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New, current and displaced entity reference
Lingua 55 (1981) 41 52 North-Holland Publishing Company
NEW, CURRENT
41
AND DISPLACED
ENTITY REFERENCE
Received April 198 I In an attempt to discover the conditions under which one realisation form rather than another is regularly used in the expression of non-new reference, an investigation of some spoken discourse with a limited discourse domain was undertaken. Appealing to a set of notional categories in a structural description and a distinction between current and displaced non-new reference, the investigation yields some insights into the circumstances in which particular realisation forms are used. It also provides a basis for discussing the successful interpretation of non-new reference in discourse.
1. Introduction
There is a well-established distinction between the expression of ‘new’ and ‘given’ information in spoken discourse. The ‘given’ element is generally described as having a more attenuated realisation, both phonologically and lexically, than the ‘new’ (cf. Halliday 1967; Chafe 1976; Yule 1980). That is, a ‘new’ entity, first mentioned in a discourse in the form - a red horizontal he of about two inches - which is phonologically prominent (raised pitch or extended pitch movement or. increased amplitude), will be referred to subsequently in the discourse via expressions such as rile red line, the line or it, which have little pitch movement or low pitch or reduced amplitude. Although there is clearly a choice of realisation forms, including zerorealisation, for the expression of reference to entities already mentioned in the discourse, no attempt has been made to discover whether there are conditions under which one form rather than another is used. In an investigation of the use of such forms by speakers restricted to a limited domain of discourse, it was found that speakers did show a preference for 0024-3841/S 1/OOOO-0000/$02.50
@I 1981 North-Holland
particul& forms under particular conditions. It is with the characterisation of such conditions that the present paper is concerned.’ One of the basic problems in investigating the formal realisations of ‘given’ and ‘new’ information derives from the fact that these terms are intended to describe the function of parts of the speaker’s utterance. When both Halliday (1967) and Chafe (1976) consider a linguistic expression in terms of its being ‘new’ information, they base their considerations on the general principles that ‘new’ means ‘treated by the speaker as new to the hearer’ and ‘given’ means ‘assumed by the speaker to be known to the hearer’. The analysis of these categories, then, is essentially an analysis of what speakers are using linguistic expressions for. The difficulty of providing any rigorous definition of ‘given’ and ‘new’ is then quite apparent. What is sought is essentially a means of defmIng the knowledge plus the intentions or purposes or even beliefs of speakers. How, then, does the analyst, in order to discover the formal linguistic realisation of ‘given’, set about deciding that a speaker can assume a particular referent, for example, is known to his hearer? One way in which th, analyst rR.&t be justified in deciding what a speaker’s intentions are at any point would be as a result of his actually providing the speaker with limited intentions. ‘[he speaker could also be provided with a limited amount of pertinent knowledge and a means of ascertaining his hearer’s relevant knowledge too. In short, the analyst can limit the domain within which the speaker produces his discourse. In this way, the analyst has some justification for his identification of ‘given’ and ‘new’ elements at any point in the discourse. Since the aim of the investigation is to discover how speakers refer to the ‘given’ element, the above constraints regarding the discourse domain must nevertheless leave the speaker free to produce his own spoken discourse. In an attempt to meet the requirements outlined above, the elicitation of spoken discourse in a controlled situation with a limited domain was undertaken.
’ The work reported in this paper was undertaken as part of SSRC Project HR6519 under the direction of Dr. Gillian Brown who made many helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2. Data A group of undergraduates,’
’ pairs, were asked to take part in a simple m lines, triangles,
of
paper, a black pen and a red pen. Participant A was required to tell B what was in the drawing in such a way that B could reproduce the drawing as accurately as possible. B was allowed to ask questions. The participants knew they were being recorded. The type of spoken discourse elicited is illustrated in extract (1). (1)
A:
Halfway down the page draw a red horizontal line of about two inches, On the right hand side, just above the ine, in black, write ON. B: ON? _A: Above the line. Draw a black triangle, a right-angle triangle, star ing to the left of the red line, about half a centimeter above it.
With this type of controlled data, the analyst can be reasonably confident that he has access to the same relevant ‘knowledge’ as the discourse speakers. One of the major problems in the analysis of spoken discourse is that every piece of discourse is, in some sense, a fragment. This is particularly true of free conversational discourse where thl: relationship of the speakers, their previous conversations, and their mutual knowledge, inter alia, are rarely available to the analyst in any detailed way. Thus, while the transcribed text of a discourse may represent a (limited) record of what was actually said, it can be a poor indication of what was communicated. The discourse record, taking a specific case, may provide no basis on which to decide whether a particular referent is ‘given’ or ‘new at any point. If, however, the discourse domain is established within narrow limits, then the analyst can, in foIlowing the record of the discourse, identify those points at which a particular speaker has a reasonable warrant for assuming that the identity of a referent is part of the participants’ mutual knowledge or not. Also, what the speaker can treat as ‘new’ or ‘given’ information at any point in the discourse is relatively constrained. ’ . At present the data-base consists of 37 such discourses and the figures presented in table I are based on an analysis of this corpus.
