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Examining the dual nature of epistemological beliefs
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International Journal of Educational Research 45 (2006) 28–42 www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedures
Examining the dual nature of epistemological beliefs Michelle M. Buehla,, Patricia A. Alexanderb a
College of Education and Human Development, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA b University of Maryland, USA
Abstract With respect to the specificity and structure of epistemological beliefs, we contend that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the multidimensional, multilayered, and interactive nature of knowledge. Here we present a model of the nested and reciprocal relations between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Additionally, we present evidence in support of three claims related to that model. Those claims are that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more precise level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction As evidenced by recent special issues (e.g., Hofer, 2004; Schraw & Sinatra, 2004) and conference symposia (e.g., Alexander, 2001; Hofer and Pintrich, 2002), individuals’ views and conceptions of knowledge and knowing have become the focus of much theoretical discussion and empirical research. Within various lines of research, individuals’ conceptions of knowledge have been explored in relation to learner characteristics (e.g., age and education, Perry, 1970; Schommer, 1993; gender, Baxter Magolda, 1992; culture, Chan & Elliott, 2004), learning environments (e.g., constructivist and traditional science classes, Tsai, 1999), and cognitive learning processes and outcomes (e.g., strategy use, Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992; text processing, Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002; conceptual change, Qian & Alvermann, 1995). One fundamental issue in this literature Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 901 678 43 92; fax: +1 901 678 47 78.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M.M. Buehl). 0883-0355/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijer.2006.08.007
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remains how to conceptualize individuals’ views of knowledge and knowing, what Hofer and Pintrich (2002) refer to as personal epistemology. This special issue is devoted to one facet of personal epistemology; that is, its domainspecificity and domain-generality. This is an issue that researchers have spent considerable time discussing and exploring. Our intention here is not to argue whether epistemological beliefs are either general or specific in nature. That issue seems well established. Rather, our intention is to explore the nature of that duality by presenting and supporting a model of epistemological beliefs. One of our first studies of personal epistemology involved developing a domain-specific epistemological belief instrument (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002). Of course, that work sparked more questions and led us to conduct additional studies. Some of those subsequent investigations have been directly related the specificity of knowledge conceptions. Others have explored how conceptions of knowledge are related to specific aspects of the learning process (e.g., motivation; Buehl, 2003). Here, we refine our views on individuals’ general and specific conceptions of knowledge based on our research and that of others (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer, 1990). 2. Guiding assumption The development of the theoretical model depicted in Fig. 1 is based on the assumption that individuals’ conceptions of knowledge and knowing (i.e., their epistemological beliefs) are components of a complex and intricate belief system (e.g., Schommer, 1990) and that these conceptions are, to some measure, reflective of the nature of knowledge itself. For example, over the past quarter century, researchers have come to appreciate that knowledge is not a unitary construct but is multidimensional and multilayered, and that some knowledge has greater power or authority in certain situations than other knowledge (e.g., Alexander, Schallert, & Hare, 1991; Prawat, 1989). It has also become apparent that prior knowledge can be a help or a hindrance in particular situations or context (e.g., Guzzetti & Hynd, 1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). In addition, that knowledge base is transformed by both maturation and experience, including school experiences (e.g., Vygotsky, 1934, 1986). We would expect that beliefs about knowledge have many of these same characteristics (i.e., multidimensional, multilayered, interactive, situational/ contextual, and developmental). In the subsequent section, we seek to substantiate each of the aforementioned assertions about epistemological beliefs and describe our proposed model. After presenting this framework, we then address three additional assertions about the nature of epistemological beliefs and present support for these assertions from recent research. Specifically, we contend that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more particular level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. 3. The interface between knowledge and knowledge beliefs 3.1. Complex, multidimensional, and interactive In the educational literature, as well as in everyday parlance, the deceptively simple word knowledge stands in lieu of a cadre of complex, diverse, and interrelated concepts (Alexander & Murphy, 1998). In effect, there are many forms (e.g., declarative, procedural,
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Fig. 1.
and conditional) and types (e.g., explicit and tacit) of knowledge (Alexander et al., 1991). Moreover, these many forms co-exist and interact in complex ways. As we start to peal back the layers of the knowledge construct, we can begin to appreciate the intricacies that are to be found. For instance, the research on conceptual change is rife with examples of how students’ schooled knowledge and unschooled knowledge can conflict in reality, yet can co-exist in memory (e.g., Guzzetti & Hynd, 1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Thus, the student who can answer a question knowledgeably in physics class (schooled knowledge) can explain an everyday occurrence in a manner that negates the very physics principles previously demonstrated (unschooled knowledge). Additionally, while some knowledge is more explicit and, thus, easily accessible to an individual, other aspects of one’s knowledge are much more elusive, existing below the realm of consciousness (Alexander et al., 1991). Although tacit knowledge may become activated (Prawat, 1989), there is also the possibility that the knowledge will remain unvoiced, unrecognized, or inert (e.g., Whitehead, 1929, 1967). Thus, cognitive researchers have long appreciated that there is more to one’s knowledge than can be put into words or
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can be called to mind. Part of the dilemma for knowledge researchers is finding creative and effective ways to bring individuals’ knowledge to the surface and to allow thoughts or understandings to be shared in natural and meaningful ways. 3.1.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge As with the knowledge they reflect, we hold that beliefs about knowledge are complex, multidimensional, and interactive. As there are many knowledge, there are many beliefs about knowledge that are part of one’s epistemological belief system. Although we do not expect knowledge characteristics and beliefs about knowledge to mirror each other exactly, we do expect that the knowledge individuals acquire and the experiences that give rise to that knowledge are influential in forming epistemological beliefs. Without such an assumption, it would be difficult to explain the relation between education and knowledge beliefs uncovered by Perry (1970) and others following in his footsteps (Schommer, 1993). For this reason, we would anticipate that epistemological beliefs are multilayered and that even seemingly contradictory beliefs could be espoused depending on the nature of the context or situation to which they pertain. Thus, students may hold particular and disparate epistemological beliefs about school physics versus everyday physical phenomena, or their beliefs about mathematical knowledge may be varied from those beliefs they ascribe to history. In addition, as has been shown for knowledge, it is difficult to uncover the beliefs that individuals hold and to do so in a way that does not alter or distort those beliefs. It is reasonable to assume that beliefs about knowledge are likely to be even more difficult to unearth than knowledge itself. For instance, while students may be able to articulate rather detailed knowledge about a given concept (e.g., cars, Civil War, or pollution), they likely find it harder to describe: (a) the source of that knowledge; (b) the truth they assign to those details; or (c) the justifications for ‘‘truth’’ judgments. 