7iiiiwpM 0--
German urban public transport policy Carmen Hass-Klau Joint Centre for Land Development Studies, University of Reading, UK
Since 1967, money for local authority roads and public transportation systems in Germany has been raised by an increase in petrol tax; 60% of these funds have gone into road building. and 40% to public transportation investments. Later this formula was changed slightly but there has never been any major change in favour of public transportation.’ Some critics have argued that the federal government, the Lander and the cities themselves have never been completely committed to public transportation. The failure to attract car drivers back to public transportatiol~ modes was partly due to extensive road building programmes in the city; which to some extent also favoured bus traffic, but which were mainly intended to improve car traffic. Therefore removing tram lines from the surface was a good way of adding addi-
tional car lanes to the road. However this was not done everywhere and there is growing opposition to doing so. By the end of the 1970s many cities had started ambitious construction programmes for .underground tram systems’ which could be changed later to ‘proper’ rapid rail systems. All construction programmes were based on overoptimistic forecasts of population and employment. It was generally believed that all large cities would experience further increases in industrial employment and much Iarger increases in tertiary sector employment, the latter especially would have its highest growth rate in the city centres. The progress of the construction of these new public transportation systems depended on either strong individual personalities such as city planners and mayor. or special events, or both. All cities which invested heavily in new public transportation systems showed an increase in passenger trips in general, and in all cases a significant growth of passengers in the newly improved lines. In Essen. the new U18 carried nearly 3 million passengers in 1978, and 5.2 million two years later. In Nuremberg the new underground line carried 26.4 million in 1978 and 34.3 million in 1980. Statistics in Hanover show passenger increases of 50% on one of the newly built lines. In Cologne, the line 16 shows a strong passenger increase varying be-
0264-27511841060551-06
& Co {Publishers)
Germany began to invest heavily in new public transpo~a tion sys terns after 1960. Car ownership had risen from just under 7 million in f 953 to 6.6 million in 1963 (by 7982 this had risen to 24.1 millions ’ and the city centres of large cities were suffering from severe traffic congestion. Unlike the UK, which got rid of its trams when traffic congestion became a serious problem, Germany pursued a more expensive policy of reducing traffic congestion by building mainly underground rights of way for trams.
$03.00 0 1984 Butterworth
Ctd
‘J.W. Woilatz and F, Tamms, eds, Die kommuna~en Verkehrsprobleme in der Bundesrepublik ~eutschtand, Essen, 1965, p 11; Verband ijffentlicher Verkehrsbetriebe, Statistiken, 1982. Verband Hfentlicher Verkehrsbetriebe, ~~entlicher Personennahverkehr, lnvestitionen ~a~leist~ngen - Erfolge 1967-1976, K&n, 1978, PG.
551
tween
Jl-X0’%
lowing 3Nuremberg, Essen: internal information of the transport authorities in Nuremberg and Essen; for Hanover see Hannoversche Verkehrsbetnebe AG, Statisfischer Ben’cht 1982. Hannover, 1982: for Cologne see, KBlner Verkehrs-Betriebe AG. Koln-Bonner Eisenbahner AG, Verkehrsztihlung 7979, Kbln, 1980. % Guhl, Schnelverkehr in 6allungsr~umen. Dijsseldorf, 1975, p 45. “Mijnchner Verkehrsverbund. Report ‘87, MDnchen. 1982. p 7.
its
between
on different
conversion 1977
and
be continued new
for
rapid
contrast. some
the
or
However, suffered
rail tram
have lost
very
public
man
fol-
west-east
line
railway
could
recently
length
of
about
313 km and the line
and
nearly
all Ger-
systems
have
because
loss of pupil further relatively higher
0
public
high than
increases
loss
fares
(fares
car petrol
has had ;I constant of trips
164
million
are much
I‘hcsc
losses
which
the
are
strongest
economic
The
Mlrtlich.
most
in Munich
S-Bahn tumn
cities
recession
is
in
biting
and
Olympic
underground before
Games.
portation
spectacular
transport
was the opening
1971, just
The
system
although
system
chains
make
them
increase
in
arcades. tion,
new
public
trans-
planning
combined
with
large-scale ccntre.
pcdestrianiz~ition although
the
some
had had experience
precincts
since
the
that
of
late
37 --
111 . which
was
standds.
