‘…Men famous in combat and battle…’: Common soldiers and the siege of Bruges, 1127

Journal cf Medieval History, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 243-258, 1998

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' . . . Men famous in combat and battle...'" Common Soldiers and the siege of Bruges, 1127 Laurence W. Marvin History Department. Evans School of Humanities and Social Sciences. Berry College, Mount Berry. GA 30149-502L USA

Abstract The siege of Bruges in 1127 tells us many things about warfare in the High Middle Ages. The major sources, including Galbert of Bruges, are overlooked by virtually all military historians. These sources provide one of the most detailed examples of any siege fought in Western Europe during the twelfth century. The conflict at Binges illustrates the role of common soldiers and non-combatants in warfare - that they participated in large numbers, and were essential to the conduct of siege operations. Archers and crossbowmen performed valuable services for both attack and defence, while engineers or men with specialized skills built and operated sophisticated machinery. The siege of Bruges drew common soldiers from all over Flanders, including 'men famous in combat and battle' that a later generation would call routiers. Knightly warfare was virtually nonexistent in siege warfare. The factional strife that plagued Bruges was not that of class or military function but of locale, respective authority and disparate economic goals. The phrase 'those who work', from the traditional tripartite structure of medieval society, is a fitting appellation for the common soldiers who participated in the siege, because sieges were tedious but required hard work and specialized skills for success. © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Sieges; Military history; Bruges

Although each generation rewrites history, certain historical icons remain lodged in our collective memory, resisting all attempts at revision. Thus today most academics, popular historians, and novelists still perceive the knight as the ideal warrior, embodying the perfect package of , ~ n o u r , weaponry, and mobility coupled with chivalry, honour, and courage) Academic historians persist in portraying the knight as the most important soldier of the Middle Ages. Chansons de geste and chivalric literature have supported this view and left many scholars overly fascinated with the knight and his role in LAURENCE W. MARVIN received his Ph.D at the Universityof Illinois Urbana-Champaignin 1997 where he studied with the late Donald E. Queller and John A. Lynn. He is currentlyassistantprofessor of history, Berry College. His research interests include warfare of the high middle ages and the Albigensiancrusade. 'Even the U.S. MarineCorps has recentlyused a knight in its recruitingcommercials,to represent the qualities it wishes to instil in would-be marines.

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medieval society. 2 Few historians have actually considered the combat effectiveness of knights, but fewer still have tried to explore that huge mass, socially beneath the knight, 3 which formed the bulk of a medieval army in the twelfth century. By re-examining medieval warfare through a concrete example, one siege, I hope to help u n d e r m i n e the view that knights were the most important soldiers of the twelfth century. Exploring this one siege helps illuminate aspects of medieval warfare that are only now being considered by historians. The siege of Bruges in the spring of 1 127 provides one of the most detailed accounts of any siege in Western Europe of this period. A local notary n a m e d Galbert carefully d o c u m e n t e d this six-week struggle, leaving a specific, almost day-to-day account of events that spring. As one of Count Charles' notaries, Galbert was in an excellent position to record what happened. One can draw upon other examples of sieges for the twelfth century, but few have the sense of immediacy, eyewitness authority, and detail of G a l b e r t ' s chronicle 4 The m u r d e r of Count Charles, which set events in motion, sent shock waves through the rest of Europe, and accounts of his death and the subsequent rebellion c o m m o n l y show up in historical works of the period. 5 N o n e come close to Galbert in detail. He literally wrote as arrows flew and houses b u r n e d around him. 6 The archdeacon of Therouanne, Walter, also wrote an account surrounding the murder of Count Charles soon after it happened. Walter was not an eyewitness, but did receive eyewitness testimony in writing his account. While Walter's Vita provides excellent background on the murdered count, and supplements

2R. Barber, Medieval Chivalry (New Haven, 1984); R.A. Brown, 'The Status of the Norman Knight', in: War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Exeter, 1984), 18-32; C. Moorman, A Knyght there was. The Evolution of the Knight in Literature (Lexington, KY, 1967); S. Painter, French Chivalry (Baltimore, 1940); A. Borst, 'Knighthood in the Middle Ages: Ideal and Reality', in: Lordship and Community in the Middle Ages, ed, and trans. F. Cheyette (New York, 1968), 180-191; J. Bumke, The Concept of Knighthood in the Middle Ages, trans. W.T.H. Jackson (New York, 1972); J. Flori, 'La Notion de Chevalerie dans les Chansons-de-Geste du XIIe si~cle: &ude historique de vocabulaire', Le Moyen Age, 81 (1975), 211-244. The above is an incomplete list, but shows a good cross section of historical and literary discussion on the importance of the knight. 3J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. From the Eighth Century to 1340, trans. S. Willard and S.C.M. Southern (New York, 1977). In fact, Verbruggen's chapter on footsoldiers is the closest thing to a real study of the common soldier from 1100 to 1302. 4Only one other comes to mind, the anonymous De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. C.W. David (New York, 1936). ~Walter of Therouanne, Vita Karoli comitis Flandriae, ed. R. Krpke, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores (Hanover, 1856), vol. 12, 537-561; Herman of Tournai, Liber de restauratione monasterii S. Martini Tornacensis, ed. G. Waitz, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores (Hanover, 1883), vol. 14, 284-289, now available in English as, The restoration of the Monastery of Saint Martin of Tournai, trans. L.H. Nelson (Washington, D.C., 1996); Suger, Vie de Louis V I l e Gros, ed. and trans. H. Waquet (Les Classiques de I'Histoire de France au Moyen Age (Paris, 1929), vol. 11, 240-251, and in English as The Deeds of Louis the Fat, trans. R. Cusimano and J. Moorhead (Washington, D.C, 1992); Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1978), vol. 6, 370-373. ~For the Latin see Galbert de Bruges, De Multro, Traditione, et Occisione Gloriosi Karoli Comitis Flandriarum, ed. J. Rider, Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaeualis CXXXI (Turnhout, 1994), 81, or Histoire du Meurtre de Charles le Bon, comte de Flandre (1127-1128), ed. H. Pirenne, Collection de Textes pour servir ?t 1"dtude et h 1"enseignement de l "histoire (Paris, 1891). For the English translation, see The Murder of Charles the Good, trans. J.B. Ross (New York, 1959, repr. 1967), 164, or the French, see Le Meurtre de Charles le Bon, trans. J. Gengonx (Antwerp, 1978). Unless otherwise specified, Rider's edition is used for the Latin.