3.1.2. Supporting evidence Empirical work in the personal epistemology literature underscores complexity of individuals’ conceptions of knowledge, as well as the difficulty in unearthing this elusive construct. Indeed, the number of frameworks used to discuss students’ conceptions of knowledge is indicative that this construct is not easily represented or assessed (e.g., Hofer, 2004). Further, several models of personal epistemology (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990) specifically address the multidimensional nature of knowledge beliefs. For instance, Schommer-Aikins proposed that individuals possess beliefs about different aspects of knowledge and found evidence of four belief dimensions. Whereas SchommerAikins took a more general approach to the assessment of epistemological beliefs, others— we included—have explored the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs within specific academic domains (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). The current personal epistemology literature also provides evidence of the interactivity of epistemological beliefs. For instance, significant relations have been identified between the different dimensions of personal epistemology when beliefs were assessed at either the domain-specific or domain-general level (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer, 1990). Additionally, there is evidence of significant moderate relations between domain-general and domain-specific beliefs (e.g., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). Further, in a recent study examining students’ epistemological belief profiles for history and mathematics (Buehl & Alexander, 2005), we found that students’ beliefs on the dimensions we assessed
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(e.g., certainty of knowledge) were relatively consistent within each profile group. This suggested the possibility of interactions across the belief dimensions within domain. We also found that a significant number of students manifested similar beliefs orientations (i.e., more naı¨ ve or more sophisticated) in both domains. We viewed this as evidence of domain-general beliefs influencing domain-specific beliefs. However, these conclusions are tentative and additional research is needed to understand these relations more fully (e.g., Mason & Boscolo, 2004). In addition to the interactions between the various epistemological dimensions, there is ample evidence that epistemological beliefs are related to constructs and processes central to learning. For example, epistemological beliefs are related to how much individuals learn from text (e.g., Rukavina & Daneman, 1996) as well as the strategies that they use (e.g., Kardash & Howell, 2000). Other research suggests the students’ epistemological beliefs are related to their reasoning and problem-solving abilities (e.g., Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995), and their academic performance (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer-Aikins, Mau, Brookhart, & Hutter, 2000). In our research, there was also evidence that students’ epistemological beliefs are related to their motivation (e.g., Buehl, 2003; Buehl & Alexander, 2000a). 3.1.3. Modeling the complex, multidimensional, and interactive characteristics To represent the complexity, multidimensionality, and interactivity of epistemological beliefs, we first nested epistemological beliefs within individuals’ broader beliefs system (see Fig. 1). In effect, epistemological beliefs are one among the many subsystems of beliefs that students possess (e.g., beliefs about ability, self, learning). Further, we propose that there are various layers to students’ epistemological beliefs. Thus, students may hold beliefs about knowledge as a general construct, as well as beliefs about more specific types of knowledge. We represent this in Fig. 1 by nesting students’ beliefs about knowledge in specific academic domain within their epistemological belief system. Further, within the different layers of epistemological beliefs, individuals may hold beliefs about different aspects or dimensions of knowledge. To illustrate the multidimensional nature of knowledge beliefs, we have included the dimensions of structure (i.e., Is knowledge isolated and compartmentalized or is it complex and integrated?), stability (i.e., Is knowledge certain and unchanging or tentative and evolving?), and source (i.e., Does knowledge come from an authority figure or is it developed through reason and personal experience?). We propose that there are belief dimensions that exist at both the domain-general and domain-specific levels, along with beliefs that only exist in reference to a specific domain. Finally, in addition to being multidimensional and multilayered, beliefs are also interactive. These interactions can occur across and within the various layers of beliefs and are represented in Fig. 1 by arrows that link the different layers of beliefs. For instance, epistemological beliefs at different levels of specificity may inform or hinder one another, as indicated by the arrows labeled with the different belief dimensions that cut across the domain-general and domain-specific levels. Additionally, the arrow between beliefs system and epistemological beliefs represents how students’ knowledge beliefs are likely to interact with other aspects of their belief systems (e.g., beliefs about ability). 3.2. Sociocultural and contextual In the past three decades, one of the most significant changes in the research on knowledge is the increased recognition that knowledge does not exist in a vacuum
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(Alexander & Murphy, 1998). Rather, knowledge is embedded in and continually shaped by the sociocultural context. The degree to which knowledge can be conceived as a social construction or merely influenced by the language, customs, and experiences afforded by society and by culture remains hotly contested in the literature (e.g., Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1934, 1986). Nonetheless, there is no ignoring role of that sociocultural context in determining what knowledge gains prominence and what experiences are valued. In addition, knowledge is acquired through social interaction (e.g., Anderson, Greeno, Reder, & Simon, 2000); schools and learning environments are social institutions with the express purpose of developing students’ knowledge. Because society and cultural are dynamic systems, the sociocultural character of knowledge is similarly dynamic. That dynamism carries into the effect that the immediate context plays in knowledge acquisition and activation (Anderson et al., 2000). The knowledge that rises to the level of consciousness or becomes explicated at any point in time is highly linked to the features of the context and the human and non-human resources that scaffold knowledge and knowing (Prawat, 1989). For example, an individual taking a mathematics class will rely more heavily on mathematics knowledge than knowledge of history or literature. Additionally, there may be some beliefs that only get voiced in certain social situations. One of the challenges in teaching is to encourage students to recognize aspects of a situation that connect with their existing knowledge. Indeed, school is one of the critical contexts for the acquisition and construction of knowledge (Alexander & Murphy, 1998). However, students often do not transfer their knowledge beyond the school context. That is, schooled knowledge remains inert or untapped when individuals encounter situations in non-schooled settings (e.g., Gardner, 1991). 3.2.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge The sociocultural nature of knowledge has specific implications for the nature of beliefs about knowledge. Similar to knowledge, the beliefs individuals hold about knowledge are shaped by the sociocultural context. Consequently, there may be variations in the nature and types of beliefs that people hold depending on their cultural background. An additional point that is particularly relevant to educators is the likelihood that epistemological beliefs are acquired through social interactions. Thus, there is a need to consider the how social interactions facilitate the acquisition of beliefs about knowledge, as well as how classroom practices promote or hinder the development of epistemological beliefs. We must also consider the situational and contextual nature of beliefs about knowledge. We hold that the context of a specific situation may increase the salience or relevance of certain aspects of students’ epistemological beliefs. Indeed, working on a task within a particular domain would likely increase the salience of domainspecific beliefs. Further, the beliefs that students convey may vary by the situation. Consequently, while a student may endorse what are considered to be more adaptive or advanced epistemological positions in some situations, in other situations less adaptive or more naı¨ ve positions may be apparent. Additionally, as with knowledge, we believe that the ability to recognize similarities between an unfamiliar task or domain, for which epistemological beliefs are non-existent or rudimentary, and a familiar domain may increase the likelihood that existing epistemological beliefs transfer to the new domain.
