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Inspector general reports as instruments of governmental accountability
Inspector General Reports as instruments of governmental Accountability
Thelma
Freides*
Inspectors General in a11 major Federal agencies report semiannually to Congress on the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of program management in their agencies. The reporting mechanism is intended to serve as an instrument of governmental accountability to Congress and the public, but there is evidence that it fails short of that goai. The study examines the semiannuaf reports from the perspective of their usefulness in conveying info~ation about the character and quality of administration in Federal agencies, Negative factors are unclear definition of the role and responsibilities of Inspectors General, proliferation of detail and paucity of generalization in the reports, and inadequate public distribution. Nonetheless, the reports contain large quantities of significant information unavailable from any other public source.
In 1989 “HUD Scandals” made the headlines, with revelations of influence peddling, political favoritism and profiteering in Federal housing programs. When press reports of misbehavior triggered outraged congressional investigations, the Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development testified before a congressional committee that questionable practices in HUD were no surprise; that he had been reporting them for years to the top officials of the agency and to Congress in the semiannual reports required under the Inspector General Act. ’ The affair recalls the scandal of a Quaker-centu~ earlier which gave rise to the office of Inspector General in Federal agencies. In the early 196Os, Billie Sol Estes was revealed to have committed extensive fraud in the cotton allotments program of the Department of Agriculture. As in the HUD case, the illegal behavior had been known for years within the department, but action was taken only when press reports stimulated criminal investigation and congressional interest. Failure to act earlier was attributed to fragmentation of responsibility and lack of communication, such that no office or official was aware of all
“Direct ull corwspmdence York at Purchase,
to: Thelma Freides, Head ofReuders Services, Library, Hill Roud. Purchase, New York 10577-1400.
735 Anderson
Government information Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 1, pages 53-64. Copyright &c1992 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of repr~uction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0740-624X.
State Universip
of New
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aspects of the case or centrally concerned with monitoring the department’s programs for indications of fraud and waste.’ In the wake of the Estes case, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed an Inspector General to centralize monitoring activity. In the years since then Inspectors General have been installed in nearly all Federal agencies, with provision for regular reporting to Congress on administrative integrity and effectiveness within the agency. Yet it appears that the reports, duly submitted for years, failed for years to arouse alarm, or even interest, concerning the HUD operations. Questions suggested by this history are: Do the reports of Inspectors General really serve, as intended, to assess the quality of administration in Federal agencies’? Arc they instruments of governmental accountability for Congress and the public? The present study considers these questions by examining the history of Inspector General legislation. the information conveyed by the semiannual reports to Congress, and the distribution of the reports through the depository library program. DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
INSPECTOR
FEDERAL
GENERAL
CONCEPT
IN
AGENCIES
The office of Inspector General (IG) has a long history in the military. where the main concern of the IG was assessment of the training and readiness of the armed forces! In civilian agencies the main function is auditing of departmental expenditures to determine that funds are spent in the manner and for the purposes set down by law. The first such office was established. as noted, by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1962. followed by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in 1972.J A critical weakness of these arrangements was the IGs’ total dependence on the departmental administration, as became evident when Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz eliminated the office in 1974.’ At around the same time, congressional concern mounted over evidence of lax administration and uncontrolled waste in rapidly expanding Federal programs. Committee hearings revealed that auditors in Federal agencies commonly worked under the direct supervision of the officials whose work they were expected to scrutinize, and that auditing staffs were so meager that case backlogs ran to ten and twenty years.” Senator Thomas Eagleton. chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency charged that “fraud and waste in federally funded programs have reached epidemic proportions,” and “everything the Federal Government is involved in is a license to steal .“’ Congress’ response was to create Officers of Inspector General by statute. thus assuring that agency heads could not abolish the position or alter its scope. The first such offices were set up in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Energy, in 1976 and 1977. respectively. The Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452) extended the program to twelve additional major agencies and set down the basic pattern of operation and reporting that continues to govern IG functions.x Under the Inspector General Act, the inspectors General are appointed by the President and removable only by the President, who must communicate the reason for the removal to Congress. Appointments are to be based solely on professional qualifications. without regard to political affiliation. Within the agencies, the IGs report only to the agency head. who is barred by the law from prohibiting or interfering with any IG investigation. The
fnspector Genera/ Reports as ~r?strumenrs of Covernmentai
Accoun~~bi/;[y
55
IGs are to report their findings and recommendations semiannually to the agency heads who must then transmit the reports, with comments but without alteration, to Congress. In cases of “pa~icuiar~y serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies” the IGs are to report immediately to the agency head, who must transmit the report, with or without comment, to the appropriate congressional committee within seven days.” The IGs were thus made largely, though not entirely, independent of departmental control and provided with direct lines of communication to the Congress. The 1978 act established Offices of Inspector General in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and Transportation, and in the Community Services Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Veterans Administration. Coverage was extended to the Department of Education in 1979, the Agency for International Development in 198 1, the Department of Defense in 1982, the Railroad Retirement Board in 1983, the Department of State in 1985, the U.S. Information Agency in 1986, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1987. lo The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 added the Departments of Justice and Treasury. thus completing the coverage of cabinetlevel agencies, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ’ ’
THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL
The Inspectors General are charged under the taw to conduct audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to recommend policies for the purpose of promoting economy and efficiency and detecting fraud: to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make recommendations concerning the impact of such legislation and regulations on economy and efficiency, and the detection of fraud and abuse; to report violations of law to the Attorney General; and to submit semiannua1 reports to the agency head and to Congress. For many people, the key functions are program auditing and recommendation of policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. It is viewed as far more desirable to prevent fraud and waste by means of sound management structures and vigorous controls than to uncover derelictions after they have occurred. At the same time, this broad view of the audit function, which considers not only whether expenditures are legal, but also whether the money spent achieves its purpose or might be better used in other ways, raises the possibility of conflict with program administrators, who may view the Inspector General’s activities as a burdensome interference, elevating accounting technicalities over program accomplishments. In general, the broader view tends to be that of the IGs themselves, the General Accounting Office, and many members of Congress. Agency officials and the Office of Management and Budget tend generally toward a more restrictive outlook, focusing on fraud detection and minimizing the inspector General’s involvement with program assessment. This ambiguity in the conception of the office is evident throughout the history of Inspector General legislation. In Senate testimony prior to passage of the 1978 Act, the Comptroller General of the United States argued strongly for a broad conception of the office and a name to reflect its range;
1 cannot stress too strongly
that what the subcommittee dots on this matter is
going to have far-reaching consequences in the years to come. “Office
of Inspector General,”
you are going to find that
increasingly be centered on investigations
If you call them future operations will
for the purpose ot’detectinp fraud.
believe it would be far better to use the bulk of these organizations’ mana~e~lent in implementing
We
efforts to assist
strong internal controls which will prevent funds from
being misused in the first place. ”
Responding to this, the Senate committee named the office “Auditor and Inspector General,” but a floor amendment reverted to the House-passed title, “Inspector General.” While the legislative history does not pinpoint the reason. it does provide evidence ot efforts by the Executive Branch to narrow the IGs’ mandate. The Office of Management and Budget objected to including “promoting economy and efficiency” among the IGs’ assigned responsibilities, and opposed any language suggesting that IGs were to have authority to review program results.” Adnliilistration support for the bill was gained only after prolonged negotiations resulting in agreement by congressional sponsors to amendments they viewed as weakening. ” All of the agencies in which statutory IGs have been appointed opposed the action (some thought it a good idea in general, but not for them), frequently citing the dangers of policy interference. ” Treasury officials argued, for example, that an IG could impede sensitive economic policy deliberations, and the Defense Department feared dilution of the President’s control over the armed services.‘” Such concerns were dismissed as exaggerated and even ~~~hildlike” by members ot Congress who saw the IGs as needed allies in their efforts to monitor and control the Federal bureaucracy. I7 The following exchange between Senator John Glenn and Richard Kusserow, Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, is illustrative of the view of the Inspector General as an active policy maker. Senator Glenn: Are IGs involved in whether agencies arc carrying out the intent 01 Congress in executing certain laws where dollars are not involved? Mr. Kusserow: Yes, that’s a major portion
of our responsibilil~cs.
