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Information, persuasion and freedom: Implications of communications technology
Information Pmctwine & Mam@mmt Vol. 16, pp. 109-114 Pergamon Press Ltd., l!BO. Printed in Great Britain
OPINION PAPER INFORMATION, PERSUASION AND FREEDOM: IMPLICATIONS OF COhiMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY ROBERT GOEHLERT Librarian for Economics, Political Science, and Forensic Studies, Indiana University Library, Bloomington, IN 47401, U.S.A. (Received
for publication
11 September
1979)
Abstract-By examining what constitutes persuasive communication and when it can be considered to be an obstacle to freedom, the author discussesthe implications of communications technology for human decision-making. An argument is made that information overload can restrict freedom by affecting man’s capacity to processand evaluate information by short-circuiting the rational thought process. Because the control and dissemination of information can be used to alter human behavior, it is important to start investigating the impact of information managementin terms of its economic, political and sociological aspects. On the night of 30 October 1938, the Mercury Theatre broadcast The War of Worlds. Orson Welles’ famous script caused thousands of Americans to be panic-stricken, believing that an invasion from Mars had begun. A poll made six weeks after the broadcast by the American Institute of Public Opinion revealed that twenty-eight percent of those who listened believed that broadcast to be a genuine news bulletin, and seventy per cent of those thinking the broadcast to be a news report were frightened or disturbed. Not only did the broadcast bring notoriety to Welles, but it dramatically demonstrated the profound impact that persuasive communication can have on the public. The advent of radio and television has revolutionized mass communication and has had an enormous effect on their audiences. The imaginary invasion from Mars initiated a public discussion of the power of persuasive communication that has continued ever since. Vance Packard, when he wrote The Hidden Persuaders,added fuel to the controversy by raising the issue of whether or not we are manipulated by the persuasion of advertisers and the mass media. On one side of the debate are those who argue that commercial advertisers and political propagandists manipulate public opinion, contending that such manipulation interferes with the individual’s ability to choose freely. The individual is not freely choosing because the persuasion industry has .manipulated him to want what the industry desires. The opposing side argues that advertising and propaganda do not constitute an obstacle to free choice, since persuasion does not ‘involve coercion. In this article I plan to examine the controversy concerning freedom and persuasion. Specifically, I will be attempting to answer the question: “Can persuasion interfere with an individual’s autonomy ?” If indeed persuasion can interfere with the individual’s freedom, then we would also want to know how and under what circumstances. Secondly, I will discuss how an overabundance of information stimuli can result in having similar effects as manipulative persuasion. In conclusion, I will explore some of the implications of information technology on society. Lexically, persuasion means the changing of beliefs or attitudes by arguments and reasons. In everyday usage the word persuasion is employed in many different contexts, reflecting conflicting definitions of the term. Some text-books on public speaking refer to persuasion as argumentation. Others delineate persuasion as ethical and emotional appeals (as opposed to rational and logaical appeals). The ambiguity concerning the meaning of persuasion points out one of the difficulties involved with its usage. Persuasion does not refer solely to either argumentation or emotional appeal. The verb “persuade” refers equivocally to either rational or 109
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irrational persuasion. In order to get a better understanding it will be useful to analyze the term from several different perspectives. First, we can analyze the word in terms of the means of persuasion. Three elements can be identified: (1) The impact of the speaker, i.e. his personality, character, etc. (2) The effect of the speaker’s appeals-to interests, needs, etc. (3) The effect of the speaker’s arguments, i.e. his evidence, reasoning, etc. Persuasion can also be conceived of as a triadic relation between the persuader, persuadee, and some object (a belief, or action). The relation can be represented by the schema: “Y persuaded X that (to do) S.” In this schema X is the subject of persuasion, Y the agent, and X the object of persuasion[ I]. This triadic relation is useful for it isolated the necessary elements of persuasion, what sort of things can serve as the subject, objects, and agents of persuasion. The subjects of persuasion are always human beings. While the agent of persuasion is usually thought of as a person, it can be any means capable of presenting arguments-advertisements, signs, books, etc. The objects of persuasion are more complex. Basically, a person can be persuaded either to do some action or to hold some belief. But the object of persuasion cannot be the changing of a disposition. As J. N. Garver says, “We can only be persuaded to do what we can also quite consciously decide to do or not to do[5]. An individual can be persuaded to buy a Coke or Wheaties or to long for them, but he cannot be persuaded to like or dislike them. Persuasion is the act of inducing someone to either do or believe something. In this sense persuasion is not different from any other act of speech, for all speech is a social action which has the potentiality of influencing the attitudes and behaviors of listeners. Persuasion does differ from ordinary acts of speech in one important aspect. Not every communicative act is normative (normative here meaning “ought”, but not necessarily in an ethical sense). When conversing with a friend about the weather there is no normative aspect to my communicative act. But when I attempt to persuade the friend to resist draft induction my communicative act is normative. When I try to persuade someone, I presume to tell him what he should believe or how he ought to act. I am attempting to have my friend accept a decision which I have already made for him. Since the goal of my persuasive act is to bring about some action or belief, then I am trying to convince my friend to do some action or to accept some belief which I believe is best or right for him. Usually, we are critical of persuasion when it uses certain unworthy techniques, such as: (1) Use of favorable or unfavorable terms, which have certain emotional connotations. (2) Use of selected facts, i.e. ignoring facts that would damage an argument. (3) Outright lying. (4) Constant repetition. (5) Appeals to authority. (6) False reasoning. (7) Threats to person or property. (8) Use of derision, caricature or ridicule. Some