The
improved
by The
main
lines
city
centre, town
~-eachthe
city
there
trees
just hall.
centre
in the middle in
The Iy
the
under-
front
of
S-Bahn ;I 1.3
km
by
This
the
its
got
l’cderal
the city centrc illegal
supporters
the govfine5 Until
for ‘anti
new
by car is
parking
parking.
policy
in
i-ail prog-
yet
the
(as
group
to finance
not
transport
some
be
structure
rapid
was very cc~nsistently arc
might
in (;crmany.
and high
fat-
even
incrcaxd
interest
from
enter
enforced
the city c;ir’
l’or more
but GII-
places in the city ccntre. and at illegal car parking ha\ bccomc
parking
and
of
and three
was placed
attractive
of
sta
ever- committed
have
impossible
recently ccntrc
buildings,
To
nearly
and
economic
It even has started
crnnient.
ICI72
main
it still
IW!
to continue
approval
by
an
yy5tcm
s~~cccss.
than
fi&ncial
was generally
the
is one of the soundest
city)
al-e
the
of
amusement
of passengers.
which
interchange lines
number
;I
and
ramme.
fountains.
new S-Bahn
ground the
restoration
schemes.
flowers. seven
ccntre
IWI
projects
of
less
transportation
been
German
enormous
city
public
far
the
the width
or
which
can be stopped
was
I’lanncrs
and
facades
around
these
shops.
streets
and
is CVCI-y political
pcdcstri~inizatic,n about
shops
in
retailing
a danger
it sccnis
of X00 m would never be accepted were worries
sex
pedestrian
1920s.
visible.
in callcd
more
city
afraid there
all
also
is
is more
length and
the
unified
Munich
were
colour
552
in
W
sim-
controls.
\o
which
as what
national
also due to Munich’s
‘I‘his kind of pcclcstrianization
unprecedented. cities
not
look
its and
have
of
especially
between its
De4pitc
la~-gc cities
centres
Munich’s has
pedes-
systems
pedestrian
in
coii-
of
city ccntre
the
although
of the
‘the scale of Munich’s pedestrianization was unprecedented’
arc
IW3.
and
out old cstablishccl
There
of the
in the
of other
~~/itrli.~icrlrttg.
city
the opening
was
to those
doniinatin~
increase
centre.
;I dangel-
giving
of the
system,
Munich’\
pushing
wme.
au-
city
they is
12. years
number
transportation
lar prc>blems
Gcrni;rny in
hardc\t.
event
the
is
30 km
;I year)’
in the
success.
There
in car ownership.
passengers
in
network
( 1972, 203 million;
increases
public
costs);
After
in I‘hc
reaches
transportation
Munich
obvious
in the city:
S-Bahn
number
trians
rolls;
population
the
the hinterland.
new
in unemployment;
0 0
into
stant
0
traffic.
total
lines
main
suburban
city with In
the declined
lines.
loss of passengers
increases
therefore somewhat
for
of: 0
tunnel.’ station
importance
passengers.
transportation
some
list
German
light
traditional
bus lines
rail
lc)7c).3 This
every
rail
stretches
to a light
present easier.
of the
Htrtro~v~.
lines
the
long
tarIts.
