- Email: [email protected]
Italy
Electoral
Studies ( 1989).
8:3. 288-295
Italy Unilwsit?,
College,
Oxford, England
As in most member nations of the EC, European elections in Italy are heavil) conditioned by domestic political events. Deeply intertwined with the normal flom of political life, they offer little opportunity to the parties to rise above the parochial and address matters of wider relevance. More frequently they are viewed as a chance for them to test their support and enhance their leverage within the national political arena. Thus it is inevitable that such elections be interpreted principally. as local contests in which the stakes are moral and psychological rather than material. Only in so far as European issues are seen as contributing to the potential moral victoq of one or more parties do they tend to be deployed in a campaign. Even more than in 1984, the 1989 poll in Italy was rich with local implications. Indeed it came to be seen almost as a substitute general election as the Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita resigned less than a month before polling, precipitating the country into a government crisis that would remain open beyond the end of the campaign. The causes of this most recent breakdown in relations between five parties (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI) which have governed the country more or less without interruption for 25 years were threefold. Only the third of these may be considered to be of more than short term relevance. In the first place De Mita’s own position had been gravely undermined at the congress of the DC in February at which he was ousted from the secretaryship after a tenure lasting some eight years. This neither enhanced his standing among the DC’s allies nor augered well for the future of his administration. Secondly, fearing the government’s mediocre record might damage his party politically, the Socialist leader Craxi announced a withdrawal of confidence at the end of the PSI congress in mid-May. This act was undoubtedly the immediate cause of De Mita’s downfall. However, the weight of a third factor should not be underestimated. In causing instability within the coalition and nervousness inside the PSI, the renewed activism of the PC1 was clearly of prime importance. After a long period in which their party seemed almost reconciled to its own decline, the (Communists have emerged under the new leadership of Achille Occhetto as a force determined to return to the forefront of political life. Definitively freed of the culture of the Historic Compromise. the PC1 challenged thr government on the environment, on citizens’ rights and on its commitment to tackling organized crime. It also supported a highly successful one-day general strike against the introduction of unpopular prescription and medical charges. For this reason the timing of De Mita’s resignation provoked the displeasure of the
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In this tense and confused atmosphere the Italian parties began their campaigns for the European election. Yet although domestic issues were paramount at the outset, international developments intervened unexpectedly to make the election one of the most bitterly fought of recent years. The Campaign: Issues and Personalities In all, 14 parties or groupings deposited their symbols and lists of candidates before the deadline of 9 May. All the major parties fielded their leaders in one or more constituencies, indicating a full-scale involvement at the highest level. In addition most party lists included a good number of other well-known politicians, city mayors and independents recruited from the arts, academia, journalism or the entertainment world. The greatest novelty was offered by the candidature of a small, but significant number of foreign nationals, permitted under a law passed in 1988. Responding to the petition of a local magistrate, the Constitutional Court rejected objections to such candidates on 31 May. The DC lists offered few surprises. The recently elected party secretary Forlani headed the campaign in the constituency of central Italy while other prominent figures played a leading role in the other four zones. The PC1 fielded an impressive number of independent candidates including the French political scientist and constitutionalist Maurice Duverger, whose role as personal adviser to President Mitterrand was highlighted as proof of the close links recently established between the party and the French Socialists. The Republican-Liberal Federation lists included the former leader of the British Liberal party David Steel. Also featured among this grouping’s candidates was the popular Radical politician Marco Pannella, whose party did not stand in the election in its own right but instead occupied ‘guest slots’ in no fewer than four different lists. Among these were the Rainbow Greens, an alternative list formed at the last minute following the breakdown in negotiations aimed at the formation of a joint list with the official Greens. The whole of the first part of the campaign was dominated by the government crisis. Following an initial round of consultations with the parties, President Cossiga invited Giovanni Spadolini, Speaker of the Senate, to undertake a further exploration of party attitudes with a view to establishing the conditions for renewed collaboration. Conducted at snail’s pace in an ill-concealed effort to gain time and delay the appointment of a prime minister designate, these meetings attracted the irony of satirists as well as the barbed comments of opposition parties. By contrast virtually no attention at all was dedicated to the referendum due to be held in conjunction with the elections of 18 June. Promoted by the Communists and the European Federalists this consultation was designed to secure a popular mandate for a reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament. The lack of controversy it aroused reflects the unanimously pro-European stance of the Italian parties. Although local political disputes occupied centre stage, each party endeavoured to outdo its rivals in appearing outward-looking and internationalist. The Christian Democrats stressed their long record of commitment to European unity while Communists and Socialists argued over their respective links to other West European Socialist parties. For their part the Republicans and Liberals highlighted their loyalty to a strong Western defence system. In the three weeks prior to voting two sets of local elections provided important tests of public opinion. On 28 May a number of communes, mainly in the south,
290
Ita!lt
