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European integration and the American model
Pergamon
EUROPEAN
History
INTEGRATION
ofEuropean
Ideas, Vol. 19, Nos 1-3, pp. Z&219,
1994 Copyright 8 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191-6599/94 S7.00+ 0.00
AND THE AMERICAN MODEL
ARTHUR
LAPAN *
Let me begin with the context of this paper. Unconventional weapons together with sovereign, self-determined and multiplying nationalisms, have made peace uncertain and at the same time more necessary than ever. What we want to do in this paper is to consider the American model and its significance for European integration and for peace in our time. According to Madison, the architect of the American Constitution, governments are most liable to go to war when there is no authority over them. But even when there is a government over them, as in a Confederation (these states still being sovereign), the likely outcome will still be internecine war, and this because of man’s intractable will-to-power when not chastened by limits. According to him (and to Hamilton) the radical vice which the American Constitution was designed to remedy was its principle of legislation for such sovereign states, as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consisted, a principle, for them, ‘as it is a solicism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity.” Essential to government is law, and essential to law a penalty for its disobedience, which can be inflicted only by the magistrate or the sword. The first can apply only to individuals; in the case of the states, courts are impotent.* Thus, federal government by definition spells peace within a Union. You have on the one hand a common government which is primary, elected by and responsible to the people for their common affairs, while the state governments, subordinate but similarly elected, devote themselves to state affairs. And if Europe is set side-by-side with the U.S.A. these past 200 years, the disparity between them, so far as peace is concerned, is obvious; since 1865 the difference is even more compelling. The American Founders also saw the need for balance and limitation of power everywhere which, they thought, would make for moderation in legislation; in a nuclear world, an invaluable characteristic. Madison’s formula for coping with extreme popular currents, which he derived from Hume’s essay ‘The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, was along the same line: cap, he said, the existing structure of American society with a federal government, and an extreme movement which started in one part of the continent would first have to capture its own locality, and then its state composed of diverse interests-Madison did not want to destroy the states but rather use them creatively, something a United States of Europe would also do with its nationalities-and finally it would have to capture the federal government itself with interests even more diverse. And this regardless of whether the movement was from the extreme left or the extreme right.3 *Haroub
4,
Zichron Yaacov 30900, Israel. 215
216
Arthur Lapan
Present-day America verifies Madison’s judgement that self-government may be greatly extended territorially by a judicious modification of the federal principle, and this applies also to the EC. His reasoning also seems to have relevance to the present neo-Nazism in Germany and xenophobia in France, Italy and Belgium, should their momentum continue; the most effective response would be federal integration of the entire EC, for then the xenophics of one nation would find it most difficult to unite with those of another, something which would not be the case with their opponents. The same thing goes for the anticipated withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany The best way for them to avoid not only economic but also military dominance of the European states by Germany lies not in the present institutional structure of the EC-foreign policy, taxation and defence now being in the hands of its individual states-but in a new federal embrace of each. The same goes for ethnic fragmentation. All this, of course, also implies the creation of a genuinely European army. So much for the American model structurally. But let us look at it dynamically and ask what it bespeaks for European integration. Dynamically, the American model is a story of death and transfiguration, an Hegelian process in which a political subject with a political structure-in this case the Articles of Confederation-entails consequences which negate its own purpose and thereby falls into self-contradicition; so that to actualise itself it must transcend and transform its premises radically, but still preserve its original intent-which it did, from a confederation of thirteen sovereign states to a federal union of the individuals of those states. In this process, the critical period in the transformation of the Confederation into a Federation becomes especially important-particularly when we ask what the American model bespeaks for European integration-as also is the character of the propitious moment when transformation occurs. In the American model, the transformation was radical and almost instantaneous, and gave rise at a precise point in time to federationto the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and its ratification in 1787-1788.4 In effecting this transformation, the Founders went to science. Their guiding light was the Scotch Enlightenment’s assumption that ‘there is a great uniformity among the actions of men.. . and that human nature remains the same. . . ‘. The science of politics was a clinical science based upon historical case-histories; and like medicine, ‘the comparative study of history could confer foresight and help the legislator make correct policy decisions.‘s This did not mean that one merely noted resemblances. The Founders also were concerned with reasons, and their reasoning permeated their diagnoses and prognoses. It implied that ideas and attitudes are effective, have implications, that their histories have a logical structure. Their reasoning applies prognositically directly to the EC. There are, indeed, significant comparabilities between the dynamics of the American Confederation and the EC. Some are: (1) Both are confederations. Legislation in both is for sovereign states rather than for the individuals of which they are composed. (2) These sovereign states each have a veto, under the Articles restricted to amendments; in the EC, amendments also need unanimity. (3) Economically, America under the Articles was more or less like what the EC was scheduled to be now. The Articles gave ‘The people of each state free ingress to any other state as well as to all the privileges ofcommerce.’ Politically, the Conferation had more supranational powers, e.g. a common army.