writers argue, that such techniques are unethical, that the means do not justify the ends or that it is unethical to make appeals to needs, emotions or fears. Yet would we say the minister or politician who is making an emotional appeal to his audience is unethical? Likewise, do we not sometimes accept falsehood as being beneficial-as when we use “little white lies?” Instead of arguing that certain techniques of persuasion are unethical, it would be better to say that the ethics of persuasion depend upon the context. Many techniques of persuasion, though not all, are ethically neutral. Coercion, because it interferes with free choice, is plainly an obstacle to freedom. The problem associated with persuasion is that it is often difficult to tell where persuasion ends and coercion begins. To determine whether there are forces, internal or external that can be said to be “forcing*’ a particular choice is problematic. When the word “popcorn”is flashed on a movie screen for so brief a period of time that the viewer is unconscious of having seen it, it still evokes a response. The individual may get up from his seat and go out to the lobby and buy a box of popcorn. This use of subliminal stimuli is very effective, yet it has been shown that even this type of persuasion has limits. The movie-goer would probably not have bought the popcorn had he not had an inclination to buy popcorn. If another message, contrary to the individual’s desires or inclinations had been flashed on the screen, it is highly unlikely that he could be
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provoked to action. Subliminal stimulus, in certain cases, can be shown to be a rather clear-cut example of persuasion being coercive. The moviegoer’s behavior was not an action resulting from conscious deliberation. As Benjamin Barber says, “A man is unfree in behaving inpulsively not because he would necessarily have chosen to act otherwise, but because he did not choose to act at all, his behavior was not really his action at all, whatever the motives, causes, or origins of the behavior”[21. How can we distinguish between persuasion and coercion? Felix Oppenheim, in his book Dimensions of Freedom, provides a useful framework which may help elucidate matters. Oppenheim says that influence, like constraint, is a form of control. According to Oppenheim, “By influencing X to do x, Y “controls” X’s “mind”, so that X will choose to do x”[3]. On the other hand, “In the case of constraint, Y manipulates X’s body or environment and thereby causes him to behave in a certain way, X’s intention to the contrary notwithstanding”, ([3], p. 251. Later on Oppenheim states that “. . . Y’s control action consists of a persuasive communication’ which contains a “recommended opinion” to which X responds by accepting Y’s recommendation and by choosing and acting accordingly” ([3], p. 271. The “persuasive communication” may be a rational argument or an appeal to emotions, it may be true or false, or use false information (deception). If Y does not indicate to X that he is intending to influence his choice or activity then Oppenheim calls this manipulation. While Oppenheim talks of manipulation, it is unclear whether he equates persuasion with constraint. Oppenheim himself points out that people are reluctant to view persuasion as a form of control, as the word “persuasion” is laudatory while “control” has an unfavorable connotation. Oppenheim does conclude that “persuasion” is a subcategory of control, but is seems that it is not the same as constraint. It would seem that in view of Oppenheim’s remarks, the persuadee still has the ability to do otherwise than he did. Oppenheim even admits this to be the case: “. . . by influencing X not to do x (whether by means of dissuasion, deterence or conditioning), Y controls X’s not doing x but does not limit his freedom to do x, while on the other hand, by restraining X from doing x (either in the strict or in the broad sense), Y not only controls X’s not doing x but also makes him unfree to do x”([3], p. 38). How are we to interpret Oppenheim? Can persuasion never be said to act as an obstacle to freedom in the same sense as “constraint”? Not necessarily. Oppenheim states that “The conditioning process tends to reduce the respondent’s awareness of the various courses of action which are in fact open to him, so that he will choose and act without prior deliberation” ([3], p. 32). While persuasion is to be distinguished from conditioning, it does operate on the same basis. The aim of persuasion is to influence the persuadee by directing him toward one alternative rather than another. Now the question remains whether persuasion can ever be such that it reduces the respondent’s awareness so that he will choose and act without prior deliberation. In essence, the issue centers on how we can decide what kinds of influences are compatible with freedom and which are not. Stanley Benn believes that some forms of persuasion (brain-washing and conditioning) can interfere with the individual’s autonomy. As Benn says, “In such cases it is the subjective conditions of choosing that are manipulated; the subject is evidently not master of himself” [4]. Benn also recognizes that brain-washing and conditioning are radically different from most forms of persuasive manipulation. Benn rejects the notion that non-rational persuasion is always inconsistent with freedom. As Benn says, “The pretty girl in the toothpaste advertisement may be captivating, but do her charms really make slaves of us?” ([4], p. 267). In regard to non-rational persuasion, Penn differentiates between those forms of non-rational persuasion that are consistent with freedom and those that are not. Benn concludes that those forms of non-rational persuasion that the individual cannot be expected to resist may be considered to be interfering with free choice. When a persuadee is unaware that his preferences are being manipulated, Benn states, his freedom is subject to interference. Benn cites the example of subliminal stimulus. But beyond this example Benn has little more to say. Finally, he offers us this rather unsatisfactory statement: “If we want to discuss whether protection from mass persuasive techniques is necessary or even desirable, we must first have some idea of the kinds of interference that a person of normal firmness of purpose and with normal interests could reasonably be expected to withstand in a given situation” ([4], p. 269). This brings us back to the issue of whether the individual is expected to be able to resist
