Overview of public transport policy developments in South Africa

Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

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Overview of public transport policy developments in South Africa Jackie Walters* Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS (Africa)), Department of Transport and Supply Chain Management, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park, Johannesburg 2006, South Africa

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Available online 6 July 2012

Public transport in South Africa is one of the most burning issues in the transport sector. The government is faced with huge public pressure to improve public transport systems in the face of rising fuel costs, the pending implementation of expensive urban toll road systems in the Gauteng province, and elsewhere in urban environments, public transport safety issues, public transport fleet renewal, especially the commuter rail services, as well as limited resources to fund public transport. As a developing country, the South African Government has pressing funding issues such as funds needed to improve housing for the poor to improve schooling and public health services. Government is also faced with a vocal minibus taxi industry that transports an estimated 65% of all commuters in the country that is also insisting on subsidies for its services. Many policies and strategies have been put in place to address the public transport system in the country, some more successful than others. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the latest policy and strategy developments, to highlight the latest modal developments and to build on previous overviews in the Thredbo Conference series. Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Public transport developments in South Africa Public transport policy processes Taxi recapitalisation BRT systems PRASA

1. Introduction Public transport in South Africa has always been a burning issue. Throughout the country’s history of separate development, millions of people were artificially located long distances away from job opportunities, places of recreation and daily chores such as shopping centres, health facilities etc. Public transport, in particular the rail and bus modes of transport, was used as an “instrument” of policy to provide mobility at reduced costs (subsidised services) to affected communities. The spatial engineering of the past unfortunately continues today and in some ways are still perpetuated by the development of major urban housing developments on relatively cheap land (to make the houses more affordable), often at the fringes of the long established townships. The challenge government faces is how to provide (and balance) affordable, safe and accessible public transport to these townships and the urban and rural communities of SA in the face of high levels of urbanisation, inward migration of millions of people from other African countries to the urban areas of South Africa, and the financial demands placed on the government for school and health services, provision of housing for the poor, security, etc.

* Tel.: þ27 5592088. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0739-8859/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.05.021

In the light of these challenges, a large number of studies have been undertaken, with public transport strategy documents developed and legislation enacted. Yet, the progress has been relatively slow in transforming the public transport system in the country. Many reasons are given for this lack of progress, for example, a lack of funding for public transport policy implementation; organised labour opposition to a tender for contracts in the commuter bus industry; cumbersome and complicated public engagement processes e also involving the respective modes of transport; a lack of skills to implement policy initiatives; complications involving three levels of government in public transport decisions; a lack of integrated public transport plans, especially at the metro levels of government to guide the implementation process; and changes in political role players (and often senior bureaucrats) at the national, provincial and local levels of government following elections (loss of institutional capacity resulting in a lack of continuity in policy direction and implementation). This paper provides an overview of public transport developments in South Africa over recent years and will describe the major events that have taken place over this period. As will be seen, progress is not consistent across the modes of transport while in some areas, such as commuter bus transport, policy implementation has been delayed for many years. In other areas, for example the recent introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems and the operationalization of Gautrain, progress is evident.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

Public transport policy and its implementation can however be seen as one of the most complex areas of transport policy in the country due to its political implications, political linkages, funding constraints, a major push to involve previously excluded businesses in the subsidy system, and being faced with financial constraints and a public outcry over the state of public transport in the country (e.g., adequacy, public transport user costs, accessibility, safety issues, affordability). In other areas of transport policy making and implementation, substantial progress has been made with the deregulated air and road transport industries, and the development of the national road system. 1.1. How is the current public transport system performing? Few formal studies are conducted to establish the current state of public transport in South Africa. However, national travel surveys are conducted from time to time, the last undertaken by the Department of Transport (DoT) in 2003 (to be repeated in 2012). An overview of the characteristics of public transport in South Africa, based on a National Household Travel Survey (NHTS, 2003), is given in Walters (2008). The following salient points regarding the South African public transport system were highlighted:  Only about 10.7% of households surveyed in South Africa had a monthly income that exceeded R 6000 (about US$800 at an exchange rate of R 7.50/US$). The majority of households (83.1%) had a monthly household income of less than R 6000.  Bus and taxi services are relatively more accessible than rail services.  The percentage of households that have access to a car is 26.1% with an average of 0.40 cars per household. The highest number of cars per household are to be found in the metropolitan and urban areas.  Almost half of the households surveyed said that their main problem was that public transport was either not available or was too far away.  One third of households reported that safety from accidents and bad driving behaviour was the most serious transport problems they experienced.  One fifth of households mentioned that the cost of public transport was of concern.  Respondents were also unhappy with security on trains (63%), lack of facilities at bus stops (74%), crowding on buses (54%) and 51% with the low off-peak frequencies of bus services.  Minibus taxi users were most unhappy about safety from accidents (67%), lack of facilities at taxi ranks (64%) and a lack of vehicle road worthiness (60%).

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This profile suggests that there is general discord with the level and quality of public transport services being provided by public transport operators in the country. Subsequent to the 2008 paper by Walters (2008), as well as an update at the Thredbo 10 conference at Hamilton Island, Australia as well as at Thredbo 11 conference held in Delft, The Netherlands, progress with policy implementation has been slow, although progress has been made in a number of key areas. Government has recognised this and has initiated a number of new strategies and policies to address the issues of concern. Progress with policy implementation as well as the strategies will be discussed in the following sections, followed by specific reference to the progress made (or the lack thereof) for the respective modes of public transport. 2. Policy framework: road-based public transport The policy framework for road-based public transport (bus and taxi) is depicted in Fig. 1: 2.1. The White Paper on National Transport Policy, 1996 In brief, the White Paper established the principle of competitive tendering for subsidised services, and promoted the principle of competition for the route in contrast to on the route. In future, all operators would be required to tender for their subsidised services. This would “open up the market” to new previously disadvantaged operators that did not participate in subsidised public transport service provision, as well as to potential international operators. Following the White Paper, a number of tendered contracts were concluded with operators in areas where existing operators indicated that they wished to withdraw their services due to financial constraints. 2.2. The conclusion of interim contracts, 1997 In 1997 the Department of Transport (DoT) concluded interim contracts (ICs) with existing subsidised operators which, in essence, put their existing services on a contractual footing. Prior to this development, services were developed based on DoT approval but not within the ambit of a formal contract or an agreed Integrated Transport Plan (ITP). This situation gave the operators perpetual rights in the operation of their services. The ICs were originally intended to last between one and three years in order to give the operators time to “get fit” for the tendering system by reorganising their businesses in such a way that they would be able to tender competitively for their existing services. Interim contracts would also only come to an end when the services incorporated in

Fig. 1. Policy framework for road-based public transport (bus and taxi).

