Thought about actions in social domains: Morality, social conventions, and social interactions

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Cognitive Development 23 (2008) 136–154

Thought about actions in social domains: Morality, social conventions, and social interactions Elliot Turiel ∗ University of California, Berkeley, CA, United States

Abstract Judgments about actual and hypothetical events were examined. The study, conducted in elementary (first, third, and fifth grades) and junior high (seventh grades) schools, included behavioral observations and assessments of judgments. Observations were conducted of 108 events classified as moral, as conventional, and as mixed type. Participants’ reactions and communications differed by domain of the event. Judgments and justifications of 312 participants in the events showed that they discriminated between the domains on several dimensions. Judgments and justifications corresponded with ones made about comparable hypothetical situations. The study supported the proposition that judgments in the domains of morality and social convention about actual events correspond with judgments about hypothetical situations. It was also found that the domains are associated with the ways children interact socially. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Domains; Social interactions; Actual social events

Children’s moral judgments have been frequently studied by presenting them with hypothetical situations depicting social conflicts, acts of transgression, and positive actions (Damon, 1977; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 1932). One reason for the use of hypothetical situations is the assumption that how people reason and reflect upon social situations is important in the realm of morality. The present study is based on a line of research that also has heavily, but not exclusively, relied on responses to hypothetical situations. That research has demonstrated that starting at a relatively young age children distinguish among the moral, social-conventional, and personal domains (Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983, 1998, 2002). Concerns have been raised about the applicability of responses based on hypothetical situations to judgments about real life experiences. For instance, Flavell (1970) noted that there was distrust

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of the findings by Piaget and others on children’s early causal thinking because they are based on verbal interviews. With regard to morality, some have claimed that real life events, which can involve self-interest, social influences, and unique emotions, are likely to elicit different judgments from hypothetical situations (Aronfreed, 1976; Gewirtz & Pal´aez-Nogueras, 1991; Hoffman, 1970, 1991; Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991; Rest, 1983). Distinctions have also been drawn between reasoning in the abstract and “how people go about judging the moral dilemmas they confront in real life” (Bandura, 1991, p. 51). For some researchers, this distinction reflects group differences in that some groups of people are more contextual in their reasoning than other groups. In this regard, it has been proposed that females, whose reasoning tends to be oriented to care, are more contextual in their judgments than males, whose reasoning tends to be oriented to justice and abstractions (Gilligan, 1982). Most of the research comparing judgments about hypothetical situations with judgments about real life events was designed to examine orientations to moralities of care and justice. In these studies, children, adolescents, and adults were asked to generate moral conflicts or dilemmas they had experienced (e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995). In reviews of the literature, Walker (1991, 2006) showed that the differences between hypothetical and real life situations in types of reasoning are minimal. Walker also pointed out that the method of using recollections of participants’ own experiences results in variability in the situations discussed. In addition, the method fails to examine how people make judgments about events they are experiencing or have very recently experienced. Research on the moral and conventional domains has not included many studies of judgments about actual events—especially beyond the preschool years. Therefore, possible correspondences and discrepancies in reasoning about hypothetical and actual events still need to be addressed with methods other than self reports. The general purposes of the present study were to examine among children and young adolescents judgments about experienced events and to compare such judgments with judgments about hypothetical situations. An additional aim of the research was to examine how social interactions in experienced events may differ in accord with the domain of events. Mainly using hypothetical situations, a large number of studies in several cultures indicate that children, adolescents, and adults make judgments in the moral domain that are distinct from their judgments in the domain of social convention (for reviews see Smetana, 1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983, 1998). Two dimensions of thinking relevant to the present study have been examined: the criteria individuals use for the domains (criterion judgments) and ways of reasoning about courses of action (justifications). Starting at an early age moral prescriptions are judged as not contingent on rules or authority and as applicable regardless of commonly accepted practices. Justifications about moral issues are based on avoiding harm, promoting people’s welfare, ensuring fairness, and protecting rights. In contrast with moral issues, social conventions are judged to be contingent on rules and authority, and as particular to institutions or group practices. Justifications about conventional issues are based on understandings of social organization, including the role of rules, authority, and the coordination of social interactions. Although there are many situations that are specific to one or the other domain, situations can also include an intersection of moral and conventional features. In such situations, individuals are able to separate the different domain components and coordinate them in coming to conclusions about how people should act (Killen, 1991; Turiel, 1989, 1998). Only a few studies (two with preschoolers and one with older children) examined domain distinctions in judgments about actual events (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci, Turiel, & Encarcion-Gawrych, 1983). In these studies, however, no direct comparisons were drawn

