Free and equal access

Free and equal access

¹elecommunications Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 171—181, 1998 ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0308-5961/98 $1...

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¹elecommunications Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 171—181, 1998 ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0308-5961/98 $19.00#0.00

PII: S0308-5961(98)00004-4

Free and equal access In search of policy models for converging communication systems

Jan van Cuilenburg and Pascal Verhoest In this paper we propose a generic model for policy with regard to convergence which allows for media specific regulations and procedures. First, we propose a political approach that is based on the well-accepted notion of freedom of communication. From this notion free and equal access to communication systems is inferred as the main policy objective for modern communications policy. Second, we argue that convergence urges to new descriptive and policy models for media and telecommunication. The notion of control over access to communications is the heart of this approach, which seeks to conceptualize the balances of power between different actors in the communications sector. Six patterns of control are distinguished: exchange, distribution, proliferation, registration, editing and packaging. Policy in a liberalized environment of converging communication systems, it is argued, should be aimed at correcting imbalances in these control patterns. Thirdly, a five-layered model of communications systems is proposed which sets out possible loci for such policy intervention. Finally, some remarks are made on future communications policy operating on a control-balance analysis of communication systems. Q 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

continued on page 172

Historically, broadcasting and telecommunication services were offered on distinct infrastructures, by different organizations, that supplied different kinds of messages. They were also regulated by different regulatory regimes. Due to technological convergence, the boundaries between broadcasting and telecommunications are blurring. Technological convergence in communications finds its complement in economic convergence: telecommunications operators are entering the business of cable television, publishing houses merge with video entertainment companies and computer software companies take an interest in television networks. With convergence, the media has become confused and the historical separation of legal and regulatory regimes is worn out. Hence, policy makers look for new policy models to cope with the increasing confusion of media. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches. The holistic approach stresses the growing interrelations and complementarity between different media. Consequently, the defenders of this approach plead for a generic policy that would encompass the whole field of communications. The more pragmatic view points to the already existing variety of services and their specificity. Proponents of this view argue that the difficulty to treat this ‘complexity’ in a uniform manner calls for media-specific solutions. This difference of opinions raises the question which perspective to prefer. We argue that convergence demands a general policy model that, however, also allows for channel and media specific solutions.

Normative cornerstones In policy making politicians and administrators use models to describe and analyze the point of departure and context for their policies. At the

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most general level, one might define a model as any system K(nown) that provides knowledge of any other system U(nknown). So politicians use K, that is, sets of concepts, propositions, schemes and data, to describe, explain and predict the behavior of U. Policy models usually include propositions about the factors shaping the future behavior of the policy subject, about end-means relationships and about the effectiveness and efficiency of means. Because of this selection of relevant elements into a model, it always has a subjective undertone. Hence, models for policy making, including those proposed in this paper, unavoidably display a number of normative presuppositions. These will be explicated in the next paragraphs. First key-concept: freedom of communication

continued from page 171 Professor J. van Cuilenburg and Dr Pascal Verhoest are with ASCoR, The Amsterdam School of Communications Research, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, Oude Hoogstraat 24, 1012 CE Amsterdam, Netherlands. Tel: #31 20 525 20 89; fax: #31 20 525 21 79; email: [email protected]; [email protected]. 1

Pool, I. de Sola, Technologies of Freedom. Belknap Press, Harvard, MA, 1984.

