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False Friends and Unnecessary Enemies? American Liberals and Conservatives and European Integration
False Friends and Unnecessary Enemies? American Liberals and Conservatives and European Integration by Ronald J. Granieri Ronald J. Granieri is Assistant Professor of Modern European History at the University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on a presentation delivered at the Foreign Policy Research Institute Study Group on America and the West, in February 2008.
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nyone who has tried to learn a modern European language is familiar with the concept of the ‘‘false friend.’’ Here a word in the new language looks very much like a word in one’s native language, but its actual meaning is so different as to make it dangerous to use. The most famous (if probably apocryphal) example of a ‘‘false friend’’ is from the Berlin Blockade, when Americans, eager to help the German people overcome the deprivations of rationing, organized the collection of food packets. In order to gain maximum credit for the American government in the emerging Cold War, these packets were originally stamped proudly with the words ‘‘Gift of the American People,’’ with ‘‘Gift’’ displayed prominently. The problem, of course, is that while the German language does indeed include the word ‘‘Gift,’’ the word in German means ‘‘poison,’’ which explains why the food packets were less than completely palatable upon first arrival. The ‘‘false friends’’ issue, helpful in warning American students of European languages, is a useful angle on understanding how many Americans view European integration. Sometimes what appears to be an obvious connection is not as perfect a fit as one might imagine, and better understanding requires a clearer sense of the complexities of an issue. At first glance, for example, American attitudes toward Europe in general and the EU in particular fall naturally along a Left/Right spectrum, with those on the Left generally proEuropean, while those on the Right are more hostile. Each side considers their view to be a logical result of their political positions. The war in Iraq has crystallized that disagreement, but its roots lie at least as much in debates over social policy and issues of cultural practice. American progressives extol the relatively pacific European foreign policy as they praise the European welfare state. Conservatives, on the other hand, lump all Continental Europeans together as a generalized group of socialists and pacifists divorced from political reality and economic good sense. # 2008 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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European Integration Recent works on Europe reinforce these stereotypes. Left-leaning writers, such as Alan Rifkin, try to emphasize the superiority of the European welfare state, communitarian values, and secularism, in contrast to the alleged belligerence and religious intolerance of the individualistic United States, to argue that the future belongs to the ‘‘European Dream.’’ In a less didactic and more engaging way, T. R. Reid pursues a similar goal, offering an image of a Europe in which universal health care, secularism, and the charmingly trashy Eurovision song contest add up to a ‘‘new superpower’’ that will somehow be better able to deal with the modern world than the stodgy old United States and lead to the ‘‘end of American supremacy.’’1 Rifkin’s book is long on details, while Reid prefers the snappy anecdote, be it about his daughter’s experiences with the British National Health Service or the European Union cartel office’s humiliation of GE and its chairman Jack Welch, but their message is the same. More and more progressive authors use a kind of critical Schadenfreude about the shortcomings of American power over the past decade to posit the creation of a strong Europe that will equal if not surpass the United States in the future. British European advocate Mark Leonard argues that the EU will control the twenty-first century because its emphasis on ‘‘networks’’ and ‘‘soft power’’ will be superior to the American reliance on traditional ‘‘hard power.’’2 Most recently, Parag Khanna, in a cover story for the New York Times Magazine (itself the basis of Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, Random House, 2008) posits a near future in which the EU ‘‘has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy’’ while ‘‘America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.’’3 Conservative skepticism of Europe in general and the EU in particular also travels along familiar patterns. Most famously, Robert Kagan has castigated Europeans for choosing to live in a ‘‘postmodern paradise’’ and avoiding the hard realities of power.4 Others go beyond that to emphasize the general cultural malaise of a Europe that has abandoned its cultural heritage in favor of secular relativism at home and pusillanimous foreign policy abroad, with its shrinking populations threatened by a wave of unassimilated and inassimilable immigrants, largely Muslim.5 1 T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Alan Rifkin, The European Dream (London: Tarcher, 2004). 2 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005). 3 Parag Khanna, ‘‘Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,’’ New York Times Magazine, January 27, 2008. 4 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Vintage, 2004). 5 See most recently, Bruce Thornton, Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2007) and Mark Steyn, America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It (Regnery, 2006). Or, less polemically, Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: St. Martin’s 2007).
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GRANIERI Faulty Mirrors, Distorted Images There are flaws in each of these mirror-image analyses. Progressives generally do not discuss the demographic house of cards upon which the European welfare states are built. Nor do they discuss long-term problems of immigration and identity, especially as advancing secularism collides with efforts to encourage immigrants to integrate themselves into European society, except perhaps when they suggest that multicultural tolerance will solve things automatically. Nor do they deal with the problem of how the European Union (let alone its member states individually) can expect to rely solely on ‘‘soft power’’ in a world where hard power still has its place, and in which there are still states (and terrorist organizations) that are not shy about using it. Despite their general Europhilia, progressives also often find themselves avoiding discussions of Europe’s failure to develop effective political institutions at the supranational level. None of the works cited concretely addresses the problem of how an EU that has failed to create effective supranational governance or a common foreign policy with six, nine, ten, twelve, fifteen, or twenty-five members will succeed in doing so with ‘‘well over thirty,’’ for example. Most simply avoid the subject; others attempt to argue that in a ‘‘post-national’’ global society effective federal institutions are unnecessary anyway.6 The conservative critique, for its part, tends toward alarmism about the future and ignores both the historical significance of European integration since 1945 and the quite impressive social and economic stability enjoyed by much of Europe today.7 Many conservatives have tried over the past decade to assert America’s superiority to the European social model by claiming that the welfare state has produced sluggish growth compared to the vibrant American economy. Recent developments in both Europe and the United States, however, have narrowed that gap considerably, leaving aside debates about whether the safety net in Europe contributes to a quality of life not as easily measured in numbers.8 Considering the current state of both the Euro and the dollar, any American commentator who criticizes European states for pursuing fiscal and monetary policies that carry potentially negative long-term consequences—and holds up American policy as a counterexample—may want to do an Internet search including the phrases 6
For a very interesting critique of ‘‘post-national’’ theorizing, see Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate (Princeton University Press, 2005). 7 An exception here is the balanced but critical assessment of Europe on the 50th anniversary of the EEC by Walter McDougall, ‘‘Will ‘‘Europe’’ Survive The 21st Century? A Meditation On The 50th Anniversary of the European Community.’’ FPRI E-notes, August 3 and 4, 2007. 8 Paul Krugman, for example, notes that the European economy is showing ‘‘surprising vitality’’ and that ‘‘tales of a moribund Europe are greatly exaggerated.’’ Paul Krugman, ‘‘The Comeback Continent,’’ New York Times, January 11, 2008.