went to the polls to elect new councils. The results revealed significant advances for the government parties while the PCI, in areas where it is traditionally weak, slipped back markedly. The Communists reacted strongly however, claiming that clientelism and criminal pressures had distorted the outcome of the poll. The results of the corruption-free Sardinian regional elections on 11 June reflected a similar trend but this time the cause of the PCI’s poor showing was quite different. Following the repression of the students’ protest in Peking, the parties of the centre and right turned their fire on the Communists, accusing them of ideological complicity with the Chinese regime. Although the PC1 was in fact the only force to express its support for the students and organize a campaign of solidarity from the very start, the Socialists also added their voice to this chorus, arguing that the party should recognize the historic failure of its cause and accept once and for all the premises of Western-style reformist socialism. Right up until 18 June an all-out assault was sustained against the PCI, highlighting its alleged lack of democratic credentials. In this way the parties hoped to strike a blow against an electoral bloc that between the general elections of 1983 and 19%’ had already dropped in size from 29.9 per cent to 26.6 per cent. But in so doing, Occhetto responded, they revealed an anti-democratic inclination in themselves that contrasted with the PCI’s proven record of commitment to pluralism, political democracy and non-violence. The crisis of world Communism filled the pages of newspapers and magazines in the final days of campaigning, overshadowing even COSSigI’S decision to call a halt to Spadolini’s explorations and entrust the mandate to form a new government to De Mita. It also dominated television coverage in the final two days before polling as Occhetto, CmXi and the Radical party secretary Stanzani took part in the Budapest funeral ceremony which marked the political rehabilitation of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and its leader Nagy. The expectations of the parties reflected the conduct of the campaign. The DC ms cautiously hopeful of an increase in its support while the PSI fixed a minimum target of 15 per cent that it anticipated would be surpassed with ease. The PRI-PI.1 federation declared that an 8 or 9 per cent share of the vote would be considered satisfactory. For their part the Communists argued that anything over the 23 per cent of the Sardinian elections would be interpreted as a success. The Media: Words
and Images
Ten years ago the press, television and radio still played a relatively minor role in Italian elections. The bulk of campaigning was done at open-air rallies, while the parties used a variety of forms of bribery or persuasion to encourage their followers to vote. Fluctuations were minimal and floating votes almost non-existent. In recent times much of this has changed. Although the PC1 and many of the smaller parties and individual Christian of the left still use traditional campaign techniques, Democrats and Socialists are not averse to promising favours and privileges in return for votes, the balance has shifted and all the leading parties now recognize the importance of a successful media campaign. The print media played a broadly passive role in the European elections. Out of habit or laziness the major newspapers confined themselves to reporting the speeches of political leaders and mirroring the themes and arguments thrown up by the parties, By br the most important topic was taken to be the domestic
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government crisis, at least until the two weeks prior to voting, when reports and discussions of events in China and Hungary as well as the elections in Poland took pride of place. Examinations of Italy’s record within the EC or of the possible effects of greater economic and political integration were notable by their absence. In part the problem derives from the strong party affiliation of many journalists and editors, who feel obliged to kowtow to their political masters. But the absence of a tradition of investigative journalism also means that newspapers have few independent means of testing the mood of the country. This situation is exacerbated by the notorious inaccuracy of Italian opinion polls. On this occasion only the weekly news magazine L’Espresso made recourse to a device whose unreliability has caused many a misplaced forecast in the past. The magazine’s final poll one week before voting placed the DC at 33.3 per cent, the PC1 at 25.4 per cent, the PSI at 15.1 per cent, the PRI-PLI federation at 8.7 per cent and the Greens at 5.2 per cent. Television provided a focus to the campaign rather than newspapers. In accordance with established practice, the public broadcasting corporation RAI instituted ‘election tribunes’ in which the leader of each party or list was called in turn to respond to the questions of a panel of ten journalists. Controlled directly by a parliamentary committee, these programmes guaranteed a measure of impartiality and equilibrium if not very lively viewing. On the evening of Friday 16 June each party was allowed to make a brief direct appeal to the electorate. The coverage of the election by the unregulated private television sector was patchy, with only Berlusconi’s news-oriented network Rete Quattro offering time on a par with RAI. The format too was basically the same, but a reduced number of journalists and more dynamic presentation made for more pointed questioning and on the whole more informative discussion. However, the late evening time slot ensured that the programmes only reached a limited audience. Not known at the best of times for their impartiality the news broadcasts of the three RAI channels are more or less openly regarded as the respective feuds of DC, PSI and PCI. In keeping with their reputations they were turned virtually into megaphones for these three parties for the duration of the election campaign. The most obvious sign of this was in the total lack of coverage accorded to the campaigns of a number of small parties and lists. A further advantage which the larger parties have over small or new ones derives from their ability to block-buy television advertising space on the private networks. As in the general election of 1987 Berlusconi made such space available to all parties at a discount of 70 per cent on normal commercial rates, but it still remained beyond the means of all but seven of them. However, most of the latter took up as much space as they could afford. A spokesman for the DC admitted that between 70 and 75 per cent of the party’s total campaign budget would be absorbed in this way. To design their media campaigns the DC, PSI and PRI-PLI federation all engaged the services of advertising agencies. For the DC the ltalian affiliate of the American multinational, Young and Rubicam, devised a strategy articulated through various media that stressed the identification of the party with Italy. As on other occasions in the recent past the Socialist campaign hinged almost exlusively on the personal charisma of Craxi, whose image was reproduced ad infinitum in a veritable bombardment of television and newspaper advertisements in the final week of the election. In a lower profile campaign reflecting more limited resources the centre federation employed the image of a tricolour apple to suggest the freshness and novelty of their union.
