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Liking and the attribution process
JOURNAL
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
Liking
SOCIAL
and
PSYCHOLOGY
the Attribution
10,
38!%97
(1974)
Process1
DENNIS T. REGAN, ELLEN STRAW AND RUSSELL FAZIO Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Two experiments were performed to examine the influence of liking on causal attributions of another person’s behavior. In both experiments, observers who either liked or disliked an actor were asked to attribute the actor’s behavior to personal or situational factors. In the first experiment, liking for a stranger was manipulated, and the behavior to be attributed was the stranger’s performance on a task requiring skill; in the second experiment, observers provided attributions for the prosocial behavior of an actual acquaintance who was either liked or disliked. Both experiments supported the hypothesis that actions which are consistent with affect for the actor (good actions by liked actors, bad actions by disliked actors) are attributed internally, to characteristics of the actor, while actions inconsistent with affect for the actor are attributed externally, to situational factors. The implications of these results for processes of person perception, including the ascription of trait characteristics to others, were discussed.
There exists a large social-psychological literature on the determinants of interpersonal attraction or liking (see, for example, Aronson, 1969; Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) . The influence on attraction toward others of attitude and personality similarity, physical attractiveness, propinquity, gain vs loss of esteem, cooperation, accidental consequences, cognitive dissonance, and the like have been extensively investigated. The reason for such intensive interest in liking is seldom stated directly, but there seemsto be an implicit assumption that liking is an attitude which is associated with (and probably causes) a wide variety of social behavior. Whether one is liked or disliked by others is thought to make an important and observable difference. Psychologists have of course attempted to determine some of the behavioral effects of interpersonal attraction, with mixed results (see Lott & Lott, 1972, for a review). The present research focuses instead on the effects of liking on judgments or attributions of another person’s ‘The first experiment was conducted honors experiment supervised by the conducted by the third author. Copyright All rights
by the second author as an undergraduate senior author. The second experiment was
385 @ 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
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behavior. There are at least three ways in which interpersonal attraction might affect our interpretation of others’ actions. First, behavior should be described whenever possible as indicating a positive characteristic or state of a liked person, but a negative characteristic or state of a disliked other. In order for liking to affect judgments in this way, the action must be interpretable as indicating more than one trait or characteristic of the actor. For example, imagine a student who talks with his professor after class. His friend might see this behavior as indicating intellectual curiosity or genuine friendliness. His enemy might see the same behavior as showing flattery or manipulativeness. Secondly, the behavior itself should be evaluated more positively when the actor is liked than when he is disliked. If a person steals a book from the campus store, for example, his friend should regard that transgression as a less serious crime than his enemy. Dion (1972) has demonstrated a similar effect of physical attractiveness on judgments of the seriousness of transgressions. Finally, in combination with the characteristics of the action, liking for the actor should strongly affect the observer’s assignment of causality for the action. As Heider (1958) suggested, we expect good people to perform good actions, and bad people to perform bad actions. Thus when liked actors do good things or disliked actors do bad things, we can readily understand the action as caused by the characteristics of the actor. We provide an internal attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) for such expected actions, we regard them as typical of the actor, and we expect more of them in the future. However, when the action is seen as out-of-character-when good actors do bad acts, or bad actors do good acts-we are unable to understand the action as internally caused, and instead provide an external attribution. We see the action as atypical of the actor, as caused by some external or situational factor, and do not expect similar actions in the future. As an example, suppose that one person insults another at a party. The insulter’s enemy will see the action as internally caused and typical of the actor. His friend will seek some external, situational cause, perhaps in some provocation by the target of the insult. As a consequence of these divergent attributions, of course, each observer can maintain his original feelings toward the insulter. In fact, all three of these attributional biases act to maintain the stability of existing levels of liking. The two experiments presented below provide evidence related to the third attributional bias hypothesized to be affected by interpersonal attraction. The experiments test the hypothesis that observers will provide internal attributions for good actions done by liked actors and bad actions done by disliked actors, and will provide external attributions for good
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387
actions done by disliked actors and bad actions done by liked actors. Put more succinctly, actions which are consistent with liking for the actor will be attributed internally; actions inconsistent with liking for the actor will be attributed externally. After presenting both experiments, we will discussthe implications of the findings both for behavioral effects mediated by these attributional processes,and for more general processes of person perception. EXPERIMENT
I
Method Overuiew. All subjects observed a female confederate partner play a game of skill, and then were asked questions about the confederate’s performance.In a 2 x 2 factorial design, two levels of liking for the confederate and two levels of confederate task performance were manipulated. Liking was manipulated by having half of the subjects (Dislike condition) ( 1) observe the confederate behaving in a rude, unpleasant manner through what the subject believed to be a closed circuit television hookup (in reality, a videotape), and (2) receive bogus attitude information from the confederate which was dissimilar to their own views. Subjects in the Like condition, on the other hand, ( 1) observed the confederate behaving politely and pleasantly, and (2) received information that the confederate had attitudes similar to their own. The confederate’s task performance was manipulated by having half the subjects see her, on videotape, perform extremely competently in a game-playing situation, while the other half saw her behave incompetently. Finally, all subjects completed a series of g-point scale questions, on each of which the confederate’s performance could be attributed either internally, to a general dispositional characteristic, or externally, to a situational characteristic. Subjects. 25 female and 23 male Cornell undergraduates served without pay as subjects in this experiment. They were recruited from introductory courses and sign-up sheets posted around campus. The subjects were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions without regard to sex. Data were collected from two additional subjects (one male and one female in the Dislik+Skilled condition), but eliminated from the analysis because these subjects indicated in debriefing that they believed the confederate was an experimental accomplice. Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, the subject was ushered by the experimenter to a small room and seated at a table on which there was a television monitor. The experimenter explained that the experiment involved pairs of subjects, that the other subject had not yet arrived, but that when she did she would be taken to an adjacent room from which she could be observed on the television monitor. The experimenter showed this room to the subject (in order to make it more credible later that the subject really was watching another person in the appropriate room). The subject was then asked to fill out an attitude survey, measuring attitudes on topics of interest to college students, “since we like to get normative data on all subjects in psychology experiments.” When the subject had nearly completed this survey, the experimenter left the room, rather loudly discovered that “the other subject” had arrived, stated a few words about “taking her into the next room,” returned to the subject’s room and shut the door. She then collected the subject’s attitude survey, and explained the
388
