Implications of the Gorbachev era for Cuban socialism

RHODA RABKIN

Implications of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

Mikhail

Gorbachev’s

ambivalent have the

call

response

been

the most

important

Soviet

Union,

Hungary,

modern,

dynamic,

national elites

has

and society.

slovakia

the political lacking.

in Eastern tions, “Why at times Soviet and

thinking,

Castro

not really doubt

militant

in socialism But

treatment

which

to its waning

on the

assistance.

Even

The

economic Cuban

initiatives.

to arrest

between

and

dynamics

elites

In

to create

a process

these

of

communist

him

has received

before

Union

for

Gorbachev,

performance,

communist

partner trade, there

to Soviet

leadership

more

means

the world

Cuba

derives

in Third

of Soviet

is likely

aspects

a No

from which

economic

be indifferent

because

it is heavily

aid,

and

impatience

to continue

is

World

objectives,

cannot

Union,

ideological

Union.

for the favored

development

signs

tensions

around

Union.4

has

answer

and poverty

Soviet

then

The

to the Soviet

policy

has

politics,

Why

warmly?

foreign

economic

also finds

internal

asset

substantially

and this impatience

for Castro

with conventional

policy,

East-West

causes

were

institu-

and has asked:

as a maverick.

exploitation

of the

by other

in socialist to Cuba

more

changes

up and repeated

to foreign

leader

from the Soviet

as a strategic

political

His disputes

as a strategic

also accounts

are

lines?“”

in reducing

contribution lives,

the recent

reforms

himself.

for revolutionary of combatting

relation-

reforms

is in some ways surprising

Soviet

Czechocommunist

of the state-society

taken

a reputation

of Cuba

Germany, hardline

for improvement

capitalist

success

military

Soviet

as in East

Gorbachev’s

ofliberalizing

innovative

support

Cuba

dependent Cuban

earned

of Cuban

value

need

communist

in the value

Cuba’s

that

in the 196Os, with regard

as a means

has cost thousands

the

reform

mysterious-Gorbachev’s

Castro’s

his reform

toppled

revision

believed

be along

a dynamic,

decline

countries.

reforms

particularly

(and

protest

a view that has been

denying

management

corresponding faith

sad,”

unorthodox

not welcomed

public

long

ofGorbachev-style

a rather

and China

the applicability

the so-called

economic

pacts

to save it. He has described

Without

rejection been

has

than

has rejected

must

a complex

political

of communist

or at least

for a liberalizing

Castro

as “very

leaders.2

Castro’s

Domestic

toward

desire

economies,

massive

conditions

socialism

Europe

Castro

the

set of political

Korea

before

Fidel

to destroy

top Cuban

of attitudes

Poland

a new

as in North

Romania

ship likely

and

has received

world.

1

leaders), are

determinant

triggered

however,

and

of socialism

in the communist

world-competitive

decline,

In Cuba,

1. tion, 2. after 3. 4.

for the rethinking

from leaders

military

with

poor

and intensify.

of the Gorbachev

era

The nature of the pact is somewhat different in China, where the government enlisted societal cooperaat leastfor a time, by offering, not participation, but order. New York Times (hereafter NY?), November 9, 1989, p. 12. See speeches in Granma Weekly Review (hereGWR), December 10, 1989, p, 1989 and Granma, December 29, 1989, p. 3. GWR, December 17, 1989, p. 2. More than two thousand Cubans died in Angola. GWR, December 17, 1989.

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, 0039.3592/90/01

0023-24

VOL. XXIII,

@ 1990 University

No.

of California

1, SPRING 1990, 23-46

deeply

disturbing.

abandoning Cubans

The

socialist to do

“pluralism”

likewise.

has

movement, loyalty

repudiation

ideas

problem

not

the

only

of the

era

subtly

of

leadership

inside which

is that national

clarity Lenin.

itself.

Gorbachev’s

endorsement

of

from

among

the communist

those

is that

critical

itself

Soviet

attitude

developments

to associate

still claiming

perhaps,

a more

These

of the

concern,

legitimizes

in the process are pressuring

defections

equal

sought

ofview,

the Soviets

and coherence Of

Cuba

has often

point

is not that

problem

and

Brezhnev

to a regime

the Cuban

to wholesale

of Marx

unsettling

are

toward

profoundly

with the prestige

of the

bloc.

Policy

Continuity

Gorbachev’s

supposedly

until

now,

other

where

he deems yet

there

expendable domestic costly

instability

increasing

miles

facilities

in the region

tures.

US,

a resource tection

Soviet

lasting

credit

offers

development, media massive favorable

image

The

need

US

strategic

ones,

the Soviet

any other

Soviet

With

the

Soviet

aircraft

along

the a

military

defense

recently,

expenditracking

Cuba

available Cuba

furnished for the pro-

from has

a

to maintain

and submarine

withdrawal but

military

furnishes surveillance.

Union

partner-soldiers

significance,

with

Cuba

and raises

Until

Castro reasons

Cuban/Soviet

surveillance

Cuban

Despite

treated

electronic

to counter

in the area.”

engagements

Union

reconnaissance

an

whose

and political

irreplaceable:

the

Cuba

prestige. have

strategic

planning

expensive

activities

military

for gathering allow

the less

tangible

By presenting

brings

portray

prestige

Cuban

of Soviet

basic

up Soviet

client-states

the Soviets

provides

D) long range

US

in Africa.

are

Union.

transfers

in providing

as the

Angola,

probably

this earned

for it.

Cuba

generally

in

considers

or Angola,

are probably

is of diminished

there

the Soviet

up

lacking

even drastic

leadership

are good

facilities

installed

from

power

contribution

In addition,

(Bear

naval

naval

unobtainable

particular

at least

is to shore

for open-ended

installation)

complicates

for example,

of Soviet

been

be described

concessions,

and Cuba,

Cuba

that

in the Caribbean.

to monitor

departures

Cuba,

lives and international

There

Florida,

Cuban

capabilities systems

best

his objective

era

support and/or

Union

and some for Soviet

seaboard.

The

Soviet

base (the Lourdes

presence

might

to make

Gorbachev

of money,

from

are unique

sophisticated

goal

sense,

dramatic

toward

that has often

is not Afghanistan

and delicacy.

that

strategic

the

Cuba

restraint

so. Ninety

eastern

that

the Soviet

for doing

It also provides

ultimate

between

resources huge,

sign

has required

with considerable

involved

continuity

In an important

in terms

friction

But policy

he is fully prepared

commitment.

to the Soviets

have

necessary.

is little

Soviet

abroad, conduct.

to preserve

Gorbachev’s

For this,

them

and

of Soviet

a concern

socialism.

and prestige.

Era

at home

principles

policies.

of Soviet

power As

both

fixed

demonstrates

Gorbachev’s renewal

in the Gorbachev

policies,

from

some

is, from

The

Rather,

led,

questions

US

Union

but to a loss of ideological

to the

Soviet

Soviet

principles.

aid,

nutrition,

of the Cuban

ideological

itself

to the socialist

socialism in Latin employment, revolution

benefits

that

of social

progress

as a model cause.

as an economic America

failure,

and elsewhere,

healthcare, (whatever

Although

and

the source

Cuban

friendship

and equitable

the American kept in being Cuban

education and scale

5. ,Jaime Suchlicki, “Soviet Policy in Latin America: Some Implications for- the United InterAmermn Studies and World Aflairs, Vol. 29, no. 1 (Sprins, 1987), p. 40.

mass only by

achievements have

created

a

of its external Statcs,“~/ournol

qf

Implications funding)

among

connection For

many

bolsters

all

of

countries

intellectuals,

the Soviet

these

bargaining, But

parties.

their

because

of political

As outlined

maneuver

above,

logical.

We can now explore and Cuban

that

Cuba

Economic Soviet

may

capitalist many

pursue

in the wake

countries,

instances,

or technology Official

is of great

come

given

however,

the socialist as cheaply

growth

economy.

The

given

the rest of Latin

that

misleading, inflation, Soviet

reported

however, and debt

In the second growth.

In

December, imports the rate high Cuba

from

1986,

Cuba

1986,

Castro

for the coming

negative

growth of 2.3

level

reported

per cent

of Cuban

in

with

the

as by necessity.

In

from

were

machinery,

the West.

indicated

recession.‘j

a robust

Cuban

was extraordinary, This

reported

not properly

by unsustainable

in the crisis.

imports

of trade

raw materials,

of 7 per cent

figures

countries

of payments

by choice

1980s

rate

rate

corrected

sources:

that

For

capital

have

reported

billion the West.

effects

is for

aid from

the

curbed

her

on the rate

to less than

In 1987,

did not recoup

($6.4 from

would

difficulties

harmful

slowed

level.

Castro

which debt

with

had

Cuba 1986

1988,

of payments

area,

growth

to half their

new investment

other

low level

as is available

balance

trading that

currency

so much

of the

output

Cuba’s

for the year,

hard

of

alterna-

creditors.7

announced year

half

was financed

the capitalist

of 3.2 percent.

of Cuban

to attract

growth

some

relationship.

balance

The

was experiencing

to Western

Like

to provide

growth

because

half of the 198Os,

to import

a quality

average

America

not only

but also because Union

ability

annual

about unable

first

and perceptions

consider

85 per cent

countries.

has not come

the

major

and the ideo-

Soviet-Cuban

to Cuba.

approximately

bloc has been from

for three

interests

a hard-currency

socialist

or in as high

figures

but a

uncertain.

Relationship

importance

that

the

leader,

to a degree,

We will then

in

one for both

world

the strategic,

the conflicting

two

also less intimate,

implications

of a loosened

is experiencing

from

not an ordinary

areas.

the period

ofbehind-the-scenes

though

is still,

Cuban capitals.

between

and uncomfortable

economic,

three

The

World

difficult

will, after a period

the outcome

detail

in these

surprising,

of the

era has threatening

in greater

Cuba

have

rupture current

relationship-the

assistance

seem

years

Soviet-initiated

Castro,

and surprise,

people.

outcome

of the Soviet-Cuban

hemisphere,

recent

with

25

in Third

in ways beneficial,

leaders

Dimensions

financial

western This

might

and ordinary ” image

will be a difficult

the Gorbachev

of the Soviet-Cuban

tives

period

we are dealing

aspects

the Soviet

probable

relationship

the adjustment

And

master

most

is that the two countries

restructure

for both.

leaders,

“progressive

a deliberate

The

relations

political

Union’s

reasons,

is unlikely.

Soviet-Cuban

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

1 per

to curtail Cuba

that growth the losses

in 1988) lo Cuba’s

hard

actually from

hard

In

currency reported

had resumed

has made

of

cent.”

1987.g

it difficult

currency

a at

The for

exports

6. Per capita GDP for the region (in constant 1980 dollars) dropped from $2036 in 1980, to $1897 in 1985. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook 1988, Table 115, pp. 184-185. 7. For an analysis of the relationship between Cuban growth figures and price inflation of about 3 per cent “Cuba’s Economy in the 198Os,” Problems of Communim Z%lIlUally, see Jorge Ptrez-L6pez, (September-October, 1986), p. 19. 8. Economist Intelligence Unit (hereafter EIU), Cuba, 1989, no. 1, p. 2. 9. Granma, December 6, 1986, supplement, p. 6; EIU, C uba, no. 3, 1988, p. 2; and Caribbean Insight, January 1989, p. 7. 10. EIU, Cuba, 1988, no. 3, p. 2. Cuba has been in default on the debt for several years.

26

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE

in 1983-1987

averaged

debt of about

6 times

of debt Cuba

to exports

Cuba’s

poor

trade

above

The

world

Soviet

Union

market

prices,

example,

in 1979,

supplied

Cuba

price.

