Actors, observers, and the attribution process

JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

Actors,

SOCIAL

Observers,

PSYCHOLOGY

13, 89- 111 (1977)

and the Attribution

Toward

Process

a Reconceptualization

THOMAS C. MONSON AND MARK University

SNYDER

of Minnesota

Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors attribute their actions to situational requirements whereas observers attribute the same actions to personal dispositions. This hypothesis is critically examined and a reconceptualization is proposed. Our conceptual analysis focuses on the attributional consequences of differences between actors and observers in: (a) availability of information about the contemporary and historical determinants of the actor’s behavior, and (b) susceptibility to possible motivational distortions and cognitive biases. The relationship between this formulation and Jones and Nisbett’s analysis of differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception is discussed.

Attribution theory is concerned with the processes by which individuals explain and interpret events that they encounter. In particular, attribution theory deals with the causal explanations that individuals construct for their own behavior and the actions of others. Researchers and theorists have attempted to specify the factors that motivate individuals to search for causally relevant information, the manner in which this information is processed to assign causes to events, and the cognitive and behavioral consequences of formulating one causal attribution rather than another. From the attributional perspective, the person is a “constructive thinker” or an “intuitive psychologist” searching for causes of events, drawing inferences about people and their circumstances, and acting upon these cognitive structures (cf. Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972). Students of causal attribution have traditionally relied, both conceptually and empirically, on a dispositional/situational dichotomy. They have tried to understand how and why perceivers decide whether a particular sample of an individual’s behavior is representative of corresponding inner states, dispositions, abilities, or attitudes (disposiThis research and the preparation of this manuscript were supported in part by a grant in aid of research from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 24998-01, and National Science Foundation Grant SOC 75-13872 to Mark Snyder. The order of authorship is alphabetical, as the two authors have contributed equally. Requestsfor reprints should be sent to Mark Snyder, Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, Department of Psychology, Elliott Hall, University of Minnesota. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455. 89 Copyright 0 1977 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

90

MONSON

AND SNYDER

tional attribution) or a reflection of current social and environmental pressures (situational attribution). The dispositional/situational dichotomy, although firmly entrenched in the vocabulary of the attribution framework, is not without its problems (cf. Kruglanski, 1975). First of all, it is not really a dichotomy. Most situational explanations seem to imply assumptions about relevant dispositions. Thus, when I offer the situational attribution “I bought the house because it has beautiful dark oak woodwork,” I am also revealing that I like dark oak woodwork. Similarly, most dispositional attributions clearly assume the influence of relevant situational determinants of behavior. Thus, when I say that “He bought the Girl Scout cookies because he is a generous person,” I need not add that he would not have bought the cookies had he not been asked by the Girl Scout. Moroever, all too often apparently situational attributions (e.g., “He did it for the money”) can be readily translated into what appear to be dispositional attribuThus, situational tions (e.g., “He did it because he is money-hungry”). and dispositional explanations of cause may reflect differences in language rather than thought. Despite these ambiguities, Ross (Note 1) has suggested that the traditional distinction be retained, providing that we categorize as situational attributions only “those explanations that state or imply no dispositions on the part of the actor beyond those typical of all or most actors” (p. 5). Similarly, Ross suggests that we consider as disthat state or imply positional attributions only “those explanations something unique or distinguishing about the actor” (p. 5). Thus, the situational/dispositional distinction may not represent a dichotomous classification, but may instead reflect the perceiver’s weighting of the relative importance of situational and dispositional determinants in an attempt to identify any unique properties of the actor and the actor’s situation.’ The intuitive psychologist’s activity does not end with the identification of a plausible situational or dispositional cause. Having once attributed an action to dispositional properties, the perceiver can then inferentially define those attributes (e.g., having decided that ability caused John’s academic performance, I can then infer just how able a person he must be). Similarly, situational attributions may serve as the basis for inferring the characteristic properties of the situation that determined the actor’s behavior. Furthermore, causal attributions can serve as the basis for predictions about future behavior. Having decided that Chris’ contribution to charity reflects a uniquely high level of generosity, I may then predict that Chris is more likely than most people to continue to contribute to this and other charities. I would ’ Although we continue recognize that perceivers and dispositional factors. naive theory of the manner

to use the traditional vocabulary of attribution theory, we may attribute behavior to some combination of situational However, few measures of attribution probe the perceiver’s in which multiple causes combine to determine behavior.

ACTORS

AND

OBSERVERS

91

be less likely to make such predictions if I had attributed Chris’ initial donations to transient peer pressures or an unexpected windfall. However, I might predict that most other people would react similarly to these situational influences. Attribution theorists have mapped the cognitive activities of the intuitive psychologist with measures of each “task”: identification of causes, inferences about the traits of the actor and the characteristics of the situation, and predictions about future behavior (cf. Ross, Note 1). PERSPECTIVE

OF THE ATTRIBUTOR

The notions of attribution theory have proven equally useful in understanding how observers understand the behavior of other individuals (interpersonal attribution) and in providing illuminating insights into the accounts that individual actors offer when contemplating the meaning of their own behavior (self-attribution). Early discussions stressed the similarities between the processes of interpersonal attribution and selfattribution (e.g., Bern, 1967). More recently, attention has focused on a search for systematic differences in causal explanations constructed from the perspective of an individual actor and those generated from the vantage point of an outside observer (e.g., Bern, 1972; Jones 8z Nisbett, 1972). Thus, Jones and Nisbett have suggested that “there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions” (1972, p. 80). According to this viewpoint, as actors, we believe that we choose our actions to fit particular situational contexts; but, as observers, we believe that others do what they do because they are bound by inherent traits, dispositions, and other personal characteristics. The identification of systematic differences in the attributions of actors and observers is not without theoretical import. Such differences in perspective may prove to be as useful in elucidating the attribution process as have illusions, biases, and fallacies for probing the basic processes of perception and cognition (e.g., Gregory, 1971; Neisser, 1966). In fact, Jones and Nisbett (1972) have carefully charted the implications for attribution theory of the differences between actors and observers that they have proposed. Thus, the importance of differences in the attributions, inferences, and predictions of actors and observers lies not in the question of their existence, but rather in the implications of such differences for advancing our knowledge of the attribution process. However, at least for now, data must come before theory. The hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett (1972) has received the widespread attention of empirical researchers. Time and again actors have seemed to attribute their actions to situational influences at the same time as observers have seemed to construct relatively dispositional explana-