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European Integration ‘‘glass houses’’ and ‘‘throwing stones.’’ Many conservative commentators who pride themselves on their geopolitical realism, such as Kagan or Charles Krauthammer, however, still tend to dismiss the entire European project as an example of a wooly headed multilateralism that ignores political realities.9 Here they may be on firmer ground, depending on the specific case, but the absence of crowds and flowers and freely flowing oil from Iraq today indicates that wishful thinking is not completely uncommon among conservative realists either. Progressive paeans to Europe are problematic in that they want to claim for contemporary Europe a perfection that it has not nearly reached, while avoiding discussions of problems that loom in the future. They do so, largely, by dismissing the need to measure a political unit such as the EU in political terms, preferring to focus on issues such as quality of life. While these issues are significant in their own way, they do not tell the whole story. Discussions of how the EU actually developed, or its political activities, do not receive nearly as much attention. They, of course, would raise problematic questions about the future. Europe is simply a blank slate (or a blue one) on which progressives project their positive view of those social and cultural traits they wish they could see in the United States. Such an attitude may be gratifying to both advocates of Europe and critics of the current administration in Washington, but it does little to advance the actual cause of European integration. That tension between surface compatibility and fundamental contradiction is what makes such progressive analysts excellent examples of ‘‘false friends.’’ Conservative Euroskeptics, for their part, appear to be so blinded by their frustration with European attitudes on specific policy questions that they refuse to consider what a strong and integrated Europe can mean for the West. The irony here is that Euroskeptics cloak their disdain for the EU in a realist mantle, without considering how a self-confident EU—speaking with one voice in world affairs as an equal partner of the United States—would serve the practical interests of the West. This is the reverse of the false friend, because here is a situation where a supposed antithesis actually makes less sense than it appears on first glance. Conservatives rarely discuss the positive aspects of European integration. It is, nevertheless, a discussion that American conservatives in particular should consider seriously. Since no one needs to convince progressives to embrace the EU, and in general the shortcomings of their positions reflect a need for a greater appreciation of political interests, the rest of this article will analyze and respond to some typical Euroskeptic positions taken by most American conservatives, and consider both their origins and their implications for the future of the West. 9
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, ‘‘Britain’s Humiliation—and Europe’s,’’ Washington Post, April 6, 2007.
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GRANIERI American Conservatives as Euroskeptics It is necessary to reconsider the political and philosophical roots of American conservative Euroskepticism. For instance, to what degree is American Euroskepticism related to the British variety? In the past two decades especially, the Tories, as embodied by Margaret Thatcher and her paladins, have become the greatest Euroskeptics. Even after the Tories lost their majority in 1997 to Tony Blair and New Labour (who had promised to bring Britain more directly into the EU), Euroskepticism had become firmly enough planted in British society that Blair never dared initiate the referendum he had promised. This has led many Anglo-American conservatives to assume that being conservative means opposing European integration. The historical irony in the British story is that in the 1960s and 1970s the roles were reversed, with Tory leaders, such as Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath, advocating membership in the EEC over the objections of a Labour party that wanted to protect native industries against European competition. Tories tend to look upon that history today with embarrassment, but it is worth remembering that there was nothing inevitable about the connection between conservatism and Euroskepticism in Britain. Indeed, when looking at the Continental example, the opposite is the case. Many of the Founding Fathers of Europe, from Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schumann, and Alcide De Gasperi to Walter Hallstein and even Charles de Gaulle, were themselves conservatives. For these Continental statesmen, conservatism meant preserving a European community by encouraging greater integration, even if they ended up disagreeing on the level of integration. Many on the moderate Left had also begun as advocates of European cooperation as an extension of socialist internationalism. However, the emerging Cold War and Labour’s political interests in Britain led most on the Left (and many middleclass business liberals, as well) to adopt a skeptical attitude toward the projects for Europe advanced by conservative and Christian Democratic governments. Once the process of integration began to bear fruit, socialist and Social Democratic parties eventually embraced European integration again, even as they debated the details with their conservative rivals. A clear understanding of recent history, however, demonstrates that European integration is at least as much a conservative project as a leftist or progressive one. American and British conservatives tend to overlook the conservative contribution to Europe for a variety of reasons. One is a difference of opinion between Continental and Anglo-Saxon conservatives about the state’s role in the economy. Most contemporary Tories or American Republicans believe that anyone who thinks the state should play an active role managing the economy, or should invest in social programs, is a socialist. Continental conservatives, however, especially those influenced by Christian Democracy, have been willing to accept an economic role for the state in order to preserve social stability and protect the value of the individual person. What most U.S. or 450
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European Integration British commentators, emphasizing individual economic freedom, label conservatism, Continentals call liberalism. This semantic problem continues to bedevil undergraduates, as well as many commentators. The point here, however, is to remember that there is no single definition of conservatism, and there is accordingly, no automatic linkage between Euroskepticism and conservatism, no matter how hard Anglo-American conservative commentators may try to argue otherwise. Some scholars have argued that attitudes toward European integration can be calibrated according to religious/cultural divisions that are part of Europe’s historical identity. According to this research, Catholic Europe embraces integration, while Protestant Europe prefers national sovereignty.10 This is a complex question, especially as secularization advances across Europe, making Protestant Euroskeptic Scandinavia as irreligious as ‘‘Catholic’’ France. I believe, however, there is a link here to American politics. Although American Catholics are not necessarily more Europhile than the general population, Evangelical Christians in the United States have long been suspicious or even hostile toward European integration, with many popular evangelists using the symbolism of European Integration—such as the fact that the EEC was created by the Treaty of Rome—to link the integration process to the approach of Armageddon.11 This article is not the place to parse these theological discussions, but it is worth noting that this Evangelical suspicion of Europe has influenced Republican views of Europe, just as hostility to/suspicion of Evangelical influence in American politics leads Europhiles such as Rifkin and Reid to praise European secularism. 12 The tension between the Anglo-American special relationship and the process of European integration has played a major role in transatlantic relations. Initially, American leaders were disappointed that Britain chose to remain aloof from integration plans, such as the Coal and Steel Community and the EEC, although they expressed understanding for British policy. By the early 1960s, however, the Kennedy Administration, increasingly concerned about the impact of an EEC dominated by de Gaulle’s France, strongly encouraged the British application for membership in 1961. British membership was a crucial part of Kennedy’s ‘‘Grand Design’’ for the Atlantic community. This was true even though the Americans knew that the British were not interested in European political integration; indeed, that may have been its most attractive aspect. When de Gaulle vetoed the British application in 1963, 10 B. F. Nelsen, J. L. Guth and C. R. Fraser, ‘‘Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union,’’ European Union Politics, 2:2 (2001), pp. 191-217. 11 For one of the first mass-market successes along this line, see the classic book by Hal Lindsey, The Late, Great Planet Earth (1973). The most prominent advocate these days is televangelist Pastor John Hagee. See Sarah Posner, ‘‘Pastor Strangelove,’’ The American Prospect, May 21, 2006. 12 For a defense of European secularism from a more conservative perspective, see Roger Cohen, ‘‘Secular Europe’s Merits,’’ New York Times, December 13, 2007.
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GRANIERI claiming Britain was merely an American ‘‘Trojan Horse’’ to hinder political integration, the charge stung because it was too close to the truth. Indeed, it is interesting to see that U.S.-British relations experienced one of their down periods in the early 1970s, when the Heath government showed too much interest in intensified European cooperation. While the Special Relationship was becoming stronger, American relations with France as the symbol of Continental Europe became more troubled. (Which of these developments came first is open to question.) Although there were periods of de´tente, in general French policy developed along de Gaulle’s lines, emphasizing French independence from American leadership, and culminating in the French withdrawal from NATO military integration in 1966. There were serious issues at stake in these debates, as well as some historical and psychological resentment, especially on de Gaulle’s side. However, subsequent French governments consistently have emphasized that they considered themselves members of the Atlantic Alliance, and were not interested in breaking that alliance but rather in encouraging Americans to view Europeans, and especially the French, as equal partners.13 Such conciliatory messages rarely got through to an American public that viewed France as an ungrateful troublemaker. Nor did these messages move the American government to rethink its attitudes toward Europe. Instead, American policy relied increasingly on the British, and judged other European states and the EU in general on how well its policies conformed to Anglo-American desires. States such as West Germany found themselves playing the role of prize in these disputes, torn between Continental and Atlantic solidarity. History casts a long shadow across the Atlantic, but there are good reasons to reconsider the dichotomy between the special relationship and European integration. One is the change in Britain’s leadership, where Gordon Brown has shown less enthusiasm for the special relationship than Tony Blair. Another, though, is France’s change of leadership, where President Nicolas Sarkozy has indicated a strong interest in improved relations between the United States and France, even hinting at deeper cooperation within NATO and with maintaining security in the Persian Gulf.14 Such changes suggest that it may be time for American conservatives to rethink their reflexive hostility toward France15 in particular and 13
See e.g. the conversation between French Ambassador Charles Lucet with National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, June 7, 1966. Memorandum of conversation at the LBJ Library, Francis Bator papers, Box 27, Folder 4. 14 Most recently, see the profile of the new French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner: James Taub, ‘‘A Statesman Without Borders,’’ New York Times Magazine, February 3, 2008. See also Dan Bilefsky, ‘‘The Special Relationship Tries to Swim the Channel,’’ New York Times, October 28, 2007; and Michaela Wiegel, ‘‘Eine kleine geopolitische Revolution,’’ Frankfurter Allgemeine, January 17, 2008. 15 See ‘‘Wir wollen kein zweites Europa schaffen.’’ Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 7, 2007.