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J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

the ICs were put out to tender, and until such developments took place would continue to remain valid. 2.3. The Moving South Africa Strategy, 1998 The Moving South Africa Strategy study was undertaken to provide a multi-modal transport vision and strategy for the country based on the White Paper of 1996s vision for transport in South Africa. This extensive study made a number of strategic recommendations regarding public transport, such as the establishment of a corridor focus, the densification of such corridors, optimising modal economics (by promoting the mode that offers the best cost/ service trade-off for a given corridor), and improving firm level performance and productivity by creating, amongst other, competition within and between modes of transport through tendering/ concessioning of services to private operators (Moving South Africa, 1998, p. 135). This also laid the foundation for the formalisation of the taxi industry (Moving South Africa, 1998, p. 156). 2.4. The Tripartite Heads of Agreement, 1999 During the period 1997 and 1999, a number of tendered contracts were concluded with IC operators, even before it was first legislated in 2000. Experiences with job losses and a reduction of condition of service and benefits of labour led to two years of discussions between the DoT, organised labour and the Southern African Bus Operators Association (SABOA) (representing operators), and eventually resulted in the Tripartite Heads of Agreement in 1999 (HOA). The main purpose of the agreement was to soften the impact of competitive tendering on labour through job losses and a reduction in wages. In particular, the agreement compelled any operator to source at least 75% of the required workforce of the contract service from the incumbent operator. It also made provision for a right of refusal of 10% where, should a service be put out to tender, and the incumbent operator’s tender prices was within 10% of the most acceptable tender, the incumbent operator was offered the contract at the tender price of the most acceptable tender. This principle was agreed to with a view to giving the incumbent operator the best chance of winning its services back, thus lessening the impact on labour. 2.5. National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 (NLTTA) In 2000, the National Land Transport Transition Act was enacted. This act, for the first time, defined the functions of the respective levels of government in managing public transport (a concurrent function in terms of the RSA Constitution), established the principle of transport authorities to manage public transport, legislated arrangements around competitive tendering, and also made provision for negotiated contracts under certain conditions, for example for transformational and empowerment reasons (a requirement that the negotiated service had to be majority black owned within two years of such negotiated agreements). The act also made provision for integrated public transport planning e a condition for concluding contracts with operators. This condition was later amended when an operator took government to court (and won the case) when a provincial government tried to put its services out to tender without the existence of an ITP. Despite the conditions contained in the HOA to protect labour in a tender situation, labour continued to voice its opposition to competitive tendering. It remained, in principle, against competitive tendering in public transport. This continued opposition and the lack of finding common ground between labour, the DoT and SABOA (the Southern African Bus Operators Association) eventually led to the indefinite suspension of the competitive tendering

system in 2002. Other reasons cited for the suspension was the unaffordability of the tendering system considering the government’s financial constraints. In most cases the tendered contracts proved to be more expensive than the services they were replacing (Walters & Cloete, 2001). A number of negotiated contracts have however been concluded since 2000. These negotiations involved organised labour, the DoT and the operator reaching amicable settlements in the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the contract. 2.6. National land transport framework (NLTSF) The establishment of the NLTSF is a legislative requirement in terms of the NLTTA of 2000 and provides a five year forwardlooking view of public transport developments (2006e2011). In terms of bus and taxi services the framework provided for all provincial and municipal bus operators to be corporatized; all subsidised services had to be provided in terms of tendered/ negotiated contracts that would be open to all road-based public transport operators (Department of Transport, 2006, p. 5). In support of the tendering system, it foresaw the gazetting of a model tender document, the replacement of interim and tendered bus contracts with new tendered or negotiated contracts, and the issuing of tenders based on transport plans (where possible). 2.7. Taxi recapitalisation programme (2006) Following many years of discussion and debate, agreement was reached between the DoT and the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) to begin a formal process of scrapping and replacing old and unroadworthy taxi vehicles with new vehicles that had to meet new national standards for the conveyance of passengers. More information about this process is included in the taxi modal overview section of this paper. 2.8. Public transport strategy documents, 2007 In March 2007 the DoT published two influential strategy documents, The Public Transport Strategy, and The Public Transport Action Plan, Phase 1 (2007e2010): Catalytic Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network Projects. The purpose of these documents was to give new direction to public transport management as well as to make provision for the introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems. The Strategy document contains two key thrusts: accelerated modal upgrading (multi-modal) that included a consolidation of the passenger rail sector; rolling out a National Rail Plan; implementing the taxi recapitalisation programme, including improved regulation and law enforcement; and transforming and optimising current subsidised bus services. Secondly, it made provision for Integrated Rapid Public Transport Networks (IRPTNs) in the main metro areas of the country. The longer term vision until 2020 is to develop a system that places over 85% of a metropolitan city’s population within one km of an IRPTN trunk or feeder corridor. A further goal for metropolitan cities by 2020 is to achieve a mode shift of 20% of car work trips to public transport networks. These networks will consist of core road and rail trunk corridors with feeder and distributor systems. The aim is also to achieve maximum physical and fare integration in the core public transport services. The Public Transport Action Plan details the Public Transport Strategy. It focuses on the six main metros and the public transport systems of the six secondary cities. It planned for the scrapping and replacement of 75 000 taxis by 2010, the refurbishment of 2000 rail coaches used for commuter rail services, and the replacement of 30% of the current commuter bus fleet of 7500 to be tender

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

compliant by 2009/10. The Action Plan also established, amongst other, more detail about the BRT system principles (such as how to accommodate affected operators) and included new specifications for buses on the trunk routes. 2.9. National Land Transport Act, 2009 This act replaced the NLTTA of 2000 and expanded on the principle of the acceptance of negotiated contracts. Negotiated contracts can now also follow a tendered contract, which was not allowed under the 2000 act. It also spelled out clearly that public transport should be devolved to the lowest effective level of government e the metro and local government levels. In addition, it created new institutional structures applicable to the licensing of operators (permits), long distance passenger transport and requirements for integrated public transport plans. Progress with policy thrusts regarding commuter buses and taxis will be highlighted later in a later section.