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3.2.2. Supporting evidence There is evidence to support the sociocultural nature of epistemological beliefs. For instance, in one study, students’ beliefs about knowledge were significantly related to their knowledge of their own culture, as well as to their exposure to television and print resources, suggesting that students’ cultural environment may impact their knowledge beliefs (Hall, Chiarello, & Edmondson, 1996). Additionally, studies of epistemological beliefs in non-Western countries suggest the existing models of epistemological beliefs may not represent the beliefs of individuals in other cultures. That is, the epistemological belief factors that emerged in countries such as China, South Korea, and Japan differed from those identified in the United States (Qian & Pan, 2002; Youn, 2000). Chan and Elliott (2004) proposed an alternative model of epistemological beliefs in which ‘‘the number and nature of the factors or dimensions extracted from the belief system depends on the interaction and relatedness of these componentsyin varied cultural contexts’’ (p. 139). There is also evidence of the contextual and situational nature of students’ conceptions of knowledge. For instance, the identification and study of domain-specific epistemological beliefs suggests that different types of beliefs emerge depending on the larger context (e.g., domain of knowledge under consideration; Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). Others take an even more contextualized view of individuals’ views of knowledge (Hammer & Elby, 2002). In particular, Hammer and colleagues conceptualize students’ views of knowledge as a set of cognitive resources that are situated within particular contexts (Hammer, 1994; Hammer & Elby, 2002). Moreover, they suggest that the activation of epistemological resources may vary from moment to moment within a single situation. 3.2.3. Modeling the sociocultural and contextual characteristics In Fig. 1, we depict the influence of the sociocultural context on the formation and activation of individuals’ beliefs by embedding individuals’ entire belief systems within a larger circle representing a pervasive sociocultural context. A double-headed arrow suggests the interaction between culture and beliefs. Additionally, we hold that the types of beliefs that are activated or most salient to an individual depend on the situation or context. 3.3. Developmental Studies with children and adults and novices and experts point to the developmental nature of knowledge (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). Specifically, with time and exposure, there are quantitative changes in the individuals’ knowledge base (e.g., Alexander, 1997). For example, at the end of a course in multivariate statistics students should know more about the different statistical procedures and how they are conducted than they did at the beginning of the course. Additionally, there are qualitative shifts in knowledge that occur with time, exposure, and expertise (e.g., Alexander, 1997; Gelman & Greeno, 1989). That is, experts not only know more than novices, but their knowledge is also more organized, more principled, and more specialized than the knowledge of novices (Alexander, 1997; Chi et al., 1988). 3.3.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge We contend that, with time and experience, there are also quantitative and qualitative changes in individuals’ beliefs about knowledge. With maturation and experience
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individuals may change with respect to how strongly they endorse specific epistemological positions (i.e., quantitative changes). Additionally, there may also be shifts in the specialization and differentiation of beliefs about knowledge as a result of developmental changes. For instance, one of the developmental changes we would expect with time and experience is the increased differentiation between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. With increased schooling and growing expertise in specific academic domains, individuals could well develop more precise and differentiate beliefs about the knowledge within those domains. Thus, young children with limited world experiences or less formalized knowledge of academic domains are apt to rely more on their general beliefs about knowledge, in contrast to highly schooled or experienced individuals who may draw more on domain-specific beliefs when the relevant domain is instantiated. 3.3.2. Supporting evidence The development of epistemological beliefs was the focus of much of the early personal epistemology research (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Perry, 1970; Schommer, 1993). Specifically, this body of work suggests that with age and education, individuals progress from what are considered to be more naı¨ ve views (e.g., knowledge is right or wrong, received from authority, certain and unchanging, relatively simplistic) to more advanced, adaptive, or sophisticated views (e.g., knowledge is contextualized, constructed, tentative and evolving, and complex). Recent research also suggests that there may be qualitative structural changes in students’ epistemological beliefs. For instance, investigations with college students have provided support for a four- or five-factor belief structure (e.g., Kardash & Howell, 2000; Schraw et al., 1995). However, when similar measures (e.g., SEQ) were used with middleand high-school students a three-factor solution emerged (Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2000). These findings suggest that perhaps younger students do not hold distinct beliefs about certain aspects on knowledge until they are older. 4. Additional assertions related to the domain-specificity and domain-generality of epistemological beliefs Thus far, we have presented our views of the relations between domain-specific and domain-general beliefs based on the extant knowledge and personal epistemology literatures. There are three additional assertions we want to make with respect to the domain-specificity and domain-generality of beliefs: (a) domain-specific beliefs emerge when beliefs are assessed at the domain level; (b) domain-specific beliefs are differentially related to motivation; and (c) domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs. 4.1. Assertion 1: domain-specific beliefs emerge when beliefs are assessed at the domain level Given the complexity, multidimensionality, and contextual nature of individuals’ beliefs about knowledge, measurement is a critical issue in the study of personal epistemology (e.g., Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Consequently, in order to make claims about the domain-specificity or domain-generality of beliefs, appropriate measures of beliefs need to be employed. Our work (Buehl et al., 2002), as well as the work of others
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(e.g., Hofer, 2000), indicates that domain-specific beliefs only emerge when they are assessed with a domain-specific measure. For instance, Schommer and Walker (1995) examined undergraduates’ beliefs relative to mathematics and social science to determine the domain dependence or independence of beliefs using a general epistemological beliefs measure. Based on their analyses of these data, they concluded that epistemological beliefs are moderately domain-independent. In contrast, when domain-specific measures were developed (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000) with the intention of assessing beliefs about knowledge in specific areas of academic study, domainspecific beliefs were identified. These investigations suggest that students do hold domainspecific beliefs about knowledge that emerge when domain-specific instruments are used. 4.2. Assertion 2: epistemological beliefs are differentially related to motivation Our more recent work focuses on the relations between students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs and achievement motivation. In particular, we hypothesize the students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs may influence their motivation for specific academic domains (e.g., Buehl, 2003). However, we also propose that there may be some variation in the strength of the relations between the constructs depending on the domain. For example, students’ beliefs about where knowledge comes from (i.e., a belief about the source of knowledge) may be more strongly related to their motivation in the context of history than mathematics. In our initial investigation of the relations between epistemological beliefs and motivation, we explored college students’ beliefs about history and mathematics in relation to domain-general goal orientations and domain efficacy and interest (Buehl & Alexander, 2000a). Correlations indicated positive relations between beliefs about the integration of knowledge in history and mathematics and task goals, performance goals, efficacy, and interest. In contrast, beliefs about the integration of knowledge in history and mathematics were negatively related to work avoidant goal orientations. Students’ beliefs about the need for effort to acquire knowledge in history and mathematics were also positively related to their goals, efficacy, and interest. These findings confirmed our hypothesized relations. A similar investigation was also conducted with eighth- and ninth-grade students to explore the relations between their beliefs about knowledge, motivation (i.e., goal orientation), and academic performance (Murphy, Buehl, Monoi, & Long, 2002). Although domain-specific epistemological beliefs did not emerge for this population of students, we found that students’ beliefs about the integration of knowledge were positively related to their learning goals and negatively related to their performanceavoidance and work-avoidant goals. In contrast, beliefs about the effort needed to be a successful student were positively related to performance-approach, performanceavoidance and work-avoidant goals. These findings were somewhat contradictory in the sense that students who believed knowledge was interrelated had more adaptive goal orientations whereas students who believe in the need for effort to acquire knowledge, typically a belief considered to be adaptive for students, tended to adopt less adaptive goal orientations. Thus, the various epistemological belief dimensions seem to be differentially related to students’ motivations. In our most recent investigation (Buehl, 2003), we examined the domain-specific beliefs of college students using a broader range of items (i.e., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000).
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This allowed us to assess students’ beliefs with respect to the certainty of knowledge, isolation of knowledge, and authority as the source of knowledge and examine them in relation to students’ competency beliefs and achievement values. Using structural equation modeling to assess the hypothesized relations, we found that although there were similarities in the relations between the belief dimensions and students’ motivation (i.e., competency beliefs and achievement values) across domains there were also some differences and some unexpected results. Specifically, as expected, beliefs about the isolation of knowledge were negatively related to competency beliefs and achievement values for each of the respective domains. That is, those who believed knowledge is isolated and compartmentalized also tended to have lower levels of motivation. However, we also found that for both history and mathematics students’ beliefs about the certainty of knowledge were positively related to their motivation. That is, students who viewed history or mathematics knowledge as more certain and unchanging, a belief typically considered less adaptive, also had higher competency beliefs and achievement value. We speculated that these findings may be due to instructional and assessment practices which place value on getting a correct answer. Additionally, we found that, within the domain of history, beliefs in authority as the source of knowledge were negatively related to competency beliefs and achievement values. These findings indicate that students who view history knowledge as coming from an authority figure have lower levels of motivation whereas students who do not endorse such beliefs have higher levels of motivation. However, within the domain of mathematics, while authority beliefs were negatively related to competency beliefs, as anticipated, beliefs about authority as the source of mathematics knowledge were not significantly related to achievement values. We hypothesized that this difference in the relations between the source of knowledge belief dimension and achievement value may be attributable to domain-specificity. That is, the source of knowledge may be a more salient issue in history than in mathematics. Collectively, these findings illustrate interactivity of epistemological beliefs and suggest that these interactions vary based on the belief dimension and domain under consideration. 4.3. Assertion 3: domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs The development of epistemological beliefs with age and education has been well documented in the literature. However, few studies have explored how domain-specific epistemological beliefs develop in relation to domain-general beliefs. We contend that students’ knowledge and subsequent beliefs about knowledge become more differentiated with exposure to a given domain. Thus, we hold that domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs as students come to recognize and experience different academic domains. This assertion is based on our research with young children, adolescents, and college students. 4.3.1. Beliefs of young children In interviews with early elementary students in the United States and Australia, we asked questions (e.g., ‘‘What is social studies/math?’’) and had students complete tasks (e.g., teach the interviewer something from social studies/math) in order to assess their understandings and beliefs about academic domains (Buehl & Alexander, 2000b). Analysis of students’ responses indicated that students had a rudimentary understanding of different academic domains.
