Landslide risk perception, social vulnerability and community resilience: The case study of Maierato (Calabria, southern Italy)

Journal Pre-proof Landslide risk perception, social vulnerability and community resilience: The case study of Maierato (Calabria, southern Italy) Loredana Antronico, Francesco De Pascale, Roberto Coscarelli, Giovanni Gullà PII:

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101529

Reference:

IJDRR 101529

To appear in:

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

Received Date: 27 November 2019 Revised Date:

14 February 2020

Accepted Date: 14 February 2020

Please cite this article as: L. Antronico, F. De Pascale, R. Coscarelli, G. Gullà, Landslide risk perception, social vulnerability and community resilience: The case study of Maierato (Calabria, southern Italy), International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101529. This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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LANDSLIDE

RISK

PERCEPTION,

SOCIAL

VULNERABILITY

AND

COMMUNITY

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RESILIENCE: THE CASE STUDY OF MAIERATO (CALABRIA, SOUTHERN ITALY)

3 4

Loredana Antronico, Francesco De Pascale, Roberto Coscarelli, Giovanni Gullà

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Italian National Research Council, Research Institute for Geo-Hydrological Protection, Via Cavour, 4-6,

7

87036

8

[email protected], [email protected]

Rende,

Italy;

e-mail:

[email protected];

[email protected],

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Corresponding author Loredana Antronico [email protected]

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Abstract

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Community resilience is the ability of people exposed to disasters, crises and underlying vulnerabilities, to

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anticipate, to prepare for, to reduce the impact of, to cope with and to recover from the effects of shocks and

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stresses without compromising their long-term prospects. In February 2010, the town of Maierato (Calabria,

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southern Italy) was hit by a large landslide, which radically changed the morphology of the territory and

18

produced an important social and economic impact. The aim of this paper is to deal with the concepts of

19

social vulnerability and community resilience, within the framework of the landslide risk governance and the

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perception of the risk. Survey was conducted by means of a structured questionnaire interviewing 200 adults.

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Results, analyzed by means of qualitative methods with the support of descriptive statistics, highlighted

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several important remarks. Globally, this case study indicates that urgent actions should be taken to reduce

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disaster-risk such as: improving citizens’ understanding of disaster management, reinforcing risk governance

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to improve disaster management, investing in risk mitigation and programs fostering adaptation and

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resilience, improving emergency planning strategies.

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Keywords: landslide risk, public perception, social vulnerability, community resilience, Calabria (Italy)

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1. Introduction

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Studies carried out on disaster related social vulnerability caused by extreme natural events are one of the

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pillars of the scientific approach to the field of social skills [1]. They have contributed to increase the

33

knowledge about populations and territories, thus improving the processes that promote risk governance in

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all its steps [2].

35

Vulnerability is defined in the Hyogo Framework for Action as «the conditions determined by physical,

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social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to

37

the impact of hazards» [3]. Starting from this definition, several attempts have been made to empirically 1

38

define this concept, by taking into account several factors. On one side, physical conditions (i.e. proximity to

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hazard and damage conditions of the housing stock), and environmental conditions were highlighted; on the

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other social, economic and demographical feature of the affected populations were considered as well [4].

41

All the elements above vary across time and space and their interaction affects the degree of hazard exposure

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and the adaptive capacity of an area [5]. Social vulnerability is, therefore, a feature of a place and of

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individuals and social groups [1]. Several studies have been conducted to assess the social vulnerability in a

44

specific area. Examples are studies in the United States [6], China [7], the United Kingdom [8, 9], Israel

45

[10], Netherlands [11], Germany [12], and Italy [13]. The concept of resilience, despite its semantic

46

difference, is strictly related and complementary to social vulnerability. The term resilience is taken from

47

other disciplines, such as material sciences, where it defines the ability of a substance to withstand shocks

48

without breaking and to spring back into its original shape. The migration of the term resilience to the social

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sciences began in the 1950s with the study of developmental psychopathology of children [14, 15, 16].

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Finally, the concept of resilience was included in sociology and human geography [17, 18], in the sense of

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resilient communities [16]. The term adopted by social sciences not only in relation to disasters generated by

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natural events, but generally related to any change or critical situation affecting an area, refers to the ability

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of a community to resist and recover from the injuries suffered. Therefore, community resilience is the

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ability of communities (and their members) that are exposed to disasters, crises and underlying

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vulnerabilities to anticipate, prepare for, reduce the impact of, cope with and recover from the effects of

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shocks and stresses without compromising their long-term prospects [19].

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community is resilient the greater its ability to develop solutions to overcome the difficulties caused by an

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external event and restore a new internal balance [20, 1]. Economic stability, strength of productive

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activities, infrastructure quality, and strong social cohesion are some of the features of a resilient community

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[21]. While the concept of vulnerability takes into account everything that is potentially exposed to damage

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and could affected by the consequences of an external event, being before the occurrence of a disaster [22],

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the concept of resilience implies the ability of a territorial system to face all phases of risk management,

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including the pre- and post-event stages [23].

64

The aim of this paper is to deal with the concepts of social vulnerability and community resilience at a local

65

scale, within the framework of the landslide risk governance and the perception of the risk by the community

66

of the town of Maierato (Calabria, southern Italy). In February 2010, this small community was hit by a large

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landslide, which radically changed the morphology of the territory and produced an important social and

68

economic impact. Specifically, starting from the peculiar context of the community of Maierato after the

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large landslide, we wanted to investigate the impact of risk perception of the community in relation to the

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landslide event experienced in 2010 and how this perception changed over the last eight years. Furthermore,

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the study examined which elements of social vulnerability remained after the shock; social vulnerability is

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«context-dependent and is often associated with the degree of exposure to extreme events, and with the

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preparedness and resilience of individuals and social groups» [24]. As we will see throughout the paper, the

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analysis of social vulnerability includes some critical aspects including psychological, cultural, political and

Essentially, the more a

2

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economic factors. In particular, in the case under investigation, social perception, social vulnerability and

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protection issues will be analyzed within the framework of resilient behaviors of the community. The tools

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employed will mainly be qualitative methodologies applied to a limited geographical area: a town located in

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the inner part of Calabria. The aim of this study is, thus, to provide a contribution in order to define an

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approach which could help local authorities in developing and implementing a strategy, as effective as

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possible, to manage residual risk, by means of the integration of (structural and non-structural) preventive

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actions and adaptation measures which might help in the study of risk perception and resilience among the

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local community. Finally, the results obtained will provide useful tools to link knowledge on risk perception

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to landslide risk management.

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2. The case study and risk management

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On 15 February 2010, as a result of intense and long-lasting rainfalls, a large landslide (volume ~5 million

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cubic meters) occurred on the left slope of the Scotrapiti Torrent, near the town of Maierato (Calabria, Italy),

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Fig. 1. The town of Maierato is located in the immediate hinterland of the S. Eufemia Gulf (southern area of

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the Tyrrhenian side of Calabria) at about 250 m a.s.l. It is a small town composed of a historical centre and a

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newly developed urban area with a total population of 2279 inhabitants (2010 Italian Census).

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The landslide, which fortunately did not cause any human casualties, destroyed a few uninhabited country

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houses and a ~800-m stretch of the S.P. 55 (provincial road) an important road that provides access to the

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inhabited area. It also generated a small lake along the Scotrapiti Torrent, and caused the loss of about 18 ha

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of olive orchards and farmland. Geological and geomorphologic field studies, as well as aerial photo

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interpretation pointed out that the slope involved by the event of February 2010 had in the past been affected

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by various landslides of an (apparently) limited extension, which – however – had a negative impact on the

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traffic along the Provincial Road and made the exploitation of agricultural land more difficult. In particular,

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the event prior to the landslide of February 15th 2010, dated back to March 10th 2009 (Borrelli et al. 2014).