Moscow

with

l2 In 1984,

million

tons of sugar

financed

a quarter

There

is a difficult subsidy

the Soviet

subsidy times

production

capitalist special

and

is not simply the volume

is sold at so-called

world

preferential

markets

are met.“14

instead

of the much

sugar, Cuba

sugar.‘” and

received

The

the 1980s

usual

loans,

represents national

during

Soviet

Cuban East

the Soviets

economic

economy, has

been

and,

have

product subsidy

but also looked variously

provided

each

world

OPEC

its seven

the US

price,

found

a half

that

includes

Cuba

sugar

for most exports

between

the official

and for

to Cuba

the value

figures,

then

estimated

a ballpark

aid equivalent

during

of the sugar develop-

this

transfer capitalist

rate of the peso to

Product

Agency

to

1976

low-interest

exchange

Social

to

price

annually

does not use the standard

that Gross

economic

price

world

quota

what

of

size of

market

“.

dollars

transfers

to estimate

matter

The

and

import

billion

economic

estimate

the extent

market

easy

these

and

not even have

of total

requirements

using

and Disarmament

If we accept

For

price, the

and world

to Cuba,

reports

prices.

paid for sugar.

of petroleum

GNP.

terms

exported would

one-fifth

The

Soviet

furthermore,

Control

for 1985.

national

It is no

world

one-third

the Soviet than

and

This

sales

rate. l6 Cuba

US Arms

dollars

the 1980s

of the Cuban

the

The

“market”

of the Cuban

system,

is not a market

pesos.

lower

annually.

aid.

as a proportion

at 26 billion

The

military

accounting

the dollar billion

and

researcher,

of the size of total

by trade

at significantly

to determine

price

domestic

one

offset

the world

the revenue

prices.

One

CMEA-price

below times

in trying

Less

after

of about

$4 to $5 billion

subsidies,

market

outlet

a subsidy

estimate

is from

nickel

ment

a residual

to

prices.‘”

between

traded.

ratio

preferential

Cuba

roughly

prices,

involved

the difference

from

well

the above-market

of sugar

partially

that had the country

market

issue

through

nickel

a barrel-or

such

the significance

provided

of sugar-five

bill at world

methodological to Cuba

have

petroleum

hard currency

the worst

bloc.

has been

and

public

at world

constitutes

1982,

sold

at $12.80

producers value

has

told the Cuban

that year

the Soviet

sugar

Cuba’s

underscores

countries

paid 444 per pound

While

is by no means

agreements

bought

of its oil import

the Soviet for sugar

with

petroleum

Castro

of aid from

where has

per year.

exports

” it nevertheless

source

profile

countries,

dollars

currency

America,

an additional

the socialist

to Cuba.

one billion hard

in Latin

of having

with

around annual

COMMUNISM

for 1987 was 27 Cuban

GNP

estimate

is that

to 15 or 20 per cent

year.

to Cuba at from

estimated,

has been the Soviet ” but

significant, point

an official

not only in relation

of view.

Total

Cuban

source

Cuban

to the debt

reported

to

$10

11. Severalcountries-Argentina, Boliwa, Nicaragua. and Peru-had even hisher lrvels of drbt relatlvt to exports m 1987. SeeJames W. Wilkie, cd., Stati&alAbs/ract ofLa/in Amerzra (UCLA Latin American CentclExprxts,” pp h93-694 and Publications, 1989), Table 2703. “IMF Data on Value of Merchandise Table 2800, “Total Public and Private External Debt (1987),” p. 738. 12. Robrrt Pastor, “Cuba and thr Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?” m Harry Lrvinr, rd., 7%~I%‘?u, Cuban Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder: Westvicw, 1983). pp 1!)9%200. 13. <;ranmn, January 4, 1985, p 5. “Sug-ar in the Caribbean: Turning Sunshinr into Money.” in Sidney Mlntz x~cl 14. C;. B. Hagrlberg, Sally Price, eds., Carzbbean Con~oun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 100. 15. Richard Turlts, “Trade, Debt, and the Cuban Economy,” in Andrew Zimbalist, Jr. cd.. Cuba ‘J 1987), p. 169 and 176. For an Socialut Economy. Toward the 199OJ (Boulder: Ly nnr Rienner Publishers, alternative calculation, see Jorge I. Dominguez, ?b Make a World Sa>for Keuolution. Cuba’s Li,rqn PU~ZC> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), appendix B, pp. 290-293. 16. According to the official exchange raw, one Cuban peso is worth $1 25 in US currency. 17. Iruesfza reported that Cuba owes 15 billion rubles to the Soviet Union; or 24 billion dollars at the official exchange ratr. NY7’, March 8, 1990, p. 14.

Implications

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

27

billion of total debt to the socialist bloc in 1987. l8 In June, 1989, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov reported a Soviet foreign debt of equivalent to $34 billion in hard currency.tg A Rand Corporation study estimated that Cuba accounted for half of the total Soviet development assistance for ail communist and non-communist countries.20 The cost of Soviet aid to Cuba domestic

can also be considered

in relation

to the total Soviet

budget deficit in 1988 of about 100 billion rubles. The deficit itself is thought

by American analysts to constitute Even before Gorbachev became

about 9 per cent of the Soviet GNP.*t General Secretary, the Soviets had signalled their

wish to elicit more responsible, efficient economic management from Cuba. Under pressure from their own chronic farm problems, and from hard-currency shortages in an era of soft energy prices, the Soviets were Cuban economic losses indefinitely. Until failures to meet sugar export contracts. climbed, Cuba Ieft the socialist countries

understandably reluctant to go on absorbing 1984, the Soviets had quietly tolerated Cuban More than once, when world sugar prices short, in order to sell to countries which paid

in hard currency. In 1984, however, the Soviets began to insist that Cuba fulfill its contractual commitments. In the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement signed in 1984, Cuba agreed to strict fulfillment of contracts,

and it has taken this obligation

1984 and in 1985, Cuba used scarce hard currency

seriously.

In both

to buy $100 million worth of sugar

on the world market to meet export commitments to the Soviet Union. Some commentators have speculated that the Soviet Union will use economic pressure to bring Cuba into conformity

with Gorbachev’s

new line. Castro has denied

this, saying: “If perestroika were to use pressure, it would not be perestroika.“” Strictly speaking, Castro is correct in his characterization of Gorbachev’s approach to intra-bloc relations. The Soviet leader has repeatedly stated that the international communist movement does not require uniformity. 23 And the Soviets have shown considerable sensitivity

to national differences

that are relevant to the reception of reforms.

ouster by a massive protest movement,

the East German

regime,

although

Until its

it made no

secret of its distaste for the Gorbachev reforms, was treated respectfully in the Soviet press. By contrast, Ceausescu’s Romania, the poorest and most repressive country of the Eastern bloc, was subject to more criticism. 24 To judge from Soviet press coverage of Cuba, the Soviet leadership has no inclination to brand the Castro government as corrupt or incompetent,

although articles criticizing

poor economic

appear in a Soviet magazine (New Times) in August and October,

growth in Cuba did 1987 (with a response

by Cuban leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez). Given the profound differences between Castro and Gorbachev, it is quite remarkable how little evidence there is of Soviet economic pressure on Ilavana. One Cuban official 18.

GWR, March 29, 1987, p. 11. 19. GWR, June 25, 1989, p. 11. A different source, Jan Various,, of PlanEcon, a respected consulting firm, estimates that total Soviet foreign debt is about $43 billion, and that Third World countries owe the Soviet Union a total of1660 billion to $6.5 billion, of which $30 billion should be “collectable,” NY?; July 31, 1989, p. D9. A Cuban official, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was quoted in the mid-1980s stating that the Cuban debt to the USSR would probably never be repaid. Cuban Annual Report 1985 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 206. 20. Charles Wolf Jr., et al., The C&r ofSouie6 Em,&re (Santa Monica: Rand, 1983), Chapter 1. 21. NYT, April 23, 1989, p. 14. The official exchange rate is f .6 rubles to the dollar. 22. Granvza, December 5, 1988, p. 6. 23. “Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Darshan Sincrh, ed., Soviet Foreien I Policy- Documents-1986 (New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers, 1i88), p. 74. ” Perestroika, and Eastern Europe,” in Suruzonl, Vol. 30, no. 4 24. Thomas M. Cynkin, “Glasnost, Uuly-August, 1988), 310-331.

who recently ment

defected

reduction in early

“It’s

hard

now on, anything Nothing

Cuban policies

sources toward

“delays

tardy

delivery

Some

of the

factory.

from however,

sugar-bowl

Cuban

market

sales

third

an

ential” One

prices

Western

in bread

help;

intelligence,

Soviet

economic

minister

and

from

and

any

cited

socialist,”

for the year.‘s

rations

not

some

after In early

food

calculated

price

political

in traditional

of Cuban

3’ The making

point bloc,

to earn

COMECON

on which

under

the

that

Soviet

citrus

products

late

advantageous 1980s.

In

it had in 1979 that

Western

1984,

of

Cuba

Soviet

countries

as the has

“Cuba’s reminded pay

of than

sugar

position

sold about

. ,“33 Rodriguez European

Cuban

suppliers

respects,

report,

to

to dealing

this is no more Cuba’s

to one

of

“satis-

with

other

in some

According the

also free onethe

“prefer-

agreements.

sell petroleum

25. NYT, May 12, 1988, p. 3. 26. Since 1976, the price paid by the Soviets

exports,

diversification

Soviet-Cuban 197Os,

to tap

interests.

Cuban

as

was any intention

disappointed

plans

meeting

meeting

need to adapt

harm

during than

there

Union,

1990,

the

would

in increasing

currency.

the Lomt ofthe

Soviet

at

view: 3:! The

although

hard

the Soviets

since

of

meeting

aspect

denied

long-range

difficulties

substantially

for sugar

in Cuba

to the January,

discussions

but said that the Cubans

on the free market

experts

currency

for the failure

of the

not necessarily

socialist

very important

and terms

about planning

difficulties

representative

diplomat

economic

dropped

1990,

hard

however,

of ships

results

enterprises.

would

ability

less sugar

public

foreign

our work,

of Cuba’s

economic

led to cuts

Cuba’s

is reportedly

of the

limited

from

that perestroika has introduced

but in view of Cuban

imports,

or more

indignation,

report both

arise,

a lack

the

a Soviet

independent

prudence

January,

wheat

with Cuba,

performance,

sweeteners,

implied

Union.2” Rodriguez,

trade

newly

sugar

as yet,

1989,

supplies,

may

blamed

pronounced

Soviet

but not,

the disruption

““t’ Recently

curtail

agreed

Castro

he told the Cuban

resources come

to imple-

a mutually

Moreover,

when

more

on Castro

however,

in 1987.‘h

undoubtedly

of Cuban

of Soviet

the Soviet

COMECON,

no pressure was,

on aid to Cuba

must

of external

Cuba

Rafael

sugar

of having

December,

problems

from

practices.

Carlos

a ceiling

as causes

1990,

to reach

paid for Cuban

concern,

The

arrival

but

has been 25 There

will be easy.“‘7

rises.

intention,

there

in Cuba.

to conceive

express

problems”

trading

that

additional

Cuba.

in the

“climate

with

price

had established

1987:

and effort.

flatly

restructuring

in the Soviet

that the Soviets from

stated

Gorbachev-style

the

economic to Cuba.