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next stage in the procedure. She said that during the experiment, which involved “various aspects of interpersonal judgment and game-playing skills,” the subject had been assigned the role of “observer” while the other person would be the “participant.” The subject would observe the other on the monitor via closed-circuit television. She explained the operation and controls on the monitor, turned it on, and told the subject that the picture would appear when the system was turned on from a control room. She said that she would turn on the picture, and also administer instructions and the attitude scale to the “partner.” She then left the subject’s room, closed the door, and turned on the videotape system. The first ten seconds of videotape showed the confederate seated at the table in the room previously shown to the subject. The subject then saw the experimenter enter this room and begin instructions to the confederate. Liking manipulation. In an attempt to create clear differences in liking, a two-part liking manipulation was devised. In the first part of the manipulation, the confederate’s behavior was varied to make her appear likeable or unlikeable to the subject watching the monitor. In the Like condition, the confederate responded pleasantly to the exnerimenter’s initial instructions. indicated that she had seen the subiect in the next room and asked whether that was her partner, and smiled pleasantly when the experimenter answered affirmatively. In the Dislike condition, on the other hand, the confederate was shown seated at her table looking bored and annoyed, drumming her fingers, riffling through papers. When the experimenter entered, the confederate began by saying “I hope this won’t take too long . . . I’m in a rush.” She responded rudely to the experimenter’s instructions, grabbing the attitude survey and pencil brusquely from her hands. As the experimenter left the room, the confederate asked “Is that person in the other room the one I have to work with?” and responded with an under-the-breath disgusted comment to the experimenter’s “yes.” At this point, the experimenter disconnected the monitor and returned to the subject. She professed surprise that the monitor was not working, and left the subject to “check the equipment.” This provided time to prepare the second part of the liking manipulation, modeled after the work of Byrne (1961) on the effect of perceived attitudinal similarity on liking. In the Like condition, the experimenter prepared a bogus attitude scale for the confederate designed to appear very similar to the subject’s own responses. In the Dislike condition, a bogus scale was designed to make the confederate’s responses appear dissimilar from the subject’s. After completing the bogus questionnaire, the experimenter returned to the subject, announced that the equipment was now functioning properly, and gave the bogus survey to the subject, remarking that “as long as you’re going to be observing her, I thought it would be helpful for you to know something about her views.” In summary, in the Like condition the subject observed a rather pleasant confederate who apparently held attitudes very similar to the subject’s own. In the Dislike condition, the subject watched a rude and unpleasant confederate who later turned out to hold attitudes very dissimilar from the subject’s Performance manipulation. After the subject had finished studying the bogus attitude scale, the experimenter instructed the subject to watch the monitor and left the room. She then activated the videotape, which once again showed the confederate seated at her table, this time adopting a neutral posture. The experimenter then entered the confederate’s room carrying a game (Impact (TM) by Ideal) which she placed on the table. She explained that the confederate was to play the game, and demonstrated its operation. The object of the game was to knock a small rolling metal ball from a U-shaped chute by hitting it with a metal weight attached
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to a string. Points were awarded for each successful trial, the number of points being larger when the ball was knocked off near the top of its arc. The confederate took 20 trials at knocking the ball from the chute. In the Skilled condition, the confederate succeeded on 12 of the 20 trials. After the last trial, the experimenter announced that she had scored 1500 points, comIn the Unskilled performance conmenting that this score was “really excellent.” dition, on the other hand, the confederate succeeded in knocking the ball from the chute only 2 of the 20 trials. The experimenter announced after the last trial that she had scored 200 points, adding that this score was “not too good.” The only difference in the videotape for the two performance conditions was in the number of successful trials and the experimenter’s brief comment. At the conclusion of the trials, the experimenter picked up the game and left the room, explaining that she would return in several minutes for the rest of the experiment. The tape then showed her leaving the confederate’s room, and a few moments later the experimenter returned to the subject’s room and turned off the monitor, which still showed the confederate seated at her table. Dependent uariabks. The experimenter then asked the subject to answer a set of written questions “in terms of what you just observed.” There were 10 questions in all, each question answerable on a Q-point scale. The first 8 questions asked about the task, the confederate’s performance, and the experimenter’s directions. In each case, the subject’s answer could indicate that he attributed the confederate’s performance either to her internal, dispositional characteristics or to some external, situational characteristic. The last two questions provided a check on the liking manipulation. After completing the dependent variables, the subjects were extensive!y debriefed. RESULTS
AND
DISCUSSION*
The question which most directly tested the central hypothesis of this experiment was: “Some tasks are good measures of the abilities they supposedly involve. Other tasks are less indicative of a person’s true abilities. This game is most likely. . . .” Responseswere indicated on a g-point scale, anchored on the extremes by the phrases “an accurate measure . . . an inaccurate measure.” An internal attribution for the confederate’s performance would be indicated by checking a response near the “accurate measure” end of the response scale, while an external attribution would be indicated by finding the task a relatively inaccurate measure of the confederate’s ability. An interaction was predicted, with subjects expected to find the task a relatively accurate measure of the confederate’s ability in the Like-Skilled and Dislike-Unskilled conditions, but an inaccurate measure in the Like-Unskilled and Dislike-Skilled conditions. The means for this question are presented in Table 1. Analysis of variance indicated a highly significant interaction [F( 1,40) = 25.65, ’ The data from this experiment were analyzed in a 2 (Liking) X 2 (Performance) X 2 (Sex of subject) unweighted-means analysis of variance. With the single exception noted below, there were no main or interactive effects of sex of subject on any of the dependent variables. All probability values reported are e-tailed.
390
BEGAN,
MEAN
STRAUSS
TABLE RESPONSES TO QUESTION AS A MEASURE
AND
FAZIO
1 ABOUT GAME’S OF ABILITY Performance
Liking
condition
condition
Skilled
Like Dislike Note: responses curacy rating.
ACCURACY
Unskilled 2.42 5.59
5.25 2.75 were
on a g-point
scale;
the higher
the number,
the higher
the ac-
p < .OOl] as predicted; there were no main effects (both F’s < 1). These results very strongly confirm the main hypothesis of the experiment. Other questions support the notion that liking for an actor significantly affects attributions of performance on a task. For example, subjects were first asked to rate the game on a continuum from “very hard” to “very easy.” The analysis of variance indicated two significant main effects (for Liking, F( 1,40) = 35.50, p < .OOl; for Performance, F( 1,40) = 54.17, p < .001).8 Subjects saw the game as harder if the confederate’s performance was unskilled; they also saw this novel game as harder if they liked the confederate than if they disliked her. It may seem paradoxical that a game should be seen as more difficult simply because a liked person is playing it, but this result makes sense in our attributional framework. By hypothesis, we wish to attribute our friends’ skilled performances to internal factors, but our enemies’ skilled performances to external factors. One way to attribute good performance by friends to their high skill level is to find the task difficult; a way to avoid the implication of high skill in a disliked other who performs well is to attribute his performance externally, for example to an easy task. Similar considerations apply to the case of poor performance, leading to the prediction that the game will be seen as more difficult if played by a liked other. The data strongly support this notion. Similarly, subjects were asked directly, “How skillful would you rate this player,” on a scale marked at the extremes “very skillful” and “very unskillful.” Once again, two main effects emerge and no interaction (for Liking, F( 1,40) = 11.97, p < .Ol; for Performance, F( 1,40) = 83.30, p < .OOl; Interaction F < 1). Liked players are judged as more skillful a In addition, male subjects = 6.37, p < .05] than female interact with the experimental
(a = 4.22) subjects (g treatments.