99

Geological and geomorphologic field studies, aerial photos interpretation and film shots taken during the

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paroxysmal phase of the event, allowed to reconstruct the geometry and dynamics of the landslide [25]. The

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landslide involved late Miocene to Plio-Pleistocene sedimentary rocks consisting of (bottom to top)

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hemipelagic marls, evaporitic limestone, silty clay, silt, and continental sand and conglomerate. After the

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evolution, the landslide displayed the following morphological characteristics: overall length 1400m,

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maximum width of main scarp about 530 m and area about 3 × 105 m2. The slip surface, which has been

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developed on the hemipelagic marls, has a maximum depth of 50 m. The movement is a complex one,

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consisting of a very rapid slide of rock and earth and of flow of debris and earth. It consisted in the

107

reactivation and partial retrogressive extension of a preexisting landslide of alleged seismic origin, remaining

108

at an incipient stage. Furthermore, Borrelli et al. [25] showed that about a year earlier (March 10, 2009) the

109

slope involved by the event of February 2010 had been affected by a landslide of limited extension, which

110

however had a negative impact on the traffic along the S.P. 55 and on the agricultural.

3

111

Following the 2010 landslide event, the competent authorities started a series of actions in the municipality

112

of Maierato. In the light of the focus of this paper, we briefly report the emergency response and risk

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management approaches set up by the institutional administrations before, during and after the occurrence of

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the landslide. In the morning of February 15th 2010, as a consequence of severe cracks along the Provincial

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Road (S.P. 55) the local authorities denied access to the area which was later affected by the landslide. A few

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hours later, between 4.55 and 5.08 PM of the same day the paroxysmal phase of the landslide started. The

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landslide evolved from a compound slide to a rapid flow [25]. The day after, vis-à-vis the size of the

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landslide and the relevance of its effects on the areas close to the inhabited part of the town, the Mayor

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issued two decrees ordering the evacuation of the whole population of Maierato (about 2,300 people) and the

120

closure of shops, businesses and places of public interest. Simultaneously, emergency Civil Protection

121

measures were implemented, including helicopter and in-situ surveys to assess, as rapidly as possible, the

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need for prolonging the evacuation of the areas. In the evening of February 17th, the Provincial Government

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of Vibo Valentia was authorized to start works to ensure the safety of the landslide affected area with the

124

utmost urgency and to carry out surveys. A monitoring network to manage the residual risk in the short

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period (in emergency) was also implemented. On February 19th, as a result of surveys carried out by experts,

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the definition of the area at risk was completed and “a state of emergency” was formally announced. On

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February 23rd, based on the results of surveys an order issued by the Mayor allowed residents of “safe” areas

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to go back to their houses, in particular the citizens who lived in the old town. However, about 300 people

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were prevented to access their houses located in the area under surveillance. On March 1st school activities

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started again and, as a result of a new Order municipal Ordinance, the number of evacuated citizen further

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decreased to about 250 people.

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Since 31st March 2010 (when the Order Ordinance of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers defining the

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modalities to face the emergency was issued) until 2013 (the year when the emergency period officially

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concluded), the activities carried out in the area were regulated by 62 Orders Ordinance of the President of

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the Regione Calabria, acting in his capacity of Deputy Commissioner for the management of the emergency.

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Basically, non-structural activities (studies, geological-gemorphological surveys, geotechnical investigations

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and monitoring, civil protection plans etc.), and structural operations (emergency remedial work and risk

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mitigation actions) were started. Among the non-structural initiatives, it is worth mentioning the Civil

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Protection Program (approved by a Decision of the local council in 2013) and the monitoring plan (extended

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until 2019). As for structural operations, the urgent action plan was completed in 2016, while risk mitigation

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plans have not been implemented yet. Currently, a dirt road constructed in the emergency phase is strictly

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used as service route because the provincial road (S.P. 55) has not yet been rebuilt.

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3. Methodology

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The survey was conducted by means of a structured questionnaire to obtain data on risk perception, social

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vulnerability and resilience of the Maierato community involved in the 2010 landslide disaster. The

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questionnaire includes 54 questions with different response formats: close questions (yes/no, multiple4

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choice, 3-level scale (in no way, low, high), 5-level scale (range 1-5)), and open-ended questions. Moreover,

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for some multiple-choice questions has been taken into account the priority of choices answers.

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The questionnaire is organized in 5 sections each investigating on some research questions that were useful

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to reach the goal of the survey. The first section (Geo-hydrological risk perception and recent landslide

152

experience) investigates the following research questions: i) knowledge and perception of exposure to

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hazardous events in the territory where people live (in particular landslides and floods); ii) how people were

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affected by the landslide event in 2010; iii) people’s perception and satisfaction of activities carried out by

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the authorities shortly after the event and after 8 years since the landslide occurrence. The second section

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(Vulnerability factors of the family) contains research questions about: i) people information on landslide

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risk of the territory and on actions and protective measures taken by Aauthorities at local level; ii) individual

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and community preparedness to cope with damaging events; iii) the social groups that were most vulnerable

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by the 2010 landslide event. The third section (Coping strategies of family) focuses on ability to cope with

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socio-economic problems and fears connected to dangerous events. The fourth section (Community and

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family resilience) contains research questions about: i) how the people manage traumatic events as

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landslides, floods, etc.; ii) how the community is reacting to reduce landslide risk and what actions should be

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taken by local policy-makers to reduce the landslide risk; iii) how much the population feel safe in their

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territory about the landslide risk. The last section includes socio-demographic questions.

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After a pre-testing questionnaire step, a total of 200 face-to-face interviews were conducted over a period of

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30 days in the January 2018 involving the inhabitants of Maierato (Fig. 1C). The method for selecting

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surveyed participants was non-proportional quota sampling. The population was divided into two layers

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based on the variables age and sex. The number of units (people) to be interviewed for each layer were

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selected by respecting the real percentages present in the Maierato population for each layer. The selection of

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the units in each layer was not randomized but it was carried out by interviewers by selecting the units and

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by making reference to a grid that allowed them good balance and a homogeneous distribution of polled

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people over the sampling area. Interviews lasted 20 minutes on average and all participants gave their

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voluntary and informed consensus before the interviews.

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The survey was prevalently conducted through qualitative methods with the support of quantitative

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methodologies (i.e. descriptive statistical analysis), in order to bridge the gaps of both survey techniques. As

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pointed out by Lucidi et al. [26], the tout court identification of qualitative research with exploratory-

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inductive method and of quantitative research with the hypothetical-deductive method is not possible, as both

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approaches use the exploratory method and sometimes also a-priori hypotheses are present and they need to

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be tested in qualitative research too. As highlighted by Hammersley [27], in the context of all surveys, both

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methods are used and conclusions are drawn moving from ideas to data (deductions) and from data to ideas

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(inductions).

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4. Results

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The paper focused on the analysis of some research questions in the questionnaire in order to detect the

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objectives to be followed, thus outlining the scope of the research. For this reason only answers to 38

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questions were considered out of 54 total questions (Appendix). A bottom-up (or inductive) approach was

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considered with the main aim of detecting concepts, topics and models from the bottom: in this way an in-

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depth analysis of the experiences lived by the people interviewed can be led [28]. The sample consisted of

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200 adult respondents; 49% of them were women and 51% men. 36% of respondents was aged between 18

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and 39, 35% between 40-59 years, and 29% were aged 60 or over. As regards employment, 11.5% were

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unemployed or seeking for a job for the first time, while most of the employed people were clerks (29%),

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followed by entrepreneurs, freelancers and managers (10%) as well as merchants, artisans, and farmers

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(8.5%). 17.5% were retired workers, 8% students, 12% housewives and 3.5% of them answered “other”.

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93% of respondents have lived in the town for at least 20 years or more.

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In order to analyse data and present them, the five point of the 5-level scale were recorded in three

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categories: “low” (1 and 2 combined), “medium” (3) and high (4 and 5 combined). Moreover, the analysis of

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the answer to open-ended questions was carried out through “exploratory coding” [26].