European Integration and the American Model
217
(4) In the beginning, most Americans were certain that ‘a sense of common interest would beget a full compliance with all the requisitions of the Union.’ But This did not occur. Something similar happened in Europe when the original focus on a United States of Europe was followed by reassertion of the nation state. (5) In both cases the inability to get the necessary compliance led federalists to try to increase the powers of the general government incrementally. (6) In the American case this gradualist approach failed to get the power for taxation for the Continental Congress, which almost aborted the American Revolution; in the EC it likewise foundered financially.’ (7) In both cases local needs and interests were a basic factor determining support or opposition to greater integration.* Neither the ineffectual prosecution of the revolutionary war by the Confederation nor the post-war economic depression were able to transform the then dying Confederation into a federal Union. The prospects for such a Union appeared altogether inauspicious. What then made the difference? One thing was Shay’s Rebellion, and another was Rhode Island’s worthless paper money. Shays’ Rebellion paralysed the government of Massachusetts, and as disorders multiplied, state after state belatedly appointed delegates to the 1787 Convention. The educated, propertied elite again became active in response to the threat to their values, their property, indeed their very identity. It was also during this critical period that Madison first realised the significance of Hume’s essay for the metamorphosis of the American Confederation. When we compare the EC with the creation of the American Republic, some significant parallels emerge. First of all, the EC itself was born in response to civil chaos, proposed to become a United States of Europe. Secondly, there is present both in the EC and in the creation of the American Republic the same outreach towards a continental economy,9 accompanied by an enormous population increase, in the case of the EC by accession. This continental outreach was characterised by a great expansion of internal trade and by qualitative economic changes. In both, too, there was the challenge of competition: in America by England, in Europe by Japan and the U.S.A. In both, these changes wereseen to require general institutions, and in both there emerged a movement for federal definition of such institutions. It might be worthwhile, too, to compare the minds of the Federalists in both, and of the Anti-federalists.‘O There is also the same commitment to human rights in both. What does the American model argue for European integration? For one thing, that if it is to occur and endure, it has to be federal. Secondly, if it is to be federal, it must emerge all at once. Third, such emergence, if it is to occur at all, can only take place after the EC, as it is now constituted, shall have proven itself incapable of implementing its essential objectives and also after its member states have failed to secure ‘the ends and order of civil polity’. This latter is of especial significance and it goes together with the threat to the identity of the elites. In America it occurred in peace, after the state governments had become thoroughly discredited. Nor does the EC lack people to motor such a federal response; people concerned about the outcome of xenophobia and ethnic fragmentaion, about unconventional wars, about common environmental threats and, of course, multinational and high-tech corporations which are reaching for a competitive continental economy; and others.