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between judgments about actual events and hypothetical situations, and they involved minimal assessments of judgments about the actual events. In one study comparing actual events and hypothetical situations in the moral domain it was found that preschoolers largely judged hypothetical situations in similar ways as they judged comparable actual events (Smetana et al., 1999). The present study was designed to augment previous research by including a relatively wide range of ages beyond the preschool years, by providing a fuller picture of criterion judgments and justifications about moral and conventional actual events, and by comparing judgments about actual events and hypothetical situations. This was accomplished through observations of moral, conventional, and mixed (with components from both domains) actual events in classroom and non-classroom settings in elementary and junior high schools, and interviews about those events to assess children’s judgments and justifications. Assessments were also made of children’s judgments and justifications regarding hypothetical situations depicting events comparable to the actual events. It was expected that the children’s criterion judgments and justifications would be generally similar for actual events and hypothetical situations. Whether making judgments in hypothetical contexts or with reference to specific rules or authorities in the school, it was expected that the children would judge conventional but not moral issues to be contingent on rules and authority dictates. However, complete correspondence between judgments about actual events and hypothetical situations was not expected. In presenting hypothetical situations, events can be more precisely specified than when asking individuals about actual events. It was expected that there would be greater variations among individuals in the ways the features of actual events are interpreted (e.g., as to what actually occurred) than in the hypothetical situations—which might result in some differences in evaluations and judgments about actual events and hypothetical situations. As found in numerous previous studies, it was expected that there would be no age differences in the ways the domains are distinguished. This differs from Piaget’s (1932) proposition that judgments about the practice of rules (he studied game rules) would progress ahead of judgments about rules in hypothetical judgments, as well as Damon’s (1977) finding that judgments about distributive justice in hypothetical situations progress ahead of judgments about actual situations. Whereas Piaget and Damon examined judgments classified on levels associated with age, the focus of this study was on domain distinctions that in the research using hypothetical situations are found to be consistent across ages. Similarly, in keeping with previous findings, it was expected that there would be no sex differences for both the hypothetical situations and actual events. As noted, only a few studies have assessed judgments about actual events. More studies, but mainly with preschoolers, have involved observations of social interactions among children and between children and adults in the context of moral and conventional events (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Smetana, 1984, 1989; Tisak, Nucci, Baskind, & Lampkind, 1991). It has been found that social interactions differ by domain in schools, playgrounds and homes. The present study also included observations of social interactions around the different events in order to ascertain if social interactions differ by the domain of the event. If children distinguish domains in their judgments about actual events, it would follow that social interactions around conventional events would be guided more by adults than children and involve concerns with rules, authority, and social order, whereas moral events would include a greater balance of adults and children and involve concerns with harm to persons and the perspectives of others. On the basis of several previous studies with adolescents (see Smetana, 2002 for a review), it was expected that the older children (young adolescents) would be more likely to challenge conventional rules and adult expectations than younger children. Specifically, it was expected that older participants would be more likely

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to engage in transgressions in teacher led classrooms than younger ones and that younger ones would engage in transgressions outside the classroom, where social interactions are removed from adults. 1. Methods 1.1. Overview, settings, and participants The study was conducted in two public elementary schools and one public junior high school in an urban area (grades 1, 3, 5, and 7). Observations were conducted in classrooms, lunch areas, and playgrounds. The observations took into account the activities of children and adults (i.e., teachers, administrators, aides) involved. Four observers who worked independently of each other collected data. Two observers were assigned to each school, with only one observing in a particular grade (e.g., one observer had responsibility for grade 1 and grade 3). Each observer spent about 6–8 h per week at the school. Observations were conducted of events classified as moral, as social-conventional, and as involving a mixture of moral and conventional components. A total of 108 events were recorded: 33 moral, 38 conventional, and 37 mixed. The events were about equally distributed across grades. Although the types of events targeted for observations occurred regularly each day in the three settings, only a sampling of those events were recorded because there was time to interview only a limited number of children involved. Therefore, the number of observed events recorded was based on an estimate of how many participants could be interviewed that day (parental consent for the interviewees also contributed to the choices of events to be recorded). Observers spent nearly two semesters (but not everyday) in the schools because they engaged in several tasks: (1) They obtained a sampling of events in each of the settings; (2) As just noted, the number of events recorded on any given day was limited; and (3) Time was devoted to administering the interviews about hypothetical situations 1 month after the interviews about actual events. The participants were first graders (6 years, 3 months to 7 years, 8 months; M = 7 years), third graders (8 years, 4 months to 9 years, 7 months; M = 8 years, 11 months), fifth graders (10 years, 3 months to 12 years, 7 months; M = 10 years, 7 months), and seventh graders (12 years to 13 years, 11 months; M = 12 years, 10 months). They were of mixed ethnicities (about 15% African-American, 10% Hispanic, and 75% Caucasian) and socio-economic classes (mixtures of working and middle classes). Some of the students who participated in each event were interviewed about the event, and all interviews took place soon after the event occurred (the same day). All those students were interviewed again, approximately 1 month later, about comparable situations stated hypothetically. A total of 312 participants were administered the two interviews, with the following grade and sex distributions: grade 1, 34 males and 39 females; grade 3, 48 males and 33 females; grade 5, 46 males and 33 females; grade 7, 32 males and 47 females. Since it is possible that the interviews about actual events could influence responses to the hypothetical situations, a group of children (16 from each grade) who had not been interviewed about the actual events were interviewed about the hypothetical situations (these participants will be referred to as the comparison group). 1.2. Design and procedures Observations of events and assessments of participants’ judgments were conducted in the schools. The observers were trained graduate student research assistants who had been given

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permission from school authorities to be present in classrooms, playgrounds, and lunch areas. Prior to recording descriptions of the three types of events, observers spent an extensive amount of time in the schools to become a familiar presence to the children and teachers. Observers who made assessments of the three types of events (moral, conventional, and mixed) were instructed on their definitions, which had been used in previous studies (e.g., Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983). The observer’s task was to identify an event that fell into one of the three types, and to record in writing the actions and communications that occurred. Subsequently, the written descriptions of the events were classified into the moral, conventional, and mixed types by trained independent coders. Participants were administered an interview designed to assess evaluations, criterion judgments, and justifications. For each event, from two to four participants (who had been given parental permission) were interviewed. The participants in the events could include transgressors, victims, and observers. Each participant was interviewed only about one actual event. A total of 92 participants were interviewed about the moral events (with 20 or more in each grade). A total of 103 other participants were interviewed about the conventional events (with 24 or more in each grade), and 117 still other participants were interviewed about the mixed events (28 or more in each grade). It should be noted that the number of participants who were transgressors, victims, and observers was not sufficiently large to draw statistical comparisons among them. In order to ascertain how participants made judgments about events comparable with respect to the domain classification to the ones they had experienced, they were all administered an interview about hypothetical situations. Six hypothetical situations were used, two of each type. However, each participant was interviewed about one of each type of situation, randomly assigned. Therefore, each situation was administered to the 156 participants who had been interviewed about actual events, with a total of 312 participants administered interviews about hypothetical situations. Each participant in the comparison group (they had not been interviewed about actual events) was interviewed about one of each type of hypothetical situation. The comparison group included a total of 64 participants who were administered hypothetical situations; one of each of the two types of hypothetical situations was administered to 32 participants (for the total of 64). The purpose of these interviews was to draw comparisons on responses to the hypothetical situations between participants who had been previously interviewed about actual events and those who had not. 1.3. Measures 1.3.1. Observations and coding of events Observers recorded the particular actions involved, dialogue among participants, and the outcomes or resolutions. The 33 events classified as moral were distributed as follows: almost 49% pertained to issues of fairness and rights (e.g., one child taking another’s goods, sharing only with some, revealing a secret about another); 40% involved physical or psychological harm (e.g., hitting another, name-calling); 12% involved actions taken to prevent unfairness. The 38 events classified as conventional were as follows: 53% involved violations of rules governing classroom order and school organization (e.g., coming late to class, failing to line up for activities, leaving classroom without permission) and disobedience of the commands of an authority regarding such rules; 37% involved deviations from established uniformities in classroom procedures (e.g., pertaining to calling out in class, taking unassigned seats); 9% involved actions taken to prevent conventional transgressions. The 37 events classified as mixed entailed actions that corresponded to the ones observed in the moral and conventional events (examples are a team captain excluding

