Interpretation as methodical procedure - methodological fundaments of normed hermeneutics

Poetics I2 (1983) 185-205 North-Holland

INTERPRETATION AS METHODICAL PROCEDURE METHODOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTS OF NORIMED HERMENEUTICS * GERHARD

PASTERNACK

-

**

The aim of the material hermeneutics of literary study is the development of normed procedures of textual analysis. Starting point is thereby the relationship between understanding and interpretation. between constiuttion of meaning and reconstruction of the semantics of a text. as described in theoretical sketches since Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Interpretation is recognized as a specific hermeneutic method which may not be reduced either to processes of reception or to text structures in the narrower sense. Material hermeneutics cannot therefore be established within the frame of a naturalistic research programme, but should rather be developed as an operationalizing and norming of the processes of interpretation. in order to ensure explicitness and verifiability of the results of understanding. The normative operations are thereby related only to the procedures of explication and not to the subject-dependent process of understanding.

1. Introduction to the problem. Interpretation comprehension of texts

as methodical

procedure in the

The question whether interpretation constitutes a “need” as defined by Finke’s constructive theory of science shall not be discussed here at length. Important in Finke’s conception of social needs is his call for an argumentational framework, in which pragmatic decisions can be theoretically justified which cannot be accounted for on the basis of scientific theory or, in the narrovver sense of the word, by methodological conceptions (Finke 1979). In hermeneutic practice and in the theory of hermeneutics [I] texts have always been subject to construin g, i.e. to methodological interpretation, either to the general end of cultural transmission of canonical texts, or with the more [I] As regards different types of hermeneutics (cf. Geldsetzer 1974) dogmatic hermeneutics as an “application hermeneutics” must be strictly distinguished from normed hsrmeneutics. The norming of hermeneutic operations is carried out on the basis of explicitly introduced criteria by means of methodological rule instructions. In this respect material hermeneutics can incorporate demands from normative-methodological philosophical hermeneutics; cf. Ape1 1973. * Translated from German by Axe1 Goodbody. Kiel. ** Author’s address: G. Pasternack, Dept. of Literature. 2800 Bremen 33. West Germany.

University

0304-422X/83/93.00

B.V. (North-Holland)

‘a 1983. Elsevier Science Publishers

of Bremen.

Biblioteksstrasse.

IS6

G. Pasternark

/ Interpretarm

as merhdicul

procedure

specific intention of explaining meaning in instances vvhere application is called for. This means both that the “ageing of texts” makes interpretation necessary and that the wording of institutionally grounded texts calls for actualization [2]. Rules for the construin g of texts have been developed and applied in hermeneutic practice since the early study of Homer which remain important, at least in part. for modern interpretation practice. These are ad hoc rules: systematic proof and methodological explication are only to be found in modern hermeneutic theory. This latter pursues two aims, which are not always distinguished from each other: explication of the processes of understanding themselves, and that of procedures for the construing of texts and the setting up of interpretation rules. Both problem spheres have been dealt with in modern hermeneutic theory. beginning with the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, in a systematic context which sets out to elucidate the conditions of understanding and historical cognition within the limits set by epistemological preconditions. Schleiermacher bases his considerations on deliberate methodical doubt: not the understanding uhich normally functions in situations of everyday practical communication, but non-understanding serves him as point of departure for his argumentation [3]. Dilthey goes a step further in his attempt to develop a ‘critique of historical reason’ as distinct from Kant’s critique of pure reason, by seeing elucidation of the conditions of the possibility of understanding as a prerequisite of operational understanding (“kunstmassiges Verstehen”). i.e. of methodical interpretation (cf. Dilthey’s drafts of a “critique of historical reason” (1968, VII: 19 1ff.)). According to Dilthey the development of procedures of interpretation presupposes an epistemological (psychological and logical) explication of understanding. Important in this line of argumentation remains the fact that besides his attempt at a psychological elucidation of understanding Dilthey deals, at least to a degree, with the analysis of “logical operations” within the process of understanding [4]. In these theories of hermeneutics. interpretation or construing of texts becomes not only a recognizable social need, the very process of understanding calls already for it: the possibility of “generally valid interpretations” is a function of the “nature of understanding”. Due to methodical doubt, which [2] For the survey and for the current discussion of different hermeneutic positions. cf. Nasssn 1979. 1982. [3] Cf. Schleiermacher’s distinction between laxer and stricter practice (1974: 82). This should be stressed. e.g. as opposed to Ricoeur‘s (1969) concept of interpretation. which is based on an intentional second-degree structure. [4] Dilthey distinguishes on the one hand betueen understanding and explaining. reveals on the other hand the structure common to both procedures. In understanding too there are operations analogous to deduction. an insight tvhich only reappears in the explication of understanding in the work of Hempel and his successors. Cf. Dilthey 1968, V: 337.

chooses as point of departure non-understanding. this holds true both for the understanding of historical documents and for contemporary texts. It must thereby be borne in mind that these philosophic analyses of the relationship between understanding and interpretation involve complex anthropological, psychological. linguistic and logical explications. which are to be understood as a clarification and systematization of concepts, and do not represent hypotheses as defined by empirical reception research. Questions as to the meaning of permanently fixed expressions of human life (“dauernd fixierte Lebensausserungen” - Dilthey) are to be answered within the framework of a theoretical elucidation of understanding. this also applying with regard to the alternative in semantic theory betvveen reconstruction and constitution of meaning. Already Schleiermacher sees no exclusive alternative between reconstruction and constitution, distinguishing between general textual regularities and individual meaning hypotheses, which he regards as individual drafts of sense. He makes a strict distinction between grammatical meaning and individual constitutions of meaning. Understanding is on the one hand a deciphering based on conventional grammatical rules and on the other a constitution of meaning in the form of an individual hypothesis about the text. Dilthey also distinguishes within the process of understanding between “the logical side of understanding”, which permits the incorporation of “general insights through a procedure analogous to deduction”, and the psychological side, which leads to a reproduction of “the inner experiences of another” on the basis of physically existant expressions as individual constitutions of meaning [5]. The question is not whether the understanding of texts, or more generally of “permanently fixed expressions of life” is accomplished independent of the subjectivity of the recipient, but rather whether there are anthropological. psychological and linguistic bases which permit a systematic methodical elimination of dependence on the subject, of limitation by time and cultural tradition, a process which Dilthey describes as entering into the “historical milieu”. Here different standpoints in hermeneutic theory are held: whereas Dilthey considers generally valid interpretations on the basis of the conditions of understanding possible, and strives to found these on methodical operations. Gadamer later denies any such possibility. Gadamer makes a principle distincand scientific cognition. Construing of tion between “historical experience”