Soviets

relationship

Despite do

not

is the quantity

the predictions appear

to have

of many cut

back

for Cuban sugar has been adjusted yearly arcordlng to a price index of Soods which Cuba imports from the Soviet Union. The agreed reduction in the prier went from 915 to 850 rubles per ton (Carz66ean Ins~$, January, 1987, p. 3). This price still seemrd to provide a tidy profit for the Cubans. Cuba’s Minister of the Sugar Industry estimated the cost of prodwin!: a ton of sugar in 1988 was 212 pesos. Granmn, July 9, 1988, p. 3. 27. GWR, January 11, 1987, pp. 2 and 5. the Cuban press loudly denounced the unilateral decision 28. GWR, December29, 1989, p. 4. By contrast, of a Hung-a&n enterprise to raise prices 20 per cent for bus parts. Zbtd., October 1, 1989, p. 9. 29. NYT, February 7, 1990, p. 10. The Finns, with whom the Soviets would undoubtedly like to increasr “Perestroika has clearly caused problems. The pattern of our trade with the Soviets was trade, rrport: Ibid ,January 16, 1989. p. D5. established over many years, and now that pattern has changed dramatically.” 30. Gmnma, January 11, 1990, p. 1. 31. NY?; January 11, 1989, p. 10. 32. EIU, Cuba, 1988, no 1, p. 12, and zbzd., 1988, no. 2, p. 10. ” in Andrew Zimbalist, ,Jr. ed , “The Performance of the Cuban Sugar Industry, 33. Carl Henry Few-, Cuba ‘J Soczalz~~Econom_y. Toward &he199Os, op. cil., note 15, p. 79.

Implications petroleum

supplies

to Cuba.

allies-Bulgaria-even Bulgarian

from

For

exports

energy

198661990, of petroleum

entire

Soviet

what

it does

a billion

dropped

sales each

pesos

each

year

by agreement

with

at the world

CMEA

There Cuban

Apart

from

economic that

in Soviet with

were

the danger

“They

1989,

should,

in many

Shevardnadze

defended

the Cuban

point

to Cuba

obligations

to a less developed

Soviet-Cuban As with Gorbachev

Cuba’s

Friction

economic

issues,

era. Conflict

in the western

hemisphere

Over

fail to affect of view,

by invoking current

value

measures,

reduce

Shevardnadze, of aid to

are

the

of continuity

to the Soviets

the new

reputation

it is rather

we

certainly

side regarding

of course, value

when

changes

the country’s

In

advocated

to the critics

be held with the other

cannot

its allies.

us be blunt-even

something-and

Cuba

is, for purely

Shmelyov, Edvard

of

price.‘”

to pressure

Union

to subsidize

responded

In

market

although

market

policy

Minister

times-let

to change

talks must

aid

to Cuba,

Nikolai

2.6 half

of falling

the world

revenue-raising

Soviet,

difficult

measures

but not by describing

supplies

unable,

s’ Foreign

to the Supreme

cases-then

Unilateral

even

to other

America.

If we wish

in its word. “38 From

policy,

in addition

us at the most

in the wrong

and

almost

because

the fall in world

an economist,

about

earning

than

use economic

the

had disappeared.

is the fact that the Soviet

debate,

in Latin

report

might

there

reluctant,

Soviet

supported

conditions

line,

increasingly

at a Supreme Union

declined

that the Soviets

with the Soviet

aid to countries

necessary faith

earnings

price

tons

re-exports

re-exported

however,

higher

have

in his October, Cuba:

actually

of a reduction

the Soviet

economic

was

Cuba

in 1985,

By 1985,

metric

not consume

Soviets,

and the world

re-export

reasons,

1989,

price

does

Cuba

MT

is no firm evidence

into conformity
1985.

price

the

price.

and 3 million

1983 through

1987,

price.“”

as much.“4 10 or 13 million

in 1984,

oil in

and Bulgarian

Cuba

1986 course

1983 and 1984,

of its loyal Soviet

price.

the CMEA

Soviet

of another

of re-exported

CMEA

the gap between the

29

about

oil prices, and

share

almost

to sell Cuba

currency

from

treatment

era. The

at a special

petroleum

Cuban Socialism

with Soviet

decreased

agreed

allocation;

not use for hard of Soviet

for

by 50 per cent between

in the West

year

petroleum

MT

contrasts

the Gorbachev

the Soviets

(MT)

million

This

before

energy

earnings

of the Gorbachev Era

and

ominous

that

in foreign

or describing

Soviet

country.

Foreign

Soviet-Cuban

conflict

over how much goes back

Policy

support

over should

to the 1960s.

That

strategic be given conflict

priorities

pre-dates

to revolutionary was muted

the

causes

for most

of

34. Washin,rton Post, November 8, 1985. Even before this, the North Koreans also suffered from abrupt changes in Soviet petroleum policy The quantity of petroleum imported from the USSR decreased from 1 111000 tons in 1975 to 1 061 000 tons in 1976, whereas the value increased from 26.6 million rubles to 43 million rubles. Pong Lee, “The Korean People’s Democratic Republic,” in Peter Wiles, cd., 7‘he New C~~mmuntst7‘hud World(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), p. 313. 35. Jorge F. PCrez-L6pez, “Cuban Hard-Currency Trade and Oil Reexports”; in S. G. Rota, ed., Pasl Zn@rpretationsand Future Challenges (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 36. This may account for Cuban Central Bank figures which in June, 1989, suggested a drop of $200 million in oil revenues. NYT, February 7, 1990, p. 10. For 1985- 1987, the Soviets reported exports to Cuba of an average 1.2 billion rubles worth of petroleum each year. EIU, Cuba, 1988, no. 3, p. 2, and Cuba, 1989, no. 2, p. 9. In 1985, Cuba imported 200 000 b arrels per day from the Soviet Union, produced 14 000 b/d domestically, and sold 2000 b/d. Washin$on Posl, February 4, 1985, p. 14. 37. GWR, June 25, 1989, p. 11. Shmelyov is affiliated with the Institute for the Study of the US and Canada. His comments left no doubt that he had Cuba, and perhaps Nicaragua, in mind. His remarks were reported in both the Soviet and Cuban press. 38. FBIS-SOV89-204, October 24, 1989, p. 46.

30

Srumes

the

197Os,

Latin

largely

America.

experiment

were when

very

Castro

by a pro-Soviet resisting tions

US

mine

US

The

regimes

Soviets,

it can

regular

have

priority.

there

has developed

elite

concerning

different tions

schools

Western since

analysts

the early

World.“”

Foreign

struggle”

must

respect dissented Soviet

from foreign

Ligachev.

The

told a gathering such

have

intellectual

this policy.

view,

and

However,

new Politburo of political

scholar

somewhat

agree,

the

an October,

during

his visit to Cuba

none

goals

however,

foreign four

expectations

member,

continuing 1988,

responsible from

that there

in July,

affirmed

In a speech

for with

policy

before),

identified

and

policy or

five

prescrip-

of which

communist

struggle in April,

1988,

en,joys

declared

for ideology, countries Gorbachev

that

Ligachev,

relevance

leadership

a decline

in the Third “class

of non-aggression

Boris

in the formulation 1989,

has been

client-states

age to principles

Politburo

class

foreign

the Soviet

however,

Another

outweigh

of support

governments,

even

World),

in the

not simple.“40

policy

within

different

Shevardnadze,

should

“are

recently

for revolutionary

in the nuclear

as peace

for our friends

two

indeed

of

of new Marxist-

established

in the Third

policy

member

arising soberly,

The

leadership.4’

enthusiasm

scientists

Congress

of these

era (and

One

with

Edvard

sovereignty.

contrary

causes.

to the 27th

a two-track

pluralization

issues.

foreign

Minister

in

by a US

around,

the celebration

with

which

confrontation

be subordinated

weakness

report

notes

pursued

concerning

in Soviet

Soviet

turned

in

denuncia-

for revolutionary

problems

relations

the Gorbachev

(each

with

report

long

of good

World

priority

“The

41 During

of Soviet

for national

years:

by the top Soviet

1980s

30 lives

was damaged

to Nicaragua

sharply

in emphasis

East-West

endorsement

that was plotted

also lost

with

The

in October,

to low-key

tanker

in Gorbachev’s

the Gorbachev

a marked

unhappy

a Soviet

a lesser

contrast

of thought

concerning

exclusive

implies

1986),

Third

Bishop

Cubans

themselves

reportedly en route

countries

and pursuit

oscillations

should

confined

After

World

be argued,

causes

also

in Grenada

Maurice The

the question

Chernenko.“”

thinking”

states,”

against

in

took on new urgency.

or non-role,

leadership.

flotilla

in the Brezhnev

independent

revolutionary

was

a Soviet

(in February,

Leninist

a coup

in Nicaragua.

to Third

role,

the Soviets

to Konstantin

“new

references

newly

Castro

Sandino,

advice

the CPSU

to forestall

of the Grenadan

action.

Gorbachev’s brief

had tried

opportunities of the Sandinistas,

in El Salvador,

governments

the Soviet

there;

revolutionary

with the triumph

and the insurgency

over

intervention

in Puerto

to Castro’s

however,

and revolutionary

intervention

COMMUNISM

so few promising

unhappy

faction

of the US

opposing

were

in Grenada,

for revolutionaries

Cubans 1983,

there

At the end of the decade,

the New Jewel of support

because

IN COMPARAI.IVE

of class shake-up Vadim

that

and

vigorously criteria

for

downgraded A. Medvedev,

“universal

issues”

of foreign

policy.“4

described

the achieve-

‘$!t. l.+‘a+qam Par/, March 24, 1985, pp. 1 and 33 .” in Sin& cd. O/I fzf., ‘40. “Political Report 01 the CPSU C:entt-al Committee to the ‘27th Congrrs:, notr 23. pp. 73-74. ‘l‘hird World Policy.” t’ruhlem~ of Cummunum 41, Francis Fukuyama. “Patterns of Sovirt (Septernber/Octoher, 1987), pp. 1 13 (May/,jnnr. “Thr USSR and theThird World in the 198Os, ” Prohlm, ofComnrunlJm 42. David E. Albri~ht. 1989), p. 50. 43. Fukuyama, “otc 41, p. 13and Albright, “otc 42, pp. 68 and 70. Kxtrenw dislllusirxunrnt with thr costs of Soviet involvrmcnt in promoting Third World socialism was expressed by acadrmic specialists I” I&rnaltonalAffaairs (Moscow), August, 1988. Although Gorbachev has not expressrd himself in such blunt tctms. Forrign Minister Shevardnadze can~c closr in mid-1987. See quotes in Stcphrn Sestanovich. “Gorbarhr\,‘s Foreign Policy: A L~iplomacy ofDecli”r,” PxN~mr qfCommunt\m (January/February. 1988). pp. 2-3 44. &‘Y’!‘. October 6. 1988, p. 1.

Implications ments of his diplomacy: easing of the nuclear

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

“Impressive

advances,”

31

he said, “have been made both in the

threat and in the political solution to military

conflicts,

plus in

increasing and strengthening trust between states belonging to different social systems and political alliances.“45 Gorbachev also renounced interventionism in behalf of revolutionary causes, although he left the door open to defensive measures against counter-revolutionary intervention: “. we are resolutely against doctrines used to justify the export of revolution or counterrevolution

any theories

or

.“46

Castro has been openly critical ofGorbachev’s foreign policy, not so much for its theoretical formulation, as for the mannerofits implementation. Castro does not see himselfas “exporting” revolution; he conceives himself as countering US interference in the western

hemisphere

and as opposing

South

African

intervention

in Africa.

Social

conditions, not low levels of military aid to insurgents, are in his view responsible for revolutionary struggles. Or as he said a few years ago: “Cuba cannot export revolution, but the US cannot prevent it.” Castro has also criticized Gorbachev’s policies, however, for showing insufficient firmness against American military involvement in the Third World. The Soviets, he has suggested, have sought to deepen detente between the superpowers at the expense of the interests of the world’s poor countries in confrontation with imperialism. 47 During Gorbachev’s visit to Cuba, Castro publicly questioned whether Gorbachev’s diplomacy had evoked reciprocating concessions from the United States. “We don’t have any indication,” “that the imperialists

he said, as Gorbachev

have adopted this new international

waited his own turn to speak, thinking.”