When speaker A, in extract (1) mentions n veci horizontal line for the first time in the discourse record, he is giving B some information which, at that point, is ‘new’. In the record of this type of spoken discourse, ‘new’ and ‘given’ elements can be identified principally because the discourse has a fixed point of departure. The analyst, quite simply, knows where the discourse begins and knows what overt referents exist for both speaker and hearer. The analyst also knows that he is dealing with primarily transactional discourse in which the speaker is principally engaged in transferring propositional information to his hearer. The speaker is less likely to be, as in conversational speech of a primarily interactional type, transferring information about his attitudes, social status, health and a plethora of other aspects, both intended and unintended, of what can be described loosely as ‘information’. Thus, there is some confidence in the analysis that it is the communication of propositional information, intentionally conveyed, that is available for investigation.
3. Basic elements In the discourse under investigation, the type of information and the nature of the task predispose the speaker to include in his utterances a set of basic elements which enable the hearer to derive the information required for the drawing to be completed. (i) The speaker has to give the hearer some instruction regarding the activity involved. The forms used in extract (I) are tlru~ and write. Such an element can simply be called an I~s~rrtc~ion (I). (ii) The speaker has to indicate what it is the hearer should draw or write. In extract (I), these are entities such as a black tricrnglr or a redhorizontal fine. Such an element in the speaker’s utterances can be treated as an Entity-r&wing e.upres.siun (E). (iii) The speaker is also required to indicate the location of an entity, normally in relation to another entity. Expressions conveying this relationship are, for example, above or hnJ#ir~n~~lou?nin extract (1). Such an element in the speaker’s utterances can be termed a Relator (R). Thus, in an initial analysis of part of extract (I), the following identification of basic elements can be made. (la) halfway down
the page
draw i
R
E
I
a red horizontal inches E
line of about two
(iv) In referring to an entity, speakers also mention certain properties which specify some relevant characteristics of the entity involved. Such properties are, for example, red, lzorimztai and qf’ abotrt wo in&es in extract (la). Any such element can be treated as a Proper!y-expression (p). It must be considered part of the entity-referring expression along with the defining element of an entity’-referring expression, typically a nominal such as line in (la), which can be treated as an E~ztit~++~ring base (e). Returning to the previous example, one of the E-elements can be analysed further, as follows.
(1b) halfway down R a red P
the page draw E 1 horizontal line of about two inches P
e
P
E
4. Esxpressions As already stated, it is possible in the type of discourse being studied to identify the ‘new’ entities as they are introduced into the discourse. For ease of reference and to formalize the distinction ‘new’ versus ‘non-new’ in the analysis, a simple numerical notation can be attached to E-elements as they are introduced into the discourse. For those E-expressions which are used to refer to entities existing in the dolrain of discourse by virtue of their physical presence (e.g. page), the notation E” can. be used. The zero notation is intended to capture the fact that such entities need not be introduced as ‘new’ entities, As each ‘new’ entity is introduced in sequence, it is given a numerical superscript in the afialysis, as in extract (2). (2) in the middle of the page draw a line and above it write ON E’ E2 E’ E0 It should then be clear that, at any point in the discourse, the ‘new’ Eexpressicln is that with the highest n, and any ‘non-new’ E-expression is either n--l or n-B 1 (i.e. n-3 1). This characterisation can be checked in
extracts (3~(8). (3) at the end of the line draw a square E4 E2
(4) in the middle (_._ ) draw a black trim& E’ E0 (5) underneath the red he write IN E’ E4 (6) draw a diametrr across it E’ E’ (7) draw a lhe in the middle of the page E’ E0 (8) draw a stwight lirw across th ciede E’ E” In these extracts, the ‘new’ E-expression (En) consists of a nominal without an article or with the indefinite article and optional property expressions. The ‘non-new’ E-expression (En _ I) takes the form of a nominal plus definite article with optional property expressions, or the proform it, or has zero realisdtion.
5. Basic structures Using extracts (3)-(8) as examples of the types of structures to be found in this type of discourse, two basic structural formulae can be identified. In (3)-(5). the structure, using the basic elements introduced esrlier, can be represented as follows: R
En -*I
In (6)(8), I
E”
I
En
it is: R
En ,’
In both these structures, there are two E-expressions, one used to refer to a new entity and one for a non-new. I would like to use these two formulae as the stable structural environments in which ‘non-new’ Eexpressions occur (cf. table I) and attempt to capture the motivation for the different realisation forms used to refer to ‘non-new‘ entities in the discourse.