and that goes into an
area where we are not talking about economy and efficiency any more: WC are talking about effectiveness. Senator Glenn: Do you watch and see what activities might be beyond the normal jurisdiction of an agency, and toot the whistle on that also? Mr. Kusserow: Yes
that’s mandated for us
to ensure that the department is
not wasting their dollars and does not engage in abusive practices. Is
Perhaps in recognition of these aspects of the job. President Ronald Reagan dismissed all the incumbent Inspectors General on the day he took office in order to appoint what his press secretary termed “a Reagan team.““’ The action drew strong criticism in Congress and the press, and administration officials later acknowledged that they had not properly recognized the non-partisan character of the office,“’ but the incident demonstrates nonetheless the political relevance and sensitivity of “fraud. waste and abuse.” There is also evidence, however, that independent scrutiny of agency administrations by the Inspectors General is less stringent than either the Inspectors’ own characterizations or the apprehensions of agency officials might suggest. The General Accounting Office reported in 1984 that Inspectors General c~)ncentrated for the most part on “dctcctinp.
inspector
General
Reports a5 instruments
ot Governmental
Accountabflity
57
rather than preventing, fraud and abuse,” and urged attention to “fraud prevention strategies” emphasizing “before-the-fact advice on the best way to attain stronger, less vulnerable systems and controls.2’ A scholarly analysis of the office concluded that the Inspectors’ location within the agencies requires them to maintain the confidence and support of the top agency administrator, leading almost inevitably to conflicts of interest.‘2 The IG Act’s provision for reporting flagrant deficiencies to Congress within seven days has rarely been used, probably because of “unwillingness of 1Gs to use a power that might be expected to jeopardize their relationship with upper management at an agency.‘j A recent Senate staff investigation reported that IGs habitually shield agency management from whistleblowers. prompting one Senator to remark that the watchdogs are really lapdogs.” One Inspector General characterizes the situation as “straddling the barbed-wire fence. The Hill is worried about the IG’s being coopted by management, and management is worried about our being a conduit to the Hill. We are stuck right in the middle.“” This ambiguity of the Inspector General’s role is reflected in the information presented in the semiannual reports.
CONTENT
OF THE REPORTS
As prescribed by the Inspector General Act of 1978, the semiannual reports are to include: a description of significant problems and deficiencies relating to the operation of agency programs, and recommendations for corrective action made by the IG; identification of previous recommendations on which corrective action has not been completed; a summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions resulting; and a listing of each audit report issued during the reporting period.‘6 The 1988 amendments added requirements for statistical tables showing the dollar value of questioned and unsupported costs and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use: reporting of management actions with which the Inspector General disagrees; and separate reports by agency heads of action taken in response to IG recommendations and the results achieved.‘7 For this study, examination of the reports focused on issues of agency management; that is, conditions within agencies reported as contributing to fraud. waste, or ineffectiveness. Reports of inadequacies, rule violations or simple criminality on the part of outsiders-i.e., contractors or grant recipients-were not considered unless the shortcomings were attributed in some way to the behavior of the Federal agency. The reports vary in their attention to underlying management issues. possibly reflecting differences in outlook among the Inspectors General. Some seem to regard program goals and procedures as given, and mainly report infractions of rules by field offices, local government agencies. contractors, and grant recipients, with emphasis on costs disallowed or required to be reimbursed. Others relate the errors and infractions to broader organizational defects and discuss needed changes in administrative procedures, but still without comment on basic program aims or methods. Less frequently, the reports call for significant changes in program structure or rules (e.g.. restricting participant eligibility to reduce costs, or contracting out an activity to the private sector),‘x or recommend major alteration or elimination of programs jndged to be unproductive or inherently unworkable.” The summaries of major audits, which are the chief source of administrative information in the reports, are characterized by masses of detail from which a coherent picture does
58
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not readily emerge. Recognizing the impediment to communication this represents, a number of the IGs have added features designed to summarize findings and highlight the most significant issues. Some reports begin with an introductory summary of major findings.3” Others contain accounts of special multiple-program reviews, variously termed Management Advisory Services, Service Delivery Assessments, Inspections, and similar designations, which are designed to highlight key management issues transcending individual audits and programs.” These more general reviews may be triggered by the repeated appearance in audits of a particular error or deficiency, signaling the existence of an underlying problem. Occasionally a report will include a comprehensive evaluation of a major agency program selected for its particular interest at that time to Congress or agency management.“” Whether or not they are pointed out for special attention, certain failings are noted so regularly and repetitively in particular agencies’ reports that the presence of a pervasive problem becomes obvious. To cite just a few examples, Office of Education reports are filled, year after year, with instances of irregularities in institutions participating in student loan programs; the HUD Inspector General reports endless examples of inadequate monitoring of local housing agencies and other participants in Federal housing programs; the Department of State IG regularly reports inadequate security measures at overseas embassies.‘3 The types of administrative deficiencies most commonly identified are lax monitoring and rule enforcement, deficiencies in planning or evaluation, poor records and weak internal controls, and inactivity in the form of failure to recognize problems or respond to signs of trouble. Less frequently cited are direct violations of program standards, failure to report or communicate as needed, defects in the statutory base, or insufficient resources allocated for the task, and poor training and utilization of personnel.“4 The reports sometimes mention the agency response to major audit findings. Instances of substantive disagreement between the Inspectors General and agency management on matters of administrative style, program goals. and the interpretation of congressional intent are not uncommon. For example, several agencies urged by their IGs to exercise tighter control over local units pa~icipatin~ in Federal programs responded that they preferred to rely on persuasion rather than coercion. or that national intervention at the local level would be contrary to the intent of the program legislation.3” When the HUD IG noted that grants under the Jobs Bill had no measurable effect on longterm unemployment, the department responded that the program’s main purpose was to assist the depressed construction industry, with employment consequences, if any, a secondary side effect.“6 Similarly, a finding by the Department of the Interior IG that grants of $5 million to fisheries programs in sixteen states had produced no increase in commercial yields brought the response that the grants had aims other than immediate harvest increases.” The Department of Labor responded to a highly critical evaluation of enforcement of equal employment oppo~unity regulations by its Office of Federal Contract compliance with the assertion that the report was based on “fundamental misunderst~~ndings” regarding the purpose of the Office, and that the IG’s recommendations “seek to preempt the exclusive policy making mandate of the Secretary.““’ Given the generality of much legislative language, the oft-noted congressional tendency to blur legislative aims in the interests of political compromise, and the shifts in program focus and emphasis brought about by successive reauthorizations and fluctuating funding levels, disagreements such as these are probably inevitable. They underscore once again
inspector General Reports ai instruments
of G~ver~mefft~/ Accou~tabj~jty
59