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parts of Galbert's description of the siege, it lacks the immediacy and specific details that Galbert provides, concentrating on the earthly or divine punishments the conspirators received for the count's murder. The monk of Tournai, Herman, writing near mid-century, devoted part of his work to events in Bruges. Herman of Tournai helps confirm some details of the other works, but he says little about the siege except at its beginning and end. His account lacks the eyewitness character and sophistication of either Galbert's or Walter's works 7 When modern historical scholarship began in the nineteenth century, some scholars focused on the military rather than the institutional history of the middle ages. These historians remained transfixed by the spectre of Napoleon, supreme advocate and practitioner of the decisive battle. By discussing and analyzing battles in great detail, they projected an image that medieval warfare was decided on the battlefield by opposing forces of heavily armoured horsemen. Scholars after 1871 were undoubtedly influenced not only by the great Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian war, but by many colonial wars fought all over the world, where Europeans often achieved victory by winning a single battle,s The horrors of war in the modern age have taught most of us that the decisive battle is a rare exception and that wars can be won or lost in a variety of ways. Simply by surveying the hundreds of castles that still dot Europe, historians could see that fortifications had some impact on medieval warfare. More careful analysis of the sources revealed that sieges occurred far more often than pitched battles 9 Despite this realization, most prominent modern military historians have insisted that the knight was the most important soldier of the twelfth century. ~° Recently though, a few scholars have begun to question whether knights were the most important soldiers in any phase of medieval warfare. Bryce Lyon, a well-known institutional historian, concludes that 'cavalry was never militarily superior to footsoldiers ~, even during the High Middle Ages. ~ Bernard Bachrach has also attempted to diminish the military importance of cavalry through a series of articles, mostly on the early Middle Ages. Bachrach believes that animals played a small tactical role in sieges, and that knights were unlikely to get

7According to A. Molinier's Les Sources de l'Histoire de France, 6 vols. (Paris, 1901-1906), 2: 173, Herman's work dates from the l140s. 8H. Delpech, La Tactique au XIII Sibcle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1885); H. Delbriick, Medieval Warfare, 1923, trans. W. J. Renfroe Jr. (Nebraska, 1982); C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (New York, 1924). These works are almost exclusively devoted to battles. The tradition of battle history dies hard: J.F.C. Fuller's, A Military History. of the Western World, 3 vols. (New York, 1954-1957), is virtually a history of battles, while A. Jones' The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana, 1987), certainly emphasizes battles over all other types of warfare. ~E Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (New York, 1984), 43,101,219; J. Bradbury, 'Battles in England and Normandy, 1066-1154', in: Anglo-Norman Studies VI: Proceedings of the Battle Con[erence (England, 1983), 12; J. Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages', in: War and Government in the Middle Ages, eds. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Exeter, 1984), 91. H~Contamine, War, 67; Bradbury, 'Battles', 12; J. Beeler, Warfare in England 1066-1189 (Ithaca, New York, 1966), 2-3. For the non-specialist stereotype, see Jones, War in the Western WorM, 118-122. ~B. Lyon, 'The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare: Horses, Horses All Around and Not a One to Use', Mededelingen van de Koninkl(jke Academic voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgik', 49 (1987), 77, 90.

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involved in the day-to-day grind of a siege. M e n who could build and operate machines, mine tunnels, fire weapons for assault parties, and use scaling ladders were the types needed to prosecute a successful investment, j2 In his review article, 'Medieval Siege Warfare: A R e c o n n a i s s a n c e ' , Bachrach has finally gone as far as Lyon, arguing that, 'Put simply, no one type of fighting m a n dominated the battlefields of Europe for a hundred years m u c h less for a thousand years during the Middle A g e s ' . j3 A few years ago Randall Rogers authoritatively e x a m i n e d selected sieges and campaigns of the twelfth century, determining that c o m m o n soldiers, engineers, siege crews, and even noncombatants had a critical role in siege warfare and eclipsed knights in importance, j4 Perhaps Carroll G i l l m o r has most accurately described the function of the knight when she compares him to a professional athlete, with his reputation for military prowess gained through the tournament, not actual warfare. ~ Though these authors are really arguing for the importance of soldiers other than knights, they do not explain in detail the c o m m o n soldier's contribution and importance in medieval warfare. For the most part their arguments have been presented as a 'top d o w n ' or negative approach to the subject, arguing why knights were not as important, rather than why c o m m o n soldiers were important. Sources reveal a pattern in twelfth-century western European warfare: typically one side, in rebellion or weaker than another, ensconced itself in a castle or other fortification, causing the other side to besiege it. A l o n g the way, countless skirmishes occurred. Sometimes battles developed b e t w e e n a besieging army and a relief force. More rarely, both sides felt confident e n o u g h to stand up to one another, or two armies accidently b u m p e d into each other, and a pitched battle resulted. 16 But descriptions of sieges are almost always the most detailed in the sources. Perhaps this is because sieges lasted longer, and seemingly m o v e d in a logical progression, whereas in battle the 'fog of war' and constant m o v e m e n t made it difficult to come up with a detailed and coherent

L~B.S. Bachrach, 'Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe', Settimane di Studio del Centro ltaliano de Studi Sull'AIto Medioevo, 31 (1985), 729, 732-733; Bachrach, 'Charlemagne's Cavalry: Myth and Reality'. Militar)' Affairs, 47 (1983), 181-187. 13B.S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance', The Journal of Military History, 58 (1994), 121. He has also said much the same thing in "On Roman Ramparts, 300-1300', in: The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, 1995), 64-91. ~4R. Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century (Oxford, 1992), 8,50,149,191,243. One should mention J. Bradbury's The Medieval Siege (Woodbridge, UK, 1992), as a comprehensive account of siege warfare in Europe during the Middle Ages. It demonstrates the prevalence of siege warfare over other types, but casts such a wide net that few sieges are described in detail, and the analysis is not deep. Nevertheless, this work is more comprehensive on the subject than any other work at present. See Bachrach's review article discussing both these works. ~C. Gillmor, 'Practical Chivalry: The Training of Horses for Tournaments and Warfare', Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History (1992), 18-20. She likens his most important piece of military equipment, the horse, to a race car - one only uses it at a tourney (or open battle), not to and from, and horses (like race cars) are carefully maintained and pampered every step of the way. Her article may be the best assessment to have come along in quite a while. ~6L. Marvin, 'Warfare and the Composition of Armies in France, 1100-1218: An Emphasis on the Common Soldier', Pb.D, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 1997. This pattern holds true in warfare in France throughout the twelfth century and into the thirteenth.