saw the game as slightly = 3.68); sex of subject
harder did not,
[F( 1,40) however,
LIKING
AND
ATTRIBUTION
391
than disliked players, and skilled performance (not surprisingly) leads to a judgment of greater skill than unskilled performance. This question also serves as a manipulation check for the performance variable. Finally, subjects’ expectations for future performance were tested by asking them to indicate if this player tries the game again, his score will probably ‘get much better’ or ‘get much worse,’ on the same g-point scale. We predicted that subjects would expect maximum improvement of performance in the Like-Unskilled condition, and minimum improvement in the Dislike-Skilled condition, yielding two main effects. The analysis of variance indicated significant effects of both the liking [F( 1,40) = 31.77, p < .OOl] and performance [F( 1,40) = 6.03, p < .05] variables, as predicted. Additional questions tapped the quality of the experimenter’s instructions, whether the game appeared in adequate working order, and whether the confederate might have cheated to improve her score. No significant effects emerged, except that subjects thought it more likely that the disliked confederate might have cheated. All of these results suggest that subjects wish to attribute high skill to a liked other and low skill to a disliked other. When performance is at variance with expectations of the other’s skill, the performance is attributed externally, primarily to task difficulty. Despite objectively identical performance by the liked and disliked confederate, very different attributions are made about the characteristics of the game itself and the skill level of the confederate. Given good performance, the game is regarded as a very accurate measure of underlying ability of the liked confederate, but a poor measure of the disliked confederate’s ability; given poor performance, the game’s perceived accuracy as an ability measure reverses. The game is seen as more difficult if played by the liked confederate; despite this, the liked confederate is expected to improve more if she tries the game again. All of these judgments, of course, protect the subject’s belief that the liked confederate is more skillful. It would not be fair to say that variations in performance are ignored in making skill attributions, but their effect is systematically affected by liking for the performer. The final two questions were a check on the liking manipulation. Subjects indicated their feeling toward their “partner” on a g-point scale labeled at the extremes “strong liking” and “strong disliking,” and whether they would like to work with this person in an experiment on a scale running from “definitely yes” to “definitely no.” Responses to these questions were summed, and an analysis of variance indicated a huge effect of the liking manipulation [F( 1,40) = 111.99, p < .OOl], with no effect attributable to the performance manipulation or the interaction
392
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STRAUSS
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FAZIO
(both F’s 5 1). 0 n a scale where 18 indicates maximum liking, the mean in the Like condition was 11.29, and in the Dislike condition was 4.50. Apparently our two-part liking manipulation was very strong. More interestingly, liking for the confederate was not at all affected by the performance manipulation. Nor should it have been. According to the logic behind this experiment, liking for the confederate is an independent variable which systematically affects attributions of performance. These attributions are expected to occur in a form which enables the observer to keep his affection for the actor more or less intact. While there are doubtless occasions where observed performance affects liking for an actor (especially, perhaps, where the observer is himself affected by the performance), in the present experiment subjects avoided any such effect by making differential attributions of the confederate’s performance. Taken as a whole, the results of this experiment strongly support the hypotheses. An additional experiment was nevertheless conducted, for three reasons. First, because of equipment limitations, it was impossible for the experimenter to be blind to the subject’s experimental condition. The experimenter had to set the videotapes for each subject, and she also administered the dependent variables. Although the written form of the dependent variables minimized the opportunity for bias, it would have been preferable for the experimenter to be blind. Secondly, although the liking manipulation clearly was very strong, we wanted to test our notions using a manipulation closer to “real-life” liking and disliking. To accomplish this, we took advantage of subjects’ liking and disliking for actual acquaintances. Finally, instead of skill attributions based on performance of a task, we investigated subjects’ attributions about a prosocial act supposedly performed by the target. Specifically, subjects were told that a target person they either liked or disliked had done a favor to help a stranger. They were then asked to select from among four alternatives the “primary motive” behind the target’s behavior. The alternatives provided were readily codeable as indicating either an internal or an external attribution. The reasoning was parallel to that in the first experiment. We predicted that subjects would give internal attributions for a pro-social action done by a friend, but give external attributions for the same action performed by someone they disliked. EXPERIMENT
II
Method Subiects. The Cornell
University.
subjects were 22 male and 20 female undergraduate They were randomly assigned to the three experimental
volunteers at conditions.
LIKING
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ATTRLBUT~ON
393
subject was run, but her data were not included in the analysis benot believe the cover storye4 Procedure. Subjects were initially contacted by telephone and asked to take part in a psychological experiment on person perception. If the subject agreed, the experimenter said that most of the work in this area involved first impressions, and that we were concerned instead with how people interpret the behavior of their actual acquaintances. To study this, we would ask the subject for the names of some of his acquaintances. We would call some of these people, and ask them to come for an experiment. We would then observe their behavior, and later ask the subject to come in and interpret this behavior for us. The experimenter then said that “we have established a variety of categories that we’d like the suggested individuals to fit into.” The subject was asked to provide names in two categories. “Scholastic ability” was the first category; the subject named an acquaintance who was a good student, and another who was a poor-to-average student. Liking was the second category; the subject was asked to name “someone you rather like, and someone you dislike.” The only restrictions were that the subject name an acquaintance of the same sex, and not name “roommates or real close friends-only acquaintances.” The latter restriction was to minimize the likelihood of discussing the experiment in advance with the named individuals. In addition, subjects were explicitly asked not to discuss the experiment with those named, because “if they know that you will find out what they did in their experiments, they might not act naturally.” The experimenter said that he would call back in a couple of weeks, after the acquaintances had been studied, to arrange a time for the subject to interpret their behavior. After an interval of IO-30 days, the subject was contacted again and came to the laboratory. After introductory remarks, the experimenter said that “we were only able to get one of the people you mentioned in for the experiment.” The experimenter then provided a sketchy description of the situation in which the acquaintance allegsdly had been observed, and gave the subject a detailed written description to read. According to this (fictitious) description, when the acquaintance arrived he was directed to a waiting room where a few other students were also waiting for experiments. A minute later, the experimenter entered the room and told the subject that he was running behind schedule, and that there would be a 15-minute delay. The subject agreed to wait. At this point another student in the room, actually a confederate, asked a favor of the subject. This confederate was made up to look as though he had had an accident, with his right calf taped and a smal1 bandage on his forehead. He said: “Say, since you’ve got to wait 15 minutes, maybe you could do me a favor. I had a car accident, and my leg and forehead were cut pretty badly. Anyway, I’m out of the pain pills the doctor prescribed for me. Do you think you could run over to the clinic and pick up some more pills for me? Fifteen minutes is plenty of time to make it in.” The subjects was instructed to turn to the next page, labeled “data sheet,” on One ,additional cause she did
4 Five additional subjects were considered problematic, for reasons such as inability to name a disliked person, and change of liking toward the acquaintance in the period between naming him and coming to the experiment. It was decided to retain these subjects in the analysis, but as a precaution the data were also analyzed with these subjects eliminated. Eliminating these subjects had no effect on the
resuIts or conclusions.