[5] Cf. the “twofold relation” in Schleiermacher’s speech (1974: 76ff.). For this problem sphere in Schleiermacher’s work cf. also Frank 1977. Dilthey 1968. V: 330 and passim. He insists on the connection of understanding with interpretation and seeks to derive the “possibility of a generally valid construction from an analysis of understanding”.

texts is thereby withdrawn reconstruction [6].

in principle

from

the domain

of methodical

1.1. Reconstruction or constitution. The fundomemal problem of lrrlderstandirlg: (I matter for hermeneutic or for semantic theocy:’ The fact that textual meanings do not constitute “objective entities” has been stressed in hermeneutic theory and later confirmed in structuralism and communication theory [7]. The theory of hermeneutics has never reduced the alternative bet\veen reconstruction and constitution to a problem of semantic theory. because it does not introduce semantic theories explicitly in its argumentation; text theory must conversely extend its semantic categories to include communicative aspects [S]. This shows already that explication of the relationship between understanding and interpretation is not merely a problem for semantic theory. The framework chosen for a semantic explication and the methodical consequences drawn depend on the underlying conception of scientific theory and cannot simply be determined by considerations of semantic theory. structures of meaning are partly Within the processes of understanding. reconstructed and partly constituted. As a result. interpretation cannot be cleanly separated from the preliminary process of understanding. Questions of meaning cannot therefore simply be passed on by hermeneutics to semantic theory or language philosophy. Attempts to reduce the problem of interpretation to one of semantic theory are inevitably inadequate [9]. For the methodological consequence thereof, that since the assignment of a meaning is identical Lvith the construction of this meaning, there is no object from which at least the “plausibility of an interpretation could be gauged” (Ih\ve 1977: 3 I). is wrong. quite independently of the one-sideness of the use theory of meaning. namely because this process of assignment can itself be made the object of scientific examination. Precisely this is done by traditional hermeneutic theory: the relationship between understanding and interpretation is conceptually explicated. Not without reason has the problem of interpretation been dealt Lvith in hermeneutics as dependent on explication of the process of understanding. However. hermeneutic theory limits itself to conceptual clarification and systematization.

[6] Gadamzr dots nor psrnut trawformation rxperisnce.

which springs

of und~stand~ng

from ths noninstrumrntal

tific concept of method (1960: 439. 279 and [7] Schmidt commsnts

fixation

Into a x+ntiT~c of langtugs.

method: hermencutic contradicts

semantics (1973: jjff..

and Schmidt

1979: 124).

1975: IjOff.).

in thr USC theory of meaning: assignment of meaning

of the usags valus in communication

ths zcien-

possum).

that this has already bscoms a topos (Kindt

[8] Cf. Schmidt’s conception of instruction [9] Ih\\e subsranriatss

charactu

proccssss (1976: 34% 1977).

is sxplicatsd

as ;1

G. Pasremack

/

Inrerprerarion

as nterhodical

procedure

189

without investigating the processes of reception empirically. The distinction between conceptual hermeneutic explications and empirical research rests though in different conceptions of scientific theory. and not merely in different semantic theories. Two scientific paradigms are here opposed to each other: conceptual “derivation” of interpretation from the “nature of understanding” is based on the hermeneutics of understanding, while empirical research into the processes of reception aims at an explanation of understanding. 1.2. The parallelism

of conceptions of scientific

theoq

The current discussion of the problematic relationship between understanding and interpretation (reception and interpretation) is being carried out within the framework of various different scientific theories. In addition to concrete differences in detail, it has thus also led to principally different strategies of research. This corresponds to the parallelism of different research paradigms observed by Freundlieb (1978: 12) in literary study, which should continue to coexist at the present stage of research. It is, however, important that there be no ensuing “assimilation” of conceptual explications of empirical hypotheses between the different paradigms. Among solutions to the problem of understanding and interpretation (reception and interpretation) three distinct positions can be made out. 1.2.1. The herrneneutic position Dilthey himself seeks to elucidate interpretation procedure (by setting up rules of “operational understanding”) in connection with his explication of the operations of understanding. He sets out to derive the “possibility of generally valid construction from an analysis of understanding”. His concern is thereby to elucidate both the psychological and the “logical side of understanding”. Only on the basis of the genera1 scientific operations which the study of literature shares with other sciences can the particular procedures of interpretation be formulated (Dilthey 1968, V: 320, 329. 261f.). In other nords. Dilthey links transcendental philosophic reflection (as opposed to Kant’s apriorism) with general methodological demands and a formulation of rules of method. This link is lost in later universalist hermeneutics. The latter is concerned exclusively. in a critical review of with the problems of constitution in understanding on Dilthey’s “objectivism”. the basis of fundamental-ontological, speculative-historical and linguistic-philosophical global theories [lo]. Material hermeneutics as a systematic represen[IO] In Heidegger’s fundamental ontology understanding is an existential and thereby preceeds all (scientific-methodical) individual cognition (1957: 143). The concept of understanding in universalist hermeneutics does not permit the evolution of a material hermeneurics. It is here not the task of hermeneutics “IO develop procedures of understanding. but rather to throw light on the conditions under which understanding takes place”

