Markets for FSS frequency allotment planning

Comment Markets for FSS frequency allotment planning A reply to Harvey J. Levin

D. J. Withers

In his article published in the March 7988 issue of Telecommunications Policy Professor Harvey Levin proposed that economic forces could be used to motivate an improvement in the management of the radio spectrum. David Withers responds here to this, claiming that Levin did not take into account a number of important issues. He explains how adding an economic dimension to the process could in fact further complicate the regulations, so making the necessary basic procedures even less acceptable. David Withers was formerly Chief Engineer of British Telecom International. Since retirement in 1984 he has been a consultant specializing in the regulation of the use of the radio spectrum. He can be contacted at 49 Greenways, Beckenham, Kent, BR3 3NQ UK.

‘Harvey J. Levin, ‘Emergent markets for orbit spectrum assignments’, Telecommunications Policy, Vol 12, No 1, March 1988, pp 57-76.

114

Professor

Levin’

the methods

finds

management

of

satellite

(GSO)

spectrum

unsatisfactory

used for the international

orbit

the

allocated

geostationary and

for

the

the

radio

fixed-

satellite service (FSS), lacking as they do the spur to efficiency

that economic

His dissatisfaction with the outcome of the present methods would be widely shared. These methods are quite complex and time-consuming but they often fail to generate the constructive attitudes between national radio spectrum management administrations and between satellite system owners in coordination, which efficient utilization of the GSO requires. It may be feasible, as Professor Levin proposes, to use economic forces to motivate an improvement in the situation, whereas at present cost tends to inhibit improvement. Nevertheless, in considering possible economic options in the FSS context, a number of important issues arise which have not been taken into account in the paper. From my standpoint as an engineer interested in the management and the regulation of satellite systems, I will try to identify some of these issues. Professor Levin foresees the possiincentives

would provide.

bility of an international market developing in the orbit/spectrum allotments which are to be made for the FSS at the second session of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Adminstrative Radio Conference on the use of the GSO, which is to begin its work on 29 August 1988 (WARC-ORB-88). He also foresees the introduction of economic factors into the frequency coordination process which is used under the existing regulatory regime. I will concentrate my comments on these two concepts. As Professor Levin points out, there is already a market, national and international, for the facilities which satellites of the FSS provide. This market is not in conflict with the existing regulatory regime. When a satellite is coordinated under Article 11 of the ITU Radio Regulations with other satellites already near, or planned to be near, to its proposed orbital location, the coordination takes into account the actual or intended characteristics of the satellite, not merely its foreseen use. If, for example, the satellite antennas have overspill beyond the limits of the intended service area, then that overspill is

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

POLICY

June 1988

Comment

taken

into

account

in

coordinating

lites of networks

at the time of WARC-ORB-85

al neighbours.

frequency

potential

If,

at a later

stage,

a

new lessee or buyer of satel-

lite capacity emerges requiring in the overspill

service

zone, it will sometimes

by that time.

make

adjustto en-

70” E longitude

by the

110” W longitude.

and

to network

sure that

interference

additional

use is acceptably

adjustments

caused

small, but

will

Organisations

usually

be

INTELSAT

like

have built up a flourishing

market

in

decision

The

plan

should

will

ment

plan

combine

bands which,

by the

networks

ITU

conference

session of

(WARC-ORB-

through

not be totally decided

be provision

in this

of the first (1985)

About

which runs from

westwards

WARC-ORB-85 for

to

rigid.

that

there

in the FSS allot-

adjacent

countries

all or part of their

allotments

The frequency the

the half of the GSO

capacity

way.

had

70% of all these slots will be needed in

parameters

agreements

the leasing of satellite

to

national

if they wished, so that joint could

frequency

be set up.

assignment

planning

All

and

agreements

ITU

allotment

have procedures

SS), are to be used for the frequency

built into them to allow modifications

allotment

plan will be managed

to be made at the wish of the assignee/

nationally

by a quite different

Consequently, those

existing

involving

GALAXIE market-making internationally

be

to what

feasible

acceptable

or

in the allot-

ment plan bands. We do not yet know what this regime will involve. ORB-85

WARC-

tives of the plan

should

be,

and to

it determined

that

be used to produce

should

plan,

but it decided

about the methods

the means

virtually

the

nothing

of management

of

orbit and spectrum to be used once the plan

is in place.

Nevertheless,

was determined

is enough

country,

interests

what

to throw

provided

of other

countries

would of zero

width,

not an orbital

arc’ of the GSO within which a specific would

chosen

subsequently

according

to

in making

an international

works

set

up

however, which

under

clearly

The

The

main

objective

ITU

set

for

the

prepare

International

plan is to make at least one

discussion preparing

member

try, to be used for a national

area

associated

corresponding

country’s

national

the 800 MHz

bandwidth

with a service the

180 orbital

soft-

between

WARC-ORB-

allotment

at the second a specimen

networks IFRB

would

will

standard

between to

network

equipment

session.