the problematic. though potitically interesting, nature of “fraud, waste and abuse,” and the ambiguous role of the Inspector General. Disagreements between IGs and agency managers can also derive from the distinctive practices, standards, and vocabulary of the auditing profession. Program managers may regard auditors as more devoted to administrative process than to results. “If the paper available would not allow (auditors) to reconstruct what happened during the process they Auditors, on the other hand, may argue that recommend additional documentation.““’ claimed program results are distorted or meaningless in the absence of adequate documentation. 4o Criticism of agency actions on the ground that grantees’ or contractors’ claims were accepted without supporting documentation is frequent in the reports, in circumstances such as acceptance by NASA of inadequately documented equipment test results, or Department of Education approval of unsupported student eligibility claims.“’ The House Committee on Government Operations reported in 1984 that agency managers were seeking to recover only thirty to forty percent of costs questioned by auditors, and prominent among the reasons was the managers’ readiness to accept documentationjudged inadequate by IG standards.42 Of the problem of auditors’ language, one Inspector General observed, “If an auditor says that internal controls are weak, that is very meaningful to an auditor. But if a manager picks up a report and it says ‘internal controls are weak’ his eyes glaze over .“47 Many, though not all, of the Inspector Generals’ evaluative judgcments are expressed in monetary terms: contracting out of Job Corps centers by the Interior Department would save $7.5 million over departmental operation; Veterans Administration hospitals can provide high voltage therapy at one-fourth the cost of purchasing the service; Commerce Department grants under the Emergency Jobs Act cost $334.000 per job created.44 Sometimes considerations other than Federal expenditures per se are considered: “Cafeteria” benefit plans in the private sector may reduce social security benefits to low-wage workers unless the law is changed; HUD’s administration of a mortgage insurance program resulted in benefits to owners at the expense of tenants, contrary to the intent of the legislation.45 For the most part, however, the reports place their greatest emphasis on monetary savings. Many begin with an account of cost recoveries, payment disallowances, rejected expenditures and other moves that save money. Similarly, the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), an umbrella ~~rganization of Inspectors General and Office of Management and Budget officials established in 1981 for ~overnr~~ent-wide coordination of anti-fraud and management improvement efforts, hi&hfi~hts in its reports the savings resulting from IG activity.“” The IGs’ semiannual reports commonly include statements to the effect that the value of the office does not rest on measurable savings alone. and that recommended organizational and procedural improvements are likely to produce more long-term benefit than the dollar figures cited,“’ but it is clear that the monetary criterion is relied on heavily to justify the existence of the office.
CONGRESSlONAt
USE OF THE REPORTS
Although Inspectors General appear regularly as witnesses at congressional oversight hearings, the available evidence (i.e., comments by the IGs and members of Congress) suggests that the semiannual reports receive little attention. Doubtless this is attributable
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1:lWL
in part to qualities of the reports as described above: the masses of detail and paucity of generalized conclusions, and the specialized and sometimes arcane auditing concepts and language. A 1987 Senate report on proposed amendments to the Inspector General Act noted wide variations in format and terminology, such that “it is difficult for Congress to analyze individual agencies and develop an overall picture of the Federal Government’s progress against waste, fraud and mismanagement.“JX During a hearing on management problems in the Federal government one Senator asked, “ . . how do we get some kind of a synopsis, a grading or whatever. periodically. because there is no way that the members of the Senate are going to read the reports.“Jg At one of the many hearings on the HUD debacle, Thomas E. Mann. Director of Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution, urged more informal contact between IG and congressional offices, but said of the reports ” . . . they are long, vague and boring, and they are not likely to get the attention of members of Congress or of congressional staff.“‘* Factors relating to congressional style and perspectives also contribute to the neglect of the reports. For one thing, it is not only the reports that are boring; so is the subject. In the words of Richard Darman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget: [T]he political leadership . tends not to be interested in management. The conspicuous exception to this general observation concerns pinpointing blame for scandals. The political system rewards this behavior. But the carecrb of few political leadcra have been made in developing management systems and improving personnel practices.5’
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that over 4000 reports are required by law to be submitted to Congress by agencies of the Executive Branch,” agency reports are not an important source of information for Congress, It has been noted for years that Congress is more active in enacting reporting requirements than in following up on the results.” A recent study of congressional oversight activities ranked reports from Executive Branch agencies tenth of fourteen oversight techniques in frequency of use. and twelfth in effectiveness, as judged by senior congressional staff.‘4 Interestingly, Senator Glenn. chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, suggested that holding hearings on the reports might be a way of increasing congressional attention.“5 That would be consistent with general congressional practice (oversight hearings ranked third in frequency and fourth in effectiveness among the fourteen techniques) and consistent also with the legal training and cou~rootn backgroLlnds of so many members of Congress. PUBLIC
USE AND
PROBLEMS
OF ACCESS
Students of government and other members of the public who are interested in Federal administrative practice can find useful information in the reports, notwithstanding the less-than-riveting qualities noted above. The reports are probably better suited to the study of particular programs than to general assessment of the quality of administration. In this regard, the summary information in the semiannual reports can be amplified by the full audit reports of the program. Similarly, audits of local participants in Federal programs (such as housing authorities. transit authorities, and school districts) can provide insights into administ~~ti~~n at the iocal level. The semiannual reports include lists of the separate audit reports issued during the reporting period. A serious impediment, however, to any public use of inf~~rmation generated by the Inspectors General is inadequate dissemination. The law provides that the reports are to be
fncpector General Reports ai instruments
of Governmental
61
Accouniabihty
available to the public, but it does not mandate distributi~)n. Roughly half the semiannual reports of half the agencies have been distributed via the depository library program of the Government Printing Office (GPO). The others are presumably available from the agencies on request as are, presumably, the individual program audits, but that is, of course, more cumbersome than library access.” Reports of none of the agencies brought under the Inspector General Act since 1981 have been distributed to depository libraries. For agencies previously subject to the Act, the percentage of reports made available to depositories ranges from zero to around eighty.‘7 Many of the reports were sent to depository libraries in microfiche and there has ’ been a notable falling off of those receipts in recent years, a deficiency that is probably connected to the GPO’s wider difficulties with microfiche production. Table I summarizes distribution of the semiannual reports to depository libraries.
CONCLUSION Inspector General reports are a window of sorts onto Federal administrative practice. although the view is clouded and somewhat difficult to interpret. Neither individually nor collectively are the reports suitable instruments for assessing the quality of administration, Table 1.
Distribution
of Semiannual Reports
to Depository
Libraries Percentage
Yr. Subject
Agency
to /G Act
Agriculture AID ACDA Commerce Community Defense Education Energy EPA FEMA
Serv.
GSA
HHS HUD Interior Justice Labor NASA NRC OPM RR Retirement Smaii Bus. Adm. State Treasury USIA Veterans
Adm.
1978 1981 1987 1978 1978 1981 1980 1917 1978 1988 1978 1976 1978 1978 1988 1978 1978 1988 1988 1983 1978 1985 1988 1986 1978
of Reports Distributed
to Depository
0
l-49%
Libraries 50-80%
x X
x X X X
x x X X
x x x X
x x X X X X
x X
x x x
62
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INFORMATiON
QUARTERLY
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111992
in a single agency or in the government as a whole. On the other hand, the semiannual reports, as well as the individual audits they identify, convey a mass of factual information concerning specific Federal programs which is unlikely to be accessible to the public in any other source. Accordingly, the reports have greater potential use as a source of data for further investigation and analysis than as a coherent, readily comprehensible view of government operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported in part by a Librarian Study Leave under the New York State/United University Professions Professional Development and Quality of Working Life program. The author wishes to thank Erminio D’Onofrio of the New York Public Library and Henry Ilnicki of the New York State Library for assistance in locating materials.
