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Ideology and the promotion of social change
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ScienceDirect Ideology and the promotion of social change Julia C Becker Most models predicting collective action for social change have not considered the role of ideology. Recent research suggests, however, that ideology is a key variable in predicting social change efforts by illustrating that conservatives are more likely to resist whereas liberals are more likely to promote social change. In this review, I bring two lines of research together showing that not ony liberals but also right-wing populists are interested in collective action for social change. I introduce an integrative framework that endeavors to clarify the relation between ideology and social change by taking the content of socio-political issues into account. I propose that the distinction between progressive and reactionary social change can help to connect different social change intentions with its underlying ideological antecedents. Address University of Osnabrueck, Seminarstraße 20, 49074 Osnabrueck, Germany Corresponding author: Becker, Julia C ([email protected])
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2019, 34:6–11 This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *Political Ideologies* Edited by John Jost, Eran Halperin and Kristin Laurin
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.10.005 2352-1546/ã 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Political ideology comprises attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved [1– 3,4]. Thus, political ideologies are motivated social cognitions [5]. Central elements are attitudes toward social stability (versus social change) and toward social hierarchy (versus social equality). Importantly for the present review, people’s preferred political ideology can morally compel them to engage in political activism that promotes social change or upholds the status quo [6]. In this review, I first present evidence showing that liberals are more likely to promote social change compared to conservatives. Second, I review work challenging the assumption that conservatives always resist change and connect the literature on ideology and social change with work on right-wing extremism and propose that a distinction between progressive and reactionary social Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
change can help to connect different social change intentions with their underlying ideological antecedents. Finally, I discuss open questions and provide directions for future work.
Liberals promote social change whereas conservatives promote system stability Until recently, psychologists did not consider political ideology as unique predictor of collective action for social change (e.g. Refs. [7–10], for exceptions see, for example, [11]). One possible reason for not considering political ideology in prominent models of collective action is that most researchers studied collective action for progressive social change which aims at a more open, tolerant and egalitarian society and as action that challenges established systems of authority. For instance, left-wing political orientation predicted the intention to engage in Gezi park protests [12], and liberal ideology predicted participation in the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations [13]. Thus, progressive social change is the default in most research on collective action. In contrast, research on the role of conservative ideology focused on system maintenance, defense of the existing social order, and resistance to social change (e.g. Refs. [6,14]). Indeed, a number of authors argued and provided empirical support for the notion that a core feature of political conservatism is the resistance to social change, whereas a core feature of political liberalism is the promotion of social change (e. g. Refs. [2,15–20]). According to Jost et al., these findings can be explained by differences among liberals and conservatives in epistemic needs (e.g. need to reduce uncertainty), existential needs (e.g. need for security) and relational needs (e.g. need for shared reality, [19]). For instance, conservatives have stronger psychological needs to maintain what is familiar and known and to reject the unknown, risky and uncertain prospects of social change [19,21]. Recently, Jost et al. [6] explicitly incorporated ideology into a model of collective action by differentiating individuals endorsing or rejecting the system and by considering system-supporting versus system-challenging collective action [6,14]. System-supporting collective action refers to protests aiming at maintaining the status quo, whereas system challenging collective action refers to protests aiming at changing established systems of inequality (see Figure 1). In two empirical tests, Osborne et al. [14] showed that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action for members of groups of low and high status. The well-established predictors of collective action (group www.sciencedirect.com
Ideology and the promotion of social change Becker 7
Figure 1
Perceived Group Efficacy
Group-Based Anger
Group Identification
LS
SystemChallenging Protest (vs. Inaction)
LS
HS HS
HS
Perceived Injustice Epistemic Needs Existential Needs
LS
System Justification
SystemSupporting Protest (vs. Inaction)
System-Based Anger
Relational Needs Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
A schematic illustration of a model of system-challenging and system-supporting protest. Note: HS = high status (or advantaged) group members; LS = low-status (or disadvantaged) group members. This figure is based on an original figure from Jost et al. ([6], Figure 7).
identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger) served as mediators of these relationships.
society (see Figure 2). Next, I review recent research on ideology and the promotion of progressive social change, before I focus on ideology and the promotion of reactionary social change.
