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Loss prevention: past, present and future
Loss
prevention:
past,
present
Loss prevention has been around for a long time, though not under that name. Its roots doubtless lay in man’s instinct for self-preservation, but with the passage of time the effect of social conscience has become an increasing component. In the early days of chemical technology, concern for the well-being of employees of industrial concerns seems to have been limited to a few individuals with developed social consciences. Among these may be noted E. I. DuPont de Nemours, who in 1802 built his gunpowder factory at Wilmington, Delaware, with employee safety in mind. The stout stone buildings were fitted with wooden blow-out walls facing onto the Brandywine river. Further, he directly involved his supervisors in the safety system by insisting that they lived in houses just a few hundred feet away from their workplaces, to be on call for night emergencies. In the 188Os, Ludwing Mond lived in a house within the perimeter of his factory at Winnington, Cheshire, with a bell outside his bedroom window, so that he could be summoned from his bed to attend to night emergencies. Such concern by proprietors was the exception: the rule seems to have been that workers were expected to accept their many occupational hazards as part of the job. Legislative progress towards controlling such hazards was primarily concerned with protecting people within factory perimeters. While factory operations continued on a modest working scale, with the possible exception of explosives manufacture, the general public were not greatly affected directly by the results of industrial disasters, and they and their elected representatives seem to have been content to accept that situation. As the scale and scope of chemical and petrochemical and transportation operations processing steadily increased during the expansion phase after World War 2, concerns of informed members of the public for the potential for disaster began to increase, though the concern of UK legislators was still focussed on people at
J.
Loss
Prev.
Process
Ind.,
1989,
Vol2,April
and
future
work, as typified by the Health and Safety at Work Act which appeared in 1974. Ironically in that same year, the Flixborough disaster occurred and impinged directly upon the homes and lives of many people living at considerable distances outside the perimeter of the Nypro plant, demonstrating that new attitudes to potential hazards which transcended boundary fences had become necessary. UK legislation to reflect the new attitudes to controlling major hazards soon followed, and matching technological advances aimed at improving process and environmental safety also began to appear. The Seveso dioxin release and the San Carlos campsite disaster, both in 1976 and with serious transboundary involvement of many members of the public, re-emphasized the need for new attitudes. The Seveso Directive followed as a pan-European response to major hazard control. The mounting scale and range of effects seen in the aftermath at Mexico City and at Bhopal in 1984, and international effects after the Sandoz spill and Chernobyl in 1986 (neither of which were actually processing disasters), can leave no doubt that there is still a long way to go before humanity can be sure that fully effective control of industrial processing operations is firmly within its grasp. Maybe we are reaching the end of the beginning of this scenario, but a long-sustained international cooperative research, development and educational programme will be needed to extend the large body of existing knowledge to the point where the beginning of the end may come into view. Journals such as Journal will have a
‘ Woodhayes’, West Road 6A E, UK
prevention:
past,
present
Loss prevention has been around for a long time, though not under that name. Its roots doubtless lay in man’s instinct for self-preservation, but with the passage of time the effect of social conscience has become an increasing component. In the early days of chemical technology, concern for the well-being of employees of industrial concerns seems to have been limited to a few individuals with developed social consciences. Among these may be noted E. I. DuPont de Nemours, who in 1802 built his gunpowder factory at Wilmington, Delaware, with employee safety in mind. The stout stone buildings were fitted with wooden blow-out walls facing onto the Brandywine river. Further, he directly involved his supervisors in the safety system by insisting that they lived in houses just a few hundred feet away from their workplaces, to be on call for night emergencies. In the 188Os, Ludwing Mond lived in a house within the perimeter of his factory at Winnington, Cheshire, with a bell outside his bedroom window, so that he could be summoned from his bed to attend to night emergencies. Such concern by proprietors was the exception: the rule seems to have been that workers were expected to accept their many occupational hazards as part of the job. Legislative progress towards controlling such hazards was primarily concerned with protecting people within factory perimeters. While factory operations continued on a modest working scale, with the possible exception of explosives manufacture, the general public were not greatly affected directly by the results of industrial disasters, and they and their elected representatives seem to have been content to accept that situation. As the scale and scope of chemical and petrochemical and transportation operations processing steadily increased during the expansion phase after World War 2, concerns of informed members of the public for the potential for disaster began to increase, though the concern of UK legislators was still focussed on people at
J.
Loss
Prev.
Process
Ind.,
1989,
Vol2,April
and
future
work, as typified by the Health and Safety at Work Act which appeared in 1974. Ironically in that same year, the Flixborough disaster occurred and impinged directly upon the homes and lives of many people living at considerable distances outside the perimeter of the Nypro plant, demonstrating that new attitudes to potential hazards which transcended boundary fences had become necessary. UK legislation to reflect the new attitudes to controlling major hazards soon followed, and matching technological advances aimed at improving process and environmental safety also began to appear. The Seveso dioxin release and the San Carlos campsite disaster, both in 1976 and with serious transboundary involvement of many members of the public, re-emphasized the need for new attitudes. The Seveso Directive followed as a pan-European response to major hazard control. The mounting scale and range of effects seen in the aftermath at Mexico City and at Bhopal in 1984, and international effects after the Sandoz spill and Chernobyl in 1986 (neither of which were actually processing disasters), can leave no doubt that there is still a long way to go before humanity can be sure that fully effective control of industrial processing operations is firmly within its grasp. Maybe we are reaching the end of the beginning of this scenario, but a long-sustained international cooperative research, development and educational programme will be needed to extend the large body of existing knowledge to the point where the beginning of the end may come into view. Journals such as Journal will have a
‘ Woodhayes’, West Road 6A E, UK