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REGAN,
STRAUSS
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which was listed the name of the acquaintance and whether he agreed to the request. In all cases, this page indicated that the acquaintance had complied with the request (of course, no acquaintance was actually contacted). A handwritten note stated, “Subject agreed immediately to the request; said ‘Sure, I’d be glad to do it.’ ” Liking was manipulated by having half the subjects read the name of the person they said they liked; the other half read the name of the person they disliked. The experimenter was kept blind as to condition by having someone else assign subjects to condition and prepare the “data sheet.” A control condition was also run. In this condition, subjects were explicitly told that they were the control group for a study in which experimental subjects interpreted the behavior of acquaintances. Their job, they were told, was to interpret the behavior of a target person who was a stranger, rather than an acquaintance. The stranger was always of the same sex as the subject. Control subjects were not asked to nominate any acquaintances. Otherwise, the procedure was the same as for experimental subjects. Dependent uariuiobtes. After reading the description of the target person’s compliance, all subjects turned to a sheet asking them to indicate the “primary motive” behind the target’s behavior. This question provided the main dependent variable; subjects were given four response alternatives, readily codeable as indicating either an internal or an external attribution. Additional questions asked how praiseworthy the acquaintance’s action was, and (for experimental subjects) a check on the liking manipulation was included. After all forms had been completed, the subjects were carefully debriefed. RESULTS
AND
DISCUSSION”
At the end of the experiment, subjects in the experimental conditions were asked “How much do you like or dislike the acquaintance who participated in the described experiment?” This item served as a check on the liking manipulation. Responses were given on a 7-point scale labeled at the extremes “dislike very much” and “like very much.” The mean in the Like condition, where 7 indicates maximum liking, was 6.50; the mean in the Dislike condition was 2.77 [t(25) = 14.09, p < .001].6 There was clearly a very large difference in how much the acquaintance was liked in these two conditions. Subjects were also asked to indicate “how often have you interacted with this acquaintance in the last month?” on a 7-point scale ranging from “never” to “more than once a day.” The mean in the Like condition was 4.64 (between “twice a week” and “nearly every day”); in the Dislike condition the mean was 4.00 (“twice a week”). These means do not differ significantly (t < 1 ), perhaps because we instructed subjects not to name roommates or very cIose friends. The major dependent variable in this experiment asked subjects to ‘There were no main or interactive dependent variables in this experiment. subjects were combined. ‘One subject in the Dislike condition items.
effects of Accordingly, failed
sex
of subjects on any data from male and
to complete
the manipulation
of the female check
LIKING
ATTRIHUTIONS
AND
395
ATTRIBUTION
TABLE OF THK TARGET’S
2 HELPING
IN EXPERIMENT
Type
Note: propriate
II
of attribution
Condition
Internal
External
Like Control Dislike
13 6 4
1 8 10
cell entries attribution.
indicate X2(2)
the number of subject.s = 12.88, p < .Ol.
in each
condition
making
the ap-
the “primary motive” for their acquaintance’s behavior. Subjects were given two sets of alternatives to choose from; one set was to be used if the acquaintance had complied with the favor request, the other if he had refused. The two sets were provided to bolster the impression that the acquaintance could have refused; for all subjects, however, only the first set of alternatives was relevant. The alternatives given in this set were: indicate
(1) He helped because of something about him, e.g., because he is a helpful and kind person. (2) He helped because of something about the confederate, e.g., because it was hard to refuse him. (3) He helped b ecause he was in a good mood. (4) He helped because of something about the situation, e.g., because he didn’t want to leave a bad impression with the other people in the room or because he wanted something to do during the wait. In analyzing responses to this question, we considered (1) to be an internal attribution, and the other three responses to indicate external attributions for the target’s helping.7 Response (1) is the only response which explains the helping as typical of the actor and stemming from his stable characteristics. Table 2 indicates the responses to this item in each of the conditions. Chi square analysis indicated a highly significant effect due to conditions (X2 = 12.88, df = 2, p < .Ol). Separate chi square analyses (corrected for continuity) indicated that internal attributions for the target’s helping were more frequent in the Like condition than in both the Dislike condition (X2 = 9.48, p < .Ol) and Control condition (X2 = 5.89, p < .02). The Dislike and Control conditions did not differ. ’ Of selected
the I9 subjects who (3) and 11 selected
gave (4).
an external
attribution,
7 selected
response
(2),
I
396
REGAN,
STRAUSS
AND
FAZIO
The major hypothesis of this experiment was clearly confirmed. A prosocial act done by a friend is viewed as internally caused; the same action by a disliked person, or a stranger, is attributed to external, situational on the attribution given, factors. We anticipated that, depending precisely the same behavior could be seen as more or less praiseworthy. Helping seen as internally motivated should be regarded as praiseworthy; helping done because of external reasons should deserve less praise. Subjects were asked to indicate how much praise or criticism the target deserves for helping or refusing to help on a 7-point scale labeled at the extremes “a great deal of criticism” and “a great deal of praise.” Subjects in the Like condition, who were most likely to attribute the behavior internally, regarded the helping as meriting more praise (2 = 5.93) than either the Dislike condition (2 = 5.14, t = 2.14, p < .05) or the Control condition (2 = 5.36, t = 1.92, p < .lO). In summary, when one hears that a friend has done a pro-social action, one attributes the action to the characteristics of the friend and finds the action relatively praiseworthy. If one hears that the same action has been done by someone who is disliked, the action is more likely to be attributed externally, to situational factors, and less likely to be regarded as praiseworthy. In this experiment, a stranger’s helping was attributed similarly to that of a disliked other. After the fact, this result does not seem to indicate that inferences about strangers are generally similar to those about enemies. The situation described to the subjects was one in which strong situational pressures should have been apparent. The person making the request had a very legitimate reason, he was suffering pain, and a ready opportunity to help him was provided. In the absence of specific information about the character of the helper, the situational pressures seem to provide an adequate explanation. Despite these obvious situational pressures, however, the action was nevertheless interpreted internally when done by a friend. Taken together, the results of the two experiments nicely complement each other. Actions by another tend to be attributed in a way consistent with liking for the actor. Whether the action involved was performance on a task or prosocial behavior, and whether liking for the actor was directly manipulated in the laboratory or developed in the natural environment, actions which were consistent with affect for the actor were attributed internally, while those inconsistent with liking for the actor were attributed externally. We have suggested that a tendency to make attributions this way leads to the stabilization and preservation of existing levels of liking. It is unlikely that one will come to like an enemy if his positive actions are consistently attributed externally while his negative actions are seen as expressive of his true characteristics. No
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doubt there are limits to this attributional plasticity; they remain to be investigated. The present results also have some general implications for processes involved in person perception, Jones and Nisbett (1971) have recently argued that the layman’s conception of personality is “a collection of traits, that is, the most general kind of dispositions” ( p. 10). These authors agree with Mischel (1968) that observers tend consistently to overemphasize individual differences at the trait level despite scant evidence for the sort of cross-situational consistency in behavior predicted by the trait formulation. They suggest a variety of reasons for people’s belief in a trait construction of behavior, including the informational deficit and information-processing biases of observers. The present results suggest an additional possibility: behavior which is consistent with prior trait ascriptions is attributed internally and provides additional evidence for the trait ascription; behavior inconsistent with trait ascriptions is attributed externally, to situational factors, and thus does not disconfirm the trait ascription. Such differential attribution could paradoxically help to maintain a conception of personality as a bundle of traits even in cases where another’s behavior is attributed to situational factors. REFERENCES AHONSON, E. Some amecedents of interpersonal attraction. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium err Motizjation, 1969. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969. BERSCHEID, E., & WALSTER, E. H. Interpersonal attraction. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969. BYRNE, D. Interpersonal attraction and attitude similarity. Jou~al of Abnormal am1 Social Psychology, 1961, 62,713-715. BYRNE, D. The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press, 1971. DION, K. K. Physical attractiveness and evaluation of children’s transgressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197.2, 24, 207-213. HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relationships. New York: Wiley, 1958. JONES, E. E., & NISBETT, R. E. The actor and the observer: Divergent psrceptionr of the causes of behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1971. LOTT, A. J., & LOTT, B. E. The power of liking. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press, 1972. MISCHEL, W. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley, 1968. (Received
September
10, 1973)
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
Liking
SOCIAL
and
PSYCHOLOGY
the Attribution
10,
38!%97
(1974)
Process1
DENNIS T. REGAN, ELLEN STRAW AND RUSSELL FAZIO Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Two experiments were performed to examine the influence of liking on causal attributions of another person’s behavior. In both experiments, observers who either liked or disliked an actor were asked to attribute the actor’s behavior to personal or situational factors. In the first experiment, liking for a stranger was manipulated, and the behavior to be attributed was the stranger’s performance on a task requiring skill; in the second experiment, observers provided attributions for the prosocial behavior of an actual acquaintance who was either liked or disliked. Both experiments supported the hypothesis that actions which are consistent with affect for the actor (good actions by liked actors, bad actions by disliked actors) are attributed internally, to characteristics of the actor, while actions inconsistent with affect for the actor are attributed externally, to situational factors. The implications of these results for processes of person perception, including the ascription of trait characteristics to others, were discussed.