Progressive versus reactionary social change So far, the reviewed literature suggests that liberals and conservatives have different needs, which cause a stronger inclination toward social change among liberals, and a stronger inclination to support the status quo among conservatives. This might result in the impression that social change is always progressive, leading to more equality in society. When we look at the world politics, however, we do not see only left-wing movements that advocate for social change. In fact, in contemporary Europe, the number of radical right-wing populist movements is on the rise [22]. These movements are not at all interested in system stability, but in social change aiming at changing society into a more hierarchical and less equal one, for instance, by restricting immigration, and fostering law and order politics [22]. Therefore, a distinction between progressive versus reactionary social change seems warranted to highlight that system rejection and social change can also be promoted by right-wing movements. In this review, I define progressive social change as change aiming at establishing more social equality in society, whereas reactionary social change as change aiming at fostering more social inequality in www.sciencedirect.com
Progressive social change and its ideological antecedents In many studies, political ideology is conceptualized as two separate but related constructs: social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, e.g. Ref. [16]). SDO reflects a competition-driven Figure 2
Progressive social change Political Ideology (right-left) Reactionary social change Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
Ideology predicts progressive versus reactionary social change. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
8 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *Political Ideologies*
motivation for group-based dominance and hierarchy [16,23], and correlates with opposition to equality as well as with prejudice toward those aiming to attenuate social hierarchy [24,25]. RWA expresses a threat-driven motivation for collective security and ingroup cohesion [16]. Further, it presents adherence to established social conventions, deference to established authorities and aggression against norm-deviants [26]. The underlying psychological needs, traits and motives reflect needs for certainty, security and order, which is associated with a preference for maintaining the status quo as opposed to support for protest [27]. Recent work illustrated that low levels of SDO predict progressive political engagement (e.g. Refs. [28–33], see also Ref. [34] for a more refined analysis). Moreover, researchers found a negative relationship between RWA [35], SDO [36] and support of progressive protest. Similarly, work in the context of more novel social movements such as #fridaysforfuture and pro-environmental action illustrated that RWA and SDO predict lower willingness to act for climate change [37–39]; see also Ref. [40] for the reverse causal order). Furthermore, system justification theorists argue that people are motivated to defend the status quo and systems on which they depend because it serves epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty, existential motives to reduce threat and relational motive to share reality with the mainstream [41,42]. In line with this, low levels of system justification ([15]; see also Ref. [43–46], and van Stekelenburg and Klandermans for examining the role of trust in politicians [47]) but some degree of system confidence [48] predicted political engagement for progressive social change (see also Ref. [49] for the reversed causal order). Some further variables representing inequality-related ideology predicted political engagement for progressive social change: low levels of paternalism [50], low levels of hope for future ingroup status change [51], low levels of masculine honor ideology [52], and low levels of postcolonial beliefs [53]. In a nutshell, there is a lot of evidence showing that liberal ideologies (e.g. left-wing political orientation, low levels of SDO and RWA, low levels in system justification) promote collective action for progressive social change. In addition to this, some first studies illustrate that under certain conditions, conservatives become less resistant against progressive social change [54–56].