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4.1. Geo-hydrological risk perception and recent landslide experience

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In order to test respondents’ level of knowledge about geo-hydrological phenomena, we firstly asked them if

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they knew what a landslide and a flood was. 99.5% of citizens respondents believed they knew what a

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landslide was, while 97% of citizens respondents believed they knew what a flood was. We asked

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respondents to provide a short definition of landslide or flood, by means of an open-ended question. Data

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from open-ended questions showed that 170 respondents (85%) were able to provide a correct definition of

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the term “landslide”; 4 respondents identified the phenomenon with the extreme event experienced in 2010

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(“that of Maierato”); 8 respondents provided a definition by using a hyperbolic language (ex: “a great flood

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of water and earth”) or by linking their definition to a specific mood or fear (“fear to be overwhelmed”); 14

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respondents described it in relation to the damage suffered, its consequences and dangerousness. Finally,

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only 4 respondents were not able to provide a correct definition of landslide. As to the term flood, only 74

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respondents (37%) provided a correct definition of the phenomenon. In particular, 2 respondents attributed

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the cause of floods to anthropic factors (“clogged holes”) and 11 to intense rainfalls. 126 respondents (63%)

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defined flood as “abundant rainfalls”, “intense rainfalls” and “water bombs”. Among those who claimed they

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knew these geo-hydrological phenomena, 81% derived their knowledge from direct experience, above all by

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referring to the landslide of 15th February 2010.

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We asked respondents (by means of a multiple-choice question) to indicate the factors they considered as the

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most influencing in triggering landslides and floods. The most frequent answer was lack of maintenance and

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remedial works along slopes and streams (120 answers), followed by illegal buildings (100), the lack of

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interest of local public administrators (92) and climate changes (91). Other categories mentioned were

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“features of the area” (70), farmland abandonment (60) and lack of citizen’s awareness towards

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environmental issues (42) Fig. 2. The answer “lack of maintenance and remedial works along slopes and 6

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streams” was also indicated by 29.5% of citizens respondents as priority 1 out of four potential answers.

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Other answers with priority 1 were “climate changes (17.5%), “lack of interest of local public

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administrators” (15.5%) and “illegal buildings” (14.5%).

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Figure 3 shows the respondents’ level of exposure to both natural (landslides, floods, earthquakes, tsunami

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and volcanic eruptions) and man-made hazardous events (environmental pollution, car accidents and terrorist

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attacks) in the territory where they live by means of a 3-level scale (in no way, low, high). 71% of

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respondents perceived the level of exposure to landslide as “high”. The percentages of "high perception" are

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57% for earthquakes, 54% for flood and 41% for environmental pollution.

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The most frequent answer to the multiple-choice question “who is responsible for the safety of natural

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hazards and to avoid damages to the people and housing stock?” was “local administrators” (171 out of 200),

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followed by Civil Protection (70 out of 200), central government administrators (60 out of 200) and private

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citizens (41 out of 200).

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In order to examine the experiences of residents in the recent landslide event, we firstly asked respondents if

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they had been affected by the landslide event of February 2010. 83% of respondents claimed they had been

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affected by such event (personally or their family members or relatives). The most frequent answer to the

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question “Being affected, what type of damages have you suffered?” was “the closure of an important road

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and consequent inconvenience” (137 answers), Fig. 4. The most frequent answer to question “How did you

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behave?”, was “I tried not to panic” (96 answers) followed by “I tried to help my neighbours” (72), “I tried

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to get info from TV, social networks, Internet, radio, neighbors and experts” (66).

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The next question focused on the possibility that such a huge event could have taken place in Maierato. 52%

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of respondents said they considered it as an “absolutely unexpected and unforeseeable event” while 38.5%

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affirmed “this was to be expected sooner or later”, while 9.5% answered “don’t know”. In an open-ended

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question, respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for their answer and they affirmed that suspicious

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signs had been long detected on the road affected by the landslide. However, none of them would have

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expected such a massive event.

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Respondents were asked if they had been involved in evacuation operations with their family members after

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the landslide and 87% of them answered “yes”. 18% of respondents involved in evacuation operations

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affirmed they had been subject to post-traumatic stress disorder, while 82% was not affected. Only 5.2% of

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the populations respondents involved in evacuation operations and affected by post-traumatic stress disorder

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affirmed they had received psychological support, while 94.8% answered they had not.

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Figure 5 shows respondents’ answers to the question on a 5-level scale merged into 3 categories (low,

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medium, high) related to their personal judgment on the activities performed by the authorities after the

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landslide and to the potential upgrades/worsening in the subsequent years. 54% was highly satisfied with the

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information on the event received by the media, while only 17% is very satisfied today (37 percentage points

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lower). 36% of the polled population was very satisfied with the interest shown by local authorities towards

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the situation after the landslide, while only 21% is today (15 percentage points lower). As to the safety

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initiatives carried out on the area at risk, 30% was very satisfied and 36% was averagely satisfied with what 7

258

had been done after the event, while only 21% is very satisfied and 41% averagely satisfied with the recent

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initiatives. 56% is totally dissatisfied with the interest shown by politicians after the event, while 48% is

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currently dissatisfied. 50% of respondents was very satisfied of the coordination among the forces working

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in the area after the event, while only 20% is satisfied with it today. 84% was dissatisfied with the economic

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support received after the event, and 88% is dissatisfied today.

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The multiple-choice question “According to you which of the following factors will increasingly be

264

important in favoring potential future landsliding events in Maierato?” obtained the following answers:

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anthropic impact (149), lack of interest of administrators (137) and climate (91). The answer “anthropic

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impact” was also indicated by 63.5% of respondents as a top priority in the order of three potential answers,

267

Fig. 6.

268 269

4.2. Vulnerability factors of the family

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In order to examine the factors contributing to the increase in vulnerability of the local community, we

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initially asked respondents (by means of ‘yes–no questions’), what categories had in their opinion been

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mainly affected by the landslide. According to 140 respondents those categories were elderly and disabled

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people; according to 13 respondents, those who owned (owns) business activities or farms had also been

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affected. According to respondents, the least affected were children and women. In the open-ended question

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respondents were asked to motivate their choices for their answers. Their answers were: i) fragility of elderly

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and disabled people and old people affective and emotional bonds with their houses in terms of the most

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affected categories; ii) women’s initiative, happiness and unawareness of children in terms of the least

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affected categories in the 2010 landslide.

279

The 4 more frequent answers to the multiple-choice question “According to you what were the main causes

280

of the 2010 landslide?” were: lack of maintenance works (127 answers), lack of interest of local

281

administrators (109), features of the area (82) and illegal housing and climate changes (70 answers each). If

282

we take into account the order of choice of the answers given by polled citizens, the main causes for the

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landslide of 2010 were: lack of maintenance and safety works along slopes and streams, ranking first for

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37.5% of responders, lack of interest of local administrators for 19%, climate changes for 14% of

285

respondents and features of the area for 13% of them.

286

We examined how respondents and their families felt informed about the landslide risk in Maierato. On a 3-

287

level scale (low, medium, high), 35% of respondents provided the answer “low”, 34% “medium”, while only

288

31% thought they are well informed. When respondents were asked question about the Municipal Civil

289

Protection Plan (PCPC), only 16.5% of respondents answered they knew about it and that they had read it,

290

28% said they knew what it was but they had not read it, 4% believed the municipality had not produced it

291

and, finally, 51.5% ignored whether the municipality had produced it or not.

292

The question “Are you aware of the works developed in Maierato for mitigating landslide risk?” received the

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following answers: 56.5% of respondents did not know anything about them; 29.5% was aware of them and

8

294

most of the respondents affirmed they were “water drainage works”, while 14% answered “there are no

295

works”.

296

We asked respondents to evaluate, on a 5-level scale merged into 3 categories (low, medium, high), their

297

personal preparedness to face a geo-hydrological event in the future. 31% of the people did not feel prepared

298

enough to face such an event, 35.5% defined “medium” their level of preparedness, only 23.5% thought they

299

were well prepared and 10% didn't know. By means of an open-ended question, we asked respondents about

300

the reasons for their evaluation of preparedness. The reasons provided were various: lack of information and

301

training, failure to take account of an emergency plan, lack of resources to face similar events and the feeling

302

of “abandonment”.