47
6. Current and displaced
In the type of discourse being investigated, I would like to suggest, there is not only a distinction to be noted between ‘new’ and ‘non-new’ entity reference, but a further distinction between c~r’t~~rt non-new and cii.@~~d non-new entity reference .3 The current non-new entity is the most recent ‘new’ entity to have been established in the discourse and, in this analysis, must have the notation E ” 1. Displaced non-new entities are, at any point, those which have been established previously in the discourse and so have the notation E” > I. There is, then, a process in this discourse whereby an entity is introduced as ‘new’ (E”). is consequently referred to as the ‘current non-new’ (En I) when the next ‘new’ entity is introduced, and becomes the ‘displaced non-new’ entity (En > I) when a further ‘new’ entity is introduced. This process may be made clearer in the analysis (9a) of extract (9). in the middle of the page draw a hfmk trim&~ underneath thr triargle draw a t-cd iitw ahnt two inchrs and at the right hand side of this liur write ON h Mu-k
(9)
(94
‘new’ R R R
E” E’ E’
I
I I
(n) E’ E” E3
E’ E’ E3
‘current’ (n-l) E0 El E’
‘displaced‘ (n-> 1) E0 El/E0
With a formal distinction established between the two types of ‘non-new’ E-expressions and also the environments in which they occl.n- explicitly delimited, it is possible to check through the data for the realisation forms used in each case. The results of this survey are set out in table I, in which the frequency of occurrence of different forms used to refer to current and displaced entities is presented as a percentage of all forms used to refer to current and displaced entities respectively. ’
The
terms ‘current’
and ‘displaced’ were suggested by &riven
concept of “foregrounded”. 1972: SO). What Scrivcn, transitory
of Chafe’s
status in spoken discourse of clemcnts Chafe described as “f’oregroundcd”.
The
should he distinguished
from
‘current’ referent. “assumed to be in the hearer’s consciousness”, ‘displaced’ or previous referents referential
in a discussion
defined as “asswmcd to he in the hcarcr’s consciousness” (Chalk as I understand his brief remarks, wished to point out was the
boundaries. Striven’s
in the discourse.
Displacement,
in this view. takes place at
remarks can he found at the end of Chafe (1972: 6X).
Table
1.
Types of ‘non-new’
.Displaced
Current R
Environments
En-
1
-
1
En
R E” >’ I E”
1 En R En-’
I E” R En ”
‘the e’
20”,,
20”,,
‘this e’
Y,,
0”
‘that e’
6”,,
3”::
7”,,
69”,,
Realisations
‘the
p e’
92”,,
36” ,,
(Total : Lexicalisdtions) ‘0’
28”,,
V’,,
‘it’
30”
Q’,,
‘that’ (Total : Non-lexicalisations)
6”::
O”,, 64”,,
8”,,
Based on the figures in table 1, the most neutral form of non-new entity reference apparently involves a repetition of the e-element (i.e. the nominal) with the definite article, in expressions such as the line or the square. These expressions are used equally for both current and displaced entity reference. I think such a finding is generally in line with Chafe’s proposal (1976: 39) that ‘definiteness’ is an aspect of language use essentially independent of the relationship ‘new-non-new’ which exists in discourse. A singular definite noun phrase is consistently used for any referent which is considered by the speaker to be identifiable by the hearer. Such identifiability need not, of course, arise from mention in the immediately preceding discourse. Limited domains of discourse do, however, provide one situation in which entities become, albeit transiently, uniquely identifiable. In the discourse under investigation, once an entity has been fully specified, it is treated as identifiable and can be referred to as the e, whether recently specified (current) or less recently so (displaced). Although deictics are more often used for current entity reference, and the examples found tend to support the proposal by Linde (1979) that the use of a deictic is determined by the speaker’s ‘focus of attention’, it is difficult to discuss their significance on the basis of such a small sample. By far the most common means of displaced entity reference, as shown in table 1, involves the use of expressions containing a p-element, such as the black square or the diagonur line. The number of current entity referring expressions containing a p-element is very small by comparison. This
49
distinction is part of it more general difference between ‘current’ and ‘displaced’ which is indicated by the greater use of repeated lexical items in the ‘displaced’ type. Clearly, the use of more attenuated forms (e.g. it, 8) is much more frequent for current entities. I think such a finding demonstrates the looseness of some discussions of ‘given’ information which normally cover all instances of what are described here as non-new E-expressions. Chafe’s claim (1976: 31) that ‘given’ items will be generally attenuated is, then, slightly misleading. In the sense that expressions used to refer to ‘non-new’ (or ‘given’) entities in the discourse never contain crll the previously expressed properties of those entities, then certainly non-new E-expressions are, to that extent, attenuated. What table 1 shows, I trust, is that there are degrees of attenuation which is attributable, in part, to the distinction I have proposed between current and displaced non-new entities in a discourse. Taking into account the interaction between both ‘degrees of attenuation’ and ‘position in discourse sequence’, it is possible to represent the relationship between the three categories, ‘new’, ‘current’ and ‘displaced’ in the form of a graph, as in fig. 1. Notice that the effect of displacement in the discourse
a red horizontal line of about:tsvoinches
positiOn in discourSc sequence-~ Fig.I.
produces forms which tend towards the full expressions associated with the introduction of ‘new’ entities. This may be because the greater the displacement, the greater the need there is for the entity to be Ye-introduced in a non-attenuated form. A distinction between the reference of ‘new’ and ‘displaced’ full forms would still be marked, of course, by the use of different articles.