NOTES 1. Congress. Senate. Committee HUD, 7 _.
Hearings
on Banking,
Vd. 2 (Washington.
I,. H. Fountain. Journal,
AND
“What
28 (Spring
3 David A. Clary.
Congress
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Grnwr1ccwrrr AlYwllill~llll.\
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Y-584.
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irk
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6. Congress.
Senate. Committee
GeneraI
m Certuin
pp. 5-6.
(Hereaftercited
7. Congress.
Senate.
General-H.
Erecutiw
on Governmental
Affairs.
Drpwfmenfs
Apw&.\
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~.stsicrhli.slit,lettt oj’Qffk~.s~~~~~~.s~~~,~,t~~~ tr~tlAt~~~;t~)r 95th Gong . 7d sess.. 197X. S. Rept. 9%1071.
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p. 11;s.
c$Inrpet.tw
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on Government
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p 7.
p, I.
p. 9.
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Nw
York Tirrws (January
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Otwsi~qhr
r!f’ Qfiws
19x1). p. 54.
,$ J~r.yw(.~(>r &rlenit,
inspector
General
Reports
21. General Accounting
23. 24.
25.
26. 27. 28.
29. 30. 31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36. 31. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.
43. 44. 45. 46.
Office.
Use
of Governmentai
Control
qf Investigntive
Weaknesses. AFMD-84-38
Information
Accou~~~b;~;ty
by Inspectors
63
Gmcrul
to Iden@
and Report
(February 24, 1984). Dan W. Reicher. ‘Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads.” Sranford Law Review, 35 (1983): 975-1005. Frederick M. Kaiser in The Abuse and Misrn~zno~~rnellt qf HUD, vol. 2, p. 562. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on General Services, Federalism and the District of Columbia. ~~ve~ti~uti~e Report; The Inspector Gcnrrul System (Washington. DC: The Committee. July 1990): Senator Jim Sasser. quoted in Martin Tolchin, “Senators Accuse Inspectors of ‘Pattern of Wrongdoing’,” New York Times (September 3, 1990). p. 26. Testimony of Sherman M. Funk in Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Serious Munugement Problems in the U.S. Government. Hearings. IOlst Cone.. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990). p. 55. P.L. 95-452, October 12, 1978, sec. 5(a). P.L. 100-504. October 18. 1988, par. t06. For example: Dep~n~ent of Health, Education and Welfare. Office of Inspector General. ~~~~iun~~u~ Report, Ocrober I. f~~#--~or~lz 31. IPKS, pp. 10-14; Department of the Interior. Office of Inspector General. Semionrwnl Report, April l-September 30. iYH2, p. 22. (Alf semiannual reports of Inspectors General hereafter cited by agency, IG. and date: e.g., Department of Interior IG. April I-Sept. 30. 1982.) For example. Department of Commerce IG. April l-Sept. 30, 1983, p. 1 I. For example. Department of State IG, 1989-. Examples: Department of Housing and Urban Development fG, April I-Sept. 30, 1979, p. 67; Department of Transportation lG. April [-Sept. 30, 1986. p. 7: Environmental Protection Agency fG, Oct. I, t988March 31. t989. p. 18. Examples: Review of food stamp program in Department of Agriculture IC, April I-Sept. 30. 1990: Review of results of Job Training Partnership Act in Department of Labor IG, April ISept. 30, 1988. pp. I&21. Department of Housing and Urban Development IG. 1979-1984. passim; Department of Education IG, Oct. I. l989-March 31. 1990, Transmittal letter; Department of State IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1989, p. I; October I. 1989-March 31. 1990. p. 1. Based on a rough categorization of statements in the reports referring to conditions contributing to fraud, inefficiency. or ineffectiveness. Because of great variability in the style and organization of the reports, between one agency and another and also within the same agency at different times. greater precision in cha~dcterizin~ the content ofthe reports was not possible. Examples: Environm~ntai Protection Agency IG. April I-Sept. 30. 1984. p. 8: Dept. of Commerce IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1979. p. 63: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1980. pp. vi. 6: Dept. of Labor IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1981. p. 45, Dept. of Housing and Urban Development IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1985. pp. 27-28. Dept. of Commerce fG. Oct. 1. 1980-March 31, 1981. p. 94. Dept. of LaborlG. April I-Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27. Gerald R. Riso and William L. Kendig. “Strengthening Federal Management Controls with Less Effort.” Public Admmistrcrtion Review. 46 (September/October 1986): 442. For example. Dept. of LaborlG. Oct. I, 1983-March 31. 1984. pp. 29-30: April I-Sept. 30, 1988. p. 15. National Aeronautics and Space Administration~~, April I-Sept. 30. 1990. introductions Dept. of Education IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1990, p. 3. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Qztestiowble Decisions t>x Program Managers C/ndermine the Federrrl Goverwmwt’s Audit Prows. 98th Cone., 2d sess., 1984, H. Rept. 98-l 106, pp. 9-11. Seriolts Mwqement Problems iI1 the U.S. Go~‘ernment, p, 5.5. Dept. of Interior IG. April I-Sept. 30, 1982, p. 22: Veterans Admimstration fG. April I-Sept. 30, 1980. p. 9; Dept. of Commerce lG. Oct. 1, 1984March 31. 1985. transmittal letter. Dept. of Health and Human Services IG, Oct. I. l987-March 31.1988, p. 18: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development lG, Oct. I. 19S~March 31. 1981. p. 17. President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. A Progress Reporr to the President: &j’orts to Prevent ) Fraud, Wosre and MOmunagement (Washington. DC: The Council, semiannual. annual. 198 Ipassim. Internal
22.
as instruments
64
COVEKNMENT
47.
Forexample.
48.
Congress. Senate.
Dept. ofTransportation
5I
Senator Wdliam Roth in Serious &rims
Murq+vnent to BeMade
54. Joel Aherbach. Brooking\ 55. Serious
Problernr
l/1992
31, 19X2. p. 8. 100th
56.
vol. 2, p. 52 I.
in the U.S. Gmvrwnent, Cort,municrrtion,tr~)m
IOlstCong..
GeneralAccounting Requirements.
19X1-March
MmtrpmerztProhlernsin thr U.S.Gowrrmrt~t.p. ofHUll.
to Cortgrrss:
crListofRrport.s. 53.
I,
Vol. ~/NO.
Senate Rept. 100-150, p. 24.
50. The Abuse rrnd Mismumgetnent 52. Reporrs
Oct.
QUARTERLY
Committee on Governmental Affairs. /n.sp~ror Genrr-crl ActA~wndrtwr~t.v o/‘/987.
Gong., 1st Sess. (1987). 49.
K,
INFORMATION
p. 288. th~~C/er-k. U.S. HOIUP ~?~Rc,l~r~,.~~,~~tf~t~~~,.\ 7‘rcrmmittirq
IstSess. (19X9), H. Dot.
10-17.
Office. A Systmtrtic~ Mnrzctgrmc~~~tApprotrc~/~ I.\ Nadecl
/br ConRrf.s.siorrtr/
Reporttrt,q
PAD 82-12 (November 25, 1981). KwpinX
(I Watchfit/
Eye:
Thr
Politic,.\ of (‘o,rKre.\.\roritr/ Ovrr.siRht
(Washington.
DC:
Institution. 1990). pp. 132-135.
Manu,qwwr~t Prohlwu
56. Awwric~trn Stcrtisttcv Indu
in the I/X.
(Washington.
Gor~c~rmnrnt. p. X0. DC: Congressional
Information
Service.