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appeals to hopes, fears, and so on? Is there some point at which the individual cannot be expected to resist? The problem is that persuasion affects individuals in different ways. Because of differences in personality types the resistence to persuasion differs from person to person. Even in the face of group pressure individuals vary. While Benn has provided a useful framework, it is very difficult to apply to actual cases. With a greater knowledge of human psychology, Benn’s framework may prove to be of considerable use, but at present there is not enough information with which to establish the criteria by which we could determine the forms on non-rational persuasion that the normal individual cannot be expected to resist. Perhaps too much credit is given to the influence of persuasion and motivational research. For successful persuasive manipulation to be achieved the persuader is making two assumptions: (1) that the real wants and motivations of a person can be discovered, and (2) that with this knowledge, it is possible to manipulate the individual without his being aware of it. These two assumptions are more difficult to fulfill than generally thought. What advertising seeks to accomplish is to insulate consumers from their conscious and critical selves, to restrict conscious deliberation. The techniques of persuasion can act as an interference on the individual’s autonomy. The short-circuiting of the thought process results in unfreedom as unconsious impulses. When persuasion results in the short-circuiting the thought process, several arguments can be presented that weigh against the use of persuasion. Since the individual has a right to determine whether or not his interests would be furthered or damaged by the recommendation of a persuasive communication, then it would be wrong to provide him with misinformation or to deceive him. While an advertisement would not necessarily make a listener unfree, there are other grounds on which to object to certain forms of persuasion. If an advertisement were followed and harm resulted to an individual, then there is sufficient reason to take action against the persuader, (but not in the name of freedom). Since persuasion is normative the persuader does assume an ethical responsibility: It is obvious that when we urge people to take a specific course of action, we share the ethical responsibility for the effects of such an act. What we are concerned about is the independence and autonomy, the voluntary and informed nature of choice. In other words, we are concerned whether the choice-making process we help create is consistent with the nature of the human personality we respect and seek to develop. In this view a speaker could urge the doing of a good act, yet foster in the doer an impulsive, uncritical, overemotional decision, the kind of decision not in keeping with an autonomous personality [5]. The intent of manipulative persuasion is to discourage an informed and critical appraisal of a speaker’s statements. Empirical studies show that resistance to persuasion has been shown to depend upon the listener’s knowledge of counter arguments[6]. Persuasion that purposefully deletes facts, or makes particular omissions is putting the persuadee at a disadvantage. Persuasion is an obstacle to freedom when it causes an individual to behave impulsively, i.e. when an individual did not choose to act. Excluding subliminal stimulus, brain-washing and conditioning, it is almost impossible to prove that most forms of persuasion have such an effect. Essentially the issue turns on whether and how a decision must be rational to count as free. As Stanley I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein state, “Unfreedom is created by the restriction of choice, by physical restraints that prevent any action whatsoever, or by the loading of choices, so that they become, for ordinary purposes, ineligible”[7]. Benn and Weinstein provide three criteria, which they feel are necessary for freedom of choice: (1) A chooser must have a realistic understanding of the alternatives. Delusions are not available courses of action. Hence a certain degree of rationality is necessary to freedom. (2) Motivation must not be vicarious. That A want B to want P must not be a sufficient condition of B’s wanting P. (That it is a necessary condition of fully consistent with freedom: a well-wisher who persuades me by good arguments to do P is not impairing my freedom. Neither, necessarily, is a successful commercial advertiser.) (3) B must be capable of criticizing and rejecting any proposal A offers him. This follows from 2, but it also requires that B’s sources of information shall not be controlled by A, for then B’s view of reality is what A chooses to make it ([7], p. 210). The second criterion states that persuasion, when it results in vicarious motivation (i.e. acting
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impulsively), disqualifies an individual as a chooser and hence the individual is not acting freely. Consequently an individual must be able to formulate alternatives and must be able to process and evaluate the information necessary to determine what course of action he will follow. While persuasion cannot be attacked in the name of freedom, since persuasion doesn’t necessarily restrict freedom, manipulative persuasion can be criticized and held accountable on the grounds of the ethics of communication. When an individual is misinformed, deceived or hindered from obtaining information, or bombarded with more information than he can handle, he is impaired in making a choice. How individuals go about the process of choosing is related to how information is disseminated and communicated in society. The model of a rational chooser is one facet of political thought that is still widely accepted. The utilitarian belief that an individual knows what he wants and what choices he can make, is still evident in modern social thought. The model of a rational chooser rarely exists, since most individuals do not make clearly motivated choices under conditions of complete information. The information explosion of the twentieth century works against the individual’s ability to exercise well-informed, rational, free choices. Jerome B. Weisner believes the danger exists that modern informational technology can develop into an “information tyranny” that &‘. . . threatens to ensnarl us in a social system in which controls could essentially eliminate human freedom and individual privacy”[8]. Weisner argues that the Bill of Rights needs to be brought up to date to take into consideration the right of individuals to have access to information. To that end, Weisner recommends that: “A watchdog authority, perhaps an independent agency, possibly a division of the General Accounting Office, perhaps the FFC, to review regularly the public and private information-gathering and processing activities within the country” ([8], p. 10). Governments have already started to enact laws that are based on the ethics of communication. Freedom of information, privacy, consumer protection, and “sunshine” legislation are all designed to serve the public interest by providing more access to information. But such, laws are only corrective measures, a reaction to the symptoms of a problem that goes much deeper. While it is important that individuals have access to information, it is also important not to overload the individual with information. Being overloaded with information is just as much a danger as not having access to information. The