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Meaning and introspection
I) In : Structxre of Language and its Syn-qosia in A plied Mathematics, Vol. 2) &;;lnguage 1933, p. 34b.
hematical
As
ts. Proceedings
o
The thesis of the hat he
ves a cer
is
speaking
about,
even when
335 or stars in a pool. ~eve~t~e~ess, t O~~~~~~,}Z nig close, it may seem possible to give tifically accura of the fact of linguistic “knowing” as related in so istic forms and vice versa. es not alter the fact, however, that ~loomfield was comht to oppose to introspection as a general heuristic ologist submits numbers af people to stimuli under the simplest conditions, and carefully prearrange records their responses. Usually he also asks these persons to “introt is, to describe as much as possible of what goes on i they get the stimulus”’ (34b). ? s is one for WC are more. The method that Bloomfields refers to is one material from persons other than the investigator. The nmfwxiann’b y. V.YV”IV..UI
rsvrhnlnwict *“I y”J “A”‘“b
rar “.-L
31~1 rnllept ULVV “V_~V.,~ mntprinl **Lu_v*eII
frnm __V1_* himc;plf _____-.___.
111 t,hat,
case introspection is the systematic observation by the investigator of his own experiences. Beside these two forms of introspection the term “introspection:.“’ is used by many linguists in the popular sense of “consu%ting one’s own experiences”, and is in this form thought to be ~:~nti~~i in order to determine the “meaning” of an element of speech. retime5 now one, now another aspect of these three ways of is slressed, all this on account of t ’ ‘_meaning’’ is somet ing of which s that “it goes on inside”. field quite rightly argued pute “has really eanlng” (1436)) and very little to do with the problem of linguistic e mentalist in practice defines anrst, in terms of actual situati hat the mentalist does not define e.g. at the meaning of this word is “the imag -fleshed etc.. . . . fruit” (144%x), does not by any means prove that the user of language, while using the q!$& does not “know” that “about” is “the welletc.. . . . fruit”. Between the two passages in Bloo there is a passage from whit mentalists draw completely opposite conchrsions. mental processes or internal n to each one of us only from able actions” ( 143~). The mentalist’s conclusion is : so
Et seems to me that they are both on t
t me can eat a cannot be eaten either, a~tho~gb for the word ~~~~~~~~~.Vlhat does prove is the “knowledge” that occurs in ‘“the use of langu-
“‘mount:ain” as “thing at “meaning”
meant”
out “knowBedge” of the part
“observable
action”.
t is a devkktion fr4x1-n
comprises.
In order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to this question of all necessary to point out that - as - this cannot be done by some sort of introspection. e latter view formulate the answer, with variations, s: “What a given linguistic form “means” we only know from meaning is not perceptible”. In this last “for” lies the r. Naturally, meaning is not perceptible, and exists “inside” speaker and hearer, but that does not mean that speaker and hearer and also the linguistic investigator do not know the meaning “on account of” OT“only by” introspection. t is not true that the user of language “consults his own experiences” in order to know what is spoken about, in the sense that he considers “what goes on inside and it is still less true that he observes anythiug systematically. IIe simple “knows” what is spoken about or he does not “know” this. This whole matter has, for the user of language and the linguist, o with “inside” or “outside”. The user of language acts in the same way, whether, while using linguistic forms, he speaks about ething that goes on “inside him” or “outside him”, or acts on account of something that exists “inside him” or “outside him” and can only exist t ere. IIe speaks and hears while by-pa:;sing all this, because as a user of language he has nothing to do with it. The only thing that speaker and hearer do is to “reproduce”, in the sense that in a_ given s~t~a~io~, a given frame of reference, IL given context, or possibly a given preceding text, the speaker at tsnce “knows” what he out and the hearer interprets what is spoken about in ependence on the situation, his frame of reference, the context, if any, :~nd the preceding text, if any. There is no question of any kind of ection on ‘“what is going on inside him”, Gther on t e part of the spea.ker or on the part of the hearer n cases when reflection is neces~;asy they nave more than enough to in dealing with “what is spoken ahOlltP’.
linguist, knowing the language am1 studying “knowing” irt communication, he does not “introspect” either. Just like the speaker ai!d the hearer he is reproducing what is spoken about. What the linguist does, when in the course of fieldwork or in his study he starts to study communication by means of language, is: to reproduce concrete cases of linguis,ic usage, not to introspect. As
to tlx
338
.