218
Arthur Lapan
In such a scenario, identification of the ‘critical period’ and of the ‘propitious moment’ become central foci of research. The critical period has, of course, received extensive study. As for ‘the appropriate moment’, ‘on the eve of the (1787) Convention a number of well-placed national leaders, including Washington, still doubted whether affairs had yet plunged to the nadir necessary to ensure the success of a reformation.‘” Of course, the idea of a ‘propitious’, a ‘decisive’ moment for transformation has played a role in the diagnoses of other historical processes. In his Memoirs, Jean Monnet speaks of crisis and what we have called the propitious moment as behind every significant transcendence and transformation towards European unity. It may be asked: on what is all the foregoing based? It may be argued that the situation of the EC is essentially different from that of the American model, that the presence of different languages, for example, makes them incomparable. However, the American model also includes the logic of its actors. There is a demonstrative structure in it. For it, the Federal Union had to be emergent because its fundamental postulates were incompatible with the Articles. And these postulates had to do with human nature as predominantly self-oriented and with power which resists its abridgement. They implied that Confederation had and that unchecked majorities could not but become to be centrifugalI despotic. I3 The same postulates entail similar conclusions for the EC, only now the conclusions are also prognoses. To the extent that they are verified, they will be a test of both the American model and the EC. But to obtain such postulates, abstraction must be used and essence identified. For example, nuclear and environmental threats did not exist in 1787. But they may easily become ‘subversive of civil polity’, just as worthless paper money and Shays’ Rebellion were then felt to be. Federal government, then, spells peace within a Union. But not external peace. According to Madison, ‘experience rather taught.. . that among independent nations preeminent over their neighbours . . . rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions . . . ‘I4 And European Union is today sought for such things as economic and political preeminence. But in counterbalance, in the American model one cannot serve in government without running into limits which in time are internationalised. Legislators are therefore less likely to be precipitate. The business ethos, an ethos of weighed decisions, common to both the U.S. and Europe, makes for the same conclusions. So does the nuclear restraint shown by the U.S. (and the U.S.S.R) during the Cold War. Indeed it seems likely that continental federations will be less likely than small states to use nuclear weapons just because they are more powerful, hence more secure and less desperate. But it may be asked: what guarantee is there that such federations will automatically endure? There is none. Thus there have been two recent occasions when the Madisoniani5 character of the U.S. has been called into question: one culminated in the resignation of President Nixon, the other the Iran-Contra affair. In both cases the central issue was the violation of fundamental constitutional limitations by the executive, But on the other hand, just as there are questions about the limitations of the American model, so have there been questions, especially in a nuclear age, about its wider global applicability. But this is to exceed the limits of our paper. Arthur Lapan Zichron Yaacov, Israel
European
Integration
and the American
Model
219
NOTES 1. Federalist #20. 2. Ibid., #15. 3. Douglass Adair, ‘That Politics May be Reduced to a Science’, Fame and /he Founding Fathers (New York, 1974). 4. William Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (ed.), (London, 1990), p.23,ft. 26. 5. Adair, op.cit., pp. 95-96. 6. Articles of Confederation, Article 4. 7. Jack N. Rakove, 27re Beginnings of National Politics (New York, 1979), Ch.XIII; Altiero Spinelli, TheEurocrats (Baltimore, 1966), Epilogue; Paul Taylor, TheLimitsof European Integration (New York, 1983). 8. Irwin H. Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, 1774-1795 (Evanston; NorthWestern U. Press, 1969); W. David Patterson and Andreas Sobisch, Materialism, Social Values and Attitudes Towards European Zntegration: An Empirical Assessment,
ISSEI Conf., Aalborg Univ., Aalborg, Denmark (24-29 August 1992). 9. Curtis P. Nettels,The Emergence of a NationalEconomy, 1775-1815 (New York 1960); Gordon S. Wood, 77teRadicalism of the American Revolution (New York 1992), Chap. 8; John Palmer, Europe Without America? (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 137-150; Margaret Sharp, ‘The Technology and the Dynamics of Integration’, in 77re Dynamics of European Integration, William Wallace (ed.). 10. Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago, 1981); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969), Parts Four and Five; and The Radicalism of the American Revolution, esp. Ch. 14. For obvious reasons there are not as yet studies of the European Federalists and AntiFederalists. 11. Rakove, op. cit., p. 396 12. Federalist #15. This, and some other aspects of the American Model’s reasoning, seems to have acquired some EC verification since the writing of this paper. 13. Federalist ii 10. 14. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, v. 1, (Yale Univ. Press), p. 448. 15. Alpheus T. Mason, ‘The Federalist-A Split Personality’, American HistoricalReview LVII (1951-52), 625-643.