292
Ita!>
Of the leading parties the Communists made least use of television. Nor did they employ an advertising agency. Yet their campaign was no less professional. Directed by the PCI’s able press and propaganda officer with the aid of some outside experts close to the party, it was on the whole more issue-based than those of other parties. However, the image of an infant taking its first steps was used in television and newspaper advertisements to convey the idea of a force reborn and full of promise for the future. Moreover a long held taboo against the identification of parties with their leaders was broken in the final seven days of campaigning as advertisements featuring Occhetto appeared in the press and on television. At a lower level everything followed well-established patterns. Election meetings large and small took place up and down the country as candidates of all parties scrambled for preference votes. Intellectuals signed appeals on behalf of this or that party or candidate. For once, however, religious interference was minimal, Although prominent clergymen offered discreet support to a number of Christian Democrats, no official announcement was made urging Catholics to vote for the DC. The Results
Within hours of the close of polling it became clear that the predictions of parties and pundits were ill-founded. The success of the Communists, who unexpectedly improved their position on the 1987 election, and the striking growth in supportby Italian standards-for the Greens provided the subject of much debate in the election specials of the three public television and radio channels. Of scarcely less interest was the failure of the DC to consolidate its position, the evaporation of all Socialist hopes of a substantial advance and the crushing defeat suffered by the Liberal-Republican federation. To complete a surprising picture, several minor lists also made rather more impact than had been anticipated. Comparisons were drawn both with 1987 and with the previous European elections of 1984 but in general the former was taken as the truer bench mark. This should not be read only as a sign that national calculations took pride of place for it was recognized that the balance of political forces in the country had altered considerably since 1984 and that in any case the European vote of that year had been distorted by the emotional impact of the sudden death of Enrico Berlinguer. In this analysis therefore comparisons will be made principally with 1987. Full results are shown in Table 1. At 81.5 per cent the turnout rate marked a decline on the 1984 figure of 85.3 per cent. Whether or not this can be interpreted as a sign of disaffection is open to debate. A more immediate cause may have been the fine weather which both DC and PSI were convinced induced potential supporters not to return from weekend trips to the seaside in order to vote. A more alarming note was struck by the increase in blank and null votes. These rose from 3.2 per cent in 1979 to 5.2 per cent in 198-t and 7.1 per cent in 1989. In all probability this stands as proof of a growing antipathy towards party politics noted by numerous observers in recent years. The DC gained one seat even though its share of the vote dropped by 0.1 per cent compared with 1984. Relative to 1987 the party suffered a more marked setback of 1.4 per cent. Despite this it was able to draw comfort from the fact that, with 32.9 per cent it recovered its position as the largest Italian party in the European Parliament. Although no candidate quailed the record of 1,053,OOO preference votes accumulated by De Mita in 1984, several Christian Democrats
293
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TABLE1. The 1989 and 1984 European election results and 1987 general election results Parties
European election 1989 %
European election 1984 %
General election 1987 %
32.9 27.6 14.8 5.5 2.7 4.4
33.0 33.3 11.2 6.5 3.5 6.1 3.4 1.4 -
34.3 26.6 14.3 5.9 2.9 5.8’ 2.6 1.7 0.5 2.5
DC PC1 PSI MS1 PSDI PRI-PLI P. Bad DP L. Lombarda Verdi Verdi Arcob. Others
1.3 1.8 3.8 2.4 2.H
1.6
2.9
*In 1987 the two parties ran separately. Sources: I1 Corriere della m-a, 20.6.89; La Repubblica,
European elections seats 1984 1989 27 22 12 4 2 4 1 2 3 2 2
26 27 9 5 3 5 3 1 2
20.6.89; L’clnitir,
20.6.87. Turnout: 1989,81.5%; 1984, 5.2%.
1984,84.1%:
1987,88.9%.
Blank and null 1989,7.1%;
scored personal successes. The DC’s least satisfactory results were obtained in its traditional stronghold in the south. Overall it lost 2.8 per cent in this constituency.
The 1 per cent increase in the PC1 vote since 1987 was deemed to be far more significant than the drop of 5.7 per cent since 1984. Even though the party lost five seats at Strasbourg, the result was viewed as a personal triumph for Occhetto. It seems clear that the very difficult campaign produced a return to the fold of voters who had drifted away since the 1970s and attracted others in the large cities repelled by the opportunist exploitation of events in China by the other parties. Several Communist independents fared well (Maurice Duverger securing election in two constituencies) while the decision to offer the candidatures of popular local mayors also yielded positive results. The modest Socialist gain of 0.5 per cent was disproportionately concentrated in the south, where Craxi won 650,000 preference votes, more than any other single candidate in any constituency. Here PSI support went up by 1.5 per cent whereas elsewhere it remained broadly stationary. In two cities the PSI suffered notable setbacks. In Milan, the party’s stronghold par excellence, it sank from 18.5 per cent in 1987 to 17.7 per cent. In Palermo, where it had been engaged in a propaganda war against the anti-mafia administration of DC, PC1 and Greens, it plummetted from 16.4 per cent to 11.8 per cent. In part the poor Socialist performance may have been due to errors in the selection of candidates. Of the independent candidates it fielded, only the popular television journalist Giuliano Ferrara and the former leader of the Catholic trade union Pierre Carniti attracted new votes to the party. Undoubtedly one of the surprises of the election was the collapse of the PRI-PLI federation. In contrast to 1984, the two parties stressed that their alliance was not merely one of electoral convenience but a step towards eventual unification. Yet the total of 4.4 per cent fell well short not only of the poor result of 6.1 per cent reached in 1984 but also represented a decline with respect to the 5.8 per cent the two parties secured separately in 1987. Neither the Liberal leader Altissimo nor
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294
David Steel won election. The far right MSI, facing its first election since the death of its historic leader Giorgio Almirante, fared relatively well, maintaining 5.5 per cent with the loss of one seat. Similarly relieved to conserve most of their share of the vote were the Social Democrats,
who recently
split into two as a result of Craxi’s alleged attempt
to annex the party. At 2.7 per cent they held two of their three seats. At their first European election the Greens advanced significantly despite acrimony between two competing lists. The ‘original’ Greens continued their upward trend, achieving a 3.8 per cent share, while the Rainbow Greens scored a respectable 2.4 per cent. More political and party-minded, the latter grouping drew together members of the Radical Party and the ecologist wing of the far left DP. which also managed to win one seat, As Green analysts were quick to note, their list fared particularly well where it formed part of the local administration. In Palermo
it won
significant
7.6 per cent
successes
for example
of all though
were
and in Salerno
concentrated
8 per cent.