Reactionary social change and its ideological antecedents Reactionary politics reflect a preference for political affairs that have been overcome, combining a resentful affectivity with the desire to return to the past [57]. In its contemporary form, it is often used to describe the discourse of right-wing populist parties [58,59,60]. Often, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
right-wing movements get more support in times of crisis (e.g. Ref. [61], but see Ref. [62]). For instance, an analysis of social movements in France between 1882 and 1980 illustrated that threat (assessed as long-term episodes of economic deprivation) increased the presence of reactionary movements [63]. Research in the last two years provides empirical support for the argument that conservatives and liberals can both resist and accept societal changes. The resistance or acceptance depends on their approval of the existing societal status quo on a given sociopolitical issue [4]. Recently, Caricati [64] presented evidence of decreased system justification among extreme conservatives. He illustrates a quadratic and negative relationship showing that system justification is highest in the middle and decreases at the left and right extremes of the political continuum. This finding is in line with Thorisdottir et al. showing that ideological extremity on the left and right was associated with greater openness to new experiences [65]. Similarly, Choma et al. [66] illustrated that RWA and SDO related positively to collective action aiming at addressing societal moral breakdown, but negatively to collective action targeting at equalizing race relations or fighting climate change (see also Refs. [67,68]). These studies support the idea that individuals are more inclined to participate in collective action in domains that align with their existing values or political affinity [66,4,68]. Relatedly, Mikolajczak and Becker [69] exposed liberals and conservatives to potential changes in the tax reform and in the healthcare system and then asked whether they intent to engage in collective action to protest against these changes. They manipulated whether the reason for the reform was based on a violation of the merit, equality or need rule of fairness. Whereas conservatives and liberals were equally interested in engaging in collective action for social change across conditions, conservatives were more likely to endorse protest when the merit rule of fairness was violated, whereas liberals were more likely to endorse protest when the need and equality rules were at stake [69]. Some research also illustrated that a right-wing ideological variables (here political orientation, [70]) and SDO [25] predict actions to counter progressive movements such as repression of Gezi park protests [70] and anti-immigrant action to sustain group-based hierarchy [25]. In sum, although conservatives have a stronger inclination to support the status quo (see Figure 1, [6]), those in the extreme right do not necessarily advocate for system stability but aim to initiate social change in a reactionary direction (see Figure 2).
Conclusion and directions for future research In this review, I highlighted two observations that are contradictory at first sight: on the one hand, a lot of evidence suggests that liberals compared to conservatives www.sciencedirect.com
Ideology and the promotion of social change Becker 9
are more supportive of social change in general [6]. On the other hand, individuals endorsing right-wing ideology reject the system [64] and promote reactionary social change [66]. In order to reconcile these two observations, I proposed a distinction between progressive and reactionary social change and reviewed evidence showing that individuals endorsing left-wing ideology (e.g. liberals, individuals rejecting SDO and RWA) are likely to promote progressive social change, whereas individuals endorsing right-wing ideology (e.g. right-wing populism, SDO and RWA) are likely to promote reactionary social change. Thus, there seems to be a distinction between ‘moderate conservatives’ who support the status quo and right-wing extremists who support reactionary social change. In the following, I provide some directions for future research. First, we need to clarify the distinction between the liberalism-conservatism and left-right dimensions. Most work in the US use the liberal-conservative dimension [21], whereas in many European countries, the left-right dimension or the distinction between social and economic conservatism is more meaningful (e.g. Ref. [65]). As illustrated, right-wing extremists do not want ‘to conserve’ the status quo, they want radical reactionary change and they cannot be identified in research projects that use the liberalconservative dimension to assess political ideology. For instance, historical analyses show that in Germany, the meaning of what is ‘right’ and what is ‘left’ changed profoundly since the French revolution [71]. Thus, more research is necessary to examine psychological and ideological differences and similarities among ‘extreme conservatism’ and ‘right-wing extremism’. Related to this, it is likely that the strength of ideology is crucial in predicting the promotion of social change. Individuals for whom their ideology is central (compared to those who are more uncertain about their political orientation) should be more likely to identify with their ideological ingroup and this politicized identity should predict the promotion of social change [72– 74]. Thus, future work could test whether strength of ideology endorsement predicts politicized identification which in turn promotes progressive versus reactionary social change. Second, although recent research considered ideology in models of collective action for social change, it is still unclear whether there are ideological differences in group efficacy, group-based emotions, and moral convictions. Following Mikolajczak and Becker [69] who illustrated ideological differences in injustice appraisals, future research could examine a) whether left-wing and rightwing individuals differ in other established predictors of collective action and b) whether the experience of group efficacy, group identification, group-based emotions and moral convictions motivate left-wing and right-wing individuals to the same extend to engage in collective action for social change. www.sciencedirect.com
Conflict of interest statement Nothing declared.
