Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany

Energy Policy ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎

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Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany Kathrin Sühlsen a,n, Matthijs Hisschemöller b a b

Institute for Sustainability Governance, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Scharnhorststraße 1, 21335 Lüneburg, Germany Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1087, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 28 November 2013 Accepted 10 February 2014

The article examines the influence of renewable energy companies on the decision-making process related to the German energy transition. It identifies clusters of different lobbying activities and styles through in depth interviews with 20 stakeholders from policy-making and business. The research used Repertory Grid Technique in combination with HOMALS multivariate analysis. Its main findings are: First, although the big four electric utilities operating on the German energy market still possess wide influence, companies of renewable energy have developed from a niche into important players of the energy regime. Second, lobbies by the renewable energy sector are mainly aimed at the legislative framework, particularly on the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the feed-in-system. Third, interviewees identified 36 different lobby activities; the most effective ones are: ‘Regular and personal maintenance of contact to politicians’, ‘Lobbying within an association’, ‘Knowledge development with correct information’ and ‘Top-down contacting of most powerful politicians’. Fourth, the statistical analysis reveals clear distinctions between companies with regards to their lobby strategies which are evaluated differently by stakeholders. Finally, the article concludes that companies have a strong influence on political-decision making and – together with governmental actors – form a ‘policy network’ that strongly shapes the German energy transition. & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Energy transition Lobbying Renewable energy Repertory grid Germany

1. Introduction For decades, Germany has been a forerunner in the development and application of renewable energy sources (RES). The country’s support policies for RES have received positive attention worldwide – the feed-in tariff model, determined by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (“EEG”) of 2000, has been adopted by more than two thirds of EU member states. The Act determines that every kilowatt-hour generated from renewable energy receives a fixed feed-in tariff and that network operators must feed in this electricity into the grid preferentially to the electricity generated by conventional sources. Moreover, renewable energy plant operators receive a 20 year guaranteed payment for their produced electricity (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), 2011). Amendments of the EEG are being made almost every year, supported by several other policy decisions favoring renewable energy. As a result of this governmental support, renewable energy technologies continuously increased their share in the German energy mix. By 2012, renewables contributed 12% to

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Corresponding author. Tel.: þ 49 4131 677 1329. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Sühlsen), [email protected] (M. Hisschemöller).

the total energy supply1 and 23% to electricity supply.2 As for the latter, wind power by far contributes the largest share, followed by biomass, solar photovoltaic and hydro power. The adoption of the German Energy Concept aiming at generating 35% of the energy supply from renewables by 2020 and 80% by 2050 and the decision in 2011 to phase out nuclear power by 2022 has definitely accelerated the energy transition (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi), 2010; 2011). Achieving the so called ‘Energiewende’ is a major issue in political decision-making and public discourse. Corporate business plays a critical role in the energy transition. Apart from its economic activities, the sector lobbies political decision-making, especially as regards the rate of feed-in tariffs. Not only companies focusing on renewable energy products have a stake in energy policy, but also the main electric utilities (‘Big Four’), which control close to 90% of the electricity market: E.ON SE, RWE AG, EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG and Vattenfall Europe AG. All economic stakeholders operating on the German energy market interact with the political system through lobbying.

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http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/energietraeger,did=159756.html http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/die-themen/datenservice/erneuerbar e-energien-in-zahlen/erneuerbare-energien-im-jahr-2012/ 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018 0301-4215 & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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In general, lobbying relates to the activities of private interest groups to influence political decision-making, particularly governmental and legislative actors (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc, 2012). Much research has been done on lobbying in general and on a supranational level, particularly in the European Union (e.g. Klüver, 2011; EU Insight, 2008; Gullberg, 2008; Beyers et al., 2008). Studies concerning lobby activities of the renewable energy sector are still a new research area. The German situation is particularly interesting in this respect, as the booming sector has gained prestige to such an extent that it may have become part of the energy regime rather than being a niche player as in many other countries (Kemp et al., 1998; Kemp, 1994). The role of German interest organizations’ lobbying on German renewable energy legislation has been studied by Lauber and Mez (2004, 2006), Jacobsson and Lauber (2006), Dagger (2009) and lastly by Ydersbond (2012). However, an extensive qualitative and quantitative study of explicit lobby strategies of different companies has not yet been published. This article reports on a study, which identifies and compares the various lobby strategies used by the German renewable energy sector and assesses their effectiveness. The study thereby employed Repertory Grid Technique, a research method that can be characterized as a bottom-up approach and allows for a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Section 2 of the paper discusses the methodology and the research approach. Section 3 presents the qualitative interview findings. Section 4 presents the statistical analysis. Reflections on methodology can be found in Section 5. Section 6 discusses some implications for the German energy transition. Section 7 provides a summary and conclusion.

2. Material and methods 2.1. Repertory Grid Technique Repertory Grid Technique (RTG: Kelly 1955, Fransella et al., 2004; Diamond, 1982) assumes that every person (re)creates a personal construct system that helps to make sense of the world. People never affirm anything without simultaneously denying something. Constructs are therefore dichotomous, having one affirmative and one negative pole. Originally, Repertory Grid has been used in clinical settings. More recently, the method became applied in the field of policy analysis (Dunn et al. 1986; Dunn, 2001; Van de Kerkhof et al., 2009; Vasileiadou et al., 2013). Repertory Grid includes two main components, ‘elements’ and ‘constructs’: Elements are usually subjects or objects that people face in the world around them and recognize as more or less relevant for them. Constructs, on the other hand, reflect the distinctions that people make as to relate the elements to their personal, individual world (Fransella et al., 2004; Van de Kerkhof et al., 2009). The first step in RTG is the structured interview. Interviewees randomly select a triad of elements (usually presented on cards) and are then asked to specify the way in which two of the elements are similar and different from the third. Next, interviewees select the constructs that they consider most relevant for the topic at hand and rank all elements on this construct (e.g. from sustainable to unsustainable) on a x.point scale. This enables a statistical analysis of the findings using a method for multivariate analysis. This analysis delivers a so-called point cloud, which visualizes the distance between the elements as perceived by the interviewees. Clusters of elements refer to a network, in our case actors using similar lobby strategies. The meaning of the plot must be found by linking it to the qualitative interview findings. There are several arguments in support of this methodology. First, RTG is a bottom-up technique in that the interviewee is not