92

MONSON

AND SNYDER

tions of the same actions. This difference in perspective between actors and observers has been inferred from measures of causal identification (e.g., Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973, Study 2; West, Gunn, & Chernicky, 1975), inferences about traits of the actor (e.g., Miller, 1975; Nisbett, Caputo, et al., 1973, Study 3), and predictions of the future behavior of the actor (e.g., Gurwitz & Panciera, 1975; Miller, 1975; Nisbett, Caputo, et al., 1973, Study 1).2 The divergent perspectives of actors and observers have been demonstrated in studies that have compared individuals’ perceptions of their own behavior with their perceptions of others (the common rater procedural paradigm; e.g., Nisbett, Caputo, et al., 1973, Study 2, Study 3) and in investigations that have compared individuals’ self-attributions with those of outside observers (the common target procedural paradigm; e.g., Miller, 1975; Nisbett, Caputo, et al., 1973, Study 1). It has even been possible to manipulate and control social perspective and thereby influence the causal viewpoints of actors and observers (e.g., Arkin & Duval, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Regan & Totten, 1975; Storms, 1973; Taylor 8z Fiske, 1975). Yet, despite the impressive track record of confirmations of the hypothesis, other empirical evidence suggests possible limitations. Some researchers have reported differences between actors and observers that are the opposite of those suggested by Jones and Nisbett (1972). Thus, in a variety of circumstances, actors attribute to themselves more responsibility for their own behaviors and the consequences of their actions than do observers (e.g., Bell, 1974; Calder, Ross, & Insko, 1973; Gross, 1967; Langer & Roth, 1975; Miller & Norman, 1975; Polefka, 1965; Sherrod, 1971; Monson & Snyder, Note 2). Actors claim that they are less influenced by situational forces than are other people (e.g., Bell, 1974; Freedman, 1969; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove, 1974; Wolosin, Sherman, & Mynatt, 1972). In at least one naturalistic study of person perception, individuals attributed a greater number of and more extreme traits to themselves than to other members of their living group (Monson, Tanke, Lund, & Snyder, Note 3). Moreover, some investigators have identified conditions in which actors make more dispositional attributions than do observers and other conditions in which observers make more dispositional inferences than do actors (e.g., Cialdini, Braver, & Lewis, 1974; Feather & Simon, 1971a; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Polly, 1974; Snyder, 1976; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976; Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976; Wolosin, Sherman, & Till, 1973). Is there a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements at the same time as observers attribute the * These converging results with causal, inferential, and predictive measures of attribution are particularly impressive because the empirical relationships amongst the three measures are often modest (Bierbrauer, 1973).

ACTORS AND OBSERVERS

93

same actions to personal dispositions? Clearly, intensive research has not assigned to this question an unequivocal answer of “yes.” Nor does the data warrant an assertion that self-perceptions are actually more dispositional than are interpersonal perceptions. It would probably be premature-and, no doubt, unproductive-to make the timid claim that there are, in fact, no reliable or important differences in social perspective between actors and observers. Rather, it is clear that the attributions of actors and observers do differ, although not always in the direction suggested by Jones and Nisbett. A consideration of the conceptual issues involved may point the way toward a theoretical specification of the “when,” “why,” and “where” of particular asymmetries between the causal viewpoints of actors and observers. Moreover, such a reconsideration may further chart the implications of such differences for understanding the attribution process. ACCURACY

OF THE ATTRIBUTOR

How does the attribution process differ for involved actors and uninvolved observers? Jones and Nisbett (1972) and Bern (1972) have suggested several informational differences. Actors have knowledge about their own inner states, attitudes, and dispositions. This information is normally not available to observers. Actors are usually more knowledgeable about their own behavior in other situations and at other times than are observers. Actors focus their visual attention on their environment rather than on their own behavior whereas the actor’s behavior is a focal point of the observer’s environment. We do not doubt that such informational differences exist. The question is, what are the resulting effects? Do these informational differences pull the attributions of actors and observers in different directions? It would seem that actors, by virtue of their extensive knowledge of the contemporary and historical factors that might have caused their behavior, should be in a better position than observers to identify the causes of their own behavior accurately.3 Actors’ knowledge of their behavior in other situations and at other times should make them potentially excellent judges of the “covariation” (Kelley, 1972) between their behavior and possible situational and dispositional causes. To the extent that they detect crosssituational consistency, actors have excellent evidence on which to anchor a dispositional attribution of cause, to make inferences about stable traits, and to predict similar behavior on other occasions. To the extent that they detect cross-situational variability or specificity, they may appropriately construct situational attributions, infer the rele3 Although Jones and Nisbett never explicitly expressed this viewpoint, they did at least imply that actors are more accurate than observers: “Without insisting that the actor is usually right, we can point to many instances where the observer’s interpretation of behavior is simply wrong” (1972, p. 88).

94

MONSON

AND SNYDER

vant situational characteristics that account for the variability, and predict what future situations will elicit similar behaviors. Similarly, actors’ knowledge of their inner states should allow them to compare the causal importance of these inner states and simultaneously present situational factors. They can, then, appropriately “discount” (Kelley, 1972) the role of less plausible causes. This analysis of information processing with the covariation and discounting rules suggests that the actor’s attributions of cause should be more often “correct” than those of the observer.” But which is more “correct”: a situational or a dispositional attribution? Heider’s (1958) observation that we often underestimate the impact of social and situational forces and overestimate the role of dispositional causes has been repeatedly confirmed (e.g., Bern, 1967; Bierbrauer, 1973; Jones & Harris, 1967). Social perceivers seem quite willing to perceive dispositional causes for behavior that (at least in the eyes of the experimenter) is a clear product of obvious situational pressure. Similarly, self-perceptions can be led astray in cleverly contrived misattribution experiments (e.g., Davison & Valins, 1969; Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo, 1969). In such misattribution experiments, actors “erroneously” infer dispositional causes for their behavior when in fact the data upon which such explanations are constructed are a product of experimental (situational) manipulations. Observations such as these have tempted attribution theorists to regard dispositional attributions as incorrect attributions (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972). This viewpoint has been bolstered by the accumulation of empirical evidence that has questioned the utility of even considering traits or dispositions as causes of behavior: rarely do observations within any domain of social behavior reveal the cross-situational consistency and temporal stability that “real” traits and dispositions should produce (e.g., Mischel, 1968). The data of human behavior seem not to provide a sufficiently solid foundation upon which to construct dispositional attributions about the causes of behavior. If, instead, social behavior + Although it may not always be possible to determine for certain the actual causes of behavior, the criterion for assessing the accuracy of the attributor most often used is whether or not the perceiver’s naive theory of causation matches the presumably veridical theory generated by the psychologist as a scientific outside observer (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, Note 4. Note 5). Scientific psychologists have available at least two methodologies to determine the causes of behavior. Within the correlational methodology, observations of cross-situational consistency and temporal stability are criteria for the identification of dispositions (e.g., Mischel, 1968). When these criteria are met, an attributor would be “correct” to make dispositional attributions. Within the experimental methodology, scientific psychologists assume that they have situationally controlled the behavior of their subjects when they observe reliable differences in the behavior of individuals randomly assigned to different experimentally created situations. In such circumstances. subjects who infer that their behavior is a product of the situation reach a “correct” attribution.

