is obligatory on the one side, and what is prohibited on the other. However, while moral principles and values are of a very general nature, obligations, permissions and prohibitions concern concrete actions, and must be specified through concrete norms. The difficulty with the norms is that they cannot very often be the more or less immediate translation of some general principle, since they must apply to complex situations and actions, which are “complex” because they involve the interference of a number of principles and values. This consideration has a first elementary consequence, i.e. the fact that criteria, standards or norms elaborated for evaluating the conformity of an action with a given particular value cannot be extrapolated to the evaluation of its conformity with a different particular value. In the case of science and ethics, this means that moral criteria could not interfere with the internal judgments concerning what has a scientific value, and with the criteria for assessing the validity of scientific results. Symmetrically, moral evaluations have to be based upon ethical criteria of judgment, and are, as such, independent of any interference coming from scientific considerations. This is the correct meaning of the reciprocal “autonomy” discussed earlier. A second consequence is that ethics, owing to its generality (which entitles it to regulate all kinds of human actions), has to view the most satisfactory fulfilment of all the human values that may be involved in a certain action. This means, in our case, that it is a real ethical commitment to grant to science the maximum of freedom compatible with the respect due to the other values involved. Hence, the freedom of science is part of the ethical consideration of science. We have thus recognized that the legitimacy of explicitly establishing norms regulating scientific activity cannot be denied. After all, we are already accustomed to the existence of norms regulating pure and applied research from the point of view of security or of secrecy, and one does
..
. ...
_ . .
60
E. AGAZZI
However, this fact still leaves open the problem of which agency should be entitled to dictate these norms, and of the way of controlling their application. Following the logic of our discourse, our opinion is that these norms should express the necessity of a systems-theoretic harmonization of different values', and hence be the result of a multilateral assumption of responsibility: the responsibility of the scientific community towards other values that are present in society, and the responsibility of other social agencies (economic, political, religious, etc.) towards the rights of science. This appeal to responsibility, moreover, is the most appropriate to express the genuine character of any ethical attitude, since responsibility implies at the same time freedom and obligation, but an obligation which is not equivalent to compulsion or imposition. To reach this stage of responsibility, a process of maturation, education and participation is needed, which implies that scientists should become more sensitive to the existence and significance of more universal human values, by participating in the discussions concerning them and deepening their understanding of their nature and the conditions for their fulfilment. This also means that moralists, theologians and politicians should also become more sensitive and better acquainted with the real issues involved in the practice of scientific research. It follows from this that a pure and simple self-regulation of the scientific community might not be sufficient, and that some legal regulation, expressing the result of the said mutual collaboration and understanding, would be appropriate. On the other hand a reasonable flexibility should characterize this regulation, except for a few very specific and exactly described cases of particular gravity. The respect of the norms concerning these specific cases should be controlled through the usual means adopted by any public authority for controlling the implementation of laws, while the more flexible norms should be subject to the mechanisms that are usually prescribed by the deontological codes of the different professions. The impact of science on ethics
What we have said concerning the cooperative spirit which should inspire the establishment of ethical and legal regulations of science does 'See AGAZZI,E., 1987, A System-Theoretic Approach to the Problem of the Responsibiliry of Science, Z . allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie XVIII (1-2), pp. 30-49.
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
61
not simply express the obvious need of some “democratic” way of solving this urgent problem, but corresponds to a much deeper understanding of the relations between science and ethics, an understanding which has again to do with the systems-theoretic view mentioned above. In fact, in speaking of the relationships between science and ethics, it is insufficient to consider the influence that ethics has to exert upon the doing of science, as we have mainly done thus far. An equally interesting investigation concerns the influence of science upon the elaboration of ethics and moral norms. We shall confine ourselves to mentioning here only a couple of examples. Ethics makes use of certain fundamental concepts such as freedom, normality and human nature, and it is clear that a concrete specification of these concepts, and of their applicability to actual human actions, requires taking into account the results of several sciences, especially of those concerning man, from biology, to genetics, neurobiology, psychology and sociology. Without correct information being taken from these sciences, it is possible that the ethical discourse be incapable of speaking to the man of today, who has derived from science a new “image” of himself, and thus may be led to feeling that ethics is something obsolete and backwards. As to the formulation of moral norms, the progress of science (particularly of applied science) has already created and will certainly continue to create quite new and unexpected situations, to which the existent moral norms can hardly apply; or, by suddenly opening unforeseen possibilities of action, and therefore of choice, this progress gives moral relevance to situations which in the past totally escaped the possibility of human decision. All this indicates that the growth of science imposes a dynamistic aspect on morals, which does not mean moral relativism, but making morals capable of coping with the actual situation of contemporary man. This, as we have said, is a consequence of the systems-theoretic approach mentioned above: if morals in general express the imperative of “doing what is right”, without the contribution of other fields they cannot answer the question ‘‘what it is right to do”, when it comes to concrete situations. Science, without pretending to answer this question (which is not a scientific question), can nevertheless be of help in elaborating the answer.