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account. As understood by contemporaries, and for that matter, modem military historians, knightly warfare did not work at a siege. There was no place to ride, to joust, or even to engage in single combat. Since the protagonists could not fight face to face, missile and siege weapons were more important. Knights could hope for some financial gain if the besieged town or fortification surrendered or was stormed, but this rarely occurred. More likely the attackers would call off the siege or work out a negotiated settlement long before the defenders had to contemplate surrender. Consequently, knights had little incentive to fight hard and possibly lose their lives or property at a siege. The siege of Bruges proves that war in the twelfth century cut across all social classes and military functions. This famous episode in some ways needs no reconstruction, but the main chronicles, including Galbert, break the thread of military events by digressing to describe political, social, and historical happenings around the time of the siege, j7 Therefore, a reconstruction of the siege for its military aspects from the major sources is warranted. The siege presents some analytical problems however. Starting out as an internal squabble, the siege eventually drew people not only from all over the county, but even from outside it. As events came to a bloody climax, King Louis VI of France intervened, and Flanders broke out in full-scale civil war over the comital succession. Atypical in the sense that it did not initially pit rulers, armies, or territories against each other, the siege evolved out of one violent act that led to a war of succession involving kings, nobles, knights, burghers and outsiders in a struggle for influence. Since Flanders was one of the most highly urbanized regions in twelfth-century western Europe, feudalism (and hence the knight's importance) weakened there earlier than elsewhere. ~s Finally, as a siege it was relatively short, about six weeks. This does not compare in length with near contemporary sieges like Amiens which could last several months or longer. For these reasons, Bruges may not reflect events at a 'typical' siege. In spite of the above caveats, the siege emphasizes the diverse type of forces which participated in twelfth-century warfare, especially illustrating the importance of nonknightly combatants and noncombatants. It demonstrates the inherent logistical, military and morale problems encountered by both sides and highlights the advantage held by the defender. A reconstruction should confirm and add to what the best historians of medieval warfare have said. Strangely, for all its detail in the sources, the siege of Bruges receives almost no attention in modem histories of siege warfare. ~9 The excellent, detailed work done on Bruges and Galbert by historians of this century has emphasized the social and legal dynamics of 1127-1128, and the development of the

~7It is equally true that, as with all writers of his time, Galbert sometimes ascribed events to magic or to God's will. See J. Dhondt, 'Une Mentalit6 du Douzibme Si~cle: Galbert de Bruges', Revue du Nord, 39 (1957), 101-109, for Galbert's belief in magic, the supernatural and divine intervention. Dhondt concluded that Galbert was an excellent judge of events, in spite of these lapses of rigour. ~SD. Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (New York, 1992), 97. ~gThere is nothing about it in Bradbury, currently the most comprehensive book on medieval siege warfare. Rogers' work concentrates on areas in the Mediterranean. In Oman's two-volume work, still the most comprehensive history of medieval warfare, he discussed the subsequent campaign, but said nothing about the siege.

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city, but has almost entirely ignored the military aspects o f the siege and subsequent 20 war. Charles the Good, C o u n t o f Flanders, was hacked to death at the collegiate church o f St Donatian in Bruges on 2 March, 1 127, by a group o f vassals w h o feared he might strip them o f their lands and titles. The circle o f conspirators included both the provost o f the church and the castellan of Bruges, w h o were brothers and heads of the leading family of Bruges, the Erembalds. After assassinating Charles as he attended Mass, the vassals then killed m a n y o f his advisors, officials, and friends, causing the others to flee. The rebels m i s j u d g e d the c o u n t ' s popularity because within the next few days, most, but not all, of the important conspirators fled into the castle in fear o f reprisals by the burghers. 2~ For the next five days the people o f Bruges tried to c o m e to grips with the e n o r m i t y of the c r i m e and what to do about it.22 Charles' death had left no direct heirs to the county, and he had no logical successor. The rebels tried to restore order by offering the county to W i l l i a m o f Ypres, a Flemish baron considered to be a man sympathetic to their interests. Gervaise, one of the slain c o u n t ' s chamberlains w h o had fled Bruges earlier, decided on 7 M a r c h to take action against the conspirators. Gathering an a r m y of foot soldiers and a few knights, he b e s i e g e d the nearby fortified town o f Raverschoot, held by rebels. Forcing the rebels to surrender, the next day he burned the stronghold and m a r c h e d his makeshift a r m y to Bruges. 23 The citizens o f Bruges agreed to admit G e r v a i s e and his m e n into the n e w l y constructed city walls to take part in the siege and avenge Count Charles. 24 G e r v a i s e ' s forces and s o m e o f the t o w n s p e o p l e chased scattered parties o f the

2oj. Dhondt, 'Les 'Solidaritrs' mrdirvales. Une socirt6 en transition: La Flandre en 1127-1128', Annales, Economies-Soci~t~s-Civilisations, 12 (1957), 529-560, and available in English as 'Medieval "Solidarities": Flemish Society in Transition', in: Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe, ed. and trans. F. L. Cheyette (New York, 1968), 268-290; N. Housley, 'Crisis in Flanders, 1127-1128', History Today, 36 (Oct 1986); 10-16; J. B. Ross, 'Rise and Fall of a Twelfth-Century Clan: The Erembalds and the Murder of Count Charles of Flanders, 1127-1128', Speculum, 34 (1959), 367-390; A.E. Verhulst, 'Les Origines et l'histoire ancienne de la ville de Bruges (IXe-XIIe si~cle)', Le Moyen Age, 66 (1960), 37-63; R.C. Van Caenegem, 'Galbert of Bruges on Serfdom, Prosecution of Crime, and Constitutionalism (1127-1128)', in: Law, Custom and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe. Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon. ed. B.S. Bachrach and D. Nicholas, Studies in Medieval Culture XXVIII (Kalamazoo, MI, 1990), 89-112. 2~Ross, 'Rise and Fall'; Dhondt, 'Les Solidarit~s'. Both articles, but especially the former, detail the whirlwind of political and social events sweeping Flanders in this period. Charles planned to break the Erembald clan's power by exposing their supposedly servile past. In spite of their possible origins, by 1127 the clan was aristocratic in prestige, wealth, officeholding and outlook. 22Multro, 39; Walter of Therouanne, 551-552; Herman of Tournai, 285-286; Genealogiae Comitum Flandriae, continuation of Lambert of Saint Omer, ed. L.C. Bethmann, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores (Hanover, 1851), vol. 9, 312. All the above sources mention in greater or lesser degree that the count's murder left nobles, burghers and the common people of Flanders stunned. 23Multro, 63, 65. Walter, Vita, 552, does not discuss the seizure of Raverschoot or the infantry Gervaise had with him, only that Gervaise came to Bruges on 9 March with thirty horsemen. 24Multro, 61, 63; Galbert, Murder, 146-147, footnotes 14, 15, 18. The citizens of Bruges built makeshift earthworks, a palisade and wooden watch towers around the town sometime after Charles' murder on 2 March and before Gervaise arrived on the eighth. These defences were built either from scratch or over and beyond an existing, but inadequate set of walls. Apparently even as early as this, some (including the provost, a conspirator in Charles' murder) had the feeling that the defences would be needed to defend the town against outsiders after Charles" death.