Castro went on to

complain that the US reserved the right to supply arms to UNITA in Angola, and the right to maintain anti-Sandinista rebel forces in Honduras. In December, 1989, Castro characterized the US intervention in Panama as “ a slap in the face and a humiliation for the Soviet peace policy. “48 One instance where the Soviets have exerted

influence

on Cuba to conform

to the

policy of reducing regional tensions is Angola. In December, 1988, Havana and Luanda, with Soviet encouragement, agreed to the phased withdrawal of all the estimated 50 000 Cuban troops by July, 1991, in exchange for a South African promise of independence for Namibia.4g In June, 1989, Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos abandoned his previous position of no negotiations with UNITA, and negotiated. a precarious cease-fire with Jonas Savimbi. These agreements followed a relative intensification of the Angolan conflict. The US in 1986 (after a ten year hiatus) began providing assistance to the rebel UNITA

forces. US aid consisted of approximately

$15

million per year of military aid, including Stinger ground-to-air missiles.“” Against Cuban advice, the Soviets in the summer of 1987 backed a massive anti-UNITA offensive in southern Angola. South Africa then sent 3000 troops to stem the assault, and forced the Angolans back to their stronghold in the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban emergency contributed

reinforcements of about 15 000 troops to Angola in November, 1987, to the failure of South African troops to capture Cuito Cuanavale that

45. GWR, April 16, 1989, p. 3. 46. GWR, April 16, 1989, p. 4. 47. NYT, January 11, 1989, p. 1. 48. GWR, April 16, 1989, p. 2 and ibd., December 31, 1989, p. 3. 49. The Soviet interest in diffusing the Angola conflict is described in NYT, June 6, 1988, p. 8. The initial Cuban condition of a ban on US aid to UNITA was not met, nor the initial Cuban timetable of four years for withdrawal. Caribbean Znsifhl, July 1988, and NY7’, July 16, 1988, p. 3. F or additional details supporting this view of the constructive Soviet role, see Geoffrey Rerridge, “Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords,” Internalional A@& (London), Vol. 65, no. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 463-479. 50. NY7: June 26, 1989.

winter.“’

Cuban

Fidel effort

Castro

troops

we made

mission

then

described exclusively

in Angola

strategy tank

force),

Cuban

aggressive bility

into

in the

mediation) assurances

southern

the

America,

an

area

of prime

of the flexibility

elsewhere

ones.

intervention region.

the

“solidarity“

with

endorsed

‘I‘hc Soviets

have

policymakers

not,

would

to intercede

insurgents

and

Gorbachev’s

perceptions, the Soviets

that 198Os,

to

defenses

in the The

African

Angola, troops

flcxi-

under

for its part,

exerted

US

agreed

without

the Arias

fat prior

to diminish

regional

especially

long-tc.rm

Nicaragua

as

to classify

Although

the

peace

pressure

and the US State

democratize in evidence

agreed

How

Airborne

to come to by Central

can

that

US

have asked

the

for the Salvadoran When

America, sitting

to

have

in Nicaragua.

on the Sandinistas

Nicaragua.”

as

profess

Soviets

Department

in Latin

US

a “socialist

Soviets

The

plan,

thr

stratrg)

Nicaragua

commitment

to end support

is yours.

the 82nd

the most

after

tended military

S~OM’II

conflicts

are not necessarily cautious,

Central

have

thr goal ofcleInocratization

and the Sanclinistas

you have

toward

to Castro),

intervention”

the strong

Arias

and

policies

classified

is no Soviet

was not more when

and

pursued,

sources

American

“ I would say the main responsibility

the Nicaraguan

to South

(and

however, have

state.”

embraces

Roth Oscar

States

Soviets

including

which

demilitarize

Union.

Gorbachev’s

Soviet

there direct

with Castro

new thinking

the

“progressive”

however,

like.

by the Soviet

of Cuban

but essentially

however,

process,

in 1987,

used

Africa,

that has helped

American

against

presidents

view.

argue

the Sandinistas,

the Contadora

American

of

to the United

thinking”

1983,

African

helicopters

government,

the withdrawal

military

the total South

aid to UNITA.”

concern

and

deftncc

South

over there; exaggerates

for the effective

and HIND

Angolan

this last

internationalist

perhaps

than

contributed

point

early

After

credit

(larger

probably

an opportunistic,

“democratic”

Nicaragua’s

answered:

In

country.

a

Soviets

can

in Grenada,

oriented” only

One

Although

(Cuba,

our

however,

troops The

border.

“And

the men and material

supplied

halt

and “new

in the world.;‘”

accurate in the

would

government

when

originally

to negotiate

US

as minimal:

were

three-sided 1988,

to the Namibian

like

“52 Castro,

the 400 tanks

on Namibia.

the US

close

just

rocket-launchers,

of Cuban

in June,

means,

in Angola.

Angola

subsequent

that

From

own

to Cuba,

RM-21

negotiations

thr first time

little

efforts

belongs

deployment

pushed

it was our ships that carried

200 Mig-23s,

push

our

we did it alone

of Cuban

and fighting

time

role in the reinforcement

with

started,

and on this last occasion, the solitariness

for the first

the Soviet

WC

asked

why

a Soviet

official

talk about

cutting

in Honduras?“5’”

51, :\:>‘T,July 28. 1988. p. 13 ~LIldI)ccr1nbrr 14, 1988. I’. 14. 52. ~:11’K.,July23. IW’~, p. 7 T’:i ,L\‘l’Y’. Jw1r 23. l!lHX.,‘_ :: 54. ‘VI-/‘. hlxch 30. I’MCI,p I. .55 KdxTl I.clkrrl, ‘. I;,mta+s and Fact\: ‘l‘hr Swirt Umon md Nical-;lgtw“ Curwd H~rllir> (( ktclt,c~l 1’184). p,,. :?I.; ‘7’. ,JWIP It,, IWli, I>.0. 50 Indrr‘T.hlarch SO. IW. ,’ 13 vi .Vl’7’. April 2. IOHO.,‘_ I i.

Implications Estimates sources;

of Soviet

33

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

military

aid to the Sandinistas

it is likely that they exaggerate

come

from US

Soviet aid for administration

government

purposes (i.e.,

to

persuade Congress to fund the “Contras.“) The trend, however, shows strong upward movement during the 1980s. Nicaraguan arms imports, most of which came from the Soviet Union and Cuba, totalled $350 million in 1984, $270 million in 1985, and $575 million in 1986.“” The transfer of Soviet-made MI-24 helicopter gunships, and other combat helicopters, during 1985 produced a rapid shift in the military balance in favor of the Nicaraguan government. “I An estimate of Nicaragua’s 1987 arms imports from the USSR is $500 position regarding

million to $1 billion, and for 1988, $515 million.6’ The Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas seems to have become more

accommodating towards the United States in the spring of 1989. At his 1986 Reykjavik meeting with Ronald Reagan, Gorbachev reportedly said that the Soviets would stop military

aid to Nicaragua

only when the US stopped its own military

American governments. But in May, 1989, Gorbachev letter in which he claimed to have stopped supplying equipment

since

the end of 1988.

US officials

aid to Central

sent President George Bush a the Sandinistas with military

believe,

however,

that the USSR

continued to supply non-lethal arms, such as uniforms and trucks, with Cuba and other Eastern bloc countries transshipping Soviet arms and equipment to the Sandinistas.“’ The Soviets have been reliable in meeting the military needs of the Sandinistas, but have been less forthcoming

in regard

to economic

aid. According

to the Czecho-

slovakian ambassador to Nicaragua, total Soviet bloc aid for 1987 totalled $425 million in 1987.“” A Nicaraguan official, Henry Ruiz, minister of foreign cooperation, stated that 1988 economic aid from the socialist bloc totalled about $300 million, which suggests a reduction from the previous year.“4 In any case foreign aid has not averted a severe economic

crisis in Nicaragua.

A study commissioned

by the Nicaraguan

ment found that per capita output had fallen by one quarter standards by 60 per cent in the same period.“”

since

govern-

1980 and living

There have been many Western reports that Moscow has been curtailing shipments of petroleum to Nicaragua, but these are misleading. Cc Nicaragua requires each year a minimum of 750 000 tons of oil. By 1986, virtually all of the country’s petroleum came from the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, including Cuba.“’ In 1987, however,

Czechoslovakia

and Hungary

reduced

oil exports

to Nicaragua,

and the

World Miiikry &$endihms and Arms 7ian~fen. 1987 59. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washin$on. DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 97, 113, 129. “Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations and the Contra 60. NIV‘, July 10, 1986, pp. 1 and 10. Marc Edelman, War,” Rruce Larkin, ed., up, (ia., note55, p. 363. Few@ &j&n (Summer, 1988), p. 1048; 61. Srephanie G. Neuman, “Arms, Aid and the Supwpowers,” Nu?; May 17, 1989, p. 9. The USestim~t~dth~t, in 1987, aid to AngolacosttheUSSR $1 billion. NY’f’.,func 6. 1988, p. 8. 62. The US government has produced different estimates of the level of aid. NYT, September 19, 1989, p. 14. US intelligence agencies concluded that 1989 shipments had fallen from 1988 levels by about 20 percent, NY?: October 5, and October 16. 1989. 63. .%‘I’?: August 20, 1987. 64. EIU. ,%carqua, C&a Rim. Panama, 1988, no. 3, p 14. According to the same official, another 20 per cent of 1988 rconomic aid to Nicaragua came from outside the socialist bloc, For another report of reduced Soviet bloc aid, NY?; October 4, 1989, p 7. 65. NY7; Juiy 6, 1989, p. 6. 66. NY7: June 18, 1987, p. 30 and J une 20, 1987, p. 3. An incorrect estimate ofonly 70 000 tons from the and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy,” Soviet Union for 1988 is cited in Jan S. Adams, “Change in Problems ofCommunism (March/June, 1989), p. 113. 67. EIU, Cuunl~y Profile ofNzcara~~un,1989-90, p, 21. Nicaraguan furl import needs should be reduced by the huge Soviet-funded Asturias hydroelectric dam, coruplcted May, 1989. EIU, N~arqua, 1989, no. 3, p. 16.

Soviets

indicated

(i.c.,

40 per

reluctance

cent

ii)r alternative Cuba

of’the suppliers,

increased the

90 000

East

from

Soviet

previous

Bulgaria, aid

of’ the

against

the military

Icf’t the

Sandinista with

its

toward

Angola,

“very

easily,”

once

The

Soviets policy,

ho\vevrr,

have

prolile

economic the

(Castro

viewed

IIC‘SS and

economic

tensions Soviet

USSR, Czecho-

that

the

the

toward

The

be needed

I’ricnd

a parallel

could

more

suggest,

be f’ound

that

the

Cuba

itself‘. as

moderation

Soviets

have

to induce

with

Union

old

pursued

solution

also

a political

removed.“’

displeased

Soviet

an

Sandinistas

however,

to negotiate

of “solidarity”

not all that

has,

Soviets

was

would

in a peaceful the

policy

political

Havana

acts

disinterest supported

pressure

of‘ Angola

cast

than

imply

Arguably,

influcncc

pressure

and

Union

the

political

Soviet

f’oreign

and

incentives, however,

he argued,

Or

in El a higher

perhaps as

in not,

C~utxrns

the

insurgents

maintains

strongly

apparent.

Castro

disagrcemcnts, the

the Soviets

is ncccssary

wcrc

more

workers

and

The

posed

the danger

the

negative

officially

ideological

Gorbachev

era.

revolutionary.

society.”

in his view, after

policy pry-dates

as insuf’ficirntly

for motivating

of’ a communist

1970s.

(:uba

Union

awareness,

aspirations

filuntlations

I,ccome

to

the

from

to

Divergence

Ix~wrrn

Inaterial

region

f’rom tons

tons.

Nicaragua

results.