197%
)
lists all the
semiannual reports and sells microfiche copies. Some large hbraries have blanket subscriptions to the documents listed m the index. 57.
Based on the receipta recorded by one regional depository and two selective depositories.
Thelma
Freides*
Inspectors General in a11 major Federal agencies report semiannually to Congress on the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of program management in their agencies. The reporting mechanism is intended to serve as an instrument of governmental accountability to Congress and the public, but there is evidence that it fails short of that goai. The study examines the semiannuaf reports from the perspective of their usefulness in conveying info~ation about the character and quality of administration in Federal agencies, Negative factors are unclear definition of the role and responsibilities of Inspectors General, proliferation of detail and paucity of generalization in the reports, and inadequate public distribution. Nonetheless, the reports contain large quantities of significant information unavailable from any other public source.
In 1989 “HUD Scandals” made the headlines, with revelations of influence peddling, political favoritism and profiteering in Federal housing programs. When press reports of misbehavior triggered outraged congressional investigations, the Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development testified before a congressional committee that questionable practices in HUD were no surprise; that he had been reporting them for years to the top officials of the agency and to Congress in the semiannual reports required under the Inspector General Act. ’ The affair recalls the scandal of a Quaker-centu~ earlier which gave rise to the office of Inspector General in Federal agencies. In the early 196Os, Billie Sol Estes was revealed to have committed extensive fraud in the cotton allotments program of the Department of Agriculture. As in the HUD case, the illegal behavior had been known for years within the department, but action was taken only when press reports stimulated criminal investigation and congressional interest. Failure to act earlier was attributed to fragmentation of responsibility and lack of communication, such that no office or official was aware of all
“Direct ull corwspmdence York at Purchase,
to: Thelma Freides, Head ofReuders Services, Library, Hill Roud. Purchase, New York 10577-1400.
735 Anderson
Government information Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 1, pages 53-64. Copyright &c1992 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of repr~uction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0740-624X.
State Universip
of New
GOVERNMENT
54
INFORMATION
QUARTERLY
Vol. Y/No. 111YY2
aspects of the case or centrally concerned with monitoring the department’s programs for indications of fraud and waste.’ In the wake of the Estes case, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed an Inspector General to centralize monitoring activity. In the years since then Inspectors General have been installed in nearly all Federal agencies, with provision for regular reporting to Congress on administrative integrity and effectiveness within the agency. Yet it appears that the reports, duly submitted for years, failed for years to arouse alarm, or even interest, concerning the HUD operations. Questions suggested by this history are: Do the reports of Inspectors General really serve, as intended, to assess the quality of administration in Federal agencies’? Arc they instruments of governmental accountability for Congress and the public? The present study considers these questions by examining the history of Inspector General legislation. the information conveyed by the semiannual reports to Congress, and the distribution of the reports through the depository library program. DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
INSPECTOR
FEDERAL
GENERAL
CONCEPT
IN
AGENCIES
The office of Inspector General (IG) has a long history in the military. where the main concern of the IG was assessment of the training and readiness of the armed forces! In civilian agencies the main function is auditing of departmental expenditures to determine that funds are spent in the manner and for the purposes set down by law. The first such office was established. as noted, by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1962. followed by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in 1972.J A critical weakness of these arrangements was the IGs’ total dependence on the departmental administration, as became evident when Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz eliminated the office in 1974.’ At around the same time, congressional concern mounted over evidence of lax administration and uncontrolled waste in rapidly expanding Federal programs. Committee hearings revealed that auditors in Federal agencies commonly worked under the direct supervision of the officials whose work they were expected to scrutinize, and that auditing staffs were so meager that case backlogs ran to ten and twenty years.” Senator Thomas Eagleton. chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency charged that “fraud and waste in federally funded programs have reached epidemic proportions,” and “everything the Federal Government is involved in is a license to steal .“’ Congress’ response was to create Officers of Inspector General by statute. thus assuring that agency heads could not abolish the position or alter its scope. The first such offices were set up in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Energy, in 1976 and 1977. respectively. The Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452) extended the program to twelve additional major agencies and set down the basic pattern of operation and reporting that continues to govern IG functions.x Under the Inspector General Act, the inspectors General are appointed by the President and removable only by the President, who must communicate the reason for the removal to Congress. Appointments are to be based solely on professional qualifications. without regard to political affiliation. Within the agencies, the IGs report only to the agency head. who is barred by the law from prohibiting or interfering with any IG investigation. The
fnspector Genera/ Reports as ~r?strumenrs of Covernmentai
Accoun~~bi/;[y
55
IGs are to report their findings and recommendations semiannually to the agency heads who must then transmit the reports, with comments but without alteration, to Congress. In cases of “pa~icuiar~y serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies” the IGs are to report immediately to the agency head, who must transmit the report, with or without comment, to the appropriate congressional committee within seven days.” The IGs were thus made largely, though not entirely, independent of departmental control and provided with direct lines of communication to the Congress. The 1978 act established Offices of Inspector General in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and Transportation, and in the Community Services Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Veterans Administration. Coverage was extended to the Department of Education in 1979, the Agency for International Development in 198 1, the Department of Defense in 1982, the Railroad Retirement Board in 1983, the Department of State in 1985, the U.S. Information Agency in 1986, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1987. lo The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 added the Departments of Justice and Treasury. thus completing the coverage of cabinetlevel agencies, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ’ ’
THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL
The Inspectors General are charged under the taw to conduct audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to recommend policies for the purpose of promoting economy and efficiency and detecting fraud: to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make recommendations concerning the impact of such legislation and regulations on economy and efficiency, and the detection of fraud and abuse; to report violations of law to the Attorney General; and to submit semiannua1 reports to the agency head and to Congress. For many people, the key functions are program auditing and recommendation of policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. It is viewed as far more desirable to prevent fraud and waste by means of sound management structures and vigorous controls than to uncover derelictions after they have occurred. At the same time, this broad view of the audit function, which considers not only whether expenditures are legal, but also whether the money spent achieves its purpose or might be better used in other ways, raises the possibility of conflict with program administrators, who may view the Inspector General’s activities as a burdensome interference, elevating accounting technicalities over program accomplishments. In general, the broader view tends to be that of the IGs themselves, the General Accounting Office, and many members of Congress. Agency officials and the Office of Management and Budget tend generally toward a more restrictive outlook, focusing on fraud detection and minimizing the inspector General’s involvement with program assessment. This ambiguity in the conception of the office is evident throughout the history of Inspector General legislation. In Senate testimony prior to passage of the 1978 Act, the Comptroller General of the United States argued strongly for a broad conception of the office and a name to reflect its range;
1 cannot stress too strongly
that what the subcommittee dots on this matter is
going to have far-reaching consequences in the years to come. “Office
of Inspector General,”
you are going to find that
increasingly be centered on investigations
If you call them future operations will
for the purpose ot’detectinp fraud.