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someone he does not like, a class monitor choosing only those of the same gender for an activity). The moral components involved issues of fairness and rights (50% of the events), physical or psychological harm (22%), and activities taken to prevent unfairness or harm (27%). In turn, the conventional components involved violations of rules or disobedience of authority (51%), deviations from classroom procedures (27%), and actions taken to prevent conventional rule violations (22%). The observed events were coded (by one graduate student researcher) as moral, conventional, and mixed using definitions taken from many previous studies with hypothetical situations and some entailing observations of social interactions (e.g., Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Moral events were defined as entailing issues of welfare, justice, and rights. Conventional events entail uniformities that coordinate interactions in systems of social organization. The mixed events included components of moral and conventional issues. The observers had been instructed on definitions of the domains, which they used in identifying observed events as one of the three types. Given limitations on time and resources and restrictions dictated by the needs of the schools, it was not feasible to have two observers record the same events for purposes of assessing inter-observer reliability. However, there are reasons to have confidence in the reliability of the observations. One is that several observers made similar classifications of the three types of events in the different grades and schools. A second is that a coder who had not acted as an observer classified the transcribed descriptions of the observations of events. There was 91% agreement in classifications of events by observers and coders. An additional index bearing on the observation of events is that in the interviews participants were asked to describe the event. Those descriptions were coded using the same coding system for type of event as used to code the observers’ recording of events. As presented in the Results, the two types of coding were the same in 89% of the cases. Consequently, there is converging evidence indicating that the event observations were reliable. The transcribed descriptions of events also included participants’ social interactions identifying who instigated the event, who acted to terminate the event, and reactions to the instigating events and communications among participants. These social interactions were scored using a coding system that has been reliably used in observational studies (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983). The types of reactions and communications are listed in Table 1 and divided into three groupings: moral (e.g., injury or loss statement, expressions of hurt), conventional (e.g., statements about order, rules), and involving adult authority. There was also an “other” category (such as physical restraint, diverting attention, avoiding the situation). These groupings, too, are based on definitions of the domains. The category “involving adult authority” is set off because children could (and did) seek the intervention of an authority for a moral concern (e.g., asking an authority to stop a fight) or a conventional concern (e.g., asking an authority to enforce a conventional rule). 1.3.2. Assessments and coding of judgments about actual events Participants were first asked if they recalled the event and to describe the event (including who was involved, where it occurred, how it started, and how it was resolved). All participants recalled the events. For the moral and conventional events participants were posed with a set of questions pertaining to evaluations, criterion judgments, and justifications. Since participants were interviewed about specific events that occurred in the school, the criterion judgment questions were about school rules and school authorities (questions about more distant issues like an act’s generalizability to another country or culture were therefore not included). Participants were

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Table 1 Categories of reactions and communications in social interactions Category Moral Injury or loss statement Emotional reaction Act as unfair or hurtful Retaliatory act

Promoting fairness Promoting welfare Social organizational Disorder or deviation statement Rule statement Sanction Command Reminder Involving adult authority

Description Statements indicating pain or injury to self, or personal loss (e.g., property, space) Statement or response (e.g., crying) expressing emotional state or exclamation of affect Indication that the behavior causes injustice or harm to others Act taken by victim, such as hitting, angry use of abusive language, or commission of parallel act (e.g., stealing back) to inflict discomfort on transgressor Intervening to assure a fair outcome (e.g., sharing food). Consolation, alleviating physical injury, aiding with physical or psychological injury Indication that behavior is out of place, odd, or is creating disorder Statements specifying a rule governing the action Imposition of punishment or indication that punishment will follow if behavior is continued. Statement to do or cease from doing act, without statement of a rule Statement which reminds transgressor of rule or correct behavior Request for adult intervention; child describing to adult misbehavior of another

asked: (1) to evaluate the act (do you think it was alright or not alright?) and their reasons for their evaluation (why or why not?); (2) whether there is a rule in the school governing the act and to evaluate the rule (is there a rule in this school about X?; is it a good rule?); (3) whether the act would be alright or not alright if there were no rule in the school or classroom (rule contingency), and why?; and (4) whether the act would be alright or not alright if the teacher said it was acceptable (authority), and why? Participants’ evaluations and judgments about actual moral and conventional events were coded as (1) positive (e.g., act is alright), (2) depends or maybe, and (3) negative (e.g., act is not alright). Explanations for evaluations and judgments were coded using justification categories derived from previous studies (Davidson et al., 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991) and listed in Table 2. Multiple justifications were allowed, but participants rarely used more than two justifications. Justifications were scored in terms of the proportional use of each category. Interviews about mixed events were different for two reasons. One was that time did not permit an extensive interview about each component in the event. In addition, the primary goal regarding the mixed events was to ascertain whether participants recognized the different domain components and if they gave one priority over the other. The questions, therefore, were less specific with regard to criterion judgments than for the single domain events. Participants’ recapitulation of the event provided a basis for assessing whether they perceived the moral and conventional components. Participants were posed questions about each component as they had described it. First, they were asked to evaluate each one, and then asked to judge whether one was more important than the other. A different coding system was developed to code responses to interviews about actual mixed events because the questions posed were less specific with regard to criterion judgments. It was