in the north-east.
the Green vote reached 14 per cent and in Bolzano 11.6 per cent. Among the minor lists the racist Lombard League attracted more expected,
capturing
list, which
ran a shoe-string
possession, Virtually plebiscite
a remarkable
8.1 per cent
campaign
in Lombardy.
in opposition
The
most
In Trento votes
than
The Anti-Prohibition
to proposals
to outlaw all drug
won 427,000 votes, enough to elect one deputy- to Strasbourg. forgotten in discussion of the results, the referendum produced of 88.1 per cent in favour of greater
powers
a
for the EP. The 11.9 per cent
who voted against were concentrated disproportionately in the south. Post-election commentary revealed marked differences in the way parties interpreted the outcome. The DC put a brave face on its mediocre showing and denied that it had ever expected
that Communist
support would collapse.
It stressed
the fact that it had gained one seat and sought as quickly as possible to shift the emphasis towards the question of resolving the month-old government crisis. For their part the Communists could scarcely believe their good fortune. The headline of the party daily L’Unit& on 19 June read ‘PC1 surprise: it wins’. In psychological
terms
the result
was evidently
far more
important
than its material
dimensions. After an almost uninterrupted downward slide lasting ten years, the party felt that it had finally reversed the trend. For the first time since 1976 hundreds of activists gathered at the PC13 headquarters in Rome to acclaim the party leader. In his comment on the result Occhetto proclaimed the failure of those who had sought to eliminate the party and demanded that the PSI revise its strategy of cooperation with the DC. Of all the parties perhaps the PSI was the most disappointed. In their first comments Socialist spokesmen sought to conceal this. Much was made of the fact that, of the government parties, only the PSI had gained votes. The party could also boast three extra seats at Strasbourg. But it was evident that something had gone wrong. Craxi himself flew to the congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm on 19 June without releasing any comment. Several days later he argued that he had fought a solitary campaign with little support from his lieutenants, In marked contrast with this judgement other Socialists blamed Craxi himself for narrowing the party’s appeal and allowing it to lose contact with the needs of ordinary people. The Republicans and Liberals put the blame for their disastrous result on Pannella. The presence of the fiery Radical in their list had deterred moderate voters while failing to attract any new basin of support. Against this reductive interpretation
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Pannella himself-who secured election in the south-pointed out that in his own constituency the list had gained 1.3 per cent, the problem derived rather from the lack of commitment to unity and mutual respect on the part of others. No less surprised by the outcome of the election than the politicians, the press was generally cautious in its reporting of the results. The fact that the electorate had produced a verdict contrary to all forecasts was evidently a source of some embarrassment. The Corriere dellu sera’s headline on 20 June read ‘Majority Disappointed: Crisis more Difficult’ while La Stumpa, in a similar vein, ran the title ‘A Warning for the Five Parties’. La Repubblicu also stressed the surprise element of the outcome. In his editoral comment Eugenio Scalfari expressed satisfaction that the corrupt and mediocre parties in office had been punished while the new PC1 had been rewarded. This would stimulate the parties to govern more efficiently. Other commentators, however, were more prudent. In the Corriere de&z swu Gianfranco Piazzesi warned of the destabilizing effects of the vote. The left that had won, he wrote, was not a left of government but of protest. As such it was likely to make the tasks of administration more difficult rather than easier. It is significant that newspapers which prior to the vote of 18 June had focused almost entirely on national issues were compelled, in order to decipher the vote, to make reference to European trends. In what was a striking indictment of its own failure to grasp the broader context of the campaign, the press noted that few of the developments in Italy constituted exceptions to what seemed to be a general European pattern. Across Europe the Greens gained support and in a number of countries so did the racist right. The results were also generally favourable for parties of the left and negative for government. Thus in the days following the elections far more space was dedicated to the political situation in the other member nations of the EC and to the composition of the new Parliament than in the course of the whole of the campaign. Two questions remain to be answered by way of conclusion. First, is it possible to isolate any specific features which distinguish this and other European election campaigns from regular Italian electoral contests? The contrast between the results of the local polls of 28 May and those of 18 June suggest that in fact there may be a significant structural difference. The division of the country into five zones and the reduced number of candidates with respect to national and local elections both make it very much more difficult for votes to be exchanged for favours or promises of material advantage. Albeit only marginally, this damages parties which rely heavily on the resourcefulness of single candidates and aids those, like the Communists and the Greens, which seek votes purely on the basis of opinion. The second point concerns the Italian role at Strasbourg. What is the quality of the parties’ involvement likely to be? It is at this point that the homogeneous attitude maintained during the campaign fragments, for despite their active role in the electoral battle, few of the party leaders elected are likely to take their seats in the European Parliament. Instead their places will be filled by those who just failed to be returned. The only exception concerns the PCI. llndeterred by the assembly’s limited influence, the Communists regard it as a privileged terrain in their own campaign for legitimation. In this sense it is significant that one of their first acts in the aftermath of the election was to announce that they would not rejoin the Communist group but instead would seek some form of affiliation with the Socialist group. Whether this represents a foretaste of future political alliances in the domestic arena remains to be seen.