believe it would be far better to use the bulk of these organizations’ mana~e~lent in implementing
We
efforts to assist
strong internal controls which will prevent funds from
being misused in the first place. ”
Responding to this, the Senate committee named the office “Auditor and Inspector General,” but a floor amendment reverted to the House-passed title, “Inspector General.” While the legislative history does not pinpoint the reason. it does provide evidence ot efforts by the Executive Branch to narrow the IGs’ mandate. The Office of Management and Budget objected to including “promoting economy and efficiency” among the IGs’ assigned responsibilities, and opposed any language suggesting that IGs were to have authority to review program results.” Adnliilistration support for the bill was gained only after prolonged negotiations resulting in agreement by congressional sponsors to amendments they viewed as weakening. ” All of the agencies in which statutory IGs have been appointed opposed the action (some thought it a good idea in general, but not for them), frequently citing the dangers of policy interference. ” Treasury officials argued, for example, that an IG could impede sensitive economic policy deliberations, and the Defense Department feared dilution of the President’s control over the armed services.‘” Such concerns were dismissed as exaggerated and even ~~~hildlike” by members ot Congress who saw the IGs as needed allies in their efforts to monitor and control the Federal bureaucracy. I7 The following exchange between Senator John Glenn and Richard Kusserow, Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, is illustrative of the view of the Inspector General as an active policy maker. Senator Glenn: Are IGs involved in whether agencies arc carrying out the intent 01 Congress in executing certain laws where dollars are not involved? Mr. Kusserow: Yes, that’s a major portion
of our responsibilil~cs.
and that goes into an
area where we are not talking about economy and efficiency any more: WC are talking about effectiveness. Senator Glenn: Do you watch and see what activities might be beyond the normal jurisdiction of an agency, and toot the whistle on that also? Mr. Kusserow: Yes
that’s mandated for us
to ensure that the department is
not wasting their dollars and does not engage in abusive practices. Is
Perhaps in recognition of these aspects of the job. President Ronald Reagan dismissed all the incumbent Inspectors General on the day he took office in order to appoint what his press secretary termed “a Reagan team.““’ The action drew strong criticism in Congress and the press, and administration officials later acknowledged that they had not properly recognized the non-partisan character of the office,“’ but the incident demonstrates nonetheless the political relevance and sensitivity of “fraud. waste and abuse.” There is also evidence, however, that independent scrutiny of agency administrations by the Inspectors General is less stringent than either the Inspectors’ own characterizations or the apprehensions of agency officials might suggest. The General Accounting Office reported in 1984 that Inspectors General c~)ncentrated for the most part on “dctcctinp.
inspector
General
Reports a5 instruments
ot Governmental
Accountabflity
57
rather than preventing, fraud and abuse,” and urged attention to “fraud prevention strategies” emphasizing “before-the-fact advice on the best way to attain stronger, less vulnerable systems and controls.2’ A scholarly analysis of the office concluded that the Inspectors’ location within the agencies requires them to maintain the confidence and support of the top agency administrator, leading almost inevitably to conflicts of interest.‘2 The IG Act’s provision for reporting flagrant deficiencies to Congress within seven days has rarely been used, probably because of “unwillingness of 1Gs to use a power that might be expected to jeopardize their relationship with upper management at an agency.‘j A recent Senate staff investigation reported that IGs habitually shield agency management from whistleblowers. prompting one Senator to remark that the watchdogs are really lapdogs.” One Inspector General characterizes the situation as “straddling the barbed-wire fence. The Hill is worried about the IG’s being coopted by management, and management is worried about our being a conduit to the Hill. We are stuck right in the middle.“” This ambiguity of the Inspector General’s role is reflected in the information presented in the semiannual reports.
CONTENT
OF THE REPORTS
As prescribed by the Inspector General Act of 1978, the semiannual reports are to include: a description of significant problems and deficiencies relating to the operation of agency programs, and recommendations for corrective action made by the IG; identification of previous recommendations on which corrective action has not been completed; a summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions resulting; and a listing of each audit report issued during the reporting period.‘6 The 1988 amendments added requirements for statistical tables showing the dollar value of questioned and unsupported costs and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use: reporting of management actions with which the Inspector General disagrees; and separate reports by agency heads of action taken in response to IG recommendations and the results achieved.‘7 For this study, examination of the reports focused on issues of agency management; that is, conditions within agencies reported as contributing to fraud. waste, or ineffectiveness. Reports of inadequacies, rule violations or simple criminality on the part of outsiders-i.e., contractors or grant recipients-were not considered unless the shortcomings were attributed in some way to the behavior of the Federal agency. The reports vary in their attention to underlying management issues. possibly reflecting differences in outlook among the Inspectors General. Some seem to regard program goals and procedures as given, and mainly report infractions of rules by field offices, local government agencies. contractors, and grant recipients, with emphasis on costs disallowed or required to be reimbursed. Others relate the errors and infractions to broader organizational defects and discuss needed changes in administrative procedures, but still without comment on basic program aims or methods. Less frequently, the reports call for significant changes in program structure or rules (e.g.. restricting participant eligibility to reduce costs, or contracting out an activity to the private sector),‘x or recommend major alteration or elimination of programs jndged to be unproductive or inherently unworkable.” The summaries of major audits, which are the chief source of administrative information in the reports, are characterized by masses of detail from which a coherent picture does
58
GOVERNMENT
lNF~RMATl~)N
QUARTERLY
Vol.
9/N<>. 111992
not readily emerge. Recognizing the impediment to communication this represents, a number of the IGs have added features designed to summarize findings and highlight the most significant issues. Some reports begin with an introductory summary of major findings.3” Others contain accounts of special multiple-program reviews, variously termed Management Advisory Services, Service Delivery Assessments, Inspections, and similar designations, which are designed to highlight key management issues transcending individual audits and programs.” These more general reviews may be triggered by the repeated appearance in audits of a particular error or deficiency, signaling the existence of an underlying problem. Occasionally a report will include a comprehensive evaluation of a major agency program selected for its particular interest at that time to Congress or agency management.“” Whether or not they are pointed out for special attention, certain failings are noted so regularly and repetitively in particular agencies’ reports that the presence of a pervasive problem becomes obvious. To cite just a few examples, Office of Education reports are filled, year after year, with instances of irregularities in institutions participating in student loan programs; the HUD Inspector General reports endless examples of inadequate monitoring of local housing agencies and other participants in Federal housing programs; the Department of State IG regularly reports inadequate security measures at overseas embassies.‘3 The types of administrative deficiencies most commonly identified are lax monitoring and rule enforcement, deficiencies in planning or evaluation, poor records and weak internal controls, and inactivity in the form of failure to recognize problems or respond to signs of trouble. Less frequently cited are direct violations of program standards, failure to report or communicate as needed, defects in the statutory base, or insufficient resources allocated for the task, and poor training and utilization of personnel.“4 The reports sometimes mention the agency response to major audit findings. Instances of substantive disagreement between the Inspectors General and agency management on matters of administrative style, program goals. and the interpretation of congressional intent are not uncommon. For example, several agencies urged by their IGs to exercise tighter control over local units pa~icipatin~ in Federal programs responded that they preferred to rely on persuasion rather than coercion. or that national intervention at the local level would be contrary to the intent of the program legislation.3” When the HUD IG noted that grants under the Jobs Bill had no measurable effect on longterm unemployment, the department responded that the program’s main purpose was to assist the depressed construction industry, with employment consequences, if any, a secondary side effect.“6 Similarly, a finding by the Department of the Interior IG that grants of $5 million to fisheries programs in sixteen states had produced no increase in commercial yields brought the response that the grants had aims other than immediate harvest increases.” The Department of Labor responded to a highly critical evaluation of enforcement of equal employment oppo~unity regulations by its Office of Federal Contract compliance with the assertion that the report was based on “fundamental misunderst~~ndings” regarding the purpose of the Office, and that the IG’s recommendations “seek to preempt the exclusive policy making mandate of the Secretary.““’ Given the generality of much legislative language, the oft-noted congressional tendency to blur legislative aims in the interests of political compromise, and the shifts in program focus and emphasis brought about by successive reauthorizations and fluctuating funding levels, disagreements such as these are probably inevitable. They underscore once again