303 304

4.3. Coping strategies of families

305

In order to analyze what type of coping strategies had been adopted by families to reduce (face) stress as a

306

result of the 2010 landslide, we firstly asked respondents by means of a multiple-choice question, what they

307

had mainly done to reduce the social and economic impact of the disaster on their families. 70% affirmed

308

they “had temporarily moved to safer areas”, 20.5% of respondents answered “I did nothing”.

309

The multiple-choice question “After the landslide in Maierato of February 2010, how did you manage your

310

life deciding to stay, without being afraid that a new emergency may could occur?” received the following

311

answers: the majority of respondents said “I have a job here” (106 answers) followed by “there are lots of

312

families and neighbors close to me” (65 answers), “I relied on God and prayers” (40 answers) and “others”

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(39 answers) specified they had remained because “their families and houses were there”.

314

65% of the polled sample answered positively to the question related to the presence of a safe area that could

315

be reached in case of a landslide event. 32.5% of them indicated “the industrial area”, 32% the football

316

ground, 19% friends’ or relative’s houses and 16.5% answered “a private building”.

317 318

4.4. Community and family resilience

319

With the aim of investigating aspects related to personal and community resilience, by means of a multiple-

320

choice question, we asked how they coped with the sudden traumas and stress caused by landslide or other

321

calamities. The majority of respondents answered “thanks to family support” (146 answers) and “other” (33

322

answers), specifying they relied only “on their own abilities”, “they trust God or Madonna”, or “needed no

323

support”.

324

The multiple-choice question, “What measures should the government/local authorities take to reduce

325

landslide risks?” based on which respondents had to select the order of their choices, the top priority choice

326

was “have provisions on building permissions and land-use be respected” (28.5%), “install monitoring and

327

alert systems in landslide prone areas” (25%), “start awareness raising campaigns on landslides causes,

328

dangerousness and landslide-prone areas” (17%), “works of naturalistic engineering” (14%). Overall the

329

three main answers were: installing monitoring systems in landslide-prone areas (118 answers), have

330

provisions on building permissions and land-use be respected (113 answers), diffusion of Civil Protection 9

331

Plans (77 answers), followed by “awareness raising campaigns on landslides causes, dangerousness and

332

landslide-prone areas” (75 answers), “works of naturalistic engineering” (55 answers), Fig. 7.

333

As for the multiple-choice question about respondents’ perception on what the community (institutions,

334

associations, companies and citizens) is doing to reduce landslide risk, the most frequent response was

335

“nothing” or “don’t know” (85 answers), followed by “they are installing monitoring and alarm networks”

336

(67 answers), “more stringent regulations on building permissions have been issued” (38); “the population is

337

being informed” (24) and “trees are being planted” (19).

338

Respondents were also asked to evaluate the level of safety perceived by their families in terms of landslide

339

risk, in the area of Maierato on a 5-level scale, merged into 3 categories (low, medium, high). 30,5% of

340

respondents answered “low” and explained that “there is a lack of ad-hoc measures to protect citizens from

341

these phenomena”, followed by “population is not informed”. Vice-versa, 19% of respondents answered

342

“high” because they do not have a house, or business activities in landslide or flood-prone areas, or because

343

they believe the population is well informed. Finally, 46% of respondents answered “medium” in terms of

344

landslide risk in Maierato and only 4.5% answered “don’t know”.

345 346

5. Discussion

347

In this section the results of the questionnaire submitted to the community of Maierato have been discussed.

348

The results of the analysis on each research topic have been compared and studied in depth; they highlighted

349

the following: i) the social perception of landslide risk and of the recently experienced event (Section 5.1); ii)

350

perceived factors of social vulnerability, resilient behaviors and expected strategies to create community

351

resilience (Section 5.2).

352 353

5.1. Social perception of landslide risk and the recent 2010 landslide event

354

By analyzing the social perception of landslide risk in each research question, some factors that have an

355

impact on how each individual perceives the territory have been considered [29, 30]. According to Bailly

356

[29], there are two perception filters that interpose between the individual and the real world: the first is a

357

sensorial filter (usually similar among individuals) apart from specific cases of sensory deficit; the second

358

filter is indeed represented by all the factors that characterize the individual, i.e. psychological, cultural and

359

economic factors. Psychological factors are emotional-affective state, motivations, needs, recollections and

360

bonds with the territory and experiences; cultural factors are those related to training and literacy, interest

361

and future aspirations; socio-economic factors are related to social classes and living standards.

362

Starting from this theoretical background, the first research question studied focused on citizens’ knowledge

363

of geo-hydrological phenomena (in particular landslides and floods) and their perception of exposure to

364

hazardous events in the territory where people live. The correct definition of the term landslide provided by

365

the majority of respondents originates from their familiarity with this natural phenomenon. In fact, over 80%

366

of respondents drew their knowledge about the phenomenon from their direct experiences, as they mostly

367

referred to the ‘great landslide of 2010’ in their answers. Some hyperbolic expressions are noticeable, in that 10

368

they convey the catastrophic perception of the calamitous event (ex: “a great flood of water and earth”,

369

“earth wave”, “seismic event of the soil”); peculiar are also some short and simple definitions that basically

370

refer to the 2010 event, such as “that of Maierato”. The importance of the direct experience of the 2010

371

landslide is further confirmed by the incorrect definition provided by respondents of the term flood, as

372

compared to the term landslide. More than half of respondents, in fact, mistook floods with intense rainfalls

373

and “water bombs”. This aspect further highlights the issue of correct information and communication on

374

risks by the mass media [31]. Everybody agrees on the fundamental role played by the mass media in

375

Disaster Risk Reduction and Crisis Management; nonetheless, because of their intrinsic nature, everybody

376

also agrees on the possibility they could convey false or incorrect information. Moreover, since information

377

specialists are convinced that news have to be «“attractive”», media are increasingly convinced they should

378

emphasize the most “sensational” aspects of events, rather than technical aspects, which are instead more

379

useful for the population [32, 33, 16]. In our case study, the potential mistake about the term flood should be

380

attributed to national and local mass media which – very often – do not provide correct communication on

381

the hydro-geological risk, also in terms of correct terminology; this aspect could also be ascribed to mass

382

media’s lack of proper knowledge [34, 35].

383

There is a high percentage of citizens interviewed who – after the 2010 experience – continued to consider

384

their exposure to landslide risk as ‘high’. Several studies suggest that direct experience with a natural hazard

385

has an influence on risk perception [36, 37, 38]. Moreover, the town of Maierato has a rich heritage of

386

popular legends and tales about “Dragons” that used to live in the landslide area; this could strengthen the

387

idea that the area could have been subject to calamitous events in the past [39]. This collective memory

388

emerged above all after the 2010 landslide. In this perspective, psychological and cultural aspects have, thus,

389

an impact on the knowledge on geo-hydrological phenomena and the perception of people’s exposure to

390

landslide and flood risk in the territory where they live.

391

The second question aimed at assessing the perception of how and to what extent people were affected by the

392

landslide event in 2010. 83% of respondents involved in the 2010 event, reported indirect losses, such as the

393

discomfort because of the closure of the main road. Indirect losses affect society by disrupting utility services

394

and local businesses, thereby causing loss of revenues, lack of tourism attraction and the cost increase of

395

commodities [40]. This landslide, in fact, prevented access to the provincial road that allowed some citizens

396

to reach their small family-run farms, thus hindering quick connection with other areas of the town. In fact,

397

some local dealers, experienced an alarming decline in their turnover as a consequence of the landslide. In

398

some cases, indirect losses caused by landslides can be significant in that they affect communities both from

399

a psychological and economical point of view and they are, typically, not monitored [41]. Indeed, the

400

cumulative effect of indirect losses includes economic, social and emotional losses. These are often not

401

immediately visible to society, in that they spread over the medium-long term. However, some studies

402

indicate that if the indirect economic loss is realistically assessed, it is greater that the direct loss [42, 43]. On

403

the other hand, many citizens respondents have suffered emotional suffering, because of the post-traumatic

404

stress disorder, and very few have received support or psychological support, which – instead – would have 11

405

been necessary to avoid those traumas causing the typical psychological consequences of post-traumatic

406

stress disorder, as we will see in the subsequent paragraph.