tation of methodical operations remains a desideratum [ 111. The ensuing universal pragmatic school of hermeneutics. which is deeply influenced by the methodological problems of the social sciences, i.e. by the so-called “ posivitism dispute”, is from the start not concerned to set up a method specifically for philology or literary study (cf. Ape1 1973; Habermas 1971). The debate on method within literary studies reveals two distinct hermeneutic positions: one orientated towards the text and the other towards literary reception. Szondi calls for material hermeneutics as a specifically literary method which should link philological methods of text construction with aesthetic premises. As methodological substantiation or justification he introduces an independent entity “philological cognition”, which is however difficult to find support for, because it orientates methodical operations by criteria which lack methodological elaboration both in general hermeneutics and in the principles of the theory of science: appropriateness to the factual context and evidence. The criterion of “appropriateness to factual context” relies on a concept of truth which Gadamer evolves for hermeneutics from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology: the truth of interpretation hypotheses cannot be verified according to the model relevant to the truth of statements; for they are not a case of adaequatio intellectus ad rem, but rather of “mensuratio ad rem”. of “taking the measure of the thing”. Methodical verification procedures which rely on a distinction between subject and object are not possible in this concept of hermeneutics. they are in fact incapable of systematic substantiation, since Gadamer’s “ hermeneutic experience” contradicts the idea of method in scientific cognition and is based on the noninstrumental character of language (“Geschehenscharakter der Sprache”). Criteria for the evaluation of interpretations (not strictly speaking for their verification) are unity of meaning (“consistency”) and subjective evidence (Szondi 1970: 17f.. 23). The change of paradigm in literary studies which reception aesthetics (121 claims to introduce is. as regards scientific theory. not in fact a change of paradigm, because both concepts and method remain wholly within the framework of the hermeneutic conception of science; despite this the relation between understanding and interpretation is newly defined in this hermeneutic

(Gadamer

1960:

SubJectless

“noninstrumental

[ 111Kamlah observes the

279).

already

we as yet

literary

hermeneutics

study due

The

particularit)

pleaded lack of

in

last

theory

of

purely

intentional

the

ontological

status

of works

for

hundred

modes

the

of

hermensutic language”

a newly

hermeneutics

premises”

[ 121Ingarden‘s of being:

1973

a literary the

to its

of

character

of

art

the

form

hardly

stems

432

hermrneutics of

for

Gadamsr

from

the

ff.). (1973:

a material

ever

felt

relies

on

126f.).

Szondi

hermeneutics

and

the

necessity

the

introduction

for

also “that

a material

12).

concretization objects

1960:

limlted

in

years

(1975:

experience (cf.

of

meamng

cannot

possess

(Ingarden

1960).

(Cf.

complete Jauss

determination. 1970:

Iser

1970.)

of This

different applies

to

G.

Pusternack

/

Interpretatron

as methodical

procedure

19

discipline, and a change in the object domain of literary study is therefore brought about. Following Ingarden’s early work on problems of the concretization of texts, text structures are no longer taken as the point of departure for literary interpretation, but in their stead as text concretizations. i.e. the result: of reception. Since reception aesthetics does not however seek to establish itsell as empirical research into reception, it finds itself faced with a methodologica dilemma: concretizations of non-empirical (historical) recipients can on principle only exist as texts and require primary interpretation, i.e. a textually methodical approach to the historical evidence of reception, to documents 01 every kind. g and interpretation as stated in The relationship between understandin hermeneutic theory has as its methodic consequence a reproduction of “the via the interpretation of “permanently fixed inner experiences of another” expressions of life” and permits no access other than through interpretation to concretization data not textually fixed. Such access can only be gained by empirical reception research, which however develops its methodic operations from another conception of science. Historical reception research cannot escape from this dilemma: either it remains a hermeneutic discipline and then cannot easily do away with the relationship between understanding and interpretation. or it becomes an empirical science, in which case it must analyze the process of reception exclusively, which is not possible for historical reception. I..?..?. The empirical position

Albert already formulated the naturalistic alternative to the hermeneutics of understanding in 1971, which is: the explanation of understanding (1971: 124ff.). Not only does this mean a change of paradigm, it also involves a change in the constitution of object domain and in research strategy. The relationship of understanding and interpretation (of reception and interpretation) can here be done away with, because non-historical concretization data from empirical reception subjects can serve as a basis for reception research and this can be dealt with by general empirical methods (those of psychology. social sciences) and thus bypass procedures of textual interpretation. Following results in cognition psychology and language psychology a model of the reception process of empirical subjects has been set up. Interpretation no longer constitutes a methodical procedure. although it is possible that the process of reception may embody interpretatory components [ 131. [I31 Kindt and Schmidt 1979: 141; Schmidt 1975: 162f. The present strongly schematizec reception model does not attempt, as Schmidt himself stresses. a reconstruction of the psycho. physiolo@al course of concrete reception processes; only levels and operations of the receptior process are here theoretically fixed. In this reception model levels are named which require the inclusion of suppositions in the constitution of meaning. which the recipient makes relative to his world.

Two schools can be distinguished in empirical reception research: one orientated exclusively towards reception and the other indirectly text-orientated. For an evaluation of interpretation that means:

(1) Interpretations

(2)

are admitted methodologically as a processing of texts b! empirical subjects merely as data on the superior level of an analysis of communication. Reception research is on the whole no longer text-orientated. but follows empirical social research (Kindt and Schmidt 1979: Schmidt 1980). Reception results from empirical subjects are taken as a basis from vvhich to draw conclusions about the structure of the work. with the aim of interpreting concretization data as data of the work. Interpretations are considered methodologically as “construction hypotheses”. which may if necessary be empirically verified. The recipients are assigned a “medial function” Lvith regard to text structures. i.e. reception research remains here clearly text-orientated. though methodically only indirectly [ 141.

In both cases interpretation is not permitted in empirical reception research as a methodical procedure. Interpretations are classified either as mere data or as construction hypotheses. The problem of adequate interpretation is either irrelevant or only peripheral, for it is no longer a question of the rightness or suitableness of interpretations; since it is a matter of concretizations by empirical recipients of a more than chance statistical distribution. questions about the diversity of creative reception lay first claim to attention. However. even a cursory glance at the demands on text construction in the case of institutionally grounded interpretations in jurisprudence or theology. for which a “need” in Finke’s sense of the word will not be questioned even by empiricists. shovvs that the exclusion of problems of the adequacy of interpretations and of interpretation methods from the scope of scientific disciplines cannot lead very far. Not without good reason has hermeneutic theory pointed over and again at the relationship betvveen philological and juridical interpretation with their particular application requirements. The field of application of philological interpretation is among other things the transmission of cultural tradition.