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traitors still roaming the streets back into the castle,e5 An exact count is unknown, but several dozen of the conspirators made it into the fortification. On 9 March, a week after the count's death, the siege of the castle began. In the meantime, the rebels had enjoyed plenty of time to gather supplies, and could draw upon the substantial food stores kept in the castle for use by the count, castellan and garrison. Once the siege started the men of Bruges set watches around the castle walls to prevent men and supplies from getting in and out. In spite of the watches the rebels sortied out of the castle at night and attacked the besiegers, taking advantage of the darkness to offset their low numbers and spread confusion.26 On 12 March, loyal barons of the murdered count, who had arrived with their forces in the previous two days, ordered an assault on the castle.27 Galbert reports that at noon, both armed knights and citizens came up to and encircled the walls of the castle, burning most of the gates still standing around it. But when they had piled up combustibles in front of the main gate to burn it down, the rebels began shooting arrows and throwing rocks, sticks, and spears. The assault lasted through to the evening, when concentrated missile fire from the walls proved too much and dispersed the besiegers, disheartening them in the process.28 It is interesting to note that knights and citizens cooperated so closely in this assault even if they did not succeed. Though the barons seem collectively to have ordered the assault, Galbert does not mention who, if anyone, led the attack, nor does he mention if there was anyone in overall command of operations. Flanders had lost its head with the count's murder, and none of the barons present had been appointed or had taken charge. The inability or unwillingness to pick a commander might partially account for the lack of success this and subsequent assaults had against the defenders. By 14-15 March, reinforcements arrived from Ghent and the surrounding countryside to help the men of Bruges. The castellan of Ghent, Wenemar, who had arrived on 10 March, invited these reinforcements to come to Bruges and make their own assault on the castle. Galbert says that these forces included not only burghers from Ghent but a 'greedy mob' (avidissima turba) from the surrounding area. They brought thirty wagons

2SHerman of Tournai, Liber, 286. According to Herman, Baldwin of Ghent arrived with forces but was met by an army of citizens of Bruges actually led by the murderers. Herman maintained that the townspeople turned against the slayers of Charles during Baldwin's persuasive speech, and together with Baldwin's men chased the conspirators into the castle. Neither Galbert or Walter mention this. Nelson, Restoration, 201, note 31, suggests that the militia of Bruges did not want their town overrun by nobles and had to be reassured by Baldwin, who simply wanted to avenge Charles' death. Z6Multro, 67-73. 27Multro, 73, 75; Walter, Vita, 553; Herman of Tournai, Liber, 286; Dhondt, 'Solidarities', 274-275. Both Galbert and Walter mention several men of castellan or baronial rank besides Gervaise. Unfortunately neither of these authors provides a description of the barons' forces, beyond saying that the barons brought armed followers. Herman simply says Baldwin of Ghent brought an army. He does say however, that the citizens of Bruges consisted of knights and a great many foot, as well as the ne'er-do-well 'murderers' of Charles. He gives no numbers. The barons signed a pact for conduct during the siege, as did others later. Dhondt interprets Galbert's term for the barons' forces, potentia, to mean, '...a baron and his knights and able-bodied men - formed a unit at the orders of its head'. This is an adequate social definition maybe, but not a military one. Herman of Tournai goes on to say that Baldwin of Ghent, harangued the 'good men' (as opposed to the mob) to attack the castle. Galbert says nothing of this, either because he did not feel it was important, or because it never took place. In any case, Baldwin did not have a prominent role in the siege according to Galbert's account. ~SMultro, 75, 77.