inspector General Reports ai instruments
of G~ver~mefft~/ Accou~tabj~jty
59
the problematic. though potitically interesting, nature of “fraud, waste and abuse,” and the ambiguous role of the Inspector General. Disagreements between IGs and agency managers can also derive from the distinctive practices, standards, and vocabulary of the auditing profession. Program managers may regard auditors as more devoted to administrative process than to results. “If the paper available would not allow (auditors) to reconstruct what happened during the process they Auditors, on the other hand, may argue that recommend additional documentation.““’ claimed program results are distorted or meaningless in the absence of adequate documentation. 4o Criticism of agency actions on the ground that grantees’ or contractors’ claims were accepted without supporting documentation is frequent in the reports, in circumstances such as acceptance by NASA of inadequately documented equipment test results, or Department of Education approval of unsupported student eligibility claims.“’ The House Committee on Government Operations reported in 1984 that agency managers were seeking to recover only thirty to forty percent of costs questioned by auditors, and prominent among the reasons was the managers’ readiness to accept documentationjudged inadequate by IG standards.42 Of the problem of auditors’ language, one Inspector General observed, “If an auditor says that internal controls are weak, that is very meaningful to an auditor. But if a manager picks up a report and it says ‘internal controls are weak’ his eyes glaze over .“47 Many, though not all, of the Inspector Generals’ evaluative judgcments are expressed in monetary terms: contracting out of Job Corps centers by the Interior Department would save $7.5 million over departmental operation; Veterans Administration hospitals can provide high voltage therapy at one-fourth the cost of purchasing the service; Commerce Department grants under the Emergency Jobs Act cost $334.000 per job created.44 Sometimes considerations other than Federal expenditures per se are considered: “Cafeteria” benefit plans in the private sector may reduce social security benefits to low-wage workers unless the law is changed; HUD’s administration of a mortgage insurance program resulted in benefits to owners at the expense of tenants, contrary to the intent of the legislation.45 For the most part, however, the reports place their greatest emphasis on monetary savings. Many begin with an account of cost recoveries, payment disallowances, rejected expenditures and other moves that save money. Similarly, the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), an umbrella ~~rganization of Inspectors General and Office of Management and Budget officials established in 1981 for ~overnr~~ent-wide coordination of anti-fraud and management improvement efforts, hi&hfi~hts in its reports the savings resulting from IG activity.“” The IGs’ semiannual reports commonly include statements to the effect that the value of the office does not rest on measurable savings alone. and that recommended organizational and procedural improvements are likely to produce more long-term benefit than the dollar figures cited,“’ but it is clear that the monetary criterion is relied on heavily to justify the existence of the office.
CONGRESSlONAt
USE OF THE REPORTS
Although Inspectors General appear regularly as witnesses at congressional oversight hearings, the available evidence (i.e., comments by the IGs and members of Congress) suggests that the semiannual reports receive little attention. Doubtless this is attributable
G~~ER~ME~~T
60
INft~RM~TiO~
QUARTERLY
Vol. 9!No.
1:lWL
in part to qualities of the reports as described above: the masses of detail and paucity of generalized conclusions, and the specialized and sometimes arcane auditing concepts and language. A 1987 Senate report on proposed amendments to the Inspector General Act noted wide variations in format and terminology, such that “it is difficult for Congress to analyze individual agencies and develop an overall picture of the Federal Government’s progress against waste, fraud and mismanagement.“JX During a hearing on management problems in the Federal government one Senator asked, “ . . how do we get some kind of a synopsis, a grading or whatever. periodically. because there is no way that the members of the Senate are going to read the reports.“Jg At one of the many hearings on the HUD debacle, Thomas E. Mann. Director of Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution, urged more informal contact between IG and congressional offices, but said of the reports ” . . . they are long, vague and boring, and they are not likely to get the attention of members of Congress or of congressional staff.“‘* Factors relating to congressional style and perspectives also contribute to the neglect of the reports. For one thing, it is not only the reports that are boring; so is the subject. In the words of Richard Darman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget: [T]he political leadership . tends not to be interested in management. The conspicuous exception to this general observation concerns pinpointing blame for scandals. The political system rewards this behavior. But the carecrb of few political leadcra have been made in developing management systems and improving personnel practices.5’
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that over 4000 reports are required by law to be submitted to Congress by agencies of the Executive Branch,” agency reports are not an important source of information for Congress, It has been noted for years that Congress is more active in enacting reporting requirements than in following up on the results.” A recent study of congressional oversight activities ranked reports from Executive Branch agencies tenth of fourteen oversight techniques in frequency of use. and twelfth in effectiveness, as judged by senior congressional staff.‘4 Interestingly, Senator Glenn. chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, suggested that holding hearings on the reports might be a way of increasing congressional attention.“5 That would be consistent with general congressional practice (oversight hearings ranked third in frequency and fourth in effectiveness among the fourteen techniques) and consistent also with the legal training and cou~rootn backgroLlnds of so many members of Congress. PUBLIC
USE AND
PROBLEMS
OF ACCESS
Students of government and other members of the public who are interested in Federal administrative practice can find useful information in the reports, notwithstanding the less-than-riveting qualities noted above. The reports are probably better suited to the study of particular programs than to general assessment of the quality of administration. In this regard, the summary information in the semiannual reports can be amplified by the full audit reports of the program. Similarly, audits of local participants in Federal programs (such as housing authorities. transit authorities, and school districts) can provide insights into administ~~ti~~n at the iocal level. The semiannual reports include lists of the separate audit reports issued during the reporting period. A serious impediment, however, to any public use of inf~~rmation generated by the Inspectors General is inadequate dissemination. The law provides that the reports are to be
fncpector General Reports ai instruments
of Governmental
61
Accouniabihty
available to the public, but it does not mandate distributi~)n. Roughly half the semiannual reports of half the agencies have been distributed via the depository library program of the Government Printing Office (GPO). The others are presumably available from the agencies on request as are, presumably, the individual program audits, but that is, of course, more cumbersome than library access.” Reports of none of the agencies brought under the Inspector General Act since 1981 have been distributed to depository libraries. For agencies previously subject to the Act, the percentage of reports made available to depositories ranges from zero to around eighty.‘7 Many of the reports were sent to depository libraries in microfiche and there has ’ been a notable falling off of those receipts in recent years, a deficiency that is probably connected to the GPO’s wider difficulties with microfiche production. Table I summarizes distribution of the semiannual reports to depository libraries.
CONCLUSION Inspector General reports are a window of sorts onto Federal administrative practice. although the view is clouded and somewhat difficult to interpret. Neither individually nor collectively are the reports suitable instruments for assessing the quality of administration, Table 1.
Distribution
of Semiannual Reports
to Depository
Libraries Percentage
Yr. Subject
Agency
to /G Act
Agriculture AID ACDA Commerce Community Defense Education Energy EPA FEMA
Serv.
GSA
HHS HUD Interior Justice Labor NASA NRC OPM RR Retirement Smaii Bus. Adm. State Treasury USIA Veterans
Adm.
1978 1981 1987 1978 1978 1981 1980 1917 1978 1988 1978 1976 1978 1978 1988 1978 1978 1988 1988 1983 1978 1985 1988 1986 1978
of Reports Distributed
to Depository
0
l-49%
Libraries 50-80%
x X
x X X X
x x X X
x x x X
x x X X X X
x X
x x x
62
GOVERNMENT
INFORMATiON
QUARTERLY
Vol.
g/No.