sire
Hanover. of
Munich
i\ another
which with
successful
CITIES
is ;Ibout 550000 city
half
inhabin terms
November
1984
of new public transportation systems. Hanover opted very early for a light rail system instead of a rapid rail system. The reasons were obvious: the light rail system could be developed from Hanover’s old tram system which was the most
‘Hanover’s public transport was planned in combination with a completely new city centre’ extensive in Germany. Trams would only need to go underground at the most congested streets and squares - mainly in the city centre - but otherwise the width of the tracks and many technical items stayed the same. Hanover today has a light rail network of 62 km, plus over 30 km outside the city where the trains have their own right of way. In c~~mparison, the new Tyne and Wear metro system in the UK will have a length of 54 km, when it is completely finished in 1984.” Hanover’s light rail system consists of four lines, of which two are completed (Line A in lY76, Line B in 1982) and a third is partly completed.’ The fourth line is not yet financed. As in Munich, on every political level there is a conviction about the future financial support for further construction of the public tr~lnsp~~rtation system. Hanover’s public transport~~ti(~n system was not planned in isolation; the system included a completely new city centre lay-out. For urban planners. Hanover’s city centre is probably the most interesting of all German city centres because of its variety of different features. There is a very modern two-level shopping area, in which the lower floor starts behind the main station - actually connecting the urban area in front of and behind the station - ft~rming a partly open and a partly covered shopping arcade which finishes in the middle of the main shopping area. Some parts of the city centre have been rebuilt in its old historic form which makes an interesting contrast with the modern architecture. There are also
CITIES
November
1984
several social housing ‘islands’, with gardens. only one minute away from huge department stores. Every Saturday on the banks of the river Leine, close to the city centre, probably the largest flea market in Germany is held. Hanover’s mixture in the city centre is ambitious, and some parts seem to work rather well: however, the underground passage is frighteningly empty by 8 o’clock in the evening, and it is not a place a woman would want to walk and look in shop windows. More impressive are improvements in inner city areas in connection with the construction of one of the light rail lines. Hanover’s East City is a good example of an improvement in living conditions of an inner city area. The main shopping street in which the tram ran has been changed to a pedestrian street. with the tram route running undergr~~un~l. The residential areas close by have all experienced Iarge schemes of VrrkehrsheruhiiSutlg, which seem to have made the whole area once again a place for good urban living. Hanover’s economic structure is not as healthy as Munich’s. Its unemployment rate is nearly double and therefore the number of public transportation passengers did drop about 2% from 1981 to lY82, after significant increases had occurred after 1975.” ~itrt~l~b~r~. The city of Nuremberg is a prime example of the extent to which political decisions can determine the choice of public transportation system. Nuremberg is one of the four cities in the Federal Republic which has a rapid rail system. although transportation planners strongly advised a light rail system.” Since the early 19th century, Nuremherg has been in the political shadow of Munich. After Mul1ich.s world-wide ‘success’ in public tr~~nsp~~rt, Nuremberg ‘had’ to have its own rapid rail system. despite the fact that the city has less than 500000 inhabitants. and even with the nearby city of Furth, the transportation area has still about 100000 less people than the transportation area of Hanover’s city transport
t-toward, ‘Integrated public transport in Tyne and 6D.F.
Wear’, paper given at Mass Transport in Asia, Hong Kong, 1980. 7Hannoversche Verkehrsbetriebe, AG, fg;t, Ref 3, p 9. ‘E. Wentzei, ‘U-Bahn Nirrnberq - Forth’, modern Tramways and fhhf Rat/ Transit. Vol 45, No 531, March 1982. pp 90-97.
553
Figure 1. Pedestrianization “Verband offentlicher Verkehrsbetriebe, op tit, Ref 1. “Stadt Nijrnberq und Stadt Ftirth, Baureferat, U-Bahn 7. NOrnbera. 1980and 1981. “NVG, internal statistics. ‘3Gesellschaft fljr Konsumforschung, Begutachtung der Entwick/ungsm~g/ichkeiten des Einzelhandels der Nijrnberger Slidsfadt, NDrnberg, 1983.
554
in the medieval
part of Nuremberg
authority. I” Nuremberg has planned three underground lines: the first line is nearly completed, and part of the second line was opened in January 1984.” As in Munich. Nuremberg’s pedestrianization area is large. covering nearly all of the medieval city. Nuremberg’s increase in passenger trips has been very successful despite a much higher unemployment rate than Munich. The trips in rapid rail cars have nearly doubled over the last four years (in lY7X there were about 21 million, in 1982 there were 3X million)” and have already exceeded the original forecast. The main beneficiary is the city centre where shops are booming. However. statistical proof is difficult or impossible because the only important statistics on retailing turnover in the city centrc were collected in 1978. exactly coinciding with the opening of the city centre stations. The next statistics will be collected in lYX5. There have been some negative effects in 21 shopping centre close to Nuremberg’s city centre. the so-called Siidstadt. According to a recent study,13 turnover and rents have dropped in this centre. Hano\,er East City (Oststadt) and
city centre.