potential of information technology as a highly effective means of manipulation is a serious danger to society. Questions of the institutional control of communications technology and the cost of information are key issues facing society, but they often overlook the question of how man will be able to cope in the information saturated society of the future. Enthusiatic proponents of information technology too often paint a rosy picture of the future. Ironically, the benefits of informational technology could actually reduce the likelihood that individuals will be able to make more rational decisions. Just as too little information or misinformation may be detrimental to rational decision making, providing too much information may have the same effect. By providing so many options to choose from, to make a rational decision becomes increasingly impossible, or simply no decision is made. Ultimately, how we view the effects of information technology on society depends upon our conception of man. One model of man is that of a rational, enlightened individual who can sift, evaluate and analyze information quickly and make well reasoned decisions. Traditionally, the model of man implicit in so much of our economic and political philosophy is that of the rational utilitarian man. In the eithteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it was possible for an individual to keep up with the growth of knowledge and communications, the model of the rational man was plausible, as it was possible to make decisions under conditions of relatively complete information. With the rapid growth of information and the dramatic changes in communications that technology has made possible, the rational model of man seems more like an ideal than a realistic, accurate picture of how man makes decisions. Consequently, these developments require that we reconsider our concepts of man as an information processor. Martin Shubik contends that “As the speed of transmission of stimuli and the volume of stimuli increase, the limitations of the individual become more marked relative to society as a whole” [9]. How will man, whose powers of perception and calculation are limited and whose “searching, data processing and memory capacities are erratic”, respond to an overabundance of informational
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stimuli” ([9], p. 772). Stafford Beer believes that individuals, especially in American society, have “wildly overreactive reflexes” in response to informational stimuli. When informational stimuli exceeds man’s capacity to process and evaluate it, individuals tend to respond “clonicly”. If Beer’s analogy to the physiological condition of clonus is an accurate picture of how man responds to overabundance of informational stimuli, then the possibility of using techniques of persuasion to effectively manipulate men are considerably enhanced. If conditions of informational overload give rise to reactive decision-making, i.e. choices that are not based on reflective, critical thought, then those individuals would be susceptible to the techniques of persuasion. For as discussed earlier, the techniques of persuasion will more likely be successful if they are able to short-circuit the individual’s rational decision making process or are used in situations where the individual is not making rational choices but acting impulsively. Certainly, informational technology has brought enormous benefits to society and holds out the primise of even greater potential uses in the future. Yet to simply extol the potentials of information and communications technology without examining all its ramifications and believe that those technological innovations will lead to a future society where everyone has ready access to inexpensive information overlooks the danger that an overabundance of information carries with it perhaps unexpected results. Heinz Eulau, in a work examining the impact of communications technology on political and social behavior, quickly came to the conclusion that: Very little is known about political man as ari information gatherer and information digester under different conditions of information abundance or scarcity. For instance, it is not really known whether political bewilderment or alienation is even due partly to a person’s inability to handle the enormous flow of often ambiguous or contradictory messages that reach him in a relatively open society. And it is not known whether a person saturated with information really comes to his decisions on the basis of the informations he has or in spite of this information[ lo]. Until we know more about man as an information gatherer and processor, it is difficult to assess what the social, political and cultural implications of future innovations in information technology will be on man. Philosophers have long dreamed of the day when an intelligent society had quick and easy access to information. The unavailability of information was considered an obstacle to freedom, for the ability to make rational decisions and develop a plan of life is related to how information is disseminated in society. Inundating individuals with information, if Beer is correct, can have the same effect on individuals as certain techniques of persuasion. Being overloaded with information can lead to what Alvin Toffler has called “future shock”, i.e. individuals feel “disoriented” and “incompetent to deal rationally with their environments”. Those who control a society’s information resources have great power. In Daniel Bell’s conception of post-industrial society, information is the transforming resource of society and the strategic resource is knowledge. Information scientists must start to examine how modern information technology affects individuals and not merely questions focusing on the availability or accuracy of information. As Daniel Bell notes, “without energy all stands still”, and “without information all is chaos”[l I]. Paradoxically, an overabundance of information might also result in chaos. REFERENCES [ll J. N. GARVER,On the rationality of persuading. Mind 1%0, 69, 164. [2] BENJAMINBARBER,Superman ond Common Men, p. 57. Praeger, New York (1971). [31 FELIX OPPENHEIM, Dimensions of Freedom, p. 25. St. Martin’s Press, New York (1%1). 141 STANLEY I. BENN,Freedom and persuasion.AustralasiunJ. Philosophy,1967,45,264. 151THOMAS R. NEILSEN, Ethicsof SpeechCommunication, p. 37. Bobb’s-Merril, Indianapolis (1%6) [6] J. L. VOHS and R. L. GARR~, Resistanceto persuasion:an integrative framework. Public OpinionQuart. 1%8,32,445-452. [71 S. T. BENNand W. L. WENSTEIN, Being free to act, and being a free man. MiAd, 1971,80,209. 181JEROMEB. WIESNER,The information revolution and the bill of rights. Comput.Automofion1971,20,8. 191 MARTINSHUBIK,Information,rationality and free choicein a future democraticsociety. Daedalus 1%7,%,772.
IlO] HEINZEULA~,Technologyand Civility: The Skill Reuolutionin Politics,p. 11. Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford (1977). [ill DANIELBELL,Welcometo the post-industrial society.PhysicsToday197629,47.