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In the media policies of most Western governments, the traditional rationale for those policies has been freedom of press and broadcasting. In contemporary society, the political meaning of the concept of ‘freedom of expression’, in press and broadcasting, goes beyond freedom from governmental interference into the contents of the media. It is generally accepted that governments may take positive measures in order to guarantee that freedom of expression is more than just a formal right. For instance, diversity stands as a prominent policy objective, along with freedom of media expression. This is reflected in media policies establishing public service broadcasting. When we look at telecommunications in Western style democracies, a similar picture emerges. On the one hand, governmental policy is aimed at protecting the privacy of users whereas on the other, it is generally acknowledged that positive action may be required to serve all users on an equitable basis. In this respect, we may point at the well-known principles common carriage and universal service, i.e. the obligation for operators to serve all customers without discrimination and at affordable prices. Communication and information technologies should be technologies of freedom.1 In the civil society individuals and groups realize political, economic and social interaction to a large extent by way of mediated communication. Hence, freedom of communication is a crucial condition to society for it to function satisfactorily. Freedom of communication is more general than freedom of expression. The latter refers to the right of the sender to communicate messages only. Freedom of communication includes also the recipient’s right to information and even the recipient’s right not to communicate and to be left alone. It is also a more inclusive right than, for instance, freedom of the press and of speech: freedom of communication is a right that exists irrespective of the communication technology used. Freedom of communication is the right to send or not to send, and to receive or not to receive messages without hindrance by any third party. When talking about freedom it is common to make a distinction between freedom from . . . (‘negative freedom’) and freedom for . . . (‘positive freedom’). Freedom from . . . refers to the capacity of agents to exchange messages without any hindrance from political (e.g. censorship), economic (e.g. monopolies) or other social forces. Freedom for refers to the capacity of communication to enable social action, for instance, to contribute to the civic debate on politics or to express artistic creativity. In different branches of the communications system, governmental policies aiming at freedom of communication may have a different focus. In

Policy models for converging communication systems: J van Cuilenburg and P Verhoest

telecommunications, governments especially focus on widespread geographical and social distribution of technical facilities, thus enhancing the freedom for . . . . Press policy on the contrary, in essence, has mainly been motivated by the rejection of governmental censorship (freedom from . . . ). In Western-European broadcasting policy both traits are present: on the one hand, rejection of any immediate governmental interference into the media content and, on the other, measures to enhance diversity of program output (minority representation, program quota regulation, public provision). Second key-concept: access Regulating communications may concern different dimensions of the communications system, that is, the structure of the communication market, the market conduct of communication participants or the content of communication.2 Freedom of communication from . . . relates mainly to market structure and market conduct, whereas freedom for . . . primarily relates to content. It is with these three different dimensions that the concept of ‘access’ comes in. At the level of market structure and market conduct, access refers to the possibility of individuals, groups and organizations to participate in the production and the distribution of communication and information resources, whether produced in a commercial, semi-commercial or in a public service environment. At the level of content, access refers to the existence of various individuals, groups and organizations with very diverse communication and information needs. Here, so to say, the notion of access gradually shifts from access for people (consumers, firms) to access for ideas, thus putting the quality and diversity of communication and information at the center. In sum, access to communication systems is the possibility for individuals, groups and organizations to share society’s communications resources. Access is more inclusive than the concepts of public service broadcasting and universal telecommunication service and, as was the case with freedom of communication, the notions of access goes beyond the technological or media system being used. Therefore, access is better suited for a pro-active policy formulation such as those satisfying old notions of the public and universal service. Indeed, although these notions are unlikely to disappear from the political agenda in the near future, convergence of technology and liberalization of communication markets require a reformulation, a different conceptualization of the communication policy. As will be elaborated in the following paragraphs, freedom of communication and free and equal access should be related to the question, who is in control of the actual communication process?

Patterns of control

2

McQuail, D., Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest. Sage, London, 1992, pp 87—96.

The more any of the parties involved in a communication system is capable of independently determining accessibility to it, the more it is liable to restrict the freedom of communication. Thus, free and equal access implies that no party dominates control in communications, that is, a balance of power exists between the parties involved in the communication process. Since control over access to communications is control over deciding who gets access to what information and communication resources, when, where, how, and on what conditions, any imbalance in this