ACTORS

AND

OBSERVERS

95

is actually organized around situations rather than traits, then it is wrong to perceive dispositions as the causes of behavior (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Mischel, 1968). According to this viewpoint, the more information available to perceivers, the more likely they should be to arrive at correct situational explanations for a target’s behavior. Since actors are better informed about the temporal and situational organization of their own social behavior, they should more often make the “correct” situational attribution than observers who should more frequently “err” in making dispositional attributions. It is thus possible to derive the hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett (1972) from a consideration of differences in the ability of actors and observers to identify accurately the situational causes of the actor’s behavior. Although we agree that actors are in a better position to generate accurate self-perceptions, we disagree that the correct answer is necessarily a situational attribution. Rather, we believe that attribution theorists themselves err when they regard dispositional attributions as incorrect attributions. Recent analyses of the “traits vs situations” controversy have suggested that, overall, the evidence for the situational determination of behavior is no better than the evidence for the dispositional control of behavior (e.g., Bowers, 1973; Jaccard, 1974; Wachtel, 1973; Block, Note 6). This implies that although a situational attribution may sometimes be the “right answer,” there are also many circumstances in which a dispositional attribution is correct. Furthermore, empirical research has indicated that individuals differ in the extent to which their social behavior is stable or variable across social settings (Bern & Allen, 1974; Campus, 1974; Snyder & Monson, 1975). Essentially, those whose social behavior is stable across differing situations have “traits”; others whose social behavior covaties with situational contexts do not have traits. Thus, an observer may be wrong if he or she makes dispositional attributions about some individuals, but may be quite accurate in ascribing dispositional causes to other individuals. Similarly, some actors might be perfectly accurate in ascribing situational causes to their own behavior, while others would err seriously if they were to do so. Moreover, the contexts in which social behaviors occur differ in the extent to which they provide salient and relevant dispositional and situational guides to action (Snyder & Swann, 1976). Accordingly, at some times and in some places it will be quite correct for an actor or observer to point to situational determinants of behavior; at other times and in other places, a dispositional attribution may more accurately reflect the true causes of the behavior under scrutiny. If we accept-as we do-the assertion that actors have more and better evidence upon which to construct causal explanations than do ob-

96

MONSON

AND

SNYDER

servers, then we ought to be able to specify conditions in which actors will be more likely than observers to make situational attributions and other conditions in which actors will be more likely than observers to choose dispositional explanations for their behavior or its consequences. We offer as our major hypothesis: Actors should make more situational are under havior that tional than

attributions than should observers situational control: by contrast, are under dispositional control the perceptions of observers. In

about behavioral acts that actors’ perceptions of beought to be more disposi-

order to more specifically characterize the attribution processes of actors and observers, we propose to examine: (a) the availability to the attributor of information about the contemporary and historical determinants of the actor’s behavior, and (b) susceptibility of the attributor to possible cognitive biases and motivational distortions. INFORMATION

AVAILABLE

TO THE ATTRIBUTOR

What, then, are the sources of information available to actors and observers as they attempt to identify the causes of the actor’s behavior? We suggest two sources of informational differences that interact with social perspective to influence the likelihood of situational or dispositional attributions: (1) knowledge of contemporary determinants of the actor’s behavior; in particular, of the effects of facilitative and inhibitory situational forces, and (2) knowledge of the historical determinants of the actor’s behavior; in particular, information about cross-situational consistency, temporal stability, and prior causal chains. Contemporary

Influences

Since the environment is more salient in the perceptual field of the involved actor than in that of the uninvolved observer, actors ought to be in a better position to assess the actual relationship between their behavior and relevant situational contingencies and social influences. Similarly, actors have access to dispositional information about inner states (including cognitions, attitudes, intentions, emotions, etc.) that is normally not available to outside observers. Actors ought to be in an excellent position to “discount” (Kelley, 1972) the significance of nonplausible situational or dispositional causes. Knowledge of the determinants of the actor’s behavior. How are we to know when perceivers are dealing with situational or dispositional behaviors? Normally, laboratory investigations of the social perception process involve explanations of behaviors elicited by experimental (situational) manipulations. Thus, in one classic study of actors and observers, Nisbett, Caputo, et al. (1973) elicited compliance or noncompliance from subjects by offering large or small incentives and

ACTORS

AND

OBSERVERS

97

then compared these subjects’ self-perceptions with those of uninvolved observers who witnessed the actors’ behavior from behind a one-way vision screen. Clearly, the behavioral acts of compliance or noncompliance were situationally controlled. We would expect actors to explain their own behavior in more situational fashion than would observers. In fact, using a predictive measure of attribution, Nisbett, Caputo, ef al. (1973) reported that actors were considerably less likely to predict that they would behave in similar fashion in the future (situational attribution) than were observers who were quite willing to make such predictions (dispositional attribution). Although the actor’s behavior often is situationally determined in many laboratory experiments, Miller and Norman (1975) probed attributions when the actor’s behavior was allowed to be substantially influenced by dispositional factors. Their task was the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In each of a series of 10 trials, the actor was given the choice of either making a cooperative or a competitive response. In addition, the actor was given information that the other player matched the actor’s previous response in at least 7 of the 10 trials. Based upon the covariation principle (Kelley, 1973), the “correct” inference was that the situation (i.e., the other player’s response) was a function of the actor’s behavioral choices, which were themselves presumably a reflection of the actor’s cooperative or competitive disposition (cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Thus, in this situation, we would expect actors to perceive greater personal responsibility for their outcomes than passive observers would attribute to them. In fact, Miller and Norman (1975) reported just such a pattern of results. In general, laboratory experiments demonstrate reliable effects of situational manipulations. In these cases actors ought to, more often than observers, label their behavior in situational terms. On the other hand, in experiments in which the behavior of the actor is dispositionally determined, actors, more so than observers, ought to accurately perceive the dispositional causation of their behavior. Knowledge of the relationship between actor and situation. In many, if not most, experiments in social psychology, the independent variable (a situational manipulation) is designed and programmed to occur in fixed and constant fashion, independently of the behavior of the subject. This is, of course, ideal for isolating and measuring the potential effects of that variable. But this procedure also effectively prevents the subjects from interacting with the stimulus and the experimenter, and consequently prevents them from having any influence or control over the interpersonal situation. Yet life situations rarely involve such predetermined stimulus events. Individuals normally have considerable freedom to choose where to be, when, and with whom. Thus, the situational factors to which they respond are often of their own making (cf.

