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Florida in the 2000 presidential election: historical precedents and contemporary landscapes
Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90 www.politicalgeography.com
Florida in the 2000 presidential election: historical precedents and contemporary landscapes Barney Warf *, Cynthia Waddell Department of Geography, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA
Abstract Given the social and spatial dynamics of the electoral college, small groups of voters can profoundly shape national outcomes. This paper examines the 2000 election in Florida in three ways. First, it offers historical depth by comparing and contrasting the 2000 and 1876 presidential elections. Second, it portrays the spatial distribution of votes across the state. Third, it applies a combinatorial analysis of the power of small groups of Florida voters to influence the 2000 presidential election to demonstrate the discrepancy between their influence compared to those of voters nationwide. 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Elections; Electoral college; Florida
The impacts of small groups of voters on national elections in the US have received great scrutiny in the media and academia, in part because of the profound influence of the electoral college (Abbott & Levine, 1991; Best, 1996; Hardaway, 1994; Longley & Dana, 1992; Pierce & Longley, 1981). Because the distribution of votes and electoral strategies are unevenly distributed over space, this topic has important ramifications for electoral geography (Archer & Shelley, 1988; Archer, 1988; Agnew, 1996). The heated controversy over the 2000 presidential election, in which the winner, George W. Bush, assumed office without a majority of the popular vote, underscored the ways in which the electoral college shapes presidential elections. With the national electoral vote essentially tied, the contest for the presidency
* Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B. Warf); [email protected] (C. Waddell). 0962-6298/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 2 - 6 2 9 8 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 6 3 - 4
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was reduced to the heated struggle over Florida’s 25 electoral votes. Within Florida, where the popular vote was essentially tied, the outcome was decided by an infinitesimally small number of voters. Following delays, multiple court challenges, and various debates over damaged ballots, the Republican candidate won by 537 votes. Thus, a tiny minority of voters in one state effectively decided the outcome of a national political contest. This paper examines the 2000 election in Florida in three ways. First, it compares and contrasts the 2000 election with its uncannily similar counterpart in 1876. The controversy over the 2000 election implied that it was historically unique; this brief historical overview, however, makes clear that the electoral college has led to contentious and occasionally undemocratic outcomes more than once. Second, the paper maps (literally and figuratively) the uneven distribution of votes across the state, illustrating how the tiny group of voters who tilted the state’s electoral votes toward Bush were located within wider constellations of race and power stretched over Florida’s landscape. Third, it applies a mathematical analysis of voting behavior to offer a quantitative assessment of the power of individual voters to shape national outcomes.
The more things change the more they stay the same: Florida in the 1876 and 2000 elections In 1876, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes faced Democratic candidate Samuel Tilden. Florida law failed in both the 1876 and 2000 elections to stipulate uniform ballots, and both elections were marred by voting irregularities, intimidation of some voters, partisan rulings by courts and elected officials, and recounts and multiple tallies. In 1876, attempts to prohibit voting by blacks and lower class whites were publicly advocated in the press and enforced by county officials; the secret ballot was still 20 years into the future. Prisoners, mostly African-Americans, were often released from captivity by county officials who personally accompanied them to the polls and instructed them on how to vote. In 2000, 50,000 former felons were illegally removed from voter registration rolls even if they had served time in another state and had their rights restored. In 1876, the vote in several counties was challenged because canvassing boards were improperly constituted. Inspectors in Alachua County signed blank returns, which were later filled in to ensure a Republican majority (Shofner, 1974). Similarly, in 2000 in Seminole County, the elections supervisor filled in missing registration numbers on only the absentee ballots cast for Republicans. In both elections, state and county officials wore partisan hats. In 1876, most poll inspectors were Republicans, because the state constitution gave the governor extraordinary appointive powers, a deliberate move by white conservatives when the state constitution was re-written immediately following the Civil War. Conservatives, all Democrats, feared they could not retain control of the legislature, opting instead to consolidate power in the governorship, the one seat that really mattered. In 2000, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris also served as co-chair of the George W. Bush election campaign in the state. Like her predecessor in 1876, Samuel B.