OPINION PAPER INFORMATION, PERSUASION AND FREEDOM: IMPLICATIONS OF COhiMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY ROBERT GOEHLERT Librarian for Economics, Political Science, and Forensic Studies, Indiana University Library, Bloomington, IN 47401, U.S.A. (Received
for publication
11 September
1979)
Abstract-By examining what constitutes persuasive communication and when it can be considered to be an obstacle to freedom, the author discussesthe implications of communications technology for human decision-making. An argument is made that information overload can restrict freedom by affecting man’s capacity to processand evaluate information by short-circuiting the rational thought process. Because the control and dissemination of information can be used to alter human behavior, it is important to start investigating the impact of information managementin terms of its economic, political and sociological aspects. On the night of 30 October 1938, the Mercury Theatre broadcast The War of Worlds. Orson Welles’ famous script caused thousands of Americans to be panic-stricken, believing that an invasion from Mars had begun. A poll made six weeks after the broadcast by the American Institute of Public Opinion revealed that twenty-eight percent of those who listened believed that broadcast to be a genuine news bulletin, and seventy per cent of those thinking the broadcast to be a news report were frightened or disturbed. Not only did the broadcast bring notoriety to Welles, but it dramatically demonstrated the profound impact that persuasive communication can have on the public. The advent of radio and television has revolutionized mass communication and has had an enormous effect on their audiences. The imaginary invasion from Mars initiated a public discussion of the power of persuasive communication that has continued ever since. Vance Packard, when he wrote The Hidden Persuaders,added fuel to the controversy by raising the issue of whether or not we are manipulated by the persuasion of advertisers and the mass media. On one side of the debate are those who argue that commercial advertisers and political propagandists manipulate public opinion, contending that such manipulation interferes with the individual’s ability to choose freely. The individual is not freely choosing because the persuasion industry has .manipulated him to want what the industry desires. The opposing side argues that advertising and propaganda do not constitute an obstacle to free choice, since persuasion does not ‘involve coercion. In this article I plan to examine the controversy concerning freedom and persuasion. Specifically, I will be attempting to answer the question: “Can persuasion interfere with an individual’s autonomy ?” If indeed persuasion can interfere with the individual’s freedom, then we would also want to know how and under what circumstances. Secondly, I will discuss how an overabundance of information stimuli can result in having similar effects as manipulative persuasion. In conclusion, I will explore some of the implications of information technology on society. Lexically, persuasion means the changing of beliefs or attitudes by arguments and reasons. In everyday usage the word persuasion is employed in many different contexts, reflecting conflicting definitions of the term. Some text-books on public speaking refer to persuasion as argumentation. Others delineate persuasion as ethical and emotional appeals (as opposed to rational and logaical appeals). The ambiguity concerning the meaning of persuasion points out one of the difficulties involved with its usage. Persuasion does not refer solely to either argumentation or emotional appeal. The verb “persuade” refers equivocally to either rational or 109
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irrational persuasion. In order to get a better understanding it will be useful to analyze the term from several different perspectives. First, we can analyze the word in terms of the means of persuasion. Three elements can be identified: (1) The impact of the speaker, i.e. his personality, character, etc. (2) The effect of the speaker’s appeals-to interests, needs, etc. (3) The effect of the speaker’s arguments, i.e. his evidence, reasoning, etc. Persuasion can also be conceived of as a triadic relation between the persuader, persuadee, and some object (a belief, or action). The relation can be represented by the schema: “Y persuaded X that (to do) S.” In this schema X is the subject of persuasion, Y the agent, and X the object of persuasion[ I]. This triadic relation is useful for it isolated the necessary elements of persuasion, what sort of things can serve as the subject, objects, and agents of persuasion. The subjects of persuasion are always human beings. While the agent of persuasion is usually thought of as a person, it can be any means capable of presenting arguments-advertisements, signs, books, etc. The objects of persuasion are more complex. Basically, a person can be persuaded either to do some action or to hold some belief. But the object of persuasion cannot be the changing of a disposition. As J. N. Garver says, “We can only be persuaded to do what we can also quite consciously decide to do or not to do[5]. An individual can be persuaded to buy a Coke or Wheaties or to long for them, but he cannot be persuaded to like or dislike them. Persuasion is the act of inducing someone to either do or believe something. In this sense persuasion is not different from any other act of speech, for all speech is a social action which has the potentiality of influencing the attitudes and behaviors of listeners. Persuasion does differ from ordinary acts of speech in one important aspect. Not every communicative act is normative (normative here meaning “ought”, but not necessarily in an ethical sense). When conversing with a friend about the weather there is no normative aspect to my communicative act. But when I attempt to persuade the friend to resist draft induction my communicative act is normative. When I try to persuade someone, I presume to tell him what he should believe or how he ought to act. I am attempting to have my friend accept a decision which I have already made for him. Since the goal of my persuasive act is to bring about some action or belief, then I am trying to convince my friend to do some action or to accept some belief which I believe is best or right for him. Usually, we are critical of persuasion when it uses certain unworthy techniques, such as: (1) Use of favorable or unfavorable terms, which have certain emotional connotations. (2) Use of selected facts, i.e. ignoring facts that would damage an argument. (3) Outright lying. (4) Constant repetition. (5) Appeals to authority. (6) False reasoning. (7) Threats to person or property. (8) Use of derision, caricature or ridicule. Some writers argue, that such techniques are unethical, that the means do not justify the ends or that it is unethical to make appeals to needs, emotions or fears. Yet would we