steered by questioning (Dunn, 2001).3 Second, the method requires only a limited number of interviews as to identify the full range of constructs among the interview sample. Normally, saturation of constructs is reached between 15 and 25 interviews, which means that new respondents are very unlikely to add new information (Dunn, 2001). Third, as the interviewees are recruited among the networks of actors immediately involved in the issue under consideration, in our case policy and business people who know lobbying from their own experience, the findings can be considered as to represent a valid measurement of the actual lobby strategies in use among actors in the renewable energy field. This claim is supported by expectation status theory (Berger et al., 1972, 1977, 1980; Berger and Zelditch, 1985) and the reputational methodology in the measurement of power (e.g. Stokman et al. (2009)). 2.2. Methodological approach in the research The methodological approach in this research consisted of five different steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Identification of elements (companies) Selection of interviewees Actual interviews Qualitative analysis Statistical analysis

First, with the help of national experts4 fourteen companies were identified which serve as ‘elements’. These fourteen include the ‘Big Four’. A long list of companies merely focusing on renewables was identified by an internet search. Out of the many German and foreign companies operating in the areas of wind, solar, hydro, biomass and geothermal energy the 25 most successful in terms of total revenue per year and number of employees were selected (Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank, 2012). Next, experts identified the 10 they considered most innovative and influential with respect to German energy policy. Unavoidably, companies with a core business in wind power and solar photovoltaic are overrepresented in the sample, whereas companies with a focus on hydropower, biomass and geothermal are somewhat underrepresented. This is due to the fact that wind and particularly solar companies have benefited most from the EEG and have managed to expand their businesses over the last years. Furthermore, they are usually more known among stakeholders than companies of hydro or bioenergy. Table 1 lists the fourteen companies that were included in the analysis. The company ‘Andritz Hydro’ (Table 1: 14) was unknown to almost all interviewees and was therefore excluded from the final analysis. As a second step, 20 interviewees were identified (see Table 2). The interviewees from business included company representatives involved in Public Affairs and Corporate Communication and representatives of business associations which serve as a ‘common voice’ of industry vis-a-vis politics. Interviewees from politics include energy spokespersons or their assistants from all five parties that were in 2012 present in the ‘Bundestag’. Also, representatives of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and the Federal Network Agency were invited for an interview. Two interviewees relate to other organizations, an anti-lobby NGO and the German Energy Agency.5 3 However, some steering maybe implied by the choice of elements, which requires the utmost caution. 4 Scientific advisers and consultants of Schultz Projekt Consult and Biogasrat e. V. served as experts due to their years of experience and daily work in the field of corporate business of energy. 5 For quotations in the following sections, the anonymous form I1 (¼ Interviewee 1), I10 (Interviewee 10) is used.

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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Table 1 Companies included in the analysis. COMPANY

1 2 3 4 5

E.ON SE RWE AG EnBW AG Vattenfall Europe AG Viessmann Werke GmbH & Co. KG 6 SolarWorld AG 7 Q.Cells SE 8 juwi Holding AG

9 Vestas Deutschland GmbH 10 SCHOTT Solar AG 11 Enercon GmbH 12 First Solar Manufacturing GmbH 13 agri.capital GmbH 14 Andritz Hydro GmbH

DESCRIPTION

TOTAL NO. OF REVENUE (2011) EMPLOYEES (2011)

Investor-owned electric utility German electric utility Publicly traded German electric utility Electric utility (principal shareholder: Swedish holding company Vattenfall) Manufacturer of heating systems, PV & solar thermal systems, biomass and biogas systems

112.954 billion 49.153 billion 18.789 billion 13.000 billion 1.269 billion

Full-line provider of PV modules 1.046 billion Development, manufacturing and marketing of PV cells. Filed for insolvency in April, 2012. 1.023 billion Project engineer & developer, service and maintenance in the sectors of solar, wind, bio and hydro 1.000 billion energy (expected) Danish manufacturer, seller, installer and servicer of wind turbines 963,960 million (2010) Manufacturer of PV modules and solar thermal power plants 482,000 million (2008) Manufacturer of wind turbines 432,000 million American manufacturer of thin film PV modules & project developer of PV power plants. Decision 292,170 million of ceasing production in Germany in 2012 (2010) Development, planning and operating of biogas plants 53,000 million Full-line provider of hydroelectric power plants 78,000 million

83,097 74,919 22,137 20,500 9,400 2,622 4 2,000 1,000 1,050 1,318 (2008) 2,500 725 143 400

Source: Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank (2012).