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a concessioning system for the operation of rail services on a competitive basis. Provision for the concessioning of commuter rail services was also made in the NLTTA. To date, concessioning has not happened and it is doubtful as to whether it is still government policy to concession services. However, at a recent investors’ conference held in Cape Town, mention was made of private sector involvement in commuter rail services (van der Walt, 2011). 3.3. The Moving South Africa (MSA) Strategy The main recommendation of the strategy pertaining to transport in South Africa, and by definition commuter rail commuter services, is that transport corridors should be densified; that there should be an optimisation of modal economics and service mix e best cost/service trade-offs for each corridor through encouragement of differentiated public transport services; and, improving firm level performance by creating competition within and between modes through tendering/concessioning (e.g. rail) of services to private sector operators (MSA, p. 136).

3. Policy framework: rail based commuter transport 3.4. National Land Transport Transition Act Commuter rail services are operated by Metrorail (previously within the Rail Commuter Corporation and today a division of PRASA) in the Western Cape (Cape Town), Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth), KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg) and Gauteng (the greater Johannesburg and Pretoria areas). A total of 2.2 million passenger trips are operated daily Monday to Friday (PRASA & 2010, p. 12) making it the third largest public transport operator in SA. The policy framework for commuter rail services in the country is depicted in Fig. 2:

Similar to road-based public transport, the act makes provision for the inclusion of rail services in the development of transport plans. In contrast to the approval process of such plans for roadbased modes, the act stipulates that until the rail function is devolved from the national to another level of government, the plans had to be submitted to the Minister of Transport for approval of the commuter rail components of the plan. To date the function has not been devolved to a lower level of government, and commuter rail remains a national government competency.

3.1. The Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 3.5. The National Railway Safety Regulator Act This act made provision for the establishment of the South African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd, a company wherein the state was the only shareholder and member of the company. 3.2. The White Paper on National Transport Policy The White Paper confirmed that the national transport authority (DoT) would own the commuter rail infrastructure, rolling stock and land associated with rail reserves until the provincial or metropolitan transport authorities (TAs) were in a position to take over the responsibility. It was also foreseen that operating and maintenance concessions would be awarded by the TAs, initially nationally, and later at the provincial or metro levels of government. It also foresaw the abolishment of the deficit form of financing (deficit subsidies) and the replacement of it with

Prior to the establishment of the act, safety issues were managed by Transnet, the national rail operator, previously known as South African Transport Services, as well as Metrorail as the operator of commuter rail services. The act established an independent Regulator to oversee safety in the railway transport industry and to promote the use of rail as a mode of transportation through improved safety performance of the industry. It was tasked with drafting regulations in compliance with the act and to monitor and ensure compliance with the act. 3.6. National land transport framework This framework provides policy and strategy guidelines for a five year forward-looking period (2006e2011). In terms of rail services,

Fig. 2. Policy framework for rail commuter services.

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J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

 “Service levels to be improved with increased frequencies and reliabilities  Improved rail infrastructure, including the removal of capacity limiting bottlenecks  Improved signalling capacity  Enhanced levels of security and accessibility associated with the station precincts with the A and B corridors  The refurbishing of 2000 rail coaches by 2010”

the DoT envisaged significant rail capability enhancements in order to better manage the rail function. It also foresaw the completion of a National Rail Plan and for significant implementation of the plan to occur over the five year period. This would require the identification of priority rail corridors through a rail network classification system, the upgrading of infrastructure and service levels on the key corridors e.g. rolling stock, security and station improvements and improved infrastructure condition. Measures would also be taken to reduce levels of fare evasion on the priority corridors.

A summary of the rail priority corridors, where 61% of the A and B corridors are supportive of public transport strategy, is set out in Table 1. It can be seen that 61% of the corridors identified (or 22 in corridors in total) were grouped in the A and B categories and 39% (or 14 corridors) in category D. In terms of the NRP the “D” corridors no longer warrant commuter rail services.

3.7. The National Rail Plan (NRP) The principal objective of the National Rail Plan is to secure the future of commuter rail in South Africa by applying a priority corridor strategy to the rail network in each of the regions. Through a series of regional rail plans (provinces where commuter rail is offered), the NRP seeks to find clarity in the role that commuter rail should play in the context of an integrated approach to public transport service provision (South African Rail Commuter Corporation/Metrorail. National Rail Plan: i). Emphasis is also put on regions adjacent to metropolitan areas currently served by commuter rail, as well as other urban areas and provinces such as Limpopo and Mpumalanga where there are at present no commuter rail services. In each region, corridors were allocated A, B, C or D, based on the level of service appropriate to the travel corridor of which rail is a part. “A” represents corridors where much higher levels of service than at present are warranted, and “D” corridors those where there is no longer a case for providing commuter rail services.

3.9. Legal Succession to the SATS Amendment Act One of the main purposes of the amendment of the act was to rename the SARCC to the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) and to expand its mandate to also include long distance passenger rail and bus services within, to, and from the RSA. The long distance passenger and rail services had to be transferred to PRASA from Transnet by the end of March 2009. 3.10. National Land Transport Act In addition to the information supplied in the previous section regarding the NLTA, the act makes provision for the rail function to be devolved to the municipal level where such municipality would plan for rail services on a corridor network basis in consultation with PRASA. This function, although nationally planned at this stage, can be requested by a municipality subject to an acceptable Integrated Transport Plan. At this stage no municipality has requested the function.

3.8. Public transport strategy and the public transport strategy action plan (2007) The two key thrusts of these strategies (Department of Transport, 2007a, 2007b) applicable to commuter rail pertains, firstly, to accelerated modal upgrading; the consolidation of the passenger rail sector; the roll-out of the National Rail Plan in the short to medium term and, secondly, Integrated Rapid Public Transport Networks (IRPTNs) with the aim to have a phased operational implementation of these networks in place in twelve cities and at least six rural districts by 2014. The latter thrust could also be more widely interpreted as to investigate new rail possibilities and even the establishment of rail services where the need may arise. In terms of the Public Transport Action Plan Phase 1: 2007e2010 (Department of Transport, 2007b, p. 19) the target to implement the rail corridor strategy was to implement the Rail Priority Corridors A and B in the applicable cities during the period 2007e2010. It was also envisaged that by the end of 2010 the services had to be improved in the following ways:

4. Current state of commuter rail in the country (services managed by PRASA) The commuter rail section of PRASA (Metrorail) owns 317 stations (but operates 468 stations) and provides rail services on 3180 of single km track. It has a fleet of 406 train sets of which 97.5% were built between 1958 and 1985. The majority of the rail fleet technology dates back to the 1950s (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 10). Currently, 65e70% of the resources required to operate the rail function come from Government in the form of deficit subsidies while the balance comes from internally generated free operating cash-flow (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 8).

