- Email: [email protected]
French liberalism and the question of society
ARTICLE IN PRESS
History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
Editorial
French liberalism and the question of society Recent years have seen a revived interest in liberalism as a political and social doctrine. As part of this rediscovery, Benjamin Constant, Fran@ois Guizot and Alexis de Tocqueville have emerged as exceptionally insightful and profound thinkers, well worth renewed attention from modern scholars. Writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution, they sought first of all to understand this momentous political event which they held to be of supreme importance and historical significance. Secondly, they wished to defend and legitimize the Revolution’s fundamental ideals and accomplishments while at the same time distancing themselves from some of its notable failures and regrettable excesses. It was in order to accomplish this dual goal that they turned to the realm of ‘‘the social’’, that is, to the underlying factors and causes of the Revolution. In so doing, they triggered what Aurelian Craiutu rightly calls ‘‘a golden age of political thought’’. Increasingly sensitive to the profound social transformations taking place all around them, these early liberals came to see both France’s present state and the French Revolution as the product of long-term and irreversible social forces. To them, the political turbulence and violent upheavals of the Revolutionary period only served to confirm their belief that politics alone could neither create nor sustain a stable and liberal political order. The social sphere was crucial. This was, of course, the sphere of economics; but it was equally the sphere of sociability, of manners and morals. Indeed, for liberals like Constant, Guizot and Tocqueville, the French Revolution made it patently clear that a healthy relationship between social mores and politics was crucially important to the survival of a just polity. It was with the goal of discussing the liberal view of the relationship between the social and the political that the authors whose articles are presented here met at the Society for French Historical Studies conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in April 2003. The papers presented at the conference have since been slightly revised for publication. Two of them focus on Benjamin Constant. They share the aim of bringing to light the richness, depth and multifaceted nature of Constant’s liberalism, which has often been described rather simplistically. Steven Vincent highlights the importance Constant attributed to morals and character as a foundation of a viable liberal polity. Basing his research in part on Constant’s little known early writings, Vincent shows that Constant worried about the nefarious effects the Revolution had had on Frenchmen’s character traits. It had strengthened bad passions like fanaticism and self-interest, both of which undermined a stable and 0191-6599/$ - see front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2003.12.001
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Editorial / History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
liberal order. In contrast, Constant believed that good passions like compassion and enthusiasm should be encouraged in the interest of the health and survival of a just polity. Thanks to Vincent’s analysis, Constant’s liberalism emerges as a more subtle and complex theory which accorded a crucial role to morals. My own piece argues that Constant’s liberalism is too often accused of being narrowly concerned with the mere satisfaction of personal self-interest and of undervaluing the political. I contend that Constant recognized the need for a vibrant political life and fought particularly hard for it during the Restoration, when other liberals gave up on politics. Indeed, a comparison of Constant’s views during this period with those of the group of liberals commonly called industrialistes, and with those of the group who became Saint-Simonians, shows that Constant fought valiantly for the rebirth of a public spirit that was as pluralistic as it was political. Moreover, Constant’s writings on religion show that he had higher goals in mind for citizens than just the pursuit of private pleasures. The three remaining papers all touch in varying degrees on Guizot and his now widely recognized influence on Tocqueville. Everyone agrees about the importance of Guizot’s innovation, in particular, his sociological approach to history and his notion of democracy as a ‘‘type of society’’ or ‘‘social condition’’ (!etat social). It is the exact nature of this achievement and its effect on Tocqueville that brought out a considerable amount of scholarly disagreement. The biggest contrast is between Aurelian Craiutu and Melvin Richter. Craiutu paints an original portrait of Guizot, presenting us with a Guizot whose turn to the social was seminal, but whose approach was always nuanced and never deterministic. According to Craiutu, Guizot believed in the ‘‘interplay’’ between politics and social structure. Moreover, from Craiutu’s perspective, Guizot subscribed to a kind of ‘‘pluralism’’ that valued variety and even discordance as positive factors in the advancement of civilization. Insisting on distinguishing Guizot from Marx, Craiutu thus draws Guizot closer