Table 2 Interview partners. INTERVIEWEES ECONOMIC STAKEHOLDERS Companies Associations POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS Members of parliament Ministries þfederal agencies OTHER ORGANIZATIONS; NGOS TOTAL

NUMBER

6 3 6 3 2 20

The actual interviews were conducted in the period May–June 2012. Each interview took approximately 60 min. At the start some open questions were asked with respect to the interests that companies pursue in relation to their view on the potential of renewable energy. Then, the RTG was applied. The elements (names of the companies identified) were presented on cards. In different rounds (between five and seven), three cards were picked and the question asked: In what respect are two companies similar and different from the third company as regards their lobby strategy ? Next, when no new constructs came up anymore, the interviewees were asked to select the three constructs pointing to what they consider the most effective lobby strategies. They then ranked all 13 elements with respect to these constructs on a 10-point scale. As a last step, a qualitative and quantitative analysis were carried out. Part of the analysis was a check as to whether the interviews show a saturation of constructs (Section 5). As for the statistical analysis, we used HOMALS, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis suited for dealing with data on a nominal scale (De Leeuw and Mair, 2009; Meulmann and Heiser, 2010). The statistical analysis was carried out for the rankings of all elements on the constructs the interviewees identified as most relevant.

3. Qualitative results Section 3.1 reports on the interests that the renewable sector in Germany has in common (open questions). Next, the section reports on the outcomes of the RTG interviews. The interviewees

identified 36 constructs, listed in Table 3. These were structured into four categories 6: In what way to lobby? (Section 3.2), Whom to lobby? (Section 3.3.), Styles of lobbying (Section 3.4) and Resources of different kinds (Section 3.5). 3.1. Joint interests of the sector The joint interests of the sector all relate to profit maximization. First, companies focus their lobby on the feed-in tariffs. As the rate of tariffs is frequently amended, each company aims at the highest tariff for their customers who receive the feed-in tariffs. Second, companies disapprove of frequent changes within the EEG. A long term time horizon of 20 years would provide stable market conditions. As one interviewee put it: “The EEG is our business model”. Third, a few business interviewees claim that the subsidy system cannot last and companies must become independent from government support. Although many interviewees tend to agree on this, only a few companies actually behave according to this vision. Policy makers stated that no company included in the analysis has lobbied so far for market independence and the end of subsidies (I1, I11). 3.2. In what way to lobby (C1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22, 23, 26, 32, 34) This category relates to all activities that are aimed at an (immediate) impact on German energy policy. Most frequently mentioned is continuous keeping in touch with political decision-makers (C1) for political stakeholders it is important to have a “relationship of confidence” (I2) with the lobbyist, being a person of integrity. One expert called this “quiet diplomacy” indicating that lobbyists should present themselves as 6 These categories are mainly introduced to allow for an encompassing report of the broad range of constructs elicited. It must be noticed though that any qualitative categorization of constructs carries an element of subjectivity and overlap cannot be avoided. Moreover, methods such as repertory grid technique confront the analyst with the fact that similar wording may express different meaning, whereas different wording may express similar meaning. Therefore, qualitative analysis must take into account the context in which specific constructs were elicited, i.e. the specific triads from the renewable business sample offered to the interviewee.

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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Table 3 Overview of all constructs. NC

Construct side 1

Construct side 2

Na

Unsteady contact to politicians Lobbying individually Bottom-up: contacts only with MPs & working level of ministries No public relations campaigns, focus only on political actors No political landscape management

19 19 18 15 13

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Regular & personal maintenance of contact to politicians Lobbying within association Top-down: contacting the most powerful decision-makers Public relations campaigns to mobilize public Political landscape management (close links to parties, party donations, strategic HR etc.) Knowledge development with correct information, e.g. technical expertise Geographically close to Berlin/Bonn (representative office) Having a concrete topic/request to talk about; clarifying interests Visiting & organizing of political events Offering external expertise, technical solutions ‘Deep lobbying’: using think tanks, publishing studies, contacts to journalist etc. Having a holistic view of the energy system & situation

11 11 10 9 8 8 7

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Having high financial resources (many lobbyists, big PR departments) Contacting technical level & specific committees Drafting & offering exact formulation of a new law Inviting politicians to visit company Knowing the right people to contact Friendly, constructive & down to earth appearance Deliberate distinction of traditional energy companies Tackling staff & assistants of MPs Convincing opponents Specific branch/topic lobbying EU- and international perspective Location bound, e.g. local or regional level Envision of disaster scenarios Tackling diversified interests (e.g. local citizens, associations) Technical experts with know-how; technical thinking Hiring of ex-ministry/MP employees Ability of self-criticism Organizing demonstrations against political decisions Astroturphing Present company’s interest as public/general interest Trying to impose decisions Focus on various topics High credibility of company within energy transition Knowing the right time to contact

Little knowledge development, wrong information Far away from Berlin/Bonn (using external PA agencies) General & too many topics/requests; unclear interests No visiting & organizing of political events Only presentation of company’s interests No use of ‘deep lobbying’ Not seeing complexity of problems; only pursuing company’s own interests Having low financial resources General contacting & many different MPs Not drafting & offering exact formulation of a new law Not inviting politicians to visit company Not knowing the right people to contact Arrogant & discriminating appearance No clear distinction of traditional energy companies Not tackling staff & assistants of MPs Weakening opponents Ongoing lobbying National perspective Not location bound No envision of disaster scenarios Not tackling diversified interests All-rounder, generalists; professional lobbyists Not hiring of ex-ministry/MP employees No ability of self-criticism No organization of demonstrations No astroturphing No presentation of company’s interest as public/general interest Not trying to impose decisions Focus on topic “100% renewable” Low credibility of company within energy transition Not knowing the right time to contact

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Na ¼number of people who mentioned the construct. NC ¼number of construct.