98

MONSONANDSNYDER

Wachtel, 1973), although these factors may still powerfully constrain the behavior of the actor once in the situation. Thus, even though an actor’s behavior may be quite sensitive to and covary with factors in the surrounding situation and interaction context, the actor may still explain that behavior in terms of the dispositions that guided the choice of that situation. An observer, not aware of that actor’s role in choosing and constructing the situational context, may avoid dispositional explanations after observing close covariation between the actor’s behavior and the situation. In general, then, we suggest that for behaviors performed in situations chosen by the actor, actors will make more dispositional attributions than will observers; whereas for behaviors performed in situations not chosen by the actor, actors will make more situational attributions about their behaviors than will observers. Knowledge of facilitative and inhibitory situational factors. Kelley’s (1972) theoretical analysis of the discounting principle suggests that dispositional causation may be discounted if the situational cues are consistent with or “facilitative” of the behavior performed. On the other hand, dispositional causation is not discounted if the situational cues are neutral to the behavior performed, and dispositional causation is even augmented if the situational cues are “inhibitory” to the behavior performed. Thus, I might be reluctant to infer that an altruistic disposition prompted a Boy Scout to offer his seat on a bus to an old lady if I knew that his Scout Master was approvingly watching his actions (facilitative situational factor). I would be more willing to attribute the Boy Scout’s deed to altruism if the bystander was an unknown and unconcerned individual (neutral situational factor). But I would readily and with great certainty decide that the Boy Scout’s action reflected an altruistic disposition if he acted under the scrutiny of his best friend who strongly disapproved such demonstrations of helpfulness (inhibitory situational factor). At least two studies have provided empirical support for the predicted role of facilitative and inhibitory situational factors in the attribution process (Enzle, Hansen, & Lowe, 1975; Monson & Snyder, Note 2). We suggest, then, that if the situational cues facilitate the behavior performed, then the actor’s increased attention to the environment and consequent knowledge of the impact of these factors should lead him or her to attribute greater situational responsibility for the act than would an observer. However, if the situational cues are neutral to or inhibit the behavior performed, then the actor should attribute greater dispositional causation for the act than would an observer. Such an interaction between facilitative vs inhibitory situational cues and actor vs observer social perspective will only be observed when such situational cues are more meaningful, relevant, or salient to actors than to observers.

ACTORS

AND

OBSERVERS

99

Thus, only the Boy Scout knows for sure that the bystander is his Scout Master, a total stranger, or his best friend. Only the Boy Scout actually experiences the facilitative, neutral, or inhibitory influence exerted by each of these persons. Accordingly, his self-attributions should more accurately reflect the actual determinants of his actions than those of a less-knowledgeable observer. Knowledge of choice and intent. Theory suggests that acts that are freely chosen (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973) and outcomes that are intended (e.g., Heider, 1958; Maselli & Altrocchi, 1969) are likely to be explained by dispositional attributions. No doubt, actors more so than observers should be aware of the internal cues associated with the subjective experience of choice (e.g., uncertainty and conflict). Similarly, actors should be more likely to know whether or not an outcome was intended. Accordingly, the attributions of actors ought to be more sensitive to these internal cues than should the attributions of observers. When an act is associated with little subjective choice or when an outcome is not intended, the attributions of actors ought to be more situational than those of observers. When an act is associated with much subjective choice or when an outcome is intended, self-attributions by actors ought to be more dispositional than the interpersonal attributions of observers (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975). Once again these predictions are a consequence of actors’ superior ability to identify accurately dispositional and situational determinants of their behavior. Historical

Influences

Actors, by virtue of their extensive knowledge of their behavioral history, should be in a better position than observers to avoid attributional error. Their knowledge of their behavior in different situations and at other times should provide the necessary data to assess causality according to the “covariation” principle (Kelley, 1972). By contrast, observers must identify causes, infer dispositions, and predict behavior on the basis of limited observations and without meaningful knowledge of the prior probability of the actor’s current behavior. Knowledge of the temporal and situational covariation behavior. Theory (Kelley, 1973) and research (McArthur,

of the actor’s

1972) indicate that consistency in response across time and situations constitutes “best evidence” upon which to anchor dispositional attributions. When patterns of behavior demonstrate the trait-defining characteristics of crosssituational and temporal stability, then the attributions of the actor (who is familiar with this history) ought to be more dispositional than those of an observer who is unfamiliar with the actor. When patterns of social behavior reflect temporal and situational specificity,