EUROPEAN
History
INTEGRATION
ofEuropean
Ideas, Vol. 19, Nos 1-3, pp. Z&219,
1994 Copyright 8 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191-6599/94 S7.00+ 0.00
AND THE AMERICAN MODEL
ARTHUR
LAPAN *
Let me begin with the context of this paper. Unconventional weapons together with sovereign, self-determined and multiplying nationalisms, have made peace uncertain and at the same time more necessary than ever. What we want to do in this paper is to consider the American model and its significance for European integration and for peace in our time. According to Madison, the architect of the American Constitution, governments are most liable to go to war when there is no authority over them. But even when there is a government over them, as in a Confederation (these states still being sovereign), the likely outcome will still be internecine war, and this because of man’s intractable will-to-power when not chastened by limits. According to him (and to Hamilton) the radical vice which the American Constitution was designed to remedy was its principle of legislation for such sovereign states, as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consisted, a principle, for them, ‘as it is a solicism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity.” Essential to government is law, and essential to law a penalty for its disobedience, which can be inflicted only by the magistrate or the sword. The first can apply only to individuals; in the case of the states, courts are impotent.* Thus, federal government by definition spells peace within a Union. You have on the one hand a common government which is primary, elected by and responsible to the people for their common affairs, while the state governments, subordinate but similarly elected, devote themselves to state affairs. And if Europe is set side-by-side with the U.S.A. these past 200 years, the disparity between them, so far as peace is concerned, is obvious; since 1865 the difference is even more compelling. The American Founders also saw the need for balance and limitation of power everywhere which, they thought, would make for moderation in legislation; in a nuclear world, an invaluable characteristic. Madison’s formula for coping with extreme popular currents, which he derived from Hume’s essay ‘The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, was along the same line: cap, he said, the existing structure of American society with a federal government, and an extreme movement which started in one part of the continent would first have to capture its own locality, and then its state composed of diverse interests-Madison did not want to destroy the states but rather use them creatively, something a United States of Europe would also do with its nationalities-and finally it would have to capture the federal government itself with interests even more diverse. And this regardless of whether the movement was from the extreme left or the extreme right.3 *Haroub
4,
Zichron Yaacov 30900, Israel. 215
216
Arthur Lapan
Present-day America verifies Madison’s judgement that self-government may be greatly extended territorially by a judicious modification of the federal principle, and this applies also to the EC. His reasoning also seems to have relevance to the present neo-Nazism in Germany and xenophobia in France, Italy and Belgium, should their momentum continue; the most effective response would be federal integration of the entire EC, for then the xenophics of one nation would find it most difficult to unite with those of another, something which would not be the case with their opponents. The same thing goes for the anticipated withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany The best way for them to avoid not only economic but also military dominance of the European states by Germany lies not in the present institutional structure of the EC-foreign policy, taxation and defence now being in the hands of its individual states-but in a new federal embrace of each. The same goes for ethnic fragmentation. All this, of course, also implies the creation of a genuinely European army. So much for the American model structurally. But let us look at it dynamically and ask what it bespeaks for European integration. Dynamically, the American model is a story of death and transfiguration, an Hegelian process in which a political subject with a political structure-in this case the Articles of Confederation-entails consequences which negate its own purpose and thereby falls into self-contradicition; so that to actualise itself it must transcend and transform its premises radically, but still preserve its original intent-which it did, from a confederation of thirteen sovereign states to a federal union of the individuals of those states. In this process, the critical period in the transformation of the Confederation into a Federation becomes especially important-particularly when we ask what the American model bespeaks for European integration-as also is the character of the propitious moment when transformation occurs. In the American model, the transformation was radical and almost instantaneous, and gave rise at a precise point in time to federationto the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and its ratification in 1787-1788.4 In effecting this transformation, the Founders went to science. Their guiding light was the Scotch Enlightenment’s assumption that ‘there is a great uniformity among the actions of men.. . and that human nature remains the same. . . ‘. The science of politics was a clinical science based upon historical case-histories; and like medicine, ‘the comparative study of history could confer foresight and help the legislator make correct policy decisions.‘s This did not mean that one merely noted resemblances. The Founders also were concerned with reasons, and their reasoning permeated their diagnoses and prognoses. It implied that ideas and attitudes are effective, have implications, that their histories have a logical structure. Their reasoning applies prognositically directly to the EC. There are, indeed, significant comparabilities between the dynamics of the American Confederation and the EC. Some are: (1) Both are confederations. Legislation in both is for sovereign states rather than for the individuals of which they are composed. (2) These sovereign states each have a veto, under the Articles restricted to amendments; in the EC, amendments also need unanimity. (3) Economically, America under the Articles was more or less like what the EC was scheduled to be now. The Articles gave ‘The people of each state free ingress to any other state as well as to all the privileges ofcommerce.’ Politically, the Conferation had more supranational powers, e.g. a common army.