diplomats of their companies with an appropriate behavior. In their contacts, lobbyists should look trustworthy and enable a constructive exchange of ideas and opinions. Personal contacts are important, because politicians “do not want to feel lobbied” (I1). Therefore, a personal network is considered critical for achieving the company’s goals of lobbying. Traditionally, the Big Four possess a very extensive network and easily get appointments with members of parliament. Also companies of the renewable energy sector (juwi, Enercon and Vestas) have been successful in establishing personal networks. Interviewees emphasized that networking requires their presence in the proximity of political stakeholders (C7, 9). Most companies keep a representative office in Berlin where most of national political decision-making takes place. As an exception SolarWorld, a big player on the solar PV market, operates in Bonn, which as the former capital hosts the ministry of environment (BMU), responsible for the EEG. Companies that do not have financial resources to keep a representative office often hire external public affairs agencies that represent their interests. Political landscape management (C5) includes all activities of a company to establish and maintain close relations to political parties and their leaders. A common form of political landscape management is inviting politicians to visit production sites in order to connect them to their board of management. Companies or business associations organize political events where they meet with high level decision-makers. Within a week of parliamentary session, up to 10 different events can take place. These activities

have a reciprocal benefit: Political stakeholders get up to date information and companies usually receive positive media coverage when a high level politician visits their production plants. A common form of landscape management is donations, either to support parties’ election campaigns or individual politicians. In Germany, party donations beyond € 50,000 must be reported to the President of Parliament and are published subsequently; donations from € 10,000–€ 50,000 need to be publicly accounted for by political parties. Interviewees confirm that party donations from companies operating in the field of renewable energy occur regularly but are not as publicly discussed as donations from other industry or banking companies. While in the past most donations were given to SPD and Grüne, nowadays all parties may receive donations from the sector. After all, coalitions change regularly. Interviews and internet research indicate that the solar sector in particular has financially supported parties over the last years. Since they are quite common in Germany, donations are not accredited very influential, unless accompanied by other lobbying activities, continuous personal contacts with politicians in particular. Some interviewees indicated that donations can backfire to a company if they are too high and negatively perceived by the public. For one case an interviewee even used the term “bribery” (I20). Apart from personal networks, the most common way of representing business interests is through an industry association (C2). Usually, associations follow internal democratic procedures before publishing official statements for policy makers. This process was described as ‘finding the least common denominator’

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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as all companies need to agree on a common interest. Interviewees perceive associations differently. On the one hand, policy makers value their importance as they represent the entire sector rather than a single company, thereby increasing companies´ influence and the credibility of policy decisions. An MP referred to the role of associations as “a mediator between companies and politics” (I17). On the other hand, associations cannot provide more specific information than a company. Instead, by representing the least common denominator of interests, concerns of individual companies become less visible. Consequently, many political stakeholders prefer talking to associations and different companies simultaneously in order to get ‘the whole picture’. Critical in effective lobbying is offering usable information (C 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 23, 26, 32, 34). Policy makers emphasized that they are not interested in a “mere promotion of the company” (I1). It is crucial that the information provided by the company is correct. By providing false information a company would significantly harm itself, raising skepticism and mistrust. Respondents also consider companies more credible if they look beyond their own borders and take (future) challenges for the energy system into account. Policy makers prefer companies that communicate a holistic vision on the energy system rather than only RES related interests, who manage to present the sector’s interest as a German national interest and take, where possible, the international (EU) context into account. An example mentioned relates to system integration of renewables through necessary grid extensions. Deep lobbing relates to the process that shapes the intellectual atmosphere around a decision-making agenda (Wallace-Wells, 2003). Think tanks play a role in influencing politics through publications or subliminal messages. Especially the Big Four regularly commission studies. These often emphasize the high costs of solar PV whereas studies commissioned by the wind, solar or biomass sectors highlight the benefits of each RES source. Some interviewees put forward that scientific publications do have an influence on political stakeholders and are cited in political statements. Though the scientific correctness can hardly be denied, these studies reflect interests of (part of) the business sector. Part of deep lobbying is to establish close relations to journalists and the media. Media involvement with certain companies is considered common practice, but some express concern that journalists may lose their critical control function in a democracy. Knowledge development implies that solutions are framed in a technical manner. In official statements, companies may chose such wording that these could serve as a draft policy decision. Some companies even suggest exact formulations or draft an entire law that decision-makers can readily adopt. Some policy makers mentioned that if they appreciate the contents, they may forward the company’s proposal to the next higher decision-level. It was also mentioned that ministers sometimes even prefer information provided by the companies over information provided by their own ministries. 3.3. Whom to lobby (C3, 14, 17, 20 and 21) Lobbying political decision-makers can be done either topdown, bottom-up or a combination of both. Top-down lobbying refers to tackling the most powerful decision-makers, i.e. the chancellor, the responsible ministers and the chairs of parliamentary committees. Only a few companies are able to use these channels of communication due to their longtime position in the German energy market. In particular the Big Four play a critical role and are therefore always incorporated in key decisions concerning the energy market. Their CEOs have a personal relation to the chancellor and are capable of using it ‘at the right moment’. At government energy summits, the Big Four are important