References and recommended reading Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as: of special interest of outstanding interest 1.
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Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
ScienceDirect Ideology and the promotion of social change Julia C Becker Most models predicting collective action for social change have not considered the role of ideology. Recent research suggests, however, that ideology is a key variable in predicting social change efforts by illustrating that conservatives are more likely to resist whereas liberals are more likely to promote social change. In this review, I bring two lines of research together showing that not ony liberals but also right-wing populists are interested in collective action for social change. I introduce an integrative framework that endeavors to clarify the relation between ideology and social change by taking the content of socio-political issues into account. I propose that the distinction between progressive and reactionary social change can help to connect different social change intentions with its underlying ideological antecedents. Address University of Osnabrueck, Seminarstraße 20, 49074 Osnabrueck, Germany Corresponding author: Becker, Julia C ([email protected])
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2019, 34:6–11 This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *Political Ideologies* Edited by John Jost, Eran Halperin and Kristin Laurin
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.10.005 2352-1546/ã 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Political ideology comprises attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved [1– 3,4]. Thus, political ideologies are motivated social cognitions [5]. Central elements are attitudes toward social stability (versus social change) and toward social hierarchy (versus social equality). Importantly for the present review, people’s preferred political ideology can morally compel them to engage in political activism that promotes social change or upholds the status quo [6]. In this review, I first present evidence showing that liberals are more likely to promote social change compared to conservatives. Second, I review work challenging the assumption that conservatives always resist change and connect the literature on ideology and social change with work on right-wing extremism and propose that a distinction between progressive and reactionary social Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
change can help to connect different social change intentions with their underlying ideological antecedents. Finally, I discuss open questions and provide directions for future work.
Liberals promote social change whereas conservatives promote system stability Until recently, psychologists did not consider political ideology as unique predictor of collective action for social change (e.g. Refs. [7–10], for exceptions see, for example, [11]). One possible reason for not considering political ideology in prominent models of collective action is that most researchers studied collective action for progressive social change which aims at a more open, tolerant and egalitarian society and as action that challenges established systems of authority. For instance, left-wing political orientation predicted the intention to engage in Gezi park protests [12], and liberal ideology predicted participation in the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations [13]. Thus, progressive social change is the default in most research on collective action. In contrast, research on the role of conservative ideology focused on system maintenance, defense of the existing social order, and resistance to social change (e.g. Refs. [6,14]). Indeed, a number of authors argued and provided empirical support for the notion that a core feature of political conservatism is the resistance to social change, whereas a core feature of political liberalism is the promotion of social change (e. g. Refs. [2,15–20]). According to Jost et al., these findings can be explained by differences among liberals and conservatives in epistemic needs (e.g. need to reduce uncertainty), existential needs (e.g. need for security) and relational needs (e.g. need for shared reality, [19]). For instance, conservatives have stronger psychological needs to maintain what is familiar and known and to reject the unknown, risky and uncertain prospects of social change [19,21]. Recently, Jost et al. [6] explicitly incorporated ideology into a model of collective action by differentiating individuals endorsing or rejecting the system and by considering system-supporting versus system-challenging collective action [6,14]. System-supporting collective action refers to protests aiming at maintaining the status quo, whereas system challenging collective action refers to protests aiming at changing established systems of inequality (see Figure 1). In two empirical tests, Osborne et al. [14] showed that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action for members of groups of low and high status. The well-established predictors of collective action (group www.sciencedirect.com
Ideology and the promotion of social change Becker 7
Figure 1
Perceived Group Efficacy
Group-Based Anger
Group Identification
LS
SystemChallenging Protest (vs. Inaction)
LS
HS HS
HS
Perceived Injustice Epistemic Needs Existential Needs
LS
System Justification
SystemSupporting Protest (vs. Inaction)
System-Based Anger
Relational Needs Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
A schematic illustration of a model of system-challenging and system-supporting protest. Note: HS = high status (or advantaged) group members; LS = low-status (or disadvantaged) group members. This figure is based on an original figure from Jost et al. ([6], Figure 7).
identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger) served as mediators of these relationships.
society (see Figure 2). Next, I review recent research on ideology and the promotion of progressive social change, before I focus on ideology and the promotion of reactionary social change.