Nuremberg South City (Siidstadt) are good examples of how different the ‘effect’ of rapid rail or light rail can be. One ma,jor difference is that Nuremberg’s city centre is much more attractive than Hanover’s and therefore people in inclined to go Nuremberg are more straight by underground or by car to the city centrc whereas in Hanover they stop in the East City. The other major difference is that the East City in Hanover is more attractive for shoppers than the South City in Nuremberg. Therefore both examples have much more to do with the general built environment, the ‘atmosphere in the city centre and in the inner city area. and with other planning policies than putting the tram underground. Other- cities. Cologne and Frankfurt both have similar large systems of light rail. Frankfurt even has one line which is a ‘real’ underground. In Cologne. there has been an interesting improvement of the old Rhein-Sieg railway which runs 44 km from Cologne-Mulheim to Bonn Bad Godesberg, and which showed a considerable passenger increase after it was improved to a light rail line in lY78.
CITIES
November
1984
Altogether Cologne’s light rail system has lost about 10% of passengers between 1979 and 1982. The Ruhr cities are the least impressive in terms of light rail systems. Isolated stretches have been built in several Ruhr cities, but there is not yet a good connecting system. The original plans were to build an S-Bahn network in an east-west direction, the same direction as the main roads and motorways and a light rail system in a north-south direction. Many of the S-Bahn lines are now finished and provide a good service. Not only are the light rail systems in the Ruhr cities disappointing, but the pedestrianized streets in the city centres somehow lack originality and special features. National shopping chains have already taken over the pedestrian streets
‘transport effects cannot be separated from the economic recession’ completely. Ruhr city centres all look more or less alike. which makes smaller historical cities in the area or close by more attractive for shoppers. Furthermore, it seems that car drivers still dominate the city centres. There is intense controversy about the accessibility of the city centre by car. and retailing interests demand even more parking spaces in the city centre - if necessary under the city centre - and no further increase in pedestrianization. Corzclusiotl. It is clear from the statistical data and from discussions with economists, urban planners. transportation experts. estate agents, etc that there are other factors which influence land use planning much more powerfully than a newly built rapid rail or light rail system. One of the major reasons for this might be that all these newly built lines used old transportation corridors. ” All research in this field shows the impossibility of separating the effects of rapid rail or light rail from the economic recession which has affected all German
CITIES November
1984
cities.
In addition. in most German cities public transportation systems were part of general city centre improvements such as large-scale pedestrianization. conservation of historic gentrification, _, buildings. more greenery, etc. What can one conclude from this kind of research? Is the car lobby right in suggesting a stop to investments in public transnortation svstems. as one cannot prove clearly its success in land use planning? What we can prove empirically is first, although passenger trips in German cities have declined. this decline is nowhere near as great as in most UK cities. Whereas in Glasgow the number of passenger trips in 1982-was less than one third. and in Greater Manchester less than one half, what they were in 1963, in German cities the strongest decline has been in Essen (over 30% over the same time period).” All German cities which have invested heavily in rapid rail or light rail can generally show an increase in passenger trips over recent years. often despite increases in unemployment rates. declines in population and declines in school rolls. Some of these passenger increases are also the result of the reorganew
nization
to large
transport
authorities,
so
Verkehrsverbund. ” Second, this increase in public transportation is even more astonishing if one considers that the car ownership in Germany is much higher than in the UK (Great Britain: 289.2, FRG: 391.0 per 1000 inhabitants in 1982).” Car ownership in German cities was nearly double called
that
of the British
cities
studied
- Bremen
,
14A recent study in Hanover investigated private investments and
poputation changes in
two inner city areas. One inner city area had a new light rail line (East Citv) and the other had none. The study showed that although there was a more favourable population
p,e,v,e,“$,m,e:,‘anthe tight rail tine, no mOre private investments were carried out. One could argue that the
endin otDooutatton loss inthe inner city
~~v~w’$$,“‘d,ai~~y other aeneral traffic impro;ements and
~~~tnrt$$‘!v$ch investment
was
(Hannoversche
~!~~$~,“,~n~~V~~, lnvestitionen
if77
6ffentlichen !=$?l]sp,snoenRd7ea,~verkehf~ Sekund~rinvestitionen und Struktureffekte, dargestellt am Beispiel der Stadtbahnstrecke A in Hannover, Materialband zum
~“,“,‘~~~~~~~~,), ‘qvcn if dne calculates passenger trips per
~~t’$‘~.!t!~~~~‘~h mOre Severethan in any of the German cities. “Hass-Klau, ‘New transport technologies in the Federal Republic of Germany’, Built Environment, Vol8, No 3, pp 190-196. “Verband offentlicher, op or, Ref 1
Figure 2. Advertisement for the opening of S-Bahn line between Bochum and
the new
Dortmund.