7. An interpretive strategy Based on the frequency with which non-realised and ‘it’-realised Eexpressions are used for the current entity (and the corresponding infrequency of their use for displaced entities), a proposal can be made that a simple interpretive strategy seems to be available to hearers in this type of discourse.
Such a strategy accounts for the ease with which successful reference is achieved in many situations in the discourse where potential ambiguity lurks, as, for example, in extract (10). (IO) about the middle of the page you’ve got a black square about two inches and in the bottom right hand corner [of ?) you’ve got a red five Using the ‘0 = current entity’ strategy, the hearer understands that it is in the corner of the square (El) and not of the page (EO) that he is required to put a red five (E2). It is worth noting that, if such an interpretive strategy provides a reasonable account of the facts in this case, then it has to be considered a feature of the pragmatics of discourse .structure, and not of the more widely discussed pragmatics of ‘knowledge of the world’. For, ‘knowledge of the world’ provides for “corners”’ in both pages and squares and could not, by itself, lead to successful reference in this case. I have attempted to present an argument against one kind of pragmatic explanation for successful reference here in order to raise a small point in connection with a frequent assumption made in discussions of natural language pragmatics. For Wilson (1975) and Gazdar (19791), among many
others, the pragmatic interpretation of sentences (or what Gazdar oddly calls “possible utterances”, 1979: 4) takes place in situations of altar/ ambiguity. Sentences have to be ambiguous in order for a pragmatic interpretation to be activated. In the pragmatics of natural language discourse, I wish to claim, no such ambiguity need exist. Pragmatic rules of interpretation, such as the one presented above, predispose the hearer to successfully identify the referent intended, and /lot C’WW to corkirr or/w! rtifi,rmts, whether they are potentially correct referents or not. In simple terms, very little actual ambiguity is encountered by hearers of utterances despite the massive potential for ambiguity which such utterances, considered as system sentences and cited without contexts, do appear to have in many formal accounts of natural language. Thus, insteadofattempting to describe thevariousalternative interpretations available for an utterance, a more pertinent undertaking within pragmatic investigation would be to account for a hearer’s choice of a single correct interpretation and his disregard for any other possible interpretations. One minor outcome of such an undertaking is the interpretive rule based on current-entity-reference presented earlier.
8.
Conclusion
The observations made in this brief paper are based on evidence from a limited type of spoken discourse, elicited in a tightly controlled situation. Analysing the realisation of ‘non-new,’ reference in uncontrolled conversational discourse is, of course, a more difficult undertaking. Two important points, however, do emerge from the approach taken in this investigation. First, by defining the domain of discourse objectively, the analyst is justified in his assignment of the labels ‘new’ and ‘non-new’ to entities within that domain at any point. He can’then investigate the types of linguistic forms used to refer to such entities, He has, in short, formalized the categories in his analysis in such a way that his claims can be tested. Thus, some of the vagueness surrounding a concept such as ‘givenness’ in discourse analysis can be removed. A decision regarding what is ‘given’ (or, more technically, ‘non-new’) at any point in a discourse follows automatically from a search of the existing domain. A second point to be emphasized is that ‘givenness’ appears to be capable of further refinement and should not be considered a primitive analytic category. I hope I have shown that, within the set of formal
realisations of ‘given’ or ‘non-new’ reference, the use of one form rather than another reflects a distinction speakers make when referring to ‘current’ or ‘displaced’ entities at a particular point in the discourse. Whether this distinction is also capable of greater refinement is a matter for further research. References Chafe. W.L.. teds.),
1972. Discourse structure and human knowledge.
Language
comprehension
and
the acquisition
In: J.B. Carroll,
of knowledge.
41-69.
R.O.
Freedle
Washington:
Winston. Chafe. W. L., 1976. Givenness. contrastiveness. definiteness, subjects. topics and point of view. 17-55. New York/London: Li (cd.). Subject and topic, b
In: C.N. Gazdar.
G., 1’)79. Pragmatics.
Halliday.
‘M.A. K..
Linguistxs
New YorkiLondon:
1967. Notes
on transitivity
G..
271-286.
Press.
Part
2. Journal
of
in discourse.
vol. IS. 337-354.
In: T. Givon
New
York/London:
New
York,‘London:
Press.
Wilson, D., 1975. Presuppositions Academic
theme in English,
and the choice of pronouns
Discourse and syntax. Syntax and Semantics.
Academic
Yule.
and
Academic
Press.
3. 199-244.