[14]

Groeben

empirical volume

1972.

social edited

van

to lngen

a more 197-I:

with

1981. which

by Soeffner

Confrontation study

1977.

research

Steinmetz

questions found

of

the

application

methods in

and

literary

representational

study

cf. also

the

means papers

in

of the

1979.

empirical

precise

For have

definition 1974.

reception of

the

research different

has led also objectives

on the part of

reception

of hermeneutic and

interpretation:

hterq cf.

regardless of the question how strongly traditions have been canonized 01 remain open. If one considers applications of text interpretations. then prob. lems of adequacy and questions of intersubjective verifiability can be justified as social needs. The elimination of interpretation as a methodical operation necessary and convincing according to the methodological principles of empirical reception research is hardly justifiable within the argumentational framework of Finke’: social and political theory of “needs”. This does not mean that interpretations must stand in the centre of literary study. but rather that interpretation procedures should be developed and given argumentational support as method. ical operations. And since this cannot be done within the frame\vork of the empirical conception of science. we must continue to support a parallelism ot different research paradigms. 1.2.3. The language-analvric and linguistic-logical positions These language-orieniated research strategies. which focus their attention on inevitably encounter the relationship the analysis of “linguistic features”. between interpretation and reception. and thereon set out to investigate the language-analytical and linguistic or text-grammatical conditions of the methodical procedure of interpretation. Text grammar on a non-linear basis introduces interpretation in its conception of structural theory and world semantics as a “further interpretation” of basic structures. Constitution of meaning as a function of the recipients is dealt with Petiifi’s partial text theory by first assigning extensional interpretations to the text-semantic representations, and then supplementing these by intensional specifications which are not represented in the text lexicon. Interpretations of approximately the kind in literary study are seen as “further interpretations” of the text-grammatical basic structure: extensional and intensional interpretations of text-semantic representations. which may be said in terms of theoretic structure to yield text worlds, must be placed in relation to the actual world of the interpreter, which means an extension of the model relative to the subject. Petijfi himself considers this further interpretation to be the true domain of literary study [15]. Within this text-grammatical conception it does not, however, seem clear how the assignment of meanings derived from world kno\vledge about the actual world of the interpreter can be reached methodically and how it can be linked stringently lvith the text worlds. i.e. with the basic structures interpreted. Consistent derivation of meanings is impossible either from the text structure or from the aorld structures, as long as a concept of textual deduction is lacking. which would have to be of similar exactitude to (151 For

the distinction

literary study cf. primarily concern verbal structure.

between

text-grammatical

analysis

and

the further

Petiifi 1973 and Pettifi and Rieser 1974. Further

interpretation

interprerations

but rather the relation between the text world manifested

structure and the actual world of the interpreter.

of

do not

in the verbal

19-l

the concept of deduction in sentence logic. The generalization of the logical relation of deduction to the concept of a relationship of meaning. as suggested by Kindt. applies to sentences and is no substitute for the lacking concept of textual deduction (Kindt and Schmidt 1976: 61). Relationships of meaning primarily enable conclusions to be draun about pragmatic presuppositions as described by Blau; such conclusions may not however be applied to truth values, but to the “suitableness” of a deduction (Blau 1975: 51, 55). Suitableness is dependent either on conventions or on interpretations. Since further interpretations cannot be derived from basic structures, they must be introduced via postulates of meaning as accomplishments of the interpreters constituting meaning. Postulates of meaning are, however, as stipulations. the results of processes of understanding or interpretations in the actual world. This means that further interpretation cannot be limited to a text-world relation. The interpreter introduces postulates of meaning in the actual world on the basis of operations of understanding, so that the relationship of interpretation and understanding cannot be eliminated [ 161. On language-analytical grounds Ihue at first rules out the possibility in principle of substantiating interpretation as a scientific procedure. The basis for his argumentation is the use theory of meaning, the methodological consequence of his argumentation is that since there can be no “object” of interpretations, no \-erification basis exists for right or even merely admissable assignments of meaning (1980: 346. 1977: 29). It is thus according to Ihvve logically impossible for interpretative statements to obtain a scientific basis. In addition to this, the language analyst should bear in mind that interpretative sentences must be classified as normative utterances. The domain of interpretation is therefore characterized by Ihwe as “deontic space”. Due to the impossibility of deriving normative from descriptive sentences, analyses in literary study can never have a purely descriptive status. Already Dilthey called attention to the “inner relationship” between descriptive and normative classes of sentences in interpretation. He distinguishes three main classes of sentences: statements about facts, theorems (laws) and value judgments and rules. But he stresses at the same time that. as opposed to the natural sciences. in the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) no strict division between descriptions and valuations can be made [17]. because the [ 161 The problsm appears more clearly in the distinction made by Abraham between text logic and text grammar. Abraham holds that text coherence does nor come about on the level of a text-grammatical basic structure. but rather on the level of spesch acts, for which presuppositional and implicative structures are crucial. Cf. Abraham 1979. [ 171 Dilthey 1968, V: 26. 120. The “inner relationship” of the different classes of sentence is supported by the concept of experience (Erlebnis) and depends finally on the “life complex”, in which all processes of understanding are bedded and in which cognition, valuation and action form a unity.