0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.(1989) 49-61
ETHICS AND SCIENCE EVANDRO AGAZZI Univ. of Fribourg, Switzerland and Univ. of Genoa, Italy
The autonomy of science The modern age -historically understood as the time that followed the twilight of the Middle Ages-may be characterized as the age of the emergence of several “autonomies” in different sectors of the spiritual and practical life of man. Such autonomies had in previous centuries known perhaps only one major example, when Thomas Aquinas clearly advocated the full legitimacy of investigations through “natural” reason (i.e. philosophical investigations) as compared to “supernatural” revelation (that constitutes the basis of theology). In this spirit, Machiavelli vindicated the autonomy of politics, Galilei the autonomy of science, British liberals the autonomy of economics, Kant and the Romantics the autonomy of art, and so on. These vindications originally expressed a particular stress laid upon the specificity of the corresponding domains, which entailed the determination of purely internal criteria for the fulfilment of their restricted and specific goals. Thus, for example, Machiavelli identified politics with the art of “acquiring, maintaining and expanding the State”, Galilei conceived natural science as the “investigation of the true constitution of the world”, A. Smith presented economics as “an inquiry into the nature and causes of wealth”, Kant, and especially the Romantics, elaborated a new concept of the fine arts as a pure creation of beauty, and the consequence was that criteria were explicitly o r implicitly provided for judging when an action is politically wise, a statement scientifically correct, a behaviour economically right, and a creative work artistically valid. Of course it would be wrong to say that proposals for circumscribing and specifying the domain and features of certain disciplines or activities had been lacking before that time. What 49
50
E. AGAZZI
was new was rather the fact that the borderlines were now meant to express clear-cut “separations”, rather than simple “distinctions”, and that the consequent “autonomy” of the different fields has quickly turned into a search for a kind of “freedom” or “liberation”. The step from autonomy to freedom may be understood in the sense that the admission of autonomy led to the rejection of any form of tutelage or interference coming from “outside” the single domains. This vindication of freedom was understood in different ways and as having different degrees. In one sense it was conceived as an independence in the criteria of judgment, such that, e.g., a decision might be considered as politically sound in spite of being economically disadvantageous, a behaviour economically profitable in spite of being morally objectionable, a picture artistically beautiful in spite of being indecent. This obviously means that, in turn, no consideration of economic or moral criteria (to remain with our examples) could improve the political, economic, or artistic value of actions or productions which are negatively judged in terms of their own internal criteria. A common way of expressing this position is to say that politics, economics and art are “value-free”, and this is also and especially said concerning science. A second and much more committed sense is the claim that the said autonomy also entails independence in action. In the above examples, this would mean that one is entitled to perform a political action in spite of its being economically disadvantageous, an economic action in spite of its being morally objectionable, an artistic work in spite of its being indecent. This means that the politician “as a politician”, the business man “as homo oeconomicus”, the artist “as artist” -and we can also add the scientist “as a scientist” -are legitimated in acting according to the pure criteria of their profession, at least to the extent that they are performing within this profession. A third sense consists of not allowing controls or limitations to this performance to be exercised by external agents in the name of the protection or promotion of goals or values of a different nature. It is clear that these different meanings of the “autonomy” are in an order of succession which is not that of an entailment, since the acceptance of the first does not imply that of the second, and this does not imply that of the third. Nowadays, the tendency is clearly manifest to reconsider these points, especially since we are confronted with the outcomes of such a process of “liberation”, which has led to several intuitively unacceptable results: the autonomy of many single domains, if pushed to excess, brings them into
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
51
serious ‘conflict with other domains. Thus, the imperative of peace and the respect of fundamental human rights are now advocated as limitations to political action; the needs of protecting the environment, of avoiding technological catastrophes and regulating genetic manipulations are producing a demand for the regulation of science and technology; the promotion of social justice is imposing limitations on the unbridled search for economic profit. Therefore, the delicate problem we now confront is that of effecting a critical revision of the said points, without becoming involved in obscurantism, regressive involution, or negation of the positive aspects which are certainly contained in the claims of autonomy and freedom. It is with this problem that we shall be concerned here. We shall first try to understand in which sense those domains for which autonomy is vindicated are to be considered “value-free”. This cannot mean that they are “devoid of any value”, or that those who operate within these domains have nothing in view. Indeed no human action (if it is really “human”) is performed without a purpose, i.e. without a goal which is considered worthy of being pursued by the agent. In this sense this goal or aim represents a “value” which inspires the action. Moreover, it follows from the examples considered above that the autonomy of certain domains was actually claimed by explicitly assigning to each of them a well-determined specific aim, and by indicating the criteria for evaluating how particular facts, assertions, actions and products ought to be in order for this aim to be pursued in the most satisfactory manner. This stage corresponds to what we have called above the “independence in the criteria of judgement”, and expresses a need for analytic clarification against which it would be hardly possible to raise objections. This stage does not involve moral problems, since it is only related to action in an indirect and hypothetical way, i.e. by suggesting which course of action should be taken ifthe specific goal envisaged were the only goal. It by no means implies either that this be the unique or the supreme goal of human action in general, or that one should disregard the impact that the fulfilment of this goal might have upon the realization of other human aims or values. Those who accept this “implication” make a transition from the first to the second of the above-mentioned meanings of “autonomy”, i.e. to the meaning of “independence in action”, and become immediately involved in a specific and highly debatable ethical claim. To the extent that the third meaning is related to the second, ethical questions also exist in connection with the third sense.
52
E. AGAZZI
Considering the ends
Let us now consider science. The above mention of science along with politics, economics and art was made with a purpose, but this purpose was not to put them on an equal footing. Indeed, certain questions of principle concerning the relations of these various domains to ethics, are common to all of them, but each domain also has its own characteristic features. As to science, it is useful to distinguish pure from applied science, not because a clear-cut separation is always possible or recommendable in concrete cases, but because these notions constitute two “ideal types” which should not be confused. Both can be considered as endeavours to provide knowledge, but in the case of pure science the goal of this knowledge is (to put it briefly) the discovery of truth, in the sense of establishing “how things are”, while in applied science this goal is the realization of some action or practical result. Admitting the specific aim of pure science to be the search for truth, it is clearly immune from moral objections in itself (i.e. it constitutes a perfectly legitimate value). The effort of approaching truth by means of sound and reliable knowledge in different specialized fields -a knowledge which may be characterized by the qualities of objectivity and rigour -has given rise to certain prescriptions concerning the activity of the scientist. They constitute what is usually called “scientific methodology”, but have no ethical meaning at all, being simply instrumental to the achievement of the cognitive aim of science, i.e. as means for evaluating whether statements, hypotheses or theories may be credited with the ability of providing sound and objective knowledge. Even those who challenge the rules of methodology, e.g. by advocating some form of methodological anarchism, usually justify their position by the claim of its allegedly being beneficial to the progress of scientific knowledge. Yet some kind of truly moral requirement seems to be implied by pure science, such as the obligation not to manipulate data, the readiness to accept criticism, recognize one’s errors, credit other people’s priorities, or the devotion to hard work. However, these are not specific virtues of science proper, but rather human virtues in a general sense (such as intellectual integrity and self-discipline), which find in scientific practice a privileged opportunity of being exercised. In other words, a scientist who manipulates data in order to credit himself with a fictitious discovery is condemnable not so much as a bad scientist, but simply as someone who has cheated, who has tried to reach a personal advantage (whatever it may be) through dishonest means. This is why scientific “deontology”, in
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
53
matters of this kind, is not really relevant to the relations between science and ethics, since its rules simply reinforce the fulfilment of the specific and internal aim of science, and do not come into conflict with it. Quite different is the situation of applied science. Here the search for truth is only a secondary end, the primary being some practical realization, and this fact immediately implies the possible existence of ethically relevant issues, depending on the particular ends any single enterprise of applied science envisages. The point is sufficiently clear in itself not to deserve extended discussion. To put it briefly: while it is in principle morally acceptable to know everything, and there are no morally prohibited truths, not everything that can be done is acceptable, and there exist morally prohibited actions. To deny this would be tantamount to denying the existence of ethics and morality, a position which we must consider alien to a discourse like this, which investigates the relations between ethics and science (admitting by that, that ethics exists no less than science). Hence, from the point of view of its en&, pure science does not raise ethical problems (and is always morally acceptable), while applied science raises ethical problems: the problems connected with the goals of the different applications, goals to which applied science is essentially instrumental and, as such, cannot be morally indifferent. It would lead us too far to consider examples, which in any case would deserve very careful scrutiny. Considering the means