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participants. Next to the chancellor and ministers, companies, the Big Four in particular, establish personal contacts with Ministries’ Division Heads. SolarWorld is the only player of the renewable energy sector that has established close links to the ministries as well. This is mainly an effect of their geographical proximity to the BMU in Bonn and the performance of its CEO. Companies who are unable to establish personal relations with the upper-level follow a bottom-up approach in that they focus on MPs or the working level of ministries. Tackling as many politicians as possible is considered most effective. Companies especially concentrate on the (scientific) assistants of politicians, who take a position as gatekeepers in processing requests and information. Respondents stressed the relevance of knowing the ‘right people’ to contact and of companies’ ability to interact with opponents in a constructive manner. Although all political parties support RES now days, there are still differences. Traditionally, SPD and Grüne show a preference for solar PV, which is explained by the fact that these politicians predominantly come from urban areas, whereas many politicians from the CDU/CSU are from rural areas and, hence, are more supportive of biomass-based solutions. 3.4. Style of lobbying (C4, 18, 19, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 35) Lobbying style refers to three dimensions, (1) mobilizing of media and public, (2) the level of antagonism employed and (3) companies’ ability with respect to professional lobbying. Advertisements in newspapers and magazines, television spots or banner ads in football stadiums serve a twofold aim. First, they may increase public acceptance of renewable energy and prevent a ‘NIMBY’ (‘Not in my backyard’) response in case of e.g. large grid extension projects. Second, political decision-makers are “very susceptible” for and “highly influenced” by the voters’ will (I3, I19, I20), because they are dependent on public support for their re-election. Interviewees evaluate public relations campaigns differently. Whereas some acknowledge their positive impact on public acceptance and political decisions, others refer to possible negative impacts: heavy attacks on political decision-makers may backfire on the companies involved in the campaign. A specific case of public mobilization is ‘astroturphing’ (Beder, 1998), the creation of a citizens or expert group by a company to publicly promote the interests of this company. In the one example mentioned, a big utility hired a public relations firm to “create” a citizens group as to publicly convey the company´s message. The interviews reveal two distinct styles of lobbying, an aggressive and partly arrogant style and one described as friendly, constructive and down-to-earth. An example mentioned frequently relates to SolarWorld, which is known because of its aggressive lobbying style and controversial public campaign through which politicians who did not support the company’s interests were labeled as ‘climate killers’, unable of sustainable thinking. Hence, SolarWorld manages to get a lot of (positive) public attention, but it does not have a good reputation as a lobbyist among politicians. The Big Four, especially RWE and E.ON, were mentioned as having an arrogant attitude and being a ‘knowit-all’. Arrogant and aggressive lobbying is also related to providing false information, e.g. through presenting disaster scenarios. Threatening with disaster is generally not well perceived by the lobbied people as it often turns out to be false. The solar sector and the Big Four are named in this respect. Until recently, the renewable energy sector contrasted itself strongly from the Big Four thereby exploiting the ‘good guys–bad guys’ dichotomy. Although this distinction is still used in public campaigns, today the positions of the renewable sector and the Big Four are closer than in the past. Hence, most companies included in the analysis are described as pursuing a constructive way of lobbying,

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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appearing friendly and serious. They have a relaxed, but also intensive personal relation to MPs. These companies claim to present the interests of the whole sector rather than the company’s. Furthermore, they are capable of accepting hints from politicians regarding energy related issues. Enercon, juwi, Q.Cells and Schott Solar have been mentioned as firms pursuing this kind of attitude. Some companies are represented by specialists with competent knowledge on energy related issues. Whereas some described technical expertise as positive because knowledge transfer can be ensured, others noted that this type of lobbyists might not fully comprehend the political process. The other type lobbyists are characterized as all-rounders, ‘professional lobbyists’ knowing how to influence and persuade people. When needed, they add an internal technical expert to a conversation with an MP or a ministry employee. Such a highly professional form of lobbying is especially conducted by the Big Four.

3.5. Resources (C8, 13, 24, 28, 36) Obviously, the abilities of a company to work with professional lobbyists largely depends on their resources. As far as finances are concerned, there are huge differences between on the one hand the Big Four and, on the other, relatively small renewable companies in biomass-related activities. The Big Four are mentioned capable of recruiting professional lobbyists, often former politicians and high level civil servants. These are able to communicate the message to the right person at the right point in time, which is highly appreciated by policy makers with a busy time schedule. Politicians also prefer talking to a company with a concrete topic who is able to clarify its interest. As one interviewee put it: MPs need to know “what they can do for the company” (I1).

4. Quantitative results 4.1. Most effective lobby strategies After having identified the full range of constructs, interviewees selected the three constructs related to what they considered the most effective (aspect of) a lobbying strategy. Out of 36 unique constructs, 21 were selected and ranked for all elements, which provided the input for the quantitative analysis. Fig. 1 shows the complete range of 21 most effective lobby strategies. Mentioned by 13 out of 20 interview partners, ‘Having a regular and personal contact to politicians’ is considered most effective. Seven experts named ‘Knowledge development with correct information’. Apart from these two, respondents had rather different thoughts of the most effective ways of influencing politics: ten most effective strategies were only mentioned by one interviewee. 0

2

4

6

Regular & personal contact to politicians Knowledge development with correct information Lobbying within association Top-down: contacting the most powerful decision-… Contacting technical level, specific committees Public relations campaigns to mobilize public Offering external expertise, technical solutions Visiting & organizing of events Knowing the right people to contact Holistic view of the energy system Concrete topic/request; clarify interests Political landscape management Ability of self-criticism Drafting exact formulation of a new law Inviting politicians to visit company EU-and international perspective ‘Deep lobbying’ Not trying to impose decisions High credibility within energy transition Knowing the right time to contact Weakening opponents

Fig. 1. Most effective lobby strategies.