Linde, C., 1979. Focus of attention ted.).
Academic
and non-truth-conditional
semantics.
Press. 1980. Intonation
and givcnncss in spoken discourse. Studies in Language
4 (7).
NEW, CURRENT
41
AND DISPLACED
ENTITY REFERENCE
Received April 198 I In an attempt to discover the conditions under which one realisation form rather than another is regularly used in the expression of non-new reference, an investigation of some spoken discourse with a limited discourse domain was undertaken. Appealing to a set of notional categories in a structural description and a distinction between current and displaced non-new reference, the investigation yields some insights into the circumstances in which particular realisation forms are used. It also provides a basis for discussing the successful interpretation of non-new reference in discourse.
1. Introduction
There is a well-established distinction between the expression of ‘new’ and ‘given’ information in spoken discourse. The ‘given’ element is generally described as having a more attenuated realisation, both phonologically and lexically, than the ‘new’ (cf. Halliday 1967; Chafe 1976; Yule 1980). That is, a ‘new’ entity, first mentioned in a discourse in the form - a red horizontal he of about two inches - which is phonologically prominent (raised pitch or extended pitch movement or. increased amplitude), will be referred to subsequently in the discourse via expressions such as rile red line, the line or it, which have little pitch movement or low pitch or reduced amplitude. Although there is clearly a choice of realisation forms, including zerorealisation, for the expression of reference to entities already mentioned in the discourse, no attempt has been made to discover whether there are conditions under which one form rather than another is used. In an investigation of the use of such forms by speakers restricted to a limited domain of discourse, it was found that speakers did show a preference for 0024-3841/S 1/OOOO-0000/$02.50
@I 1981 North-Holland
particul& forms under particular conditions. It is with the characterisation of such conditions that the present paper is concerned.’ One of the basic problems in investigating the formal realisations of ‘given’ and ‘new’ information derives from the fact that these terms are intended to describe the function of parts of the speaker’s utterance. When both Halliday (1967) and Chafe (1976) consider a linguistic expression in terms of its being ‘new’ information, they base their considerations on the general principles that ‘new’ means ‘treated by the speaker as new to the hearer’ and ‘given’ means ‘assumed by the speaker to be known to the hearer’. The analysis of these categories, then, is essentially an analysis of what speakers are using linguistic expressions for. The difficulty of providing any rigorous definition of ‘given’ and ‘new’ is then quite apparent. What is sought is essentially a means of defmIng the knowledge plus the intentions or purposes or even beliefs of speakers. How, then, does the analyst, in order to discover the formal linguistic realisation of ‘given’, set about deciding that a speaker can assume a particular referent, for example, is known to his hearer? One way in which th, analyst rR.&t be justified in deciding what a speaker’s intentions are at any point would be as a result of his actually providing the speaker with limited intentions. ‘[he speaker could also be provided with a limited amount of pertinent knowledge and a means of ascertaining his hearer’s relevant knowledge too. In short, the analyst can limit the domain within which the speaker produces his discourse. In this way, the analyst has some justification for his identification of ‘given’ and ‘new’ elements at any point in the discourse. Since the aim of the investigation is to discover how speakers refer to the ‘given’ element, the above constraints regarding the discourse domain must nevertheless leave the speaker free to produce his own spoken discourse. In an attempt to meet the requirements outlined above, the elicitation of spoken discourse in a controlled situation with a limited domain was undertaken.
’ The work reported in this paper was undertaken as part of SSRC Project HR6519 under the direction of Dr. Gillian Brown who made many helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2. Data A group of undergraduates,’
’ pairs, were asked to take part in a simple m lines, triangles,
of
paper, a black pen and a red pen. Participant A was required to tell B what was in the drawing in such a way that B could reproduce the drawing as accurately as possible. B was allowed to ask questions. The participants knew they were being recorded. The type of spoken discourse elicited is illustrated in extract (1). (1)
A:
Halfway down the page draw a red horizontal line of about two inches, On the right hand side, just above the ine, in black, write ON. B: ON? _A: Above the line. Draw a black triangle, a right-angle triangle, star ing to the left of the red line, about half a centimeter above it.
With this type of controlled data, the analyst can be reasonably confident that he has access to the same relevant ‘knowledge’ as the discourse speakers. One of the major problems in the analysis of spoken discourse is that every piece of discourse is, in some sense, a fragment. This is particularly true of free conversational discourse where thl: relationship of the speakers, their previous conversations, and their mutual knowledge, inter alia, are rarely available to the analyst in any detailed way. Thus, while the transcribed text of a discourse may represent a (limited) record of what was actually said, it can be a poor indication of what was communicated. The discourse record, taking a specific case, may provide no basis on which to decide whether a particular referent is ‘given’ or ‘new at any point. If, however, the discourse domain is established within narrow limits, then the analyst can, in foIlowing the record of the discourse, identify those points at which a particular speaker has a reasonable warrant for assuming that the identity of a referent is part of the participants’ mutual knowledge or not. Also, what the speaker can treat as ‘new’ or ‘given’ information at any point in the discourse is relatively constrained. ’ . At present the data-base consists of 37 such discourses and the figures presented in table I are based on an analysis of this corpus.