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Table 2 Justification categories Category

Description

Welfare Justice/rights

Reference to harmful consequences to others Reference to maintaining a balance of rights between persons Appeal to customs or authority expectations, commands, or existence of rules Appeal to the need for social organization, shared expectations, and order Individual preferences and prerogatives as legitimate reasons for action References to negative reactions of others, including social condemnation and explicit punishment References to acts benefiting academic interests and goals

Tradition/authority Social organization Personal concerns Punishment Academic

necessary to use a global coding system with the following features. First, the responses were coded as to whether or not the event was recognized as entailing both moral and conventional components. Then the evaluations for each component, insofar as used, were coded as positive, negative, or depends/maybe. Justifications for the evaluations were coded as moral, conventional, or other. The relative importance given to each component was also coded. 1.3.3. Assessments and coding of judgments about hypothetical situations In all, participants were presented with six hypothetical situations depicting events occurring in school settings, with each participant interviewed about one of each of the three types: two situations were classified as moral (a child pushes another she did not like to the ground; a child takes food from another), two as conventional (a child goes against the expectation that students are to line up and wait for the teacher to lead them into the classroom; a child eats lunch at a table different from the assigned one in order to talk to a friend), and two of the mixed kind (a team captain excludes one child from playing in a kickball game (on the grounds that the child is not a good player) but allows another to play and the excluded child’s feelings are hurt; a teacher allows one child, but not another, to sit in a place in the classroom different from the assigned seat). In these mixed events the conventional component evaluated was not a transgression. Rather, the children were asked to evaluate the conventional authority of the team captain and teacher. After ascertaining that the participant understood the story, he or she was presented with all but one of the questions that were posed for the actual events; they were not asked if there is a rule governing the act (which pertains to what exists in the school). Evaluations, judgments, and justifications for moral, conventional, and mixed hypothetical situations were coded with the same systems as for the actual events. 1.4. Reliability An independent judge also coded 10% of the protocols for the actual events and hypothetical situations. Their interjudge agreements based on Cohen’s kappa were as follows: in the coding of evaluations and judgments of actual events, .89 for the moral and conventional, and .78 for the mixed events; .71 for the coding of justifications for the actual moral, conventional, mixed events; in the coding of the hypothetical situations, .91 for evaluations/judgments and .76 for justifications.

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2. Results The main hypotheses in this study pertained to judgments and justifications about actual events and their correspondence with hypothetical situations. Results bearing on these hypotheses are presented first. These include findings on participants’ perceptions of events, evaluations and judgments about the actual events, evaluations and judgments about the hypothetical situations, and comparisons between the two. The findings are based on the recorded observations, in accord with the design of the research, of events fitting the definitions of moral, conventional, and mixed. Results bearing on hypotheses regarding domains of actual events and their correspondence to social interactions are then presented. 2.1. Perceptions, evaluations and judgments 2.1.1. Perceptions of actual events The study was premised on the proposition that for the most part children would perceive the events in terms of the domains. However, it was also expected that children’s interpretations of what actually occurred might sometimes differ from that of the observers. To ascertain if this was the case, the descriptions of events given by participants were coded using the same coding system for type (moral, conventional, mixed) used to code the observers’ recording of events. Overall, the two types of coding were the same in 89% of the cases. Of the observed events coded as moral, the participants’ descriptions (a total of 91) were also coded as moral in 86% of the cases, 9% of the descriptions were coded as mixed and 4% were uncodeable. An examination of the participants’ descriptions of the moral events showed that some of them gave interpretations of what actually occurred that differed from both the observer’s interpretations and other participants. As considered further in Section 3, these differences in interpretations bear on the findings on evaluations and judgments about the actual moral events. Of the events coded as conventional, the participants’ descriptions were also coded as conventional in 88% of the cases (a total of 100 interviewee descriptions); 2% were coded as moral and 10% as mixed. Finally, of the events coded as mixed, 95% of the participants’ descriptions (a total of 113) were also coded as mixed; 2% were coded as moral, 2% as conventional, and 2% were uncodeable. 2.1.2. Evaluations and judgments of actual events It was expected that moral and conventional transgressions might both be evaluated negatively, but that criterion judgments would be different for the two—with moral transgressions judged as non-contingent on rules and authority and conventional transgressions judged as contingent on rules and authority. Table 3 presents participants’ mean evaluations, existence of rules, and criterion judgments for the actual moral and conventional events. A MANOVA by domain (2), age (4) and sex (2) was conducted on the mean evaluations and each of the criterion judgments (given the large number of analyses, only effects with p < .001 are reported). The MANOVA yielded a significant effect only for domain, F(5, 109) = 8.77, p < .001, η2 = .29. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that the two criterion judgments showed differences between moral and conventional events in the expected directions (see Table 3). More participants judged that moral transgressions (65%) than conventional transgressions (28%) would be wrong in the absence of rules, F(1, 113) = 25.88, p < .001, η2 = .19. Similarly, more judged that moral transgressions (70%) than conventional transgressions (22%) would be wrong if acceptable to the teacher F(1, 113) = 34.81, p < .001, η2 = .24.