In

plan, and verifydifferent

not be excessive,

have

to

plans for

adopt

parameters

characteristics,

the

a set of the

and same

for all networks.

of

dards will be a crucial one, since on it

would

be

depends

slots will

be needed for this. In addition,

provi-

for example, earth much

satellite

The

orbital

choice of stanseparation

between

satellites.

that If,

the size assumed for the

station

‘existing

these are the satel-

the

will be required

the

POLICY June 1988

and

ing that interference

sion is to be made in the plan for 34 systems’;

interval

Part

and the rest at 13 and

About

was given

planning

allottee

territory.

of bandwidth

at 6 and 4 GHz 11 GHz.

to

Each

of an orbital

position and a transmission of 800 MHz,

counsystem

services.*

is to consist

Frequency

(IFRB)

the

specimen

to every ITU

allotment

will,

freedom

88, and also of using the software

allotment

domestic

the

allows.

Board

during

Net-

plan

FSS international

regime

Registration

allotment

providing

providing

the

lack

the present

regulatory

be which

scope for flexibility.

WARC-ORB-85

in these allotments.

criteria

have not yet been defined, some further

ware

market

slot

but a ‘predetermined

ly feasible, sanction,

not

the plan so that a satellite

be allotted,

the task of developing

regulatory

the

are

are also various proposals for

constructing

some light on what might be technicalwith or without

that

thereby.

There

location

decided what the main objec-

some extent

allottee injured

systems

guidance

will

like

INTELSAT,

PALAPA

no useful

inter-

regime.

markets

the

and

provide

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

cy coordination

tion

minor.

Second Session of the conference, Section 3.3.4.

plan or which

begun the process of frequen-

the coordina-

such

2Report of WARC-ORB-85to the

for the allotment already

in the

bands which are to be used

be necessary to reopen ments

‘WARC-ORB-85 decided what the main objectives of the plan should be’

which were operating

with the owners of the satellite’s orbit-

antenna

is too small or

antenna

is allowed

overspill

beyond

the

limits

too of

115

the national

between

satellites

will

be

will

surround

areas.

all

It might

be

find enough

an allotment

satisfactory

finding

would

orbital

satellites made

hand,

orbital

be less difficulty

slots

for

but system

unnecessarily

for the optimum an iterative

in

of

the

costs would The

parameter

be

a parameter had

set will be

circulated.

the

’

using satellite

has not

yet

broadly

Pacific

Basin,

levant

cluding

to every

the

‘existing

maintaining

systems*,

adequate

against interference. of disregarding a specimen offering

mized.

being This

provision

GHz

duce results in better expectations IFRB

will

sultation tives,

with

interference

allotments

made

However,

the

include orbital will

proThe

in con-

representa-

a range

which

contained

opti-

not

those

ate there

of opti-

same

were

however,

that

parameters

have to be accepted expectations

choose.

It

pay

another

country’s

allotment

if it can

set

additional

up

networks

the

satellite

concentrated,

allotments

IFRB

work

on

show

that

specimen the

an international

market

at present

of

the

for

for allotments

made under this plan? Nothing

can be

international

aspects because no relevant

regulations

Professor

It that

yet exist. International

law

radically would

the UN

Outer

Space

of 1967, but I must leave that

would

all to be

It is possible,

however,

arises

in

the

a few hundred

when

into use. At that stage

might

be an opportunity for a limited

of the plan,

agreement

all

of

allotments

the

that

with

outthe

countries would

be

If the service areas of these

temporary countries

of

to set

period

side the terms having

prospect

plan

years,

may not have brought

affected.

zone, typically

allotment

their allotments

to form some ideas about what will be feasible.

the

the

to depart

many countries

technically first

high

for

reasonable

opportunity

from

up networks

The

is not

arise in the early

and in particular

overspill

for

to

adopted

such a plan

apparent

there

to the lawyers.

leading

In this busier half of the orbit, only

may have some bearing on the matter, Treaty

packed

hopes

if at all, if very

costs were

allotments.

allotment

loosely Levin

parameters

suppose

be

agreed.