It would be too hasty a conclusion to say as a consequence of the above considerations, that pure science can never be morally objectionable. This was said from the point of view of its ends, but the question of means must also be considered, and the general principle that the end does not justify the means, also holds for science. Of course, when saying this we are not thinking of those cases in which a scientist might try to take advantage of some dishonest tools for facilitating his work. We are rather addressing the question whether the acquisition of pure knowledge might sometimes require the use of certain means, the moral legitimacy of which could be questionable. The answer is yes. In fact, at least in the case of the experimental sciences, truth cannot be discovered simply by thinking, or by watching, but requires the performance of operations, which implies the manipulation of the object that is submitted to investigation. This is not an accidental feature, but the very condition for the
54
E.AGAZZI
existence of any objective experimental knowledge, which always requires the isolation of certain very specific aspects of reality, through an appropriate creation of artificial conditions of observation and testing. The production of these artificial conditions is what is called here “manipulation” in a quite neutral sense. However, manipulation is action and not knowledge, and even when the acquisition of knowledge is its explicit aim, it may well happen that a particular manipulating action not be morally admissible in itself. This fact was not very well perceived when the object of manipulation was nature, since any manipulation of nature seemed to be morally acceptable (nowadays there are quite different views on this point not only regarding the manipulation of animals, but also of inanimate nature). However, it became evident when experimental research on man inevitably implied manipulating man (the paradigmatic case being that of medical research), that moral criteria should guide this very delicate practice, since a very general moral principle prohibits treating a man simply as a tool (quite independently of the more elementary requirement not to harm those who are submitted to the experiment). In fact, the moral reflection concerning experiments on humans has been developed for several decades and has produced the elaboration of certain widely recognized and accepted norms. At present, experiments on human embryos and genetic manipulations for pure research purposes, are widely discussed issues that are interesting to consider here because they show that moral problems may arise in the field of pure science, and may imply restrictions of its freedom, in spite of its aims being morally unobjectionable. It is very easy to recognize that these considerations about the ethical relevance of the means may also be transferred without modification to applied science; the moral acceptability of the goal of a particular applied research does not free us from considering the moral acceptability of the means used in performing this research. Considering the conditions Our discussion about means has already called attention on the fact that science (even pure science) is not merely knowledge, since it is necessary to “do something” in order to produce this knowledge, and this fact immediately inscribes science within the domain of action, and not simply of reflection. Among the factors which are usually involved in moral considerations
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
55
regarding human actions, the conditions of the action also have special importance. They are similar to the means, but differ from them mainly in that the means are tools for directly reaching the end as a terminus of a certain action, while the conditions are something which makes the action itself possible, and thereby serve the end only indirectly. This distinction is useful in order to understand that an action seeking the realization of a morally legitimate goal through the adoption of morally acceptable means still remains open to moral questioning until its conditions have been analyzed. The most familiar example of this kind of problem, which has been discussed with reference to science in the past few years, is that of the allocation of funds for research. Several questions might emerge in this context. One might concern the provenance of the funds: e.g. would it be morally admissible to accept from a “benefactor” funds which we seriously suspect to be the product of criminal activities, such as narcotic trafficking or kidnapping? Problems also exist in much more normal situations: scientific research is fed throughout the world by great supplies of public money, but public money is always insufficient to fully satisfy all the needs of the community. Hence the money allocated to science is necessarily subtracted from other possible destinations such as, say, hospitals, schools, social security and environmental protection. Since the satisfaction of these needs corresponds to the existence of several aims or values, which it is not only legitimate, but even dutiful to pursue, we easily see that a problem of moral choice inevitably surfaces, a problem whose solution implies determining priorities and also limiting or cutting