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McLin (another Republican), she had the power to certify the tally before a recount could be completed or any inquiry conducted into voting irregularities. McLin testified in the subsequent Congressional investigation of the presidential election that he considered himself a partisan first and an official second (Shofner, 1974). In both elections, the Republican candidate won the state popular vote by an extremely narrow margin. In 1876, the original vote count gave Hayes a 43 vote victory (24,337 to 24,294). However, the Republican-dominated canvassing board threw out 1,800 votes to give Hayes a 924 vote majority. In 2000, the Republicans first warned their opponents not to take court action, then themselves brought the courts into the dispute. In both years, the election involved the Supreme Court. The legal dispute in 2000 hinged on the lack of uniform voting standards throughout the state, but in 1876 it concerned the power of the state canvassing board to investigate allegations of wrong-doing. When Florida’s legislature took office in January, 1877, the newly sworn lawmakers, dominated by Democrats, promptly chose a new canvassing board and created a new set of electors to send to the House of Representatives (Shofner, 1974). The 1876 dispute was settled in Congress, partly because the Supreme Court had disgraced itself with the Dred Scott decision of 1857, when a lack of judicial restraint robbed the nation of any ability to compromise on the issue of slavery and precipitated the Civil War (Hall, 1992). The House of Representatives, given constitutional power to decide disputes among rival slates of electors to the electoral college, resolved the contested legitimacy of the delegations from Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina, ruling in all three cases in favor of the Republicans (Shofner, 1974). By the end of January, 1876, Florida’s Democrats were willing to compromise, conceding the presidency in return for control of the governor’s office. Regionally, “redemption” or “home rule”, that is, removal of the federal troops from the South, was a burning issue, and a prize worth giving up the White House.
Mapping Florida’s votes Of the total 5.93 million votes cast in Florida in 2000, the Republican candidate, George W. Bush, received 2,912,790, while the Democrat, Al Gore, received 2,912,253. Thus, the official margin of difference was 537 votes, or 0.009 percent of the total, reflecting the extremely close vote nationally. Because the margin of victory in this case was dwarfed by the margin of error found in vote counting machines, the election stimulated an enormous outcry over spoiled ballots, “hanging chads”, and the like. Notably, the Green Party candidate, Ralph Nader, received 96,837 votes; Florida was one of two states (the other being New Hampshire) in which the Green vote exceeded the margin of difference between the Republican and Democratic candidates. Across the landscape of the state the distribution of votes was highly uneven (Fig. 1). The core Democratic stronghold was located primarily in the Miami metropolitan area, home to numerous Jews and African-Americans, including Palm Beach, MiamiDade, Broward, and Volusia counties. In contrast, Bush’s supporters were scattered
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Fig. 1.
Vote margin of victory or defeat for George W. Bush in 2000 Presidential Election.
across much of the lightly populated interior of the state.. This distribution mirrors the urban–rural schism between Democrats and Republicans that formed a fundamental part of the geography of the popular vote nationally.
Every vote counts, but not equally: the power of the Florida voter The most influential mathematical treatment of the electoral college was proposed by Banzhaf (1968), who introduced combinatorial analysis to the study of voting (see also Merrill, 1978; Natapoff, 1996; Sterling, 1978). Banzhaf’s approach viewed voting power in light of the probability that voters in a given state could affect a national election by throwing their state’s electoral votes to one presidential candidate or another. Banzhaf assumed that for a marginal voter to make a difference, the remaining votes in a given state must be equally split between the two political
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
89
parties, a condition that holds particularly well in the context of the 2000 election. He calculated voter power (VP) in state s as VPs ⫽
ns! EVs (n⫺d)!d!