G. Pasternack

/

Intrrpretation

as merhodical

procedure

195

concept of experience (Erlebnis) is presupposed in the complex process of understanding. This confounding of utterances is fundamental in the interpretation practice of literary study [ 181 and is criticized by Ihwe. He discusses three possibilities of making statements about literature and develops in several steps his conception of conversation: statements cannot be made about the aesthetic features of linguistic works. but rather about experiences with works of art. For this speaking about literary works Ihwe introduces two different categories: “everyday interpretation” and “institutionalized interpretation”. Both forms of conversation observe specific demands, rules and norms. For Ihwe this field of linguistic conversation analysis provides the true challenge to science. His paper published in 1980 is an elaboration of the conversational framework modified in some points: he now concentrates his elaboration on speaking about literature in descriptive form. without ho\vever forgetting the normative aspect. Definitions are introduced for speaking about literature in general and also specifically for speaking in institutionalized contexts. These are intended on the one hand to provide a language-analytic explication of the conversation process, and on the other introduce standards for rational speaking about literature (1976, 1980: 498ff.). It is revealing for an explication of the relationship between understanding and interpretation (reception and interpretation) that this “conversation about literary texts” is still made dependent on the intuitive ability to understand texts and to speak about literary texts. As such intuitive resources Ihwe explicitly introduces linguistic-poetic competence and logical-argumentatory competence (1980: 465). These intuitive competences are the foundation both of everyday speaking about literature and also of institutional speaking. for which additional rules are introduced. In the place of the complex concept of understanding, which hermeneutics sets out to elucidate conceptually through psychological and logical explications, language-orientated conversation analysis speaks of competences. which enable the intricate business of psychological explications to be avoided and yet cover the fundamental possibilities of speaking, and are capable of development through the introduction of standards as a scientific speaking meeting all rational requirements.

2. Hermeneutic methodology The research positions outlined above show that the relationship between understanding and interpretation (reception and interpretation) has by no means been satisfactorily clarified and that questions as to the relations [ 181 Numerous examples of the confounding be found in Kindt and Schmidt 1976.

of statements

in interpretation

in literary

study are to

between constitution and justification of interpretations have found different answers. Three different solution strategies can be distinguished ivhich. ho\vever. cut across the distribution of positions according to scientific theory: ( I) Problems of constitution in understanding and questions of justification in interpretation are dealt with in a uniform theoretic context. This applies to Dilthey’s hermeneutic explications. nhich attempt to derive from the interpretation procedures governed by the .’ nature of understanding” criteria of objectivity and general validity. Dilthey distinguishes theoretically betueen the “two sides of understanding”: the psychological and the .’ logical”. (2) The relationship of understandin g to interpretation is restricted to quesinterpretation is tions of constitution in understandin g and reception: excluded from the sphere of methodical operations and is not subject to demands of normative methodological justification. For universalist hermeneutics in the tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer the “noninstrumental character” of understanding forbids an introduction of methodical procedures of interpretation: for empirical literary study interpretations can only serve as data or construction hypotheses within the Lvider context of empirical theoretical research, and not as methodical procedures. (3) Problems of constitution in understanding can be reduced in hermeneutic or semantic theory to fundamental hypotheses about intuitive ad hoc understanding or linguistic and argumentatory competences. so that on this as yet theoretically unelaborated basis general rules for explication or “conversation about literary texts” should be formulated. ivhich can for their part be normed in relation to rational standards or methodological criteria. In this outline of current research on the problem sphere of understanding and interpretation the alternative in scientific theory between naturalistic and antinaturalistic programmes of cognition reveals itself as too simple. The demand raised by Albert in his discussion of Apel’s and Habermas’ of understanding universal pragmatic hermeneutics, that the “real conditions activity” be investigated in the context of a naturalistic programme of cognition (1971: 129). has been taken up in empirical literary study. it leads hoLyever to the consequence that interpretations cannot under any circumstances be the object of literary research. But if social ‘-needs” must or even merely can be assumed for text interpretations, not only in the case of institutionally grounded text sorts, but also in that of not institutionally grounded cultural texts [19]. then interpretation as methodical procedures in a reconstructive transmission [ 191

For

and

cultural

the pressnt tradition.

argumentational without

purpose I

providing

speak

substantiation

of social in

social

“needs” theory.

for

transmission

of social

G. Pasrernock

/

Interpretation

as nterhodral

procedure

19’

of sense or in assignment of sense through constitution of meaning cannot b< dispensed with, and then normative methodological justification demands (ant adequacy demands) are unavoidable. That means interpretation as a methodical operation is then, despite th< open constitution question. to be treated as subject to normative methodologi. cal demands, or, the “logical side of understanding” described by Dilthey musl be methodologically elaborated. This methodological elaboration of interpretation procedures cannot be carried out within the framework of naturalistic cognition program. since the relation of understanding to interpretation forbids elimination of the “subjec. tive element” (Greimas) from the processes of understanding in order tc construct a data basis Lvhich would answer the demands of reliability and validity. A modified frameuork must therefore be chosen for this elaboration standing neither in the context of the naturalistic nor in that of the anti-naturalistic a normatively and methodologically orientated cognition program: hermeneutics, which is not primarily concerned with problems of constitution in understanding, but rather with the questions of justification and verification of interpretations. Interpretation is thereby regarded as a complex of methodical operations which is to be structured and normed. This material hermeneutics is designated by the term ‘normed hermeneutics’ 2.1. Material

hermetleutics

as normed methodical procedure

The point of departure is the differentiation between problems of constitution in understanding or reception and questions of the validity of interpretations. This presupposes elucidation of the relationship already observed by Schleiermacher between general hermeneutics and specific hermeneutics as a material hermeneutics. Dilthey seeks within the framework of general hermeneutics to derive the targets and specific rules of a material hermeneutics on the basis of anthropological and psychological explications of understanding. He thus accounts for the possibility of “objective and generally valid interpretations” by the “nature of understanding”, i.e. by conditions of constitution; the methodical consequence drawn is the elimination of the recipient’s individual systems of preconditions (“entering into the historical milieu”). The target criteria of “objectivity and general validity” are developed Lvithin his conception of rationality quite clearly following the example of the empirical cognition programs of natural science [20]. (201 Dilthey 1968. V: 320. The aim of objective interpretation has also been repeatedly formulated after Dilthey; cf. Hirsch 1972: Betti 1967. For the problem of objective interpretation and its “lo$cal impossibility” cf. Frank 1977: 248ff.