8

10

12

14

4.2. Statistical analysis and its interpretation Fig. 2 presents the HOMALS analysis for the 13 companies in a two dimensional plot. The plot reflects a complex relationship between different constructs, all referring to specific features that make companies more or less different and similar as regards their lobby strategy. Interpretation requires to look into both the statistical analysis and the qualitative data. Two procedures are followed below. First, we look into the meanings of the axes, as the meaning of the X and Y axes is not given by the statistical analysis itself.7 Then, we look into the company clusters. 4.2.1. The axes For defining the axes we look into the discrimination measures for the 50 rankings produced by 17 interviewees. Constructs that score (relatively) high on dimension 1 and low on dimension 2, have explanatory value for the X axis. Three items appear salient (representing 11 out of the 21 construct rankings). The Big Four on the left have a convincing score where it comes to ‘top-down contacting’, including a direct line to ministers and the Bundes Chanceller, whereas actors in the right quadrants tend to focus on bottom-up contacting (1 ranking). Four rankings that appear decisive for the distribution of actors over the X axes relate to the item ‘Regular and personal contacts with politicians’. The more an actor is situated on the right, its contacts with politicians may be of a less regular and personal nature, in particular as regards the highest level of decision-makers (3 rankings). A construct also put under this category is a company’s ability to arrange appointments with many different MPs (left column) as opposed to ‘contacting specific people only’ (right column). The more on the left, companies organize and attend many political events and seek other forms of publicity (2 rankings). In conclusion, the X-axis visualizes companies’ (dis)advantage in lobbying in so far it depends on abundant (financial) resources to invest time and high quality personnel in lobbying. The renewable companies have – to a varying degree – less resources than the Big Four. They compensate by inviting politicians to visit their companies. A last item relates to companies’ credibility and willingness to assist decision-makers with reliable technical information (3 rankings). For the respondents who ranked the companies on these constructs, the renewable parties on the right are generally more credible than the Big Four on the left. The renewable companies are considered more successful in offering technical expertise and ‘competent and factual knowledge transfer’. However, the interview findings indicate that respondents are in disagreement with respect to the competence and credibility of companies and that their statements may depend on their own position in the transition debate. The same is true where it comes to a company’s ability of self-criticism (1 ranking) The Y-axis can be understood through identifying rankings that show a low score on dimension 1 and a (relatively) high score on dimension 2. However, the Y-axis appears to have less explanatory value for the differences between companies’ lobbying strategies, since 9 out of the 13 companies get about a similar ranking. This axis is interesting because of the deviant position of the two solar companies on top and the two bio-energy related companies on the bottom. There are four items that may help to interpret the Yaxis (representing 6 out of 21 constructs). In part, they overlap with the items that constitute the X-axis. Companies on top tend to be better in managing regular and personal contacts with (high level) politicians (2 rankings). Yet, the majority of the renewable energy companies most active in lobbying (Fig. 3, on top) do not 7 The X and Y axes are not a necessary part of the plot. They can be included but rotation is also possible.

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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their longtime lobbying history. They possess the right “channels” and know exactly whom, when and in what way to contact. These companies have the privilege to personally contact the most powerful decision-makers such as the chancellor or ministers. They spend such high sums on lobbying that allow them to operate representative offices in Berlin, employ many lobbyists and organize well attended political events. E.ON (1) is located farthest to the left which confirms that this company scores best on ‘Top-down contacting’. Interviewees referred to the “highly professionalized way of lobbying” (I1) which is, however, occasionally not as “relaxed and personal” as several renewable energy companies. RWE (2) follows the same approach as E.ON and possesses longtime contacts to MPs and ministries which were particularly used by its former long-time CEO. EnBW (3) is located slightly more above which may indicate that, due to its regional bonds with the state of Baden-Württemberg, the company is regarded more “down-to earth” (I7) and is positively perceived by the public. Vattenfall (4) is positioned lowest from all of the four companies. Following the same lobby approach as E.ON, EnBW and RWE, and operating on the German energy market for ten years, Vattenfall is still considered as “the Swedish enterprise” with a little less influence than the three traditionally German electric utilities.

Fig. 2. Companies 1 to 13 plotted in a two-dimensional figure.

have an immediate line to ministers and the German Chancellor, but focus on specific MPs and high level civil servants, whereas the companies at the bottom tend to lobby through ‘contacting anyone unspecifically’ (1 ranking). A second distinctive feature of this axis relates to the organization of lobbying using a well elaborated strategy. Companies in the upper quadrants are supposed ‘to know the right target group’, whereas companies in the lower segment have less knowledge with respect to their target group (1 ranking). The companies in the upper quadrants (the Big Four as well as most RES companies) are also recognized as active participants within an association, whereas the companies in the lower quadrant, in spite of association membership, are considered to operate more on an individual basis (1 ranking). Furthermore, the companies on top are considered more effective in mobilizing the public through PR (1 ranking). Finally, it may be concluded with caution that the higher a company is positioned in the plot, the more effective they are in ‘trying to impose decisions’ (1 ranking). In conclusion, as the X axis, the Y-axis also appears to relate effective lobbying to companies’ resources, but now it is companies’ exposure that counts. 4.2.2. The clusters In order to look into the different clusters, we look into what respondents have specifically said about what makes the companies in the clusters similar and different from companies in other clusters. 4.2.3. Cluster the Big Four The Big Four are concerned with an overall development of the fossil based energy system, pursuing interests different from the companies merely focusing on RES. The Big Four score high on the ranking ‘Having regular and personal contacts to politicians’ due to