100

MONSON

AND SNYDER

actors ought to make more situational attributions than observers who have no access to information about past behavior of the actor. One approach to testing this hypothesis involves identifying individuals who differ in the extent to which they rely on situational guides in choosing their social behavior and then comparing their attributions about the causes of their own behavior with their attributions about the causes of the behavior of other persons (Snyder, 1976). In one study, individuals whose social behavior was known to be relatively sensitive to situational and interpersonal guides to social appropriateness (as assessed by the Self-Monitoring Scale;5 Snyder, 1974) made more situational attributions about their own behavior than they did about that of another person. By contrast, individuals whose social behavior was known to be relatively insensitive to situational and interpersonal cues, made more dispositional attributions about themselves than about familiar acquaintances. Knowledge of the actor’s previous attributions. Behavior and outcomes that are consistent with prior expectancies and previous trait attributions are attributed to dispositional causes and further bolster the original attribution; however, behavior and outcomes that are inconsistent with prior expectancies and trait attributions are attributed to situational forces and thus do not disconfirm the original perception (Feather, 1969; Feather & Simon, 1971a, 1971b; Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974; Simon & Feather, 1973). As a consequence of actors’ knowledge of their own behavioral history, they should be better able than less-knowledgeable observers to assess whether single behaviors and outcomes are consistent or inconsistent with previously attributed traits. Therefore, when actors perform behaviors or experience outcomes inconsistent with previous selfattributions, they should ascribe more situational causation for the acts than should observers. When actors perform acts or experience outcomes consistent with prior self-attributions, they should ascribe more dispositional responsibility for the acts than should observers. 5 Considerable evidence suggests that persons with high scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) are situationally guided individuals and that those with low scores are relatively dispositionally guided individuals. High self-monitoring individuals are particularly sensitive to social and interpersonal cues to situational appropriateness; the behavior of low self-monitoring individuals is hardly affected by these factors (Snyder & Monson, 1975). High self-monitoring individuals report considerably greater cross-situational variability in their social behavior than do their low selfmonitoring counterparts (Snyder & Monson, 1975). Correspondence between measured attitudes and observed behavior is substantial for low self-monitoring individuals; the attitudes and behavior of high self-monitoring individuals are virtually uncorrelated with each other (Snyder & Tanke, 1976; Snyder & Swarm, 1976). Accordingly, the Self-Monitoring Scale is an appropriate instrument for identifying individuals who differ in the extent to which they guide their social behavior on the basis of situational or dispositional factors.

ACTORS

AND

101

OBSERVERS

Knowledge of prior causal chains. Even if actors and observers have access to the same knowledge about the characteristics of the immediate environment, the actor may take account of events more extended in time than those known to the observer (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman (1975) have systematically investigated the attribution of personal responsibility as a function of prior and immediate causes. When the immediate cause of an event was perceived to be external (i.e., situational), the knowledge of a prior internal (i.e., dispositional) cause had a considerable impact on reversing the direction of the attribution. Similarly, when the immediate cause of an event was perceived to be internal, the knowledge of a prior external cause reversed the direction of the attribution. Normally, information about prior causes will be unavailable to an observer. Accordingly, the results of Brickman et al. (1975) imply that the actor should be more likely than an observer to attribute dispositional reasons for behaviors for which there are prior dispositional causes known only to the actor. The actor also should be less likely than an observer to attribute dispositional reasons for behaviors for which there are prior situational causes known only to the actor. This difference should be most noticeable outside the psychology laboratory where it is most likely that actors will be able to take heed of events extended over substantial periods of time. Implications

of Contemporary

and Historical

Informational

Diflerences

It should be clear from this discussion that in most laboratory investigations of social perception, the behavior of an actor to be explained is (a) situational because it is elicited by an experimental manipulation, (b) performed in a situational context not chosen or controllable by the actor, (c) performed in the presence of facilitative situational cues provided by those aspects of the experimental manipulation designed to elicit the behavior, (d) dissimilar to previously manifested behaviors because the actor has no prior exposure to the experimental situation, (e) inconsistent with previous self-attributions because the actor has had no prior experience with the particular experimental situation, and (f) not part of an extended causal chain. Accordingly, in such contexts the self-perceptions of actors ought to be more situational than the interpersonal perceptions of observers. Only in specially constructed laboratory contexts (or for naturally occurring events) that permit attributions about behaviors that are (a) dispositional, (b) performed in situations chosen and/or controllable by the actor, (c) performed in the presence of neutral or inhibitory situational factors, (d) similar to previously manifested behaviors, (e) consistent with prior attributions, and (f) part of a causal chain with prior disposi-

102

MONSONANDSNYDER

tional causes, will an actor’s self-attributions than the attributions of an outside observer. BIASES

AND DISTORTIONS

be more

IN THE ATTRIBUTION

dispositional

PROCESS

Theoretical analyses of social perception typically have considered the impact of self-serving distortions and biases on the attribution process (e.g., Bern, 1972; Heider, 19.58; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Kelley, 1967; Ross, Note 1). Such influences may undermine the informational advantages of the actor. Maintaining

the Illusion

of Free Will and Self-Determination

Jones and Nisbett (1972) have suggested that an actor’s sense of behavioral freedom would be optimized by constructing situational selfattributions and dispositional attributions about others. We agree that actors are probably more concerned about incorporating perceptions of freedom into their self-images than into their portraits of other people. In fact, actors generally do report that they possess greater freedom than other individuals (e.g., Bell, 1974; Wolosin, 1969; Wolosin, Sherman, & Mynatt, 1972; Wolosin & Denner, Note 7). However, we don’t agree that this will necessarily lead actors to prefer situational self-perceptions and dispositional interpersonal perceptions. For actors in these same studies also claimed to be less constrained by situational factors than other people (e.g., Bell, 1974; Wolosin, 1969; Wolosin, Sherman, & Mynatt, 1972; Wolosin & Denner, Note 7). Moreover, observers attribute greater freedom to an act when it is consistent with an actor’s disposition and when it is inconsistent with situational demands (Kruglanski & Cohen, 1973). Is an actor’s sense of behavioral freedom best preserved and bolstered by a situational or a dispositional attribution? Depending on its precise meaning to the subject, either form of attribution may enhance the perception of freedom. Perceptions of the situational or dispositional location of a cause may be independent of perceptions of self-determination, freedom of choice, and responsibility (e.g., Snyder, 1976). Consider, for example, the following comparisons between situational and dispositional explanations. A situational attribution may reflect the perception that the situation is in control and the individual is responding in accord with its requirements and contingencies. This seems to limit choice or selfdetermination. By contrast, dispositional attributions may mean control by the individual, by personal attitudes, feelings, and desires. Such perceptions seem to imply much more personal freedom. Given this choice, clearly, individuals would maximize perceived freedom by making dispositional attributions about themselves and situational attributions about others.