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European Integration Continental Europe in general. Although the Continentals, along with the British, are not as enthusiastic for strong action against Iran than many American conservatives. Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, two conservative leaders to emerge in Europe over the past four years, are supportive of resolute Western positions and for greater European integration. This situation indicates that one need not preclude the other, and that they may actually reinforce each other. It also offers an opportunity for both Europeans and Americans to consider the ways they can work to build complementary policies on their common interests, but only if they set aside cherished historical myths and resentments. A New West in a New World Lastly, the United States should rethink its position on Europe with regard to its own more complex international situation. As I wrote in this journal two years ago, American attitudes toward Europe generally have followed an imperial pattern. While American administrations have encouraged European integration as a way to create a stable economic partner, the United States has been ambivalent about the idea of an integrated Europe. Faced with the choice between an equal and possibly headstrong partner or a pliable and internally divided sidekick, the United States has preferred the sidekick, and has played individual European states against each other, whether it was Britain against France in the 1960s, or Eastern against Western Europe more recently.16 What made some sense during the Cold War makes less sense now, as the United States faces the reality of its own relative decline and the emergence of potentially strong challengers to its global interests, such as China and Russia, as well as global challenges such as terrorism. Even during the Cold War, conservatives, in particular, were caught in an intellectual bind. They criticized European members of NATO for failing to pull their weight in the alliance and for relying on American military power, while rebuffing European desires for greater equality in alliance decision-making. The Europeans, of course, were more eager to demand equality in decisions than they were to offer equality of exertions. The time has now come for both sides to approach this question again. Even if the political/historical foundation of conservative Euroskepticism can be shown to be open to reconsideration, however, one needs to address the philosophical underpinnings. There are three arguments against Europe’s political integration within the Atlantic alliance: that it does not work, that it cannot work, and that it should not work. Let me explain what I mean by these three positions. 16
Ronald J. Granieri, ‘‘Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American ‘Empire by Invitation.’’’ Orbis, Fall 2006.
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GRANIERI The argument that the EU does not work is the most concrete, in that it is advanced by those who can refer directly to the actions (or inactions) of the EU as an institution. It is most popular among those who argue that the system is not functioning because it is structurally deficient, or because the Europeans have chosen to pursue policies that are inappropriate. In matters of diplomacy, an excellent example is when critics point to the failure of European institutions to act effectively in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The inability or unwillingness of the European Community (at that time) to develop a common diplomatic or strategic response to Yugoslavia’s collapse, and their eventual reliance on American diplomacy and American military power (through a NATO war in 1999 where the United States provided the overwhelming majority of the forces) provides an object lesson of Europe’s political impotence. The incoherence of European responses to the American war in Iraq also functions, for many, as proof of Europe’s uselessness as a partner for the United States. This argument has a good deal of force. Indeed, it is one of the major weaknesses of much pro-European literature, which does not frankly confront the areas where Europe has failed to live up to its promise. At the same time, however, it is important to consider that individual failures, while useful in winning short-term arguments, are not sufficient proof of the uselessness of the European project. It is a significant fallacy to believe that supporting the European project—or any political project—requires unreserved praise for things as they are. Pointing out Europe’s failures does not make one an enemy of Europe, and refusing to see manifest problems does not make one a friend of Europe. The decisive question rather should be: is the European project important enough to deserve the necessary effort to solve its remaining problems? It is now an article of faith among the Euroskeptics, especially the British, to focus their ire on Brussels as the center of bureaucracy and regulations. Whether the specific cause is Brussels’ emphasis on the metric system or on other consumer regulations, Brussels is considered a distant, unaccountable font of rules. There is a deep irony in such complaints, however. The very same Anglo-Saxon Euroskeptics who complain that the EU is politically distant or irresponsible, for example, themselves bear heavy responsibility for Brussels’ failure to be anything more than the home of an unelected bureaucracy. For those same Euroskeptics have stood in the way of the political integration that would have granted Brussels the legitimacy it lacks. Thus, Euroskeptics are complaining about a legitimacy gap they helped to create. There is something wrong with decrying a European ‘‘Superstate,’’ and hindering political integration, and at the same time complaining that Europe does not have the legitimacy to act. Noted historian of European integration John Gillingham, for example, does an excellent job skewing Brussels and the EU’s structures, as standing in the way of progress. Yet his proposals for reform beg the question of 454
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European Integration whether the current problems are the result of too much integration or too little.17 The problem is that managing a free trade area, if the market is to function properly across such a large area, requires precisely the kind of regulation about which Euroskeptics complain even if one can argue for less here and there. What is missing from contemporary Europe is a sense that a responsible and legitimate political authority made those regulations, and that there is recourse to appeal regulations that are ineffective or onerous. But there can be no such legitimacy or appeal if there is no political authority or a clear process that transfers necessary sovereignty to that authority. The answer to incomplete integration, therefore, is more integration. If Europeans hope to speak with one voice within the West and within the world, then they need to take the necessary steps in that direction, using their current weaknesses not as stumbling blocks, but as building blocks. Discussion of the EU’s recent and current shortcomings leads to the second level of abstraction, the argument that European integration cannot work. This argument is very common for those who seek to expose some fatal flaw that will make it impossible for Europe as a whole to play a vital role in the West, thereby foreclosing discussions about possible reforms. This type of argumentation can be found, for example, among commentators who worry about the long-term impact of Muslim immigration in Europe, and it also lurks behind much Euroskeptic criticism of current European policy. Concerning international diplomacy in particular, the most popular version comes from those who follow Robert Kagan’s arguments. He posited a fundamental difference in international outlook between Europeans and Americans. The Kagan argument commonly reflects conservative American skepticism about Europe, contending that Europeans fail to understand the realities of the modern international system, and is often reduced to the commonplace: ‘‘Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus.’’ This is a catchy phrase, and appeals to those on both sides of the Atlantic who would prefer not to see either a politically active Europe or an effective Atlantic partnership. In the end, though, even if it happens to ring true for the moment, it is the kind of comment that can only be made with either a sneer or a shrug, and neither of those attitudes are helpful if we are serious about (re-)building the Atlantic community. It is historically dubious, as Kagan himself has noted, admitting that weaker states generally prefer to work through negotiation, while stronger states prefer to rely on force. When the power relationship across the Atlantic was different (say during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century) the roles of paradise and power were reversed, for 17