There exists a large social-psychological literature on the determinants of interpersonal attraction or liking (see, for example, Aronson, 1969; Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) . The influence on attraction toward others of attitude and personality similarity, physical attractiveness, propinquity, gain vs loss of esteem, cooperation, accidental consequences, cognitive dissonance, and the like have been extensively investigated. The reason for such intensive interest in liking is seldom stated directly, but there seemsto be an implicit assumption that liking is an attitude which is associated with (and probably causes) a wide variety of social behavior. Whether one is liked or disliked by others is thought to make an important and observable difference. Psychologists have of course attempted to determine some of the behavioral effects of interpersonal attraction, with mixed results (see Lott & Lott, 1972, for a review). The present research focuses instead on the effects of liking on judgments or attributions of another person’s ‘The first experiment was conducted honors experiment supervised by the conducted by the third author. Copyright All rights
by the second author as an undergraduate senior author. The second experiment was
385 @ 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
386
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AND
FAZIO
behavior. There are at least three ways in which interpersonal attraction might affect our interpretation of others’ actions. First, behavior should be described whenever possible as indicating a positive characteristic or state of a liked person, but a negative characteristic or state of a disliked other. In order for liking to affect judgments in this way, the action must be interpretable as indicating more than one trait or characteristic of the actor. For example, imagine a student who talks with his professor after class. His friend might see this behavior as indicating intellectual curiosity or genuine friendliness. His enemy might see the same behavior as showing flattery or manipulativeness. Secondly, the behavior itself should be evaluated more positively when the actor is liked than when he is disliked. If a person steals a book from the campus store, for example, his friend should regard that transgression as a less serious crime than his enemy. Dion (1972) has demonstrated a similar effect of physical attractiveness on judgments of the seriousness of transgressions. Finally, in combination with the characteristics of the action, liking for the actor should strongly affect the observer’s assignment of causality for the action. As Heider (1958) suggested, we expect good people to perform good actions, and bad people to perform bad actions. Thus when liked actors do good things or disliked actors do bad things, we can readily understand the action as caused by the characteristics of the actor. We provide an internal attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) for such expected actions, we regard them as typical of the actor, and we expect more of them in the future. However, when the action is seen as out-of-character-when good actors do bad acts, or bad actors do good acts-we are unable to understand the action as internally caused, and instead provide an external attribution. We see the action as atypical of the actor, as caused by some external or situational factor, and do not expect similar actions in the future. As an example, suppose that one person insults another at a party. The insulter’s enemy will see the action as internally caused and typical of the actor. His friend will seek some external, situational cause, perhaps in some provocation by the target of the insult. As a consequence of these divergent attributions, of course, each observer can maintain his original feelings toward the insulter. In fact, all three of these attributional biases act to maintain the stability of existing levels of liking. The two experiments presented below provide evidence related to the third attributional bias hypothesized to be affected by interpersonal attraction. The experiments test the hypothesis that observers will provide internal attributions for good actions done by liked actors and bad actions done by disliked actors, and will provide external attributions for good
LIKINGANDATTRJBUTION
387
actions done by disliked actors and bad actions done by liked actors. Put more succinctly, actions which are consistent with liking for the actor will be attributed internally; actions inconsistent with liking for the actor will be attributed externally. After presenting both experiments, we will discussthe implications of the findings both for behavioral effects mediated by these attributional processes,and for more general processes of person perception. EXPERIMENT
I
Method Overuiew. All subjects observed a female confederate partner play a game of skill, and then were asked questions about the confederate’s performance.In a 2 x 2 factorial design, two levels of liking for the confederate and two levels of confederate task performance were manipulated. Liking was manipulated by having half of the subjects (Dislike condition) ( 1) observe the confederate behaving in a rude, unpleasant manner through what the subject believed to be a closed circuit television hookup (in reality, a videotape), and (2) receive bogus attitude information from the confederate which was dissimilar to their own views. Subjects in the Like condition, on the other hand, ( 1) observed the confederate behaving politely and pleasantly, and (2) received information that the confederate had attitudes similar to their own. The confederate’s task performance was manipulated by having half the subjects see her, on videotape, perform extremely competently in a game-playing situation, while the other half saw her behave incompetently. Finally, all subjects completed a series of g-point scale questions, on each of which the confederate’s performance could be attributed either internally, to a general dispositional characteristic, or externally, to a situational characteristic. Subjects. 25 female and 23 male Cornell undergraduates served without pay as subjects in this experiment. They were recruited from introductory courses and sign-up sheets posted around campus. The subjects were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions without regard to sex. Data were collected from two additional subjects (one male and one female in the Dislik+Skilled condition), but eliminated from the analysis because these subjects indicated in debriefing that they believed the confederate was an experimental accomplice. Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, the subject was ushered by the experimenter to a small room and seated at a table on which there was a television monitor. The experimenter explained that the experiment involved pairs of subjects, that the other subject had not yet arrived, but that when she did she would be taken to an adjacent room from which she could be observed on the television monitor. The experimenter showed this room to the subject (in order to make it more credible later that the subject really was watching another person in the appropriate room). The subject was then asked to fill out an attitude survey, measuring attitudes on topics of interest to college students, “since we like to get normative data on all subjects in psychology experiments.” When the subject had nearly completed this survey, the experimenter left the room, rather loudly discovered that “the other subject” had arrived, stated a few words about “taking her into the next room,” returned to the subject’s room and shut the door. She then collected the subject’s attitude survey, and explained the
388
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AND