Table 1 Priority rail corridors. Regions

Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria area) Western Cape (Cape Town) KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg area Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) Total % % (A D B corridors) D C Source: PRASA Corporate Plan 2009/10e2011/12:19.

Corridor

Total

A

B

C

7 3 1 1 12 33 61

7 3 0 0 10 28

6 2 5 1 14 39 39

20 8 6 2 36

%

56 22 17 5 100 100

Total A&B

Corridor definitions

%

A

Ideal corridor for rail, high quality service

70 75 17 50

B C

Important role for rail, 2000 service levels Role of rail uncertain, investigation required

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

During the period 2007e2010 government made available R 25b (or about US$3.33b at R 7.50/US$) for the stabilisation of PRASA and a turnaround strategy. This figure included an operational subsidy to the value of R 9.9bn, capital investment of R 14.7bn for the business, R 7bn for the refurbishment of 2000 rail coaches, R 1.4bn for the procurement of new buses, infrastructure upgrades to the value of R 2.6bn, and planned signalling upgrades at major stations to the value of R 1.5bn (PRASA Leaflet: Our Positive Future). At a recently organised (2011) DoT International Transport Investors Conference held in Cape Town, where the DoT showcased transportation infrastructure projects which may attract private sector capital, PRASA highlighted the following potential projects for financing: the Cape Town Airport Rail Link; the Moloto Rail Corridor (north of Pretoria); the Bloemfontein e Botshabelo Passenger Rail Corridor; the Bara Rail Link (Gauteng); The Motherwell Rail Link (Port Elizabeth); the Daveyton Rail Extension (Gauteng) and the re-introduction of the Hammanskraal Rail Link north of Pretoria (van der Walt, 2011). In terms of its ageing rolling stock, PRASA mentioned that it was busy with a feasibility study to replace 8600 rail coaches with new rolling stock over an 18 year time frame. A transaction adviser for the project was appointed and it was estimated that the rolling stock renewal programme would cost about R 86b over the 18 year period. It was estimated that a Request For Proposals (RFPs) would be issued by mid-2012 (van der Walt, 2011). Some of the challenges faced by PRASA are detailed in its Corporate Plan 2009/11e2011/12 (PRASA Corporate Plan, pp. 21e28):  Consolidation/Turnaround/Restructuring processes.  Change management e consolidation of five organisations into a consolidated organisation (Metrorail (commuter rail); Autopax (consisting of Translux and City to City long distance bus services); Shosholoza Meyl (long distance passenger rail services) and Intersite Property Services.  Sustainable funding.  Ageing rolling stock and infrastructure.  Human capital development.  Leadership and skills development e shortage of key skills as well as a lack of depth in skills  Rail technology development e “catch up” with new technology.  Long term planning alignment e road, rail and land.  Strategic partnerships e national alliances and strengthening relationships (nationally and internationally).  Modal integration e poses internal and external challenges.

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Fig. 3. Gautrain route map. Source: van der Merwe (2011).

Currently there are 24 Electrostar train sets manufactured by Bombardier. The train sets operating to the airport differs from the normal commuter sets as provision is made for luggage capabilities on the airport services. The current frequency is between 10 min and 30 min with the latter mainly applying to weekend services. The initial operating hours is from 05:30 to 20:30. A significant bus feeder and distributor system supports the rail service to and from stations. An example of the feeder system is included in Fig. 4: The feeder and distribution system is operated with 125 buses operating 36 feeder and distribution routes spanning 420 km. The Gautrain service operates every 12e30 min generating about 2200 bus trips per day and over 26 000 daily operating kilometres. The service complements existing bus services in the various metropolitan areas (Dachs, 2011). The project is one of the largest PublicePrivate-SectorPartnership (PPP) concession projects of its kind in Africa. The concession is for 20 years for the design, build, part-finance and operation of the system. The Bombela Consortium1 manages the client interface with the Gauteng Provincial Government and provides an integrated solutions approach for the PPP (http://www. gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/). The estimated value of the project at completion was R 25.4bn or US$3.39bn at an R 7.50/US$ exchange rate (Engineering News, 2009). Gautrain has five sources of funding (van der Merwe, 2011):

5. The Gauteng high speed rail service (gautrain) The need to establish a high speed rail service between the metropolitan area of Tshwane (which includes Pretoria), Johannesburg and Oliver Tambo International Airport (South Africa’s main international air hub) has been a point of discussion for many years. The project was meant to speed up the travel time between Tshwane and Johannesburg, a notoriously congested freeway link, thereby enticing car users to make use of the rail service instead. As the airport is some 20 km from the CBD of Johannesburg and about 40 km from Tshwane, a link to the airport was also built into the project as it is expected that the airport would in future become significantly busier. The system consists of 10 stations and 80 km of railway lines (of which 15 km are underground) linking the three nodes (see Fig. 3). The Gautrain system interfaces with Metrorail commuter rail services at Hatfield Station, Pretoria Station, Rhodesfield Station and Johannesburg Park Station. The maximum speed of the system is 160 km/h and operates on standard gauge.

 The Division of Revenue Act e which enables funds to flow from Central Government via the Department of Transport (44.2%) to the Gauteng Province.  The Medium Term Expenditure Framework from the Gauteng Provincial Government (26.1%).  Private sector equity (1.8%).  Private sector borrowing (9.5%), and

1 The Bombela Consortium Concession Company Shareholders consist of:  Murray & Roberts Limited e a leading South African engineering, construction and contracting services company.  Strategic Partners Group (SPG) e a 25% shareholder in the Consortium.  Bombardier UK e a Canadian company and world leader in the aerospace and rail transportation sectors.  Bouygues Travaux Publics e one of the world’s top global “design and build” civil engineering and building contractors with extensive experience in concession projects.  The J&J Group e an investment holding company with more than 200 000 shareholders representing individuals and their families.  ABSA Capital, a division of Absa Bank Ltd (subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC). Source: http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/.