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Table 3 Mean evaluations, rules, and criterion judgments for actual moral and conventional events (N = 312) Judgment

Event type

Evaluation of act Existence of rule Evaluation of rule Evaluation of act in absence of rule Evaluation of act when acceptable to teacher

Moral

Conventional

2.57 (.75) 1.36 (.78) 1.12 (.36) 2.53 (.71) 2.52 (.79)

2.33 (.85) 1.11 (.47) 1.38 (.73) 1.68 (.88) 1.61 (.83)

Note. Means range from 1 (positive) to 3 (negative). Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

As indicated in Section 1, assessments of judgments for the actual mixed events were limited. It was ascertained whether participants recognized the two components, and if so, how they evaluated each one and judged their relative importance. It was found that the majority of participants at each age (ranging from 66 to 74%, with no significant age differences) recognized the two components: 63% gave greater importance to the moral component, 22% greater importance to the conventional component, and 16% gave them equal importance. As indicated by a 2(domain) × 4(age) × 2(sex) ANOVA, more participants negatively evaluated the moral component (86%) than the conventional component (52%), F(1, 90) = 39.00, p < .001, η2 = .30. Since justifications for the actual mixed events were also coded globally as to whether they were in the Moral or Conventional categories, those results are noted here (rather than in Section 2.2). It was found that the Moral category was used more often for the moral component (78%) than for the conventional component (15%), whereas the Conventional category was used more often for the conventional component (64%) than for the moral component (10%), F(1, 97) = 49.39, p < .001. 2.1.3. Evaluations and judgments of hypothetical situations Table 4 presents evaluations and criterion judgments for the hypothetical moral and conventional transgressions (presented only for those participants who had also been interviewed about actual events). A MANOVA by domain (2), age (4) and sex (2), with domain as a repeated measure, on the mean evaluations and criterion judgments yielded significant effects for domain, F(4, 225) = 275.20, p < .001, η2 = .83, and age, F(12, 595) = 4.09, p < .001, η2 = .06. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that participants made more negative evaluations of moral than conventional Table 4 Mean evaluations, rules, and criterion judgments for hypothetical moral, conventional, and mixed events (N = 312) Judgment

Event type Moral

Evaluation of act Evaluation of rule Evaluation of act in absence of rule Evaluation of act when acceptable to teacher

3.00 (.06) 1.09 (.37) 2.86 (.48) 2.81 (.55)

Conventional

2.79 (.55) 1.31 (.67) 1.54 (.79) 1.27 (.61)

Mixed Moral component

Conventional component

2.85 (.49) 1.21 (.56) 2.61 (.74) 2.67 (.66)

1.26 (.62) 1.36 (.71) 1.51 (.76) 1.29 (.62)

Note. These results are for participants who had been administered the interview about actual events. Means range from 1 (positive) to 3 (negative). Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

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transgressions (99 versus 86%), F(1, 228) = 30.61, p < .001, η2 = .12. In addition, more participants made positive judgments of moral than conventional rules (94 versus 81%), F(1, 228) = 25.19, p < .001, η2 = .10, and more made negative judgments of moral than conventional transgressions in the absence of rules (91 versus 19%), F(1, 228) = 584.50, p < .001, η2 = .72, or authority (88 versus 9%), F(1, 228) = 930.63, p < .001, η2 = .80. Follow-up analyses for age indicated only that first graders were more likely to positively evaluate rules than seventh graders, F(3, 228) = 6.47, p < .001, η2 = .08. Table 4 also presents the evaluations and criterion judgments of the moral and conventional components of the hypothetical mixed situations. A global coding (the coding system used for the mixed actual events) of responses to the hypothetical mixed situations showed that, like the actual mixed events, the majority of participants (87%) recognized the two components. In addition, most (88%) gave greater importance to the moral components than to the conventional components. A MANOVA by domain (2), age (4), and sex (2), with domain as a repeated measure, was conducted on the mean evaluations and judgments based on the detailed coding. The MANOVA yielded only a significant effect for domain, F(4, 120) = 284.99, p < .001, η2 = .91. For the most part, judgments made about each component paralleled those made about the moral and conventional transgressions. As with the moral and conventional transgressions, follow-up analyses indicated that participants made more negative evaluations of the moral than of the conventional component (90 versus 10%), F(1, 123) = 1001.83, p < .001, η2 = .89. It should be noted, however, that whereas most participants had negatively evaluated actual conventional transgressions, the majority made positive evaluations of the conventional component of mixed situations. To interpret this finding it is necessary to keep in mind that in the mixed events the children evaluated a conventional regulation (not a transgression) that was in conflict with a moral consideration. The follow-up analyses also indicated that participants made more negative evaluations of the moral than the conventional component in the absence of rules (76 versus 16%), F(1, 123) = 173.47, p < .001, η2 = .59, and authority (78 versus 9%), (1, 123) = 270.91, p < .001, η2 = .69. The comparison group, made up of participants who had not been interviewed about actual events but administered the hypothetical situations, was included in the study to ascertain if having been interviewed about the actual events would influence responses to the hypothetical situations. The findings indicate that this was not the case. Evaluations, judgments, and justifications for the comparison group yielded the same findings as obtained with the main group. (The analyses are not presented here, but the complete set of results can be obtained from the author). 2.1.4. Comparisons between actual events and hypothetical situations The next set of analyses entailed comparisons between evaluations or judgments about the actual events (Table 3) and the hypothetical situations (Table 4). A perusal of Tables 3 and 4 shows that the direction of responses is the same for the two types of events. The majority of participants negatively evaluated moral and conventional transgressions, and positively evaluated rules governing both types of acts. For both the actual events and hypothetical situations, the majority judged moral acts as wrong even if no rules existed or if the teacher stated the acts were acceptable and judged the conventional acts acceptable if no rule existed or if acceptable to the teacher. MANOVAs comparing evaluations and criterion judgments about actual moral events and hypothetical moral situations showed a significant effect for type of event (actual events vs. hypothetical situations), F(4, 47) = 8.75, p < .001, η2 = .43. The follow-up analyses showed that participants made more negative judgments of hypothetical than of actual events, F(1, 50) = 16.49, p < .001, η2 = .25, and made more negative judgments about the hypothetical events in the absence