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of equipment with them.29 These men were opportunists, who hurried to the siege as quickly as possible for the prospect of riches that a successful outcome might bring. The important thing about these combatants is that they were not knights but heavily armed bowmen and engineers with expertise in siege warfare, '...men famous in combat and battle with skill in pulling down defences'. 3° In his notes to the edited Latin text, Henri Pirenne suggested that they were routiers, but Galbert never used that term or any of the other common terms for this type of soldier to describe them.3~ It does not appear that they had any semblance of units. Terms such as brabanqon, coterelus, flamen, ribald, routier, rupta and other Latin or vernacular variants did not come into wide use until later in the twelfth century, when writers began using the terms to describe individual soldiers and units who fought for pay as mercenaries.32 These mercenary companies, regardless of actual ethnic origin, would become highly successful infantry units by the 1170s. While by skill and reputation the men in Galbert's chronicle certainly resemble those from a generation or two later, they do not seem to have the organization or unit cohesion that later routier units had. We might more accurately describe them as 'proto-routiers'. Even by the 1120s the population density of Flanders was beginning to force male inhabitants to seek their fortunes in military service wherever it might be, but only later did mercenaries and mercenary units from this part of Europe gain their European-wide reputation.33 Galbert did use the term coterelus twice but only to describe one person, Benkin, discussed below. 34 As the castellan of Ghent well knew, these men were more useful in siege warfare and cheaper than an army of knights. At first the burghers of Bruges refused to allow any more outsiders to participate in the siege so that they would not have to share the booty once they took the castle. The ZgMultro, 77. It is possible that this is when Baldwin of Ghent arrived. If so, the conspirators were already besieged in the castle. Herman's sequence of events simply does not hold up here. 3~Multro, 77....viri gloriosi in certamine et pugna, habentes scientiam demoliendi obsessos. The direct translation is mine. Ross translates this phrase as '...men with a name for conflict and battle who knew how to demolish defences in sieges'. 3tMeurtre, 55, fn 4. 3ZActes des Comtes de Flandre 1071-1128, ed. F.Vercauteren (Bruxelles, 1938), 88-95; B.D. Lyon, From Fief t o Indenture. The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 201. English monarchs had availed themselves of Flemish military aid as early as the conquest, and we have the famous example of the money fief in exchange for military help between Henry I and Robert of Flanders in 1101. But the men employed for these operations were not routiers, even if they may have been mercenary. 3~H. G6raud, 'Les Routiers au Douzi~me Sibcle', Bibliothkque de L'Ecole des Chartes, 3 (1841-1842), 125-147; H. Grundmann, 'Rotten und Brabanzonen: S61dner-heere im 12. Jahrhandert', Deutsches Archiv fiir Erforschung des Mittelalters (1942), 419-492; J. Boussard, 'Les Mercenaires au XIIe Si~cle, Henri II Plantegenet et Les Origines de L'Arrn6e de M&ier', Bibliothkque de L'Ecole des Chartes, 106 (1945-46), 188-224; Delbriick, Medieval Warfare, 314-318; Verbruggen, Art, 118-125; Contamine, War, 243-247; M. Strickland, War and Chivalry. The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217 (Cambridge, 1996); Walter Map, De Nugis Curialium, ed. and trans. M.R. James, rev. C.N.L. Brooke and R.A.B. Mynors (London, 1983), 118-119. There is no full length work on the twelfth-century routiers, and the above works, including Strickland's, all concentrate on the period from 1150 and after. Grundmann, 'Rotten', 424-436, has the most thorough discussion of the origins of the words for this type of mercenary, and Contamine uses many of Grundmann's findings in his own work. Walter Map's frightening description of the Flemish routiers of his day places these men in a different category than mere mercenary or stipendiary troops. On the overpopulation of Flanders in the twelfth century, see Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 107-109. 34Multro, 128, 130.

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burghers eventually made an uneasy pact for the division of the spoils with the outsiders, but stipulated that only responsible citizens and experts in fighting be allowed to join the siege 35 While squabbling already began to divide the besiegers and threatened to disrupt the siege, the defenders industriously blocked up the gates in the walls of the castle with piles of dirt and other debris, and obstructed the doors of the buildings within it. 36 On 17 March, the canons of St Donatian scaled the south wall of the castle and removed the relics and liturgical vestments from St Donatian. Both sides permitted them to do this, a curious development in the middle of a battle z o n e s The barons invited those among the besieged who were innocent, or wished to prove their innocence of Charles' murder, to come out unharmed. Galbert does not mention any that actually left, but the offer further weakened and demoralized the defenders, no doubt a development intended by the besiegers. The provost and castellan of Bruges attempted to bargain for themselves and the other rebels but the besiegers strongly rejected their plea. 3s The men of Ghent and others carried out their own major assault on 18 March, using sixty-foot scaling ladders designed for this purpose.39 These ladders are unique in medieval siege warfare for their conception, size, and the fact that Galbert described them in great detail. Though he did not mention how many were made, he says they were fabricated in two sections of unseasoned timber, making them heavy and bulky. Twelve feet wide in the lower sections, this would allow about four men to climb side by side. Attached on top of each lower section was another ladder, longer and not as wide, designed somehow to be slid over the wall to allow men to descend from it once they had reached the top. Each ladder must have taken several dozen men to move, because Galbert mentions that a few 'audacious' juvenes carried far smaller ladders that took ten men apiece to move.4° In addition to their size, each ladder had a covering on three sides woven out of green branches to provide some protection for those ascending them. All this made the ladders extremely heavy and unwieldy, and the men dragging them provided easy targets for the defenders firing from above.4~ Both knights and common soldiers carried shields and wore coats of mail for this attack. The men of Ghent formed a cover of shields to protect those of their number dragging the ladders up to the castle walls. The juvenes took their smaller ladders and tried to get over lower portions of the defences. Still others brought up tools to knock holes in the walls. The

~SMultro, 75, 77. 36Multro, 83, 85-86. 3VMultro, 79, 81. ~SMultro, 86-88. '~Multro, 89; Meurtre, 65, fn 1, Galbert, Murder, 173 fn 1. Pirenne figured sixty feet of Bruges equalled sixteen metres, thirty-eight millimetres (fifty-three feet). The walls of the castle are estimated to have been approximately fifteen metres (approximately forty-nine feet). 4°What was the social class of these youth? In Northern France anyway, the word usually referred to the younger sons of a noble or knightly family. However, here it could possibly refer to the young men or apprentices of Bruges, who must have formed a significant group in any large town of this period. See G. Duby, 'Dans la France du Nord-Ouest. Au XIIe si~cle: les 'jeunes' dans la soci6t~ aristocratique', Annales, Economies-Sociitis-Civilisations, 19 (1964), 835-846, for his explanation of the term to describe the younger sons of nobles or knights. It is available in English as, 'In Northwestern France, The 'Youth' in Twelfth-Century Aristocratic Society', in: b)rdship and Communi~ in Medieval Europe, ed. and trans, F.L. Cheyette (New York, 1968), 198-209. 4tMultro, 81, 83, 89-90.