4.2.4. Cluster SolarWorld and First Solar The upper right quadrant shows two clusters. On top there are two solar PV producing companies closely together, Solar World and the American First Solar. These companies strongly demand a continuation of feed-in tariffs for solar PV and oppose any reduction. Taking into account the German market with falling tariffs and Asian markets with lower production costs, First Solar decided to cease manufacturing in Germany in 2012. SolarWorld is peculiar in various ways. It pursues ‘high pressure lobbying’ through media and public relations campaigns that some interview partners criticized as “aggressive”, in one case referring to personal attacks on politicians (I9). Politicians who support the interests of SolarWorld are being supported by the company through financial donations in election campaigns (I20). It is also peculiar in that the company rarely seeks agreements with other companies from the solar sector (I4). It focuses on close connections with the environment ministry in Bonn and regional decision-makers and has less high level relationships with the Economics ministry in Berlin. Moreover, the company prefers to conduct its lobby activities mainly through the work of its dominant CEO and a few lobbyists. 4.2.5. Cluster renewables mixed Lower in the same quadrant is a cluster of four RES companies with wind turbine producer Enercon closest to the centre and solar PV producer Q-cells somewhat closer to the top. Q.Cells, which recently went over in Korean hands, is one of the biggest and well-known solar companies in Germany. Enercon (11) and Vestas (10) are among the biggest manufacturers of wind turbines, whereas juwi (8), as a project engineer and developer, combines all sectors of renewable energy in its portfolio. The positions close to the centre (and to the Big Four on the left) of juwi and Enercon may be explained as a result of their high market share and company size which provides them with more financial resources to influence politics. The companies in this cluster are being described as having a positive and friendly attitude, even an ability of self-criticism, and following a ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach. They engage in regular networking, in particular through organizing and visiting political events and offer their expertise and exclusive information to political stakeholders. They are also aware of the importance of scientific assistants of MPs. The solar companies, Q.

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

Cells (7) and Schott Solar (9), mainly lobby with their associations and try to benefit from frequent and personal contacts to political decision-making, especially local politicians. They do not spend as many financial resources on lobbying as the Big Four or SolarWorld. In general, the way of lobbying of companies in this cluster is considered the ‘mainstream’ way of lobbying. 4.2.6. Marginal players The bottom right quadrant depicts a form of lobbying which is less visible than lobby activities from companies positioned above. They follow a more passive lobby strategy and do not have the same opportunities to influence politics as the others. While agri. capital (13) develops and operates biogas plants, Viessmann (5) is traditionally a manufacturer of heating systems. Their business areas may explain their ‘outside position’ in the plot. Viessmann follows a distinct lobby approach by focusing on specific branch or topic lobbying: it concentrates its activities on a few though concrete issues. Moreover, it does not operate aggressively but rather “reserved and conservative” and establishes a strategic network of political partners (I9). Respondents familiar with the company have a positive impression with respect to its way of lobbying. However, Viessmann is quite unknown among the public. Agri.capital (13) is also publicly unknown. It cannot exert high influence as the sector of biomass does not have one strong association, but several pursuing different interests. Also, agri. capital received low to medium scores when it comes to ‘Having regular and personal contact to politicians’. However, it must be noted that the ranking of agri.capital has many missing values due to the fact that many experts were not able to evaluate the lobby activities of the company. Out of 50 possible values, agri.capital only received 22 which certainly influences the analysis and its position in the plot. To conclude, the findings with respect to the clusters and axes largely reinforce each other. The left column on the X-axis shows a cluster with the Big Four fossil-based companies, having abundant resources available for regular and personal contacts with the highest level decision-makers. The right column includes companies with a core business in renewables, who do not have immediate access to the upper level decision-makers but generally manage to effectively compensate for this. The mixed cluster closest to the centre is appreciated because of their relaxed style of lobbying, even referred to as ‘mainstream’. More on top of the Y-axis, companies follow a more aggressive approach, mobilizing the public and media in their attempts to counter the reduction of feed-in tariffs. The bio energy and heating companies in the lower right quadrant are less well organized and do not manage to get sufficient public attention.

5. Reflections on methodology Repertory grid analysis inter alia claims that with a limited number of in depth interviews the full range of constructs relevant for understanding the variety of perspectives can be identified. In this research, the line of new constructs flattens out up to the point that new interviewees do not elicit new constructs. Fig. 3 depicts that in this case saturation was reached after about 15 interviews. In consequence, we are confident that no major issues are left out in this study. The fact that all interviewees are experts as well as personally involved in decision-making on the German energy transition, adds to the observation that the results of the study are likely to reflect the social and political reality with respect to the German renewable energy lobby. Yet, the methodology also brings to light that not all interviewees turned out familiar with all companies presented to them, which led to missing values in the ranking for the heat and

Cumulative number of unique constructs

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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Interviewed experts Fig. 3. Saturation of constructs.

bioenergy related actors (Fig. 2, down right quadrant). In fact, uncertainty among the interviewees as regards the features of these companies’ lobbying strategies (less visible and less heard) may in part explain their marginal position in the plot.