John Gillingham, Design for a New Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2006). For more background, see also his massive European Integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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GRANIERI example. That realization undermines the idea that such characterizations are forever, a weakness of any analysis that attempts to treat ‘‘culture’’ as a fixed quantity. It is ironic that realists, who generally dislike taking cultural issues into account because they are so difficult to quantify and measure, become the most likely to overvalue cultural factors (once they do decide to recognize them) by trying to use them as fixed quantities, and miss out on the reality that within societies, especially societies with competitive and free political systems, a variety of attitudes is usually present. Even if the broad characterization of Europe and the United States were accurate at the moment, however, it remains of limited utility. I am not sure that the idea of permanent differences is even helpful in dealing with relations between the sexes, from whence the ‘‘Mars/Venus’’ characterization is drawn.18 In that literature, however, the goal is for both sides to negotiate their differences, since it is the differences as well as the similarities among partners that make relationships so interesting. No one would argue that difficulties in understanding mean that no relationship between disparate partners is possible. It is amusing to think, in contrast to their other social policies, that many in the current administration, not to mention their supporters in the American punditocracy, are so hostile to the notion of working with the Europeans that they, in effect, appear to be advocating same-sex marriage in international affairs. Here again it is necessary to look at the electoral makeup of both individual European states and their willingness to work together. With the replacement of Gerhard Schro¨der and Jacques Chirac with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, new leaders have emerged on the European scene that advocate both a stronger European international role and more vigorous cooperation within the West. The two need not be mutually exclusive. Recent surveys of transatlantic trends also indicate Europe’s growing interest in having the EU play a stronger role in international affairs.19 Even if the nature of that European role causes great debate, and current disagreements over Afghanistan show that the United States and Europe do not agree on all issues, the proper response should be more, not less cooperation. Even if a more tightly integrated Europe could be shown to be a workable option both for itself and for its role in the West, there would still be a substantial group of Euroskeptics arguing against it on the basis that it simply should not be. The ‘‘should not work’’ argument has its roots in the idea that the nation-state is the best and only possible level of government and the rejection of the idea of supranational integration tout court. Even de Gaulle could be counted among those skeptics when he declared: ‘‘To imagine that something can be built that would be effective for action and that would be 18
John Gray, Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus (New York: HarperCollins, 2002). See the results of the latest ‘‘Transatlantic Trends’’ survey at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm. 19
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European Integration approved by the peoples outside and above the States—this is a dream.’’20 De Gaulle, of course, still wanted to see a strong Europe, though one clearly led by France. On the other end of the Euroskeptic spectrum, Anglo-Saxon conservatives reject the idea of an integrated Europe for their own reasons. John O’Sullivan of National Review, for example, responded to French and Dutch voters’ rejection of the proposed European Constitution by claiming that American interests lie not in an integrated Europe, but in ‘‘promoting a more flexible and varied European Union—intergovernmental rather than supranational, reliant on tax and regulatory competition rather than on bureaucratic harmonization, and determined to keep NATO as the basis of its foreign and defense policies.’’ This ‘‘prosperous free-trade Europe, hospitable to U.S. trade and investment, and a reliable U.S. ally rather than a ‘counterweight’ in diplomacy and military affairs’’ would return more sovereignty to the member states. O’Sullivan calls that ‘‘a major step toward restoring European democracy.’’21 The Economist follows a similar tack in its responses to the constitution’s failure, also arguing that Europe’s future lies in an intergovernmental model based on a free trade zone. Indeed, when European leaders such as Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schu¨ssel discussed the possibility of reviving the constitution, the Economist likened the idea of a supranational Europe to a zombie rising from the dead, a shambling, rotting threat to Europe’s future, wondering ‘‘what part of ‘no’ do European integrationists not understand?’’22 These reactions are not surprising. Indeed, as discussed above, Euroskeptics in the Anglo-Saxon tradition prefer the economic aspects of integration, and would be happy for Europe to end there rather than discuss political integration at all. Ironically, some early integrationists—such as the technocrats associated with Jean Monnet and those who embraced functional integration after the European Defense Community’s collapse in 1954—also preferred to pursue economics first, because they hoped that such processes, which operate according to ‘‘objective’’ forces, would encourage habits of cooperation and also produce tangible evidence of the utility of integration, would lead to deeper integration by the back door.23 This, of course, as we have also discussed, is precisely the attitude that has helped lead to Europe’s current ‘‘democracy deficit.’’ As harmonization of the European economy leads to increasing power flowing to Brussels without creating the political 20
De Gaulle, press conference of 5 September 1960. Quoted in David Calleo, Europe’s Future: The Grand Alternatives (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 90. 21 John O’Sullivan, ‘‘Not the answer they expected: French voters say no to the EU constitution.’’ National Review, June 20, 2005. 22 See ‘‘The Europe that Died—and the one that should live on,’’ Economist, June 4, 2005, pp. 13–14. For the ‘‘Zombie’’ caricature, and the quotation, see ‘‘Back from the Dead,’’ Economist, January 7, 2006, p. 46. 23 On more recent developments along those lines, see Nicholas Jabko, Playing the Market (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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GRANIERI structures that would lend this regulatory power either domestic legitimacy or international influence, the European project lurches from one crisis to another. One can certainly debate the relative merits of ‘‘federalism’’ (a term that, like conservatism, has very different meanings on either side of the Atlantic). To use the American example, however, with its roots in the ideas of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, there can be no legitimate regulatory power, however limited, without a clear division of authority between the central government and the regions. Nor can one expect to pursue a coherent foreign policy without a legitimate central government. Of course, if the goal is to avoid pursuing any kind of coherent policy, then a weak central government makes a great deal of sense. Is that, however, in Europe’s best interest, or the West’s? Euroskeptics might welcome the crises that doomed the European Constitution, but their vision for an alternative would leave a political vacuum in Europe and within the West. It is time for conservatives to question whether that should be their position after all.
Divided and Weak or United and Strong Those American conservatives arguing that it is in American interest for Europe to remain divided and weak need to explain how this makes the United States more secure. A divided Europe could still disagree with American policy, and would be a weak partner even if it agreed. It is a bad idea for the United States to simply ignore the concerns of states with whom it is supposed to share cultural and historical boundaries. Both realist and idealist calculations suggest that real partnership is a better way. If, as realists like to argue, foreign policy is made according to material interests, is it not likely that a representative democracy and pluralist society such as the United States would have more interests in common with European societies than with, say, authoritarian regimes such as China? From the idealist side (and it is worth remembering that American conservatism contains at least as much idealism as realism), if the rhetoric about Western Civilization so common during the Cold War—and reborn during the current war on terror—has any meaning at all, it should require that both Europeans and Americans focus on what unites them rather than what divides them. Of course this does not mean that Europeans and Americans will agree on all policy questions. There are strong differences of opinion, and there will be disagreements into the future. Nor should anyone expect anything different. Representative democracy is based on the idea of making policy through disagreement and discussion, not through rigid enforcement of an imposed consensus. What is true of individual federal republics should be even truer of an alliance between federal republics. Shared values and historical connections are not invalidated by intelligent, even spirited, disagreement. Honest disagreement and discussion can deepen those ties, and can take them beyond 458
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European Integration ritual repetitions of Cold War formulae to the vibrant reality of conscious practice. The West needs more than false friends and misguided critics. It is not enough for critics of American policy to sit back smugly and speculate on how much weaker the United States will be in the future compared to the Europe of their dreams. Nor is it enough for American Euroskeptics to throw up their hands and consign European integration to the dustbin of History. Europeans and Americans need to consider what can be done to make sure that the relative global power shift underway in the twenty-first century can be managed in a way that avoids dangerous upheaval as much as possible. The way for that to happen is for Atlantic discord to be replaced by a genuine Atlantic partnership. Not a partnership between an overweening, imperial United States and a variety of middling European states, with whom the Americans will cooperate according to shifting coalitions of convenience; nor a partnership between a declining and resentful United States and a diffuse and diffident Europe; but a partnership between a strong and confident United States and a Europe possessing the structures, the capabilities, and the will to act as an equal. The road to that partnership has never been smooth, but the journey along it must begin with a renewed willingness on all sides to carry on together.