198

G. P~srernack

/

Interpretation

us ntethodlcul

procedure

Dilthey. standing in the tradition of Kant with his “critique of historical reason”, distinguishes between problems of constitution and justification. Universalist hermeneutics follows Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological substantiation of understanding as an extential in completely neglecting questions as to methodologically relevant justifications of the results of understanding in favcor of problems of constitution. Gadamer sees as the exclusive task of general hermeneutics “to elucidate the conditions under which understanding “to develop procedures of takes place”: it is not the concern of hermeneutics understanding”. Universal pragmatic hermeneutics marks a change of approach in this respect. In his criticism of Heide,,ooer and Gadamer, Ape1 demands explicitly that not only questions about the conditions of the possibility of understanding relevant be dealt vvith, but that also questions of “ the methodologically justification of the results of the understanding of sense” be included [21]. This change of approach within general hermeneutics should also be made use of by material hermeneutics: the methodical operations of material hermeneutics should be structured and normed vvith regard to normative and methodological criteria. Promise of success depends however on a separation of problems of constitution from questions of justification. Not the constitution conditions of understanding, i.e. not the “psychological side of understanding” is normable, but rather the “logical side” in Dilthey’s terminology permits norming. 2. I. 1. Not-wing instead of theoretic reconsttwction

Though the constitution problems of understanding are as yet largely unsolved and though language psychology and reception theories at best merely outline psycho-physiological processes, a norming of the validity requirements on the results of understanding is possible. Norminp does not depend on explicit theoretic reconstruction of the processes of understanding. Norms are possible at every level of theoretic and empirical cognition, for they do not represent hypotheses about the recipient’s knowledge of rules or rule competence which would first have to be empirically reviewed. Norming is a regulation with respect to target criteria which are either taken in learning over as already existing, or, if the occasion rises, introduced situations, as Kamlah and Lorenzen demonstrate for norms in logical propaedeutics (1967: 116ff.).

[21] Ape] 1973: 44. So also Habermas, who concedes in the postscript to “Erkenntnis und Interesse” that he had not at first distinguished adequately between questions of constitution and validity; cf. Habermas 1973: 383. The solutions proposed, to proceed according to the model of psychoanalysis from a complementarity of understanding and explaining and to transfer these procedures to the textual sciences, remains however problematic.

G. Pasrernock

/

Inrerprernrron

as merhodicul

procedure

19s

The basis for the introduction of norms is provided by intuitive operations of understanding or conventional rules of understanding which do not have to be explicit [22]. The establishment of standards or norms must, however. be carried out explicitly, and with regard to methodological criteria adapted to the discipline in question, Hermeneutic study of literature does not have to derive its normative-methodological justification criteria from general scientific theory or methodology; for the weak criteria are already formulated in hermeneutic methodology, though they have not been introduced in material hermeneutics as such.

(1) The demand for explicitness.

Due to the constructivist character of the process of understanding, all accomplishments constituting meaning must be introduced in the methodical procedure as explicit results (of very largely intuitive and implicit operations of understanding) [23]. (2) The demand for intersubjectioity. “General validity” is introduced in Dilthey’s general hermeneutics in the stricter version of objectivism. For verification (justification) objectivity is not required. but merely intersubjectivity (of description procedure, testing method) (Dilthey 1968. V: 3 17ff., 329ff.). “Operational understanding” is dis(3) The demand for operationalizing. tinguished from everyday practice by the presence of explicit rule regulations [24]. and consistent): The description of mean(4) The demands for systematization ings takes place in a metalanguage which does not observe the rules of the object language but represents a classification system of its own. 2.1 2. Normed hernreneutics or a standardization of concersation about literature Normed hermeneutics aims to set up a model for interpretation procedure with regard only to weak methodological criteria. i.e. to decompose interpretation into a systematic sequence of operations and to make possible textual explications by means of standardized meta-language descriptions. The foundation remains intuitive understanding, various degrees of en-

Anz and Stark (1977) attempt to explain the whole process of interpretation as social behaviour governed by rules. For the concept of rule cf. Keller 1974. [23] Cf. Dilthey’s concept of reproduction (“Nachbildung”) as a reconstruction of “the inner experiences of another” and for structural connexions which should be revealed (1968, V: 277; 1968, VII: 85). Cf. also Gadamer 1960: 280. Japp 1977 stresses the constructive character of interpretation as opposed to all claims of merely immediate pragmatic or historical world experience. Recent research on linguistic understanding confirms this constructive aspect (Coulmas 1977). [24] Interpretation as operational understanding of expressions of life fixed in writing (Dilthey 1968, V: 332). [22]

700

G. Pasrrrnack

/ lnrrrprerurron as mdtodicul

procrdrrrr

cyclopaedic competence and a command of different standardized (non-formal) systems of description. Point of departure of normed hermeneutics is the non-understanding of (historical) texts already introduced in theory by Schleiermacher. This means that on principle all text structures are involved in interpretation procedure. Interpretation as a methodical operation is not subsidiary: it does not limit itself to clarifying defects in understanding or individual misunderstandings. as textual annotation in ev,eryday practice. In contrast to this Ihwe does not proceed from a methodical non-understanding in his conception of conversation [25], but rather from language-analytically idealized conversation situations (“everyday interpretation”), which require partial questions of understanding and partial explanations. Through distinction between different degrees of competence and through introduction of the construct of an “optimal competence” in the institutionalized context in which speaking about literature takes place. additional demands on explanation accomplishments can be formulated. In this way a flexible framework for various types of conversation about literature is introduced. which range from everyday practical talk about literature to forms of partially institutionalized conversation in literary criticism and deeply institutionalized and standardized forms of conversation between “experts” (Ihne 1980: 480ff.). As opposed to this the normative methodological demands of normed hermeneutics are solely concerned with “operational understanding”. i.e. in the tradition of hermeneutics with methodical scientific interpretations. The reason for the difference of approach appears to lie therein. that the conversation conception proceeds from everyday-language questions about literary texts. about encyclopaedic background knowledge etc.. and assumes an only gradual difference from scientific conversation about literature. tvhile normed hermeneutics proceeds for its part from problems which are not only preformed by scientific traditions but actually only arise through consideration of scientific standards. This means that normed hermeneutics holds to a distinction in principle between the requirements of scientific interpretation and the desiderata of everyday practical explanation. Not all questions of “interesting” questions can lead to scientific everyday practice or individually interpretations. Scientific work does not begin with questions in an unspecified conversational framework. but rather with the formulation of problems within a scientific community. Within the scientific community as a strongly standardized conversational framework it is possible to proceed from methodical doubts in Schleiermacher’s sense, namely from a principle non-understanding texts, something de facto [Zj] Already in 1978/79 I had the opportunity to discuss at length problems of interpretation with Jens Ihwe and to deal uith them in joint university courses. for which I here express mq thanks.