So what scope can be foreseen

regulatory

that

most

will

the results of the initial

plans

network

to be fulfilled.

said

without

In the half of the orbit where of

severe

are

for

paying?

rather

of WARC-ORB-85

a

country

would

if the minimum

if

should

satellite-hungry

could only be obtained,

network

of

bands

Why

WARC-ORB-88 likely,

report

the possibil-

frequency

room.’

plan

seems

to

other

within the plan, might oper-

in the

mized and feasible options from which

severe

to

additional

to do,

may

area

allotments

to

accord with the

national

in preparing

re-

service

fulfilled

of WARC-ORB-85. have much

re-

be

networks,

trans-

their orbital

study

to

ity that satellite

for a predetermined further

in the

GSO

foresaw

arc for each allotment. Assuredly,

allotment

countries.

transponders

does

feasible

associated

the

a different

of

relatively

WARC-ORB-85

independently

plan

be

beam

unacceptable

from

the

systems’,

to each count-

satellites,

to

the

of

to

with

the pressure

be technically

for

part

without or

identifiable

a satellite

directed

neighbour-

produced

that the 6/4 GHz

and 1301

locations

and

protection

has been

one allotment

are in different

in-

By the expedient

the ‘existing

plan

ry, provided ponders

country,

scope for

between

where

It might

with

allotment

performance.

is likely

to arrange

found a way to draw up a plan giving

by

hard-

there will be parts of the

world,

one

only

be solved

this limited

trading

allotments

problems,

and earth station

from

allotment

in that mode

could

ware of enhanced

light.

previously

IFRB

technical

of which

Apart

user in that

operating

ing countries,

set for allotments

been

announced,4

will produce some

search

first work on

was recently

to a potential

zone, although

process, and it has begun.

this problem which

all

high.

A report of the IFRB’s Using

slots.

the equipment

standards are pitched too

high, there

116

which

service

feasible to lease or sell the right to use

performance

31FRB Circular Letter No 725, 28 January 1988. ‘Section 2.3 of the Annex to IFRB Circular Letter No 794.30 July 1987. %eport of WARC-ORB-85 to the Second Session of the conference, Section 3.3.4.8.

wide,

allotment

too great and it will not be possible to If, on the other

‘The search for the optimum parameter set will be an iterative process’

miles

service area, the required

separation

networks affected

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

small,

the

might be few,

were

and

POLICY June 1988

securing

the

whatever

necessary

means,

achievable.

consents,

might

by

be relatively

is

for

newcomer

both

networks

reasons, the

to accept

larger num-

parts, perhaps quite small parts, of the

ber

have

of

countries

large,

might

to

be

if the area to be served were making

success more

doubtful

more expensive.

is not likely that departures on this scale could unless provision allotment

from plan

for the practice

plan

were

However,

a

possible model for this might be found in the ‘interim Resolution

systems’ mechanism

2 of the Region

broadcasting

of

2 satellite

planning conference the scope for

these allotments be small

is likely,

marketing at most,

and short-term,

the possible overspill

apart

to

from

market.

Professor

economic

Levin’s

proposals

coordination

on

procedures

since there

is an established

regulations

here and 20 years experi-

ence in its application. be reviewed

at WARC-ORB-88 to be radically

The basic dilemma establish

existing

of capital in systems, and

the established

and tend to require

oser of a new network solution

There

procesatellite

the prop-

to find his own

to the interference

which his new network suffer.

favourable

regulations

favour

network

but it changed.

is that, in order to

an environment

to the investment

code of

This code is to

is not likely

dures

use

would

an opporunity

problems

might cause or

is at present no compulnewcom-

cooperation

has

been limited. Many tween

existing

of coordination

satellite

newcomer

be-

networks networks

and could

be solved by spending more money on the new networks the

use

ground

of and

benefit

and,

better in

space.

cases by replacing satellite

antennas

this may these

(LDC)

proposing should

a developed its satellite

to make

room

new

satellite

LDC’s

in the

location,

at

its

subject

to

paying the cost of the mod-

ifications.

If the DC declines to do so,

it would

be required

LDC

the additional

the satellite

to pay

Nothing ant

at a less favourable

finding

ways of promoting

in the coordination Levin’s

proposals

deserve sympathetic

consideration

that reason. If they were applied, might prove to be constructive

in some to have

However,

they

been formulated satellite will

orbital

be

seem

assuming that this is

a DC versus LDC

problem, network

that when is planned

a shortlist

of

blocked, single

operating

There owning

are

satellite.

is

by a

None

of

is likely to be valid.

now

LDCs

as many

as

satellite-

satellite-owning

It will often happen in the future a DC

proposing

coordinate

sponsible

a new satellite

with

Regulations

must

able

countries,

to

economic required

an

LDC

for an established

would have to await

order

and that

location

it is likely to be blocked

these assumptions

better

specific

locations which will be particu-

if access to the optimum

networks;

satellites.

for they

cases.

must

way to facilitate

pro-

cess, and Professor

of the satellite,

important

loca-

in this field is more import-

than

cooperation

station

in

to the

cost of setting up

tion.

earth

solution

net-

in orbit

the LDC

DCs.

and

have coun-

orbital

that

not be a quick

POLICY June 1988

all, on

Considerable

days of longer-lived third

is seized.