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nyone who has tried to learn a modern European language is familiar with the concept of the ‘‘false friend.’’ Here a word in the new language looks very much like a word in one’s native language, but its actual meaning is so different as to make it dangerous to use. The most famous (if probably apocryphal) example of a ‘‘false friend’’ is from the Berlin Blockade, when Americans, eager to help the German people overcome the deprivations of rationing, organized the collection of food packets. In order to gain maximum credit for the American government in the emerging Cold War, these packets were originally stamped proudly with the words ‘‘Gift of the American People,’’ with ‘‘Gift’’ displayed prominently. The problem, of course, is that while the German language does indeed include the word ‘‘Gift,’’ the word in German means ‘‘poison,’’ which explains why the food packets were less than completely palatable upon first arrival. The ‘‘false friends’’ issue, helpful in warning American students of European languages, is a useful angle on understanding how many Americans view European integration. Sometimes what appears to be an obvious connection is not as perfect a fit as one might imagine, and better understanding requires a clearer sense of the complexities of an issue. At first glance, for example, American attitudes toward Europe in general and the EU in particular fall naturally along a Left/Right spectrum, with those on the Left generally proEuropean, while those on the Right are more hostile. Each side considers their view to be a logical result of their political positions. The war in Iraq has crystallized that disagreement, but its roots lie at least as much in debates over social policy and issues of cultural practice. American progressives extol the relatively pacific European foreign policy as they praise the European welfare state. Conservatives, on the other hand, lump all Continental Europeans together as a generalized group of socialists and pacifists divorced from political reality and economic good sense. # 2008 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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European Integration Recent works on Europe reinforce these stereotypes. Left-leaning writers, such as Alan Rifkin, try to emphasize the superiority of the European welfare state, communitarian values, and secularism, in contrast to the alleged belligerence and religious intolerance of the individualistic United States, to argue that the future belongs to the ‘‘European Dream.’’ In a less didactic and more engaging way, T. R. Reid pursues a similar goal, offering an image of a Europe in which universal health care, secularism, and the charmingly trashy Eurovision song contest add up to a ‘‘new superpower’’ that will somehow be better able to deal with the modern world than the stodgy old United States and lead to the ‘‘end of American supremacy.’’1 Rifkin’s book is long on details, while Reid prefers the snappy anecdote, be it about his daughter’s experiences with the British National Health Service or the European Union cartel office’s humiliation of GE and its chairman Jack Welch, but their message is the same. More and more progressive authors use a kind of critical Schadenfreude about the shortcomings of American power over the past decade to posit the creation of a strong Europe that will equal if not surpass the United States in the future. British European advocate Mark Leonard argues that the EU will control the twenty-first century because its emphasis on ‘‘networks’’ and ‘‘soft power’’ will be superior to the American reliance on traditional ‘‘hard power.’’2 Most recently, Parag Khanna, in a cover story for the New York Times Magazine (itself the basis of Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, Random House, 2008) posits a near future in which the EU ‘‘has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy’’ while ‘‘America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.’’3 Conservative skepticism of Europe in general and the EU in particular also travels along familiar patterns. Most famously, Robert Kagan has castigated Europeans for choosing to live in a ‘‘postmodern paradise’’ and avoiding the hard realities of power.4 Others go beyond that to emphasize the general cultural malaise of a Europe that has abandoned its cultural heritage in favor of secular relativism at home and pusillanimous foreign policy abroad, with its shrinking populations threatened by a wave of unassimilated and inassimilable immigrants, largely Muslim.5 1 T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Alan Rifkin, The European Dream (London: Tarcher, 2004). 2 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005). 3 Parag Khanna, ‘‘Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,’’ New York Times Magazine, January 27, 2008. 4 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Vintage, 2004). 5 See most recently, Bruce Thornton, Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2007) and Mark Steyn, America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It (Regnery, 2006). Or, less polemically, Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: St. Martin’s 2007).
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GRANIERI Faulty Mirrors, Distorted Images There are flaws in each of these mirror-image analyses. Progressives generally do not discuss the demographic house of cards upon which the European welfare states are built. Nor do they discuss long-term problems of immigration and identity, especially as advancing secularism collides with efforts to encourage immigrants to integrate themselves into European society, except perhaps when they suggest that multicultural tolerance will solve things automatically. Nor do they deal with the problem of how the European Union (let alone its member states individually) can expect to rely solely on ‘‘soft power’’ in a world where hard power still has its place, and in which there are still states (and terrorist organizations) that are not shy about using it. Despite their general Europhilia, progressives also often find themselves avoiding discussions of Europe’s failure to develop effective political institutions at the supranational level. None of the works cited concretely addresses the problem of how an EU that has failed to create effective supranational governance or a common foreign policy with six, nine, ten, twelve, fifteen, or twenty-five members will succeed in doing so with ‘‘well over thirty,’’ for example. Most simply avoid the subject; others attempt to argue that in a ‘‘post-national’’ global society effective federal institutions are unnecessary anyway.6 The conservative critique, for its part, tends toward alarmism about the future and ignores both the historical significance of European integration since 1945 and the quite impressive social and economic stability enjoyed by much of Europe today.7 Many conservatives have tried over the past decade to assert America’s superiority to the European social model by claiming that the welfare state has produced sluggish growth compared to the vibrant American economy. Recent developments in both Europe and the United States, however, have narrowed that gap considerably, leaving aside debates about whether the safety net in Europe contributes to a quality of life not as easily measured in numbers.8 Considering the current state of both the Euro and the dollar, any American commentator who criticizes European states for pursuing fiscal and monetary policies that carry potentially negative long-term consequences—and holds up American policy as a counterexample—may want to do an Internet search including the phrases 6
For a very interesting critique of ‘‘post-national’’ theorizing, see Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate (Princeton University Press, 2005). 7 An exception here is the balanced but critical assessment of Europe on the 50th anniversary of the EEC by Walter McDougall, ‘‘Will ‘‘Europe’’ Survive The 21st Century? A Meditation On The 50th Anniversary of the European Community.’’ FPRI E-notes, August 3 and 4, 2007. 8 Paul Krugman, for example, notes that the European economy is showing ‘‘surprising vitality’’ and that ‘‘tales of a moribund Europe are greatly exaggerated.’’ Paul Krugman, ‘‘The Comeback Continent,’’ New York Times, January 11, 2008.
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European Integration ‘‘glass houses’’ and ‘‘throwing stones.’’ Many conservative commentators who pride themselves on their geopolitical realism, such as Kagan or Charles Krauthammer, however, still tend to dismiss the entire European project as an example of a wooly headed multilateralism that ignores political realities.9 Here they may be on firmer ground, depending on the specific case, but the absence of crowds and flowers and freely flowing oil from Iraq today indicates that wishful thinking is not completely uncommon among conservative realists either. Progressive paeans to Europe are problematic in that they want to claim for contemporary Europe a perfection that it has not nearly reached, while avoiding discussions of problems that loom in the future. They do so, largely, by dismissing the need to measure a political unit such as the EU in political terms, preferring to focus on issues such as quality of life. While these issues are significant in their own way, they do not tell the whole story. Discussions of how the EU actually developed, or its political activities, do not receive nearly as much attention. They, of course, would raise problematic questions about the future. Europe is simply a blank slate (or a blue one) on which progressives project their positive view of those social and cultural traits they wish they could see in the United States. Such an attitude may be gratifying to both advocates of Europe and critics of the current administration in Washington, but it does little to advance the actual cause of European integration. That tension between surface compatibility and fundamental contradiction is what makes such progressive analysts excellent examples of ‘‘false friends.’’ Conservative Euroskeptics, for their part, appear to be so blinded by their frustration with European attitudes on specific policy questions that they refuse to consider what a strong and integrated Europe can mean for the West. The irony here is that Euroskeptics cloak their disdain for the EU in a realist mantle, without considering how a self-confident EU—speaking with one voice in world affairs as an equal partner of the United States—would serve the practical interests of the West. This is the reverse of the false friend, because here is a situation where a supposed antithesis actually makes less sense than it appears on first glance. Conservatives rarely discuss the positive aspects of European integration. It is, nevertheless, a discussion that American conservatives in particular should consider seriously. Since no one needs to convince progressives to embrace the EU, and in general the shortcomings of their positions reflect a need for a greater appreciation of political interests, the rest of this article will analyze and respond to some typical Euroskeptic positions taken by most American conservatives, and consider both their origins and their implications for the future of the West. 9
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, ‘‘Britain’s Humiliation—and Europe’s,’’ Washington Post, April 6, 2007.
