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Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis
Marine Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 195-196, 1997
Pergamon
~) 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0308-597X/97 $17.00 + 0.00 PII:SO308-597X(96)O0006-7
Commentary Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis I liked not the never-ending recurrence to Acts of Parliament. Something must be left and something ought to be left, to the sense and reason and morality and religion of the people. William Cobbett
It soon becomes clear to a reader of Sen and Nielsen's paper [1] that the term fisheries co-management signifies little more than that government and fishers (with other operatives) have c o m m o n interest in decisions about the industry and that each side has some part, however small, in taking those decisions. The classification of arrangements into the categories Instructive, Consultative, Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative, shows how empty is the term. These are presented as classes of decision-making arrangements. Under arrangements of the first two classes decisions are taken by administration and users are informed of them (Instructive) or are consulted about them (Consultative); under those of the last two classes the users decide matters and inform administration (Informative) or inform administration and obtain authorisation of their decision (Advisory). In the middle stands Cooperative under which both sides decide. In the main the classification is concerned with the direction of movement of information. But what is decided upon is not shown although one has the impression that the paper is about decisions as to where, when and how fishing is to take place and
how much catch can be taken. Without a distinction between the generalised rules and decisions proper to administration and the day to day, even hour to hour decisions by operatives, at sea, on the w h a r f and in the processing plant, the classification is empty. In view of this appraisal of the term, noting that there is little of "comparative analysis" in the paper, and that the authors appear not to have become aware of the error of the idea that fishery resources are c o m m o n property, it immediately can be seen that the authors are unlikely to contribute much to solving world fishery problems through achievement of the objective they set for themselves, namely, "to develop a set of globally or regionally applicable fishery co-management models". In fact, any attempt to develop "models" out of the woolly thinking of this paper would be bound to deepen the confusion in which so m a n y fisheries stand today. Central to the reform that must be made to the administration of fisheries is recognition that fishery resources are not c o m m o n property, and therefore (of still greater significance) that a universal right of access to those resources is mere fiction. An administration which accepts and acts by the idea
of c o m m o n property has before it an unending story of competition and conflict. The ownership of fishery resources was for millennia a matter of little interest, given that the fished stocks appeared to be inexhaustible. Through this century the situation changed rapidly from being in limbo, to reach the present de facto situation with establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the U N Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the setting up of various national and international arrangements for regulation of fishing. Although few if any of the regulatory arrangements are presented as being established under the rights of ownership, their practical effect is the same. The difference of intention, effect and force between regulatory arrangements under a condition of ownership and those under the p r e - U N C L O S situation is considerable. Those of the early condition, aimed at law and order and conservational objective, were shaped and justified by a conviction that all fishermen were predatory and irresponsible. They took little account of the business feature of fishing, and had little understanding (pace Michael G r a h a m ' s "Fish Gate") of socioeconomic aspects of fisheries.
195
Commentary--fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis. G L Kesteven
Recognition of those aspects, in the 60s and 70s, led to emergence of a profession of f i s h e r y economist. With that development came the difference between administration of fisheries and management of the industry. It is their failure to recognise the significance of that difference that has debilitated the Sen/Nielsen paper. The difference can in part be represented by saying that administration is a matter of decisions about the promulgation and enforcement of rules whereas management is a matter of decisions about activities in accordance with rules. Administration confronts and codifies the generalities; management copes with the exigencies of the singular. Administration is the prerogative and responsibility of the owner, management the task and course
196
of reason of the user. Administration is the exercise of power by an owner in protection of his property with a view to enjoyment of benefit from it. Management is the control of operations. Clearly, therefore, we are dealing with two distinct programmes of decision-making which, although they cohere in their orientation to the interests of the community, involve procedures which differ in almost every respect, of information collection and analysis, of purpose, of consultation, and of orientation. The sharing of responsibility for the resource, each party acting according to his operative role, can be realised only through accurate identification of the decisions each is competent and authorised to take. It is not facilitated by a catchphrase.
Nothing of what is written here is to be taken to signify a rejection of the idea of co-operation. It is not a matter of transaction costs being lowered by the "co-management approach" because "fishermen can provide information on fishing patterns, catches and the status of resource" (an extraordinarily ingenuous observation) but of effective conduct of a fishery being possible only through collaboration. Fishermen are the source of the indispensable information. G L Kesteven
Reference 1. Sen, S. and Nielsen, J.R., Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis. Marine Policy, 1996, 20(5), 405418.