suggests that a less

to modify

in order the

the

optimum

in some

the

of exising

the replacement

The

above

antennas

could also be obtained

antennas

Clearly

larly suitable for the satellite,

problems

proposed

Levin

the right to require

for

the

but we do not know

country

(DC)

on

cases and

process provides

to set up a new satellite

there

voluntary

greatly

be small.

problems,

network

to help a would-be

large. The

of solutions to coordina-

Professor

try

are

on frequency

how often the opportunity

a new

and

they

for deals to be struck on

the financing tion

use of

cost of better

of individual

they may often

sion upon the owner of an established er,

depend

existing coordination

work

We are on surer ground in consider-

that

is not necessarily

developed

In short,

the

spectrum

true cost of constraints

held

in 1983.”

ing

frequency

on their

assigned. The additional

circumstances

on which the

is based.

constraints

antennas

It

be implemented

built into the agreement

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

and

For technical

and, if purchased,

%elating to interim systems: Resolution 2 of Final Acts of the Reaional Administrative Conference for the- planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in Region 2. Geneva 1983; ITU, Geneva, 1983.

coordination

consent of a considerably secured

‘There are now as many satellite-owning LDCs as DCs’

efficient established

all

be equally

applic-

regardless

status; yet regulations an LDC

re-

satellite. of that

to buy off a DC (in

that the LDC

should be left to

117

Commenr

enjoy its registered assignments) seem unlikely

to be widely

For a few international viding worldwide domestic

of a few countries

in high northern narrow

latitudes,

arcs of the

uniquely lites.

suitable

For

location

GSO

FSS

suitable,

to achieve.

would

be almost

the

rational

is the one

where

Why should any one estabbear a unique responsi-

bility for the problems there

any

seems likely to be easiest

lished network For

FSS satel-

networks,

and

choice of location coordination

are are

an arc of many tens of

degrees of longitude equally

there which

for their

other

within

systems pro-

coverage and for the

networks

every

of a newcomer?

satellite

that is in orbit,

are nowadays

two more

which

have been coordinated

but are not yet

launched,

five more that

and perhaps

have been formally

announced

as pro-

jects but have not yet been successful-

A newcomer

ly coordinated.

is not

likely to find that his route to successful

coordination

another

is

network

obstructed

which

operation.

Instead,

obstructed

by perhaps

works,

in every dination

net-

and others

stage of project acquisition,

definition,

frequency

and hardware

in

be partly

ten other

some in operation

capital

by

is already

it may

coor-

fabrication.

a newcomer

A

situation

in which

can

intervene

at any time and upset what-

ever progress has been made in other projects can only lead to chaos. It is not clear that an acceptable could

be devised

party

drawing

the

‘Efficient use of this limited resource is necessary’

GSO,

quired

benefit

or a party through

from

way

a specific its use of

which

has ac-

coordination

the

to do so, could be required to compensate another specific party whose access to the GSO has been blocked. A less radical line for progress might be opened up if some way could be found of placing a duty to cooperate within definable bounds upon all parties to frequency coordination negotiations. Even this more limited objective has not yet been achieved in the ITU, although the opportunity

multilateral are

planning

in prospect

FSS frequency way here.

118

by which

meetings

for

managing

bands

may

The ITU is. however, making progress by

acceptable.

that some

lead

the

two

interrelated

routes

to-

The first of these routes is the establishment of a series of technical standards for FSS networks which will increase the number of geostationary satellites that can operate simultaneously. The second route is the improvement of the effectiveness of the frequency coordination process. The acceptance and implementation of these measures, particularly the first, has been slow, primarily for reasons of cost; improvements in hardware are mostly limited to new systems and all the cost of the improvements falls on the systems making the improvements. It might be possible to make faster progress if grants from a world fund, supported perhaps by a levy on established systems, were available for this purpose. Whatever changes may be made to the regulatory regime, applicable to any frequency bands allocated to the FSS, it is essential to keep two objectives in balance - efficiency and acceptability. Efficient use of this limited resource of orbit and spectrum is necessary because the need for communication facilities is great. High wards

the

same

performance antennas,

ultimate

equipment,

is essential,

goal.

particularly

and progress is

in securing the widespread adoption of good specifications. So far the ITU has tended towards complexity of procedure to complement good specifications as the means for achieving high efficiency, and this too is capable of providing major benefits to the extent that it is implemented with good will and expertise. Nevertheless, the sheer complexity of these procedures, coupled with shortages in expertise, cause many countries, and especially the LDCs, to lose confidence in their ability to achieve equitable access to the radio spectrum when they have need of it. This was the prime reason for the demand for frequency allotment planning for the FSS. It is to be feared that additional regulatory complexities, designed to add an economic dimension to the process, will make the necessary basic procedures even less acceptable. being made

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

POLICY

June

1988