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Specifically, students’ understanding of mathematics was more defined than their understanding of social studies. When asked to define mathematics the majority of the children referred to mathematical operations (e.g., adding and subtracting; 71.1% of students) or numbers (21.1% of students) and only 5.3% were unable to respond. In contrast, when asked to define social studies, although a sizable number of students referred to learning about people (39.5%) or places (39.5%), 26.3% of the students were unable to respond and 26.3% referred to mathematics or science. Additionally, when asked to teach the researcher content from each domain, few students (2.6%) were unable to select an appropriate mathematics activity. In contrast, 34.2% of the students were unable to think of an activity when asked to teach something from social studies and 23.7% of the students taught content from mathematics and science instead of social studies. Further, the Australian children had a more difficult time defining social studies and teaching something from social studies than the American children. However, both groups of children preformed similarly with respect to mathematics. We attributed these findings to the ill-structured nature of social studies and the amount of classroom instruction. Thus, while students age young ages may be epistemologically aware (e.g., Burr & Hofer, 2002), their conceptions of academic domains are still forming. 4.3.2. Beliefs of adolescents In another study, the beliefs of eighth- and ninth-grade students were assessed with social studies and mathematics as the target domains (Murphy et al., 2002). Exploratory factor analysis of this data indicated that at this age students’ beliefs did not differentiate by domain. That is, domain-specific factors did not emerge from the data. Instead, items loaded on two factors: beliefs about the interrelatedness of learning and knowledge and beliefs about the need for effort to do well. Presumably, students at this age have more cohesive understandings of academic domains. However, this study suggests that their beliefs, while multidimensional, are not yet differentiated by domain. 4.3.3. Beliefs of college students As previously discussed, we found evidence of domain-specific epistemological beliefs in college students when beliefs were assessed with a domain-specific instrument (Buehl et al., 2002). Additionally, there is evidence of domain-specific beliefs in separate college samples using different domain-specific measures (e.g., Buehl, 2003; Hofer, 2000). Based on these findings, we propose that students’ beliefs become more differentiated and domain-specific as they age and have greater experience with different domains. For instance, the young children that we interviewed were just beginning to recognize different domains of knowledge and to form an understanding of those domains. Further, their understandings appeared to be related to their experiences. Consequently, their beliefs about knowledge in these domains are also likely to be very rudimentary, if not entirely based on their general epistemological beliefs. As children develop and progress through the educational system their understandings of different academic domains are also likely to develop. However, our evidence suggests that even at the middle school and early high school levels students’ beliefs about these domains are not well differentiated from one another. We proposed that this may be due to a lack of compartmentalization of domains in the pre-secondary years. As the lines between academic domains become more defined, we believe that students’ beliefs also become more differentiated. Indeed, by the time
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students reach college, they hold distinct beliefs about different domains of academic knowledge. 5. Conclusions As others have suggested (e.g., Pajares, 1996), the study of beliefs is a ‘‘messy’’ endeavor. This is especially true for the study of personal epistemology. In this manuscript, we presented a model illustrating the potential relations between students’ domain-general and domain-specific beliefs. This model is based on the guiding assumption that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the nature of knowledge itself, assumptions supported by the personal epistemology literature. Specifically, we propose that students’ beliefs are complex, multidimensional, interactive, sociocultural, contextual, and developmental. This perspective of students’ knowledge beliefs has important implications for the conceptualization and study of personal epistemology. First, given the contextual nature of beliefs, the type of beliefs that are most salient and explicitly available for consideration will vary depending on the context. Consequently, although individuals may possess more specific beliefs or hold beliefs that are particularly adaptive to performance, these beliefs may go untapped or remain tacit unless they are explicitly addressed and activated. For example, as evidenced by the literature, domainspecific beliefs tend to emerge only when the belief measure provides the appropriate context. Thus, in studying personal epistemology, researchers should carefully consider the type of beliefs they wish to study as well as how to best assess them. Although various measures of personal epistemology are available, additional research is needed to develop additional ways of assessing beliefs in varied contexts. Additionally, in terms of practice, teachers need to be vigilant with respect to the types of beliefs that are activated within the classroom context. Research is needed to explore how teachers can evoke those beliefs that are most beneficial for students’ learning and motivation. Second, given the interactivity of beliefs it is important to examine the relations between domain-general and domain-specific beliefs and their relations to other constructs. As we have suggested, these relations may vary depending on the aspect of beliefs and domain under consideration. Numerous studies have examined the role of general beliefs in relation to various aspects of the learning process. However, more work is needed examining domain-specific beliefs in relation to students’ learning and motivation. Third, there are a variety of avenues for future research with respect to the sociocultural and social nature of beliefs. For instance, continued work is needed in examining the nature and role of epistemological beliefs in varied cultural contexts. Chan and Elliott (2004) suggest that current conceptualizations of beliefs may not be appropriate for nonwestern cultures. Consequently, research in this area may result in developments in the way that beliefs are conceptualized and studied. Additionally, there are a host of social and contextual issues to be considered within a culture. For example, we need to examine how beliefs are fostered within different social environments, particularly school settings. That is, how are beliefs cultivated within classrooms? Are there ways that teachers can promote beliefs that are more beneficial for students’ learning and motivation? Further, the beliefs of teachers should be examined more closely. Teachers’ beliefs about pedagogical knowledge as well as content knowledge may play an influential role in teachers’ professional development and classroom practice, which in turn may influence students’ beliefs.
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Finally, due to the developmental nature of beliefs it is important to consider how domain-general and domain-specific beliefs develop in relation to one another. Our recent research suggests that beliefs become more differentiated and specialized with age and experience. However, additional research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. In particular, there is a need for longitudinal investigations that explore the onset and developmental changes in the structure and specificity of beliefs.
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Hofer, B. K. (2000). Dimensionality and disciplinary differences in personal epistemology. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 378–405. Hofer, B. K. (Ed.). (2004). Special issue: Personal epistemology: Paradigmatic approaches to understanding students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Educational Psychologist, 39. Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67, 88–140. Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (Eds.). (2002). Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Kardash, C. M., & Howell, K. L. (2000). Effects of epistemological beliefs and topic-specific beliefs on undergraduates’ cognitive and strategic processing of dual-positional text. Journal Educational Psychology, 92(2), 524–535. Lave, J. (1988). Cognition and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mason, L., & Boscolo, P. (2004). Role of epistemological understanding and interest in interpreting a controversy and in topic-specific belief change. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29, 103–128. Murphy, P. K., Buehl, M. M., Monoi, S., & Long, J. F. (2002). Understanding the achievement of inner-city adolescents: The influence of epistemological beliefs and achievement goal orientation on academic performance. In M. M. Buehl (Chair) What is the value of understanding beliefs?: An exploration of beliefs related to academic achievement. Symposium presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans. Pajares, F. (1996). Self-efficacy beliefs in academic settings. Review of Educational Research, 66, 543–578. Perry, W. G. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years: A scheme. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Prawat, R. S. (1989). Promoting access to knowledge, strategy, and disposition in students: A research synthesis. Review of Educational Research, 59, 1–41. Qian, G., & Alvermann, D. (1995). Role of epistemological beliefs and learned helplessness in secondary school students’ learning science concepts from text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 87, 282–292. Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. New York: Oxford University Press. Rukavina, I., & Daneman, M. (1996). Integration and its effects in acquiring knowledge about competing scientific theories from text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 88, 272–287. Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504. Schommer, M. (1993). Epistemological development and academic performance among secondary students. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504. Schommer, M., Crouse, A., & Rhodes, N. (1992). Epistemological beliefs and math text comprehension: Believing it is simple does not make it so. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 435–443. Schommer, M., & Walker, K. (1995). Are epistemological beliefs similar across domains? Journal of Educational Psychology, 87, 424–432. Schommer-Aikins, M., Mau, W., Brookhart, S., & Hutter, R. (2000). Understanding middle students’ beliefs about knowledge and learning using a multidimensional paradigm. Journal of Educational Research, 94, 120–128. Schraw, G., Bendixen, L. D., & Dunkle, M. E. (2002). Development and validation of the epistemic belief inventory (EBI). In B. K. Hofer, & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 261–275). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Schraw, G., Dunkle, M. E., & Bendixen, L. D. (1995). Cognitive processes in well-defined and ill-defined problem solving. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9, 523–538. Schraw, G., & Sinatra, G. (Eds.). (2004). Special issue: Epistemological development and its impact on cognition in academic domains. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29. Tsai, C. (1999). The progression toward constructivist epistemological views of science: A case study of the STS instruction of Taiwanese high school female students. International Journal of Science Education, 21(11), 1201–1222. Vosniadou, S. E., & Brewer, W. F. (1992). Mental models of the earth: A study of conceptual change in childhood. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 535–585. Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language (A. Kozulin, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Original work published in 1934).