European Integration and the American Model
217
(4) In the beginning, most Americans were certain that ‘a sense of common interest would beget a full compliance with all the requisitions of the Union.’ But This did not occur. Something similar happened in Europe when the original focus on a United States of Europe was followed by reassertion of the nation state. (5) In both cases the inability to get the necessary compliance led federalists to try to increase the powers of the general government incrementally. (6) In the American case this gradualist approach failed to get the power for taxation for the Continental Congress, which almost aborted the American Revolution; in the EC it likewise foundered financially.’ (7) In both cases local needs and interests were a basic factor determining support or opposition to greater integration.* Neither the ineffectual prosecution of the revolutionary war by the Confederation nor the post-war economic depression were able to transform the then dying Confederation into a federal Union. The prospects for such a Union appeared altogether inauspicious. What then made the difference? One thing was Shay’s Rebellion, and another was Rhode Island’s worthless paper money. Shays’ Rebellion paralysed the government of Massachusetts, and as disorders multiplied, state after state belatedly appointed delegates to the 1787 Convention. The educated, propertied elite again became active in response to the threat to their values, their property, indeed their very identity. It was also during this critical period that Madison first realised the significance of Hume’s essay for the metamorphosis of the American Confederation. When we compare the EC with the creation of the American Republic, some significant parallels emerge. First of all, the EC itself was born in response to civil chaos, proposed to become a United States of Europe. Secondly, there is present both in the EC and in the creation of the American Republic the same outreach towards a continental economy,9 accompanied by an enormous population increase, in the case of the EC by accession. This continental outreach was characterised by a great expansion of internal trade and by qualitative economic changes. In both, too, there was the challenge of competition: in America by England, in Europe by Japan and the U.S.A. In both, these changes wereseen to require general institutions, and in both there emerged a movement for federal definition of such institutions. It might be worthwhile, too, to compare the minds of the Federalists in both, and of the Anti-federalists.‘O There is also the same commitment to human rights in both. What does the American model argue for European integration? For one thing, that if it is to occur and endure, it has to be federal. Secondly, if it is to be federal, it must emerge all at once. Third, such emergence, if it is to occur at all, can only take place after the EC, as it is now constituted, shall have proven itself incapable of implementing its essential objectives and also after its member states have failed to secure ‘the ends and order of civil polity’. This latter is of especial significance and it goes together with the threat to the identity of the elites. In America it occurred in peace, after the state governments had become thoroughly discredited. Nor does the EC lack people to motor such a federal response; people concerned about the outcome of xenophobia and ethnic fragmentaion, about unconventional wars, about common environmental threats and, of course, multinational and high-tech corporations which are reaching for a competitive continental economy; and others.