(1)
where VPs=power of voter in state s; n=total votes in state s; d=votes for one party in state s; EV=electoral votes of state s in any given election. This approach holds that distribution of votes follows a binomial distribution with mean of 0.5; for large populations, the Central Limit Theorem allows the binomial to be approximated using a normal distribution with the same mean and variance, which, when simplified, can be stated as VP ⫽ √2/nd
(2)
In the specific context of Florida in the 2000 presidential election, Banzhaf’s approach is instructive. Relative to voters in the nation as a whole, Florida’s electorate, by virtue of being able to throw 25 electoral votes into the column of either candidate, each held roughly 1.4 times the average capacity of voters to influence the election nationally (Table 1). However, when the margin of victory is narrowed to particular blocs of voters within the state, the estimated capacity to shape the national election rises significantly. Thus, in the four counties that formed the largest bloc of Democratic voters, each individual casting a ballot was 61 times as influential as other voters in the nation taken as a whole. Finally, the razor-thin margin of victory that effectively awarded Florida — and the election — to George W. Bush consisted of 537 voters, each of whom was 1,584 more influential in the election than the “average” American voter. In the limiting case of this analysis, were a single voter to decide the outcome of the election, he or she would be 36,707 times more influential than his/her counterparts elsewhere in the nation.
Conclusions The exercise of voting power — the foundation of democratic political systems — is flawed when the capacity of individuals to shape national outcomes is unevenly distributed, whether by class, gender, race/ethnicity, or among places. In a democracy, at least hypothetically, every vote counts equally. However, given the dynamics Table 1 Results of application of Banzhaf’s methodology to Florida botes, 2000
US Florida 4 countries 537 voters
Estimated voting power
Voting Power Relative to US Average
0.005869 0.008203 0.361358 9.296440
1.00 1.40 61.57 1584/04
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of the electoral college, in which the winner of the popular vote is not guaranteed victory, small groups of voters may have disproportionately large degrees of influence over national elections. The precise degree to which the American public was divided between the two major parties in the 2000 presidential election positioned Florida in a unique role of deciding the winner. As the comparisons to the 1876 election indicate, corruption, abuse of power, and voting irregularities played a key role in determining the outcome in both cases. Within Florida too, the electorate was split down the middle. Ultimately, the national victory of the Republican candidate rested upon a razor-thin margin of 537 votes. As the Banzhaf approach indicates, the electoral college effectively telescoped national power to decide an election into a handful of counties within the state, greatly empowering a small group of voters over others nationwide.
Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Angela Brink at the University of Alabama for drafting the map for this essay.
References Abbott, D., & Levine, J. (1991). Wrong winner: The coming debacle in the electoral college. New York: Praeger. Agnew, J. (1996). Mapping politics: How context counts in electoral geography. Political Geography, 15, 129–146. Archer, J. (1988). Macrogeographical versus microgeographical cleavages in American presidential elections: 1940–1984. Political Geography Quarterly, 7, 111–126. Archer, J., & Shelley, F. (1988). The geography of U.S. presidential elections. Scientific American, 259, 44–53. Banzhaf, J. (1968). One man, 3.312 votes: A mathematical analysis of the electoral college. Villanova Law Review, 8, 303–341. Best, J. (1996). The choice of the people? Debating the electoral college. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Hall, K. (1992). The Oxford companion to the supreme court of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Hardaway, R. (1994). The electoral college and the constitution: The case for preserving federalism. Westport, CT: Praeger. Longley, L., & Dana, J. (1992). The biases of the electoral college in the 1990s. Polity, 25, 123–145. Merrill, S. (1978). Citizen voting power under the electoral college: A stochastic model based on state voting patterns. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 34, 376–390. Natapoff, A. A. (1996). Mathematical one-man one-vote rationale for Madisonian presidential voting based on maximum individual voting power. Public Choice, 88, 259–273. Pierce, N., & Longley, L. (1981). The people’s president: The electoral college in American history and the direct vote alternative. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shofner, J. (1974). Nor is it over yet: Florida in the era of reconstruction, 1863–1877. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida. Sterling, C. (1978). The electoral college biases revealed, the conventional wisdom and game theory models notwithstanding. Western Political Quarterly, 31, 159–177.