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J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

Fig. 4. Sandton Station: feeder and distribution routes (OCD 2). Source: http://www.iweek.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Gautrain-BusRoute.pdf.

 Provincial borrowing (18.4%). The project has a patronage guarantee of R 360m per annum for the concessionaire (Dachs, 2011). In terms of the concession agreement, the concessionaire takes all completion and integration risks, offers a fixed price for the project, fixed specification and fixed time frame (turnkey contract). The concessionaire is fully involved in the operation and maintenance of the system for the entire concession period. At the end of the concession the concessionaire has to hand over the system to the client in a prescribed condition. The Sandton/Airport link was operationalized just before the Soccer World Cup event in SA in 2010, and the remainder of the network opened in August 2011, excepting for a part of an underground section between the Johannesburg Park and Rivonia stations where water seepage and sub-surface water issues are currently being addressed. The project is not without criticism. Opponents were of the view that the project is “elitist” as it was meant to relieve the congestion on the highways around Gauteng (between Tshwane (Pretoria) and Johannesburg and the airport). These users were considered to be already “mobile” through the use of their cars and now had the luxury of a choice of modes. Opponents were of the opinion that the value of the project would have been much better spent, and reached many more potential users, should the funds have been spent on the existing commuter rail services in the country. These services generate about 2.2 million passenger trips per day where it was estimated that the Gautrain would generate about 120 000 passenger trips per day by 2010 (http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/ services/ridership-fare-structure/).

competitive tender. As an interim measure, it will enter into negotiated contracts with incumbent operators for a period of up to 12 years. Requirements to enter into such agreements may involve set-asides for the taxi industry as well as small bus operators that have not yet participated in the subsidy system. It is also a requirement that such contracts should be entered into based on approved Integrated Public Transport Plans. As mentioned earlier, a major impasse has been reached regarding competitive tenders mainly due to organised labour’s opposition to the tendering system and concerns about the potential costs of the system. At issue is the impact of competitive tenders on employment levels, labour wages and benefits, and the lack of continuity of employment. In this regard the last competitively tendered contracts were concluded in 2002. Since then most of these contracts have expired, and almost all operators are operating on short term contracts e from month to month or slightly longer. Since 2002 a few negotiated contracts were concluded. Government has indicated that it would negotiate all contracts in the next round of tenders to avoid the issues that labour has with tendered contracts. This will probably allow sufficient time to solve the remaining issues that labour has with the tendering system. All new contracts ought to be based on Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs). ITPs involve all public transport modes erail, buses and taxis. These plans are currently being updated, and once completed should result in a wave of negotiated contracts being concluded. Should negotiations with operators not be successful, services will be put out to competitive tender for a period of seven years. Table 2 sets out the current state of contracting in South Africa. Some of the challenges faced by the commuter bus industry and which impact policy implementation are the following:

6. Commuter bus transport An overview of the policies, strategies and legislation applicable to the commuter bus industry was provided earlier in the paper. This section considers the latest developments regarding policy implementation, and also highlights some issues that the industry is concerned about. The government policy is, and remains, that subsidised commuter transport, now and in future, should be put out to

 Lack of funds to adequately fund road-based public transport.  Inadequate cost indexing in existing contracts e especially problematic over longer term contracts.  Organised labour opposition to competitive tenders.  The slow progress with the development/revision of Integrated Transport Plans.  Lack of managerial and implementation skills/capacity at the provincial and local levels of government.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

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Table 2 Contracts in place in South Africa. Type of contract

Number of buses

Contract characteristics

Duration

Interim contracts

Foreseen as transition arrangement in 1997

Tendered contracts

þ/ 3849 (68% of sub budget) þ/1834 (28% of subsidy budget)

Negotiated contracts

250

Mostly applicable to state-owned and operated bus companies e form of privatisation

Sale of bus entity through negotiation based on service contract specification (form of privatisation)

1050

Applicable to bus operations owned by local and provincial governments

1e3 Years originally. In practice some interim contracts are 15 years old 5 Years originally. Contracts are being extended to 7 years New contracts to be 7 years. Most contracts are currently on a month-to-month basis. 5 Years originally. New contracts to be 7 years. Some contracts on a month-to-month basis Contracts are 5 years in duration. New contracts to be 7 years. Implemented in the City of Durban (June 2003) and North West Province (January 2004).

Based on standard contract document Mostly “stand alone” services in rural/urban operations

Source: Compiled by the author for the purpose of this paper (SABOA and DoT sources) (2006 data).

 Lack of properly capacitated institutional structures to implement PT policy.  Institutional complexities between National, Provincial and Local government (concurrent functions i.t.o. the RSA Constitution).  Complexities of integrating the minibus taxi industry and the commuter bus industry in one service design. 7. Modal overview: bus rapid transit (BRT) systems The introduction of BRT systems in the country was officially sanctioned in the DoT Public Transport Strategy and the Public Transport Strategy Action Plans of 2007. These documents spell out government policy and strategy and provide guidelines for the introduction of the systems in SA. Amongst other, guidelines are spelled out on how to deal with existing operators on routes affected by the introduction of BRT systems. At present two systems are in operation e the Rea Vaya system in Johannesburg and MyCiTi in Cape Town. A number of other metro governments are planning systems, such as in Durban, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and Brits (west of Pretoria).

7.1. Rea Vaya: Johannesburg Plans are to introduce 325 km of BRT routes and 30 interchange nodes in the Johannesburg area. Phase one of the system consisting of 122 km of routes was approved by the Johannesburg Metro Council in 2006 (Seftel, 2011). The envisaged Rea Vaya BRT network, when fully implemented is depicted in Fig. 5 and consists of a number of phases. The intention of the Johannesburg Metro (and supported by government policy and strategies) was to incorporate the taxi industry in the BRT, as the sole operator (there were no bus services on the route) on the Phase 1A route. The Johannesburg Metro therefore was one of the first Metros to engage the taxi industry in a new business model that would manage the BRT route. Major difficulties were however encountered to get the taxi industry to “transform” from an informal business to a formal business. Taxi owners and their drivers were (amongst other) concerned about their future earnings, the loss of revenue as their taxi vehicles had to be removed from the route, the potential job losses, the complexities associated with a “formal” business etc. This led to protracted negotiations and many acrimonious meetings.