say the minister or politician who is making an emotional appeal to his audience is unethical? Likewise, do we not sometimes accept falsehood as being beneficial-as when we use “little white lies?” Instead of arguing that certain techniques of persuasion are unethical, it would be better to say that the ethics of persuasion depend upon the context. Many techniques of persuasion, though not all, are ethically neutral. Coercion, because it interferes with free choice, is plainly an obstacle to freedom. The problem associated with persuasion is that it is often difficult to tell where persuasion ends and coercion begins. To determine whether there are forces, internal or external that can be said to be “forcing*’ a particular choice is problematic. When the word “popcorn”is flashed on a movie screen for so brief a period of time that the viewer is unconscious of having seen it, it still evokes a response. The individual may get up from his seat and go out to the lobby and buy a box of popcorn. This use of subliminal stimuli is very effective, yet it has been shown that even this type of persuasion has limits. The movie-goer would probably not have bought the popcorn had he not had an inclination to buy popcorn. If another message, contrary to the individual’s desires or inclinations had been flashed on the screen, it is highly unlikely that he could be
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provoked to action. Subliminal stimulus, in certain cases, can be shown to be a rather clear-cut example of persuasion being coercive. The moviegoer’s behavior was not an action resulting from conscious deliberation. As Benjamin Barber says, “A man is unfree in behaving inpulsively not because he would necessarily have chosen to act otherwise, but because he did not choose to act at all, his behavior was not really his action at all, whatever the motives, causes, or origins of the behavior”[21. How can we distinguish between persuasion and coercion? Felix Oppenheim, in his book Dimensions of Freedom, provides a useful framework which may help elucidate matters. Oppenheim says that influence, like constraint, is a form of control. According to Oppenheim, “By influencing X to do x, Y “controls” X’s “mind”, so that X will choose to do x”[3]. On the other hand, “In the case of constraint, Y manipulates X’s body or environment and thereby causes him to behave in a certain way, X’s intention to the contrary notwithstanding”, ([3], p. 251. Later on Oppenheim states that “. . . Y’s control action consists of a persuasive communication’ which contains a “recommended opinion” to which X responds by accepting Y’s recommendation and by choosing and acting accordingly” ([3], p. 271. The “persuasive communication” may be a rational argument or an appeal to emotions, it may be true or false, or use false information (deception). If Y does not indicate to X that he is intending to influence his choice or activity then Oppenheim calls this manipulation. While Oppenheim talks of manipulation, it is unclear whether he equates persuasion with constraint. Oppenheim himself points out that people are reluctant to view persuasion as a form of control, as the word “persuasion” is laudatory while “control” has an unfavorable connotation. Oppenheim does conclude that “persuasion” is a subcategory of control, but is seems that it is not the same as constraint. It would seem that in view of Oppenheim’s remarks, the persuadee still has the ability to do otherwise than he did. Oppenheim even admits this to be the case: “. . . by influencing X not to do x (whether by means of dissuasion, deterence or conditioning), Y controls X’s not doing x but does not limit his freedom to do x, while on the other hand, by restraining X from doing x (either in the strict or in the broad sense), Y not only controls X’s not doing x but also makes him unfree to do x”([3], p. 38). How are we to interpret Oppenheim? Can persuasion never be said to act as an obstacle to freedom in the same sense as “constraint”? Not necessarily. Oppenheim states that “The conditioning process tends to reduce the respondent’s awareness of the various courses of action which are in fact open to him, so that he will choose and act without prior deliberation” ([3], p. 32). While persuasion is to be distinguished from conditioning, it does operate on the same basis. The aim of persuasion is to influence the persuadee by directing him toward one alternative rather than another. Now the question remains whether persuasion can ever be such that it reduces the respondent’s awareness so that he will choose and act without prior deliberation. In essence, the issue centers on how we can decide what kinds of influences are compatible with freedom and which are not. Stanley Benn believes that some forms of persuasion (brain-washing and conditioning) can interfere with the individual’s autonomy. As Benn says, “In such cases it is the subjective conditions of choosing that are manipulated; the subject is evidently not master of himself” [4]. Benn also recognizes that brain-washing and conditioning are radically different from most forms of persuasive manipulation. Benn rejects the notion that non-rational persuasion is always inconsistent with freedom. As Benn says, “The pretty girl in the toothpaste advertisement may be captivating, but do her charms really make slaves of us?” ([4], p. 267). In regard to non-rational persuasion, Penn differentiates between those forms of non-rational persuasion that are consistent with freedom and those that are not. Benn concludes that those forms of non-rational persuasion that the individual cannot be expected to resist may be considered to be interfering with free choice. When a persuadee is unaware that his preferences are being manipulated, Benn states, his freedom is subject to interference. Benn cites the example of subliminal stimulus. But beyond this example Benn has little more to say. Finally, he offers us this rather unsatisfactory statement: “If we want to discuss whether protection from mass persuasive techniques is necessary or even desirable, we must first have some idea of the kinds of interference that a person of normal firmness of purpose and with normal interests could reasonably be expected to withstand in a given situation” ([4], p. 269). This brings us back to the issue of whether the individual is expected to be able to resist