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next stage in the procedure. She said that during the experiment, which involved “various aspects of interpersonal judgment and game-playing skills,” the subject had been assigned the role of “observer” while the other person would be the “participant.” The subject would observe the other on the monitor via closed-circuit television. She explained the operation and controls on the monitor, turned it on, and told the subject that the picture would appear when the system was turned on from a control room. She said that she would turn on the picture, and also administer instructions and the attitude scale to the “partner.” She then left the subject’s room, closed the door, and turned on the videotape system. The first ten seconds of videotape showed the confederate seated at the table in the room previously shown to the subject. The subject then saw the experimenter enter this room and begin instructions to the confederate. Liking manipulation. In an attempt to create clear differences in liking, a two-part liking manipulation was devised. In the first part of the manipulation, the confederate’s behavior was varied to make her appear likeable or unlikeable to the subject watching the monitor. In the Like condition, the confederate responded pleasantly to the exnerimenter’s initial instructions. indicated that she had seen the subiect in the next room and asked whether that was her partner, and smiled pleasantly when the experimenter answered affirmatively. In the Dislike condition, on the other hand, the confederate was shown seated at her table looking bored and annoyed, drumming her fingers, riffling through papers. When the experimenter entered, the confederate began by saying “I hope this won’t take too long . . . I’m in a rush.” She responded rudely to the experimenter’s instructions, grabbing the attitude survey and pencil brusquely from her hands. As the experimenter left the room, the confederate asked “Is that person in the other room the one I have to work with?” and responded with an under-the-breath disgusted comment to the experimenter’s “yes.” At this point, the experimenter disconnected the monitor and returned to the subject. She professed surprise that the monitor was not working, and left the subject to “check the equipment.” This provided time to prepare the second part of the liking manipulation, modeled after the work of Byrne (1961) on the effect of perceived attitudinal similarity on liking. In the Like condition, the experimenter prepared a bogus attitude scale for the confederate designed to appear very similar to the subject’s own responses. In the Dislike condition, a bogus scale was designed to make the confederate’s responses appear dissimilar from the subject’s. After completing the bogus questionnaire, the experimenter returned to the subject, announced that the equipment was now functioning properly, and gave the bogus survey to the subject, remarking that “as long as you’re going to be observing her, I thought it would be helpful for you to know something about her views.” In summary, in the Like condition the subject observed a rather pleasant confederate who apparently held attitudes very similar to the subject’s own. In the Dislike condition, the subject watched a rude and unpleasant confederate who later turned out to hold attitudes very dissimilar from the subject’s Performance manipulation. After the subject had finished studying the bogus attitude scale, the experimenter instructed the subject to watch the monitor and left the room. She then activated the videotape, which once again showed the confederate seated at her table, this time adopting a neutral posture. The experimenter then entered the confederate’s room carrying a game (Impact (TM) by Ideal) which she placed on the table. She explained that the confederate was to play the game, and demonstrated its operation. The object of the game was to knock a small rolling metal ball from a U-shaped chute by hitting it with a metal weight attached
LIKING
AND
ATTRIBUTI0N
389
to a string. Points were awarded for each successful trial, the number of points being larger when the ball was knocked off near the top of its arc. The confederate took 20 trials at knocking the ball from the chute. In the Skilled condition, the confederate succeeded on 12 of the 20 trials. After the last trial, the experimenter announced that she had scored 1500 points, comIn the Unskilled performance conmenting that this score was “really excellent.” dition, on the other hand, the confederate succeeded in knocking the ball from the chute only 2 of the 20 trials. The experimenter announced after the last trial that she had scored 200 points, adding that this score was “not too good.” The only difference in the videotape for the two performance conditions was in the number of successful trials and the experimenter’s brief comment. At the conclusion of the trials, the experimenter picked up the game and left the room, explaining that she would return in several minutes for the rest of the experiment. The tape then showed her leaving the confederate’s room, and a few moments later the experimenter returned to the subject’s room and turned off the monitor, which still showed the confederate seated at her table. Dependent uariabks. The experimenter then asked the subject to answer a set of written questions “in terms of what you just observed.” There were 10 questions in all, each question answerable on a Q-point scale. The first 8 questions asked about the task, the confederate’s performance, and the experimenter’s directions. In each case, the subject’s answer could indicate that he attributed the confederate’s performance either to her internal, dispositional characteristics or to some external, situational characteristic. The last two questions provided a check on the liking manipulation. After completing the dependent variables, the subjects were extensive!y debriefed. RESULTS
AND
DISCUSSION*
The question which most directly tested the central hypothesis of this experiment was: “Some tasks are good measures of the abilities they supposedly involve. Other tasks are less indicative of a person’s true abilities. This game is most likely. . . .” Responseswere indicated on a g-point scale, anchored on the extremes by the phrases “an accurate measure . . . an inaccurate measure.” An internal attribution for the confederate’s performance would be indicated by checking a response near the “accurate measure” end of the response scale, while an external attribution would be indicated by finding the task a relatively inaccurate measure of the confederate’s ability. An interaction was predicted, with subjects expected to find the task a relatively accurate measure of the confederate’s ability in the Like-Skilled and Dislike-Unskilled conditions, but an inaccurate measure in the Like-Unskilled and Dislike-Skilled conditions. The means for this question are presented in Table 1. Analysis of variance indicated a highly significant interaction [F( 1,40) = 25.65, ’ The data from this experiment were analyzed in a 2 (Liking) X 2 (Performance) X 2 (Sex of subject) unweighted-means analysis of variance. With the single exception noted below, there were no main or interactive effects of sex of subject on any of the dependent variables. All probability values reported are e-tailed.
390
BEGAN,
MEAN
STRAUSS
TABLE RESPONSES TO QUESTION AS A MEASURE
AND
FAZIO
1 ABOUT GAME’S OF ABILITY Performance
Liking
condition
condition
Skilled
Like Dislike Note: responses curacy rating.
ACCURACY
Unskilled 2.42 5.59
5.25 2.75 were
on a g-point
scale;
the higher
the number,
the higher
the ac-
p < .OOl] as predicted; there were no main effects (both F’s < 1). These results very strongly confirm the main hypothesis of the experiment. Other questions support the notion that liking for an actor significantly affects attributions of performance on a task. For example, subjects were first asked to rate the game on a continuum from “very hard” to “very easy.” The analysis of variance indicated two significant main effects (for Liking, F( 1,40) = 35.50, p < .OOl; for Performance, F( 1,40) = 54.17, p < .001).8 Subjects saw the game as harder if the confederate’s performance was unskilled; they also saw this novel game as harder if they liked the confederate than if they disliked her. It may seem paradoxical that a game should be seen as more difficult simply because a liked person is playing it, but this result makes sense in our attributional framework. By hypothesis, we wish to attribute our friends’ skilled performances to internal factors, but our enemies’ skilled performances to external factors. One way to attribute good performance by friends to their high skill level is to find the task difficult; a way to avoid the implication of high skill in a disliked other who performs well is to attribute his performance externally, for example to an easy task. Similar considerations apply to the case of poor performance, leading to the prediction that the game will be seen as more difficult if played by a liked other. The data strongly support this notion. Similarly, subjects were asked directly, “How skillful would you rate this player,” on a scale marked at the extremes “very skillful” and “very unskillful.” Once again, two main effects emerge and no interaction (for Liking, F( 1,40) = 11.97, p < .Ol; for Performance, F( 1,40) = 83.30, p < .OOl; Interaction F < 1). Liked players are judged as more skillful a In addition, male subjects = 6.37, p < .05] than female interact with the experimental
(a = 4.22) subjects (g treatments.