Florida in the 2000 presidential election: historical precedents and contemporary landscapes Barney Warf *, Cynthia Waddell Department of Geography, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA
Abstract Given the social and spatial dynamics of the electoral college, small groups of voters can profoundly shape national outcomes. This paper examines the 2000 election in Florida in three ways. First, it offers historical depth by comparing and contrasting the 2000 and 1876 presidential elections. Second, it portrays the spatial distribution of votes across the state. Third, it applies a combinatorial analysis of the power of small groups of Florida voters to influence the 2000 presidential election to demonstrate the discrepancy between their influence compared to those of voters nationwide. 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Elections; Electoral college; Florida
The impacts of small groups of voters on national elections in the US have received great scrutiny in the media and academia, in part because of the profound influence of the electoral college (Abbott & Levine, 1991; Best, 1996; Hardaway, 1994; Longley & Dana, 1992; Pierce & Longley, 1981). Because the distribution of votes and electoral strategies are unevenly distributed over space, this topic has important ramifications for electoral geography (Archer & Shelley, 1988; Archer, 1988; Agnew, 1996). The heated controversy over the 2000 presidential election, in which the winner, George W. Bush, assumed office without a majority of the popular vote, underscored the ways in which the electoral college shapes presidential elections. With the national electoral vote essentially tied, the contest for the presidency
* Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B. Warf); [email protected] (C. Waddell). 0962-6298/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 2 - 6 2 9 8 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 6 3 - 4
86
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
was reduced to the heated struggle over Florida’s 25 electoral votes. Within Florida, where the popular vote was essentially tied, the outcome was decided by an infinitesimally small number of voters. Following delays, multiple court challenges, and various debates over damaged ballots, the Republican candidate won by 537 votes. Thus, a tiny minority of voters in one state effectively decided the outcome of a national political contest. This paper examines the 2000 election in Florida in three ways. First, it compares and contrasts the 2000 election with its uncannily similar counterpart in 1876. The controversy over the 2000 election implied that it was historically unique; this brief historical overview, however, makes clear that the electoral college has led to contentious and occasionally undemocratic outcomes more than once. Second, the paper maps (literally and figuratively) the uneven distribution of votes across the state, illustrating how the tiny group of voters who tilted the state’s electoral votes toward Bush were located within wider constellations of race and power stretched over Florida’s landscape. Third, it applies a mathematical analysis of voting behavior to offer a quantitative assessment of the power of individual voters to shape national outcomes.
The more things change the more they stay the same: Florida in the 1876 and 2000 elections In 1876, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes faced Democratic candidate Samuel Tilden. Florida law failed in both the 1876 and 2000 elections to stipulate uniform ballots, and both elections were marred by voting irregularities, intimidation of some voters, partisan rulings by courts and elected officials, and recounts and multiple tallies. In 1876, attempts to prohibit voting by blacks and lower class whites were publicly advocated in the press and enforced by county officials; the secret ballot was still 20 years into the future. Prisoners, mostly African-Americans, were often released from captivity by county officials who personally accompanied them to the polls and instructed them on how to vote. In 2000, 50,000 former felons were illegally removed from voter registration rolls even if they had served time in another state and had their rights restored. In 1876, the vote in several counties was challenged because canvassing boards were improperly constituted. Inspectors in Alachua County signed blank returns, which were later filled in to ensure a Republican majority (Shofner, 1974). Similarly, in 2000 in Seminole County, the elections supervisor filled in missing registration numbers on only the absentee ballots cast for Republicans. In both elections, state and county officials wore partisan hats. In 1876, most poll inspectors were Republicans, because the state constitution gave the governor extraordinary appointive powers, a deliberate move by white conservatives when the state constitution was re-written immediately following the Civil War. Conservatives, all Democrats, feared they could not retain control of the legislature, opting instead to consolidate power in the governorship, the one seat that really mattered. In 2000, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris also served as co-chair of the George W. Bush election campaign in the state. Like her predecessor in 1876, Samuel B.