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appeals to hopes, fears, and so on? Is there some point at which the individual cannot be expected to resist? The problem is that persuasion affects individuals in different ways. Because of differences in personality types the resistence to persuasion differs from person to person. Even in the face of group pressure individuals vary. While Benn has provided a useful framework, it is very difficult to apply to actual cases. With a greater knowledge of human psychology, Benn’s framework may prove to be of considerable use, but at present there is not enough information with which to establish the criteria by which we could determine the forms on non-rational persuasion that the normal individual cannot be expected to resist. Perhaps too much credit is given to the influence of persuasion and motivational research. For successful persuasive manipulation to be achieved the persuader is making two assumptions: (1) that the real wants and motivations of a person can be discovered, and (2) that with this knowledge, it is possible to manipulate the individual without his being aware of it. These two assumptions are more difficult to fulfill than generally thought. What advertising seeks to accomplish is to insulate consumers from their conscious and critical selves, to restrict conscious deliberation. The techniques of persuasion can act as an interference on the individual’s autonomy. The short-circuiting of the thought process results in unfreedom as unconsious impulses. When persuasion results in the short-circuiting the thought process, several arguments can be presented that weigh against the use of persuasion. Since the individual has a right to determine whether or not his interests would be furthered or damaged by the recommendation of a persuasive communication, then it would be wrong to provide him with misinformation or to deceive him. While an advertisement would not necessarily make a listener unfree, there are other grounds on which to object to certain forms of persuasion. If an advertisement were followed and harm resulted to an individual, then there is sufficient reason to take action against the persuader, (but not in the name of freedom). Since persuasion is normative the persuader does assume an ethical responsibility: It is obvious that when we urge people to take a specific course of action, we share the ethical responsibility for the effects of such an act. What we are concerned about is the independence and autonomy, the voluntary and informed nature of choice. In other words, we are concerned whether the choice-making process we help create is consistent with the nature of the human personality we respect and seek to develop. In this view a speaker could urge the doing of a good act, yet foster in the doer an impulsive, uncritical, overemotional decision, the kind of decision not in keeping with an autonomous personality [5]. The intent of manipulative persuasion is to discourage an informed and critical appraisal of a speaker’s statements. Empirical studies show that resistance to persuasion has been shown to depend upon the listener’s knowledge of counter arguments[6]. Persuasion that purposefully deletes facts, or makes particular omissions is putting the persuadee at a disadvantage. Persuasion is an obstacle to freedom when it causes an individual to behave impulsively, i.e. when an individual did not choose to act. Excluding subliminal stimulus, brain-washing and conditioning, it is almost impossible to prove that most forms of persuasion have such an effect. Essentially the issue turns on whether and how a decision must be rational to count as free. As Stanley I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein state, “Unfreedom is created by the restriction of choice, by physical restraints that prevent any action whatsoever, or by the loading of choices, so that they become, for ordinary purposes, ineligible”[7]. Benn and Weinstein provide three criteria, which they feel are necessary for freedom of choice: (1) A chooser must have a realistic understanding of the alternatives. Delusions are not available courses of action. Hence a certain degree of rationality is necessary to freedom. (2) Motivation must not be vicarious. That A want B to want P must not be a sufficient condition of B’s wanting P. (That it is a necessary condition of fully consistent with freedom: a well-wisher who persuades me by good arguments to do P is not impairing my freedom. Neither, necessarily, is a successful commercial advertiser.) (3) B must be capable of criticizing and rejecting any proposal A offers him. This follows from 2, but it also requires that B’s sources of information shall not be controlled by A, for then B’s view of reality is what A chooses to make it ([7], p. 210). The second criterion states that persuasion, when it results in vicarious motivation (i.e. acting
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impulsively), disqualifies an individual as a chooser and hence the individual is not acting freely. Consequently an individual must be able to formulate alternatives and must be able to process and evaluate the information necessary to determine what course of action he will follow. While persuasion cannot be attacked in the name of freedom, since persuasion doesn’t necessarily restrict freedom, manipulative persuasion can be criticized and held accountable on the grounds of the ethics of communication. When an individual is misinformed, deceived or hindered from obtaining information, or bombarded with more information than he can handle, he is impaired in making a choice. How individuals go about the process of choosing is related to how information is disseminated and communicated in society. The model of a rational chooser is one facet of political thought that is still widely accepted. The utilitarian belief that an individual knows what he wants and what choices he can make, is still evident in modern social thought. The model of a rational chooser rarely exists, since most individuals do not make clearly motivated choices under conditions of complete information. The information explosion of the twentieth century works against the individual’s ability to exercise well-informed, rational, free choices. Jerome B. Weisner believes the danger exists that modern informational technology can develop into an “information tyranny” that &‘. . . threatens to ensnarl us in a social system in which controls could essentially eliminate human freedom and individual privacy”[8]. Weisner argues that the Bill of Rights needs to be brought up to date to take into consideration the right of individuals to have access to information. To that end, Weisner recommends that: “A watchdog authority, perhaps an independent agency, possibly a division of the General Accounting Office, perhaps the FFC, to review regularly the public and private information-gathering and processing activities within the country” ([8], p. 10). Governments have already started to enact laws that are based on the ethics of communication. Freedom of information, privacy, consumer protection, and “sunshine” legislation are all designed to serve the public interest by providing more access to information. But such, laws are only corrective measures, a reaction to the symptoms of a problem that goes much deeper. While it is important that individuals have access to information, it is also important not to overload the individual with information. Being overloaded with information is just as much a danger as not having access to information. The potential of information technology as a highly effective means