to Tocqueville. After all, Craiutu argues, both men emphasized the ways in which the manners and mores of society influence political institutions. And both men were simultaneously supporters and critics of both democracy and the French Revolution. Melvin Richter’s paper, in contrast, sharply differentiates between Guizot’s view of the social and that of the mature Tocqueville. According to Richter, Guizot was a social determinst; to Guizot, the nature of a society dictated its political organization. Unlike Tocqueville, Guizot was unequivocally ‘‘opposed’’, ‘‘antagonistic’’ and ‘‘hostile’’ to democracy. Richter offers uncomfortable facts about the political regime that Guizot actually led and supported. Richter further argues that the early Tocqueville was indeed indebted to Guizot in his definition of democracy as a form of society. But Tocqueville also vacillated in his view of democracy, sometimes adopting Montesquieu’s more nuanced perspective on the interaction between politics and society. Finally, Richter argues, Tocqueville altogether rejected Guizot’s anti-democratic views and embraced an unequivocally political definition of democracy. Cheryl Welch’s paper tries to nuance what she sees as these overly stark contrasts; in the process, she disagrees with both Craiutu and Richter. Welch stresses the life-long originality of Tocqueville. Comparing him not only to Guizot and the
ARTICLE IN PRESS Editorial / History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
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Doctrinaires, but to Catholic social reformers and to thinkers influenced by the school of classical political economy, she argues that Tocqueville always stressed the interaction between the social and political spheres and gave political agency a creative power that the others denied. Characterizing Guizot’s position as social determinism, Welch argues that Tocqueville never entirely agreed with him on this; but neither did Tocqueville entirely abandon Guizot’s point of view either. According to Welch, it would be more accurate to say that Guizot was ‘‘a continuing presence’’ that was ‘‘imperfectly assimilated’’ in Tocqueville’s writings. Clearly, the relationship of the social and the political gave not only French liberals much to talk about, but it triggered a lively debate among us as well. We agreed that our papers would be just the beginning of what we hoped would be a continuing discussion. We would all like to thank Richard Whatmore very much for his generous invitation to publish our papers in the History of European Ideas.
H. Rosenblatt Department of History, Hunter College, City University of New York, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021, USA Email address: [email protected]
History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
Editorial
French liberalism and the question of society Recent years have seen a revived interest in liberalism as a political and social doctrine. As part of this rediscovery, Benjamin Constant, Fran@ois Guizot and Alexis de Tocqueville have emerged as exceptionally insightful and profound thinkers, well worth renewed attention from modern scholars. Writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution, they sought first of all to understand this momentous political event which they held to be of supreme importance and historical significance. Secondly, they wished to defend and legitimize the Revolution’s fundamental ideals and accomplishments while at the same time distancing themselves from some of its notable failures and regrettable excesses. It was in order to accomplish this dual goal that they turned to the realm of ‘‘the social’’, that is, to the underlying factors and causes of the Revolution. In so doing, they triggered what Aurelian Craiutu rightly calls ‘‘a golden age of political thought’’. Increasingly sensitive to the profound social transformations taking place all around them, these early liberals came to see both France’s present state and the French Revolution as the product of long-term and irreversible social forces. To them, the political turbulence and violent upheavals of the Revolutionary period only served to confirm their belief that politics alone could neither create nor sustain a stable and liberal political order. The social sphere was crucial. This was, of course, the sphere of economics; but it was equally the sphere of sociability, of manners and morals. Indeed, for liberals like Constant, Guizot and Tocqueville, the French Revolution made it patently clear that a healthy relationship between social mores and politics was crucially important to the survival of a just polity. It was with the goal of discussing the liberal view of the relationship between the social and the political that the authors whose articles are presented here met at the Society for French Historical Studies conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in April 2003. The papers presented at the conference have since been slightly revised for publication. Two of them focus on Benjamin Constant. They share the aim of bringing to light the richness, depth and multifaceted nature of Constant’s liberalism, which has often been described rather simplistically. Steven Vincent highlights the importance Constant attributed to morals and character as a foundation of a viable liberal polity. Basing his research in part on Constant’s little known early writings, Vincent shows that Constant worried about the nefarious effects the Revolution had had on Frenchmen’s character traits. It had strengthened bad passions like fanaticism and self-interest, both of which undermined a stable and 0191-6599/$ - see front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2003.12.001