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
87
McLin (another Republican), she had the power to certify the tally before a recount could be completed or any inquiry conducted into voting irregularities. McLin testified in the subsequent Congressional investigation of the presidential election that he considered himself a partisan first and an official second (Shofner, 1974). In both elections, the Republican candidate won the state popular vote by an extremely narrow margin. In 1876, the original vote count gave Hayes a 43 vote victory (24,337 to 24,294). However, the Republican-dominated canvassing board threw out 1,800 votes to give Hayes a 924 vote majority. In 2000, the Republicans first warned their opponents not to take court action, then themselves brought the courts into the dispute. In both years, the election involved the Supreme Court. The legal dispute in 2000 hinged on the lack of uniform voting standards throughout the state, but in 1876 it concerned the power of the state canvassing board to investigate allegations of wrong-doing. When Florida’s legislature took office in January, 1877, the newly sworn lawmakers, dominated by Democrats, promptly chose a new canvassing board and created a new set of electors to send to the House of Representatives (Shofner, 1974). The 1876 dispute was settled in Congress, partly because the Supreme Court had disgraced itself with the Dred Scott decision of 1857, when a lack of judicial restraint robbed the nation of any ability to compromise on the issue of slavery and precipitated the Civil War (Hall, 1992). The House of Representatives, given constitutional power to decide disputes among rival slates of electors to the electoral college, resolved the contested legitimacy of the delegations from Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina, ruling in all three cases in favor of the Republicans (Shofner, 1974). By the end of January, 1876, Florida’s Democrats were willing to compromise, conceding the presidency in return for control of the governor’s office. Regionally, “redemption” or “home rule”, that is, removal of the federal troops from the South, was a burning issue, and a prize worth giving up the White House.
Mapping Florida’s votes Of the total 5.93 million votes cast in Florida in 2000, the Republican candidate, George W. Bush, received 2,912,790, while the Democrat, Al Gore, received 2,912,253. Thus, the official margin of difference was 537 votes, or 0.009 percent of the total, reflecting the extremely close vote nationally. Because the margin of victory in this case was dwarfed by the margin of error found in vote counting machines, the election stimulated an enormous outcry over spoiled ballots, “hanging chads”, and the like. Notably, the Green Party candidate, Ralph Nader, received 96,837 votes; Florida was one of two states (the other being New Hampshire) in which the Green vote exceeded the margin of difference between the Republican and Democratic candidates. Across the landscape of the state the distribution of votes was highly uneven (Fig. 1). The core Democratic stronghold was located primarily in the Miami metropolitan area, home to numerous Jews and African-Americans, including Palm Beach, MiamiDade, Broward, and Volusia counties. In contrast, Bush’s supporters were scattered
88
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
Fig. 1.
Vote margin of victory or defeat for George W. Bush in 2000 Presidential Election.
across much of the lightly populated interior of the state.. This distribution mirrors the urban–rural schism between Democrats and Republicans that formed a fundamental part of the geography of the popular vote nationally.
Every vote counts, but not equally: the power of the Florida voter The most influential mathematical treatment of the electoral college was proposed by Banzhaf (1968), who introduced combinatorial analysis to the study of voting (see also Merrill, 1978; Natapoff, 1996; Sterling, 1978). Banzhaf’s approach viewed voting power in light of the probability that voters in a given state could affect a national election by throwing their state’s electoral votes to one presidential candidate or another. Banzhaf assumed that for a marginal voter to make a difference, the remaining votes in a given state must be equally split between the two political
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
89
parties, a condition that holds particularly well in the context of the 2000 election. He calculated voter power (VP) in state s as VPs ⫽
ns! EVs (n⫺d)!d!