certain scientific projects. Several other problems, besides that of the allocation of funds, obviously surface when we consider the question of the “conditions” for the existence of pure and applied science; these problems are not treated here. It would be question-begging to say that in these cases the decision criteria are of a social rather than of an ethical nature, for in any case they should serve to determine what ought to be done, and this is the typical feature of any ethicaI question. To rely upon social motivations for answering the question simply means that, in certain cases, we accept that social values play the role of moral standards (which is by no means incorrect, provided we are aware that there should be other moral standards as well). Let us remark that in the special example considered above, the solution of the moral problem may be easier in the case of applied science than in the case of pure science, for it is usually easier to show how an applied research could “compensate” through its expected
56
E. AGAZZI
results the sacrifices made by the community, while it might prove more difficult to show the same, in the case of the simple acquisition of knowledge. This shows, among other things, how superficial the idea is that ethical problems are typical of applied science while hardly being of concern to pure science. Considering the consequences
The last point of this analysis concerns the possible consequences of scientific research. It is an obvious moral principle that one is responsible for the consequences of one’s actions, and therefore has the duty of trying to foresee them to the extent possible. We mean, of course, the unintended consequences, for those that are intended are simply to be numbered among the goals of the action. This problem has come to the focus of ethical discussions regarding science, owing to the dramatic impact of certain unexpected tragic consequences of technological development, and of the generalized concern about the potentially enormous dangers of an uncontrolled growth of this development. The problem is not new in ethics, however, and has led to the formulation of the so-called “double effect principle” in the tradition. This principle strictly applies to those cases in which the intended end of an action necessarily entails morally unacceptable consequences; but in a more or less stringent way it also applies to those cases in which such consequences are to be expected only with high probability. In such cases the first thing to do is to examine whether it is possible to renounce pursuit of the goal-in order to avoid the unacceptable consequences -and if this is possible, it is also morally dutiful to renounce. Here we have a kind of counterpart of the principle “the end does not justify the means”, since it is said that “the end does not justify the consequences”; both statements express a criticism of the thesis that all that matters in ethics is one’s intention in performing an act. However, there are situations in which pursuing the goal has the connotations of a moral obligation. In these cases one has to compare the importance of the two values (the value that is served by the action, and the value that is violated by the consequences of the action), and sacrifice the one that is less important or, to put it differently, to “choose the lesser of two evils”. A classical case in which this principle is advocated is that of the “therapeutic abortion”, where omitting a certain therapy would mean exposing the life of the mother to a serious risk, while
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
57
implementing it would imply the death of the foetus: losing the foetus is considered as the “lesser evil” (a situation not to be confused with that of killing the foetus as a means of saving the mother). Situations of the kind envisaged here are not rare in the field of applied science, and in many cases they may be treated not as questions of “all or nothing”, but rather in terms of a balance of “costs and benefits”, which enables one to reduce the risk or the impact of the negative consequences, by reducing the measure of realization of the goal. However, discourse about costs and benefits is possible and correct when the alternatives are homogeneous and allow a common unit of measure, but it is much more difficult or even impossible when we are confronted with a real conflict of values. In these cases the problem appears to be inevitably of an ethical nature. Even though consideration of the consequences is chiefly a problem for applied science, it is not totally alien to pure science, since not so much the discovery of truth as its communication may raise moral questions. Already in everyday life it could be said that “telling the truth” may not always be a moral obligation, due to its consequences. For example, it might be right not to tell a sick man the truth about the severity of his illness, if this would seriously lessen his chances of recovery. Or, a man submitted to torture by the secret police of a dictator, who denies having accomplices (to avoid their being persecuted or killed) is not morally blamed as a liar, but is highly esteemed. The analogy with scientific truth is not that dramatic, yet it is not unusual that scientific discoveries or theories be communicated to the public in a sensationalistic way, accompanied by superficial and gratuitous interpretations, with possible negative impacts on people’s ways of thinking, and on their appreciation of life and values. This is not always a fault of the media, but sometimes also of more or less distinguished scientists, who indulge in superficial popularization or even in a partisan interpretation or extrapolations of the content of science. At a time when science has attained such high prestige and has such a tremendous influence on the thoughts and feelings of men, the honest and morally scrupulous dissemination of scientific truth has become a major ethical imperative. The plurality of values A common denominator of the reflections presented here is the recognition of the existence of a plurality of values, none of which can