Ideological Like

in the reluctant

1988,

tons

Soviet

intc‘rvr‘ntion

covert

are

fruitlessly 100 000

In

160 000

strongly

a domestic

pressure

from

the Soviets

simply

have

economic

in the

the strong

commitment

additional

400000

necessarily

strong

to

ton

starched

tons.“H

another

contras.

claimed

potential actions

to refrain

7’ Perhaps

product

early

the

with

US-armed

of’ foreign

issue

an

100 000

and

300 000

Nicaragua

combined.“” not

opposition. they

to

Soviets

under

where

as yet exerted

been

of‘thc

domestic

as thrir

re\~olutionary have

The

initial

delivering

Cuba,

does

there.

up

of’ imports,

from

Hungary

the

Nicaraguans)

Sal\.ador.

level

govcrnmrnt

their Afier

60 000

and

challenge

policy

Ibrci,qn

from

to Nicaragua

situation

than

ended

90 000

Poland,

compromise

Soviets

year’s

Germany,

military

resolution

(anti

the

more

requirement).

its contribution

maintained

slovakia,

to supply

Nicaraguan

important fhr

pursuit

recanted

than

appeals

the

of economic toward

consequences his

thr

Ideological

building

of regression

economic

divergence

During

“heretical”

196Os,

consciousto individual

material

and

rf’ficicncy

moral through

capitalism. of‘ his

policies

interpretations

In the hat1 of’

Implications Marxism.

In a public

and excessive 198Os, reforms.

This

time

restructuring

discord

Soviet

process

ones.

Castro’s

to revitalize hardline center

in setting

supervision Some

efforts

economic

countries,

they argued

Shaoqi

and

Deng

market

mechanisms,

of stimulating

scrutiny

economy

unwanted

side-effects,

discontent.

Moreover,

and

even

to market

forces

including

price

reform

during

the 198Os, form

the need

liberalization

Enterprises

that tried to become of socialism

kind

ideology

was that?

a system

worse

communism.

And than

That

were I want

could

These

combatted

energetically

profitable we going to know

things

were

becoming

the masses

ized, and the ideas and objectives The

clear

point

socialism

produces

a socialist

regime.

The with

economic

of Castro’s

difficulties

such vividness

gains

are,

role

wrongheaded of socialist

the policies

197Os),

potent

a great

deal to be

generates

important

corruption,

and

public

a capitalisttsocialist results

are

described

swindles, along

the effects

of half-

and the first half of the 1980s: swindling

those

lines?

these methods us

weren’t toward

anyone

one another. What

kind

leading socialism

grabbed

of

us to and

anything

he

and

generalized.

If this

to get skeptical,

discouraged

and demoral-

process

implanting

during

merely

become

market

and weakens

by Cuba

that means

that exposing

that the economic

Castro

habitual

of course,

of Liu

indicates

evidence

demand,

of leading

is that

of the

in economic

economy.

in which

in efficiency,

experienced

by Castro,

start

the

producing

of our revolutionary

remarks

negligible

and

by theft,

chaos

under

conspicuous

to build

instead

universal

a traditional

party

is obviously

the 1970s

whether

the most

the

are the most

it is far from clear

during

the

experience

is also much

for rectification,

capitalism,

almost

7’3 There

of centralized

in Cuba

What

during

of supply

the

1986,

of an initiative

as a completely the PRC

there

member

no longer

revealed

historical

is half-hearted,

traditional

are

a

praised

since

for increasing

of resources,

inflation,

to the more

explaining

itself

hand,

as in Hungary

economic

Cuba

and But

toward

out.

The NEP,

Politburo

the role ofthe

program

and growth.

superior

In a speech

of

introduced

Earlier,

however, calls

under

Cuba

Castro

the appearance

are carried

allocation

On the other

when

program

Union

hybrid,

hearted

leadership

Congress,

criteria

presented

economy.

1986,

problems.

Ligachev’s

priorities

efficiency

of view.

economic

rectification

not centralized

economic

Third

and for increasing

of the Cuban

Xiaoping,

said for this point

economic

and seriousness

to be moving

In May,

of the program, The

central

(the Soviet

seemed

Party

and

priorities,

that

to the problems

the Soviet the depth

“rectification.”

program

see Castro’s

response

a command

deepened,

Close

to ensure

accused

process.

to address

not perestroika.

observers

in the

to liberalizing

Nevertheless,

Communist

rectification

socialism.

of his conversion

Castro

reform

he called

Cuban has

crackdown,

immaturity,”

on market-experimentation

not directly

rule,

the Soviet

serious

reform

relevant

himselfof“revolutionary

of capitalism.

which

the

for their

has

35

Socialism

is unmistakable.

program,

attended

Cubans

Castro

Cuban

attack

the depth

of Gorbachev’s

in line with

reform

Ligachev

question

around,

the first year

his own

he accused

or the restoration

of the ideological

Era for

In light of his renewed

one must

“revisionism” After

self-criticism,

idealism.

however,

of the Gorbachev

the 1970s

73. Carrnelo Mesa-Lago, “The Cuban Economy in the 1980s: The Return rd., Soczalis/ Cuba. Past ln~er,brelalion.\ and Fu‘ulureChallen,qe.r (Roukkr: Wrstview, 74. GU’h’. Decembrr 14. 1986, supplrrr~nt p. 11.

discredited.”

mechanisms

the political

a particular

is not

within

legitimacy

of

and 198Os, described instance

of a general

of Ideology," in 1988),

p. 83

Srrgio

Rota,

problem.

Wherever

decentralizing

ruling

economic

institutional

forms.

The

lc\,cl of development, cause.

According

itself

is

is

in

autonomy,

planned

thus the

aincc markrt

public

sufticiently, through

intensified

is, from

this point

c.xtcnsive

of local

possible

that

approach

party

austerity

clothing,

average

lnid-1988.

with

into exports Despite

1960s economic

of self-

labor,

“succeed” public

raw

in meeting

character

corruption,

and

outcomes

of the collusion

by state-controlled

marketize

effort

direction.

officials

the

to force

prices,

of voluntary

Cuban

short-term

to tighten

Facilitating

and

economic could

strategy

labor

central

ha\,c dramatically

of’ investment

econom)

a cut in consumption

be a realistic

which

successful

researcher

to

discipline control

decreased

managers.” bring

were

wages figures

1984

available pesos:

are

the job It is even

a more

restrained

to buy Wcstcrn

goods

i0 A lack

from

203

through

pesos 1989

show

up purchasing stores.

in

From

purchases

of goods

Because

a new program, in special

consumption.

Cuban

consumer

austerity.

to soak

under

that

stagnant.

dropped from

in curbing

reports

for the consumer

monthly

for hard

The

irrational

Castro’s

changes

appliances

responsible

too few goods

the

Out

to compensate

for credit,

officials

program

indeed

in the riaht

has been

a Cuban

does not want

in order

allocation enterprise

planning.”

Ncvcrtheless,

government

socialism collectivist

officials. attempt

officials

to

problem.

government

program

and household

tlonuscs.

the

prices.

centralization

1987,

of cash, was

the state

and

Castro’s

through

a move

state

is aggravated the

a universal

favoring

then

of waste,

an austerity

and personnel

of

in new in size,

state

and planning,

and

in general.

fear

controls-might

ofview,

suggests

logic

and state

commitment

of payments

to investment

Castro’s

savings,

political

central

demotions

situation

csscnce

balance

and forms

justifiably

on arbitrary

of

rectification-in

Cuba’s

lack

based

firms

often

variation

Kornai,

ownership

targets,

of society

The then

strongly J&no,

bv petitioning

to multiple

interest.i”

absence

address

security

way

authorities

the

public

Managers

at the expense the

transactions

GiLTen

etc.

the great

pronouncements

plan

deficiencies

prices,

countries,

by public

market-oriented,

has persisted,

despite

economist

theoretical

“easy”

sponsored

anti-collective

between

seek

productive

opens

political

despite

bargaining

goals-often

against

characterized

firms

preferential

economy

1984

bureaucratic,

achieved,

for their

socialist

for

individual

materials,

ofthe

of Hungarian

the

have

coordination

of this outcome,

and culture

through

interest, further

universality

j5 In an economy

practice

elites

bureaucratic

to the work

responsible

economy.

communist

reforms,

in the stores,

of strict 1987

to

strong

powrr.H” Cubans

not

new rules

on

182

by

pesos

growth Even

sell family

This,jewelry

of food,

in cash

the Cuban jewelry

to

is then converted

currency.

rhetorical radicalism,

7.7. S~r,J&>os KOI-nap, “Thr

similarities current Hungarian

between rectification Kclorrrr

the

rectification policies

Prorrss,”

campaign

are not as extreme

and

Cuba’s

(either

in

m Vlctol- Nce and David Stark, ds., Rernakuy Press, 1989). pp. 43 -46. 7t). J;inos Kornai wind the term “soft budgrt consrraint” tu reler to this phrnornrnon. [hid., p. 45. 77 Glt'fi, Ikccmhcl- 14, 1986. p, 8. F.ftiricncy may alv~ gain if chr tlcmr)tctl arc I-cpld~rtl by hrttcl <~luc I~IccI. 1110rt’ tee hnlcally ctualiticd proli~hsional~ Frank ‘I’ Firzqrald rmphnsi/cs. a~cl prrhnp o~t‘r(~tllt)hil’rln.~, thls point. gi\,cn littlr or no clala on thr fit-rd vrr’rub rhc promoted. Su, “‘l‘hr Krtmn of thr C:atmn 1,:~r,n,,~~jy. l’li(,-86,“ ,J~iiunalof I.n/ln/lrrr~ricari Studm. \‘ol. 2 I , no 2 (l&y, 1989). I’,’ :~02-‘10’1. 71i ‘l’tus I\ It.\> likely. hwcvc-. txxdusc Cdstl-0 ha:, txcn hr,lbdy ilrbdxd 111pldn~~~rl~ Sur mm? ~v.II-\, nml thcr-ctc,r-r c r,nrr~t,utd much to over-ly ;mlt,itious pa\r plans. ,Josb Luis I.lov~o-Mcn(_ntlt~~. Zn\wr .Lfy Hidden 1,~‘; (New York: Bantarn. 1988), !I. :X50 NI (1 Kt.m/u/mnrL.tn Cuba, tran\. F.dirh (;rmsrnan 79. Cmhhcan Inqt~i. Ma). 1988. MI i
Eronomtr

lnstzlulzon~

r~fSocid2sm

(Stanfor& StanfordUniversity

of the Gorbachev Era for

Implications respect Leap

to egalitarianism Forward,

rectification

program

dialectical

term)

through

or coercion)

or Cuba’s

as restoring

between

one,

the two

we

could

see

accompanied

even

by concern

spent

on meetings,

into

“production

positive

to avoid

brigades.

to allow

the 196Os,

when

more

l’s*

Castro

has reaffirmed

give up paying

salaries

in

labor

basic

individual

to quantity

and quality

of getting

paid

sectors

singled

out for Castro’s

and tourism)

receive

special

material

Castro

argues

mechanisms looks

that

Cuba

to heightened

1990,

process.

need

and the bureaucratic

work and political In

according

central

increased s6 But

profound

intra-party

Castro

analysis

does

of

between of central

the

from

democracy not

even

to

pay was all but

output:

of work

are

In contrast

norms,

“We

can’t

or the socialist

.“84 Moreover,

attention

above,

the ruthless

(sugar,

supported

became

Instead,

construcof market

rectification

by intensified

out ofthe

a new

to have

problems

pressures

planning.