111992
in a single agency or in the government as a whole. On the other hand, the semiannual reports, as well as the individual audits they identify, convey a mass of factual information concerning specific Federal programs which is unlikely to be accessible to the public in any other source. Accordingly, the reports have greater potential use as a source of data for further investigation and analysis than as a coherent, readily comprehensible view of government operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported in part by a Librarian Study Leave under the New York State/United University Professions Professional Development and Quality of Working Life program. The author wishes to thank Erminio D’Onofrio of the New York Public Library and Henry Ilnicki of the New York State Library for assistance in locating materials.
NOTES 1. Congress. Senate. Committee HUD, 7 _.
Hearings
on Banking,
Vd. 2 (Washington.
I,. H. Fountain. Journal,
AND
“What
28 (Spring
3 David A. Clary.
Congress
REFERENCES
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Drpwfmenfs
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1st \ess..
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1981. H. Rcpt. 97.40,
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p 7.
p, I.
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“Reagan Moves Fast to Swear in Staff and Drop Holdovers.”
Nw
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r!f’ Qfiws
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,$ J~r.yw(.~(>r &rlenit,
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23. 24.
25.
26. 27. 28.
29. 30. 31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36. 31. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.
43. 44. 45. 46.
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Use
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qf Investigntive
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Information
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63
Gmcrul
to Iden@
and Report
(February 24, 1984). Dan W. Reicher. ‘Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads.” Sranford Law Review, 35 (1983): 975-1005. Frederick M. Kaiser in The Abuse and Misrn~zno~~rnellt qf HUD, vol. 2, p. 562. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on General Services, Federalism and the District of Columbia. ~~ve~ti~uti~e Report; The Inspector Gcnrrul System (Washington. DC: The Committee. July 1990): Senator Jim Sasser. quoted in Martin Tolchin, “Senators Accuse Inspectors of ‘Pattern of Wrongdoing’,” New York Times (September 3, 1990). p. 26. Testimony of Sherman M. Funk in Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Serious Munugement Problems in the U.S. Government. Hearings. IOlst Cone.. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990). p. 55. P.L. 95-452, October 12, 1978, sec. 5(a). P.L. 100-504. October 18. 1988, par. t06. For example: Dep~n~ent of Health, Education and Welfare. Office of Inspector General. ~~~~iun~~u~ Report, Ocrober I. f~~#--~or~lz 31. IPKS, pp. 10-14; Department of the Interior. Office of Inspector General. Semionrwnl Report, April l-September 30. iYH2, p. 22. (Alf semiannual reports of Inspectors General hereafter cited by agency, IG. and date: e.g., Department of Interior IG. April I-Sept. 30. 1982.) For example. Department of Commerce IG. April l-Sept. 30, 1983, p. 1 I. For example. Department of State IG, 1989-. Examples: Department of Housing and Urban Development fG, April I-Sept. 30, 1979, p. 67; Department of Transportation lG. April [-Sept. 30, 1986. p. 7: Environmental Protection Agency fG, Oct. I, t988March 31. t989. p. 18. Examples: Review of food stamp program in Department of Agriculture IC, April I-Sept. 30. 1990: Review of results of Job Training Partnership Act in Department of Labor IG, April ISept. 30, 1988. pp. I&21. Department of Housing and Urban Development IG. 1979-1984. passim; Department of Education IG, Oct. I. l989-March 31. 1990, Transmittal letter; Department of State IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1989, p. I; October I. 1989-March 31. 1990. p. 1. Based on a rough categorization of statements in the reports referring to conditions contributing to fraud, inefficiency. or ineffectiveness. Because of great variability in the style and organization of the reports, between one agency and another and also within the same agency at different times. greater precision in cha~dcterizin~ the content ofthe reports was not possible. Examples: Environm~ntai Protection Agency IG. April I-Sept. 30. 1984. p. 8: Dept. of Commerce IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1979. p. 63: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1980. pp. vi. 6: Dept. of Labor IG, April I-Sept. 30. 1981. p. 45, Dept. of Housing and Urban Development IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1985. pp. 27-28. Dept. of Commerce fG. Oct. 1. 1980-March 31, 1981. p. 94. Dept. of LaborlG. April I-Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27. Gerald R. Riso and William L. Kendig. “Strengthening Federal Management Controls with Less Effort.” Public Admmistrcrtion Review. 46 (September/October 1986): 442. For example. Dept. of LaborlG. Oct. I, 1983-March 31. 1984. pp. 29-30: April I-Sept. 30, 1988. p. 15. National Aeronautics and Space Administration~~, April I-Sept. 30. 1990. introductions Dept. of Education IG, April I-Sept. 30, 1990, p. 3. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Qztestiowble Decisions t>x Program Managers C/ndermine the Federrrl Goverwmwt’s Audit Prows. 98th Cone., 2d sess., 1984, H. Rept. 98-l 106, pp. 9-11. Seriolts Mwqement Problems iI1 the U.S. Go~‘ernment, p, 5.5. Dept. of Interior IG. April I-Sept. 30, 1982, p. 22: Veterans Admimstration fG. April I-Sept. 30, 1980. p. 9; Dept. of Commerce lG. Oct. 1, 1984March 31. 1985. transmittal letter. Dept. of Health and Human Services IG, Oct. I. l987-March 31.1988, p. 18: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development lG, Oct. I. 19S~March 31. 1981. p. 17. President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. A Progress Reporr to the President: &j’orts to Prevent ) Fraud, Wosre and MOmunagement (Washington. DC: The Council, semiannual. annual. 198 Ipassim. Internal
22.
as instruments
64
COVEKNMENT
47.
Forexample.
48.
Congress. Senate.
Dept. ofTransportation
5I
Senator Wdliam Roth in Serious &rims
Murq+vnent to BeMade
54. Joel Aherbach. Brooking\ 55. Serious
Problernr
l/1992
31, 19X2. p. 8. 100th
56.
vol. 2, p. 52 I.
in the U.S. Gmvrwnent, Cort,municrrtion,tr~)m
IOlstCong..
GeneralAccounting Requirements.
19X1-March
MmtrpmerztProhlernsin thr U.S.Gowrrmrt~t.p. ofHUll.
to Cortgrrss:
crListofRrport.s. 53.
I,
Vol. ~/NO.
Senate Rept. 100-150, p. 24.
50. The Abuse rrnd Mismumgetnent 52. Reporrs
Oct.
QUARTERLY
Committee on Governmental Affairs. /n.sp~ror Genrr-crl ActA~wndrtwr~t.v o/‘/987.
Gong., 1st Sess. (1987). 49.
K,
INFORMATION
p. 288. th~~C/er-k. U.S. HOIUP ~?~Rc,l~r~,.~~,~~tf~t~~~,.\ 7‘rcrmmittirq
IstSess. (19X9), H. Dot.
10-17.
Office. A Systmtrtic~ Mnrzctgrmc~~~tApprotrc~/~ I.\ Nadecl
/br ConRrf.s.siorrtr/
Reporttrt,q
PAD 82-12 (November 25, 1981). KwpinX
(I Watchfit/
Eye:
Thr
Politic,.\ of (‘o,rKre.\.\roritr/ Ovrr.siRht
(Washington.
DC:
Institution. 1990). pp. 132-135.
Manu,qwwr~t Prohlwu
56. Awwric~trn Stcrtisttcv Indu
in the I/X.
(Washington.
Gor~c~rmnrnt. p. X0. DC: Congressional
Information
Service.
197%
)
lists all the
semiannual reports and sells microfiche copies. Some large hbraries have blanket subscriptions to the documents listed m the index. 57.
Based on the receipta recorded by one regional depository and two selective depositories.