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Table 5 Act evaluation justifications for actual moral and conventional events and for hypothetical moral, conventional, and mixed situations (in percentages) (N = 312) Justifications

Welfare Justice/rights Tradition/authority Social organization Personal concerns Punishment Academic

Actual events

Hypothetical situations

Hypothetical mixed situations

Moral

Conventional

Moral

Conventional

Moral component

Conventional component

53 33 7 6 5 10 4

21 6 28 17 18 4 7

83 12 7 1 3 11 0

11 4 51 5 15 22 1

27 59 7 2 3 3 3

4 16 41 16 2 1 14

of rules, F(1, 50) = 14.35, p < .001, η2 = .22. The MANOVA conducted on the conventional evaluations and judgments also showed a significant effect for type of event, F(4, 46) = 12.13, p < .001, η2 = .51. The ANOVAs indicated that participants made more negative evaluations of the hypothetical than the actual events, F(1, 49) = 12.17, p < .001, η2 = .20, and more judged the acts as alright if acceptable to the teacher in hypothetical than actual events, F(1, 49) = 30.61, p < .001, η2 = .38. No significant effects or interactions involving age or sex were found. 2.2. Justifications Participants’ justifications for their evaluations and criterion judgments were obtained with regard to the actual events and hypothetical situations. The body of data on justifications is large and need not be presented here in its entirety. Only the results for justifications of the evaluations of acts are presented since act evaluations were elicited first and since the findings for justifications on criterion judgments did not differ from justifications on act evaluations. (The complete set of results on justifications can be obtained from the author.) Table 5 includes the proportional use of justification categories for actual moral and conventional events, and for hypothetical moral, conventional, and mixed situations (for the group also interviewed about actual events). MANOVAs, and subsequent ANOVAs, were conducted on the proportional use of justification categories. (ANOVA-based procedures were adopted because they have been shown to be more appropriate for analyzing this type of data than are loglinear-based procedures, as the latter run into a distinct estimation problem; see Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001.) For the actual events and hypothetical situations, comparisons were made between justifications for moral and conventional events. For hypothetical situations, comparisons were also made between justifications for the moral and conventional components of the mixed situations. Comparisons were also made between justifications given for the actual and hypothetical situations. For the actual events, the MANOVA yielded a significant effect for domain, F(8, 166) = 10.49, p < .001, η2 = .34. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that participants referred to Welfare, F(1, 181) = 22.58, p < .001, η2 = .11, and Justice, F(1, 179) = 24.40, p < .001, η2 = .12, more often in the moral than in the conventional events, and to Tradition, F(1, 180) = 13.49, p < .001, η2 = .07, more often in the conventional than the moral events. For the hypothetical situations, too, the MANOVA yielded a significant effect for domain, F(8, 267) = 113.61, p < .001, η2 = .77. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that participants referred to Welfare, F(1, 580) = 611.75, p < .001, η2 = .51, more often

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in the moral than in the conventional situations, and to Tradition, F(1, 580) = 177.27, p < .001, η2 = .23, Punishment, F(1, 579) = 13.94, p < .001, η2 = .02, Personal Concerns, F(1, 579) = 24.99, p < .001, η2 = .04, and Social organization, F(1, 580) = 42.73, p < .001, η2 = .07, more often in the conventional than in the moral situations. The MANOVA also yielded a significant age × domain interaction, F(24, 275) = 2.61, p < .001, η2 = .07. Follow-up analyses indicated that more seventh graders than first or third graders used Personal Concerns in justifying their evaluations of hypothetical situations in the conventional domain, F(3, 284) = 8.17, p < .001, η2 = .11, but no age differences were obtained for the moral domain. The MANOVA comparing the justifications used for the moral and conventional components of the hypothetical mixed situations also yielded a significant effect for domain (p < .001). Followup ANOVAS indicated that participants referred to Welfare, F(1, 582) = 66.20, p < .001, η2 = .10, and Justice, F(1, 582) = 142.83, p < .001, η2 = .20, more often in the moral than in the conventional component, and referred more often to Tradition, F(1, 582) = 107.64, p < .001, η2 = .16, Social Organization, F(1, 582) = 33.91, p < .001, η2 = .06, and Academic Concerns, F(1, 582) = 22.65, p < .001, η2 = .04, in the conventional than the moral components. The comparisons of justifications for the moral actual events and moral hypothetical situations yielded no significant differences. The MANOVA for the comparisons of justifications for conventional actual events and conventional hypothetical situations yielded a significant effect for domain (p < .001). Followup ANOVAs indicated that participants referred to Punishment more often in the hypothetical situations than in the actual events, F(1, 192) = 17.80, p < .001, η2 = .09. 2.3. Social interactions and events The observed events fitting the definitions of moral, conventional, and mixed included social interactions among the children and between the children and adults in the school settings. Analyses were conducted on three aspects of the social interactions: the settings of the events within the school, the persons who stopped to the event, and the type of reactions to the different domains of events. It was found that each type of event was observed in classroom and non-classroom settings in each grade (moral: 39% in classrooms, 61% in non-classrooms; conventional: 55% in classrooms, 44% in non-classrooms; mixed: 54% in classrooms, 46% in non-classrooms). There were significant grade differences in types of events observed in these settings. In accord with the expectation that the younger children’s transgressions would more likely occur in settings outside the classroom since they would not openly challenge adults, it was found that each type of event was more likely to be observed on the playground (while at play) for the younger children (grades 1 and 3). In line with the expectation that the older children (especially those entering adolescence) would be more likely to challenge adult expectations, it was found that in grades 5 and 7 more of the events were observed in classrooms, χ2 (12, N = 108) = 28.96, p < .01. It was also expected that conventional events would be guided by persons in authority more than moral events, and that children would take greater initiative in dealing with moral than conventional transgressions. Analyses of persons who acted to terminate events showed that persons in positions of authority (peers or adults) were more likely to stop all types of events than non-authorities, but a smaller percentage of moral than other events were stopped by an authority: moral, 65%; conventional, 94%; mixed, 84%, F(2, 79) = 3.70, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .28. As revealed by post-hoc Scheff´e tests, children who were not in positions of authority stopped moral events (35%) more frequently than they stopped (7%) conventional events (p < .05). It was also found that the gender composition of transgressors varied across the three types of events. Boys (73%)