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GRANIERI American Conservatives as Euroskeptics It is necessary to reconsider the political and philosophical roots of American conservative Euroskepticism. For instance, to what degree is American Euroskepticism related to the British variety? In the past two decades especially, the Tories, as embodied by Margaret Thatcher and her paladins, have become the greatest Euroskeptics. Even after the Tories lost their majority in 1997 to Tony Blair and New Labour (who had promised to bring Britain more directly into the EU), Euroskepticism had become firmly enough planted in British society that Blair never dared initiate the referendum he had promised. This has led many Anglo-American conservatives to assume that being conservative means opposing European integration. The historical irony in the British story is that in the 1960s and 1970s the roles were reversed, with Tory leaders, such as Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath, advocating membership in the EEC over the objections of a Labour party that wanted to protect native industries against European competition. Tories tend to look upon that history today with embarrassment, but it is worth remembering that there was nothing inevitable about the connection between conservatism and Euroskepticism in Britain. Indeed, when looking at the Continental example, the opposite is the case. Many of the Founding Fathers of Europe, from Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schumann, and Alcide De Gasperi to Walter Hallstein and even Charles de Gaulle, were themselves conservatives. For these Continental statesmen, conservatism meant preserving a European community by encouraging greater integration, even if they ended up disagreeing on the level of integration. Many on the moderate Left had also begun as advocates of European cooperation as an extension of socialist internationalism. However, the emerging Cold War and Labour’s political interests in Britain led most on the Left (and many middleclass business liberals, as well) to adopt a skeptical attitude toward the projects for Europe advanced by conservative and Christian Democratic governments. Once the process of integration began to bear fruit, socialist and Social Democratic parties eventually embraced European integration again, even as they debated the details with their conservative rivals. A clear understanding of recent history, however, demonstrates that European integration is at least as much a conservative project as a leftist or progressive one. American and British conservatives tend to overlook the conservative contribution to Europe for a variety of reasons. One is a difference of opinion between Continental and Anglo-Saxon conservatives about the state’s role in the economy. Most contemporary Tories or American Republicans believe that anyone who thinks the state should play an active role managing the economy, or should invest in social programs, is a socialist. Continental conservatives, however, especially those influenced by Christian Democracy, have been willing to accept an economic role for the state in order to preserve social stability and protect the value of the individual person. What most U.S. or 450
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European Integration British commentators, emphasizing individual economic freedom, label conservatism, Continentals call liberalism. This semantic problem continues to bedevil undergraduates, as well as many commentators. The point here, however, is to remember that there is no single definition of conservatism, and there is accordingly, no automatic linkage between Euroskepticism and conservatism, no matter how hard Anglo-American conservative commentators may try to argue otherwise. Some scholars have argued that attitudes toward European integration can be calibrated according to religious/cultural divisions that are part of Europe’s historical identity. According to this research, Catholic Europe embraces integration, while Protestant Europe prefers national sovereignty.10 This is a complex question, especially as secularization advances across Europe, making Protestant Euroskeptic Scandinavia as irreligious as ‘‘Catholic’’ France. I believe, however, there is a link here to American politics. Although American Catholics are not necessarily more Europhile than the general population, Evangelical Christians in the United States have long been suspicious or even hostile toward European integration, with many popular evangelists using the symbolism of European Integration—such as the fact that the EEC was created by the Treaty of Rome—to link the integration process to the approach of Armageddon.11 This article is not the place to parse these theological discussions, but it is worth noting that this Evangelical suspicion of Europe has influenced Republican views of Europe, just as hostility to/suspicion of Evangelical influence in American politics leads Europhiles such as Rifkin and Reid to praise European secularism. 12 The tension between the Anglo-American special relationship and the process of European integration has played a major role in transatlantic relations. Initially, American leaders were disappointed that Britain chose to remain aloof from integration plans, such as the Coal and Steel Community and the EEC, although they expressed understanding for British policy. By the early 1960s, however, the Kennedy Administration, increasingly concerned about the impact of an EEC dominated by de Gaulle’s France, strongly encouraged the British application for membership in 1961. British membership was a crucial part of Kennedy’s ‘‘Grand Design’’ for the Atlantic community. This was true even though the Americans knew that the British were not interested in European political integration; indeed, that may have been its most attractive aspect. When de Gaulle vetoed the British application in 1963, 10 B. F. Nelsen, J. L. Guth and C. R. Fraser, ‘‘Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union,’’ European Union Politics, 2:2 (2001), pp. 191-217. 11 For one of the first mass-market successes along this line, see the classic book by Hal Lindsey, The Late, Great Planet Earth (1973). The most prominent advocate these days is televangelist Pastor John Hagee. See Sarah Posner, ‘‘Pastor Strangelove,’’ The American Prospect, May 21, 2006. 12 For a defense of European secularism from a more conservative perspective, see Roger Cohen, ‘‘Secular Europe’s Merits,’’ New York Times, December 13, 2007.
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GRANIERI claiming Britain was merely an American ‘‘Trojan Horse’’ to hinder political integration, the charge stung because it was too close to the truth. Indeed, it is interesting to see that U.S.-British relations experienced one of their down periods in the early 1970s, when the Heath government showed too much interest in intensified European cooperation. While the Special Relationship was becoming stronger, American relations with France as the symbol of Continental Europe became more troubled. (Which of these developments came first is open to question.) Although there were periods of de´tente, in general French policy developed along de Gaulle’s lines, emphasizing French independence from American leadership, and culminating in the French withdrawal from NATO military integration in 1966. There were serious issues at stake in these debates, as well as some historical and psychological resentment, especially on de Gaulle’s side. However, subsequent French governments consistently have emphasized that they considered themselves members of the Atlantic Alliance, and were not interested in breaking that alliance but rather in encouraging Americans to view Europeans, and especially the French, as equal partners.13 Such conciliatory messages rarely got through to an American public that viewed France as an ungrateful troublemaker. Nor did these messages move the American government to rethink its attitudes toward Europe. Instead, American policy relied increasingly on the British, and judged other European states and the EU in general on how well its policies conformed to Anglo-American desires. States such as West Germany found themselves playing the role of prize in these disputes, torn between Continental and Atlantic solidarity. History casts a long shadow across the Atlantic, but there are good reasons to reconsider the dichotomy between the special relationship and European integration. One is the change in Britain’s leadership, where Gordon Brown has shown less enthusiasm for the special relationship than Tony Blair. Another, though, is France’s change of leadership, where President Nicolas Sarkozy has indicated a strong interest in improved relations between the United States and France, even hinting at deeper cooperation within NATO and with maintaining security in the Persian Gulf.14 Such changes suggest that it may be time for American conservatives to rethink their reflexive hostility toward France15 in particular and 13
See e.g. the conversation between French Ambassador Charles Lucet with National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, June 7, 1966. Memorandum of conversation at the LBJ Library, Francis Bator papers, Box 27, Folder 4. 14 Most recently, see the profile of the new French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner: James Taub, ‘‘A Statesman Without Borders,’’ New York Times Magazine, February 3, 2008. See also Dan Bilefsky, ‘‘The Special Relationship Tries to Swim the Channel,’’ New York Times, October 28, 2007; and Michaela Wiegel, ‘‘Eine kleine geopolitische Revolution,’’ Frankfurter Allgemeine, January 17, 2008. 15 See ‘‘Wir wollen kein zweites Europa schaffen.’’ Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 7, 2007.