Progressive versus reactionary social change So far, the reviewed literature suggests that liberals and conservatives have different needs, which cause a stronger inclination toward social change among liberals, and a stronger inclination to support the status quo among conservatives. This might result in the impression that social change is always progressive, leading to more equality in society. When we look at the world politics, however, we do not see only left-wing movements that advocate for social change. In fact, in contemporary Europe, the number of radical right-wing populist movements is on the rise [22]. These movements are not at all interested in system stability, but in social change aiming at changing society into a more hierarchical and less equal one, for instance, by restricting immigration, and fostering law and order politics [22]. Therefore, a distinction between progressive versus reactionary social change seems warranted to highlight that system rejection and social change can also be promoted by right-wing movements. In this review, I define progressive social change as change aiming at establishing more social equality in society, whereas reactionary social change as change aiming at fostering more social inequality in www.sciencedirect.com
Progressive social change and its ideological antecedents In many studies, political ideology is conceptualized as two separate but related constructs: social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, e.g. Ref. [16]). SDO reflects a competition-driven Figure 2
Progressive social change Political Ideology (right-left) Reactionary social change Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
Ideology predicts progressive versus reactionary social change. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
8 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *Political Ideologies*
motivation for group-based dominance and hierarchy [16,23], and correlates with opposition to equality as well as with prejudice toward those aiming to attenuate social hierarchy [24,25]. RWA expresses a threat-driven motivation for collective security and ingroup cohesion [16]. Further, it presents adherence to established social conventions, deference to established authorities and aggression against norm-deviants [26]. The underlying psychological needs, traits and motives reflect needs for certainty, security and order, which is associated with a preference for maintaining the status quo as opposed to support for protest [27]. Recent work illustrated that low levels of SDO predict progressive political engagement (e.g. Refs. [28–33], see also Ref. [34] for a more refined analysis). Moreover, researchers found a negative relationship between RWA [35], SDO [36] and support of progressive protest. Similarly, work in the context of more novel social movements such as #fridaysforfuture and pro-environmental action illustrated that RWA and SDO predict lower willingness to act for climate change [37–39]; see also Ref. [40] for the reverse causal order). Furthermore, system justification theorists argue that people are motivated to defend the status quo and systems on which they depend because it serves epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty, existential motives to reduce threat and relational motive to share reality with the mainstream [41,42]. In line with this, low levels of system justification ([15]; see also Ref. [43–46], and van Stekelenburg and Klandermans for examining the role of trust in politicians [47]) but some degree of system confidence [48] predicted political engagement for progressive social change (see also Ref. [49] for the reversed causal order). Some further variables representing inequality-related ideology predicted political engagement for progressive social change: low levels of paternalism [50], low levels of hope for future ingroup status change [51], low levels of masculine honor ideology [52], and low levels of postcolonial beliefs [53]. In a nutshell, there is a lot of evidence showing that liberal ideologies (e.g. left-wing political orientation, low levels of SDO and RWA, low levels in system justification) promote collective action for progressive social change. In addition to this, some first studies illustrate that under certain conditions, conservatives become less resistant against progressive social change [54–56].