Fig. 5. Long term network proposed for Rea Vaya BRT in the greater Johannesburg area. Source: Seftel, 2011.

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J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

The Metro was however under pressure to have the first phase of the service up and running by a certain date (a financial requirement) and services began operating before agreement could be reached with the taxi industry to buy into and manage the BRT system. In this regard the city initially signed a 12 year contract with Clidet, an interim company owned by the BRT Systems Trust. Clidet signed a management contract with Metrobus (the municipally owned bus company) to manage the bus operating company in the interim whilst negotiations were still on-going with the taxi industry. After the Metro reached an agreement with the taxi industry to take over and manage the BRT, Clidet passed a resolution on 31 January 2011 to transfer the Clidet shares to the new shareholders of the bus operating company consisting of taxi industry role players (Ndebele, 2011). The service is operated on a 12 year contract by the bus operating company (valued at about R 184m per year) consisting of nine Taxi Operator Investor Companies (TOICS) who are taxi operators affected by Phase 1A (Ndebele, 2011). Over 300 taxi owners owning about 550 taxi vehicles contributed R 54 000 equity derived from the sale or scrapping of their minibus taxis in exchange for one share in the bus operating company (Seftel, 2011). The BOC was renamed PioTrans as from 1 February 2011 and operates in partnership with an experienced South American (Columbian) BRT operator, Fanalca (Rea Vaya, 2011). Phase 1A from Soweto, a large township south west of Johannesburg, to Ellis Park on the north eastern side of the Johannesburg CBD, has been operating since August 2009 and transports about 30 000 passengers per day over the 25.5 km of dedicated roadway, 33 stations and 146 Euro 4 buses (Seftel, 2011). Fig. 6 shows the Phase 1A route. Phase 1B construction is nearing completion and the expectation is that this phase will be operational during the first quarter of 2012. In contrast to the first phase, this phase impacts existing bus operators that will have to be accommodated in the business model to manage this section. These discussions have been very protracted. Major issues were encountered in determining market shares of the respective modes (buses and taxis), the sharing of financial risk versus market share, expertise to manage the system etc. One of the criticisms of the current Metro approach is that it appears as if each new section will demand a new round of negotiations. As the entire network is being rolled out section-bysection, this could mean that a host of operating companies will have to be established to manage the system, eventually leading to operational, integration, systems efficiency and managerial issues. It should be remembered that there are a host of taxi operators operating sections of the route compared to only a few bus

companies directly impacted by BRT route proposals. This could prove to be unmanageable. 7.2. MyCiTi: Cape Town The MyCiTi BRT in Cape Town (or Integrated Rapid Transit as it’s referred to in Cape Town) is a 15 year project to establish BRT systems in the city area. The inner-city distribution service linked the World Cup stadium in Sea Point area (to the west of the Cape Town CBD) during the World Cup in 2010. A shuttle service links the Cape Town station to the Cape Town International Airport. The most recent phase of the BRT was launched in May 2011 e the West Coast corridor between Table View and the Cape Town CBD. This service is shown in Fig. 7. The entire service is supplemented with an extensive bicycle route network and links existing bus, taxi and rail services. The interim inner-city feeder route between Gardens, the Civic Centre and the Cape Town Waterfront also began operating recently. The business model included operators affected by the BRT. The market share model was based on passenger trips, passenger km generated, fare revenue and profits. The outline of the business model is depicted in Fig. 8 with the future systems plan in Fig. 9. 8. Modal overview: commuter taxi industry In South Africa, the dominant public transport mode is the 16seater minibus taxi. These services had their origin after a 1985 White Paper on National Transport Policy where the services were “legitimised”. This led to the rapid growth of the industry at the expense of the formal commuter bus and rail industries. Today, it is estimated that about 65% of all commuter trips take place in taxis, although the figure varies depending on local circumstances (Arrive Alive, 2011a). Table 3 provides a statistical overview of the taxi operating sector: The industry is regarded as a prime example of Black Economic Empowerment in the country, in particular small black business. The industry is largely unregulated, although route associations control access to routes and the associated associations. This has, especially in the past, led to major rivalry among operators, often leading to bloody battles, deaths and injuries. It is estimated that there are between 120 000 and 140 000 taxis in the country with the largest concentrations in urban areas. There is little effective governmental control over the industry by ways of fares (the market and intensity of intra- and inter-modal competition determines fare levels), and the effective enforcement of road traffic laws governing vehicle road worthiness, driving techniques.

Fig. 6. Phase 1A route of the Johannesburg BRT. Source: www.reavaya.org.za/images/stories/2010/transportfor2010/routes.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

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Fig. 7. Map of the MyCiTi West Coast corridor route and picture of the route as seen from the Gardens area towards Cape Town. Map source: Fortune, 2011. Picture source: Fortune, 2011.

The industry is also criticised for its poor safety record e a point that was mentioned in the National Household Travel Survey. Government has been engaging with the taxi industry through its representative structure SANTACO (South African National Taxi Council). This institution was formed by the DoT in 2001 to enable government to engage with the taxi industry in a single national forum. This specific aim has largely been achieved although there are a number of large associations not affiliated with SANTACO. In addition, the DoT established a National Joint Working Group (NJWG) to deal with matters such as the taxi recapitalisation programme, taxi subsidies, legislation, regulation and enforcement. It also deals with enterprise and skills development, communication, stakeholder management, the BRT systems, and Integrated Public Transport Networks (South African Government Information, 2010). In an effort to address the financial viability of the industry, and to improve its service levels, a number of governmental interventions have been identified, the most visible being the taxi recapitalisation programme that began in 2006 (Department of Transport, 2006). Other initiatives include the involvement of taxi

Fig. 8. MyCiTi business management model. Source: Fortune, 2011.

companies in the subsidy system (tenders), the BRT developments in the country, and promises of taxi industry subsidies. 8.1. The taxi recapitalisation programme The government’s aim is to formalise the taxi industry through an R 7.7bn taxi recapitalisation programme (Arrive Alive, 2011a)to assist the industry to replace ageing and unroadworthy taxis, and, eventually, to make it part of the overall public transport solution through its envisaged involvement in ITPs. The governmental assistance is in the form of a once-off capital subsidy where, irrespective of the condition of the vehicle, government will compensate the operator R 57 400 to use as a deposit on a new

Fig. 9. MyCiTi development phases. Source: Fortune, 2011.