saw the game as slightly = 3.68); sex of subject
harder did not,
[F( 1,40) however,
LIKING
AND
ATTRIBUTION
391
than disliked players, and skilled performance (not surprisingly) leads to a judgment of greater skill than unskilled performance. This question also serves as a manipulation check for the performance variable. Finally, subjects’ expectations for future performance were tested by asking them to indicate if this player tries the game again, his score will probably ‘get much better’ or ‘get much worse,’ on the same g-point scale. We predicted that subjects would expect maximum improvement of performance in the Like-Unskilled condition, and minimum improvement in the Dislike-Skilled condition, yielding two main effects. The analysis of variance indicated significant effects of both the liking [F( 1,40) = 31.77, p < .OOl] and performance [F( 1,40) = 6.03, p < .05] variables, as predicted. Additional questions tapped the quality of the experimenter’s instructions, whether the game appeared in adequate working order, and whether the confederate might have cheated to improve her score. No significant effects emerged, except that subjects thought it more likely that the disliked confederate might have cheated. All of these results suggest that subjects wish to attribute high skill to a liked other and low skill to a disliked other. When performance is at variance with expectations of the other’s skill, the performance is attributed externally, primarily to task difficulty. Despite objectively identical performance by the liked and disliked confederate, very different attributions are made about the characteristics of the game itself and the skill level of the confederate. Given good performance, the game is regarded as a very accurate measure of underlying ability of the liked confederate, but a poor measure of the disliked confederate’s ability; given poor performance, the game’s perceived accuracy as an ability measure reverses. The game is seen as more difficult if played by the liked confederate; despite this, the liked confederate is expected to improve more if she tries the game again. All of these judgments, of course, protect the subject’s belief that the liked confederate is more skillful. It would not be fair to say that variations in performance are ignored in making skill attributions, but their effect is systematically affected by liking for the performer. The final two questions were a check on the liking manipulation. Subjects indicated their feeling toward their “partner” on a g-point scale labeled at the extremes “strong liking” and “strong disliking,” and whether they would like to work with this person in an experiment on a scale running from “definitely yes” to “definitely no.” Responses to these questions were summed, and an analysis of variance indicated a huge effect of the liking manipulation [F( 1,40) = 111.99, p < .OOl], with no effect attributable to the performance manipulation or the interaction
392
REGAN,
STRAUSS
AND
FAZIO
(both F’s 5 1). 0 n a scale where 18 indicates maximum liking, the mean in the Like condition was 11.29, and in the Dislike condition was 4.50. Apparently our two-part liking manipulation was very strong. More interestingly, liking for the confederate was not at all affected by the performance manipulation. Nor should it have been. According to the logic behind this experiment, liking for the confederate is an independent variable which systematically affects attributions of performance. These attributions are expected to occur in a form which enables the observer to keep his affection for the actor more or less intact. While there are doubtless occasions where observed performance affects liking for an actor (especially, perhaps, where the observer is himself affected by the performance), in the present experiment subjects avoided any such effect by making differential attributions of the confederate’s performance. Taken as a whole, the results of this experiment strongly support the hypotheses. An additional experiment was nevertheless conducted, for three reasons. First, because of equipment limitations, it was impossible for the experimenter to be blind to the subject’s experimental condition. The experimenter had to set the videotapes for each subject, and she also administered the dependent variables. Although the written form of the dependent variables minimized the opportunity for bias, it would have been preferable for the experimenter to be blind. Secondly, although the liking manipulation clearly was very strong, we wanted to test our notions using a manipulation closer to “real-life” liking and disliking. To accomplish this, we took advantage of subjects’ liking and disliking for actual acquaintances. Finally, instead of skill attributions based on performance of a task, we investigated subjects’ attributions about a prosocial act supposedly performed by the target. Specifically, subjects were told that a target person they either liked or disliked had done a favor to help a stranger. They were then asked to select from among four alternatives the “primary motive” behind the target’s behavior. The alternatives provided were readily codeable as indicating either an internal or an external attribution. The reasoning was parallel to that in the first experiment. We predicted that subjects would give internal attributions for a pro-social action done by a friend, but give external attributions for the same action performed by someone they disliked. EXPERIMENT
II
Method Subiects. The Cornell
University.
subjects were 22 male and 20 female undergraduate They were randomly assigned to the three experimental
volunteers at conditions.
LIKING
AND
ATTRLBUT~ON
393
subject was run, but her data were not included in the analysis benot believe the cover storye4 Procedure. Subjects were initially contacted by telephone and asked to take part in a psychological experiment on person perception. If the subject agreed, the experimenter said that most of the work in this area involved first impressions, and that we were concerned instead with how people interpret the behavior of their actual acquaintances. To study this, we would ask the subject for the names of some of his acquaintances. We would call some of these people, and ask them to come for an experiment. We would then observe their behavior, and later ask the subject to come in and interpret this behavior for us. The experimenter then said that “we have established a variety of categories that we’d like the suggested individuals to fit into.” The subject was asked to provide names in two categories. “Scholastic ability” was the first category; the subject named an acquaintance who was a good student, and another who was a poor-to-average student. Liking was the second category; the subject was asked to name “someone you rather like, and someone you dislike.” The only restrictions were that the subject name an acquaintance of the same sex, and not name “roommates or real close friends-only acquaintances.” The latter restriction was to minimize the likelihood of discussing the experiment in advance with the named individuals. In addition, subjects were explicitly asked not to discuss the experiment with those named, because “if they know that you will find out what they did in their experiments, they might not act naturally.” The experimenter said that he would call back in a couple of weeks, after the acquaintances had been studied, to arrange a time for the subject to interpret their behavior. After an interval of IO-30 days, the subject was contacted again and came to the laboratory. After introductory remarks, the experimenter said that “we were only able to get one of the people you mentioned in for the experiment.” The experimenter then provided a sketchy description of the situation in which the acquaintance allegsdly had been observed, and gave the subject a detailed written description to read. According to this (fictitious) description, when the acquaintance arrived he was directed to a waiting room where a few other students were also waiting for experiments. A minute later, the experimenter entered the room and told the subject that he was running behind schedule, and that there would be a 15-minute delay. The subject agreed to wait. At this point another student in the room, actually a confederate, asked a favor of the subject. This confederate was made up to look as though he had had an accident, with his right calf taped and a smal1 bandage on his forehead. He said: “Say, since you’ve got to wait 15 minutes, maybe you could do me a favor. I had a car accident, and my leg and forehead were cut pretty badly. Anyway, I’m out of the pain pills the doctor prescribed for me. Do you think you could run over to the clinic and pick up some more pills for me? Fifteen minutes is plenty of time to make it in.” The subjects was instructed to turn to the next page, labeled “data sheet,” on One ,additional cause she did
4 Five additional subjects were considered problematic, for reasons such as inability to name a disliked person, and change of liking toward the acquaintance in the period between naming him and coming to the experiment. It was decided to retain these subjects in the analysis, but as a precaution the data were also analyzed with these subjects eliminated. Eliminating these subjects had no effect on the
resuIts or conclusions.