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International Journal of Educational Research 45 (2006) 28–42 www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedures
Examining the dual nature of epistemological beliefs Michelle M. Buehla,, Patricia A. Alexanderb a
College of Education and Human Development, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA b University of Maryland, USA
Abstract With respect to the specificity and structure of epistemological beliefs, we contend that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the multidimensional, multilayered, and interactive nature of knowledge. Here we present a model of the nested and reciprocal relations between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Additionally, we present evidence in support of three claims related to that model. Those claims are that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more precise level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction As evidenced by recent special issues (e.g., Hofer, 2004; Schraw & Sinatra, 2004) and conference symposia (e.g., Alexander, 2001; Hofer and Pintrich, 2002), individuals’ views and conceptions of knowledge and knowing have become the focus of much theoretical discussion and empirical research. Within various lines of research, individuals’ conceptions of knowledge have been explored in relation to learner characteristics (e.g., age and education, Perry, 1970; Schommer, 1993; gender, Baxter Magolda, 1992; culture, Chan & Elliott, 2004), learning environments (e.g., constructivist and traditional science classes, Tsai, 1999), and cognitive learning processes and outcomes (e.g., strategy use, Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992; text processing, Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002; conceptual change, Qian & Alvermann, 1995). One fundamental issue in this literature Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 901 678 43 92; fax: +1 901 678 47 78.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M.M. Buehl). 0883-0355/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijer.2006.08.007
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remains how to conceptualize individuals’ views of knowledge and knowing, what Hofer and Pintrich (2002) refer to as personal epistemology. This special issue is devoted to one facet of personal epistemology; that is, its domainspecificity and domain-generality. This is an issue that researchers have spent considerable time discussing and exploring. Our intention here is not to argue whether epistemological beliefs are either general or specific in nature. That issue seems well established. Rather, our intention is to explore the nature of that duality by presenting and supporting a model of epistemological beliefs. One of our first studies of personal epistemology involved developing a domain-specific epistemological belief instrument (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002). Of course, that work sparked more questions and led us to conduct additional studies. Some of those subsequent investigations have been directly related the specificity of knowledge conceptions. Others have explored how conceptions of knowledge are related to specific aspects of the learning process (e.g., motivation; Buehl, 2003). Here, we refine our views on individuals’ general and specific conceptions of knowledge based on our research and that of others (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer, 1990). 2. Guiding assumption The development of the theoretical model depicted in Fig. 1 is based on the assumption that individuals’ conceptions of knowledge and knowing (i.e., their epistemological beliefs) are components of a complex and intricate belief system (e.g., Schommer, 1990) and that these conceptions are, to some measure, reflective of the nature of knowledge itself. For example, over the past quarter century, researchers have come to appreciate that knowledge is not a unitary construct but is multidimensional and multilayered, and that some knowledge has greater power or authority in certain situations than other knowledge (e.g., Alexander, Schallert, & Hare, 1991; Prawat, 1989). It has also become apparent that prior knowledge can be a help or a hindrance in particular situations or context (e.g., Guzzetti & Hynd, 1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). In addition, that knowledge base is transformed by both maturation and experience, including school experiences (e.g., Vygotsky, 1934, 1986). We would expect that beliefs about knowledge have many of these same characteristics (i.e., multidimensional, multilayered, interactive, situational/ contextual, and developmental). In the subsequent section, we seek to substantiate each of the aforementioned assertions about epistemological beliefs and describe our proposed model. After presenting this framework, we then address three additional assertions about the nature of epistemological beliefs and present support for these assertions from recent research. Specifically, we contend that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more particular level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. 3. The interface between knowledge and knowledge beliefs 3.1. Complex, multidimensional, and interactive In the educational literature, as well as in everyday parlance, the deceptively simple word knowledge stands in lieu of a cadre of complex, diverse, and interrelated concepts (Alexander & Murphy, 1998). In effect, there are many forms (e.g., declarative, procedural,
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Fig. 1.