407

Most respondents considered the lack of maintenance and remedial works along slopes and streams and the

408

lack of interest by local authorities as the main causes of disasters related to geo-hydrological phenomena.

409

Indeed, many citizens respondents have not been informed on the works carried out in the area and, in many

410

cases, they are convinced that local administrations have done nothing to protect citizens from a new risk

411

situation. For respondents, even climate changes and territorial features are relevant factors that could trigger

412

landslides and floods. If we consider the lack of maintenance works, illegal buildings, the lack of interest by

413

local authorities and farmland abandonment as anthropic factors, surely the percentages of respondents who

414

assess them as relevant factors are much higher than the percentages of respondents who consider natural

415

factors as the main contributors to landslides and floods (climate changes, territorial features). The results of

416

another study carried out by Calvello et al. [44] in southern Italy also confirmed the central importance of

417

correct land management (related to human factors) for the prevention and reduction of landslides and

418

related risks.

419

Moreover, according to the citizens interviewed, anthropic activities were increasingly important in terms of

420

contribution to landslide events in Maierato. David Alexander [45] wrote that disasters are the consequences

421

of community actions. In fact, the uncontrolled exploitation of land by man and the careless exposure of

422

economic activities and infrastructures to natural hazards cause risk increase [46]. Citizens’ answers

423

therefore confirmed that risk is caused by our everyday activities and that disasters are the expression of

424

historical circumstances being in place when such an event occurs and of the conditions that regulate social

425

order [47].

426

Analyzed data showed that almost 40% of respondents considered such a huge landslide as a foreseeable

427

event. Some of them explained the reason for this interpretation by making reference to previous landslide

428

phenomena occurred on the slope which was later affected by the 2010 event, or to more recent signs of land

429

deformation (fractures, scarps and swellings) that had been noticed in early 2009 on the provincial road and

430

on the slope. References to past landslide events reported by Borrelli et al. [25], are clearly related to the

431

collective memory of past landslides in the area that emerged immediately after the 2010 landslide. Some of

432

the respondents that had considered such a massive event as predictable, believed that predictability was

433

closely associated to failure to comply to environmental regulations, farmland abandonment and illegal

434

buildings. Probably these motivations have been influenced by the mass-media which, very often, contribute

435

to generate confusion between the causes and consequences of an extreme event. Respondents who

436

considered the event as totally unexpected underlined that “there had been signs, but that they had not

437

expected such a massive event”. The answers to open-ended questions also underline the unique and

438

catastrophic dimension of the event as perceived by the local population that is evident in the metaphors and

439

hyperboles used such as “no one had imagined an earth tsunami”, “it looked like apocalypse” and “nature

440

does not warn you”.

12

441

Therefore, cultural, psychological and socio-economic factors also influenced the perception of how and to

442

what extent people were affected by the landslide event in 2010 and of the causes that had an impact on the

443

occurrence of that disaster.

444

The third research question analyzed focused on people’s perception and satisfaction about the activities

445

carried out by the authorities shortly after the event and after 8 years following the landslide. The lack of

446

information on risks and the correct behavior to be adopted in the circumstances of an extreme event is,

447

indeed, a human responsibility in that it contributes to create vulnerability conditions vis-à-vis natural

448

hazards. If populations are educated about correct behavior and the relationship between human impact and

449

environment, both resistance and resilience of a community can be improved [48]. By differentiating the

450

assessment on landslide risk information received by the community before the 2010 event, after that and

451

today, the following data emerge: a) almost total lack of information on landslide risk in Maierato in the pre-

452

slide period; b) satisfactory information for more than half of respondents, immediately after the event; c)

453

only 17% of respondents is currently satisfied with the information received and almost 60% is not satisfied

454

at all. These results emphasize the urgent need for awareness and information campaigns for the whole

455

population as a fundamental tool to manage disaster risk (Disaster Risk Reduction). Disaster Risk Reduction

456

is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the

457

causal factors of disasters [49]. Reducing risk exposure deriving from natural events, reducing vulnerability

458

of people and properties, promoting careful management of the territory and the environment, as well as

459

improving preparedness and early warning for adverse events, are all examples of measures to be

460

implemented for effective risk management of catastrophes, in particular over the medium and long term. If

461

we continue to investigate, the data obtained from respondents concerning their judgment on the measures

462

taken after the event and the potential improvements/worsening over the years, other important elements

463

emerge. Basically, these sets of data could be interpreted as if the attention towards the event, that was

464

initially perceived as high, decreased over time (above all with reference to the attention by local authorities

465

and the coordination of all regional bodies). As to the safety measures taken on the area at risk, respondents

466

were not really satisfied with the initiatives taken both after the event and today, thus it would be important

467

to organize conferences or meetings and inviting experts who could illustrate the measures and initiatives

468

taken in the landslide area. The only work mentioned by 30% of respondents is the water channeling in the

469

Scotrapiti River. Experts should explain what safety measures have been taken to bridge the gap of

470

knowledge of the local community. Also, Antronico et al. [50] showed participatory emergency of local

471

communities and lack of communication between local authorities and citizens interviewed in another area in

472

southern Italy, close to the area under investigation.

473

Very negative impressions were expressed then on the economic support received, both immediately after

474

the event and today: apathy, sadness, anger and deep melancholy describe the feelings of those who have

475

suffered and lost their farms, business activities, cattle etc.

476

The research highlights that almost all respondents believe that the local authorities are mainly responsible

477

for safety from natural hazards and they should prevent damages to the population and the building stock. 13

478

This is a fundamental element because it reflects the great expectations of the population related to the safety

479

measures taken by local administrators; such expectations were not met or just partially met by local

480

administrators (based on the answers received). However, in accordance with the study carried out by

481

Bubeck et al. [51], citizens who consider governments as responsible for the management of flood-related

482

risks and damages, will be less incline to adopt risk mitigation measures as compared to citizens that have no

483

such belief. On the other hand, Terpstra [52] found that excessive responsibility posed on institutions causes

484

excessive ‘relax’ among the citizens that have a lower perception of risks. Therefore, people’s perception and satisfaction about activities carried out by the authorities shortly after

485 486

the event and after 8 years were also affected by cultural, psychological and socio-economic factors.

487

Table 1 summarizes the cultural, psychological and socio-economic factors that influenced landslide risk

488

perception of citizens interviewed from Maierato, based on the research questions analyzed in this study.

489 490

5.2. Social vulnerability and resilient behavior of the community of Maierato: the urgent need for risk

491

governance

492

The analysis and discussion of the research questions pointed out the perceived factors of social vulnerability

493

and resilient behavior of the community of Maierato, which should be taken into account by local policy

494

makers in order to study strategies aimed at improving risk governance. In DRR terminology, as highlighted

495

by Titz et al. [53], the notion of ‘community’ typically refers to a sub-system or a segment of society at the

496

local level (both rural villages and sometimes urban neighbourhoods). A ‘community’ is often considered a

497

“social entity” [54,53], which implies the presence of common social structures (e.g., shared experiences,

498

social interest) and most often a clearly defined, geographical area [53].

499

Risk governance is the application of a multi-level organization model to the various stages of risk analysis

500

and management [1]. Participatory governance implies a network-oriented model, i.e. greater

501

interdependence between individuals and social subsystems in a collective decision making process [55, 56,

502

57].