555
had 3%. Glasgow 142. Essen 347. Manchester ISO. Munich 366. Shcfficld Xi0 per 1000 inhabitants Third. light
rail
increase the even
rapid
opencd
transport
systems.
show
from
cxes
some
that the ori@nal
only
three planners
car movcnients In order whether
to answer German
Clearly
cannot
German
prosperous.
pedestrians, all trans-
out ii decline
of
the larger question city centres are
healthier
one
passenger inof cases come
Fourth.
point
con have
in the city centre.
economically tres.
they
forecasts
sourccs:
or car drivers.
portation
of
or
;IS csisting
corridor
In
been exceeded. These creases can in the mnjority bicycle
rail
can offer ;I puasenge~ of between 30 and IOO”!~, along lines
same
tram
in IYXI or IYX?.
all newly
than
give
city
but
overall st:irting
economic to fade
;Irc’ not
more
UK
an
centres
this
is
tit!
ccn-
;inswcr.
easy
look
more
becauac
of
;~n
SL~CCCSS which is now Germ:in pl:inncrs
away.
ima@native
than
UK
plan-
ners but somehow
getting ideas put into practice s~‘t’ms easier in German!; ~
although
there
wcen
arc great
German
economic centres
cities.
climate.
strongly
patterns.
field shopping
which
from and UK
German
are affected
in shopping
differences Apart
It is not only
mode.
green
city centre
quality
which
shops.
luck
prices
for
:~nd some very high-class have left Lrge citv centres
of high rents. in the
lower
large
To
city
improve
centres
the lost shoppers.
higher
shops h~cause
car nccessihility
\\;ill
h:trclly
It swms
bring
clear that
Gcrrnan and IJK large tit! ccntres ;ii-c in 2 process of rudefining their roles. pcrh;ips tow:irds ii nioi-e sptxialist shopping centre and cultural focus. There is another point which i\ very important in Gernianv. the cn\~ironniental costs car drivers impcjsc on society. This kind of awarcncw will qrow ~ even in the lJK ~ and in light transportation invcstnicnt moi-c clc:irly justified. both
556
because
two
in Gernianq
CJK cities
Their
amazed.
:rg;iinst could
the difurban which
the
Gcrmnn
argunicnt
I:lrgc
UK
m2iin tr~rnsport~itioii trnnsport~ltioii plnnners
a4
utterly
simplv
Wherever
to those
hllses
Lvere
city
policies.
I rcferrcd LISC
street in Dortmund
final point demonstr~ites between German and
transport
the
shopping, much more effcctivc seemed to he medium and snialI city ccntrcs which offer shoppers 17t’destrianizatic~ii. individual
One ference
bet-
by chanfcs
threatens
Figure 3. Main shopping with trams crossing.
not
husc5 financially
ncv,
strongest
w;~s
that
affoi-d
tramcars
with
thcb them. one
driver WOLIICI hc equiv:llent to thi-cc (;erman busts. It w;15 also generally helicvccl that
buses
;Irc much
congestion. light surface possible
with
e\‘cn rail
more \vith lines.
light
riiil
prone
to trirffic
bus lanes. It i4 Gmply lines
to
than not clut’uc
or for- deliver! \iin\ to 11x2 r;iil .j~imp. I:lnes fol- lxlrking sl~cc. Thirt! !c;lr\ ago. trams in the IJK were scrq?pcd; the m:lin :rrgument was that the> were conycstin!y the
street\.
This article anses out of a research project begun In 1983 at the Joint Centre for Land Development Studies, at the University of Reading, under the direction of Professor Peter Hall on the question of the effects of rapid rail or light rail on German and UK city centres. The research has been funded by the Anglo-German Foundation. The project has researched four German and four UK cities as case studies of two In each country which should have newly invested In rapld rail or light rail systems and two cities which should not.
CITIES
November
1984