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European Integration Continental Europe in general. Although the Continentals, along with the British, are not as enthusiastic for strong action against Iran than many American conservatives. Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, two conservative leaders to emerge in Europe over the past four years, are supportive of resolute Western positions and for greater European integration. This situation indicates that one need not preclude the other, and that they may actually reinforce each other. It also offers an opportunity for both Europeans and Americans to consider the ways they can work to build complementary policies on their common interests, but only if they set aside cherished historical myths and resentments. A New West in a New World Lastly, the United States should rethink its position on Europe with regard to its own more complex international situation. As I wrote in this journal two years ago, American attitudes toward Europe generally have followed an imperial pattern. While American administrations have encouraged European integration as a way to create a stable economic partner, the United States has been ambivalent about the idea of an integrated Europe. Faced with the choice between an equal and possibly headstrong partner or a pliable and internally divided sidekick, the United States has preferred the sidekick, and has played individual European states against each other, whether it was Britain against France in the 1960s, or Eastern against Western Europe more recently.16 What made some sense during the Cold War makes less sense now, as the United States faces the reality of its own relative decline and the emergence of potentially strong challengers to its global interests, such as China and Russia, as well as global challenges such as terrorism. Even during the Cold War, conservatives, in particular, were caught in an intellectual bind. They criticized European members of NATO for failing to pull their weight in the alliance and for relying on American military power, while rebuffing European desires for greater equality in alliance decision-making. The Europeans, of course, were more eager to demand equality in decisions than they were to offer equality of exertions. The time has now come for both sides to approach this question again. Even if the political/historical foundation of conservative Euroskepticism can be shown to be open to reconsideration, however, one needs to address the philosophical underpinnings. There are three arguments against Europe’s political integration within the Atlantic alliance: that it does not work, that it cannot work, and that it should not work. Let me explain what I mean by these three positions. 16
Ronald J. Granieri, ‘‘Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American ‘Empire by Invitation.’’’ Orbis, Fall 2006.
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GRANIERI The argument that the EU does not work is the most concrete, in that it is advanced by those who can refer directly to the actions (or inactions) of the EU as an institution. It is most popular among those who argue that the system is not functioning because it is structurally deficient, or because the Europeans have chosen to pursue policies that are inappropriate. In matters of diplomacy, an excellent example is when critics point to the failure of European institutions to act effectively in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The inability or unwillingness of the European Community (at that time) to develop a common diplomatic or strategic response to Yugoslavia’s collapse, and their eventual reliance on American diplomacy and American military power (through a NATO war in 1999 where the United States provided the overwhelming majority of the forces) provides an object lesson of Europe’s political impotence. The incoherence of European responses to the American war in Iraq also functions, for many, as proof of Europe’s uselessness as a partner for the United States. This argument has a good deal of force. Indeed, it is one of the major weaknesses of much pro-European literature, which does not frankly confront the areas where Europe has failed to live up to its promise. At the same time, however, it is important to consider that individual failures, while useful in winning short-term arguments, are not sufficient proof of the uselessness of the European project. It is a significant fallacy to believe that supporting the European project—or any political project—requires unreserved praise for things as they are. Pointing out Europe’s failures does not make one an enemy of Europe, and refusing to see manifest problems does not make one a friend of Europe. The decisive question rather should be: is the European project important enough to deserve the necessary effort to solve its remaining problems? It is now an article of faith among the Euroskeptics, especially the British, to focus their ire on Brussels as the center of bureaucracy and regulations. Whether the specific cause is Brussels’ emphasis on the metric system or on other consumer regulations, Brussels is considered a distant, unaccountable font of rules. There is a deep irony in such complaints, however. The very same Anglo-Saxon Euroskeptics who complain that the EU is politically distant or irresponsible, for example, themselves bear heavy responsibility for Brussels’ failure to be anything more than the home of an unelected bureaucracy. For those same Euroskeptics have stood in the way of the political integration that would have granted Brussels the legitimacy it lacks. Thus, Euroskeptics are complaining about a legitimacy gap they helped to create. There is something wrong with decrying a European ‘‘Superstate,’’ and hindering political integration, and at the same time complaining that Europe does not have the legitimacy to act. Noted historian of European integration John Gillingham, for example, does an excellent job skewing Brussels and the EU’s structures, as standing in the way of progress. Yet his proposals for reform beg the question of 454
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European Integration whether the current problems are the result of too much integration or too little.17 The problem is that managing a free trade area, if the market is to function properly across such a large area, requires precisely the kind of regulation about which Euroskeptics complain even if one can argue for less here and there. What is missing from contemporary Europe is a sense that a responsible and legitimate political authority made those regulations, and that there is recourse to appeal regulations that are ineffective or onerous. But there can be no such legitimacy or appeal if there is no political authority or a clear process that transfers necessary sovereignty to that authority. The answer to incomplete integration, therefore, is more integration. If Europeans hope to speak with one voice within the West and within the world, then they need to take the necessary steps in that direction, using their current weaknesses not as stumbling blocks, but as building blocks. Discussion of the EU’s recent and current shortcomings leads to the second level of abstraction, the argument that European integration cannot work. This argument is very common for those who seek to expose some fatal flaw that will make it impossible for Europe as a whole to play a vital role in the West, thereby foreclosing discussions about possible reforms. This type of argumentation can be found, for example, among commentators who worry about the long-term impact of Muslim immigration in Europe, and it also lurks behind much Euroskeptic criticism of current European policy. Concerning international diplomacy in particular, the most popular version comes from those who follow Robert Kagan’s arguments. He posited a fundamental difference in international outlook between Europeans and Americans. The Kagan argument commonly reflects conservative American skepticism about Europe, contending that Europeans fail to understand the realities of the modern international system, and is often reduced to the commonplace: ‘‘Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus.’’ This is a catchy phrase, and appeals to those on both sides of the Atlantic who would prefer not to see either a politically active Europe or an effective Atlantic partnership. In the end, though, even if it happens to ring true for the moment, it is the kind of comment that can only be made with either a sneer or a shrug, and neither of those attitudes are helpful if we are serious about (re-)building the Atlantic community. It is historically dubious, as Kagan himself has noted, admitting that weaker states generally prefer to work through negotiation, while stronger states prefer to rely on force. When the power relationship across the Atlantic was different (say during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century) the roles of paradise and power were reversed, for 17