%nter-
339
hematical
As
ts. Proceedings
o
The thesis of the hat he
ves a cer
is
speaking
about,
even when
335 or stars in a pool. ~eve~t~e~ess, t O~~~~~~,}Z nig close, it may seem possible to give tifically accura of the fact of linguistic “knowing” as related in so istic forms and vice versa. es not alter the fact, however, that ~loomfield was comht to oppose to introspection as a general heuristic ologist submits numbers af people to stimuli under the simplest conditions, and carefully prearrange records their responses. Usually he also asks these persons to “introt is, to describe as much as possible of what goes on i they get the stimulus”’ (34b). ? s is one for WC are more. The method that Bloomfields refers to is one material from persons other than the investigator. The nmfwxiann’b y. V.YV”IV..UI
rsvrhnlnwict *“I y”J “A”‘“b
rar “.-L
31~1 rnllept ULVV “V_~V.,~ mntprinl **Lu_v*eII
frnm __V1_* himc;plf _____-.___.
111 t,hat,
case introspection is the systematic observation by the investigator of his own experiences. Beside these two forms of introspection the term “introspection:.“’ is used by many linguists in the popular sense of “consu%ting one’s own experiences”, and is in this form thought to be ~:~nti~~i in order to determine the “meaning” of an element of speech. retime5 now one, now another aspect of these three ways of is slressed, all this on account of t ’ ‘_meaning’’ is somet ing of which s that “it goes on inside”. field quite rightly argued pute “has really eanlng” (1436)) and very little to do with the problem of linguistic e mentalist in practice defines anrst, in terms of actual situati hat the mentalist does not define e.g. at the meaning of this word is “the imag -fleshed etc.. . . . fruit” (144%x), does not by any means prove that the user of language, while using the q!$& does not “know” that “about” is “the welletc.. . . . fruit”. Between the two passages in Bloo there is a passage from whit mentalists draw completely opposite conchrsions. mental processes or internal n to each one of us only from able actions” ( 143~). The mentalist’s conclusion is : so
Et seems to me that they are both on t
t me can eat a cannot be eaten either, a~tho~gb for the word ~~~~~~~~~.Vlhat does prove is the “knowledge” that occurs in ‘“the use of langu-
“‘mount:ain” as “thing at “meaning”
meant”
out “knowBedge” of the part
“observable
action”.
t is a devkktion fr4x1-n
comprises.
In order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to this question of all necessary to point out that - as - this cannot be done by some sort of introspection. e latter view formulate the answer, with variations, s: “What a given linguistic form “means” we only know from meaning is not perceptible”. In this last “for” lies the r. Naturally, meaning is not perceptible, and exists “inside” speaker and hearer, but that does not mean that speaker and hearer and also the linguistic investigator do not know the meaning “on account of” OT“only by” introspection. t is not true that the user of language “consults his own experiences” in order to know what is spoken about, in the sense that he considers “what goes on inside and it is still less true that he observes anythiug systematically. IIe simple “knows” what is spoken about or he does not “know” this. This whole matter has, for the user of language and the linguist, o with “inside” or “outside”. The user of language acts in the same way, whether, while using linguistic forms, he speaks about ething that goes on “inside him” or “outside him”, or acts on account of something that exists “inside him” or “outside him” and can only exist t ere. IIe speaks and hears while by-pa:;sing all this, because as a user of language he has nothing to do with it. The only thing that speaker and hearer do is to “reproduce”, in the sense that in a_ given s~t~a~io~, a given frame of reference, IL given context, or possibly a given preceding text, the speaker at tsnce “knows” what he out and the hearer interprets what is spoken about in ependence on the situation, his frame of reference, the context, if any, :~nd the preceding text, if any. There is no question of any kind of ection on ‘“what is going on inside him”, Gther on t e part of the spea.ker or on the part of the hearer n cases when reflection is neces~;asy they nave more than enough to in dealing with “what is spoken ahOlltP’.
linguist, knowing the language am1 studying “knowing” irt communication, he does not “introspect” either. Just like the speaker ai!d the hearer he is reproducing what is spoken about. What the linguist does, when in the course of fieldwork or in his study he starts to study communication by means of language, is: to reproduce concrete cases of linguis,ic usage, not to introspect. As
to tlx
338
.
%nter-
339