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Table 6 Reactions to each event type (in percentages) Category

Event type Moral

Moral Social organizational Authority Other

Conventional

Mixed Moral component

Conventional component

63 18 22 25

22 67 10 20

73 34 24 39

44 69 22 18

N = 104

N = 49

N = 67

N = 45

Note. Since participants gave multiple responses, totals add to more than 100%.

were more likely than girls to be the sole transgressors in the moral events, whereas there were no significant differences for the conventional (42% boys and 34% girls) events. The sex difference between moral and conventional events was significant, χ2 (1, N = 59) = 4.16, p < .05. The primary analyses of domains and social interactions were based on a coding of reactions of participants and communications among them, as measured by the categories presented in Table 1 (see Section 1), and which correspond with moral features, social organizational features, and involving authority (and “other”). As expected, the moral events and moral components of the mixed events were associated with a set of reactions and communications (e.g., focus on matters like the pain and harm inflicted or unfairness) differing from those associated with conventional events and conventional components of the mixed events (focus on aspects of social order). Table 6 shows the percentages of participants giving a type of reaction or communication to each type of event. ANOVAs comparing use of each response category across the three types of events yielded significant domain differences for moral, F(2, 262) = 14.23, p < .001, η2 = .10, and social organizational, F(2, 262) = 22.53, p < .001, η2 = .15, responses. Post-hoc Scheff´e tests revealed that responses with moral features were more likely to be made to moral and mixed events than to conventional events (p < .05), and that responses with social organizational features were more likely to be made to conventional and mixed events than to moral events (p < .05). Similar findings were obtained in analyses of responses to the moral and conventional components of the mixed events. No significant age differences in responses to the events were found. 3. Discussion For children, functioning in the context of on-going events involving interactions with other children and adults in a place like a school no doubt is different from functioning in the context of a more or less formal interview with an adult who poses questions about situations couched in hypothetical terms. Nevertheless, it may well be that children are attuned to the domain of an event in on-going interactions and that they apply similar judgments to actual events and corresponding hypothetical situations. If children form stable ways of thinking involving domain distinctions, it follows that they would apply those ways of thinking in the two types of contexts. The present study provides evidence for this proposition. The study shows that children’s distinctions between morality and social convention apply to the context of an interview about hypothetical situations and the contexts of social interactions in school settings. The findings, therefore, indicate that certain types of moral and social judgments are stable across these two types of contexts and not

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altered by differences between them in matters like social influences and affective reactions. The findings of this study also point to the ecological validity of reasoning about the domains found in many studies. Using naturally occurring events in elementary and junior high schools corresponding to the domain classifications, it was found that the children from 6 to 12 years of age described the events in ways consistent with those classifications. In the large majority of cases, the children’s descriptions of the moral, conventional, and mixed events were coded in the same categories as were the researchers’ observations of those events. At all ages, the majority of children negatively evaluated the moral and conventional transgressions that had occurred, perceived that rules governed both types of acts, and positively evaluated each type of rule. The findings showed that children view morality as prescriptive and as not contingent on existing rules or the expectations of those in positions of authority. The actual moral transgressions were judged to be wrong even if no rule existed or if they were acceptable to the teacher (the criterion judgments of rule contingency and authority contingency). By contrast, it was judged that the conventional acts would not be wrong if no rule existed or if acceptable to the teacher. Discriminations were also evident in the ways children approached events that included mixtures of moral and conventional components. Although it was not feasible to do as fine-grained analyses of judgments about the mixed events, it was ascertained that children viewed the components as distinct, generally gave greater importance to the moral components, and provided different justifications in their evaluations of each component. These findings on mixed events show that children are able to recognize moral and conventional aspects in complex situations involving multiple components. The judgments children made about the actual events generally corresponded with their judgments about the hypothetical situations (in both the main group and the comparison group). Within that context, however, there were differences. More of the children negatively evaluated hypothetical situations and more judged that the hypothetical moral acts were not contingent on rules or authority dictates than the actual moral acts. One difference between the two is that children were presented with only two of each type of hypothetical situation, while there were several events within each type of actual events. Moreover, in constructing hypothetical situations the particulars of events could be specified more precisely than for actual events. It is, therefore, more likely that there would be variations in interpretations of what occurred in the actual events. Indeed, this was the case in some of the moral events, resulting in some participants giving either positive evaluations or a combination of positive and negative (mixed) evaluations. Two kinds of differences in interpretations of moral events were associated with positive and mixed responses. First, several children thought that an act (e.g., running away in the school yard with another’s jacket) was permissible because it occurred in the context of a game. Those children thought that everyone had agreed to play the game that way, whereas other children thought there was no agreement that the activity was part of the game. Second, there were differences in interpretations of what had actually occurred in a few events. For instance, one event was classified as moral because a child was presumably chosen more than once to be a class monitor (a limit of one choice was placed on the activity). Some children maintained that it was only the first time he had been chosen to be class monitor. These examples do not reflect variations in moral evaluations; they reflect differences in interpretations of the actions and intentions of the actors (Turiel et al., 1991; Wainryb, 1991). The majority of moral events, in which there was uniformity in interpretations, were evaluated negatively and the same criterion judgments were made as for the hypothetical situations. In a few instances, some of the children gave mixed evaluations; viewing acts as partially legitimate because they involved retaliation for acts of provocation.