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relation may require monitoring by some authority, in order to prevent abuse of power. Mapping relations of control Textbooks usually conceptualize communication as a relation between two parties only: sender and recipient. In ‘traditional’ broadcasting, for example, as in most other forms of mass communication, the sender is solidly in control of the communication process, because this party determines what content is being produced and even what distribution channel will be used. Consequently, the relationship between sender and receiver is generally seen as one of dependency. However, in many cases, such dual representation blurs our understanding of the actual communication process. In most communication forms, except ‘plain old’ face-to-face conversation, some third party, an intermediary, is involved. In processes of political communication, for example, mass media play an intermediary role between the supplier of content (e.g. a political organization) and the user of the communication message. Moreover, convergence has greatly facilitated different forms of electronic two-way communication, which cannot be captured as a sender—receiver relationship. In building new policy models for communications, we should therefore accommodate for the three-party feature of many forms of communication. We may label these roles as suppliers, users and brokers. Suppliers are those who provide the content, regardless of the fact whether these are individuals or (media) organizations. Users are the recipients of the content and may also be individuals or organizations. Typical about interactive communication is that users and suppliers may inverse there roles like, for example, in a telephone conversation. Brokers are all those parties that perform an intermediary function between suppliers and users. Typical brokers are publishers, cable operators and telephone companies and internet access providers. As these example shows the notion of control and the subsequent idea of a balance of control between the agents involved can be used independently of the technology in use. To illustrate the implications of this notion let us briefly describe one example. In plain cable television, the cable operator usually takes on the role of a broker, that is, the intermediary between the viewer (user) and the broadcaster (supplier). Who is in control? The cable operator is the dominant party: he decides what package of television programs at what price will be offered to the customers. Yet, the cable operator to a certain degree is dependent on attractive programs supplied by the broadcaster. The user is the weakest party here, since he has no control over the channel of distribution, nor over the production of content. The implication of this imbalance is that governmental communications policy should especially

Table 1. Typology of control over access. Supplier

User

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!

#

Broker

Broker

!

#

!

#

!

A

B

C

D

#

E

F

G

H

Policy models for converging communication systems: J van Cuilenburg and P Verhoest

focus on tariffs and on the composition of program packages (must-carry rules), or even, in the case the market fails to provide the socially desired content, the production of content itself. If we restrict control over access to low (!) and high (#) only, then a typology of eight different patterns results (see Table 1).

Check and balances The main patterns of control in practice are the following: f Exchange: In this point-to-point pattern of communication both supplier and user have high control over the communication process, whereas the broker has an indeterminate (low/high?) influence. So, there is relative equality between supplier and user. The most common example is a telephone conversation. E-mail and other forms of data transmission are other fairly common examples. f Distribution: Distribution refers to multi-point communication where the provision of content is centrally controlled by the supplier, whereas the user only has little control over content production and distribution. Most homepages on the internet also fall under this category. Press, radio and television broadcasting are the more common examples of this pattern. The user’s control is generally indirect, through market mechanisms or, in the case of public broadcasting, through political representation. f Proliferation: Proliferation indicates a many-to-many form of communication where the supplier profusely transfers information to a great number of different users. Neither the supplier himself, nor the broker or user are much in control of the actual communication process. An example of proliferation is the circulation of photographic material on the Internet. f Registration: This, a many-to-one form of communication indicates a pattern where most control is in the hands of the user, often a kind of governmental, semi-governmental or business agency. Examples of registration are telemetry and telebanking. The supplier has generally only the control to provide or not to provide information. The supplier afterwards has but little grip on the usage that is made of the information supplied. f Editing: This, many-to-one-to-many pattern of control refers to the presence of a third party, performing a broker’s role and thus acting as an intermediary between the original supplier of information and the user. A typical example would be a publisher who out of the raw materials of supplying news agencies composes a newspaper or a magazine. Another example is the moderator of a bulletin board or an Internet newsgroup. Generally, most forms of database publishing may also be described by this type. f Packaging: This form of communication resembles the latter, though the broker here only performs a packaging function of putting together pieces of information in a package, without editing the information. A typical example would be the cable operator offering different packages of television programs and video-on-demand to the public. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to place applications in discrete analytical categories. An unmediated bulletin board for a closed user group is rather closely related to exchange than to editing. A strongly

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Policy models for converging communication systems: J van Cuilenburg and P Verhoest Table 2. Main patterns of control in information or communication services. Supplier !

#

Broker

Broker

! User

! #

Proliferation

#

!

Packaging

Distribution

Registration

# Editing

Exchange

mediated bulletin board that is freely accessible resembles more a distribution pattern. Moreover, combinations of patterns are imaginable too. The six patterns above all find a place in the control typology of Table 2.

A five-layer model of social communications systems For a long time in media policy, the dichotomy press versus broadcasting sufficed as a basis for regulation. Furthermore, media and telecommunication were separate worlds. With the advance in communications technology new typologies allowing for more mixed and hybrid services were developed, as is illustrated by the above typology of patterns of control. As was already argued, the blurring boundaries between telecommunications and mass media, on the one hand, and between different forms of mass media on the other, urge a search for new models that are preferably not dependent on a specific communication technology. The above model, which is primarily concerned with content provides an analytical entry point for doing so. However, in order to be implemented, this model requires an operational linkage with actual market structures and market conduct. The five-layered model of communication networks proposed in this paragraph permits such a linking. (Figure 1). Network layers: facts and fiction

3

Fagan, M. D., A History of Science and Engeneering in the Bell System: the Early Years (1875—1925). S.l., 1974.