58
E. AGAZZI
pretend to be “absolute” (in the sense of being totally disconnected from the others and worthy of being pursued for its own sake above any other consideration); however no “relativism” is entailed by this claim, since values are not said to depend upon the different situations, but simply to apply to these situations in different ways. Ethics must start with this awareness, which is simply the projection of the evidence that men are pushed to action by a great variety of motivations, which they consider to be legitimate in themselves, while spontaneously admitting that not everything is permitted in following these motivations, so that valuejudgments are necessary at every point in order to determine the right course of action. Making one single value absolute (be it pleasure, wealth, power, family, fatherland, friendship, beauty, truth, love, religion) would amount to admitting that in pursuing this value anything is permissible. This would simply mean that the truly moral attitude is suspended in that sphere, since no value-judgments in a proper sense would be adopted for directing the course of action, but simply “efficiency-judgments’’ concerning the best means to be employed to fulfill the pre-established value. Hence, a subhuman way of acting would characterize this sphere. The correctness of this statement is not suspended even if one admits a hierarchy of values (e.g. that which is implicitly presented in the ordering of the above list). Indeed we have been accustomed to concede that one acts at a subhuman level when one is oriented exclusively to, for example, the search of pleasure or wealth. This is true, but does not depend essentially on the fact that these are values of lower rank; it depends rather on the fact that these are promoted (consciously or unconsciously) to the position of absolute values. To be persuaded, it suffices to remember how many morally condemnable facts have been or could be the consequence of making the higher-ranking values absolute as well. Hence our conclusion is that science too does not constitute an exception to this general rule. If we limit ourselves to considering science as a system of knowledge (i.e. if we consider only its contents), science has no ethical relevance. However, as soon as we consider its also being a human activity, i.e. the activity which aims at producing this knowledge, we must conclude that it cannot help being subject to the general conditions of any human activity, that of being guided by choices inspired by valuejudgments, which must take the plurality of values into consideration. From this awareness follows what we said about the evaluation of ends, means and consequences in the case of pure and applied science.
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
59
The regulation of science Some corollaries derive from the considerations developed thus far. The first is that specifically ethical limitations and regulations may concern the practice of scientific research. In fact, as soon as we admit that moral principles must govern human actions, we are obliged to accept that everything is not permissible, and that, at the extremities of the interval of what is permissible, there is what is obligatory on the one side, and what is prohibited on the other. However, while moral principles and values are of a very general nature, obligations, permissions and prohibitions concern concrete actions, and must be specified through concrete norms. The difficulty with the norms is that they cannot very often be the more or less immediate translation of some general principle, since they must apply to complex situations and actions, which are “complex” because they involve the interference of a number of principles and values. This consideration has a first elementary consequence, i.e. the fact that criteria, standards or norms elaborated for evaluating the conformity of an action with a given particular value cannot be extrapolated to the evaluation of its conformity with a different particular value. In the case of science and ethics, this means that moral criteria could not interfere with the internal judgments concerning what has a scientific value, and with the criteria for assessing the validity of scientific results. Symmetrically, moral evaluations have to be based upon ethical criteria of judgment, and are, as such, independent of any interference coming from scientific considerations. This is the correct meaning of the reciprocal “autonomy” discussed earlier. A second consequence is that ethics, owing to its generality (which entitles it to regulate all kinds of human actions), has to view the most satisfactory fulfilment of all the human values that may be involved in a certain action. This means, in our case, that it is a real ethical commitment to grant to science the maximum of freedom compatible with the respect due to the other values involved. Hence, the freedom of science is part of the ethical consideration of science. We have thus recognized that the legitimacy of explicitly establishing norms regulating scientific activity cannot be denied. After all, we are already accustomed to the existence of norms regulating pure and applied research from the point of view of security or of secrecy, and one does
..