503

The first research question investigates on information campaigns on the landslide risk of the territory and on

504

actions and protective measures taken by the Authorities at local level. The survey indicates that a higher

505

percentage of respondents felt poorly or not at all informed on the landslide risk in Maierato, as compared to

506

that of respondents who felt informed. Moreover, over half of the population respondents did not know

507

whether the Municipality had deployed any Communal Civil Protection Plan (PCPC). The Italian law sets

508

forth that each municipality should prepare and adopt a Municipal Civil Protection Plan, which represents “a

509

tool that should be disseminated to make citizens aware of the risks of their territory and to understand what

510

emergency management modalities are”. Each citizen should be aware of the PCPC, information measures

511

should therefore be implemented not only online on the homepage of Municipalities, but also through

512

awareness raising campaigns organized by the Municipalities themselves. The lack of information on the

513

landslide risk and on the PCPC for a large percentage of respondents of the area under investigation (despite

514

its publication on the Wwebsite of the Municipality of Maierato since 2013) is another important factor of 14

515

social vulnerability. Moreover, the fact that respondents identified the cause of the 2010 landslide event with

516

the lack of preventive and safety measures on the area as a consequence of the lack of interest by local

517

administrators and policy-makers indicates their poor trust towards them and the great responsibility of

518

regional and local policy-makers for an inefficient risk governance.

519

Over half of respondents of the citizen of Maierato ignored whether remedial works had been made in the

520

town to reduce landslide risk. This was due to the lack of communication between institutions and citizens,

521

but also to the lack of social cohesion of the community which does not display a resilient behavior. Both

522

factors, i.e. the lack of communication between institutions and citizens, but also to the lack of social

523

cohesion of the community (probably due to internal political divisions that ascribe merits and demerits to

524

the various Municipal Authorities that succeeded one after the other), are considerable elements of social

525

vulnerability. Thus, the need for a more harmonious, cohesive and organized community, like it was in 2010,

526

is a fundamental requirement to overcome the current territorial crisis and build community resilience that

527

might help facing new challenges and lead to the economic rebirth of the town. The commitment of

528

territorial actors (institutions, stakeholders, privileged actors etc.) would be desirable in that they could

529

coordinate participatory and collaborative processes, thus being able to foster mediation capacity and

530

conflicts solution [58].

531

The second research question analyzed individual and community preparedness to cope with damaging

532

events. Most respondents that felt prepared to face a geo-hydrological event in the future justified their

533

choice based on their experience of the 2010 event. Vice-versa, the reasons for the choice of respondents

534

who felt poorly prepared to face a geo-hydrological event in the future are the lack of information and the

535

feeling of being “abandoned” by the local and national Aauthorities. The main answer given by most

536

respondents (above all women) is the following: «I am always in an alert state because of the past experience

537

and each time I perceive sounds different from that of the rain or of the nature, I start panicking». Actually,

538

an aspect which should have been taken into account by institutions, not only after the landslide but also in

539

the longer period, is the psychological support to citizens. The Italian Red Cross, in fact, provided valuable

540

psychological support to citizens immediately after the landslide and during the evacuation. However, the

541

process should have been continued over the years with the support of emergency psychologists. Even today,

542

some psychological actions should be taken to treat traumas because trauma-caused reactions (neglected and

543

not monitored over time) could be the prelude of more severe and disabling mental conditions, as in the case

544

of some women interviewed that suffer from panic attacks in case of severe rainfalls or suspicious noises. In

545

this framework, thanks to the greater awareness for an emergency culture, over the last few years, new

546

professionals have been trained such as psychologists expert in “critical incident” and in “disaster

547

management”. By means of studies and experiences carried out at a national and international level, we have

548

better understood the experiences and damages suffered by people as a consequence of natural and social

549

disasters, such as earthquakes [59, 60, 61]. Emergency psychology emerged in this context and it deals with

550

the study, prevention and treatment of psychological, cognitive and behavioral phenomena occurring in

551

emergency situations [60]. It also promotes the management of human defenses with a view to preventing 15

552

that a particularly stressful event could cause permanent damage in the individual or among the community.

553

This is exactly what emerged from the witnesses of respondents in Maierato. The feeling of unpreparedness

554

to face a new emergency is linked to psychological frailty, but above all to cultural factors and an inefficient

555

risk governance, it is therefore another important factor of social vulnerability.

556

The third research question concerned respondents’ identification of the most vulnerable social groups in the

557

2010 landslide event. According to the answers the categories of citizens that had been most exposed to the

558

consequences of the landslide in 2010 were the elderly and disabled people: the first because of their

559

emotional bond to their houses (some of them refused to leave their homes despite the municipality's

560

evacuation order) and the second because of their psychological and physical frailty. The latters are two

561

factors of social vulnerability that could amplify uncertainty and suffering in highly impacting psychological

562

events. In fact, inhabitants with a higher social vulnerability seem to suffer significantly more from a natural

563

extreme event as compared to people with a lower social vulnerability [62, 63, 11]. Moreover, the research

564

highlights that women and children were the least affected categories in the event (based on respondents’

565

answers). According to respondents, in fact, women were more prone to adapt to the ‘perturbing’ event and

566

to lead the family, thus showing greater resilience, while the children experienced the events like a game,

567

thus adopting a protective behavior in that they had no full awareness of the event, thanks to the support of

568

their parents.

569

Analyzing the ability to cope with socio-economic problems and fears connected to dangerous events, in the

570

attempt to reduce the socio-economic impact of the disaster on their families, the majority of respondents

571

temporarily moved to safer areas, while about 20% of the citizens interviewed affirmed they had done

572

nothing and tried to survive relying on their abilities. This aspect is the indicator of the feeling of

573

abandonment perceived by the community, thus representing another significant factor of social

574

vulnerability. Actually, a high percentage of the population feels abandoned and experiences a mood of

575

apathy, the so called “melancholy disaster”. On the other hand, landslides and floods in Calabria are a more

576

incisive and subtle factor of abandonment [64].

577

Immediately after the landslide, most citizens respondents decided to remain in Maierato because they had a

578

job or their families there, and also because other friends and relatives had decided to remain setting aside

579

the idea that a new emergency could occur. Those who decided to “stay” represent those who decided not to

580

cut the links with their origins and not because of resignation, but with a positive attitude towards the future.

581

Therefore, remaining is a courageous choice and a resilient behavior for the community.

582

The subsequent research question focused on how the people manages traumatic events as landslides, floods,

583

etc. The analysis of this study also showed that most respondents adopted a resilient behavior, i.e. positively

584

reacted to the disaster and implemented correct behavior to face the extreme event (not panicking, helping

585

other people and getting information from experts during the emergency stage). Moreover, the fact that 13%

586

of respondents relied on God and many participated in the procession of the statue of Madonna highlights the

587

great devotion and religious attitude of the community. Thus, significant elements of religiousness are

588

present in the culture of the community of Maierato, and they are a resilient factor of civil resistance and 16

589

cohesion, above all in the post-event period. Religion, in terms of cultural expression, in fact, cannot be

590

separated from the wider perspective of risk mitigation, in that it interacts with the social, economic and

591

political elements of vulnerability of a population when facing natural events [65]. Indeed, cultural and

592

religious practices model disasters and provide a response to them. Chester et al. [66], Gugg [67, 68] and

593

Cannizzaro [69] showed that the religious practices in the areas surrounding the Vesuvius and Etna are

594

simply the expression of a protection behavior adopted by the local communities, before, during and after

595

volcanic eruptions. In fact, religious and cultural mechanisms in these cases, allow individuals and social

596

groups to accept traumatic events and start the recovery process [70, 71]. The contact between rite and

597

disaster generates the so-called “emergency rite”, that is folklore tools useful to absorb the shock caused by a

598

trauma and to keep the community united after turmoil [72]. “Emergency rites” are the means through which

599

survivors seek for comfort being close to one another, so as to be united and be able to win over despair and

600

disintegration [67, 68].

601

Most respondents affirmed they knew a safe area that could be reached in case of a landslide, probably

602

because of their experience related to the 2010 landslide event past experience, and excluded the knowledge

603

of the PCPC, as inferred by the answers provided by those who did not know anything about it. The

604

industrial area and the football ground, as well as the houses of friends and relatives, private buildings or

605

other places nearby were considered as safe areas. This is also a protection factor within the context of

606

community’s resilient behavior [73].