to work Cuba

pretend

economic

on time workers

incentives.85

distortions

from below,

and been

experiments

level.“”

work

personal

not choose

prioritizing

supervision

to cut down

to worker

produced,

in priority

and now

of them

by organizing

tourism,

a

lived

has

and individual

to the amount

formula tion,

and

productivity

workers

“We’ve

of both

at the enterprise

the

use

“Rectification”

the need to link base wages

according

policy:

mobilizations,

industry

Great

defends

the one before

in agriculture,

discretion

Castro

a synthesis-to

consequences

both.“81

incentives

In

(perhaps

two experiences,

disruptive

the Chinese

in economic

the negative things

managerial

the link between

balance

through

seen

and to strengthen

underway severed,

we’ve

some

Communism,

in the late 1960s.

and materialism

lived

of them;

War

period

a proper

idealism

the experience-we’ve

this

as Soviet

own “Guevarist”

37

Cuban Socialism

element

presented

characteristic

political

hard currency

crisis.

in the rectification a comprehensive

of

centrally

or

planned

economies: rectification

implies making more accurate

have now, an economic a lame

nag

prescribing horse.

management

with many medicines

sores

that

it wishes to take us

riding on the old nag full of sores,

Rectification

81. 82. 83.

with Mercurochrome

the perils of that horse, how it kicked and bucked,

anything

and

and try to lead it on our

But we’ll see how far we get, even

but correctly

led, for as long as we don’t have

better than the old nag.8’ is thus,

reform

illogic

we were treating

we

was a horse,

for it, putting splints on one leg, in short fixing up the nag, the

path and not go wherever

term

system which

I said that the thing to do now was to go on using that horse, knowing its bad

habits,

political

use ofthe system and mechanisms

and planning

as Castro

strategy

implicitly

admits

at all. It is a patchwork

of the bureaucratic

centralist

GM/R, Decrmber 14, 1986, supplement, GWR, February 9, 1986, p. 4; Granma, Cartbbean Znsyht, April, 1989.

here, solution

not a consistent

economic

that does not address

and

the long-

economy.

p. 12. November

1, 1988, p. 3; and November

4, 1988, p. 1.

84. GWR, December 14, 1986, supplement, p. 12. Performance-related financial incentives in Cuba a\rrraged only 10.6 per cent of the basic wa,cr in 1985 (before rectification). a low .DroDortion bv, comparison . . to other communist countries. The comparable figure for East German; is 55 per cent and for the Soviet Union, 36 per cent. Andrew Zimbalist, “Incentives and Planninr in Cuba.” Latin American Research Reuieu,. Vol. 24, no 1 (1989), p. 84. Union leaders in Cuba have knplained that ceilings on bonuses curb productivity. Caribbean Insight, November, 1988. 85. NY7‘, January 11, 1989, p. 10; Carzbbean Im&ht, December, 1987, and January, 1988. 86. K&s guiding the selection oflocal party leaders were changed to require secret balloting for party hasc organizations with more than fifteen members. Granma, ~January 6, 1990, p. 1. 87. GWR, October 18, 1987, pp. 5-6.

38

sTUI)IES It is not only Gc?rbachev’s

re,jects,

but also glasnost.

control

the dissemination

the

onset

stepped

up efforts

T‘hc (Cuban

press

of‘ordinary

AII>s

danger,

monthly attended

and

and difticulties criticism

that

I,atrr

Castro

1987

meeting that

might

c\‘en though a year

c.ssential

part

meeting:

“.

I receive Hut

ago. ““I

no one should

imagine

althou~gh

hc has

indicated

that it is inappropriate

aren’t

not

in the Black

miles

from

Castro

said

Sea,

that

defends

the Soviets

what

they

“It

do,

“.

the Cuban

on his

sourc’c

.4n(l

dcfcnsc

is an

told

party

can write

a 1987

an article

the Party.

90 miles

of

I couldn’t

of’ socialism

to keep in mind

aren’t

have

He told a

main

of glaJnoJt is wrong,

have We

people

ncwspapcrs.““”

as Castro

own

of’ the

shortcomings

media.

my

but especially

policy

“WV

are

that

(Castro

the sort of unbridled

or American

Or

the laws,

Soviet

art’ doing.“‘”

Rut

considerable

logic

ethos.

Apparently being

to make

respects,

calling ““” And

Castro

has

our location.

M’e

from

as a response

to us to think

to the Soviet

same

time,

that

he invokes

Odessa

but 90

that

arqles,

mechanisms

more

farsighted

implications

to the particular

we had

simply

to copy

we ha\,c to cop)

far-reaching

Castro

market

theoretical

that

lcaclcrship

ofCuba.

he is perhaps

and

ideological

for example,

arc dctrimcntal

that by tlrcssing

in his understanding

of “restructuring”

capitalists.

Because as acapitalist;

the cwncr

a supcrcfficient

it is only

and

under

if you wanted

of the factory street

a person up as a capitalist

in the f&tory

vendor

and and

so after socialism

to make nothinK

make

him

a fashion that

a capitalist

with to tht

socialism

is: WC thought production

him

at the

persuasiveness,

efticicnt

administrator

reforms

occurred

the peculiarities

requirements

Gorbachev

achicvc

and

In some

practical

ol‘(;orbachev-style never

nor has it occurred

that transcend

find

new

to Cuba:

his rqjection

justifications

than

believes

1986,

at hiding

of information

in Cuba.

that anyone

In

complained

in the Cuban

kinds

but in the Caribbean.

of Cuba.

what

the

the

tht

A popular

Miami.“‘”

circumstances

socialist

clearly

ol’,journalism

the role of the stat<‘, the Party,

into question

in (:uba.

ncwspapcrs

other

of the legal

pregnancy,

aimed

since British

days

of’

explanations.

media.

journalists

improvements

many

Castro

of the mission

that,

in French,

with “‘l‘hesc

of journalists:

issue

.” OIIC could not cxprct

find

satisfaction

in the

of Ray

complaints.

at which

argued

public

on violations

discussed

on the part of officials

of’ war

whereas

as that

such as teenage

a scnsitivc union,

lif’c. Castro

one

“.

also

airs consumer

however.

still in a state

to report

greater

broadcasting

example,

such

by elaborate

willing

factor,

stimulated

For

defections,

must

another

Cuban

informed.

problems,

are

had

Castro

government

however,

1985,

followed

Social

absenteeism

an attitude

professed

information.

wcrc

of the journalist’s

in Cuban

in and arc

1987,

is that

for an audience,

recent

increasingly

remains,

syndrome,”

May,

population

ignored,

Opina, regularly

a meeting

in

which

pewstroika,

socialism

beforeglasnost,

Marti

by officials.

worker

Even

Cuban once

has also been

reporting

“lnystcry

the

in May,

citizens

periodical,

Negati\,c

Radio

restructuring,

of Cuban

If only to compete

were

de1 Pino

rights

say

to keep

by top officials

Pigs hero Rafael

t)ern

by

media.

~OhlMLNISXl

ofeconomic

principle

of information.

in the Cuban

defections

COhll’ARATI\~E

policy

A firm

of’ broadcasting

openness

IN

MT wcr~ going to

WC zltartcd

you

cwuld

out ofhim.

elsr,

rrturn

to the capitalist

the

ownrr

of thr

place

to play

dress

up

you’d

at an

have

system, When

of‘

ofthe Gorbachev

Implications there’s

no competition,

if the motivation

to defend his personal

interests

not

clusions property

as the

the close

ownership to decentralize

reform

in other

society

what is there to substitute not just the collective’s

been

ownership

of his extremist

between

reached

command

countries

of state

product

relationship

have

efforts

the owner in a capitalist

sense of responsibility,

on the incompatibility

be dismissed

about

39

for sense

A revolutionary.‘”

emphasis

should

prompting

Socialism

the role played by the cadres. The man who is in charge there must

be a Communist Castro’s

for Cuban

is out of the question,

this? Only the cadres’ individual of responsibility,

Era

market

It remains

in economic

Castro

to prepare

mechanisms Similar

and private

by other

will culminate

market

mechanisms

reluctantly

economies.“4

and

temperament. long-time

to be seen

systems

con-

forms

of

observers

whether

of

efforts

at

that are still recognizably

socialist. In the spring restoration implied

the Soviet

respect

its right

sovereign

will

principles.

of

“‘Is Some of election

leader’s to build

and

to capitalism?

speculated:

and each

Party’s

the notion

that

vowed

Cuba

sacred would

which

indicates

Castro’s

as the highest

form of popular

coverage

report

fully

through Despite

world

ofglasnost

on Soviet

Radio

Marti,

Castro’s

foreign

travel,

reservations

students

interested

in glasnost and perestroika. bought

the

for the

the likely

anti-socialist

transition each

from

country’s

he entertained

At the same

time,

he

and students

young,

an impact

import

very

taken

by

bourgeois

returning

1987

and

up by information-hungry

1988,

But

from

copies

Cuban

journals.

way Cuban

the failure

trickles

Union.‘”

many

Cubans,

are

reportedly

of the still-legal readers.!‘s

to

in anyway,

the Soviet

reforms,

specialists,

the Soviet democracy

for the American these

the news

Gorbachev-style

Ideological

charged

circumspect.

since

Soviet-trained In

on Cuba.

justifying

“.

line

to set his own course.

a G ranma editorial

no longer

is no solution, about

exert

to the

policies,

and with a fascination

would

and perestroika has been

especially

News were quickly

1989,

Sputnik with

Cuba

developments

and

inevitably

participation

that

for

speech,

opposite

at least in domestic

In August,

News and the monthly

Granma reported

media

off in a direction

ability,

in the socialist

described

peaceful

disappear.

we

Marxist-Leninist

it. We defend

In the same might

he

capitalism

to capitalism.

charges

is a real concern.

Moscow

of life.”

return

Castro

witnessing

subtly when

respect

of

as “victory

not against

itself

to build

rule

speech,

to independence.““”

never

program,

weekly

we’re

Castro

of socialism,

ofunrestricted

Hungary

we perhaps

community

Castro’s

But developments

are

and

for the possible

example,

wants

is a golden

in his 26th July

is possible;

right

the socialist

country

the principle country

in Poland

“. This

public

For

lead to the abandonment

“If a socialist

and

later,

Gorbachev,, contamination

would

the Cuban

strongholds.

capitalism,

processes

forces,”

socialist

visit:

people

months

socialism

that

policies

each

outcome

began

in former

that Gorbachev’s

said during must

of 1989,

of capitalism

A small

very MOJGOW protest

93. GWR, December 14, 1986, pp. 12 and 13. 94. See Wlodzimierz Brus, “Evolution of the Communist Economic System: Scope and Limits,” in Nee It was wrong to underestimate the question of property rights and Stark, eds., op. cit., note 75, p. 271: “. in the blueprints of economic reform a mixed economy, both in the sense of a larger share of nonstate enterprises and in the sense of greater diversification of ownership relations with the state sector, seems to me much more conducive to a market-oriented economic reform than the structure that has evolved so far.” 95. 96. 97. 98.

CWR, April 16, 1989, p. 2. GWR, August 6, 1989, p. 2. In 1988, more than 6000 young Cubans were studying in the USSR. Wihon Quar&rly, Vol. W. Raymond Duncan, “The Odd Partners.”

Granma, October 14, 1988, p. 6. 12, no. 5 (Winter, 1988). p. 82.

demonstration

even

be Young?” with

students

to Soviet

Gorbachev’s political

There

governments Cuba’s

forces,

which

and

intellectuals

Leante).

For

Jtissional rc’srrvations man.