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Layered conceptions of telecommunications systems are relatively new to the telecommunications sector. Their advent corresponds to the introduction of competition in the sector. Indeed, models as conceptualizations of reality on technical and economic grounds, factual or virtual, come and go and do not depend so much on reality itself, but on political needs. If integration and natural monopoly is policy ‘dogma’, then an integrated model of networks is designed and applied. If, on the contrary, more market stimuli are welcomed, then a kind of layered OSI-model is being announced. A short historical overview shows this. In 1974, the Bell Telephone Laboratories described a telecommunication network as one technical system made up out of four ‘subsystems’: transmission, switching, signaling and terminal equipment. It was argued that those subsystems require a high level of integration.3 This technical description is apparently neutral and it is, indeed, a rather good portrayal of the network architecture of that period. However, it is less neutral than appearance suggests. High-level integration, that is, integration based on the usage of a single technique, also served other purposes than merely technical ones. From the 19th century onwards, the Bell consortium had tried to discourage potential competitors by way of, amongst other things,

Policy models for converging communication systems: J van Cuilenburg and P Verhoest

4

Verhoest, P., De maatschappelijke en technologische constructie van de Belgische telefoonnetten in de 19e eeuw: een structurele ananlyse. In Media and Maatschappij 1. eds H. Verstraeten and P. Perceval, VUBPress, Brussel, 1991, pp 211—228. 5 CEC, Towards a dynamic European economy: green paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment. COM(87) 290 final, 30 June 1987; CEC, Council directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services. 90/388/EEC; OJ L192/10, 24 June 1990. Within the ‘layer’ of services, an additional differentiation was made between ‘basic’ and ‘value added’ services. Value added services were those that did not affect the ‘basic’ economy of the network. These economic distinctions were further translated into political terms in the European directive on the liberalization of services. This directive introduced the principle that ‘all services were free’. However, some basic services, the most important of which was ‘plain old’ telephony (POT), could still be exploited exclusively by the incumbent operator. These services were therefore called ‘reserved services’. The commission argued, amongst other things, that the continuous monopolization of ‘basic’ telephony was needed to finance the development of the fixed switched infrastructure. 6 Arnbak, J. C., van Cuilenburg, J. J. and Dommering E. J., Verbinding en Ontvlechting in de Communicatie: Een Studie Naar Toekomstig Overheidsbeleid Voor de Openbare Electronische Informatievoorziening. Otto Cramwinkel Uitgever, Amsterdam, 1990. 7 Cuilenburg, J. van and Slaa, P., From media policy towards a national communications policy. European Journal of Communication, 1993, 8(2), 149—176; Cuilenburg, J. van and Slaa, P., Towards an anticyclical competition policy in telecommunications. Telecommunications Policy, 1993, 18(1), 51—65. Cuilenburg, J. van and Slaa, P., Competition and innovation in telecommunications. Telecommunications Policy, 1994, 19(8), 647—663.