When speaker A, in extract (1) mentions n veci horizontal line for the first time in the discourse record, he is giving B some information which, at that point, is ‘new’. In the record of this type of spoken discourse, ‘new’ and ‘given’ elements can be identified principally because the discourse has a fixed point of departure. The analyst, quite simply, knows where the discourse begins and knows what overt referents exist for both speaker and hearer. The analyst also knows that he is dealing with primarily transactional discourse in which the speaker is principally engaged in transferring propositional information to his hearer. The speaker is less likely to be, as in conversational speech of a primarily interactional type, transferring information about his attitudes, social status, health and a plethora of other aspects, both intended and unintended, of what can be described loosely as ‘information’. Thus, there is some confidence in the analysis that it is the communication of propositional information, intentionally conveyed, that is available for investigation.
3. Basic elements In the discourse under investigation, the type of information and the nature of the task predispose the speaker to include in his utterances a set of basic elements which enable the hearer to derive the information required for the drawing to be completed. (i) The speaker has to give the hearer some instruction regarding the activity involved. The forms used in extract (I) are tlru~ and write. Such an element can simply be called an I~s~rrtc~ion (I). (ii) The speaker has to indicate what it is the hearer should draw or write. In extract (I), these are entities such as a black tricrnglr or a redhorizontal fine. Such an element in the speaker’s utterances can be treated as an Entity-r&wing e.upres.siun (E). (iii) The speaker is also required to indicate the location of an entity, normally in relation to another entity. Expressions conveying this relationship are, for example, above or hnJ#ir~n~~lou?nin extract (1). Such an element in the speaker’s utterances can be termed a Relator (R). Thus, in an initial analysis of part of extract (I), the following identification of basic elements can be made. (la) halfway down
the page
draw i
R
E
I
a red horizontal inches E
line of about two
(iv) In referring to an entity, speakers also mention certain properties which specify some relevant characteristics of the entity involved. Such properties are, for example, red, lzorimztai and qf’ abotrt wo in&es in extract (la). Any such element can be treated as a Proper!y-expression (p). It must be considered part of the entity-referring expression along with the defining element of an entity’-referring expression, typically a nominal such as line in (la), which can be treated as an E~ztit~++~ring base (e). Returning to the previous example, one of the E-elements can be analysed further, as follows.
(1b) halfway down R a red P
the page draw E 1 horizontal line of about two inches P
e
P
E
4. Esxpressions As already stated, it is possible in the type of discourse being studied to identify the ‘new’ entities as they are introduced into the discourse. For ease of reference and to formalize the distinction ‘new’ versus ‘non-new’ in the analysis, a simple numerical notation can be attached to E-elements as they are introduced into the discourse. For those E-expressions which are used to refer to entities existing in the dolrain of discourse by virtue of their physical presence (e.g. page), the notation E” can. be used. The zero notation is intended to capture the fact that such entities need not be introduced as ‘new’ entities, As each ‘new’ entity is introduced in sequence, it is given a numerical superscript in the afialysis, as in extract (2). (2) in the middle of the page draw a line and above it write ON E’ E2 E’ E0 It should then be clear that, at any point in the discourse, the ‘new’ Eexpressicln is that with the highest n, and any ‘non-new’ E-expression is either n--l or n-B 1 (i.e. n-3 1). This characterisation can be checked in
extracts (3~(8). (3) at the end of the line draw a square E4 E2
(4) in the middle (_._ ) draw a black trim& E’ E0 (5) underneath the red he write IN E’ E4 (6) draw a diametrr across it E’ E’ (7) draw a lhe in the middle of the page E’ E0 (8) draw a stwight lirw across th ciede E’ E” In these extracts, the ‘new’ E-expression (En) consists of a nominal without an article or with the indefinite article and optional property expressions. The ‘non-new’ E-expression (En _ I) takes the form of a nominal plus definite article with optional property expressions, or the proform it, or has zero realisdtion.
5. Basic structures Using extracts (3)-(8) as examples of the types of structures to be found in this type of discourse, two basic structural formulae can be identified. In (3)-(5). the structure, using the basic elements introduced esrlier, can be represented as follows: R
En -*I
In (6)(8), I
E”
I
En
it is: R
En ,’
In both these structures, there are two E-expressions, one used to refer to a new entity and one for a non-new. I would like to use these two formulae as the stable structural environments in which ‘non-new’ Eexpressions occur (cf. table I) and attempt to capture the motivation for the different realisation forms used to refer to ‘non-new‘ entities in the discourse.