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stone throwing and missile fire from the defenders was so heavy that, in spite of the elaborate planning and large numbers that had gone into this assault, the besiegers retreated with nothing achieved. They would have to wait until all the other besieging forces decided to assault the castle 42 The men of Ghent had failed in the attack promised to them by their castellan. Had they succeeded each would have gained a greater share of the booty and spared at least their own side much death and destruction. As it was, one can begin to see an important dynamic at work here: there were too many competing factions involved in the siege to concentrate forces. No one person, baron, knight, or burgher possessed sufficient stature to fill the vacuum left by Charles' death, and consequently the assaults were conducted piecemeal. Considering how well the siege had been going for the defenders, what happened next is ironic. Early the next morning, 19 March, over-confident rebel guards left their posts on the castle walls to warm themselves in the count's house. A few citizens of Bruges noticed this and with small, one man ladders got over a southern section of the walls, managing to find and force a door on the west end of the wall that had not been blocked by debris. The rest of the besiegers, unaware of what was going on, were alerted by the men of Bruges and poured in 43 They had different reasons for doing so however. Some came to help fight the rebels inside, but many came simply to plunder what they could find. Another group tried to seize Charles' body, buried in a sepulchre in the gallery of St Donatian, and carry it off to Ghent. The possessors of his body would gain tremendous prestige and potential wealth, because the count's saintly life, the circumstances and place of his death would be a financial draw 44 Though the besiegers captured or killed a few knights at the east gate, most of the rebels immediately retreated into the collegiate church of St Donatian and the dead count's lodgings, their pursuers hard on their heels.45 Some of the besiegers even got into the church, the count's and the provost's residences, but stopped their momentum to loot the buildings. The defenders kept enough presence of mind despite the confusion to climb one of the church towers and throw large mill stones onto the looters' heads, until arrow fire from attackers on the castle walls stopped them 46 What brute force, courage, technology and manpower were unable to accomplish - the taking of the castle walls - simple inattention on the part of the besieged had, resulting in a considerably shortened defensive perimeter. Galbert reports however, that the defenders still had plenty of food, including wine, meat, flour, cheese, beans and 'other neccessities of life.' 47 Later on 19 March, a fight almost broke out between the men of Ghent and Bruges

4ZMultro, 89-90. 43Walter of Therouanne, Vita, 553. 44Multro, 53-55, 90-92. Who would have Charles' corpse had been a problem as early as 3 March, the day after his death. The abbot from the monastery at Ghent tried to take his body then, but an angry mob refused to allow him. This was not the last time during the siege that someone would try to take Charles' body from Bruges. For the importance of relics, saints' bodies, and their theft, see P. J. Geary, Furta Sacra, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1990). Though he covers a slightly earlier period, his analysis could be equally applied to Bruges in 1127. 4~Multro, 90-91. 46Multro, 92. Walter, Vita, 553, mentions this assault too, but does not describe it in great detail. He names some of the nobles involved, but says nothing about the forces which participated. 47Multro, 92.

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over the disposition of the count's body, still lying in the gallery of the church. The men of Ghent laid claim to the body because they had caused the defenders to flee in terror from the castle walls after the besieged had seen their siege ladders. The burghers of Bruges denounced this for the lie that it was and shouted insults back. A few cooler heads prevailed upon both sides to defer disposition of the body until after the choosing of a new count 48 The argument between the men of Bruges and Ghent solved nothing because neither group actually had possession of the body; rebels still occupied the gallery where Charles' corpse rested. After calm was restored, the 'armed and audacious' of both towns broke into the church and chased the defenders up into its gallery. The fighting inside grew ever more desperate with the defenders shooting arrows, throwing stones, spears, glass, wooden furniture, even pieces of the bells and old lead roofing tiles down on the attackers 49 Despite the fact that the besiegers now controlled the castle walls, the rebels in the church easily held out another three weeks. 5° At this stage the main source breaks off recounting military actions to concentrate on the flood of other events going on in Flanders including Louis V I ' s personal intervention and arrival in Bruges, the choosing of a new count, William Clito, and the subsequent swearing of homage and professions of loyalty to him. Some of the traitors who had never been in the castle or had fled in the early stages of the siege were captured and executed. 51 The disposition of the count's body still served as a subject of controversy, even though it remained in rebel hands. On 26 March, burghers and monks from Ghent, together with the connivance of some citizens of Bruges, including an officer of the castellany and some of the rebels inside, once again tried to steal Charles' body from the church. The citizens of Bruges stopped this effort violently, wounding some of the would-be thieves. After hearing that the monks of Ghent had offered 100 marks for the count's body, the burghers of Bruges grew incensed and determined to remain more vigilant than before, s2 How was the siege progressing? With the exception of what seems to be a minor attack on 23 March, to keep the defenders in the church while the barons went to visit King Louis, the sources say little about it until 11 April:~3 Obviously, political and social events overshadowed military ones. Were the besiegers delaying another assault on the castle or other aggressive actions until a new count was chosen, or were they simply trying to starve the defenders out? On 11 April, on the orders of Gervaise, newly appointed castellan of Bruges, the

48Multro, 92-93. The men of Ghent had sent a youth ahead early that morning to sneak into the church, find where the count's body lay, and open a door or window for them to get in and steal the count's body. The youth was killed by his own greed, when the lid of a heavy chest he had been rifling through fell on his head. The men of Ghent may have been upset by his disappearance, because his body landed in a pile of feathers, where it lay undiscovered for some time. 49Multro, 93-94. S°Galbert, Murder, introduction, 58-60. It is not because the church had any inherent defensive capabilities. Built of black limestone, it was a polygonal structure based on the design of Charlemagne's church at Aachen. This made it sturdy perhaps, but not designed to withstand a siege. 5tMultro, 98-99; 106-109; Walter, Vita, 553, 554.

52Multro, 100. S3Multro, 98.

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besiegers dismantled a w o o d e n siege tower to use one of its beams as a battering ram. The knights' task was n o w to protect the engineers who operated 'rams, sows, stone throwers, ladders and the like to destroy walls and stone buildings'.5~ Obviously, in the three weeks b e t w e e n assaults the besiegers had been busy laying the ground work for a proper siege by building or gathering this equipment. Notice that the knights acted in a supporting role, keeping the engineers safe. Not everything ran smoothly however. Later that day, factionalism b e t w e e n groups threatened the progress of the siege yet again. King Louis and the council of barons had forbidden any contact with the defenders because at this point they wanted to end the siege swiftly, and clearly did not want the rebels to k n o w w h e n the next assault might occur. One of G e r v a i s e ' s knights arrested a burgher of Bruges who had m a n a g e d to sneak into the church tower and retrieve some of his clothing and dishes from his brother-in-law, a rebel knight. This explicitly violated the law o f the siege agreed to by all the participants, and went against the recent wishes of the king. The citizens of Bruges did not view it that way - a citizen was simply trying to get his o w n property back before s o m e o n e destroyed or looted it. A body of men, angry at his seizure, went to G e r v a i s e ' s residence to threaten violence unless he released the m a n into their custody, and left them alone. Skilfully choosing his words, including offering to resign his n e w l y appointed position as castellan, Gervaise defused the situation.56 T h o u g h Gervaise had cooled the temper of the mob, he had trouble enforcing authority over his o w n citizens. All groups n o w anxiously watched the others for violations of the law of the siege, suspecting that a n y o n e not of their o w n faction would transgress in some manner. O n 12 April, King Louis, who had arrived in Bruges on 5 April, consulted various experts in the dormitory of the canons adjacent to St Donatian to determine the best location for the next assault on the church. N o w that King Louis took personal charge of the siege, the besiegers finally had a c o m m a n d e r of sufficient stature who could centralize the various forces and factions and cow them into at least reluctant cooperation. 57 Meanwhile, the besieged had done everything possible to make the upper

~4Multro, 81, 83, 89-90, 110. Galbert uses the specific word turris, tower, which he says had been constructed

earlier to assault the walls (of what structure he does not say). In his otherwise excellent notes Ross refers us to the chapters on the siege ladders (Chaps 35 and 40) used on 19 March. However, in all points Galbert calls these scalae - ladders, not towers. Even though they had covered sides and front, it is hard to believe that a beam from a scaling ladder, even ones twelve feet wide at the base, would be sturdy enough to use as a battering ram. Then where did the beam come from? It could have come from the scaling ladder, though not likely, or from a bonafide wooden tower constructed some point earlier but never used, or, if used, never mentioned by Galbert. Considering that by 11 April men had constructed sows and stone throwers, a siege tower was not out of the question. See Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, 45-46, 62-63, 71 and especially 243-247, 253. In the wide range of sources he used, Rogers does not show a siege tower ever being called a scala, though they are called turris. Also see Bradbury, Medieval Siege, 241-250, for a more general description of siege towers. 55Multro, 110. Quod factum inspicientes milites - qui scutati praesentes et oppositi in omni opere artificum astiterant, protegentes illos artificiose operantes machinas rerum, sicut sunt arietes, sues, jactatoria, scalae et consimilia quibus muros et lapideas compositiones destruere solent... The partial translation in the text is mine. 56Multro, 110-111. 57F.-L. Ganshof, 'Le Roi de France en Flandre en 1127 et 1128', Revue Historique de droit Franfais et gtranger, 27 (1949), 204-228, 214-215. This article details the French king's political, and to a lesser extent his military, involvement in Flanders before, during, and after the siege.

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reaches of the church impregnable, constructing barricades of chests and benches, and hanging tapestries and mattresses over windows to block incoming missiles. They still had plenty of stones and lead to throw down upon the attackers.5s On 13 April King Louis ordered his own milites to attack the church thinking he could storm the increasingly weakened defenders. He was wrong; from noon until evening the assault continued, but Louis' forces could not make headway against the besieged.59 The next day, 14 April, engineers brought the battering ram into the canons' dormitory and tore down the wooden wall facing the church, exposing an old window on the level of the gallery that had been covered by the dormitory wall. Suspending the iron headed ram from the central beam of the dormitory, they aimed it below the window to enlarge the opening. The men pulling the ram were protected by branches and wooden shields placed in front and on top of them to protect against missile fire from the church. From noon until evening they pounded against the wall. The defenders desperately tried to slow down the operation, throwing hot coals covered in pitch, wax, and butter onto the roof of the dormitory, and stones at the engineers. One of the knights protecting the engineers managed to get on the dormitory roof amid missile and flame to put out the fire. By evening the hole was large enough so that the crew of the ram, Louis' knights, and 'local juvenes' rushed into the gallery, preventing the besieged from picking them off by sheer weight of numbers. The defenders had to watch all windows and other apertures and could not concentrate their fire on the hole made by the ram.6° None of the sources indicate that the knights had precedence over the others in this dash into the gallery. The besieged still refused to capitulate. They fled from the gallery into the two church towers on the west end of the church, followed closely by Louis' knights. The rebels defiantly blew on horns, to show their willingness to continue what was fast becoming a hopeless situation. The gallery, except for Charles' body, was looted of any valuables.6~ On 18 April, growing impatient that the rebels had not surrendered and exasperated over pleas for clemency by one of the besieged, Louis ordered some of his sergeants to begin undermining the towers. The besiegers could have destroyed the church long before this if they really wanted to end the siege. No one wanted St Donatian demolished because of the treasures inside and the tact that Charles' body might be harmed.62 Galbert calls the miners servi, sergeants. It would seem that they were part of 63 the king's armed retinue, but were they specialists in mining? None of the sources say. By now the defenders had begun to lose heart, and, short of edible food and drinkable

~Multro, 59Multro, 6°Multro, 6~Multro,

111-112. 113; Herman, Liber, 288.

114-116.

117-118. 6'ln an appendix to Ross's translation, archaeological digs at the site of St Donatian indicate that the towers were not built onto the church but constructed directly against it. Therefore, undermining the towers would not necessarily cause the church to collapse. Consequently, it was only when the rebels moved into the towers that mining operations could begin without serious risk to the church. 63E. Bournazel, Le Gouvernement Capdtien au Xlle Sikcle 1108-1180. Structures, Sociales et Mutations lnstitutionnelles (Limoges, 1975), 102-111. In his discussion on the familia regis of twelfth-century French kings, Bournazel confined his remarks to the juvenes and knights who were regular members. At this early date we do not know whether Louis had specialists like the miners as permanent parts of his retinue.

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water, tried to ask for terms. 64 By the next morning, with the towers in imminent danger of collapse, twenty-seven tired, hungry and scared men surrendered and threw themselves at the mercy of king 65 The siege was over though the struggle for the comital succession had just begun. The siege of Bruges reveals how hard it was to conduct a successful investment in the twelfth century, even when the besiegers dwarfed the other in men and equipment, and the building used for defence, in this case the church of St Donatian, had not been designed with warfare in mind. Until late in the siege the besiegers concentrated on assaults rather than systematic siege warfare with mining and machines - why? Is it a typical example of western Europeans in warfare, that they were inherently impatient and preferred assaults? At times both outsiders and Louis believed their respective forces could break the siege by assault. A more plausible but related explanation might be that by conducting an assault, always a gamble in siege warfare, the besiegers would end the siege quicker. More specifically, if one group managed to take the castle and church ahead of the others, it would have first claim to whatever spoils lay within. 66 Or was it simply overconfidence on the part of the besiegers - that they so outnumbered those inside the castle that one desperate rush would end the siege? Perhaps it was simply that the besiegers, especially the citizens of Bruges, did not want their church damaged or destroyed by undermining or siege artillery. The siege did not really go against the defenders until operations with machines and mining began, coupled with the arrival of an overall commander, King Louis, capable of drawing all the forces under his aegis by auctoritas or threat. The defenders on the other hand, had almost everything to gain by holding out. They gambled too, because if an assault were successful they stood a good chance of losing their lives. Short of this, given the state of political turmoil that spring in Flanders, it was entirely possible that the rebels might escape at the very least with their lives, if not their property and status. They apparently knew of the factional problems among their attackers, and that this threatened day-to-day operations. In fact, at points in the siege, Galbert claims that the barons of the siege (who specifically he does not say) shot arrows with messages of encouragement attached to them at the church towers. At other times, some of these barons secretly communicated with and encouraged the defenders. If this was true, the rebels had every reason to resist as long as possible 67 The siege of Bruges certainly illustrates the importance of common soldiers. Archers and crossbowmen performed vital services for both attack and defence, by causing

64Multro, 126-127, 128-129; Walter, Vita, 558. Curiously, both Galbert and Walter mention that there was a problem with the rebels' rations. Galbert says they bad plenty of wine, grain and bread but that it tasted bad. He says it was a 'marvellous dispensation of God', but it is more likely that the foodstuffs had simply spoiled. Walter says the rations and wine were fine but the besieged had lost their power of taste. After the siege ended Gervaise, the new castellan of Bruges, seized many foodstuffs. Galbert does not mention that there was anything wrong with these, but what was seized had probably not been taken up in the tower. 65Multro, 127; Herman, Liber, 288. Herman says that thirty men surrendered. 66Bradbury, Medieval Siege, 79-81. 67Multro, 71, 73, 75, 96. All the more noteworthy because the barons had sworn, as early as 11 March, that they would give no aid to the traitors, and would continue to press the siege until the rebels were dead or captured. This is just a further example showing the lack of unity and different agendas that had plagued the siege from the very beginning.

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casualties, keeping men pinned down by missile fire, and preventing the enemy from getting too close. Engineers or men with specialized skills built and operated sophisticated machinery. Other men acted as guards and formed assault parties. Most significantly, knights do not seem to have played a critical role in either side's success. During the siege townspeople, knight, noble, outsider and the king had cooperated, albeit reluctantly. The siege blurred the line between what we would consider non-combatants versus combatants. The factional disputes that disrupted the siege were not those of class or even of military function but of locale, respective authority, or economic g o a l Ghent versus Bruges; Bruges versus outsiders; town versus comital authority; royal authority versus comital. The siege ultimately depended on an uneasy coalition of these forces, under the leadership of the French monarch. Though knights played a larger role among the defenders, even the rebels were a diverse lot. Many of them were knightly, like the Erembalds and their vassals, but there were non-knightly men among them. Galbert talks about armigers, or squires, several 68 times and these may, or may not, have been knightly asptrants. He also mentions archers, specifically one named Benkin, a mercenary who joined the rebels after the siege began. Galbert calls him a coterelus, the only time he uses this term during the siege. Benkin served bravely and effectively, and (;albert regarded him as a most capable defender and a gifted archer.69 Possibly an outsider and neither noble nor knightly, he had either made his reputation prior to or (luring the siege. Galbert does not explain why Benkin decided to throw his lot in with the rebels. It certainly would not have been a belief in the justness of their cause. In order for him to join the rebels he must have thought that the Erembald circle had a fair chance of weathering the siege and political storm.7° Be that as it may, his and the others' hard-fought defence simply made the besiegers more determined to take the church. Once the men in the tower surrendered or fled, their lives lost any value, regardless of their social origins, or political and military effectiveness• Twenty-seven defenders were quickly executed for their complicity in the murder of Charles the Good and for participating in the siege.7j •

~SMultro, 73, 75, 88, 110; Contamine, War, 68; M. Bennett, 'The Status of the Squire: the Northern Evidence', in: The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood 1, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1986), 1-11; L.M. Paterson, 'The Occitan Squire in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', in: The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood 1, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1986), 133-151; Oman, Art of War, 372-373. No one has done a full length study, but the current consensus is that in the twelfth-century squires were attendants of knights, but not necessarily knights in training, hence not even necessarily youths. 6')Multro, 83, 128, 130. 7°Multro, 39, Galbert, introduction, 32, 122. There was another Benkin or Berakin mentioned in Galbert's account, Lambert Benkin. Both Pirenne and Ross assumed that this Benkin was the same as the coterelus Benkin. It is true that a Lambert Berakin, whom Galbert called '...unus civium nostrorum...' did murder a son of one of Count Charles' other castellans on 2 March, The other times Galbert mentions a Benkin, (chaps. 36, 75, 77) however, he distinctly refers either to Benkin's military skills or calls him a coterelus. There is no firm reason to conclude that Lambert Benkin, citizen of Bruges, and Benkin the routier were the same man. The frequency of certain names in twelfth-century Flanders (and medieval Europe more widely) does lend itself to confusion; this is especially true of the name Lambert. See P. Adair, 'Lambert Nappin and Lambert of Aardenburg: One Fleming or Two', Medieval Prosopography, 11 (1990), 17-34. Neither of the two Lamberts Adair discusses is the same as Benkin the routier. V~See Ross, 'Rise and Fall', 368-369, for the social implications of the siege.

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By examining one violent episode we can see beneath the layers of historiography and literature that twelfth-century warfare was far more complex than a knightly jousting contest. Common soldiers were present in medieval armies in far greater numbers than knights and nobles, and it is manifest that in the siege of Bruges they did not simply serve as static support for knights. Yet in the traditional tripartite structure of medieval society of those who fight, those who pray, and those who work, the knight was the person who fought - all others except churchmen were 'those who work'. 72 Modern historians and students of the middle ages have taken this construct too literally. Indeed, 'those who work' was a fitting appellation for the common soldiers of all types who participated in the siege of Bruges. Siege warfare was tedious but dangerous, required hard work and specialized skills. Military success in the twelfth century depended on the presence of many segments of the population besides a mounted military elite.73

72G. Duby, The Three Orders. Feudal Society Imagined, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago, 1980), 259-262. 731 would like to thank the editor and anonymous reader of The Journal of Medieval History for their comments. Additionally, my thanks to C. Derek Croxton, Thomas F. Madden, Michael Pedrotty, Paula Rieder and Reid Rozen for their close readings and comments on earlier drafts.