Reactionary social change and its ideological antecedents Reactionary politics reflect a preference for political affairs that have been overcome, combining a resentful affectivity with the desire to return to the past [57]. In its contemporary form, it is often used to describe the discourse of right-wing populist parties [58,59,60]. Often, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:6–11
right-wing movements get more support in times of crisis (e.g. Ref. [61], but see Ref. [62]). For instance, an analysis of social movements in France between 1882 and 1980 illustrated that threat (assessed as long-term episodes of economic deprivation) increased the presence of reactionary movements [63]. Research in the last two years provides empirical support for the argument that conservatives and liberals can both resist and accept societal changes. The resistance or acceptance depends on their approval of the existing societal status quo on a given sociopolitical issue [4]. Recently, Caricati [64] presented evidence of decreased system justification among extreme conservatives. He illustrates a quadratic and negative relationship showing that system justification is highest in the middle and decreases at the left and right extremes of the political continuum. This finding is in line with Thorisdottir et al. showing that ideological extremity on the left and right was associated with greater openness to new experiences [65]. Similarly, Choma et al. [66] illustrated that RWA and SDO related positively to collective action aiming at addressing societal moral breakdown, but negatively to collective action targeting at equalizing race relations or fighting climate change (see also Refs. [67,68]). These studies support the idea that individuals are more inclined to participate in collective action in domains that align with their existing values or political affinity [66,4,68]. Relatedly, Mikolajczak and Becker [69] exposed liberals and conservatives to potential changes in the tax reform and in the healthcare system and then asked whether they intent to engage in collective action to protest against these changes. They manipulated whether the reason for the reform was based on a violation of the merit, equality or need rule of fairness. Whereas conservatives and liberals were equally interested in engaging in collective action for social change across conditions, conservatives were more likely to endorse protest when the merit rule of fairness was violated, whereas liberals were more likely to endorse protest when the need and equality rules were at stake [69]. Some research also illustrated that a right-wing ideological variables (here political orientation, [70]) and SDO [25] predict actions to counter progressive movements such as repression of Gezi park protests [70] and anti-immigrant action to sustain group-based hierarchy [25]. In sum, although conservatives have a stronger inclination to support the status quo (see Figure 1, [6]), those in the extreme right do not necessarily advocate for system stability but aim to initiate social change in a reactionary direction (see Figure 2).
Conclusion and directions for future research In this review, I highlighted two observations that are contradictory at first sight: on the one hand, a lot of evidence suggests that liberals compared to conservatives www.sciencedirect.com
Ideology and the promotion of social change Becker 9
are more supportive of social change in general [6]. On the other hand, individuals endorsing right-wing ideology reject the system [64] and promote reactionary social change [66]. In order to reconcile these two observations, I proposed a distinction between progressive and reactionary social change and reviewed evidence showing that individuals endorsing left-wing ideology (e.g. liberals, individuals rejecting SDO and RWA) are likely to promote progressive social change, whereas individuals endorsing right-wing ideology (e.g. right-wing populism, SDO and RWA) are likely to promote reactionary social change. Thus, there seems to be a distinction between ‘moderate conservatives’ who support the status quo and right-wing extremists who support reactionary social change. In the following, I provide some directions for future research. First, we need to clarify the distinction between the liberalism-conservatism and left-right dimensions. Most work in the US use the liberal-conservative dimension [21], whereas in many European countries, the left-right dimension or the distinction between social and economic conservatism is more meaningful (e.g. Ref. [65]). As illustrated, right-wing extremists do not want ‘to conserve’ the status quo, they want radical reactionary change and they cannot be identified in research projects that use the liberalconservative dimension to assess political ideology. For instance, historical analyses show that in Germany, the meaning of what is ‘right’ and what is ‘left’ changed profoundly since the French revolution [71]. Thus, more research is necessary to examine psychological and ideological differences and similarities among ‘extreme conservatism’ and ‘right-wing extremism’. Related to this, it is likely that the strength of ideology is crucial in predicting the promotion of social change. Individuals for whom their ideology is central (compared to those who are more uncertain about their political orientation) should be more likely to identify with their ideological ingroup and this politicized identity should predict the promotion of social change [72– 74]. Thus, future work could test whether strength of ideology endorsement predicts politicized identification which in turn promotes progressive versus reactionary social change. Second, although recent research considered ideology in models of collective action for social change, it is still unclear whether there are ideological differences in group efficacy, group-based emotions, and moral convictions. Following Mikolajczak and Becker [69] who illustrated ideological differences in injustice appraisals, future research could examine a) whether left-wing and rightwing individuals differ in other established predictors of collective action and b) whether the experience of group efficacy, group identification, group-based emotions and moral convictions motivate left-wing and right-wing individuals to the same extend to engage in collective action for social change. www.sciencedirect.com
Conflict of interest statement Nothing declared.
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