Studies ( 1989).
8:3. 288-295
Italy Unilwsit?,
College,
Oxford, England
As in most member nations of the EC, European elections in Italy are heavil) conditioned by domestic political events. Deeply intertwined with the normal flom of political life, they offer little opportunity to the parties to rise above the parochial and address matters of wider relevance. More frequently they are viewed as a chance for them to test their support and enhance their leverage within the national political arena. Thus it is inevitable that such elections be interpreted principally. as local contests in which the stakes are moral and psychological rather than material. Only in so far as European issues are seen as contributing to the potential moral victoq of one or more parties do they tend to be deployed in a campaign. Even more than in 1984, the 1989 poll in Italy was rich with local implications. Indeed it came to be seen almost as a substitute general election as the Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita resigned less than a month before polling, precipitating the country into a government crisis that would remain open beyond the end of the campaign. The causes of this most recent breakdown in relations between five parties (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI) which have governed the country more or less without interruption for 25 years were threefold. Only the third of these may be considered to be of more than short term relevance. In the first place De Mita’s own position had been gravely undermined at the congress of the DC in February at which he was ousted from the secretaryship after a tenure lasting some eight years. This neither enhanced his standing among the DC’s allies nor augered well for the future of his administration. Secondly, fearing the government’s mediocre record might damage his party politically, the Socialist leader Craxi announced a withdrawal of confidence at the end of the PSI congress in mid-May. This act was undoubtedly the immediate cause of De Mita’s downfall. However, the weight of a third factor should not be underestimated. In causing instability within the coalition and nervousness inside the PSI, the renewed activism of the PC1 was clearly of prime importance. After a long period in which their party seemed almost reconciled to its own decline, the (Communists have emerged under the new leadership of Achille Occhetto as a force determined to return to the forefront of political life. Definitively freed of the culture of the Historic Compromise. the PC1 challenged thr government on the environment, on citizens’ rights and on its commitment to tackling organized crime. It also supported a highly successful one-day general strike against the introduction of unpopular prescription and medical charges. For this reason the timing of De Mita’s resignation provoked the displeasure of the
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289
In this tense and confused atmosphere the Italian parties began their campaigns for the European election. Yet although domestic issues were paramount at the outset, international developments intervened unexpectedly to make the election one of the most bitterly fought of recent years. The Campaign: Issues and Personalities In all, 14 parties or groupings deposited their symbols and lists of candidates before the deadline of 9 May. All the major parties fielded their leaders in one or more constituencies, indicating a full-scale involvement at the highest level. In addition most party lists included a good number of other well-known politicians, city mayors and independents recruited from the arts, academia, journalism or the entertainment world. The greatest novelty was offered by the candidature of a small, but significant number of foreign nationals, permitted under a law passed in 1988. Responding to the petition of a local magistrate, the Constitutional Court rejected objections to such candidates on 31 May. The DC lists offered few surprises. The recently elected party secretary Forlani headed the campaign in the constituency of central Italy while other prominent figures played a leading role in the other four zones. The PC1 fielded an impressive number of independent candidates including the French political scientist and constitutionalist Maurice Duverger, whose role as personal adviser to President Mitterrand was highlighted as proof of the close links recently established between the party and the French Socialists. The Republican-Liberal Federation lists included the former leader of the British Liberal party David Steel. Also featured among this grouping’s candidates was the popular Radical politician Marco Pannella, whose party did not stand in the election in its own right but instead occupied ‘guest slots’ in no fewer than four different lists. Among these were the Rainbow Greens, an alternative list formed at the last minute following the breakdown in negotiations aimed at the formation of a joint list with the official Greens. The whole of the first part of the campaign was dominated by the government crisis. Following an initial round of consultations with the parties, President Cossiga invited Giovanni Spadolini, Speaker of the Senate, to undertake a further exploration of party attitudes with a view to establishing the conditions for renewed collaboration. Conducted at snail’s pace in an ill-concealed effort to gain time and delay the appointment of a prime minister designate, these meetings attracted the irony of satirists as well as the barbed comments of opposition parties. By contrast virtually no attention at all was dedicated to the referendum due to be held in conjunction with the elections of 18 June. Promoted by the Communists and the European Federalists this consultation was designed to secure a popular mandate for a reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament. The lack of controversy it aroused reflects the unanimously pro-European stance of the Italian parties. Although local political disputes occupied centre stage, each party endeavoured to outdo its rivals in appearing outward-looking and internationalist. The Christian Democrats stressed their long record of commitment to European unity while Communists and Socialists argued over their respective links to other West European Socialist parties. For their part the Republicans and Liberals highlighted their loyalty to a strong Western defence system. In the three weeks prior to voting two sets of local elections provided important tests of public opinion. On 28 May a number of communes, mainly in the south,
290
Ita!lt