technological exclusion.4 Thus, the high-level integration of AT&T’s network was not solely the result of technical imperatives, but also to a considerable extend the outcome of an anti-competitive strategy and a political argument in favor of the AT&T monopoly. Contemporary technical descriptions often sketch a more varied picture of telecommunication systems. Such descriptions are based on the opposite idea of low-level integration, whereby different types of networking techniques coexist. For example, the OSI-model (open systems interconnection) describes network architecture in seven layers, designed to facilitate connectivity of different network facilities (run by different operators). The description of networks contained in the OSI-model is also not purely technical or neutral, as it equally is a politico-economic concept, that is meant to enhance the liberalization of telecommunication markets. Much like the above technical descriptions, representations of networks based on economic concepts vary with the evolution of communication markets. One example thereof is the evolution of the terminology used by the European Commission. Before liberalization, the term telecommunication infrastructure was quite often used as a generic concept, comprising all the components of the earlier described Bell system. With the (partial) European liberalization of telecommunications in the 1980s, a clearer distinction was made between, infrastructure (transmission and switching), on the one hand, and ‘services’ offered on the infrastructure on the other.5 The Commission is now moving from this two-layered model towards a three-layered conception of the telecommunications market. In its Green Paper on Convergence (also see Clements, this issue) a distinction is proposed between transport, service provision and content. This threelayered approach is not so new. For example, a similar model was already introduced in 1990 in a study for the Dutch government on the implications of convergence and competition.6 This model combines the idea of different layers within communication with the notion that content provision and exchange is the finality of any telecommunication service provision.7 Towards a five-layer model In the next sections, we will try to develop an even more general model. Convergence and competition, it is argued, make it necessary to revise the familiar models of communications systems. Convergence has brought about all kinds of hybrid forms of communication. Competition in addition has made the concept of one integrated infrastructure operated by one common carrier obsolete. Therefore, before proceeding to a new policy model for communications, we will briefly describe a more general and

Figure 1. A three-layer model of telecommunications networks.

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descriptive model of a social communications system, starting with a revised three-layered model which is then elaborated. f The term application in this model indicates all distinct end-uses of a communication system, irrespective of their physical media. To make a phone call or to consult a audio database, to watch TV or to consult teletext are end uses. All services rendering possible distinct end-uses can then be grouped in an application layer. f The conveyance over distance of an application intended for the enduser may be called carriage. The term carrier indicates services like telephony, data-transmission and television. Telephony, for example, can serve as a carrier to convey conversations, to consult audiotex services or to perform financial transactions. Applications like videoon-demand and pay-per-view are often offered on hybrid carriers combining cable television and telephony. f The infrastructure consists of the physical artifacts used for the transmission and switching of any electronic data. Convergence further contributes to the confusion of infrastructure services. Fixed switched networks, cable distribution, cellular networks and satellite can all be used as alternative carrier for a same carrier service. A telephone conversation, for example, can be carried from one end of a connection to another using lines owned by different infrastructures. Cable operators, for example, could want to offer telephony and switched network operators could want to offer video-on-demand. In Figure 2 this is depicted by an infrastructural layer with more than one infrastructure. The picture that emerges so far is one of a diversified three-layered system, each layer comprising a multiple number of services. This picture, however, is incomplete. In order to function as a network, application, carrier and infrastructure services have to run conjunctly. Services should allow interoperability. The conditions for interoperability are represented by two in-between layers: the interfaces. f ºser interfaces indicates those features that facilitate interoperability of networks at the level of carrier and application services. Typical examples are set-top-boxes, carrier select functions, and Internet software. f The network interface layer indicates those features that facilitate interoperability of carrier and infrastructure services. Typical examples are problems related to the management and control of routing, signalling and billing.

Figure 2. A five-layer model of telecommunications networks.

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User and network interfaces represent important regulatory bottelnecks. These issues can be identified at both the upper (user) and the lower (network) end of the telecommunication network and have technical as well as financial aspects. At the level of user interfaces, regulatory issues relate to the ease with which the customer can access and choose between different applications and different carriers. The financial aspect concerns tariffs, especially the retail prices charged to the customers. At the level of network interfaces, technical problems relate to the ease by which competitors can access different infrastructures and other carrier services. The financial dimension concerns fees, these are; generally, the wholesale prices charged to another operator. The smaller size of the interface layer in Figure 2 symbolizes their hidden character. Network interfaces are closely related to the so-called ‘intelligence’ of networks. Intelligent network features allow end-users and/or service providers to customize networks. Flexible interfaces situated at the periphery of the network generally increase costs, but provide end-users and service providers greater mobility. Rigid interfaces, centralized within a network, permit economies of scale, but also increase the grip of the operator who is in control of them. They are therefore very important to competition. If competition is going to increase, the importance of interfaces is going to augment, because they determine the capacity of users to ‘navigate’ through the network, hence to opt for the service providers of their own choice. Although the five-layer model sticks relatively close to technical reality, it should be noted that these layers (and services) are not necessarily physically separated from one another. For example, the ‘intelligence’ of a ‘carrier select’ interface can be integrated at different levels of the network. To add to the already existing confusion, it should also be noted that some services could also be build upon each other within the same layer. For example, an ‘enhanced’ carrier service can be offered on top of a more ‘basic’ carrier service.