ACTORS AND OBSERVERS

103

On the other hand, an individual may use a situational attribution when he or she has paid careful attention to situational information as a basis for choosing appropriate patterns of social behavior and selfperception. By contrast, dispositional attributions could mean control by traits and impulses that are fixed within the individual and drive him or her to behave as they dictate. Now it is the situational attribution that better preserves the individual’s sense of self-determination. Faced with this choice, perceivers would explain their own behavior in situational terms and others’ behavior in dispositional fashion. It is simply that perceptions of freedom are not inherent in either situational or dispositional attributions; actors will construct whatever self-perceptions will maximize their sense of behavioral freedom and selfdetermination relative to that of other individuals. If attributing another’s actions to situational factors will reduce psychological reactance, individuals will do so (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). If a dispositional self-attribution for a performance has too many implications for a future performance, a situational self-attribution may be preferred (e.g., Wortman, Costanzo, & Witt, 1973). The Quest for Positive

Self-Regard

It has been suggested that actors may alter their perceptions of causality to protect or enhance their self-esteem (e.g., Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). This may be accomplished by attributing socially desirable behavior and successful outcomes to personal dispositions and by attributing socially undesirable behavior and failures to situational factors. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that actors’ self-attributions should be more influenced by the quest for positive self-regard than should observers’ attributions about actors. Accordingly, actors should attribute positive or socially desirable behaviors to dispositions more frequently than should observers. However, actors should attribute negative or socially undesirable acts to situational causes more readily than should observers. Empirical evidence generally supports these propositions. Actors take relatively more credit than observers give them for successful, praiseworthy, or socially desirable behaviors and outcomes (e.g., Gross 1967; Polefka, 1965; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Polly, 1974’j; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976; Streufert & Streufert, 1969; Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976; Wolosin, Sherman, & Till, 1973; Monson & Snyder, Note 2). By contrast, actors accept less personal responsibility than observers ascribe to them for unsuccessful, blameworthy, or socially undesirable behaviors and outcomes (e.g., Harvey, Harris, & Barnes; 1975; Ross, Bierbrauer, et al., 6 Although actors in this study were generally unwilling to accept much credit for their successes, nonetheless they were more “ego-defensive” than observers: Actors took more credit for success and less blame for failure than observers granted them.

104

MONSON

AND SNYDER

1974; Snyder, Stephan, et al., 1976; Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976; Wolosin, Sherman, & Till, 1973). Nonetheless, this and other apparently self-serving biases in the attribution process may reflect informational rather than motivational influences (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Miller & Ross, 1975; Wyer, 1974). If actors know that they typically do “good” deeds (and if observers do not have this information), actors are likely to regard “bad” deeds as inconsistent with their typical behavior, and thus attribute them to situational factors. However, actors may overestimate their track records of performing good deeds if they selectively remember such actions in order to construct and maintain likable self-images. Whether the ultimate answer is motivational or informational, it is clear that actors and observers systematically differ in their attributions about the causes of positive and negative actions.’ Cognitive

Biases of the Attributor

Increasingly, attribution researchers and theorists are attending to sources of distortion, bias, or error in the cognitive processes of the attributor (e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976; Nisbett & Wilson, Note 4, Note 5; Ross, Note 1). Several attempts have been made to “derive” systematic attributional differences between actors and observers from considerations of the differential susceptibility of actors and observers to such biases and distortions in information gathering and processing. Focus of attention. Numerous empirical investigations have demonstrated that individuals attribute causality to whatever or whomever they direct their visual attention (see Jones, 1976, for a review). According to this viewpoint, the search for potential causes is not exhaustive: rather, we accept the first plausible cause we can identify. Accordingly, any systematic differences in where attributors look for causes may have profound effects on the attribution process. It has often been noted that actors focus their visual attention on the surrounding situation, whereas observers must divide their attention between the actor’s behavior and the situational context in which it occurs. It would seem to follow that actors ought to be more likely to “find” causes in the situation than would observers. Thus, the hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett (1972) can be “derived” from the focus-of-attention bias. Unfortunately for this derivation, as our review of the empirical evidence has indicated, it is only some of the time that actors and observers behave in accord with the hypothesis of ’ An experiment by Arkin. Gleason, and Johnston (1976) has recently provided evidence of the importance of both informational and motivational factors in actors’ causal explanations of success and failure.

ACTORS

AND

OBSERVERS

105

Jones and Nisbett (1972). At times, some attributors do exactly the opposite. Thus, the focus of attention bias cannot fully account for attributional differences between actors and observers. However, according to our conceptual formulation, the contemporary and historical information available to actors and observers differs in the extent to which it plausibly supports situational or dispositional attributions. Even if actors begin their search with highly salient features of their situations, they may continue the search long enough to consider possible dispositional explanations if they encounter no plausible situational causes. False consensus. Individuals seem to perceive a “false consensus.” They tend to see their behaviors as relatively common ones, typical of what other people would do in the same situation (see Ross, Note 1, for a review of empirical evidence). In and of itself, this falseconsensus bias is hardly surprising; to the extent that people differentially associate with those who are similar in attitudes, personality, and behavior, they effectively do live in a small world populated by those who do generally behave as they themselves do. Ross (Note 1) claims to have derived the “divergent perceptions” of actors and observers from the false consensus bias. According to Ross’ interpretation, an observer is likely to encounter situations in which the actor’s behavior differs from his or her own. Thus, the observer is particularly likely to see the actor’s behavior as uncommon or deviant and attribute it to the actor’s unique dispositional characteristics. Once again, it is simply not true that actors and observers always differ in the direction demanded by the false consensus derivation. Moreover, this derivation assumes that the actor is more susceptible to this bias than is the observer. But observers also overestimate the extent to which others would behave similarly to actors whom they have observed (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). To our knowledge, direct comparisons between perceptions of false consensus by actors and by observers have yet to be made. Even so, the implications of any perceptions of false consensus may be blunted by the attributor’s unwillingness or inability to use consensus or base rate information appropriately in the attribution process (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). Belief in the law of small numbers. Intuitive psychologists seem trustingly to believe in a “law of small numbers”: they are quite willing to draw strong inferences about populations from knowledge about even a very small number of cases (e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). For example, in one demonstration of this bias, armed with the knowledge that two subjects had taken the maximum level of shock in a pain perception study, raters were willing to infer that such extreme tolerance was the most frequent behavior of all participants in the experiment (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).