6. Discussion The methodological reflections above form the point of departure for highlighting four issues that, in our view, come out as most challenging with respect to the research findings and analyses presented. First, the findings and analysis that shape the plot in Fig. 2 can be understood as to reflect the current state of the German energy transition in the context of its main recent history. On the one hand, the big four fossil based companies still have a strong position in the energy regime. They have become active in renewables and therefore also benefit from the feed-in tariff system. In spite of their powerful lobby, they have lost terrain over the first decade of the 21st century. Since the 1950s they have received high subsidies for coal, which will be phased out by 2018 (Meyer et al., 2010). On the other hand, the renewable energy sector has received tremendous support through the EEG. More recently, their position has further been strengthened by the decision to phase out nuclear power in 2022. Whereas for many countries the renewable sector is considered a ‘niche’ struggling for power against a fossil based regime, for Germany this label looks inadequate for large parts of the renewable sector. The presence of a renewable cluster close to the centre in Fig. 2, may very well articulate their incorporation into the energy regime in which international utilities and the (inter)national renewable business balance each other. Within the renewable sector and notwithstanding the fact that geographically Germany might not be the ideal location, the solar PV business has taken most advantage of the financial support schemes, which were boosted by the government coalition of SPD and Grüne (1998–2005). The position of SolarWorld is exemplary in this respect. Although often labeled as “aggressive” and “arrogant”, interviewees consider their lobby strategy quite effective. Whereas solar PV companies (high on the Y axis) have benefited most from the German financial schemes, the companies on bottom have, so far, benefited least. Also in this regard, the plot reflects the current state of the transition. At the same time, however, the plot also reflects specific uncertainties with respect to the (near) future of the energy transition. For SolarWorld it remains to be seen if it will be able to maintain its high political influence. Decisions to further decrease tariffs for solar PV and raising the importance of other renewable sources indicate a shift in political priorities. For this reason, First Solar (forming the solar cluster with Solar World in Fig. 2), has already closed down its German production units. The position of the companies on bottom, Viessmann and agri.capital,

Please cite this article as: Sühlsen, K., Hisschemöller, M., Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany. Energy Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.018i

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appears surrounded with even more uncertainties. Although apparently less effective in lobbying than most other renewable businesses, the interview findings do not indicate that their lobby strategy has been very different from companies in the centre. Some interviewees praise the way they communicate their knowledge and their ability of self-criticism. The main difference with other companies is that they are apparently less well organized in that their associations do not manage to move into the spotlight. As regards the future opportunities for Viessmann and agri.capital as to lobby themselves closer to the regime parties in the centre, the findings do not offer much of a clue either. We are left with the observation that they are in a position of disadvantage. At this point, a third issue must be raised. Interviewees agree that corporate business of renewable energy strongly influences political decision-making related to the German energy transition. Political decision-makers express the need for lobbying in order to acquire information and incorporate interests of affected stakeholders in their decisions. The great majority of interviewees (with as exceptions those representing the views of the left-wing party “Die Linke” and an anti-lobby NGO) perceive political lobbying as positive for democracy, as long as companies are honest. To carry this point a little further, interviewees active in politics argued for a “relationship of confidence” on a regular basis with companies as ‘quiet diplomats’. In contrast they mentioned to dislike the ‘feeling to be lobbied’. As politicians prefer regular rather than sporadic contacts to company lobbyists, companies that do not engage in lobby activities cannot “enter” the policy network, thus being often disregarded. The dominant vision on lobbying therefore may have as a consequence that lobbying fosters the status quo. Those who have benefitted most from the system have more resources available for this way of lobbying than parties who are at the fringe of the system. In this respect, lobbying may have implications similar to what has been referred to as the ‘participation paradox’ (Seley, 1983): participation may be aimed at considering views normally not taken into account, but benefits those who are already more able to promote their views and interests. Finally, notwithstanding the impressive results of the EEG and the feed-in tariff system for the German energy transition, there is an increasing awareness that the system has become expensive and in need of revision. Some interviewees ask companies to abstain from an approach of “produce it and forget it” (I12). Rather than to rely on politics they need to become more competitive by themselves. However, as politics has set the ambitious targets of a 30% by 2020 and an 80% by 2050 share of renewables in the energy supply, economic stakeholders expect politics to make it work. This may contribute to a situation, which fosters conservatism rather than innovation. This is especially a risk in case policy networks involve companies of renewable energy who already made it and deny access to innovative companies representing a niche (Hisschemöller et al., 2006). Hence, the current practices of environmental lobbying in Germany may, in spite of their wide acceptance, pose a serious challenge.

7. Conclusion and policy implications The decision of 2011 to fundamentally transform the German energy system was a political will. Although it is politics that took main responsibility for the success of the energy transition, electric utilities and the sector of renewable energy play a critical role in the process of implementation, providing technological and economic benefits on the one hand while pursuing their company interests on the other. This study reported on the activities of companies to influence the German energy transition. It identified and compared various lobby strategies in order to detect the most effective ones.

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Repertory Grid Technique in combination with HOMALS for multivariate analysis was chosen as a methodology that proved to be suitable for investigating the topic. As for the qualitative results, 36 different constructs of lobby strategies have been mentioned by the interviewees indicating a wide range of lobby activities in German politics. With regards to companies operating on the market of renewables, an effective lobby strategy ensures the inclusion of their interests in political decision-making. In order to influence political decision making, ‘Having a regular and personal contact to politicians’ is considered to be most effective for a company. Moreover, ‘Knowledge development with correct information’ and ‘Lobbying within an association’ contribute to an effective lobby approach of companies. It may be questioned why ‘Establishing regular and personal contacts’ is most effective and important to politicians. Usually, only companies with high financial resources can ensure these contacts. Interests of innovative companies, however, that might contribute to the energy transition with technological developments and business ideas, but refrain from investing in lobbying, will most likely not be considered by politicians. Political decisions are taken within policy networks that tend to institutionalize and hence, lead to conservatism and impair innovation. The findings of this study reflect the current state of the German energy transition. Through political support and continuous lobby activities, the sector of renewable energy does no longer represent a niche, but is incorporated in the German energy regime. At the same time, it remains to be seen what role the renewables sector will take in the progress of the energy transition. Challenges such as grid extension and higher electricity costs may lead to a shift in political priorities with less support for renewable energy sources.

Acknowledgements The authors thank Reinhard Schultz who established contacts to interview partners and supported the research with valuable expertise and insights in German energy policy. Furthermore, we thank Dr. Eleftheria Vasileiadou and Dr. Eefje Cuppen for their valuable methodological advice.

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