Communications policies for access: some concluding remarks The present technological and economic convergence in the communications and media sector makes the traditional separation of telecommunications policy and media policy more and more obsolete. In this paper, we tried to develop a framework for communications policy design, which is general and at the same time allows for communication channel and media specific application. Though it might be possible that distinctions between, for instance, telephony and broadcasting, in practice, will still stay for a long time to come, this does not rule out a general perspective from which channel specific developments may be assessed and evaluated. The framework we proposed may be labeled as communications policy for access. It takes as its starting point that in most Western societies is accepted as the main goal of a communications policy—the free and equal access to a social communications system that diversely provides for the information and communication needs in society. A general communications policy for access should therefore aim at the greatest freedom, for the greatest number of communication and information suppliers, users, and brokers, and should therefore monitor and correct any situation in which control of access is subject to market failure and consequently out of

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balance. To put it in other words, a communication policy for access should strive for maximum equality in the distribution of communication freedom. Access may mean different things at different levels of the social communications system, that is, free and equal access as a policy goal has different implications for different actors (suppliers, users, and brokers) in the communication sector. Policies for access may therefore require channel and media specific solutions. Moreover, we have to add that the topology of a social communications system gets increasingly complex. For communications policy, this brings along the necessity to design specific policy measures for specific layers, channels and information and communication services in the national communications system. To finish our treatise, let us briefly sketch some implications of access policy for information and communication services. Information and communication services, the ultimate finality of any collective communication system, are offered in six main modes: exchange, distribution, proliferation, registration, editing and packaging. From this table we may infer the following: f In distribution as a rule the user is the weaker party, so that policy should focus on guaranteeing access for audiences to preferred, diverse and affordable media content. f In proliferation as a rule all parties do not have much control over the communication process. We could regret this, but that in itself does not produce strong arguments for policy, except perhaps that all parties should be made aware of the fact that proliferation usually goes with much information waste and loss. f In registration as a rule the supplier is the weaker party, so that policy should focus on guaranteeing privacy of people being registered. f In exchange, at the level of content, as a rule there is a balance of power between supplier and user. Communication policy should mainly focus on keeping the communication power distribution in balance and on matters of privacy. f In editing as a rule the user is the weaker party, so that—like in distribution— policy should focus on guaranteeing access for audiences to preferred, diverse and affordable media content. f In packaging as a rule the broker is the strongest party, whereas notably the supplier is the weakest party. Access policy for these kinds of services should aim at promoting access for content suppliers to their customers and audiences. From the point of view of firms, access in the first place means access to customers. Firms may either have direct access to customers (for example, a vertically integrated firm) or indirect access through intermediate firms (for example, the horizontally integrated firm). Direct access to customers represents a important strategic advantage for firms. It may either serve to lock-out other service providers and/or it may serve to lock-in the enduser. To prevent this a competitive communication systems should have relatively open architectures allowing for user mobility. It was not the aim of this article to design a blueprint for regulation, but only to propose some conceptual tools that may support such effort. However, the models proposed are suggestive of a direction the regulation may take. As was pointed out, a competitive environment would be a diversified one, hence the need to counter vertical and horizontal concentration tendencies. But such policy needs careful consideration

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because some level of integration could be required to sustain a sound network economy (economies of scale and scope). A good compromise may be the unbundling of activities of firms that are active in different layers where such is feasible. This would improve the transparency of the market, while still allowing cross-layer investments. Because of the specific characteristics of each level in an economic, but also in a socio-cultural respect, regulation could also be designed on a layer specific basis. The schemes presented thus enhance a service specific regulation rather than a technology or firm specific one (such specific regulations may always be added if such is deemed necessary). If, at the level of application techno-economic regulation does not suffice to achieve the socially desired goals, it may be complemented, or even supplemented by non-market regulation, for example, the public provision of certain forms of content. The design of such a balanced policy and regulation constitutes an important future research agenda. In this regard, this article demonstrated that, though access is a very general concept, it allows for specific questions, problem definitions and solutions for specific information and communication patterns and services. So, communications policy for access is not just an abstract ideal of freedom of communication, utopian far away, but an ideal that may energize practical policy design and implementation.

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