106

MONSONANDSNYDER

It would seem that an observer, who must identify causes on the basis of limited (often single) observations of the actor’s behavior, might be particularly susceptible to belief in the law of small numbers. The observer (by comparison with the more knowledgeable actor) ought to overestimate the extent to which a particular sample of the actor’s behavior is representative of that actor’s behavior in different situations and at other times. Therefore, the observer should be more likely than the actor to see the actor’s behavior as a reflection of corresponding underlying dispositions. Apparently, the hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett can also be derived from the belief in the law of small numbers. It should be clear by now that since attributors do not always behave consistently with the smallnumbers derivation, this bias cannot entirely account for differences between actors and observers. Nonetheless, belief in the law of small numbers may partially account for any tendencies to fashion our images of others largely in dispositional or trait terms (see Schneider, 1973, for a review). CONCLUSIONS

What are the consequences of the differences in social perspective of actors and observers? Our conceptual analysis suggests that actors differ in their knowledge of the contemporary and historical influences that have guided the actor’s actions. Actors and observers also differ in their tendency to construct attributions that enhance the actor’s sense of self-determination and positive self-regard. Furthermore, actors and observers may differ in their susceptibility to perceptual and cognitive biases in the gathering and processing of information. These factors will systematically influence the outcomes of the attribution process and the relationship between the perceptions of actors and observers. It should be clear from this discussion that our position is not fundamentally at odds with that of Jones and Nisbett (1972) or Bern (1972) whose provocative analyses of differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception have stimulated and influenced our own consideration of the issues. With some differences of emphasis, we all agree that actors and observers have differential access to information about contemporary and historical determinants of an actor’s behavior. Similarly, we all agree that motivational factors may differentially channel the information processing of involved actors and uninvolved observers. We agree with Jones and Nisbett (1972) that actors are generally in a better position than are observers to avoid attributional error. However, when it comes to specifying the consequences of these differences, we must disagree with earlier viewpoints. We do not agree

ACTORS AND OBSERVERS

107

that there exists a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational influences and for observers to attribute the identical actions to dispositions of the actor. Rather, we have suggested conditions in which actors will be more likely than observers to make situational attributions and other conditions in which actors will be more likely than observers to choose dispositional explanations for their behavior and its consequences. Whatever the ultimate fate of our viewpoint, it does suggest that empirical researchers turn from attempts to “verify” the hypothesis of Jones and Nisbett (1972) to systematic investigations of the “when,” “why,” and “with what implications for attribution theory” of differences between actors and observers. REFERENCES Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. A Bayesian analysis of attribution processes. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82, 261-277. Arkin, R. M.. & Duval, S. Focus of attention and causal attributions of actors and observers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 197.5, 11, 427438. Arkin, R. M., Gleason, J. M., & Johnston, S. Effect of perceived choice, expected outcome, and observed outcome of an action on the causal attributions of actors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 151-158. Bell, L. G. Influence of need to control on differences in attribution of causality by actors and observers (Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1973). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1974, 34, 4401. (University Microfilms No. 74-1122) Bern, D. J. Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 1%7, 74, 183-200. Bern, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimenttil social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1972. Vol. 6. Bern, D. J., & Allen, A. On predicting some of the people some of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. PsychologicalRevietij, 1974,81,506-520. Bierbrauer, G. Effect of set, perspective, and temporal factors in attribution. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1973. Bowers, K. S. Situationism in psychology: An analysis and a critique. Psychological Retview,

1973, 80, 307-336.

Brickman, P., Ryan, K., & Wortman, C. B. Causal chains: Attribution of responsibility as a function of immediate and prior causes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 1060- 1067. Calder, B. H., Ross, M., & Insko. C. A. Attitude change and attitude attribution: Effects of incentive, choice, competence, and consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 84-99. Campus, N. Transituational consistency as a dimension of personality. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology,

1974, 29, 593-600.

Cialdini, R. B., Braver, S. L., & Lewis, S. K. Attributional bias and the easily persuaded other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 631-637. Davison, G. C.. & Valins, S. Maintenance of self-attributed and drug-attributed behavior change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969. 11, 25-33. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. Effects of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 1973, 9, 17-31. Enzle, M. E., Hansen, R. D.. & Lowe, C. A. Causal attribution in the mixed-motive

108

MONSON

AND SNYDER

game: Effects of facilitory and inhibitory environmental forces. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 50-54. Feather, N. T. Attribution of responsibility and valence of success and failure in relation to initial confidence and task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 129- 144. Feather, N. T., & Simon, J. G. Attribution of responsibility and valence of outcome in relation to initial confidence and success and failure of self and other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971a, 18, 173- 188. Feather, N. T., & Simon, J. G. Causal attributions for success and failure in relation to expectation of success based upon selective or manipulative control. Journal of Personality, 1971b, 39, 527-541. Freedman, J. Role playing: Psychology of consensus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1%9, 13, 107- 114. Gregory, R. L. Visual illusions. In R. C. Atkinson (Ed.), Contemporary psychology: Readings from “Scientific American”. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Company, 1971. Gross, A. Evaluation of the target person in a social influence situation (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1966). Dissertation Abstracts, 1%7, 27, 4338. (University Microfilms No. 67-03, 493). Gurwitz, S. B., & Panciera, L. Attributions of freedom of actors and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 531-539. Harvey, J. H., Harris, B., & Barnes, R. D. Actor-observer differences in perceptions of responsibility and freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 22-28. Hastorf, A. H., Schneider, D. J., & Polefka, J. Person perception. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970. Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, 1958. Jaccard, J. J. Predicting social behavior from personality traits. Journal of Research in Personality, 1974, 7, 358-367. Jones, E. E. How do people perceive the causes of behavior? American Scientist, 1976,64, 300-305. Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. Fran acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1%5. Vol. 2. Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. The attribution of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, l-24. Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D., Kelley, H. H., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S., & Weiner, B. Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1972. Jones, E. E.. & Nisbett, R. E. The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1972. Kelley, H. H. Attribution in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. 1%7, 15, 192-238. Kelley, H. H. Attribution in social interaction. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1972. Kelley, H. H. The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 1973, 28, 107-128. Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. The social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 66-91.

109

ACTORS AND OBSERVERS Kruglanski,

A.

W. The

Psychological

Review,

Kruglanski,

endogenous-exogenous

A. W., & Cohen, M. Attributed

of Personality

partition

in attribution

theory.

1975, 82, 387-406.

and Social

Psychology,

freedom and personal causation. Journal 1973, 26, 245-250.

Langer, E. J., & Roth, J. Heads I win, tails it’s chance: The illusion of control as a function of the sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 951-955. Maselli, M. D., & Altrocchi, J. Attribution of intent. Psychological Bulletin, 1969, 71, 445-454. McArthur, L. A. The how and what of why: Some determinants and consequences of causal attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 22, 171-193. Miller, A. G. Actor and observer perceptions of the learning of a task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 95- 111. Miller, A. G., Gillen, B., Schenker, C., & Radlove, S. The prediction and perception of obedience to authority. Journal of Personality, 1974,42, 23-42. Miller, D. T., & Norman, S. A. Actor-observer differences in perceptions of effective control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 503-515. Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82, 213-225. Mischel, W. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley, 196l3. Neisser, U. Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Nisbett, R. E., & Borgida, E. Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal of Personality

and Social

Psychology,

1975, 32, 932-943.