of manipulation is a serious danger to society. Questions of the institutional control of communications technology and the cost of information are key issues facing society, but they often overlook the question of how man will be able to cope in the information saturated society of the future. Enthusiatic proponents of information technology too often paint a rosy picture of the future. Ironically, the benefits of informational technology could actually reduce the likelihood that individuals will be able to make more rational decisions. Just as too little information or misinformation may be detrimental to rational decision making, providing too much information may have the same effect. By providing so many options to choose from, to make a rational decision becomes increasingly impossible, or simply no decision is made. Ultimately, how we view the effects of information technology on society depends upon our conception of man. One model of man is that of a rational, enlightened individual who can sift, evaluate and analyze information quickly and make well reasoned decisions. Traditionally, the model of man implicit in so much of our economic and political philosophy is that of the rational utilitarian man. In the eithteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it was possible for an individual to keep up with the growth of knowledge and communications, the model of the rational man was plausible, as it was possible to make decisions under conditions of relatively complete information. With the rapid growth of information and the dramatic changes in communications that technology has made possible, the rational model of man seems more like an ideal than a realistic, accurate picture of how man makes decisions. Consequently, these developments require that we reconsider our concepts of man as an information processor. Martin Shubik contends that “As the speed of transmission of stimuli and the volume of stimuli increase, the limitations of the individual become more marked relative to society as a whole” [9]. How will man, whose powers of perception and calculation are limited and whose “searching, data processing and memory capacities are erratic”, respond to an overabundance of informational
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stimuli” ([9], p. 772). Stafford Beer believes that individuals, especially in American society, have “wildly overreactive reflexes” in response to informational stimuli. When informational stimuli exceeds man’s capacity to process and evaluate it, individuals tend to respond “clonicly”. If Beer’s analogy to the physiological condition of clonus is an accurate picture of how man responds to overabundance of informational stimuli, then the possibility of using techniques of persuasion to effectively manipulate men are considerably enhanced. If conditions of informational overload give rise to reactive decision-making, i.e. choices that are not based on reflective, critical thought, then those individuals would be susceptible to the techniques of persuasion. For as discussed earlier, the techniques of persuasion will more likely be successful if they are able to short-circuit the individual’s rational decision making process or are used in situations where the individual is not making rational choices but acting impulsively. Certainly, informational technology has brought enormous benefits to society and holds out the primise of even greater potential uses in the future. Yet to simply extol the potentials of information and communications technology without examining all its ramifications and believe that those technological innovations will lead to a future society where everyone has ready access to inexpensive information overlooks the danger that an overabundance of information carries with it perhaps unexpected results. Heinz Eulau, in a work examining the impact of communications technology on political and social behavior, quickly came to the conclusion that: Very little is known about political man as ari information gatherer and information digester under different conditions of information abundance or scarcity. For instance, it is not really known whether political bewilderment or alienation is even due partly to a person’s inability to handle the enormous flow of often ambiguous or contradictory messages that reach him in a relatively open society. And it is not known whether a person saturated with information really comes to his decisions on the basis of the informations he has or in spite of this information[ lo]. Until we know more about man as an information gatherer and processor, it is difficult to assess what the social, political and cultural implications of future innovations in information technology will be on man. Philosophers have long dreamed of the day when an intelligent society had quick and easy access to information. The unavailability of information was considered an obstacle to freedom, for the ability to make rational decisions and develop a plan of life is related to how information is disseminated in society. Inundating individuals with information, if Beer is correct, can have the same effect on individuals as certain techniques of persuasion. Being overloaded with information can lead to what Alvin Toffler has called “future shock”, i.e. individuals feel “disoriented” and “incompetent to deal rationally with their environments”. Those who control a society’s information resources have great power. In Daniel Bell’s conception of post-industrial society, information is the transforming resource of society and the strategic resource is knowledge. Information scientists must start to examine how modern information technology affects individuals and not merely questions focusing on the availability or accuracy of information. As Daniel Bell notes, “without energy all stands still”, and “without information all is chaos”[l I]. Paradoxically, an overabundance of information might also result in chaos. REFERENCES [ll J. N. GARVER,On the rationality of persuading. Mind 1%0, 69, 164. [2] BENJAMINBARBER,Superman ond Common Men, p. 57. Praeger, New York (1971). [31 FELIX OPPENHEIM, Dimensions of Freedom, p. 25. St. Martin’s Press, New York (1%1). 141 STANLEY I. BENN,Freedom and persuasion.AustralasiunJ. Philosophy,1967,45,264. 151THOMAS R. NEILSEN, Ethicsof SpeechCommunication, p. 37. Bobb’s-Merril, Indianapolis (1%6) [6] J. L. VOHS and R. L. GARR~, Resistanceto persuasion:an integrative framework. Public OpinionQuart. 1%8,32,445-452. [71 S. T. BENNand W. L. WENSTEIN, Being free to act, and being a free man. MiAd, 1971,80,209. 181JEROMEB. WIESNER,The information revolution and the bill of rights. Comput.Automofion1971,20,8. 191 MARTINSHUBIK,Information,rationality and free choicein a future democraticsociety. Daedalus 1%7,%,772.
IlO] HEINZEULA~,Technologyand Civility: The Skill Reuolutionin Politics,p. 11. Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford (1977). [ill DANIELBELL,Welcometo the post-industrial society.PhysicsToday197629,47.