607

The subsequent research question examined how the community reacted to reduce landslide risk and what

608

actions had been taken by local policy-makers to reduce the landslide risk. The citizens of Maierato involved

609

in the survey, indicated the types of action that the government and local authorities should consider to

610

reduce landslide risk; «have regulations on building procedures and land-use be respected», «installing

611

monitoring and alert system in risk-prone areas» and «promote awareness campaigns on landslide causes,

612

dangerousness and risk areas» were top priority answers. In fact, improving communication, informing the

613

community and involving it in the activities carried out in the area at risk and impose the compliance with

614

the regulations on building and environment, are the fundamental requirements to increase resilience and risk

615

governance.

616

The aim of the last question was to assess how and to what extent the population respondents feels safe in its

617

territory about landslide risk. Most citizens respondents felt quite safe in Maierato. Being informed means

618

feeling safer; in fact, social insecurity and vulnerability can also be reduced by means of enhancing

619

awareness and knowledge [74]. Indeed, the respondents who affirmed they felt little exposure or no exposure

620

to landslide risk, were the best informed on the safety measures taken in the area.

621

Therefore, because of the reasons above, social vulnerability is closely linked to the socio-economic and

622

cultural conditions of a community that is still suffering from the causes of a phenomenon whose signs are

623

still visible in the scars left on the area. However, some signs of economic recovery are also present in the

624

industrial area of the town, where various business initiatives have been started over the last few years. This

625

is a sign of hope and trust in the economic recovery of the whole area. 17

626

Table 2 summarizes vulnerability factors within the thematic dimensions (social, economic, cultural and

627

institutional) indicated in the Move framework [4] and protection factors, detected in the survey, within the

628

framework of individual and community resilient behavior. MOVE (Methods for the Improvement of

629

Vulnerability Assessment in Europe) is a research Project within which a framework for multi-dimensional,

630

holistic vulnerability assessment that is understood as part of risk evaluation and risk management in the

631

context of disaster risk management (DRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA), has been developed [4].

632 633

6. Conclusions

634

This paper dealt with public perception of risks by citizens, social vulnerability and resilience at a local scale

635

in the area of Maierato (Calabria, southern Italy) affected by a large landslide in February 2010, which

636

produced important social and economic consequences.

637

While in the post-event phase, the community showed perfect resilience and ability to adapt to changes,

638

these did not last over the years because of psychological, political, cultural and economic factors that had a

639

negative impact on the recovery of the area. For instance, a significant element of social vulnerability that

640

should not be overlooked is the permanence of post-traumatic stress disorders, which would have required

641

actions and ad-hoc treatment by a team of experts of Emergency Psychology in the immediate post-shock

642

period. Moreover, based on the analysis of data, it cannot be denied that the institutions have not done a lot

643

to stimulate the hopes of a community that feels abandoned and – though – is willing to react.

644

Thus, the Maierato case indicates that urgent actions should be taken to reduce disaster-risk by following

645

the four priorities established by the Sendai Framework: 1) improving citizens’ understanding of disaster

646

management, 2) reinforcing risk governance to improve disaster management, 3) investing in risk mitigation

647

and programs fostering adaptation and resilience and 4) improving emergency planning strategies along with

648

strategies of emergency management, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction [3]. A synergistic approach

649

should therefore be taken, encompassing all the “components” that contribute to the actions of risk

650

adaptation, mitigation and reduction with the final aim of managing residual risk [2]. Communication and

651

training, risk perception by the community and the improvement of individual and collective resilience are

652

among the various components to be considered. In the Maierato case, such actions would require not only

653

public and private investment aiming the implementation of structural and non-structural measures, but also

654

social investment to provide the best conditions to maintain these measures over time. There is still a lot to

655

do to overcome the territorial crisis: experts should develop solutions considering an integrated territorial

656

development approach which takes into account cultural, economic, social and political dynamics to support

657

technical solutions exclusively aiming at controlling natural phenomena. In this perspective, the participation

658

of the community should be included both in the analysis of risk assessment, prevention and reconstruction,

659

thus implementing a community-resilience-oriented approach, intended as a process rather than a result, and

660

as adaptability rather than stability and including a collective horizon rather than an individual one [20, 75,

661

76]. From the study case of Maierato it is evident that the “emergency measures”, i.e. exceptional measures

662

to face an extraordinary and rare event should not be implemented only during the calamitous events, they 18

663

should rather be implemented as a long-lasting approach with a view to define planning and adaptation tools,

664

as well as resilience. Thus, not only “heavy” infrastructural investment (still insufficient today and difficult

665

to be implemented because of the complex administrative system) should be considered, but also actions

666

aiming at the reinforcement of social infrastructures, that could promote training and innovation and collect

667

skills, abilities, competencies and intelligences [77].

668 669 670

Acknowledgements

671

The authors would like to thank participants who gave their voluntary and informed consent before the

672

interviews. This work was carried out under the Progetto DTA.AD003.077 “Tipizzazione di eventi di

673

dissesto idrogeologico” of the CNR-Department of “Scienze del sistema Terra e Tecnologie per l'Ambiente”

674

and was partially funded under the Project "Supporto tecnico e scientifico per il monitoraggio delle frane, la

675

pianificazione e la valutazione degli interventi di protezione dai rischi per il comune di Maierato", agreement

676

between CNR-IRPI and Municipality of Maierato. The authors wish to thank the anonymous referees for

677

providing helpful suggestions to improve the initial version of this paper.

678

The paper is a result of a collaboration between the authors; specifically, L.A. wrote sections 2, 3, 4.1 and

679

4.2; F.D.P. wrote sections 1 and 5; R.C. wrote the sections 4.3 and 4.4; G.G. wrote the section 2; all authors

680

contributed to the section 6.

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Figure captions

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Fig. 1 - (A) Digital terrain model of the study area with location of the 2010 Maierato landslide; (B)

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panoramic view of the phenomenon (photo taken by G. Gullà); (C) interviews administered in the town of

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Maierato (image from Google Earth).

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Fig. 2 – Answers to the multiple-choice question about the factors that respondents considered as the most

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Fig. 3 – Answers to the question about the respondents’ level of exposure to both natural and man-made

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Fig. 4 - Answers to the question “Being affected, what type of damages have you suffered? (multiple

888

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Fig. 5 – Answers to the question related to personal judgment of respondents on the activities performed by

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the authorities.

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Fig. 6 – Answers to the multiple-choice question “According to you which of the following factors will

894

increasingly be important in favoring potential future landsliding events in Maierato? (3 answers allowed)”.

895 25

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Fig. 7 – Answers to the question “What measures should the government/local authorities take to reduce

897

landslide risks? (3 answers allowed)”.

898 899

26

Appendix - Queries of the questionnaire analyzed in this paper Geo-hydrological risk perception and recent experience Q.1 Do you know what is a landslide? Q.2 Do you know what is a flood? Q.3 If you answered yes to the previous question (Q.1 and Q.2): Your personal knowledge about landslide and floods derives from…..

Q.4 In your opinion, which are the factors that mostly influence landslides and floods? [4 responses allowed] - Please indicate the order of your choices

Q.5 How much do you feel yourself exposed to each of these events in Maierato?

Q.6 In your opinion, who is responsible for the safety of natural hazards and to avoid damages to the people and housing stock? [4 responses allowed]

Q.7 Were you (or your relatives) involved in the landslide event of February 2010

Q.8 If you answered “yes” to the previous question, which type of damage have you suffered? [multiple responses allowed]

Q.9 Your behaviors during the event were……..[3 responses allowed]

Q.10 In your opinion, the possibility that such a huge event could have taken place in Maierato is…

Q.11 If you answered n.1 and n.2 to the previous question indicate the reasons Q.12 Were you involved in evacuation operations with your family members after the landslide? Q.13 If you answered “yes” to the previous question, have you (or your relatives) been subject to posttraumatic stress disorder? Q.14 If you answered “yes” to the previous question, have you received psychological support? Q.15 Indicate your personal judgment on the activities performed by the authorities after the landslide and to the potential upgrades/worsening in the subsequent years Q.16 In your opinion, which of the following factors will increasingly be important in favoring potential future landsliding events in Maierato? [multiple responses allowed]

Vulnerability factors of the family Q.17 Which are, in your opinion, the categories that have been mainly affected by the landslide?