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Nevertheless, criterion judgments were more alike with regard to the domain of events than as to whether the events were actual or hypothetical. This is to say that criterion judgments about actual moral events more closely corresponded to criterion judgments about hypothetical moral situations than to actual conventional events or hypothetical conventional situations. Additionally, the justifications for evaluations and criterion judgments corresponded to the domain of events and not to whether the events were actual or hypothetical. For the most part the findings in this study were similar across ages. Previous research by Piaget (1932) indicated that children’s judgments about game rules in the context of practice are developmentally advanced over their judgments as expressed in interview situations. Damon (1977) found the opposite age pattern with regard to judgments about distributive justice. No such age differences were found in this study. These findings provide further confirmation that the domain distinctions are made at a relatively early age and maintained at later ages. Even though age-related changes were not obtained, the body of research to which this study contributes has important implications for our understandings of development. This is because it is essential to identify those realms that involve age-related changes and those that do not. Some explanations of moral development have been based on the idea that it involves a process of differentiating morality from convention (Kohlberg, 1963, 1971; Piaget, 1932). As discussed elsewhere (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1983, 1998, 2006), such differentiation models fail to accurately portray continuities and changes in development. Through their social interactions young children form judgments about morality that are different from their judgments about convention; it is within each domain that there are age-related changes (see Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1983 for details). The present study further confirms that at ages 6 and beyond the domain distinctions are not age-related. This is not to say that social contexts do not make a difference in moral evaluations and decisions. Research into concepts of rights, for example, has shown that children evaluate rights in the abstract differently from situations in which rights are in conflict with other moral or social considerations (Helwig, 1995, 1997; Helwig & Turiel, 2002). However, the difference between abstract concepts of rights and the application of rights in particular situations is not captured by a distinction between hypothetical situations and actual events. In interviews about hypothetical situations children uphold rights when they are not placed in conflict with other social considerations (abstract) and sometimes subordinate rights when contextualized in conflicts with other considerations. Insofar as “abstract” concepts are defined as their application in interviews about hypothetical situations (Bandura, 1991), the present study did not show that they differ from their application to actual events. The assessments of social interactions and particular contexts within schools revealed some age differences, as well as commonalities across ages. Among the older children (especially seventh graders) a large number of transgressions were observed in classrooms, suggesting that young adolescents do assert their independence in the confines of the classroom. These findings also demonstrate the importance of accounting for behaviors in different contexts. If the observations had been limited to classrooms, it might have appeared that young children do not engage in many moral or conventional transgressions. By observing in several settings, it was documented that children at all ages do engage in interactions that involve moral and conventional events, as well as events with both components. However, a greater number of moral events were observed in non-classroom than in classroom settings, whereas more conventional events were observed in classrooms than in other settings. There was also some suggestion that in the actual events more of the older children made the domain-consistent responses than younger ones. It may be that older children made the domain distinction more consistently than younger children or that there was more inconsistency in younger children’s interpretations of what actually occurred in the events.

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Few sex differences were found in this study. The most notable is that boys were observed to engage in a greater number of moral transgressions than girls. This is in line with findings of a greater amount of physical aggression among boys, although it has been shown that girls engage in a fair amount of what is referred to as relational aggression (Coie & Dodge, 1998). In the present study, there were no differences in the extent to which boys and girls engaged in conventional transgressions or in their judgments about events in both domains. Overall, the results of this study provide support for two propositions. One is that children’s judgments about moral and social events are applied in on-going real-life contexts and with regard to hypothetical situations. Children’s judgments, which have been uncovered in many studies conducted outside of the context of actual events and documented in this study (i.e., through the assessments of hypothetical situations), are closely involved in the ways they approach and judge events they experience. The second proposition is that judgments about social interactions are interconnected in the context of various aspects of events (i.e., the nature of the act, reactions of participants, and communications among participants). Social interactions around moral events differed from those around conventional events, with systematic variations in types of communications. The focus of communications around moral events is not the rules invoked or needs for social order. Rather, there is a focus on the effects of actions on persons (welfare, fairness). Communications about conventional acts do bear on rules and social order. Although this study did not directly address the question of relations between judgments and the actions people undertake, its findings can productively be used as a basis for future investigations of the issue. Most of the research to date has examined whether moral judgments are associated with actions presumed to follow from such judgments. Many studies involve assessments of correlations, usually comparing a general measure of moral judgment development (e.g., the stages formulated by Kohlberg) or general evaluations of an issue (e.g., helping others is good, dishonesty is wrong) with specific behaviors (e.g., helping, sharing, cheating) in efforts to assess levels of consistency. The present study showed that children’s judgments are multifaceted in behavioral contexts. This suggests that in order to examine relations between judgments and actions it is necessary to consider how people interpret social situations, the different domains of judgment involved, and how domains are applied and coordinated in behavioral contexts. This study’s methods and findings provide a basis for further research on relations of judgments and actions that would systematically compare how children in the different roles of transgressor, victim, and observer interpret situations and coordinate different domains. Acknowledgments Thanks are due to a number of people who, in one way or another, contributed to the presentation of this research: Sara Brose, Batya Friedman, Charles Helwig, Carolyn Hildebrandt, Marta Laupa, Peter Kahn, Adam Kay, Melanie Killen, Terry Madden, Ellen Middaugh, Kristin Neff, and Cecilia Wainryb. References Aronfreed, J. (1976). Moral development from the standpoint of a general psychological theory. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues (pp. 54–69). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development: Theory (pp. 45–103). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Coie, J. D., & Dodge, K. A. (1998). Aggression and anti-social behavior. In W. Damon & N. Eisenberg (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology, Social, emotional, and personality development (5th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 779–862). New York: Wiley.

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