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J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

Table 3 Taxi operating statistics.  Number of people using taxi services each day: 14 millionþ  Number of officially registered minibus taxis on South African roads: 120 000þ  Average number of taxis per owner: 2  Average number of hours taxi drivers spend daily on the road: 8.8  Number of days each taxi driver works per week: 6.33  Average monthly kilometres driven by a taxi: 8000  Average number of passengers transported monthly per vehicle: 3161  Average time spent daily in a taxi by a passenger: 65 min  Average number of trips per passenger per day: 2.3 Source: http://www.ComutaNet.co.za as quoted by the Mercatus Policy Series. Policy Comment No 3. Taxing Alternatives: Poverty Alleviation and the South African Taxi/Minibus Industry. Author: K Boudreaux, Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, February 2006 page 6.

participated in the subsidy system, will be accommodated through the designs of such contracts, based on ITPs, to favour the “most appropriate mode of transport” for given circumstances. In practice this would mean that on trunk and high density routes, especially in the peaks, buses would be specified in the contract, and on the less dense routes, during the off-peak and after hours/ late night services, lower capacity vehicles. The lower capacity vehicles, i.e. taxis, would also be used as feeder and distributor vehicles to the trunk routes. Taxi cooperatives/companies would also be encouraged to tender, or be involved in, the negotiations for traditional bus service contracts, and in doing so, exit the taxi industry, and participate in traditional larger capacity public transport service provision. 8.3. The involvement of the taxi industry in the formal public transport system through BRTs

vehicle or to use the money to exit the industry (South African Government Information, 2010). The vehicles that are traded in (or handed in should the operator wish to exit the industry) are physically destroyed to ensure that they do not re-enter the industry. A special Taxi Scrapping Agency (the Taxi Scrapping Administrator) was established by the DoT and has a presence in all nine provinces. To date (May 2007) more than 42 000 taxis have been scrapped and a total of R 2.13b paid out as compensation for these vehicles (Department of Transport, 2011). The aim of the recapitalisation programme is to improve the safety and reliability of the industry through the replacement of older vehicles with new, higher quality, purposefully specified vehicles; to reduce the number of vehicles to about 85 000 (Walters, 2008); to ensure that the new vehicles meet the South African Bureau of Standards safety requirements for instance, rollover protection, brakes, tyre ratings, seating arrangements, and safety belts (Arrive Alive, 2011b); to replace existing 16-seater vehicles with 18-seater as well as 18e35 seater vehicles; to address the economic sustainability of the industry, and to effectively regulate the industry. In order to qualify for the recapitalisation programme:  Taxi operators are required to convert their radius based operating permits to route based operating licences (for existing vehicles as well as for replacement/recapitalization vehicles).  To ensure that minimum wages are paid to drivers and other employees working in the taxi sector.  To regulate driving hours. Drivers are allowed to work at most 48 h per week and must have at least 12 h a day and 36 continuous hours of rest per week.  To regulate leave conditions.  To ensure that operators have adequate passenger liability insurance.  To ensure that operators pay their income taxes. A tax clearance certificate is required before operators may participate in the scrapping allowance as part of the recapitalisation programme (Walters, 2007). 8.2. The involvement of the taxi industry in the public transport tender and contracting system Provision is made in the “model tender document”, a guideline document developed by the DoT in consultation with provincial departments of transport and the respective industries, for, among other, the taxi industry to participate in the tender and contracting system. Little progress has been recorded to date, but it is expected that once negotiated contracts are entered into, the taxi industry, as well as the small bus operators that have not yet

Two successful examples of the conversion from taxis to buses are the BRT systems in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Taxi services are predominantly short distance urban commuter services, mainly concentrating on high density corridors. Many of these corridors have been identified for BRT services. Based on the 2007 DoT strategy documents discussed earlier (Department of Transport, 2007a, 2007b), it is evident that many taxi operators will be encouraged to participate in these systems in future. The challenge remains to find acceptable business models to accommodate both existing bus and taxi industry service providers. 8.4. Taxi industry subsidies The call to subsidise the taxi industry has come from various quarters over many years. The most vocal of these have been SANTACO. Philip Taaibosch, the General Secretary of SANTACO is quoted as follows: “.government subsidised other modes of public transport in the country, such as rail and bus transport, but the taxi industry did not get any subsidy and was discriminated against despite transporting between 68 percent and 70 percent of commuters daily” (Taaibosch, 2011). The DoT has indicated that it was investigating the subsidisation of the industry but the funding constraints faced by government, as well as the difficulty in managing such a system among thousands of small operators, remain a challenge. Most of the effort in this regard has been through developing enabling policy and strategy documentation, especially the model tender documents, the BRT systems and statements that provision will be made in ITPs for the taxis to participate in the formal public transport system. There have been calls for set-asides in the future contracts of up to 30% of the vehicle kilometres for the taxi and small bus operators. This will no doubt negatively affect the financial wellbeing of established bus operators that will find it difficult to cut overheads in relation to the proposed 30% cut in their services. It has however often been stated by government that the intention was to expand the public transport services to accommodate the taxi industry and the small bus operators, and that it would not be at the expense of existing operators. In reality, the lack of sustainable funding and the total sum available for public transport subsidies will most likely dictate the policy direction that the DoT will be following. In the urban areas there are however significant rationalisation possibilities among bus operators, Metrorail (where commuter rail services are present) and the taxi industry. Most, if not all, of the present urban transport system design emanates from the days before 1994 and the transition to democracy. The envisaged ITPs will address these inequities in favour of integrated and operationally optimised public transport systems and should be ready for implementation in some metros as from 2012.