G. Pasternack

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Interpretarm

as nwrhodml

prowdurr

201

probably very seldom the case. Only this “stricter practice” of Schleiermacher’s makes possible the introduction of demands for explicitness and intersubjective verifiability for all partial results of the process of understanding.

3. An outline of the norming of interpretation

procedure [26]

The aim of material hermeneutics is the development and substantiation of a procedure of explication which replaces global intuitive ad hoc understanding by systematic methodical operations and which permits a distinction between the construction of construing hypotheses and the description of text internal data of understanding, by means of methodical rule instruction, in order to be able to introduce explicit test decisions. To this end the complex process of ad hoc understanding must be decomposed according to methodological rules into partial operations, and represented in a model which does not reproduce actual instances of reception. but rather looks to the methodological components of scientific procedure: object constitution. hypothesis constitution, description of data and verification of hypotheses. For the methodological rules only vveak criteria are drawn on which are also important in the hermeneutic methodology evolved by Dilthey: explicitness, intersubjective verificability, the operationalizing and systematizing of the scientific languages. The central point of normed hermeneutics is the distinction between two classes of interpretation operations (not classes of sentences): construing and describing. The construction of construing hypotheses is to be understood as a systematic arrangement of hierarchies of hypotheses; the description of the data of understanding is to be seen as the creation of an explicit version about the original text, i.e. an explicit unfolding of the assignments of meaning carried out by the interpreter as a result of the text-internal structures and his text-external world knowledge. The verification basis of normed hermeneutics is only the explicit version of the assignments of meaning, it contains no “hard” data. does not in principle meet the demands of reliability or validity. The distinction between hypothesis construction and data description is permitted by the introduction of explicit verification operations, in which global or partial interpretation hypotheses are confronted with descriptions of the explicit version. Special methodological rules must ensure the independence of hypothesis construction and data description from each other. [26] A first draft. which I do not here wish to repeat. is contained only some central problems are indicated.

in my publication

of 1979. Here

3.1. The problem sphere of normed data of understanding.

hermeneutics

remains

the description

of the

(1) Data description

is the production of an explicit version. Theoretically therefore completeness of the description is required. All text-internal structures and all assignments of meaning on the basis of meaning postulates, implications and presuppositional conclusions are part of the explicit version. (2) The explicit version must in addition admit alternative descriptions. Because the interpreter’s (recipient’s) accomplishment in constituting meaning applies both to text structures and to selections and inferences on the basis of meaning postulates and presuppositions. The explicit version makes precise descriptions on different levels of (3) representation Linguistic-grammatical. genre-poetological necessary. socio-historical units must not be represented globally, but only at different levels of description. No uniform descriptive instrumentarium is here available: different description systems must therefore be introduced. Systematizing of these meta-linguistic instruments is required. not transi-tivizing. Th& has the consequence that in the verification of hypotheses these must each be assigned individually to the different levels of description. 3.‘. The aim of verification procedure in normed hermeneutics is not the “ rightness” of construction hypotheses, but their intersubjective verifiability. It is quite possible that alternative verification results may be obtained with this method. Hermeneutic text procedure does not rely on the classical tvvo-languages model, but rather on a two-operations model: the operationally separated interpretation steps of hypothesis construction and description in the explicit version lead to two classes of hypotheses, since the data of understanding themselves have hypothetical character. The independence of the two classes of hypotheses can only be ensured operationally: the description is carried out by means of description instructions from different systems of description. the construction of hypotheses on the basis of previously established distinct classes of hypotheses. The actual test procedure is a procedure of argumentational decision between the results of the constructive and descriptive operations. both of which have hypothetical status..

G. Pastemuck

/ Interpretation

as methodical procedure

20:

3.3.

Only on this foundation questions of the adequacy

of intersubjectively verifiable individual results can or admissability of total interpretations be anw.ered.

References Abraham, W.. 1979. Zur literarischen Analysediskussion. Kritisches und Konstruktives anhand dreier Kafka-Erzahlungen. Amsterdamer Beitrage zur neueren Germanistik 8: 13 I - 17 I. (Rodopi.) Albert, H. 1971. Pladoyer fur kritischen Rationalismus. hlunich: Piper. Anz. Th. and M. Stark, 1977. Literaturwissenschaftliches interpretieren als regelgeleitetes Verhalten. Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem wissenschaftstheoretischen Projekt. Deutsche ViertelJahresschrift 5 I : 272-299. Apel. K.-O., 1973. Transformation der Philosophie. I. Frankfurt a.11.: Suhrkamp. Betti, E.. 1967. Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften. Tubingen: Niemeyer. Blau. U.. 1978. Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache. Ihre Syntax, Semantik und Anwendung in der Sprachanalyse. Berlin/New York: Springer. Coulmas. F., 1977. Rezeptives Sprachverhalten. Eine theoretische Studie tiber Faktoren des sprachlichen Verstehensprozesses. (Papiere zur Textlinguistik 15.) Hamburg: Buske. Dilthey. W.. 1968. Gesammelte Schriften. vol. V and VII. Stuttgart: Teubner. Finke. P.. 1979. Grundlagen einer linguistischen Theorie. Empirie und Begrtindung in der Sprachuissenschaft. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg. Frank. Xl.. 1977. Das individuelle Allgemeine. Textstrukturierung und -interpretation nach Schleiermacher. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Freundlieb. D.. 1978. Zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Literaturwissenschaft. Eine Kritik der transzendentalen Hermeneutik. (Grundfragen der Literaturu-issenschaft. N.F. 4.) htunich: Fink. Gadamer. H.-G.. 1960. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundziige einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Ttibingen: Mohr. Geldsetzer. L., 1974. ‘Hermeneutik’. In: H. Rombach, ed.. Wissenschaftstheorie I. Positionen und Probleme der Wissenschaftstheorie. Freiburg: Alber. Groeben. N.. 1972. Literaturpsychologie. Literaturwissenschaft zwischen Hermeneutik und Empirie. (Sprache und Literatur 80.) Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Groeben. N.. 1977. Rezeptionsforschung als empirische Literaturwissenschaft. Paradigmadurch Methodendiskussion an Untersuchungsbeispielen. (Empirische Literaturwissenschaft 1.) Kronberg/T.: Athenaeum. Groeben. N.. ed.. 1981. Rezeption und Interpretation. Ein interdisziplinarer V’ersuch am Bcispiel der “Hasenkatastrophe” van Robert Musil. (Empirische Literaturwissenschaft 5.) Tubingen: Narr. Habermas. J.. 1971. ‘Der Universalitatsanspruch der Hermeneutik’. In: K.-O. Ape1 et al.. Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. pp. 120- 159. Habermas. J.. 1973. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Epilogue. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Heidegger. M.. 1957. Sein und Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer. Hirsch. E.D. 1972. Prinzipien der Interpretation. Munich: Fink. Ihwe. J.. 1976. The philosophy of literary criticism reconsidered. On the ‘logic’ of interpretation. Poetics 5, 339-372. Ihue. J.. 1977. ‘Sprache und Interpretation’. In: W. Klein ed.. Methoden der Textanalyse. (Medium Literatur 3.) Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer. pp. 24-31.