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Editorial / History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
liberal order. In contrast, Constant believed that good passions like compassion and enthusiasm should be encouraged in the interest of the health and survival of a just polity. Thanks to Vincent’s analysis, Constant’s liberalism emerges as a more subtle and complex theory which accorded a crucial role to morals. My own piece argues that Constant’s liberalism is too often accused of being narrowly concerned with the mere satisfaction of personal self-interest and of undervaluing the political. I contend that Constant recognized the need for a vibrant political life and fought particularly hard for it during the Restoration, when other liberals gave up on politics. Indeed, a comparison of Constant’s views during this period with those of the group of liberals commonly called industrialistes, and with those of the group who became Saint-Simonians, shows that Constant fought valiantly for the rebirth of a public spirit that was as pluralistic as it was political. Moreover, Constant’s writings on religion show that he had higher goals in mind for citizens than just the pursuit of private pleasures. The three remaining papers all touch in varying degrees on Guizot and his now widely recognized influence on Tocqueville. Everyone agrees about the importance of Guizot’s innovation, in particular, his sociological approach to history and his notion of democracy as a ‘‘type of society’’ or ‘‘social condition’’ (!etat social). It is the exact nature of this achievement and its effect on Tocqueville that brought out a considerable amount of scholarly disagreement. The biggest contrast is between Aurelian Craiutu and Melvin Richter. Craiutu paints an original portrait of Guizot, presenting us with a Guizot whose turn to the social was seminal, but whose approach was always nuanced and never deterministic. According to Craiutu, Guizot believed in the ‘‘interplay’’ between politics and social structure. Moreover, from Craiutu’s perspective, Guizot subscribed to a kind of ‘‘pluralism’’ that valued variety and even discordance as positive factors in the advancement of civilization. Insisting on distinguishing Guizot from Marx, Craiutu thus draws Guizot closer to Tocqueville. After all, Craiutu argues, both men emphasized the ways in which the manners and mores of society influence political institutions. And both men were simultaneously supporters and critics of both democracy and the French Revolution. Melvin Richter’s paper, in contrast, sharply differentiates between Guizot’s view of the social and that of the mature Tocqueville. According to Richter, Guizot was a social determinst; to Guizot, the nature of a society dictated its political organization. Unlike Tocqueville, Guizot was unequivocally ‘‘opposed’’, ‘‘antagonistic’’ and ‘‘hostile’’ to democracy. Richter offers uncomfortable facts about the political regime that Guizot actually led and supported. Richter further argues that the early Tocqueville was indeed indebted to Guizot in his definition of democracy as a form of society. But Tocqueville also vacillated in his view of democracy, sometimes adopting Montesquieu’s more nuanced perspective on the interaction between politics and society. Finally, Richter argues, Tocqueville altogether rejected Guizot’s anti-democratic views and embraced an unequivocally political definition of democracy. Cheryl Welch’s paper tries to nuance what she sees as these overly stark contrasts; in the process, she disagrees with both Craiutu and Richter. Welch stresses the life-long originality of Tocqueville. Comparing him not only to Guizot and the
ARTICLE IN PRESS Editorial / History of European Ideas 30 (2004) 1–3
3
Doctrinaires, but to Catholic social reformers and to thinkers influenced by the school of classical political economy, she argues that Tocqueville always stressed the interaction between the social and political spheres and gave political agency a creative power that the others denied. Characterizing Guizot’s position as social determinism, Welch argues that Tocqueville never entirely agreed with him on this; but neither did Tocqueville entirely abandon Guizot’s point of view either. According to Welch, it would be more accurate to say that Guizot was ‘‘a continuing presence’’ that was ‘‘imperfectly assimilated’’ in Tocqueville’s writings. Clearly, the relationship of the social and the political gave not only French liberals much to talk about, but it triggered a lively debate among us as well. We agreed that our papers would be just the beginning of what we hoped would be a continuing discussion. We would all like to thank Richard Whatmore very much for his generous invitation to publish our papers in the History of European Ideas.
H. Rosenblatt Department of History, Hunter College, City University of New York, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021, USA Email address: [email protected]