went to the polls to elect new councils. The results revealed significant advances for the government parties while the PCI, in areas where it is traditionally weak, slipped back markedly. The Communists reacted strongly however, claiming that clientelism and criminal pressures had distorted the outcome of the poll. The results of the corruption-free Sardinian regional elections on 11 June reflected a similar trend but this time the cause of the PCI’s poor showing was quite different. Following the repression of the students’ protest in Peking, the parties of the centre and right turned their fire on the Communists, accusing them of ideological complicity with the Chinese regime. Although the PC1 was in fact the only force to express its support for the students and organize a campaign of solidarity from the very start, the Socialists also added their voice to this chorus, arguing that the party should recognize the historic failure of its cause and accept once and for all the premises of Western-style reformist socialism. Right up until 18 June an all-out assault was sustained against the PCI, highlighting its alleged lack of democratic credentials. In this way the parties hoped to strike a blow against an electoral bloc that between the general elections of 1983 and 19%’ had already dropped in size from 29.9 per cent to 26.6 per cent. But in so doing, Occhetto responded, they revealed an anti-democratic inclination in themselves that contrasted with the PCI’s proven record of commitment to pluralism, political democracy and non-violence. The crisis of world Communism filled the pages of newspapers and magazines in the final days of campaigning, overshadowing even COSSigI’S decision to call a halt to Spadolini’s explorations and entrust the mandate to form a new government to De Mita. It also dominated television coverage in the final two days before polling as Occhetto, CmXi and the Radical party secretary Stanzani took part in the Budapest funeral ceremony which marked the political rehabilitation of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and its leader Nagy. The expectations of the parties reflected the conduct of the campaign. The DC ms cautiously hopeful of an increase in its support while the PSI fixed a minimum target of 15 per cent that it anticipated would be surpassed with ease. The PRI-PI.1 federation declared that an 8 or 9 per cent share of the vote would be considered satisfactory. For their part the Communists argued that anything over the 23 per cent of the Sardinian elections would be interpreted as a success. The Media: Words
and Images
Ten years ago the press, television and radio still played a relatively minor role in Italian elections. The bulk of campaigning was done at open-air rallies, while the parties used a variety of forms of bribery or persuasion to encourage their followers to vote. Fluctuations were minimal and floating votes almost non-existent. In recent times much of this has changed. Although the PC1 and many of the smaller parties and individual Christian of the left still use traditional campaign techniques, Democrats and Socialists are not averse to promising favours and privileges in return for votes, the balance has shifted and all the leading parties now recognize the importance of a successful media campaign. The print media played a broadly passive role in the European elections. Out of habit or laziness the major newspapers confined themselves to reporting the speeches of political leaders and mirroring the themes and arguments thrown up by the parties, By br the most important topic was taken to be the domestic
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government crisis, at least until the two weeks prior to voting, when reports and discussions of events in China and Hungary as well as the elections in Poland took pride of place. Examinations of Italy’s record within the EC or of the possible effects of greater economic and political integration were notable by their absence. In part the problem derives from the strong party affiliation of many journalists and editors, who feel obliged to kowtow to their political masters. But the absence of a tradition of investigative journalism also means that newspapers have few independent means of testing the mood of the country. This situation is exacerbated by the notorious inaccuracy of Italian opinion polls. On this occasion only the weekly news magazine L’Espresso made recourse to a device whose unreliability has caused many a misplaced forecast in the past. The magazine’s final poll one week before voting placed the DC at 33.3 per cent, the PC1 at 25.4 per cent, the PSI at 15.1 per cent, the PRI-PLI federation at 8.7 per cent and the Greens at 5.2 per cent. Television provided a focus to the campaign rather than newspapers. In accordance with established practice, the public broadcasting corporation RAI instituted ‘election tribunes’ in which the leader of each party or list was called in turn to respond to the questions of a panel of ten journalists. Controlled directly by a parliamentary committee, these programmes guaranteed a measure of impartiality and equilibrium if not very lively viewing. On the evening of Friday 16 June each party was allowed to make a brief direct appeal to the electorate. The coverage of the election by the unregulated private television sector was patchy, with only Berlusconi’s news-oriented network Rete Quattro offering time on a par with RAI. The format too was basically the same, but a reduced number of journalists and more dynamic presentation made for more pointed questioning and on the whole more informative discussion. However, the late evening time slot ensured that the programmes only reached a limited audience. Not known at the best of times for their impartiality the news broadcasts of the three RAI channels are more or less openly regarded as the respective feuds of DC, PSI and PCI. In keeping with their reputations they were turned virtually into megaphones for these three parties for the duration of the election campaign. The most obvious sign of this was in the total lack of coverage accorded to the campaigns of a number of small parties and lists. A further advantage which the larger parties have over small or new ones derives from their ability to block-buy television advertising space on the private networks. As in the general election of 1987 Berlusconi made such space available to all parties at a discount of 70 per cent on normal commercial rates, but it still remained beyond the means of all but seven of them. However, most of the latter took up as much space as they could afford. A spokesman for the DC admitted that between 70 and 75 per cent of the party’s total campaign budget would be absorbed in this way. To design their media campaigns the DC, PSI and PRI-PLI federation all engaged the services of advertising agencies. For the DC the ltalian affiliate of the American multinational, Young and Rubicam, devised a strategy articulated through various media that stressed the identification of the party with Italy. As on other occasions in the recent past the Socialist campaign hinged almost exlusively on the personal charisma of Craxi, whose image was reproduced ad infinitum in a veritable bombardment of television and newspaper advertisements in the final week of the election. In a lower profile campaign reflecting more limited resources the centre federation employed the image of a tricolour apple to suggest the freshness and novelty of their union.