and conditional) and types (e.g., explicit and tacit) of knowledge (Alexander et al., 1991). Moreover, these many forms co-exist and interact in complex ways. As we start to peal back the layers of the knowledge construct, we can begin to appreciate the intricacies that are to be found. For instance, the research on conceptual change is rife with examples of how students’ schooled knowledge and unschooled knowledge can conflict in reality, yet can co-exist in memory (e.g., Guzzetti & Hynd, 1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Thus, the student who can answer a question knowledgeably in physics class (schooled knowledge) can explain an everyday occurrence in a manner that negates the very physics principles previously demonstrated (unschooled knowledge). Additionally, while some knowledge is more explicit and, thus, easily accessible to an individual, other aspects of one’s knowledge are much more elusive, existing below the realm of consciousness (Alexander et al., 1991). Although tacit knowledge may become activated (Prawat, 1989), there is also the possibility that the knowledge will remain unvoiced, unrecognized, or inert (e.g., Whitehead, 1929, 1967). Thus, cognitive researchers have long appreciated that there is more to one’s knowledge than can be put into words or
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can be called to mind. Part of the dilemma for knowledge researchers is finding creative and effective ways to bring individuals’ knowledge to the surface and to allow thoughts or understandings to be shared in natural and meaningful ways. 3.1.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge As with the knowledge they reflect, we hold that beliefs about knowledge are complex, multidimensional, and interactive. As there are many knowledge, there are many beliefs about knowledge that are part of one’s epistemological belief system. Although we do not expect knowledge characteristics and beliefs about knowledge to mirror each other exactly, we do expect that the knowledge individuals acquire and the experiences that give rise to that knowledge are influential in forming epistemological beliefs. Without such an assumption, it would be difficult to explain the relation between education and knowledge beliefs uncovered by Perry (1970) and others following in his footsteps (Schommer, 1993). For this reason, we would anticipate that epistemological beliefs are multilayered and that even seemingly contradictory beliefs could be espoused depending on the nature of the context or situation to which they pertain. Thus, students may hold particular and disparate epistemological beliefs about school physics versus everyday physical phenomena, or their beliefs about mathematical knowledge may be varied from those beliefs they ascribe to history. In addition, as has been shown for knowledge, it is difficult to uncover the beliefs that individuals hold and to do so in a way that does not alter or distort those beliefs. It is reasonable to assume that beliefs about knowledge are likely to be even more difficult to unearth than knowledge itself. For instance, while students may be able to articulate rather detailed knowledge about a given concept (e.g., cars, Civil War, or pollution), they likely find it harder to describe: (a) the source of that knowledge; (b) the truth they assign to those details; or (c) the justifications for ‘‘truth’’ judgments. 3.1.2. Supporting evidence Empirical work in the personal epistemology literature underscores complexity of individuals’ conceptions of knowledge, as well as the difficulty in unearthing this elusive construct. Indeed, the number of frameworks used to discuss students’ conceptions of knowledge is indicative that this construct is not easily represented or assessed (e.g., Hofer, 2004). Further, several models of personal epistemology (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990) specifically address the multidimensional nature of knowledge beliefs. For instance, Schommer-Aikins proposed that individuals possess beliefs about different aspects of knowledge and found evidence of four belief dimensions. Whereas SchommerAikins took a more general approach to the assessment of epistemological beliefs, others— we included—have explored the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs within specific academic domains (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). The current personal epistemology literature also provides evidence of the interactivity of epistemological beliefs. For instance, significant relations have been identified between the different dimensions of personal epistemology when beliefs were assessed at either the domain-specific or domain-general level (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer, 1990). Additionally, there is evidence of significant moderate relations between domain-general and domain-specific beliefs (e.g., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). Further, in a recent study examining students’ epistemological belief profiles for history and mathematics (Buehl & Alexander, 2005), we found that students’ beliefs on the dimensions we assessed
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(e.g., certainty of knowledge) were relatively consistent within each profile group. This suggested the possibility of interactions across the belief dimensions within domain. We also found that a significant number of students manifested similar beliefs orientations (i.e., more naı¨ ve or more sophisticated) in both domains. We viewed this as evidence of domain-general beliefs influencing domain-specific beliefs. However, these conclusions are tentative and additional research is needed to understand these relations more fully (e.g., Mason & Boscolo, 2004). In addition to the interactions between the various epistemological dimensions, there is ample evidence that epistemological beliefs are related to constructs and processes central to learning. For example, epistemological beliefs are related to how much individuals learn from text (e.g., Rukavina & Daneman, 1996) as well as the strategies that they use (e.g., Kardash & Howell, 2000). Other research suggests the students’ epistemological beliefs are related to their reasoning and problem-solving abilities (e.g., Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995), and their academic performance (e.g., Hofer, 2000; Schommer-Aikins, Mau, Brookhart, & Hutter, 2000). In our research, there was also evidence that students’ epistemological beliefs are related to their motivation (e.g., Buehl, 2003; Buehl & Alexander, 2000a). 3.1.3. Modeling the complex, multidimensional, and interactive characteristics To represent the complexity, multidimensionality, and interactivity of epistemological beliefs, we first nested epistemological beliefs within individuals’ broader beliefs system (see Fig. 1). In effect, epistemological beliefs are one among the many subsystems of beliefs that students possess (e.g., beliefs about ability, self, learning). Further, we propose that there are various layers to students’ epistemological beliefs. Thus, students may hold beliefs about knowledge as a general construct, as well as beliefs about more specific types of knowledge. We represent this in Fig. 1 by nesting students’ beliefs about knowledge in specific academic domain within their epistemological belief system. Further, within the different layers of epistemological beliefs, individuals may hold beliefs about different aspects or dimensions of knowledge. To illustrate the multidimensional nature of knowledge beliefs, we have included the dimensions of structure (i.e., Is knowledge isolated and compartmentalized or is it complex and integrated?), stability (i.e., Is knowledge certain and unchanging or tentative and evolving?), and source (i.e., Does knowledge come from an authority figure or is it developed through reason and personal experience?). We propose that there are belief dimensions that exist at both the domain-general and domain-specific levels, along with beliefs that only exist in reference to a specific domain. Finally, in addition to being multidimensional and multilayered, beliefs are also interactive. These interactions can occur across and within the various layers of beliefs and are represented in Fig. 1 by arrows that link the different layers of beliefs. For instance, epistemological beliefs at different levels of specificity may inform or hinder one another, as indicated by the arrows labeled with the different belief dimensions that cut across the domain-general and domain-specific levels. Additionally, the arrow between beliefs system and epistemological beliefs represents how students’ knowledge beliefs are likely to interact with other aspects of their belief systems (e.g., beliefs about ability). 3.2. Sociocultural and contextual In the past three decades, one of the most significant changes in the research on knowledge is the increased recognition that knowledge does not exist in a vacuum
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(Alexander & Murphy, 1998). Rather, knowledge is embedded in and continually shaped by the sociocultural context. The degree to which knowledge can be conceived as a social construction or merely influenced by the language, customs, and experiences afforded by society and by culture remains hotly contested in the literature (e.g., Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1934, 1986). Nonetheless, there is no ignoring role of that sociocultural context in determining what knowledge gains prominence and what experiences are valued. In addition, knowledge is acquired through social interaction (e.g., Anderson, Greeno, Reder, & Simon, 2000); schools and learning environments are social institutions with the express purpose of developing students’ knowledge. Because society and cultural are dynamic systems, the sociocultural character of knowledge is similarly dynamic. That dynamism carries into the effect that the immediate context plays in knowledge acquisition and activation (Anderson et al., 2000). The knowledge that rises to the level of consciousness or becomes explicated at any point in time is highly linked to the features of the context and the human and non-human resources that scaffold knowledge and knowing (Prawat, 1989). For example, an individual taking a mathematics class will rely more heavily on mathematics knowledge than knowledge of history or literature. Additionally, there may be some beliefs that only get voiced in certain social situations. One of the challenges in teaching is to encourage students to recognize aspects of a situation that connect with their existing knowledge. Indeed, school is one of the critical contexts for the acquisition and construction of knowledge (Alexander & Murphy, 1998). However, students often do not transfer their knowledge beyond the school context. That is, schooled knowledge remains inert or untapped when individuals encounter situations in non-schooled settings (e.g., Gardner, 1991). 3.2.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge The sociocultural nature of knowledge has specific implications for the nature of beliefs about knowledge. Similar to knowledge, the beliefs individuals hold about knowledge are shaped by the sociocultural context. Consequently, there may be variations in the nature and types of beliefs that people hold depending on their cultural background. An additional point that is particularly relevant to educators is the likelihood that epistemological beliefs are acquired through social interactions. Thus, there is a need to consider the how social interactions facilitate the acquisition of beliefs about knowledge, as well as how classroom practices promote or hinder the development of epistemological beliefs. We must also consider the situational and contextual nature of beliefs about knowledge. We hold that the context of a specific situation may increase the salience or relevance of certain aspects of students’ epistemological beliefs. Indeed, working on a task within a particular domain would likely increase the salience of domainspecific beliefs. Further, the beliefs that students convey may vary by the situation. Consequently, while a student may endorse what are considered to be more adaptive or advanced epistemological positions in some situations, in other situations less adaptive or more naı¨ ve positions may be apparent. Additionally, as with knowledge, we believe that the ability to recognize similarities between an unfamiliar task or domain, for which epistemological beliefs are non-existent or rudimentary, and a familiar domain may increase the likelihood that existing epistemological beliefs transfer to the new domain.