Nisbett, R. E., Borgida, E., Crandall, R., & Reed, H. Popular induction: Infonnation is not always informative. In J. Carroll & J. Payne (Eds.), Cognition and social behavior. Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976. Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Marecek, J. Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 27, 154-165. Nisbett, R. E., & Schachter, S. Cognitive manipulation of pain. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2, 227-236. Poletka, J. T. The perception and evaluation of responses to social influence (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1%5). Dissertation Abstracts, 1965, 26, 6892. (University Microfilms No. 66-02, 607). Regan, D. T., Straus, E., Br Fazio, R. Liking and the attribution process. Journal of Experimental

Social

Psychology,

1974, 10, 385-397.

Regan, D. T., & Totten, J. Empathy and attribution: Turning observers into actors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 850-856. Ross, L., Bierbrauer, G., & Polly, S. Attributions of educational outcome by professional and nonprofessional instructors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 609-618. ROSS, L. D., Rodin, J., & Zimbardo, P. G. Toward an attribution therapy: The reduction of fear through induced cognitive-emotional misattribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 12, 279-288. Schneider, D. J. Implicit personality theory: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 79, 294-309. Sherrod, D. R. Attribution of causal responsibility for behavior in actors and observers. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1971. Simon, J. G., & Feather, N. T. Causaf attributions for success and failure at university examinations. Journal of Educational Psychology, 1973, G&46-56. Snyder, M. The self-monitoring of expressive behavior, Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology.

1974, 30, 526-537.

110

MONSON

AND SNYDER

Snyder, M. Attribution and behavior: Social perception and social causation. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Snyder, M., & Monson, T. C. Persons, situations, and the control of social behavior. Journal

of Personality

and Social

Psychology,

1975. 32, 637-644.

Snyder, M.. & Swann. W. B. When actions reflect attitudes: The politics of impression management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, in press. Snyder, M., & Tanke, E. D. Behavior and attitude: Some people are more consistent than others. Journal of Personality, 1976. 44, 501-5 17. Snyder, M. L., Stephen. W. G., & Rosenfield, D. Egotism and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 435-441. Storms, M. D. Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors’ and observers’ points of view. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 27, 165- 175. Streufert, S., & Streufert, S. C. Effects of conceptual structure, failure, and success on attribution of causality and interpersonal attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11, 138-147. Taylor, S. E., & Fiske, S. T. Point of view and perceptions of causality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 439-445. Taylor. S. E.. & Koivumaki, J. H. The perception of self and others: Acquaintanceship, affect, and actor-observer differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 403-408. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 76, 105-110. Wachtel, P. Psychodynamics, behavior therapy, and the implacable experimenter: An inquiry into the consistency of personality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1973. 82, 324-334.

West, S. G., Gunn, S. P., & Chemicky, P. Ubiquitous Watergate: An attributional analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 55-65. Wolosin, R. Self- and social perception and the attribution of internal states (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968). Dissertation Abstracts Internationa/, 1969, 30, 3%. (University Microfilms No. 69-12, 276). Wolosin, R., Sherman, S. J., & Mynatt, C. R. Perceived social influence in a conformity situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 23, 184- 191. Wolosin, R., Sherman, S. J., & Till, A. Effects of cooperation and competition on responsibility attribution after success and failure. Journal of Experimental Social

Psychology,

1973, 9, 220-235.

Worchel, S., & Andreoli, V. A. Attribution of causality as a means of restoring behavioral freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 237-245.

Wortman, C. B., Costanzo, P. R., & Witt, T. R. Effect of anticipated performance on the attributions of causality to self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973. 27, 372-381. Wyer. R. S. Cognitive organization and change: An information-processing approach. Potomac, Md.: Erlbaum, 1974.

REFERENCE NOTES 1. ROSS, L. The attribution

2. Monson. ability,

intuitive process.

psychologist

und

his

shortcomings:

Distortions

in

Unpublished manuscript. Stanford University. 1976. T. C., & Snyder, M. Causal explanation: The effects of sociul perspective.

preparation.

and

facilitative

and

University of Minnesota, 1976.

inhibitoty

environmental

forces.

the

desirIn

111

ACTORS AND OBSERVERS 3. Monson,

T. C., Tanke, E. D., Lund, J., & Snyder, M. Determinants of social in a naturalistic setting. In preparation, University of Minnesota, 1976. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. Awareness of higher mental processes. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, 1976. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. On telling more than we can know: Znaccurate verbal report on mental processes. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, 1976. Block, J. Recognizing the coherence of personality. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 1976. Wolosin, R. J., & Denner, B. Three studies of the attribution of freedom to the self and to others. Unpublished manuscript, Indiana University. 1970. perception

4. 5. 6.

7.

(Received February 23, 1976)

Statement of ownership, United States Code: of

management

and circulation

required

by the Act of October

23, 1962. Section

4369. Title

39,

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Published bimonthly by Academic Press, Inc., 1 II Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. looO3. Number of issues published annually: 6. Editor: Anthony N. Doob, Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Toronto, Toronto. Ontario, Canada. Owned by Pcademic Press: Inc., II I .Fiftb Avenue. New York, N. Y. IOCO3. Known bondholders, mortgagees,, and ot;%,sec”nty holders owmng or holdmg I percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other secuntxs: Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, also the statements in the two paragraphs show the ffiant’s full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner. Names and addresses of individuals who are stockholders of a corporation which itself is a stockholder or holder of bonds, mortgages or other securities of the publishing COTporation have been included in paragraphs 2 and 3 when the interests of such individuals are equivalent to I percent or more of the total amount of the stock or securities of the publishing corporation. Total no. copies printed: average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months: 2291; single issue nearest to filing date: 2281. Paid circulation la) to term subscribers by mail, carrier delivery or by other means: average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months: 1740: single issue nearest to filing date: 1737, (b) Sales through agents. news dealers, or otherwise: average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months: 0: single issue nearest to filing date: 0. Free distribution by mail. carrier delivery, or by other means: average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months: 75; single issue nearest to filing date: 75. Total no. of copies distributed: average no. copies each issue during preceding I2 months: 1815; single issue nearest to tiling date: 1812. (Signed) Roselle Coviello, Vice President