The

about

1986, Castro which little

ha5 been where

in the

anti-market

wake

to Western (Taiwan,

to compare regressed

in

“IL l‘hc

improving,

is in many

mav

and

not have

Finally, fi)r more SUIIIIIICI~

1989,

years. Castro

lacks

popular

any

(legal

reaped

since

spokesMa),

In

1980)

enormous

impact

pro-

significant

undc~

prolits

of the private

with

lxmers’

on food output,

This

contrasts

food

production,

‘I’hcrc

is

showed

during

with

there

Hungary. the leading

educ,ation child

of no

apparent

his

a home,

alternative to act

which to Castro,

food,

not

(low rates might

bc

Cubans

or a school.

has led the (Cuban to his leadership. ruthlessly

Castro

althou,qh

politics

healthcare)

Castro

willingness

to social

that has

that

one

citizen,

“” Accordinq

is without

leadership.

is

living “Four

for Cubans

to a region

Cuban

and

their to the

It is natural

198Os,

thanks

of dcvclopmcnt.

compare

themsrlvcs

comparison, the

and tolerable,

Cuban factor

This

of’ the ordinary

free path

Europeans

compare

and Singapore).

terms

secure

no

Eastern

Chinese

Korra.

situation

capitalist but

with

leadership salts.

is arrest

Cut)a’s

members

of lbod

private

Americans.

social

respects

is the crucial

than thirty of’

and

unemployment,

luxuries,

thrrc

South Latin

economic

in a more

the

and

to other

encourages. 01‘ inflation

low expectations.

Hong Kong,

economic

there

for state authority.

im adverse

discouraged

ant1 Ccsar

was demoted.“”

Europe,

themselves

pro-market

end IO market

that

match

sales

Despite

ofthe

however, no

and speculators

rcplaccd.

from

market

farmers

member

also benefits

free

influential

of policies

Castro

sacrificed

to

sector,

has pro\,cd

or thq

Rojo,

reputation,

hold

in 1971,

leadership,

to “technocrats,” many

in other

a strong

Padilla

Hcnitez

by international

This

process

en,joyed

to Castro’s

imposition.

Countervailing

of Heberto

Antonio

contains

an once

loyalty

Triana,

probably

sector

end

arrest

in the

communist

of Soviet States.

outright era

to the former

has never

references

policies.

questioning

Politburo

their

and

to the liberalization

slighting

farming

The

standards TI‘ig:crs”

class

a few private

public

has bcrn

of the Gorbache\r

is not a product

notorious

unprotected

was completely

no

the ~Jos6

by Castro’s

Castro’s

benefit,

organization

to

met

regimes

censorship

but the United

and Catholicism

profess

Arenas,

announced

regime

significantly

Since

cithcr

private

he claimed, public

there.

crude

in contrast

is not Russia,

contributed

administrative

small

it Easy

personally

the way that Cuba

impact

is that,

the Castro

antagonist

dissidents

‘1‘0 judge

and

“Is

Castro

to Marxist-Leninist

besides

the destabilizing

important

Europe,

Rcinaldo those

prison.

documentary

about

destabilizing

however,

are weak in Cuba

religiosity

(c.g.

Soviet

on television).

concerns

has proved

offset

have

popular

writers

their

factors,

most

national

societies,

ernigratc

and

which

in Eastern

communist over

many

Perhaps

historic,

ofthe

broadcast

to discuss

program

arc

repression, casc.‘()”

a showing

(it was later

developments.“!’

reform

in Europe. Cuban

out when

ofJournalism

responding

social

broke

was cancelled

revolution During

to pry-empt

the the

‘1’) (.‘i~hat’oli/~~ol.‘+~~, I&N~I 5aridHumonK~,<~hti :InniialKq~nr/ hythr(.‘uhnn (:i~rnrn~m~~ /orilunmi RI,@,(Ha\ a,,<, IIccembet-, 1987), transcribed and distributed by OfHuman Rz&J, Washington DC, 1988. 100. .I‘hcrc i\ no la< k 01 political r-rprrssiorr, howc\ CI I:or clcta115 on rht. r~rl.~b,ttcd ~)rr’ic’cution 01 aIt opponrnt~, srt’ IVY?‘, Apr-il I and 5, 1989 ‘md /\uqu\t f, ~md 10. 198!1. 101 I Sxtcnyi. “I
Implications

41

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism lo4 Despite much speculation

emergence

of such an alternative.

he appears

every bit as energetic,

combative

and loquacious

concerning as ever.

his health,

He is still the

maximum leader, hero and symbol of national aspirations to many Cubans, for whom his mystique transcends mundane issues of performance. He is Cuba’s leading government official, and simultaneously, he is the government’s leading critic. He presides over a system in which corruption and favoritism is a way oflife (from top officials whose political standing determines the lavishness of their housing and foreign buying sprees, down to the shop clerks who tell their friends before shipments of scarce goods go on sale). Castro is also the chief scourge ofcorruption, as he proves by arresting his minister of the interior and cracking

down on illegal vendors in the streetslo

Belief in Castro’s charisma and sagacity has waned among the better educated, more critical younger generation which has come into being since the Revolution.t”” Castro and other leaders frequently

denounce

in their speeches the “hypercritical”

and “faint-

hearted. ” The Cuban government has also reportedly acquired anti-riot helicopters for the first time. But creeping disillusion should not be confused with an explosive or prerevolutionary situation. Alternatives:

Castro

as Third

World

Castro does not have many attractive

Champion? options for expressing

his rejection

ofglafnost and

~erestro~ka. He is not in a position to go his own way as an independent communist state, on the model of North Korea. to7 Cuba’s heavy dependence on trade, to say nothing of its exposed position as an outpost of socialism on the doorstep of the United States, precludes the development of an autarkic model of socialism.‘“8 Nor is there any significant advantage in coalescing with North Korea and China to form an anti~er~~-~r~~~a rump of the socialist direction”‘” China.

world,

with the announcement

although

in Autumn,

Castro

has gone some way in this

1989, of plans for his first-ever visit to

One possibility is merely to settle down and wait for the replacement of Gorbachev. Such a strategy, however, fails to engage the aspects of change in the Soviet Union which are likely

to persist,

regardless

of which

strand

of Soviet

leadership

dominates.

104. There was surely more to the Ochoa case than an issue of simple criminality. But there is no evidence that the executed General Arnaldo Ochoa had actively plotted Castro’s overthrow or that he had advocated Gorbachev-style changes in Cuba. His political challenge was only potential. 105. Interior Minister Abrantes was arrested for corruption, along with many of his subordinates, at the end of July, 1989. This arrest is in line with the observations on military-police tensions, ,yiven before the Orhoa case, by defector Rafael de1 Pino. See interview in Mirta A. O,jito, Rafael de1 Anon Nzqpphical NOM (Coml Gables, Research Institute for Cuban Studies, n.d. ). p. 34. Conspicuous corruption at MININT was known and resented, not only by the regular military, but by much bmadrl- currents in society. See the call of Council of State member Lidia Tablada Romero for further investigations of ~ININT. GWR, -July 23, 1989, p. 4. 106. For elaboration, see Rhoda Rabkin, “The .4ging of the Revolution, ” in Rota, ed., $. czt., note 35, pp. 47-53. 107. Kim il Sung inherited an economy almost completely isolated from the world market, with a strong industnal base, and an unusually diverse and rich stock of natural resources. 108. imports in the 1980s have quailed the value ofone quarter of national product-the same share as in the pr~-re~~lutiana~ period. See Cuba’s Financtal Grim. The Secret Repor Jim Banco Nacionai de Cuba (Washington: The Cuban-American National Foundation, 1985). p. 12, and EIU, Cuba, 1985, no. 4, p. 2. 109 In early 1986, after addressing the 27th Soviet Party Congress (at which Gorbachev expressed only muted support for wars of national liberation, Castro stopped off in North Korea, where both countries pledged to continue material support for movements of national liberation. K. Bruce McColm, “Castro’s Ambitions and the New Winds from Moscow,” Strrr~glc R&w, Vol. 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1986), p. 55. Cuba was also one of the few countries in the world which joined North Korea in a boycott of the Summer, 1988 Olymprc Games in Seoul.

Nationalist tensions and economic weakness in the Soviet Union, revealed during the eraofC;orbachcv, are not likely to abate instantly with his political cfemise. These factors

of the late

probably

militate against a return to the aggressive. 1970s. Moreover, as noted above, Soviet

to Cuba, appeared

and even

policies

would

0nr an

doubt before

about the value of promoting Third World revolutions, had the Gorbachev era. Consequently, some aci,justment of Cuban

be more

avenue

peace

than

has begun

on Rilarxisrrt-Lt:ninism anti-irnpcrialisrn, and

nationalism, direction in L>ccernber. survival

prudent

that Castro

emphasis

and

two

expansionist Soviet fi)reign policy impatience with the high cost ofaid

kinds

1988,

when

of peace,

waiting and he said,

of the rich and the peace

of the poor.

to the status

is a reorientation

East/West

North/South

the survival

place, that there may be detente not necessarily mean that there

for a return

to explore

conflict, conflict.

rather ofthc

That

and

to an

Castro

bitterly: rich

quo ante.

of his ideology moved

“Thcrr

from

emphasis

art:

two

on

in

thrs

kinds

of

the survival

of the poor; the that there may be

is why the news

States and the Soviet Union, does for us.“’ I” In his cft’ort to explain the dismaying defections from the socialist cause in Europe, Castro has gone very f&r in portraying the main political faultlines as North/South, rather than EastiWrst: LLNo\~

imperialism

is inviting

between thr United is going to be peace

the European

socialist

countries

to,join

it in this colossal

plundet

The: prize promistd by imprrialism is it share of tht, plunder wrcstetl from our peoples, the only way of’ building capitalist consumer societies. “I ’ i Castro has also tried to pxss Cuba‘s Third World leadership role by taking a radical position in favor of thr cancellation

ofdc’t)t to Western

bankers.

In

this position.

hr appears

to crl,joy

some

Soviet support. ‘I’ In sornr respects, rhc loosening of the Soviet-<:ul)an relationship actually prcscnts a welcome’ opportunity for Castro to advance what has long been a dipiomaric goal for him--carving out a role of Third World leadership. The Soviet wit~~~~r~t~~~~lfrom Afghanistan removes an issue which had weakened Cuba’s bid fbr 'l'hird World lcadership.

‘I’hc Cuban

withdrawal

from Angola

(and the more

recently

announced

pull-out

llthiopia), rnay also in some respects cnhancc Cuban prestige, by reducing Cuba’s controvrrsinl military role in Africa. The loosening of the Soviet-Cuban relationship. ho\~~ver, dots not necessarily presage an increase in Cuban influence on Third World fi-orn

diplomacy, leadership

and in some respects even works against it. Crrba's claim to role has always rested on two premises: first, the superiority

dc~~cloprnent model, and lutionary regimes around however, have

have always

Cuba’s

major

second, its militant support the world. ‘I’hc achievements

hren

financially

military

underwritten

undertakings

‘I’hird World of its internal

for rrvolutionaric~s and rc\‘oof the Cuban social system,

by rna,jor Soviet

abroad.

a

Cuba’s

economic

ability

to

aid. as pro\3dc

“solidarity” in military terms has been undercut, now that Gorbachev has made improved relations with the West a more important foreign policy ob.jcctivr than spreading socialism. Without the prcstigc of serving as a key link between Third World countries and the economic and military resources ofthe Soviet bloc, Castro’s initiatives may

bcs mart‘

frequently

disregnrded

I IO. KY-r. ,Januar~Il. t989, p

in Third

World

capitals.’

“’ And

as the Soviet

1. l>ecPmbcr 17. 1989. i-‘, 2. 112 NY?‘.April 4. 1089. p 12 ( ;orbarhcv inciutlcd in his Ikrrntbw, 3088. .1ddrrss to rhc UN fkIWly il. call li,r Wcstcm banks co t,r ,now lerlitmt with ‘l‘h~rd Wr,rld h~rro\\.m-s ~;orlxd~c\~. dc\pitr~ Wrstcrn stwcn~tation. did not USC tht, occasion ofhis visit to (:uba to cancel the C:ubarl debt to thr Sm ict CJniotl. 1 17. Fitkl Cktro did nut attrnd the Rclpde Non-Alipwd rnwtirrg in Sqxcmbcr. lW9, whcrc anti-US wntirncnt? wcrr vcrv rnntrtl, but sent his brothtr Karil in?tcatl. ill.