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3.2.2. Supporting evidence There is evidence to support the sociocultural nature of epistemological beliefs. For instance, in one study, students’ beliefs about knowledge were significantly related to their knowledge of their own culture, as well as to their exposure to television and print resources, suggesting that students’ cultural environment may impact their knowledge beliefs (Hall, Chiarello, & Edmondson, 1996). Additionally, studies of epistemological beliefs in non-Western countries suggest the existing models of epistemological beliefs may not represent the beliefs of individuals in other cultures. That is, the epistemological belief factors that emerged in countries such as China, South Korea, and Japan differed from those identified in the United States (Qian & Pan, 2002; Youn, 2000). Chan and Elliott (2004) proposed an alternative model of epistemological beliefs in which ‘‘the number and nature of the factors or dimensions extracted from the belief system depends on the interaction and relatedness of these componentsyin varied cultural contexts’’ (p. 139). There is also evidence of the contextual and situational nature of students’ conceptions of knowledge. For instance, the identification and study of domain-specific epistemological beliefs suggests that different types of beliefs emerge depending on the larger context (e.g., domain of knowledge under consideration; Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). Others take an even more contextualized view of individuals’ views of knowledge (Hammer & Elby, 2002). In particular, Hammer and colleagues conceptualize students’ views of knowledge as a set of cognitive resources that are situated within particular contexts (Hammer, 1994; Hammer & Elby, 2002). Moreover, they suggest that the activation of epistemological resources may vary from moment to moment within a single situation. 3.2.3. Modeling the sociocultural and contextual characteristics In Fig. 1, we depict the influence of the sociocultural context on the formation and activation of individuals’ beliefs by embedding individuals’ entire belief systems within a larger circle representing a pervasive sociocultural context. A double-headed arrow suggests the interaction between culture and beliefs. Additionally, we hold that the types of beliefs that are activated or most salient to an individual depend on the situation or context. 3.3. Developmental Studies with children and adults and novices and experts point to the developmental nature of knowledge (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). Specifically, with time and exposure, there are quantitative changes in the individuals’ knowledge base (e.g., Alexander, 1997). For example, at the end of a course in multivariate statistics students should know more about the different statistical procedures and how they are conducted than they did at the beginning of the course. Additionally, there are qualitative shifts in knowledge that occur with time, exposure, and expertise (e.g., Alexander, 1997; Gelman & Greeno, 1989). That is, experts not only know more than novices, but their knowledge is also more organized, more principled, and more specialized than the knowledge of novices (Alexander, 1997; Chi et al., 1988). 3.3.1. Implications for beliefs about knowledge We contend that, with time and experience, there are also quantitative and qualitative changes in individuals’ beliefs about knowledge. With maturation and experience
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individuals may change with respect to how strongly they endorse specific epistemological positions (i.e., quantitative changes). Additionally, there may also be shifts in the specialization and differentiation of beliefs about knowledge as a result of developmental changes. For instance, one of the developmental changes we would expect with time and experience is the increased differentiation between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. With increased schooling and growing expertise in specific academic domains, individuals could well develop more precise and differentiate beliefs about the knowledge within those domains. Thus, young children with limited world experiences or less formalized knowledge of academic domains are apt to rely more on their general beliefs about knowledge, in contrast to highly schooled or experienced individuals who may draw more on domain-specific beliefs when the relevant domain is instantiated. 3.3.2. Supporting evidence The development of epistemological beliefs was the focus of much of the early personal epistemology research (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Perry, 1970; Schommer, 1993). Specifically, this body of work suggests that with age and education, individuals progress from what are considered to be more naı¨ ve views (e.g., knowledge is right or wrong, received from authority, certain and unchanging, relatively simplistic) to more advanced, adaptive, or sophisticated views (e.g., knowledge is contextualized, constructed, tentative and evolving, and complex). Recent research also suggests that there may be qualitative structural changes in students’ epistemological beliefs. For instance, investigations with college students have provided support for a four- or five-factor belief structure (e.g., Kardash & Howell, 2000; Schraw et al., 1995). However, when similar measures (e.g., SEQ) were used with middleand high-school students a three-factor solution emerged (Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2000). These findings suggest that perhaps younger students do not hold distinct beliefs about certain aspects on knowledge until they are older. 4. Additional assertions related to the domain-specificity and domain-generality of epistemological beliefs Thus far, we have presented our views of the relations between domain-specific and domain-general beliefs based on the extant knowledge and personal epistemology literatures. There are three additional assertions we want to make with respect to the domain-specificity and domain-generality of beliefs: (a) domain-specific beliefs emerge when beliefs are assessed at the domain level; (b) domain-specific beliefs are differentially related to motivation; and (c) domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs. 4.1. Assertion 1: domain-specific beliefs emerge when beliefs are assessed at the domain level Given the complexity, multidimensionality, and contextual nature of individuals’ beliefs about knowledge, measurement is a critical issue in the study of personal epistemology (e.g., Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Consequently, in order to make claims about the domain-specificity or domain-generality of beliefs, appropriate measures of beliefs need to be employed. Our work (Buehl et al., 2002), as well as the work of others
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(e.g., Hofer, 2000), indicates that domain-specific beliefs only emerge when they are assessed with a domain-specific measure. For instance, Schommer and Walker (1995) examined undergraduates’ beliefs relative to mathematics and social science to determine the domain dependence or independence of beliefs using a general epistemological beliefs measure. Based on their analyses of these data, they concluded that epistemological beliefs are moderately domain-independent. In contrast, when domain-specific measures were developed (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000) with the intention of assessing beliefs about knowledge in specific areas of academic study, domainspecific beliefs were identified. These investigations suggest that students do hold domainspecific beliefs about knowledge that emerge when domain-specific instruments are used. 4.2. Assertion 2: epistemological beliefs are differentially related to motivation Our more recent work focuses on the relations between students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs and achievement motivation. In particular, we hypothesize the students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs may influence their motivation for specific academic domains (e.g., Buehl, 2003). However, we also propose that there may be some variation in the strength of the relations between the constructs depending on the domain. For example, students’ beliefs about where knowledge comes from (i.e., a belief about the source of knowledge) may be more strongly related to their motivation in the context of history than mathematics. In our initial investigation of the relations between epistemological beliefs and motivation, we explored college students’ beliefs about history and mathematics in relation to domain-general goal orientations and domain efficacy and interest (Buehl & Alexander, 2000a). Correlations indicated positive relations between beliefs about the integration of knowledge in history and mathematics and task goals, performance goals, efficacy, and interest. In contrast, beliefs about the integration of knowledge in history and mathematics were negatively related to work avoidant goal orientations. Students’ beliefs about the need for effort to acquire knowledge in history and mathematics were also positively related to their goals, efficacy, and interest. These findings confirmed our hypothesized relations. A similar investigation was also conducted with eighth- and ninth-grade students to explore the relations between their beliefs about knowledge, motivation (i.e., goal orientation), and academic performance (Murphy, Buehl, Monoi, & Long, 2002). Although domain-specific epistemological beliefs did not emerge for this population of students, we found that students’ beliefs about the integration of knowledge were positively related to their learning goals and negatively related to their performanceavoidance and work-avoidant goals. In contrast, beliefs about the effort needed to be a successful student were positively related to performance-approach, performanceavoidance and work-avoidant goals. These findings were somewhat contradictory in the sense that students who believed knowledge was interrelated had more adaptive goal orientations whereas students who believe in the need for effort to acquire knowledge, typically a belief considered to be adaptive for students, tended to adopt less adaptive goal orientations. Thus, the various epistemological belief dimensions seem to be differentially related to students’ motivations. In our most recent investigation (Buehl, 2003), we examined the domain-specific beliefs of college students using a broader range of items (i.e., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000).