. ...
_ . .
60
E. AGAZZI
However, this fact still leaves open the problem of which agency should be entitled to dictate these norms, and of the way of controlling their application. Following the logic of our discourse, our opinion is that these norms should express the necessity of a systems-theoretic harmonization of different values', and hence be the result of a multilateral assumption of responsibility: the responsibility of the scientific community towards other values that are present in society, and the responsibility of other social agencies (economic, political, religious, etc.) towards the rights of science. This appeal to responsibility, moreover, is the most appropriate to express the genuine character of any ethical attitude, since responsibility implies at the same time freedom and obligation, but an obligation which is not equivalent to compulsion or imposition. To reach this stage of responsibility, a process of maturation, education and participation is needed, which implies that scientists should become more sensitive to the existence and significance of more universal human values, by participating in the discussions concerning them and deepening their understanding of their nature and the conditions for their fulfilment. This also means that moralists, theologians and politicians should also become more sensitive and better acquainted with the real issues involved in the practice of scientific research. It follows from this that a pure and simple self-regulation of the scientific community might not be sufficient, and that some legal regulation, expressing the result of the said mutual collaboration and understanding, would be appropriate. On the other hand a reasonable flexibility should characterize this regulation, except for a few very specific and exactly described cases of particular gravity. The respect of the norms concerning these specific cases should be controlled through the usual means adopted by any public authority for controlling the implementation of laws, while the more flexible norms should be subject to the mechanisms that are usually prescribed by the deontological codes of the different professions. The impact of science on ethics
What we have said concerning the cooperative spirit which should inspire the establishment of ethical and legal regulations of science does 'See AGAZZI,E., 1987, A System-Theoretic Approach to the Problem of the Responsibiliry of Science, Z . allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie XVIII (1-2), pp. 30-49.
ETHICS AND SCIENCE
61
not simply express the obvious need of some “democratic” way of solving this urgent problem, but corresponds to a much deeper understanding of the relations between science and ethics, an understanding which has again to do with the systems-theoretic view mentioned above. In fact, in speaking of the relationships between science and ethics, it is insufficient to consider the influence that ethics has to exert upon the doing of science, as we have mainly done thus far. An equally interesting investigation concerns the influence of science upon the elaboration of ethics and moral norms. We shall confine ourselves to mentioning here only a couple of examples. Ethics makes use of certain fundamental concepts such as freedom, normality and human nature, and it is clear that a concrete specification of these concepts, and of their applicability to actual human actions, requires taking into account the results of several sciences, especially of those concerning man, from biology, to genetics, neurobiology, psychology and sociology. Without correct information being taken from these sciences, it is possible that the ethical discourse be incapable of speaking to the man of today, who has derived from science a new “image” of himself, and thus may be led to feeling that ethics is something obsolete and backwards. As to the formulation of moral norms, the progress of science (particularly of applied science) has already created and will certainly continue to create quite new and unexpected situations, to which the existent moral norms can hardly apply; or, by suddenly opening unforeseen possibilities of action, and therefore of choice, this progress gives moral relevance to situations which in the past totally escaped the possibility of human decision. All this indicates that the growth of science imposes a dynamistic aspect on morals, which does not mean moral relativism, but making morals capable of coping with the actual situation of contemporary man. This, as we have said, is a consequence of the systems-theoretic approach mentioned above: if morals in general express the imperative of “doing what is right”, without the contribution of other fields they cannot answer the question ‘‘what it is right to do”, when it comes to concrete situations. Science, without pretending to answer this question (which is not a scientific question), can nevertheless be of help in elaborating the answer.