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Some of the unintended consequences of a de facto deregulated taxi industry include: infighting about routes; issues arising from taxi associations controlling routes and taxi ranks; road safety issues; lack of long term economic sustainability; maintenance and capital renewal issues; driver behaviour etc. 9. Conclusions The public transport sector in South Africa faces major challenges. There is no lack of a holistic vision as to the role that public transport should play in the future of South Africa e this is evidenced in the many policy and strategy documents that have been developed. The main problem is the lack of effective policy implementation, mainly due to a lack of sustainable funding to achieve the ambitious policy objectives; the huge financial demands to replace ageing bus, rail and taxi fleets; a lack of skills to effectively implement and monitor policy initiatives; the complex political and policy relationship between the three levels of government dealing with public transport; complex intra- and inter-modal negotiation processes where many of the discussions are, and will be centred on, how to involve the informal taxi industry and the many small bus operators in the formal subsidised public transport industry; significant migration to the cities from the poorer parts of South Africa as well as countries to the north of South Africa; the resultant spread of existing townships further and further away from job opportunities and the concomitant complications of offering extended public transport services to serve these communities; and complicated labour arrangements that oppose certain policy thrusts such as the competitive tendering system. There is also mounting public pressure to drastically improve public transport access, availability and safety, especially in the face of the imminent introduction of expensive urban tolls on the freeways surrounding and supporting the cities of Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town, as well as persistently high fuel costs. Opponents to the toll system argue that they have no choice but to use their cars to commute to and from work as public transport is not regarded as a viable alternative to the car. On the positive side there are encouraging signs that issues are being addressed and progress made: major funding has been made available for the renewal of Metrorail rolling stock and infrastructure improvements; there are major investments in BRT systems e two of which are already operating and many more being planned; the development of a BRT business model in Cape Town that involves both existing bus and taxi operators in the operation of the BRT, and a business model that is emerging in the Rea Vaya Phase 1B involving established bus companies, small bus operators and the taxi industry; the introduction of the Gautrain high speed rail service; a firm decision to speed up the public transport contracting system through the introduction of negotiated contracts of up to 12 years (thus by-passing the labour issues related to the competitive tendering system), and the recapitalisation of the taxi industry through the taxi recap programme e although behind schedule, more than 42 000 taxis have been part of the programme. The key to future urban transport in South Africa is to be found in the implementation of ITPs that will, over time, integrate and coordinate public transport service provision. This is however, a medium term process, and full implementation is not expected for many years to come. References Arrive Alive. (2011a). Taxi recapitalisation. Available from http://www.arrivealive. co.za/pages.aspx?i¼2407 Accessed 03.08.11. Arrive Alive. (2011b). Minibus taxis and road safety. Available from http://www. arrivealive.co.za/pages.aspx?i¼2850 Accessed 03.08.11.

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Dachs, W. (2011). Address to the air/rail conference, Venice, October 2011. Department of Transport. (2003). National household travel survey. Department of Transport. (2007a). Public transport action plan, phase 1 (2007e2010): Catalytic integrated rapid public transport network projects. March 2007. Department of Transport. (2007b). The public transport strategy. March 2007. Department of Transport. (2011). List of consolidated payments as at 28 July 2011. Correspondence received from the DoT regarding the taxi recapitalisation programme. Engineering News. (2009). Gautrain to cost extra R300m e van der Merwe. Available from http://engineeringnews.co.za/article/gautrain-to-cost-extra-r300mvan-der-merwe Accessed 21.11.11. Fortune, G. (2011). Acting manager: IRT System Planning & Modelling. Cape Town integrated rapid transit project progress Address to the SABOA annual conference. Pretoria: CSIR, 24 February 2011. Moving South Africa. (7 September 1998). Towards a transport strategy for 2020. Report and strategic recommendations. Draft for discussion. Ndebele, S. (2011). Minster of transport. Address during the handover to the taxi industry shareholders of phase 1A bus operating company. 7 February 2011. Available from http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid¼461& sid¼16061&tid¼27748 Accessed 02.08.11. PRASA Corporate Plan. Connecting people, building communities. Final. 2009/ 10e2011/12. PRASA leaflet: our positive future. Employee version of the corporate plan 2011/ 12e2013/14. PRASA Publication. PRASA &2010. Rea Vaya. (2011). Piotrans is new bus company. Available from http://www.reavaya. co.za/news-archive/news-2011/646-piotrans-is-the-new-bus-operator Accessed 02.09.11. Seftel, L. (2011). Executive director: Transportation Johannesburg Metro. Overview of progress with IPTNs with specific reference to the role of BRTs in IPTNs24 February 2011 Address to the SABOA annual conference. Pretoria: CSIR. South African Government Information. (2010). Keynote address by the Minister of Transport Mr Sibusiso Ndebele, MP. In South African National Taxi Association Council (SANTACO) national conference. 4 May 2010. Available from http://www. info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid¼461&sid¼10392&tid¼1049 Accessed 03.08.11. South African Rail Commuter Corporation/Metrorail. (2006). National rail plan consolidation report. Final report. August 2006. Taaibosch, P. (2011). Taxi group seeks equal subsidies. Business report. 14 February 2011. Available from http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/taxi-groupseeks-equal-subsidies-1.1025 Accessed 19.11.11. van der Merwe, J. (2011). CEO: Gautrain Management Agency. In Address to the international transport investors conference. Cape Town: Cape Town International Convention Centre, 13/14 June 2011. van der Walt, D. (2011). General manager: PRASA. In Address to the international transport investors conference. Cape Town: Cape Town International Convention Centre, 13/14 June 2011. Walters, J. (2007). Overview of public transport policy developments in South Africa. In Thredbo 10 conference, Hamilton Island Australia. August 2007. Walters, J. (2008). Overview of public transport developments in South Africa. Research in Transportation Economics, 22(2008), 98e108. Walters, J., & Cloete, J. J. (2001) An evaluation of the tender for contract system. In Thredbo 7 conference, Molde, Norway.

List of abbreviations BOC: bus operating company BRT: bus rapid transit CBD: central business district DoT: Department of Transport (National) HOA: Heads of Agreement IC/ICs: interim contract/s IRPTN/s: Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network/s IRT: Integrated Rapid Transit ITP: Integrated Transport Plan LTA: Land Transport Act, 2009 MSA: Moving South Africa NHTS: National Household Travel Survey NJWG: National Joint Working Group NLTSF: National Land Transport Strategic Framework NLTTA: National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 NRP: National Rail Plan PPP: PublicePrivate Partnership PRASA: Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa RFP: request for proposal RSA: Republic of South Africa SA: South Africa SABOA: Southern African Bus Operators Association SANTACO: South African National Taxi Council SPG: Strategic Partners Group TA: transport authority TOICS: Taxi Operator Investor Companies