292
Ita!>
Of the leading parties the Communists made least use of television. Nor did they employ an advertising agency. Yet their campaign was no less professional. Directed by the PCI’s able press and propaganda officer with the aid of some outside experts close to the party, it was on the whole more issue-based than those of other parties. However, the image of an infant taking its first steps was used in television and newspaper advertisements to convey the idea of a force reborn and full of promise for the future. Moreover a long held taboo against the identification of parties with their leaders was broken in the final seven days of campaigning as advertisements featuring Occhetto appeared in the press and on television. At a lower level everything followed well-established patterns. Election meetings large and small took place up and down the country as candidates of all parties scrambled for preference votes. Intellectuals signed appeals on behalf of this or that party or candidate. For once, however, religious interference was minimal, Although prominent clergymen offered discreet support to a number of Christian Democrats, no official announcement was made urging Catholics to vote for the DC. The Results
Within hours of the close of polling it became clear that the predictions of parties and pundits were ill-founded. The success of the Communists, who unexpectedly improved their position on the 1987 election, and the striking growth in supportby Italian standards-for the Greens provided the subject of much debate in the election specials of the three public television and radio channels. Of scarcely less interest was the failure of the DC to consolidate its position, the evaporation of all Socialist hopes of a substantial advance and the crushing defeat suffered by the Liberal-Republican federation. To complete a surprising picture, several minor lists also made rather more impact than had been anticipated. Comparisons were drawn both with 1987 and with the previous European elections of 1984 but in general the former was taken as the truer bench mark. This should not be read only as a sign that national calculations took pride of place for it was recognized that the balance of political forces in the country had altered considerably since 1984 and that in any case the European vote of that year had been distorted by the emotional impact of the sudden death of Enrico Berlinguer. In this analysis therefore comparisons will be made principally with 1987. Full results are shown in Table 1. At 81.5 per cent the turnout rate marked a decline on the 1984 figure of 85.3 per cent. Whether or not this can be interpreted as a sign of disaffection is open to debate. A more immediate cause may have been the fine weather which both DC and PSI were convinced induced potential supporters not to return from weekend trips to the seaside in order to vote. A more alarming note was struck by the increase in blank and null votes. These rose from 3.2 per cent in 1979 to 5.2 per cent in 198-t and 7.1 per cent in 1989. In all probability this stands as proof of a growing antipathy towards party politics noted by numerous observers in recent years. The DC gained one seat even though its share of the vote dropped by 0.1 per cent compared with 1984. Relative to 1987 the party suffered a more marked setback of 1.4 per cent. Despite this it was able to draw comfort from the fact that, with 32.9 per cent it recovered its position as the largest Italian party in the European Parliament. Although no candidate quailed the record of 1,053,OOO preference votes accumulated by De Mita in 1984, several Christian Democrats
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TABLE1. The 1989 and 1984 European election results and 1987 general election results Parties
European election 1989 %
European election 1984 %
General election 1987 %
32.9 27.6 14.8 5.5 2.7 4.4
33.0 33.3 11.2 6.5 3.5 6.1 3.4 1.4 -
34.3 26.6 14.3 5.9 2.9 5.8’ 2.6 1.7 0.5 2.5
DC PC1 PSI MS1 PSDI PRI-PLI P. Bad DP L. Lombarda Verdi Verdi Arcob. Others
1.3 1.8 3.8 2.4 2.H
1.6
2.9
*In 1987 the two parties ran separately. Sources: I1 Corriere della m-a, 20.6.89; La Repubblica,
European elections seats 1984 1989 27 22 12 4 2 4 1 2 3 2 2
26 27 9 5 3 5 3 1 2
20.6.89; L’clnitir,
20.6.87. Turnout: 1989,81.5%; 1984, 5.2%.
1984,84.1%:
1987,88.9%.
Blank and null 1989,7.1%;
scored personal successes. The DC’s least satisfactory results were obtained in its traditional stronghold in the south. Overall it lost 2.8 per cent in this constituency.
The 1 per cent increase in the PC1 vote since 1987 was deemed to be far more significant than the drop of 5.7 per cent since 1984. Even though the party lost five seats at Strasbourg, the result was viewed as a personal triumph for Occhetto. It seems clear that the very difficult campaign produced a return to the fold of voters who had drifted away since the 1970s and attracted others in the large cities repelled by the opportunist exploitation of events in China by the other parties. Several Communist independents fared well (Maurice Duverger securing election in two constituencies) while the decision to offer the candidatures of popular local mayors also yielded positive results. The modest Socialist gain of 0.5 per cent was disproportionately concentrated in the south, where Craxi won 650,000 preference votes, more than any other single candidate in any constituency. Here PSI support went up by 1.5 per cent whereas elsewhere it remained broadly stationary. In two cities the PSI suffered notable setbacks. In Milan, the party’s stronghold par excellence, it sank from 18.5 per cent in 1987 to 17.7 per cent. In Palermo, where it had been engaged in a propaganda war against the anti-mafia administration of DC, PC1 and Greens, it plummetted from 16.4 per cent to 11.8 per cent. In part the poor Socialist performance may have been due to errors in the selection of candidates. Of the independent candidates it fielded, only the popular television journalist Giuliano Ferrara and the former leader of the Catholic trade union Pierre Carniti attracted new votes to the party. Undoubtedly one of the surprises of the election was the collapse of the PRI-PLI federation. In contrast to 1984, the two parties stressed that their alliance was not merely one of electoral convenience but a step towards eventual unification. Yet the total of 4.4 per cent fell well short not only of the poor result of 6.1 per cent reached in 1984 but also represented a decline with respect to the 5.8 per cent the two parties secured separately in 1987. Neither the Liberal leader Altissimo nor
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294
David Steel won election. The far right MSI, facing its first election since the death of its historic leader Giorgio Almirante, fared relatively well, maintaining 5.5 per cent with the loss of one seat. Similarly relieved to conserve most of their share of the vote were the Social Democrats,
who recently
split into two as a result of Craxi’s alleged attempt
to annex the party. At 2.7 per cent they held two of their three seats. At their first European election the Greens advanced significantly despite acrimony between two competing lists. The ‘original’ Greens continued their upward trend, achieving a 3.8 per cent share, while the Rainbow Greens scored a respectable 2.4 per cent. More political and party-minded, the latter grouping drew together members of the Radical Party and the ecologist wing of the far left DP. which also managed to win one seat, As Green analysts were quick to note, their list fared particularly well where it formed part of the local administration. In Palermo
it won
significant
7.6 per cent
successes
for example
of all though
were
and in Salerno
concentrated
8 per cent.