• • • • • • • • •

Yes [Could you briefly describe it?] No Yes [Could you briefly describe it?] No Personal experience Experience from relatives or friends Personal initiative Organizations and/or associations initiative Other (specify……)

• Climate change • Territory natural characteristics • Illegal building • Abandonment of agriculture • Lack of protection works and territory management • Disinterested public administrations • Low interest of citizens • I don't know • environmental pollution • car accident • earthquake • flood • landslide • terrorist attacks • volcanic eruption • tsunami • Local administrators • Central government administrators • Civil Protection • Private citizens • Yes • No [go to question 10] • I don’t remember this event [go to questions 18] • Physical injuries • Private home damages • Damages to other personal properties • Crops damages • closure of an important road and consequent inconvenience • Facility interruptions • I tried to get information about the situation through TV, social network, internet, radio, neighbors • I tried not to panic • I tried to help close people • I accepted it as an inevitable situation • I trusted in God • I remained indifferent • Absolutely unexpected and unforeseeable event • This was to be expected sooner or later • I don't know Open-ended question • Yes/No • Yes/No • Yes/No Five point scale • • • •

Anthropic impact Climate Population growth Lack of interest of administrators

• • • •

Children Elderly Disabled people Women

Q.18 Can you explain the reasons of your answer? Q.19 In your opinion, which were the main causes of the 2010 landslide? [4 responses allowed] Please indicate the order of your choices

Q. 20 Presently, how do you rank your information level about the landslide risk in Maierato? Q.21 Has your municipality done a Civil Protection Plan?

Q.22 Are you aware of the works developed in Maierato for mitigating landslide risk?

Q. 23 If an extreme geo-hydrological event should take place in Maierato, how do you feel well prepared to face it? Q.24 Can you explain the reasons of your answer Coping strategies of families Q.25 Are you aware of the existence of a safe area that could be reached in case of an extreme geohydrological event? Q.26 If you answered “yes” to the previous question, indicate the place

Q. 27 After the 2010 event, what did you done to reduce the social and economic impact of the disaster on your family? [multiple responses allowed]

Q.28 After the landslide in Maierato of February 2010, how did you manage your life deciding to remain in Maierato without being afraid that a new emergency could occur?

Community and family resilience Q. 29 How do you deal with the sudden traumas and stress caused by landslide or other calamities? [multiple responses allowed]

Q.30 Which measures should the government/local authorities take to reduce landslide risks? [3 responses allowed] - Please indicate the order of your choices

Q.31 Please evaluate what the community (institutions, associations, companies and citizens) is doing to reduce landslide risk. [multiple responses allowed]

• Other (specify…….) Open-ended question • Illegal housing • Climate changes • Lack of maintenance works • Features of the area • Lack of maintenance works • Lack of interest of local administrators • Low interest of citizens • I don't know Five point scale • Yes and I know its contents • Yes but I do not know its contents • It was never done; • I don't know if it exist • Yes (specify……..) • Nothing was done • I don't know Five point scale Open-ended question • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Yes (specify……..) No I don't know School building Friends’ or relative’s houses Town Hall Church Private building Other (specify…….) I asked economic aid to relatives/friends I realized protective works in my house My family and I have temporarily moved to safer areas I have looked for job opportunities elsewhere I did nothing There are lots of families and neighbors close to me I relied on God and prayers I received a support from the institutions I work here My friends live here I realized protective works in my house I moved to other places Other (specify…….)

• By means of family support • By means of friends support • By means of education and information provided by the institutions • By means of psychological counseling • Other (specify…….) • Works of naturalistic engineering • Awareness raising campaigns on landslides causes, dangerousness and landslide-prone areas • To enforce provisions on building permissions and land-use • Relocate population to safe areas • Diffusion of Civil Protection Plans • Inform population through social networks and mobile apps • Install monitoring and alert systems in landslide prone areas • Other (specify…….) • Trees are being planted • Cultivation on steep slopes is being avoided • Population has been moved to safer areas • More stringent regulations on building permissions have been issued • The population is being informed • They are installing monitoring and alarm networks

Q.32 On a scale from 1 (min) to 5 (max), considering landslide risk, how much do you feel safe in Maierato? Q.33 If you answered n.1 or n.2 to question 43 indicate the reasons

Q.34 If you answered n.4 or n.5 to question 43 indicate the reasons

• Other (specify…….) Five point scale • Lack of ad-hoc measures to protect citizens from these phenomena • Population is not informed • House and other business activities are located in geohydrological prone areas • Ad-hoc measures to protect citizens from these phenomena have been carried out • Population is well informed • I do not have a house, or business activities in geohydrological prone areas

Table 1 - Cultural, psychological and socio-economic factors that influenced landslide risk perception of citizens from Maierato.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

CULTURAL FACTORS

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Knowledge and perception of exposure to hazardous events in the territory where people live (in particular landslides and floods)

Misleading ideas on the use of the term “flood” caused by inaccurate risk communication by mass media

Direct experience in the 2010 landslide implying greater familiarity of the population with the term “landslide”, as compared to the term “flood” which affects their perception of exposure to such a risk

Historical memory of legends and tales about Dragons that used to live in the landslide area; this could support the idea that the area could have been subject to calamitous events in the past

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

Perception of how people were affected by the landslide event in 2010.

Greater awareness that human impact has a role in transforming the effects of an extreme event into a disaster

Psychological problems and post-traumatic stress disorder that have not been treated over time or registered in groups of citizens that experienced the 2010 event

Economic hardship for the lack of or paucity of economic support as a consequence of the indirect losses experienced by the population because of the 2010 landslide

People’s perception and satisfaction of activities carried out by the authorities shortly after the event and after 8 years following the landslide.

Lack of information by local policy-makers on the measures taken in the landslide-affected area after the event and today

Direct experience of the 2010 event affected the perception of satisfaction of measures taken as many citizens felt frustrated and abandoned by local and national policy-makers

Great indirect losses that were not counteracted by satisfactory measures of economic support, affected citizens’ perception of this issue

Table 2 – Vulnerability factors within the thematic dimensions, following the MOVE framework (Birkmann et al., 2013), and protection factors within the framework of individual and community resilient behavior of the community of Maierato. Psycho-physical frailty of disabled people and emotional bond with home and homeland of elderly people, who find it difficult to move, even temporarily, to other places in case of extreme natural hazard Social dimension

Economic dimension Vulnerability factors within the thematic dimensions of MOVE framework

Lack of ad-hoc and long-lasting measures of Emergency Psychology to treat traumas caused by a severely stressful event (the 2010 landslide) Economic losses of local farmers and dealers as a consequence of the closure of a road providing access to the town and connecting it to the surrounding area; poor economic support received from the institutions Lack of information and poor involvement of the local community in the actions and measures taken by local policy-makers; no information of the Civil Protection Plan (institutional dimension)

Institutional dimension

Political divisions in the community and lack of social cohesion; feeling of abandonment by the central and local institutions (institutional dimension) Feeling of a part of the population of being unprepared and unsafe in case of a new emergency, because of an inefficient risks governance in the post-disaster period and until now Damage to habitual practices such as agricultural activities carried out by some farmers in the lands of the area affected by the extreme event of 2010

Cultural dimension

Upheaval of the natural landscape in the landslide area due to the exceptional and imposing dynamics of the 2010 event Organizational ability of women (groups of them started a collective bakery activity in the area of provisional stay). Children do not seem to have experienced the event as a dramatic one because they have considered it as a game Dignity and control of the community during evacuation operations

Protection factors within the framework of individual and community resilient behaviour

Perception of preparedness in the event of a new emergency (60% of respondents) Citizens’ awareness of the areas to be reached in case of an emergency (thanks to the previous experience) Religiousness and religious devotion of citizens, playing an important role of civil cohesion Choice of the families to remain in their town, after the disaster, with a positive attitude towards the future

Declaration of interests ☒ The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. ☐The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: