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Morality in the making: Thought, action, and the social context
New Ideas Psychol Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 85 86. Pergamon Press Ltd, 1984. Printed in Great Britain
BOOK REVIEW
Morality in the Making: Thought, Action, and the Social Context edited by John Wiley, Chichester, U.K. (1983) This edited volume, part of the Wiley series in developmental psychology, originates from a 1977 British conference on moral development and moral education. The eleven contributors include philosophers as well as psychologists and educators; the editors state that "by raising traditional [moral development] issues in this interdisciplinary context, we hope not merely to suggest new answers, but to raise new questions" (p. xix). The book is described as "the outcome of an exercise in communal thinking by a group of individuals," indeed as "a collection of differently-colored pieces put together to form a pattern" (p. vii). Although there was some interrelating across the 13 chapters, I did not find this "communal outcome" or "integrated .... pattern". I did find throughout the book, however, the "themes" listed on p. vii: "the development of moral and social cognition, the relationships between moral thought and action, the nature and sources of moral judgment and moral behavior, the impact of moral conceptions on the group and the individual, the nature of morality itself." In terms of these themes, for the most part, the contributors do offer stimulating perspectives on "traditional issues." Virtually all of the book's contributions relate in one way or another to Lawrence Kohlberg's and Jean Piaget's cognitive-structural stage theories of moral development; every contributor at least mentions Kohlberg, and the first five chapters provide explicit reviews or critiques. The general thrust of the critiques is that Kohlberg's theory is insufficiently "social" in one way or another. Ian Vine (chap. 2) faults Kohlberg for failing to acknowledge the social variability of "some of the h u m a n values and sympathies upon which our reason must build" (p. 40). David and Stephanie Thornton (chap. 4) relate Kohlberg's stages to a progressively expanded scope of social concern. Helen Weinreich-Haste (chap. 5) doubts that there is "a real difference between the processes of reasoning applied to 'moral' questions and those applied to other social issues" (p. 90). T h e most severe "non-social" critique is offered by Nicholas Emler (chap. 3), who claims that Kohlberg's theory "retain[s] the individual as the exclusive and sole focus of analysis" (p. 54). Although Emler's contention has some merit in terms of Kohlberg's developmental construct of "post-conventional level," it is manifestly inaccurate and unfair as the broad characterization that Emler seem also to intend. Emler should discover Kohlberg's [1, pp. 414-423] embrace of the symbolic-interactionist theories of James Mark Baldwin and George Herbert Mead, on the basis of which Kohlberg wrote: "The motivational problem usually proposed to socialization theory is the question of why the 'selfish' or impulsive infant develops into a social b e i n g . . . The answer of
85
86
Book review
developmental theory is that the self is itself born out of the social or sharing process" (p. 416); "the basic unit of the self is a bipolar self-other relationship" (p. 417). The best perspective on individualism in Kohlberg's theory, I thought, took place near the end of the book, in terms of T o m Kitwood's (chap. 12) historical-anthropological analysis of "the modern predicament", i.e. the contemporary individual's experience of tension between the security and meaning offered by small-scale community life and the freedom and non-contextual ethical principles associated with global consciousness. Kitwood sees Kohlberg's theory as representing an effort to theoretically resolve this predicament by "[postulating] an ascent from particularistic to universalistic ethics as an individual matures. In this way it would be possible to acknowledge the importance of special ties and commitments in the earlier stages, while claiming that these are gradually laid aside as a person approaches the principled level of moral thought" (p. 227). Kitwood doubts, however, the appropriateness and psychological feasibility of granting priority to individualism in the end-state of moral development: It appears to be necessary for the morally principled person to take a stance outside any community, to have no strong particularistic ties, to attach little importance to private projects: to avoid all forms of c o m m i t m e n t that might compromise impartiality to become in reality the atomized individual that the theory requires. Perhaps this might be feasible for a while, at least in certain cases; residues of past sociality r e m a i n in the personality a n d can provide some kind of sustenance. One might suppose, however, that in due course some of these rigorously principled moralists would begin to suffer from problems of "personal identity," caused by precisely the kind of deprivations that I have discussed earlier in this chapter; and so, despite the rectitude of their theoretical position, become ineffective as practical moral agents. (p. 227)
Other contributions were also noteworthy. I especially liked Emler's (chap. 11) bold and brilliant defense of "the particular idea of moral character and • . . the more general concept of personality traits" (p. 189). Among the philosophical contributions, I particularly liked Don Locke's (chap. 6) helpful identification of implicit moral understanding as bearing a greater relationship to most moral action than does conscious moral deliberation, and Roger Straughan's (chap• 7) appealing conceptual analysis of the "moderate" relationship between moral judgment and moral action found in the empirical literature. In general, I found Morality in the Making to be a sophisticated, thoughtprovoking book. I recommend it to all thinkers seriously concerned with basic issues in moral developmental theory and research, especially those issues entailed in the cognitive-structural approach. John C. Gibbs Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio REFERENCE 1. Kohlberg L. Stage and sequence: T h e cognitive-developmental a p p r o a c h to socialization. In Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (ed. Goslin D. A.). R a n d McNally, Chicago (1969).
BOOK REVIEW
Morality in the Making: Thought, Action, and the Social Context edited by John Wiley, Chichester, U.K. (1983) This edited volume, part of the Wiley series in developmental psychology, originates from a 1977 British conference on moral development and moral education. The eleven contributors include philosophers as well as psychologists and educators; the editors state that "by raising traditional [moral development] issues in this interdisciplinary context, we hope not merely to suggest new answers, but to raise new questions" (p. xix). The book is described as "the outcome of an exercise in communal thinking by a group of individuals," indeed as "a collection of differently-colored pieces put together to form a pattern" (p. vii). Although there was some interrelating across the 13 chapters, I did not find this "communal outcome" or "integrated .... pattern". I did find throughout the book, however, the "themes" listed on p. vii: "the development of moral and social cognition, the relationships between moral thought and action, the nature and sources of moral judgment and moral behavior, the impact of moral conceptions on the group and the individual, the nature of morality itself." In terms of these themes, for the most part, the contributors do offer stimulating perspectives on "traditional issues." Virtually all of the book's contributions relate in one way or another to Lawrence Kohlberg's and Jean Piaget's cognitive-structural stage theories of moral development; every contributor at least mentions Kohlberg, and the first five chapters provide explicit reviews or critiques. The general thrust of the critiques is that Kohlberg's theory is insufficiently "social" in one way or another. Ian Vine (chap. 2) faults Kohlberg for failing to acknowledge the social variability of "some of the h u m a n values and sympathies upon which our reason must build" (p. 40). David and Stephanie Thornton (chap. 4) relate Kohlberg's stages to a progressively expanded scope of social concern. Helen Weinreich-Haste (chap. 5) doubts that there is "a real difference between the processes of reasoning applied to 'moral' questions and those applied to other social issues" (p. 90). T h e most severe "non-social" critique is offered by Nicholas Emler (chap. 3), who claims that Kohlberg's theory "retain[s] the individual as the exclusive and sole focus of analysis" (p. 54). Although Emler's contention has some merit in terms of Kohlberg's developmental construct of "post-conventional level," it is manifestly inaccurate and unfair as the broad characterization that Emler seem also to intend. Emler should discover Kohlberg's [1, pp. 414-423] embrace of the symbolic-interactionist theories of James Mark Baldwin and George Herbert Mead, on the basis of which Kohlberg wrote: "The motivational problem usually proposed to socialization theory is the question of why the 'selfish' or impulsive infant develops into a social b e i n g . . . The answer of
85
86
Book review
developmental theory is that the self is itself born out of the social or sharing process" (p. 416); "the basic unit of the self is a bipolar self-other relationship" (p. 417). The best perspective on individualism in Kohlberg's theory, I thought, took place near the end of the book, in terms of T o m Kitwood's (chap. 12) historical-anthropological analysis of "the modern predicament", i.e. the contemporary individual's experience of tension between the security and meaning offered by small-scale community life and the freedom and non-contextual ethical principles associated with global consciousness. Kitwood sees Kohlberg's theory as representing an effort to theoretically resolve this predicament by "[postulating] an ascent from particularistic to universalistic ethics as an individual matures. In this way it would be possible to acknowledge the importance of special ties and commitments in the earlier stages, while claiming that these are gradually laid aside as a person approaches the principled level of moral thought" (p. 227). Kitwood doubts, however, the appropriateness and psychological feasibility of granting priority to individualism in the end-state of moral development: It appears to be necessary for the morally principled person to take a stance outside any community, to have no strong particularistic ties, to attach little importance to private projects: to avoid all forms of c o m m i t m e n t that might compromise impartiality to become in reality the atomized individual that the theory requires. Perhaps this might be feasible for a while, at least in certain cases; residues of past sociality r e m a i n in the personality a n d can provide some kind of sustenance. One might suppose, however, that in due course some of these rigorously principled moralists would begin to suffer from problems of "personal identity," caused by precisely the kind of deprivations that I have discussed earlier in this chapter; and so, despite the rectitude of their theoretical position, become ineffective as practical moral agents. (p. 227)
Other contributions were also noteworthy. I especially liked Emler's (chap. 11) bold and brilliant defense of "the particular idea of moral character and • . . the more general concept of personality traits" (p. 189). Among the philosophical contributions, I particularly liked Don Locke's (chap. 6) helpful identification of implicit moral understanding as bearing a greater relationship to most moral action than does conscious moral deliberation, and Roger Straughan's (chap• 7) appealing conceptual analysis of the "moderate" relationship between moral judgment and moral action found in the empirical literature. In general, I found Morality in the Making to be a sophisticated, thoughtprovoking book. I recommend it to all thinkers seriously concerned with basic issues in moral developmental theory and research, especially those issues entailed in the cognitive-structural approach. John C. Gibbs Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio REFERENCE 1. Kohlberg L. Stage and sequence: T h e cognitive-developmental a p p r o a c h to socialization. In Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (ed. Goslin D. A.). R a n d McNally, Chicago (1969).