Ihwe. J.. 1980. Conversations about literature. or: Lvhen you and I and ths literary scholar talk about a literary text. Poetics 9. 457-507. Ingarden. R., 1960. Das sprachliche Kunstuerk. Tubingen: Niemeyer. Ingen. F. van, 1974. Die Revolte des Lesers oder Rezeption versus Interpretation. Zu Fragen der Interpretation und der Rezeptionslsthetik. Amsterdamer Beitrage zur Neueren Germanistik 3. 83- 147. (Rodopi.) Iser. VV.. 1970. Die Appellstruktur der Texte. Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer Prosa. (Konstanzer Universitatsreden 28.) Konstanz: Universitatwerlag. Japp. U.. 1977. Hermeneutik. Der theoretische Diskurs. die Literatur und die Konstruktion ihres Zusammenhanges in den philoiogischen Wissenschaften. (Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schonen Ktinste 47.) Munich: Fink. Jauss. H.R.. 1970. Literaturgeschichte als Provokation. Frankfurt a.11.: Suhrkamp. Kamlah. W., 1973. ‘Pladoyer fur eine wieder eingeschrankte Hermeneutik‘. In: D. Harth. ed.. Propadeutik der Literaturwissenschaft. Munich: Fink. pp. 126-135. Kamlah. W. and P. Lorenzen, 1967. Logische Propadeutik oder Vorschule des verntinftigen Redens. Mannheim: Bibliographischer Verlag. Keller. R.. 1974. ‘Zum Begriff der Regel’. In: H.J. Heringer. ed., Seminar: der Regelbegriff in der praktischen Semantik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Kindt. W. and S.J. Schmidt, eds., 1976. lnterpretationsanalysen. Argumentationsstrukturen in literaturwissenschaftlichen Interpretationen. (Grundfragen der Literaturwissenschaft. N.F. 2.) Munich: Fink. Kindt. W. and S.J. Schmidt, 1979. ‘Textrezeption und Textinterpretation’. IS: W. Burghardt and K. Hdlker. eds.. Text Processing, Textverarbeitung. (Research in Text Theory 3.) Berlin/Ne\\ York: de Gruyter. pp. 119-162. Nassen. U.. ed.. 1979. Texthermeneutik. Aktualitat. Geschichte. Kritik. Paderborn: Schoningh. Nassen. U.. ed., 1982. Klassiker der Hermeneutik. Paderborn: Schoningh. Pasternack, G., 1979. Interpretation. Munich: Fink. Petofi. J.S.. 1973. ‘Towjards an empirically motivated grammatical theory of verbal texts’. In: J.S. Petofi and H. Rieser, eds.. Studies in text grammar. (Foundations of Language. Supplement Series 19.) Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 204-275. Petofi. J.S.. 1973. Text grammars, text-theory and the theory of literature. Poetics 7, 36-76. Petofi. J.S. and H. Rieser. 1974. Problems der modelltheoretischen Interpretation van Texten. (Papiere zur Textlinguistik 7.) Hamburg: Buske. Ricoeur. P.. 1969. Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch iiber Freud. Frankfurt a.>[.: Suhrkamp. Schleiermacher, Fr.D.E., 1974. Hermeneutik. (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Jg. 1959. 2.Abh.) Heidelberg: Winter. Schmidt. S.J.. 1973. Texttheorie. Probleme einer Linguistik der sprachlichen Kommunikation. Munich: Fink. Schmidt. S.J.. 1975. Literaturwissenschaft als argumentierende Wissenschaft. Zur Grundlegung einer rationale” Literaturwissenschaft. hlunich: Fink. Schmidt. S.J.. 1980. Grundriss der empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 1. Der Gesellschaftliche Handlungsbereich Literatur. (Konzeption Empirische Literaturwissenschaft I.) Braunschwseig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg. Soeffner. H.-G.. ed., 1979. Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften. Stuttgart: Metzler. Steinmstz. H., 1974. Rezeption und Interpretation. Versuch einer hbgrenzung. Amsterdamer Beitrage zur Neueren Germanistik 3. 37-51. (Rodopi.) Szondi. P.. 1970. ‘Uber philologische Erkenntnis’. In: P. Szondi. Holderlin-Studien. Frankfurt a.hl.: Suhrkamp. pp. 9-34. Szondi. P.. 1975. Einftihrung in die literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt a.%l.: Suhrkamp.

G. Pasrernack

/ Inrerprerdon

Gerlwrd Pasrernack (b. 1937) is professor University

of Bremen. His primary

of methodolog addition

in literan_ study. focusing

he is concerned uith

semantics.

for literary

research interests

OS

methodreal procedure

205

theory. text theory and methodology at the include questions of theory construction

on problems of hermeneutic analysis procedures.

questions of the relationship

betussn

and In

aesthetics and text theory or