218
Arthur Lapan
In such a scenario, identification of the ‘critical period’ and of the ‘propitious moment’ become central foci of research. The critical period has, of course, received extensive study. As for ‘the appropriate moment’, ‘on the eve of the (1787) Convention a number of well-placed national leaders, including Washington, still doubted whether affairs had yet plunged to the nadir necessary to ensure the success of a reformation.‘” Of course, the idea of a ‘propitious’, a ‘decisive’ moment for transformation has played a role in the diagnoses of other historical processes. In his Memoirs, Jean Monnet speaks of crisis and what we have called the propitious moment as behind every significant transcendence and transformation towards European unity. It may be asked: on what is all the foregoing based? It may be argued that the situation of the EC is essentially different from that of the American model, that the presence of different languages, for example, makes them incomparable. However, the American model also includes the logic of its actors. There is a demonstrative structure in it. For it, the Federal Union had to be emergent because its fundamental postulates were incompatible with the Articles. And these postulates had to do with human nature as predominantly self-oriented and with power which resists its abridgement. They implied that Confederation had and that unchecked majorities could not but become to be centrifugalI despotic. I3 The same postulates entail similar conclusions for the EC, only now the conclusions are also prognoses. To the extent that they are verified, they will be a test of both the American model and the EC. But to obtain such postulates, abstraction must be used and essence identified. For example, nuclear and environmental threats did not exist in 1787. But they may easily become ‘subversive of civil polity’, just as worthless paper money and Shays’ Rebellion were then felt to be. Federal government, then, spells peace within a Union. But not external peace. According to Madison, ‘experience rather taught.. . that among independent nations preeminent over their neighbours . . . rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions . . . ‘I4 And European Union is today sought for such things as economic and political preeminence. But in counterbalance, in the American model one cannot serve in government without running into limits which in time are internationalised. Legislators are therefore less likely to be precipitate. The business ethos, an ethos of weighed decisions, common to both the U.S. and Europe, makes for the same conclusions. So does the nuclear restraint shown by the U.S. (and the U.S.S.R) during the Cold War. Indeed it seems likely that continental federations will be less likely than small states to use nuclear weapons just because they are more powerful, hence more secure and less desperate. But it may be asked: what guarantee is there that such federations will automatically endure? There is none. Thus there have been two recent occasions when the Madisoniani5 character of the U.S. has been called into question: one culminated in the resignation of President Nixon, the other the Iran-Contra affair. In both cases the central issue was the violation of fundamental constitutional limitations by the executive, But on the other hand, just as there are questions about the limitations of the American model, so have there been questions, especially in a nuclear age, about its wider global applicability. But this is to exceed the limits of our paper. Arthur Lapan Zichron Yaacov, Israel
European
Integration
and the American
Model
219
NOTES 1. Federalist #20. 2. Ibid., #15. 3. Douglass Adair, ‘That Politics May be Reduced to a Science’, Fame and /he Founding Fathers (New York, 1974). 4. William Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (ed.), (London, 1990), p.23,ft. 26. 5. Adair, op.cit., pp. 95-96. 6. Articles of Confederation, Article 4. 7. Jack N. Rakove, 27re Beginnings of National Politics (New York, 1979), Ch.XIII; Altiero Spinelli, TheEurocrats (Baltimore, 1966), Epilogue; Paul Taylor, TheLimitsof European Integration (New York, 1983). 8. Irwin H. Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, 1774-1795 (Evanston; NorthWestern U. Press, 1969); W. David Patterson and Andreas Sobisch, Materialism, Social Values and Attitudes Towards European Zntegration: An Empirical Assessment,
ISSEI Conf., Aalborg Univ., Aalborg, Denmark (24-29 August 1992). 9. Curtis P. Nettels,The Emergence of a NationalEconomy, 1775-1815 (New York 1960); Gordon S. Wood, 77teRadicalism of the American Revolution (New York 1992), Chap. 8; John Palmer, Europe Without America? (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 137-150; Margaret Sharp, ‘The Technology and the Dynamics of Integration’, in 77re Dynamics of European Integration, William Wallace (ed.). 10. Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago, 1981); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969), Parts Four and Five; and The Radicalism of the American Revolution, esp. Ch. 14. For obvious reasons there are not as yet studies of the European Federalists and AntiFederalists. 11. Rakove, op. cit., p. 396 12. Federalist #15. This, and some other aspects of the American Model’s reasoning, seems to have acquired some EC verification since the writing of this paper. 13. Federalist ii 10. 14. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, v. 1, (Yale Univ. Press), p. 448. 15. Alpheus T. Mason, ‘The Federalist-A Split Personality’, American HistoricalReview LVII (1951-52), 625-643.