(1)
where VPs=power of voter in state s; n=total votes in state s; d=votes for one party in state s; EV=electoral votes of state s in any given election. This approach holds that distribution of votes follows a binomial distribution with mean of 0.5; for large populations, the Central Limit Theorem allows the binomial to be approximated using a normal distribution with the same mean and variance, which, when simplified, can be stated as VP ⫽ √2/nd
(2)
In the specific context of Florida in the 2000 presidential election, Banzhaf’s approach is instructive. Relative to voters in the nation as a whole, Florida’s electorate, by virtue of being able to throw 25 electoral votes into the column of either candidate, each held roughly 1.4 times the average capacity of voters to influence the election nationally (Table 1). However, when the margin of victory is narrowed to particular blocs of voters within the state, the estimated capacity to shape the national election rises significantly. Thus, in the four counties that formed the largest bloc of Democratic voters, each individual casting a ballot was 61 times as influential as other voters in the nation taken as a whole. Finally, the razor-thin margin of victory that effectively awarded Florida — and the election — to George W. Bush consisted of 537 voters, each of whom was 1,584 more influential in the election than the “average” American voter. In the limiting case of this analysis, were a single voter to decide the outcome of the election, he or she would be 36,707 times more influential than his/her counterparts elsewhere in the nation.
Conclusions The exercise of voting power — the foundation of democratic political systems — is flawed when the capacity of individuals to shape national outcomes is unevenly distributed, whether by class, gender, race/ethnicity, or among places. In a democracy, at least hypothetically, every vote counts equally. However, given the dynamics Table 1 Results of application of Banzhaf’s methodology to Florida botes, 2000
US Florida 4 countries 537 voters
Estimated voting power
Voting Power Relative to US Average
0.005869 0.008203 0.361358 9.296440
1.00 1.40 61.57 1584/04
90
B. Warf, C. Waddell / Political Geography 21 (2002) 85–90
of the electoral college, in which the winner of the popular vote is not guaranteed victory, small groups of voters may have disproportionately large degrees of influence over national elections. The precise degree to which the American public was divided between the two major parties in the 2000 presidential election positioned Florida in a unique role of deciding the winner. As the comparisons to the 1876 election indicate, corruption, abuse of power, and voting irregularities played a key role in determining the outcome in both cases. Within Florida too, the electorate was split down the middle. Ultimately, the national victory of the Republican candidate rested upon a razor-thin margin of 537 votes. As the Banzhaf approach indicates, the electoral college effectively telescoped national power to decide an election into a handful of counties within the state, greatly empowering a small group of voters over others nationwide.
Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank Angela Brink at the University of Alabama for drafting the map for this essay.
References Abbott, D., & Levine, J. (1991). Wrong winner: The coming debacle in the electoral college. New York: Praeger. Agnew, J. (1996). Mapping politics: How context counts in electoral geography. Political Geography, 15, 129–146. Archer, J. (1988). Macrogeographical versus microgeographical cleavages in American presidential elections: 1940–1984. Political Geography Quarterly, 7, 111–126. Archer, J., & Shelley, F. (1988). The geography of U.S. presidential elections. Scientific American, 259, 44–53. Banzhaf, J. (1968). One man, 3.312 votes: A mathematical analysis of the electoral college. Villanova Law Review, 8, 303–341. Best, J. (1996). The choice of the people? Debating the electoral college. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Hall, K. (1992). The Oxford companion to the supreme court of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Hardaway, R. (1994). The electoral college and the constitution: The case for preserving federalism. Westport, CT: Praeger. Longley, L., & Dana, J. (1992). The biases of the electoral college in the 1990s. Polity, 25, 123–145. Merrill, S. (1978). Citizen voting power under the electoral college: A stochastic model based on state voting patterns. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 34, 376–390. Natapoff, A. A. (1996). Mathematical one-man one-vote rationale for Madisonian presidential voting based on maximum individual voting power. Public Choice, 88, 259–273. Pierce, N., & Longley, L. (1981). The people’s president: The electoral college in American history and the direct vote alternative. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shofner, J. (1974). Nor is it over yet: Florida in the era of reconstruction, 1863–1877. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida. Sterling, C. (1978). The electoral college biases revealed, the conventional wisdom and game theory models notwithstanding. Western Political Quarterly, 31, 159–177.