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This allowed us to assess students’ beliefs with respect to the certainty of knowledge, isolation of knowledge, and authority as the source of knowledge and examine them in relation to students’ competency beliefs and achievement values. Using structural equation modeling to assess the hypothesized relations, we found that although there were similarities in the relations between the belief dimensions and students’ motivation (i.e., competency beliefs and achievement values) across domains there were also some differences and some unexpected results. Specifically, as expected, beliefs about the isolation of knowledge were negatively related to competency beliefs and achievement values for each of the respective domains. That is, those who believed knowledge is isolated and compartmentalized also tended to have lower levels of motivation. However, we also found that for both history and mathematics students’ beliefs about the certainty of knowledge were positively related to their motivation. That is, students who viewed history or mathematics knowledge as more certain and unchanging, a belief typically considered less adaptive, also had higher competency beliefs and achievement value. We speculated that these findings may be due to instructional and assessment practices which place value on getting a correct answer. Additionally, we found that, within the domain of history, beliefs in authority as the source of knowledge were negatively related to competency beliefs and achievement values. These findings indicate that students who view history knowledge as coming from an authority figure have lower levels of motivation whereas students who do not endorse such beliefs have higher levels of motivation. However, within the domain of mathematics, while authority beliefs were negatively related to competency beliefs, as anticipated, beliefs about authority as the source of mathematics knowledge were not significantly related to achievement values. We hypothesized that this difference in the relations between the source of knowledge belief dimension and achievement value may be attributable to domain-specificity. That is, the source of knowledge may be a more salient issue in history than in mathematics. Collectively, these findings illustrate interactivity of epistemological beliefs and suggest that these interactions vary based on the belief dimension and domain under consideration. 4.3. Assertion 3: domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs The development of epistemological beliefs with age and education has been well documented in the literature. However, few studies have explored how domain-specific epistemological beliefs develop in relation to domain-general beliefs. We contend that students’ knowledge and subsequent beliefs about knowledge become more differentiated with exposure to a given domain. Thus, we hold that domain-specific beliefs develop from more general beliefs as students come to recognize and experience different academic domains. This assertion is based on our research with young children, adolescents, and college students. 4.3.1. Beliefs of young children In interviews with early elementary students in the United States and Australia, we asked questions (e.g., ‘‘What is social studies/math?’’) and had students complete tasks (e.g., teach the interviewer something from social studies/math) in order to assess their understandings and beliefs about academic domains (Buehl & Alexander, 2000b). Analysis of students’ responses indicated that students had a rudimentary understanding of different academic domains.
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Specifically, students’ understanding of mathematics was more defined than their understanding of social studies. When asked to define mathematics the majority of the children referred to mathematical operations (e.g., adding and subtracting; 71.1% of students) or numbers (21.1% of students) and only 5.3% were unable to respond. In contrast, when asked to define social studies, although a sizable number of students referred to learning about people (39.5%) or places (39.5%), 26.3% of the students were unable to respond and 26.3% referred to mathematics or science. Additionally, when asked to teach the researcher content from each domain, few students (2.6%) were unable to select an appropriate mathematics activity. In contrast, 34.2% of the students were unable to think of an activity when asked to teach something from social studies and 23.7% of the students taught content from mathematics and science instead of social studies. Further, the Australian children had a more difficult time defining social studies and teaching something from social studies than the American children. However, both groups of children preformed similarly with respect to mathematics. We attributed these findings to the ill-structured nature of social studies and the amount of classroom instruction. Thus, while students age young ages may be epistemologically aware (e.g., Burr & Hofer, 2002), their conceptions of academic domains are still forming. 4.3.2. Beliefs of adolescents In another study, the beliefs of eighth- and ninth-grade students were assessed with social studies and mathematics as the target domains (Murphy et al., 2002). Exploratory factor analysis of this data indicated that at this age students’ beliefs did not differentiate by domain. That is, domain-specific factors did not emerge from the data. Instead, items loaded on two factors: beliefs about the interrelatedness of learning and knowledge and beliefs about the need for effort to do well. Presumably, students at this age have more cohesive understandings of academic domains. However, this study suggests that their beliefs, while multidimensional, are not yet differentiated by domain. 4.3.3. Beliefs of college students As previously discussed, we found evidence of domain-specific epistemological beliefs in college students when beliefs were assessed with a domain-specific instrument (Buehl et al., 2002). Additionally, there is evidence of domain-specific beliefs in separate college samples using different domain-specific measures (e.g., Buehl, 2003; Hofer, 2000). Based on these findings, we propose that students’ beliefs become more differentiated and domain-specific as they age and have greater experience with different domains. For instance, the young children that we interviewed were just beginning to recognize different domains of knowledge and to form an understanding of those domains. Further, their understandings appeared to be related to their experiences. Consequently, their beliefs about knowledge in these domains are also likely to be very rudimentary, if not entirely based on their general epistemological beliefs. As children develop and progress through the educational system their understandings of different academic domains are also likely to develop. However, our evidence suggests that even at the middle school and early high school levels students’ beliefs about these domains are not well differentiated from one another. We proposed that this may be due to a lack of compartmentalization of domains in the pre-secondary years. As the lines between academic domains become more defined, we believe that students’ beliefs also become more differentiated. Indeed, by the time
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students reach college, they hold distinct beliefs about different domains of academic knowledge. 5. Conclusions As others have suggested (e.g., Pajares, 1996), the study of beliefs is a ‘‘messy’’ endeavor. This is especially true for the study of personal epistemology. In this manuscript, we presented a model illustrating the potential relations between students’ domain-general and domain-specific beliefs. This model is based on the guiding assumption that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the nature of knowledge itself, assumptions supported by the personal epistemology literature. Specifically, we propose that students’ beliefs are complex, multidimensional, interactive, sociocultural, contextual, and developmental. This perspective of students’ knowledge beliefs has important implications for the conceptualization and study of personal epistemology. First, given the contextual nature of beliefs, the type of beliefs that are most salient and explicitly available for consideration will vary depending on the context. Consequently, although individuals may possess more specific beliefs or hold beliefs that are particularly adaptive to performance, these beliefs may go untapped or remain tacit unless they are explicitly addressed and activated. For example, as evidenced by the literature, domainspecific beliefs tend to emerge only when the belief measure provides the appropriate context. Thus, in studying personal epistemology, researchers should carefully consider the type of beliefs they wish to study as well as how to best assess them. Although various measures of personal epistemology are available, additional research is needed to develop additional ways of assessing beliefs in varied contexts. Additionally, in terms of practice, teachers need to be vigilant with respect to the types of beliefs that are activated within the classroom context. Research is needed to explore how teachers can evoke those beliefs that are most beneficial for students’ learning and motivation. Second, given the interactivity of beliefs it is important to examine the relations between domain-general and domain-specific beliefs and their relations to other constructs. As we have suggested, these relations may vary depending on the aspect of beliefs and domain under consideration. Numerous studies have examined the role of general beliefs in relation to various aspects of the learning process. However, more work is needed examining domain-specific beliefs in relation to students’ learning and motivation. Third, there are a variety of avenues for future research with respect to the sociocultural and social nature of beliefs. For instance, continued work is needed in examining the nature and role of epistemological beliefs in varied cultural contexts. Chan and Elliott (2004) suggest that current conceptualizations of beliefs may not be appropriate for nonwestern cultures. Consequently, research in this area may result in developments in the way that beliefs are conceptualized and studied. Additionally, there are a host of social and contextual issues to be considered within a culture. For example, we need to examine how beliefs are fostered within different social environments, particularly school settings. That is, how are beliefs cultivated within classrooms? Are there ways that teachers can promote beliefs that are more beneficial for students’ learning and motivation? Further, the beliefs of teachers should be examined more closely. Teachers’ beliefs about pedagogical knowledge as well as content knowledge may play an influential role in teachers’ professional development and classroom practice, which in turn may influence students’ beliefs.
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Finally, due to the developmental nature of beliefs it is important to consider how domain-general and domain-specific beliefs develop in relation to one another. Our recent research suggests that beliefs become more differentiated and specialized with age and experience. However, additional research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. In particular, there is a need for longitudinal investigations that explore the onset and developmental changes in the structure and specificity of beliefs.
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