in the north-east.
the Green vote reached 14 per cent and in Bolzano 11.6 per cent. Among the minor lists the racist Lombard League attracted more expected,
capturing
list, which
ran a shoe-string
possession, Virtually plebiscite
a remarkable
8.1 per cent
campaign
in Lombardy.
in opposition
The
most
In Trento votes
than
The Anti-Prohibition
to proposals
to outlaw all drug
won 427,000 votes, enough to elect one deputy- to Strasbourg. forgotten in discussion of the results, the referendum produced of 88.1 per cent in favour of greater
powers
a
for the EP. The 11.9 per cent
who voted against were concentrated disproportionately in the south. Post-election commentary revealed marked differences in the way parties interpreted the outcome. The DC put a brave face on its mediocre showing and denied that it had ever expected
that Communist
support would collapse.
It stressed
the fact that it had gained one seat and sought as quickly as possible to shift the emphasis towards the question of resolving the month-old government crisis. For their part the Communists could scarcely believe their good fortune. The headline of the party daily L’Unit& on 19 June read ‘PC1 surprise: it wins’. In psychological
terms
the result
was evidently
far more
important
than its material
dimensions. After an almost uninterrupted downward slide lasting ten years, the party felt that it had finally reversed the trend. For the first time since 1976 hundreds of activists gathered at the PC13 headquarters in Rome to acclaim the party leader. In his comment on the result Occhetto proclaimed the failure of those who had sought to eliminate the party and demanded that the PSI revise its strategy of cooperation with the DC. Of all the parties perhaps the PSI was the most disappointed. In their first comments Socialist spokesmen sought to conceal this. Much was made of the fact that, of the government parties, only the PSI had gained votes. The party could also boast three extra seats at Strasbourg. But it was evident that something had gone wrong. Craxi himself flew to the congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm on 19 June without releasing any comment. Several days later he argued that he had fought a solitary campaign with little support from his lieutenants, In marked contrast with this judgement other Socialists blamed Craxi himself for narrowing the party’s appeal and allowing it to lose contact with the needs of ordinary people. The Republicans and Liberals put the blame for their disastrous result on Pannella. The presence of the fiery Radical in their list had deterred moderate voters while failing to attract any new basin of support. Against this reductive interpretation
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Pannella himself-who secured election in the south-pointed out that in his own constituency the list had gained 1.3 per cent, the problem derived rather from the lack of commitment to unity and mutual respect on the part of others. No less surprised by the outcome of the election than the politicians, the press was generally cautious in its reporting of the results. The fact that the electorate had produced a verdict contrary to all forecasts was evidently a source of some embarrassment. The Corriere dellu sera’s headline on 20 June read ‘Majority Disappointed: Crisis more Difficult’ while La Stumpa, in a similar vein, ran the title ‘A Warning for the Five Parties’. La Repubblicu also stressed the surprise element of the outcome. In his editoral comment Eugenio Scalfari expressed satisfaction that the corrupt and mediocre parties in office had been punished while the new PC1 had been rewarded. This would stimulate the parties to govern more efficiently. Other commentators, however, were more prudent. In the Corriere de&z swu Gianfranco Piazzesi warned of the destabilizing effects of the vote. The left that had won, he wrote, was not a left of government but of protest. As such it was likely to make the tasks of administration more difficult rather than easier. It is significant that newspapers which prior to the vote of 18 June had focused almost entirely on national issues were compelled, in order to decipher the vote, to make reference to European trends. In what was a striking indictment of its own failure to grasp the broader context of the campaign, the press noted that few of the developments in Italy constituted exceptions to what seemed to be a general European pattern. Across Europe the Greens gained support and in a number of countries so did the racist right. The results were also generally favourable for parties of the left and negative for government. Thus in the days following the elections far more space was dedicated to the political situation in the other member nations of the EC and to the composition of the new Parliament than in the course of the whole of the campaign. Two questions remain to be answered by way of conclusion. First, is it possible to isolate any specific features which distinguish this and other European election campaigns from regular Italian electoral contests? The contrast between the results of the local polls of 28 May and those of 18 June suggest that in fact there may be a significant structural difference. The division of the country into five zones and the reduced number of candidates with respect to national and local elections both make it very much more difficult for votes to be exchanged for favours or promises of material advantage. Albeit only marginally, this damages parties which rely heavily on the resourcefulness of single candidates and aids those, like the Communists and the Greens, which seek votes purely on the basis of opinion. The second point concerns the Italian role at Strasbourg. What is the quality of the parties’ involvement likely to be? It is at this point that the homogeneous attitude maintained during the campaign fragments, for despite their active role in the electoral battle, few of the party leaders elected are likely to take their seats in the European Parliament. Instead their places will be filled by those who just failed to be returned. The only exception concerns the PCI. llndeterred by the assembly’s limited influence, the Communists regard it as a privileged terrain in their own campaign for legitimation. In this sense it is significant that one of their first acts in the aftermath of the election was to announce that they would not rejoin the Communist group but instead would seek some form of affiliation with the Socialist group. Whether this represents a foretaste of future political alliances in the domestic arena remains to be seen.