John Gillingham, Design for a New Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2006). For more background, see also his massive European Integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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GRANIERI example. That realization undermines the idea that such characterizations are forever, a weakness of any analysis that attempts to treat ‘‘culture’’ as a fixed quantity. It is ironic that realists, who generally dislike taking cultural issues into account because they are so difficult to quantify and measure, become the most likely to overvalue cultural factors (once they do decide to recognize them) by trying to use them as fixed quantities, and miss out on the reality that within societies, especially societies with competitive and free political systems, a variety of attitudes is usually present. Even if the broad characterization of Europe and the United States were accurate at the moment, however, it remains of limited utility. I am not sure that the idea of permanent differences is even helpful in dealing with relations between the sexes, from whence the ‘‘Mars/Venus’’ characterization is drawn.18 In that literature, however, the goal is for both sides to negotiate their differences, since it is the differences as well as the similarities among partners that make relationships so interesting. No one would argue that difficulties in understanding mean that no relationship between disparate partners is possible. It is amusing to think, in contrast to their other social policies, that many in the current administration, not to mention their supporters in the American punditocracy, are so hostile to the notion of working with the Europeans that they, in effect, appear to be advocating same-sex marriage in international affairs. Here again it is necessary to look at the electoral makeup of both individual European states and their willingness to work together. With the replacement of Gerhard Schro¨der and Jacques Chirac with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, new leaders have emerged on the European scene that advocate both a stronger European international role and more vigorous cooperation within the West. The two need not be mutually exclusive. Recent surveys of transatlantic trends also indicate Europe’s growing interest in having the EU play a stronger role in international affairs.19 Even if the nature of that European role causes great debate, and current disagreements over Afghanistan show that the United States and Europe do not agree on all issues, the proper response should be more, not less cooperation. Even if a more tightly integrated Europe could be shown to be a workable option both for itself and for its role in the West, there would still be a substantial group of Euroskeptics arguing against it on the basis that it simply should not be. The ‘‘should not work’’ argument has its roots in the idea that the nation-state is the best and only possible level of government and the rejection of the idea of supranational integration tout court. Even de Gaulle could be counted among those skeptics when he declared: ‘‘To imagine that something can be built that would be effective for action and that would be 18
John Gray, Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus (New York: HarperCollins, 2002). See the results of the latest ‘‘Transatlantic Trends’’ survey at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm. 19
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European Integration approved by the peoples outside and above the States—this is a dream.’’20 De Gaulle, of course, still wanted to see a strong Europe, though one clearly led by France. On the other end of the Euroskeptic spectrum, Anglo-Saxon conservatives reject the idea of an integrated Europe for their own reasons. John O’Sullivan of National Review, for example, responded to French and Dutch voters’ rejection of the proposed European Constitution by claiming that American interests lie not in an integrated Europe, but in ‘‘promoting a more flexible and varied European Union—intergovernmental rather than supranational, reliant on tax and regulatory competition rather than on bureaucratic harmonization, and determined to keep NATO as the basis of its foreign and defense policies.’’ This ‘‘prosperous free-trade Europe, hospitable to U.S. trade and investment, and a reliable U.S. ally rather than a ‘counterweight’ in diplomacy and military affairs’’ would return more sovereignty to the member states. O’Sullivan calls that ‘‘a major step toward restoring European democracy.’’21 The Economist follows a similar tack in its responses to the constitution’s failure, also arguing that Europe’s future lies in an intergovernmental model based on a free trade zone. Indeed, when European leaders such as Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schu¨ssel discussed the possibility of reviving the constitution, the Economist likened the idea of a supranational Europe to a zombie rising from the dead, a shambling, rotting threat to Europe’s future, wondering ‘‘what part of ‘no’ do European integrationists not understand?’’22 These reactions are not surprising. Indeed, as discussed above, Euroskeptics in the Anglo-Saxon tradition prefer the economic aspects of integration, and would be happy for Europe to end there rather than discuss political integration at all. Ironically, some early integrationists—such as the technocrats associated with Jean Monnet and those who embraced functional integration after the European Defense Community’s collapse in 1954—also preferred to pursue economics first, because they hoped that such processes, which operate according to ‘‘objective’’ forces, would encourage habits of cooperation and also produce tangible evidence of the utility of integration, would lead to deeper integration by the back door.23 This, of course, as we have also discussed, is precisely the attitude that has helped lead to Europe’s current ‘‘democracy deficit.’’ As harmonization of the European economy leads to increasing power flowing to Brussels without creating the political 20
De Gaulle, press conference of 5 September 1960. Quoted in David Calleo, Europe’s Future: The Grand Alternatives (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 90. 21 John O’Sullivan, ‘‘Not the answer they expected: French voters say no to the EU constitution.’’ National Review, June 20, 2005. 22 See ‘‘The Europe that Died—and the one that should live on,’’ Economist, June 4, 2005, pp. 13–14. For the ‘‘Zombie’’ caricature, and the quotation, see ‘‘Back from the Dead,’’ Economist, January 7, 2006, p. 46. 23 On more recent developments along those lines, see Nicholas Jabko, Playing the Market (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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GRANIERI structures that would lend this regulatory power either domestic legitimacy or international influence, the European project lurches from one crisis to another. One can certainly debate the relative merits of ‘‘federalism’’ (a term that, like conservatism, has very different meanings on either side of the Atlantic). To use the American example, however, with its roots in the ideas of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, there can be no legitimate regulatory power, however limited, without a clear division of authority between the central government and the regions. Nor can one expect to pursue a coherent foreign policy without a legitimate central government. Of course, if the goal is to avoid pursuing any kind of coherent policy, then a weak central government makes a great deal of sense. Is that, however, in Europe’s best interest, or the West’s? Euroskeptics might welcome the crises that doomed the European Constitution, but their vision for an alternative would leave a political vacuum in Europe and within the West. It is time for conservatives to question whether that should be their position after all.
Divided and Weak or United and Strong Those American conservatives arguing that it is in American interest for Europe to remain divided and weak need to explain how this makes the United States more secure. A divided Europe could still disagree with American policy, and would be a weak partner even if it agreed. It is a bad idea for the United States to simply ignore the concerns of states with whom it is supposed to share cultural and historical boundaries. Both realist and idealist calculations suggest that real partnership is a better way. If, as realists like to argue, foreign policy is made according to material interests, is it not likely that a representative democracy and pluralist society such as the United States would have more interests in common with European societies than with, say, authoritarian regimes such as China? From the idealist side (and it is worth remembering that American conservatism contains at least as much idealism as realism), if the rhetoric about Western Civilization so common during the Cold War—and reborn during the current war on terror—has any meaning at all, it should require that both Europeans and Americans focus on what unites them rather than what divides them. Of course this does not mean that Europeans and Americans will agree on all policy questions. There are strong differences of opinion, and there will be disagreements into the future. Nor should anyone expect anything different. Representative democracy is based on the idea of making policy through disagreement and discussion, not through rigid enforcement of an imposed consensus. What is true of individual federal republics should be even truer of an alliance between federal republics. Shared values and historical connections are not invalidated by intelligent, even spirited, disagreement. Honest disagreement and discussion can deepen those ties, and can take them beyond 458
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European Integration ritual repetitions of Cold War formulae to the vibrant reality of conscious practice. The West needs more than false friends and misguided critics. It is not enough for critics of American policy to sit back smugly and speculate on how much weaker the United States will be in the future compared to the Europe of their dreams. Nor is it enough for American Euroskeptics to throw up their hands and consign European integration to the dustbin of History. Europeans and Americans need to consider what can be done to make sure that the relative global power shift underway in the twenty-first century can be managed in a way that avoids dangerous upheaval as much as possible. The way for that to happen is for Atlantic discord to be replaced by a genuine Atlantic partnership. Not a partnership between an overweening, imperial United States and a variety of middling European states, with whom the Americans will cooperate according to shifting coalitions of convenience; nor a partnership between a declining and resentful United States and a diffuse and diffident Europe; but a partnership between a strong and confident United States and a Europe possessing the structures, the capabilities, and the will to act as an equal. The road to that partnership has never been smooth, but the journey along it must begin with a renewed willingness on all sides to carry on together.
Summer 2008
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