47
6. Current and displaced
In the type of discourse being investigated, I would like to suggest, there is not only a distinction to be noted between ‘new’ and ‘non-new’ entity reference, but a further distinction between c~r’t~~rt non-new and cii.@~~d non-new entity reference .3 The current non-new entity is the most recent ‘new’ entity to have been established in the discourse and, in this analysis, must have the notation E ” 1. Displaced non-new entities are, at any point, those which have been established previously in the discourse and so have the notation E” > I. There is, then, a process in this discourse whereby an entity is introduced as ‘new’ (E”). is consequently referred to as the ‘current non-new’ (En I) when the next ‘new’ entity is introduced, and becomes the ‘displaced non-new’ entity (En > I) when a further ‘new’ entity is introduced. This process may be made clearer in the analysis (9a) of extract (9). in the middle of the page draw a hfmk trim&~ underneath thr triargle draw a t-cd iitw ahnt two inchrs and at the right hand side of this liur write ON h Mu-k
(9)
(94
‘new’ R R R
E” E’ E’
I
I I
(n) E’ E” E3
E’ E’ E3
‘current’ (n-l) E0 El E’
‘displaced‘ (n-> 1) E0 El/E0
With a formal distinction established between the two types of ‘non-new’ E-expressions and also the environments in which they occl.n- explicitly delimited, it is possible to check through the data for the realisation forms used in each case. The results of this survey are set out in table I, in which the frequency of occurrence of different forms used to refer to current and displaced entities is presented as a percentage of all forms used to refer to current and displaced entities respectively. ’
The
terms ‘current’
and ‘displaced’ were suggested by &riven
concept of “foregrounded”. 1972: SO). What Scrivcn, transitory
of Chafe’s
status in spoken discourse of clemcnts Chafe described as “f’oregroundcd”.
The
should he distinguished
from
‘current’ referent. “assumed to be in the hearer’s consciousness”, ‘displaced’ or previous referents referential
in a discussion
defined as “asswmcd to he in the hcarcr’s consciousness” (Chalk as I understand his brief remarks, wished to point out was the
boundaries. Striven’s
in the discourse.
Displacement,
in this view. takes place at
remarks can he found at the end of Chafe (1972: 6X).
Table
1.
Types of ‘non-new’
.Displaced
Current R
Environments
En-
1
-
1
En
R E” >’ I E”
1 En R En-’
I E” R En ”
‘the e’
20”,,
20”,,
‘this e’
Y,,
0”
‘that e’
6”,,
3”::
7”,,
69”,,
Realisations
‘the
p e’
92”,,
36” ,,
(Total : Lexicalisdtions) ‘0’
28”,,
V’,,
‘it’
30”
Q’,,
‘that’ (Total : Non-lexicalisations)
6”::
O”,, 64”,,
8”,,
Based on the figures in table 1, the most neutral form of non-new entity reference apparently involves a repetition of the e-element (i.e. the nominal) with the definite article, in expressions such as the line or the square. These expressions are used equally for both current and displaced entity reference. I think such a finding is generally in line with Chafe’s proposal (1976: 39) that ‘definiteness’ is an aspect of language use essentially independent of the relationship ‘new-non-new’ which exists in discourse. A singular definite noun phrase is consistently used for any referent which is considered by the speaker to be identifiable by the hearer. Such identifiability need not, of course, arise from mention in the immediately preceding discourse. Limited domains of discourse do, however, provide one situation in which entities become, albeit transiently, uniquely identifiable. In the discourse under investigation, once an entity has been fully specified, it is treated as identifiable and can be referred to as the e, whether recently specified (current) or less recently so (displaced). Although deictics are more often used for current entity reference, and the examples found tend to support the proposal by Linde (1979) that the use of a deictic is determined by the speaker’s ‘focus of attention’, it is difficult to discuss their significance on the basis of such a small sample. By far the most common means of displaced entity reference, as shown in table 1, involves the use of expressions containing a p-element, such as the black square or the diagonur line. The number of current entity referring expressions containing a p-element is very small by comparison. This
49
distinction is part of it more general difference between ‘current’ and ‘displaced’ which is indicated by the greater use of repeated lexical items in the ‘displaced’ type. Clearly, the use of more attenuated forms (e.g. it, 8) is much more frequent for current entities. I think such a finding demonstrates the looseness of some discussions of ‘given’ information which normally cover all instances of what are described here as non-new E-expressions. Chafe’s claim (1976: 31) that ‘given’ items will be generally attenuated is, then, slightly misleading. In the sense that expressions used to refer to ‘non-new’ (or ‘given’) entities in the discourse never contain crll the previously expressed properties of those entities, then certainly non-new E-expressions are, to that extent, attenuated. What table 1 shows, I trust, is that there are degrees of attenuation which is attributable, in part, to the distinction I have proposed between current and displaced non-new entities in a discourse. Taking into account the interaction between both ‘degrees of attenuation’ and ‘position in discourse sequence’, it is possible to represent the relationship between the three categories, ‘new’, ‘current’ and ‘displaced’ in the form of a graph, as in fig. 1. Notice that the effect of displacement in the discourse
a red horizontal line of about:tsvoinches
positiOn in discourSc sequence-~ Fig.I.
produces forms which tend towards the full expressions associated with the introduction of ‘new’ entities. This may be because the greater the displacement, the greater the need there is for the entity to be Ye-introduced in a non-attenuated form. A distinction between the reference of ‘new’ and ‘displaced’ full forms would still be marked, of course, by the use of different articles.