GiVH,

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

Implications economic

contribution

economic

model

to Cuba

may

American

Latin

America.

community

of

integrated

Latin

on an integration invited

and

Castro

the performance

that

nations:

take

10,

“In

15, 20,

stepped

American

heads

of the Cuban

the

25,

would,

future,

we

Ecuador. American

‘I5 In group

will

American

economically

make

plans

based pessi-

In 1988,

and he attended in 1989.

Cuba

Security

was

Council

he

presidential He has had

like Argentina

1989,

for a UN

be

the

last for the most

and in Venezuela

Autumn,

to

re.join

diplomacy.

countries

other

naturally

eventually,

30 years-the

ties with important

with

belongs

We can’t

of state to visit Havana, in 1988

relations

that Cuba

Cuba

up his Latin

and Mexico

in strengthening

in the Latin

is strengthening argued

But that will take time.

could

in Ecuador

Havana has always

promised

American

petroleum-exporting

countries

Castro

has clearly

most Latin success

attenuate,

America

that

Castro

inaugurations some

1972,

with Latin

rnistic.““4

bloc

governments. In

curtailed,

also be put in question.

As ties to the socialist Latin

is gradually

43

and Brazil, nominated

seat

by

beginning

in

1990. Many Eight

Latin

countries

(formed

and Mexico) primary

desire

to persuade

reduce

its

would

1987,

motivation

to conform

in

destabilization

on the Group

rejoin

the OAS,

into Latin

Argentina, Cuba

to be, as Brazil’s to regional

Brazil, should

practices

action.

change

which

from

America.

Jose

the OAS.

expressed

it, a

behavior

regimes.“”

The

“’ And although Castro

press

has been

vowed

as the

and to

Cuban

there US

of

Uruguay,

to rejoin

Sarney

of diplomatic

to characterize

Group

Peru,

be invited

the days when

he used

The

Panama,

President

of hemispheric

of Eight’s

this was still an obvious

never

reintegration

said that

seems

Cuba

interest

favorably

follow-up,

Cuba’s Venezuela,

in November,

Their

reported

favor

by Colombia,

little

that Cuba

Ministry

for

Colonies. Moderation, the price Cuba. In

which

that

Latin

Cuban

leaders

Venezuala,

immediate be socialism,

Latin

policies,

especially

as much

potential that

not intervening

have

Castro

objective

is unhappy

means American

expressed

told journalists:

Americans

should

for conflict

Latin

social

organizations

to

struggle

for unity between

bring

political

to

the

that

that

pressure

there

and Latin

on

works Latin

with

as an

there

would

of their

issues,

of level.

socialism before

are not heeded

Cuba

seem to be

on the rhetorical

and integration

Cuba

of debt

are annoyed

would

for full acceptance

to establish

on to explain

‘la But even on ecomic

for cancellation

governments

at least

is incorrect

as for harmony

his proposals

And

“It

affairs,

in return

moderation,

He went

issues.

domestic

are asking

such

in our countries.” on economic

ments.

in their

governments

foreign

seems

to be

America.

Castro

by Latin

govern-

leftist

unions

and

governments

for

debt

repudiation. There

also

movements. training. with

Even

Cuba,

in

1988

the Colombian

has

movements. guerrillas

continues Chile not

been

Recognizing for

114. GWR, 115. There and Brazil for 116. Garefa 117. GWR, 118. Granma,

the

release

be

problem

accused

the

government, exempt these

from ties,

of former

of Cuba’s

Cubans which Cuban

Colombia presidential

involvement

of recruiting

with

Chileans

has tried to maintain “solidarity” asked

Cuba

candidate

guerrilla

diplomatic

activities

with

to intercede Alvaro

guerrilla

for

Gomez

August 6, 1972. is also a program ofhealth cooperation with Bolivia and Ecuador, and agreemwts the exchange of students. Mercantil (Sao Paula), December 1, 1987, pp. 1 and 7 in FRIS-LAT, ,January December 20, 1987, p. 1. February 6, 1989, p_ 8.

links

guerrilla

with

M-19

Hurtado, with Ecuador 26, 1988.

S~VDIES

44 kidnapped

in ,Junc,

1988.“”

Central

America,

process.

Consequently,

reintegration

Cuba

into

IN

Because

was

of

excluded

it is still

Latin

COMPARATIVI: COMMUNISM suspicion

from

the

premature

concerning Support

to speak

Cuban

Group

for

of Cuba’s

activities the

in

Contadora

complete

diplomatic

America.

Realignment? Even

as Cuba

seeks

direction

seerns

countries

in both

evolution,

there

is

Moreover,

leadership have

during

increased;

frequent

apart

United

States,

economic

reason

contrast,

large

to subsidize 21 cents

the Soviet 35 cents

Underlying

paid 30 cents

in 1981-1985

the relatively

domestic

sugar-producer

domestic

corn-growers.

dismantlin?

of the

a market

lobby American

US

domestic

sugar L

Cuba,

advantageous.

The

benefits

to Cuba

finally

and

on the

consistency

settled,

domestic cost suqar

sugar

producer,

subsidies. would

market.“”

optimism the United

about States,

however,

Under

almost

‘I’hr history

of 20th

the establishment quite

apart

would

depend

century

sugar

of free trade from

sugar,

strength benefit

sugar

find exports the world competitors

trade,

free trade, however,

be of substantial

of thr

interest

of

from

the

imports

at,

on those

terms

market

prier

OI

renounced

Cuba,

position

Nevertheless,

H)

1976-1980

the

potential

in sugar.

would

certainly

competitive

the

per year.“’

on where

approximating a strong

In 1988, sources.‘?”

with

with

support

but the US

during

tons

together

combined

which

sugar

Thv

has no

the US sugar of 7 cents),

l‘hc

not.

sweeteners,

is the political

almost

economic

does

all foreign

million

not necessarily

with

price

of Cuban

States,

industry,

economy

from

would

en,joy

his with

and the US.

and the Caribbean.

tons

would

greater

to corn

imports

United

conditions

certainly

behind

sentiments

hysterical,

Cuba

In 1987,

3.7

sugar

consumers

price.

virtually

will

its Sovitt

people

is somewhat

America short

f 01 dn average ’ in the

from

anti-American

rnarket

per pound

low level of US

Sadat)

between

sugar.

the world

1 million

relationship

the Cuban

increasingly

ofCuban

tons f’rom Latin about

however,

but the American years

(triple

an

to US influence,

has turned there

in recent

such

relations

to Nazis. than

the import

Union

topics

capitalist

with

in normalizing

to nationalist,

leaders

imports,

In keeping

of Anwar

to mobilize

promising

with

Soviet-Cuban

considerations,

per pound prices

aversion

and the USSR,

sugar

has turned

at quota

and possibly

near,

Cuba

a mere 600 000 short

imported

on such

ideological

world.

(on the model

States

the most

relations

benefit

looser

his appeals

stridency

of United

which

was about

imported US

has attempted

needs

leadership,

amicable

deep-seated

somewhat

period,

between

economy

a

as Castro

from

Soviet

Castro’s defection

his usual

World more

economic

wholesale

comparisons

Quite

be great

that

a difficult

complementarity

price

Given

unlikely

toward

and the less developed

obviously

States.

in Cuba’s

alliance.

a role in Third

evolution

the developed

extremely

culminate

an

would

with the United it

to preserve

to be

as a lo\v-

in the world

does not encourage better economic

ties with value

to

Implicalions Cuba. cant

A more

normal

expenditures

to tourism hard

diplomatic

on defense.

development

currency

(medicines,

US

insecticides,

economic

climate

would

Cuban

government

The

and American

to Cuba.

at

would

allow

tourists

firms

etc.)

ties to the US

45

of the Gorbachev Era for Cuban Socialism

could

could

also

better

Cuba bring

supply

prices

than

also rise relative

to reduce

has made

its very

a major

a considerable

Cuba other

with

quantity

certain

countries.

to a leveled

signifi-

commitment of

products

The

value

off or declining

of

Soviet

aid

of Brezhnev

to

effort In many

respects,

the unsettling Even

in the era

caudillo

would

Union

prefer

of today.

of Gorbachev,

socialism

States,

Castro

Soviet

the Soviet

the Soviet

political

process

leaving

Cuba

inflicted

on the rest of the Caribbean

innovative

approaches

diminished

the previous

Concluding

Reflections the

reform

to the Cuban trade

nature

of the social

personalistic,

(and

collective

leadership policy.

peasant

in Cuba,

with little

refinement growth,

Cuban

remain

seemed numerous Cuban obvious

signs, economic

key

individual

nor evidence

politically

factional and

staked

“consumer

social

welfare

with

model,

waste

of labor

in Cuba;

but

despite

elements

that many

Cubans

have begun

its highly

opinion,

restricted

resources,

by

over Fidel

forces

worker

are

and/or

are

record

of Cuban to believe

consumption

in the absence

Politics

of public

not

the

for economic

healthcare,

Castro’s

too high.

understanding

development,”

as employment,

of broad

other

of

opposition

a poor

approval with

is

is no sign

in the party

with Castro’s

“equitable

In the past,

and

public

on

America.

the

however,

(such

as

institutions.

Indeed,

indicators of Latin

activity

of the and the

“economistic”

autonomous

are inconsistent

his legitimacy society.”

Cuban

leadership

There

potential

intelligentsia,

religious in Cuba

for

In Cuba,

political

his coterie.

Other

era

for new solutions.

of ongoing

marginalized.

reform

has

and

population.

of their leadership

Romania),

aid.

on the intellectual

use the opportunity

“technocratic”

sign of an independent

at the forefront

to meet

in the search

Ceausescu’s

and Soviet

of Soviet

Gorbachev

on the quality

in

or influential

Castro of the

participate

considered

for economic

of socialism.

societies

which

Officials

organization,

Proposals

communist

by one

find themselves

also weak,

effectively

formerly

Castro

open

can no longer

revolution

to his own

of the

clearly

the options

that Cuba infusions

places

centralism

have

Gorbachev-style

affect

socialist

implications depends

gyrations Gorbachev’s

and Havana.

imposing

era means

direct

socialism

dominated

economic Castro

forces

Korea

of

discourse

management

diplomacy

for ever-increasing

and political

the

stable

Moscow

nevertheless

advancing

of Castro’s

the year-to-year

and

between

camp.

to the United

Nevertheless,

politics,

intention

ideological

economic

from

Congress.

Union

partner,

indulgent

be. Compared

for a relatively

the Gorbachev

in return

of Soviet

era to restructure

North

First,

World,

How

any

in the Soviet

elite.

however,

are limited.

Gorbachev

disavowed

as a strategic/military

this,

socialism

policy

have

in justifying

Beyond

etc.)

internal of interests

the pluralization

defensive

by the US

Union

to bolt the socialist

is more likely

protected

convergence

developments

in the Third

Second,

somewhat

to economics,

communist

its value

influence

in

Soviets

on Cuba,

would

also has allowed

exports,

Soviet

has no reason

government

than any US administration

of sugar

Although

the predictable

But Castro

education,

development society.

goals

There

are

that the costs of the possibilities,

and

controls

economic

debate,

only

indirectly

its

SIXII)IES

46 inlluences fication economic discontent consistent

Cuban program

politics. offers

and ideological must with

worsen,

IN COMPAKATIVF COMMUNISM

There

is no sign of“leadership

a decisive

(even

malaise. beforc

the Gorbachev

if ultimately

‘x’ It appears the

era.

Cuban

that

political

drift

” in Cuba;

ineffectual) economic elite

Castro’s

response conditions

undertakes

recti-

to Cuba’s and popular

a restructuring