394
REGAN,
STRAUSS
AND
FAZIO
which was listed the name of the acquaintance and whether he agreed to the request. In all cases, this page indicated that the acquaintance had complied with the request (of course, no acquaintance was actually contacted). A handwritten note stated, “Subject agreed immediately to the request; said ‘Sure, I’d be glad to do it.’ ” Liking was manipulated by having half the subjects read the name of the person they said they liked; the other half read the name of the person they disliked. The experimenter was kept blind as to condition by having someone else assign subjects to condition and prepare the “data sheet.” A control condition was also run. In this condition, subjects were explicitly told that they were the control group for a study in which experimental subjects interpreted the behavior of acquaintances. Their job, they were told, was to interpret the behavior of a target person who was a stranger, rather than an acquaintance. The stranger was always of the same sex as the subject. Control subjects were not asked to nominate any acquaintances. Otherwise, the procedure was the same as for experimental subjects. Dependent uariuiobtes. After reading the description of the target person’s compliance, all subjects turned to a sheet asking them to indicate the “primary motive” behind the target’s behavior. This question provided the main dependent variable; subjects were given four response alternatives, readily codeable as indicating either an internal or an external attribution. Additional questions asked how praiseworthy the acquaintance’s action was, and (for experimental subjects) a check on the liking manipulation was included. After all forms had been completed, the subjects were carefully debriefed. RESULTS
AND
DISCUSSION”
At the end of the experiment, subjects in the experimental conditions were asked “How much do you like or dislike the acquaintance who participated in the described experiment?” This item served as a check on the liking manipulation. Responses were given on a 7-point scale labeled at the extremes “dislike very much” and “like very much.” The mean in the Like condition, where 7 indicates maximum liking, was 6.50; the mean in the Dislike condition was 2.77 [t(25) = 14.09, p < .001].6 There was clearly a very large difference in how much the acquaintance was liked in these two conditions. Subjects were also asked to indicate “how often have you interacted with this acquaintance in the last month?” on a 7-point scale ranging from “never” to “more than once a day.” The mean in the Like condition was 4.64 (between “twice a week” and “nearly every day”); in the Dislike condition the mean was 4.00 (“twice a week”). These means do not differ significantly (t < 1 ), perhaps because we instructed subjects not to name roommates or very cIose friends. The major dependent variable in this experiment asked subjects to ‘There were no main or interactive dependent variables in this experiment. subjects were combined. ‘One subject in the Dislike condition items.
effects of Accordingly, failed
sex
of subjects on any data from male and
to complete
the manipulation
of the female check
LIKING
ATTRIHUTIONS
AND
395
ATTRIBUTION
TABLE OF THK TARGET’S
2 HELPING
IN EXPERIMENT
Type
Note: propriate
II
of attribution
Condition
Internal
External
Like Control Dislike
13 6 4
1 8 10
cell entries attribution.
indicate X2(2)
the number of subject.s = 12.88, p < .Ol.
in each
condition
making
the ap-
the “primary motive” for their acquaintance’s behavior. Subjects were given two sets of alternatives to choose from; one set was to be used if the acquaintance had complied with the favor request, the other if he had refused. The two sets were provided to bolster the impression that the acquaintance could have refused; for all subjects, however, only the first set of alternatives was relevant. The alternatives given in this set were: indicate
(1) He helped because of something about him, e.g., because he is a helpful and kind person. (2) He helped because of something about the confederate, e.g., because it was hard to refuse him. (3) He helped b ecause he was in a good mood. (4) He helped because of something about the situation, e.g., because he didn’t want to leave a bad impression with the other people in the room or because he wanted something to do during the wait. In analyzing responses to this question, we considered (1) to be an internal attribution, and the other three responses to indicate external attributions for the target’s helping.7 Response (1) is the only response which explains the helping as typical of the actor and stemming from his stable characteristics. Table 2 indicates the responses to this item in each of the conditions. Chi square analysis indicated a highly significant effect due to conditions (X2 = 12.88, df = 2, p < .Ol). Separate chi square analyses (corrected for continuity) indicated that internal attributions for the target’s helping were more frequent in the Like condition than in both the Dislike condition (X2 = 9.48, p < .Ol) and Control condition (X2 = 5.89, p < .02). The Dislike and Control conditions did not differ. ’ Of selected
the I9 subjects who (3) and 11 selected
gave (4).
an external
attribution,
7 selected
response
(2),
I
396
REGAN,
STRAUSS
AND
FAZIO
The major hypothesis of this experiment was clearly confirmed. A prosocial act done by a friend is viewed as internally caused; the same action by a disliked person, or a stranger, is attributed to external, situational on the attribution given, factors. We anticipated that, depending precisely the same behavior could be seen as more or less praiseworthy. Helping seen as internally motivated should be regarded as praiseworthy; helping done because of external reasons should deserve less praise. Subjects were asked to indicate how much praise or criticism the target deserves for helping or refusing to help on a 7-point scale labeled at the extremes “a great deal of criticism” and “a great deal of praise.” Subjects in the Like condition, who were most likely to attribute the behavior internally, regarded the helping as meriting more praise (2 = 5.93) than either the Dislike condition (2 = 5.14, t = 2.14, p < .05) or the Control condition (2 = 5.36, t = 1.92, p < .lO). In summary, when one hears that a friend has done a pro-social action, one attributes the action to the characteristics of the friend and finds the action relatively praiseworthy. If one hears that the same action has been done by someone who is disliked, the action is more likely to be attributed externally, to situational factors, and less likely to be regarded as praiseworthy. In this experiment, a stranger’s helping was attributed similarly to that of a disliked other. After the fact, this result does not seem to indicate that inferences about strangers are generally similar to those about enemies. The situation described to the subjects was one in which strong situational pressures should have been apparent. The person making the request had a very legitimate reason, he was suffering pain, and a ready opportunity to help him was provided. In the absence of specific information about the character of the helper, the situational pressures seem to provide an adequate explanation. Despite these obvious situational pressures, however, the action was nevertheless interpreted internally when done by a friend. Taken together, the results of the two experiments nicely complement each other. Actions by another tend to be attributed in a way consistent with liking for the actor. Whether the action involved was performance on a task or prosocial behavior, and whether liking for the actor was directly manipulated in the laboratory or developed in the natural environment, actions which were consistent with affect for the actor were attributed internally, while those inconsistent with liking for the actor were attributed externally. We have suggested that a tendency to make attributions this way leads to the stabilization and preservation of existing levels of liking. It is unlikely that one will come to like an enemy if his positive actions are consistently attributed externally while his negative actions are seen as expressive of his true characteristics. No
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doubt there are limits to this attributional plasticity; they remain to be investigated. The present results also have some general implications for processes involved in person perception, Jones and Nisbett (1971) have recently argued that the layman’s conception of personality is “a collection of traits, that is, the most general kind of dispositions” ( p. 10). These authors agree with Mischel (1968) that observers tend consistently to overemphasize individual differences at the trait level despite scant evidence for the sort of cross-situational consistency in behavior predicted by the trait formulation. They suggest a variety of reasons for people’s belief in a trait construction of behavior, including the informational deficit and information-processing biases of observers. The present results suggest an additional possibility: behavior which is consistent with prior trait ascriptions is attributed internally and provides additional evidence for the trait ascription; behavior inconsistent with trait ascriptions is attributed externally, to situational factors, and thus does not disconfirm the trait ascription. Such differential attribution could paradoxically help to maintain a conception of personality as a bundle of traits even in cases where another’s behavior is attributed to situational factors. REFERENCES AHONSON, E. Some amecedents of interpersonal attraction. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium err Motizjation, 1969. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969. BERSCHEID, E., & WALSTER, E. H. Interpersonal attraction. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969. BYRNE, D. Interpersonal attraction and attitude similarity. Jou~al of Abnormal am1 Social Psychology, 1961, 62,713-715. BYRNE, D. The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press, 1971. DION, K. K. Physical attractiveness and evaluation of children’s transgressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197.2, 24, 207-213. HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relationships. New York: Wiley, 1958. JONES, E. E., & NISBETT, R. E. The actor and the observer: Divergent psrceptionr of the causes of behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1971. LOTT, A. J., & LOTT, B. E. The power of liking. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press, 1972. MISCHEL, W. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley, 1968. (Received
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10, 1973)