Pergamon
~) 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0308-597X/97 $17.00 + 0.00 PII:SO308-597X(96)O0006-7
Commentary Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis I liked not the never-ending recurrence to Acts of Parliament. Something must be left and something ought to be left, to the sense and reason and morality and religion of the people. William Cobbett
It soon becomes clear to a reader of Sen and Nielsen's paper [1] that the term fisheries co-management signifies little more than that government and fishers (with other operatives) have c o m m o n interest in decisions about the industry and that each side has some part, however small, in taking those decisions. The classification of arrangements into the categories Instructive, Consultative, Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative, shows how empty is the term. These are presented as classes of decision-making arrangements. Under arrangements of the first two classes decisions are taken by administration and users are informed of them (Instructive) or are consulted about them (Consultative); under those of the last two classes the users decide matters and inform administration (Informative) or inform administration and obtain authorisation of their decision (Advisory). In the middle stands Cooperative under which both sides decide. In the main the classification is concerned with the direction of movement of information. But what is decided upon is not shown although one has the impression that the paper is about decisions as to where, when and how fishing is to take place and
how much catch can be taken. Without a distinction between the generalised rules and decisions proper to administration and the day to day, even hour to hour decisions by operatives, at sea, on the w h a r f and in the processing plant, the classification is empty. In view of this appraisal of the term, noting that there is little of "comparative analysis" in the paper, and that the authors appear not to have become aware of the error of the idea that fishery resources are c o m m o n property, it immediately can be seen that the authors are unlikely to contribute much to solving world fishery problems through achievement of the objective they set for themselves, namely, "to develop a set of globally or regionally applicable fishery co-management models". In fact, any attempt to develop "models" out of the woolly thinking of this paper would be bound to deepen the confusion in which so m a n y fisheries stand today. Central to the reform that must be made to the administration of fisheries is recognition that fishery resources are not c o m m o n property, and therefore (of still greater significance) that a universal right of access to those resources is mere fiction. An administration which accepts and acts by the idea
of c o m m o n property has before it an unending story of competition and conflict. The ownership of fishery resources was for millennia a matter of little interest, given that the fished stocks appeared to be inexhaustible. Through this century the situation changed rapidly from being in limbo, to reach the present de facto situation with establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the U N Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the setting up of various national and international arrangements for regulation of fishing. Although few if any of the regulatory arrangements are presented as being established under the rights of ownership, their practical effect is the same. The difference of intention, effect and force between regulatory arrangements under a condition of ownership and those under the p r e - U N C L O S situation is considerable. Those of the early condition, aimed at law and order and conservational objective, were shaped and justified by a conviction that all fishermen were predatory and irresponsible. They took little account of the business feature of fishing, and had little understanding (pace Michael G r a h a m ' s "Fish Gate") of socioeconomic aspects of fisheries.
195
Commentary--fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis. G L Kesteven
Recognition of those aspects, in the 60s and 70s, led to emergence of a profession of f i s h e r y economist. With that development came the difference between administration of fisheries and management of the industry. It is their failure to recognise the significance of that difference that has debilitated the Sen/Nielsen paper. The difference can in part be represented by saying that administration is a matter of decisions about the promulgation and enforcement of rules whereas management is a matter of decisions about activities in accordance with rules. Administration confronts and codifies the generalities; management copes with the exigencies of the singular. Administration is the prerogative and responsibility of the owner, management the task and course
196
of reason of the user. Administration is the exercise of power by an owner in protection of his property with a view to enjoyment of benefit from it. Management is the control of operations. Clearly, therefore, we are dealing with two distinct programmes of decision-making which, although they cohere in their orientation to the interests of the community, involve procedures which differ in almost every respect, of information collection and analysis, of purpose, of consultation, and of orientation. The sharing of responsibility for the resource, each party acting according to his operative role, can be realised only through accurate identification of the decisions each is competent and authorised to take. It is not facilitated by a catchphrase.
Nothing of what is written here is to be taken to signify a rejection of the idea of co-operation. It is not a matter of transaction costs being lowered by the "co-management approach" because "fishermen can provide information on fishing patterns, catches and the status of resource" (an extraordinarily ingenuous observation) but of effective conduct of a fishery being possible only through collaboration. Fishermen are the source of the indispensable information. G L Kesteven
Reference 1. Sen, S. and Nielsen, J.R., Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis. Marine Policy, 1996, 20(5), 405418.