7. An interpretive strategy Based on the frequency with which non-realised and ‘it’-realised Eexpressions are used for the current entity (and the corresponding infrequency of their use for displaced entities), a proposal can be made that a simple interpretive strategy seems to be available to hearers in this type of discourse.
Such a strategy accounts for the ease with which successful reference is achieved in many situations in the discourse where potential ambiguity lurks, as, for example, in extract (10). (IO) about the middle of the page you’ve got a black square about two inches and in the bottom right hand corner [of ?) you’ve got a red five Using the ‘0 = current entity’ strategy, the hearer understands that it is in the corner of the square (El) and not of the page (EO) that he is required to put a red five (E2). It is worth noting that, if such an interpretive strategy provides a reasonable account of the facts in this case, then it has to be considered a feature of the pragmatics of discourse .structure, and not of the more widely discussed pragmatics of ‘knowledge of the world’. For, ‘knowledge of the world’ provides for “corners”’ in both pages and squares and could not, by itself, lead to successful reference in this case. I have attempted to present an argument against one kind of pragmatic explanation for successful reference here in order to raise a small point in connection with a frequent assumption made in discussions of natural language pragmatics. For Wilson (1975) and Gazdar (19791), among many
others, the pragmatic interpretation of sentences (or what Gazdar oddly calls “possible utterances”, 1979: 4) takes place in situations of altar/ ambiguity. Sentences have to be ambiguous in order for a pragmatic interpretation to be activated. In the pragmatics of natural language discourse, I wish to claim, no such ambiguity need exist. Pragmatic rules of interpretation, such as the one presented above, predispose the hearer to successfully identify the referent intended, and /lot C’WW to corkirr or/w! rtifi,rmts, whether they are potentially correct referents or not. In simple terms, very little actual ambiguity is encountered by hearers of utterances despite the massive potential for ambiguity which such utterances, considered as system sentences and cited without contexts, do appear to have in many formal accounts of natural language. Thus, insteadofattempting to describe thevariousalternative interpretations available for an utterance, a more pertinent undertaking within pragmatic investigation would be to account for a hearer’s choice of a single correct interpretation and his disregard for any other possible interpretations. One minor outcome of such an undertaking is the interpretive rule based on current-entity-reference presented earlier.
8.
Conclusion
The observations made in this brief paper are based on evidence from a limited type of spoken discourse, elicited in a tightly controlled situation. Analysing the realisation of ‘non-new,’ reference in uncontrolled conversational discourse is, of course, a more difficult undertaking. Two important points, however, do emerge from the approach taken in this investigation. First, by defining the domain of discourse objectively, the analyst is justified in his assignment of the labels ‘new’ and ‘non-new’ to entities within that domain at any point. He can’then investigate the types of linguistic forms used to refer to such entities, He has, in short, formalized the categories in his analysis in such a way that his claims can be tested. Thus, some of the vagueness surrounding a concept such as ‘givenness’ in discourse analysis can be removed. A decision regarding what is ‘given’ (or, more technically, ‘non-new’) at any point in a discourse follows automatically from a search of the existing domain. A second point to be emphasized is that ‘givenness’ appears to be capable of further refinement and should not be considered a primitive analytic category. I hope I have shown that, within the set of formal
realisations of ‘given’ or ‘non-new’ reference, the use of one form rather than another reflects a distinction speakers make when referring to ‘current’ or ‘displaced’ entities at a particular point in the discourse. Whether this distinction is also capable of greater refinement is a matter for further research. References Chafe. W.L.. teds.),
1972. Discourse structure and human knowledge.
Language
comprehension
and
the acquisition
In: J.B. Carroll,
of knowledge.
41-69.
R.O.
Freedle
Washington:
Winston. Chafe. W. L., 1976. Givenness. contrastiveness. definiteness, subjects. topics and point of view. 17-55. New York/London: Li (cd.). Subject and topic, b
In: C.N. Gazdar.
G., 1’)79. Pragmatics.
Halliday.
‘M.A. K..
Linguistxs
New YorkiLondon:
1967. Notes
on transitivity
G..
271-286.
Press.
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2. Journal
of
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In: T. Givon
New
York/London:
New
York,‘London:
Press.
Wilson, D., 1975. Presuppositions Academic
theme in English,
and the choice of pronouns
Discourse and syntax. Syntax and Semantics.
Academic
Yule.
and
Academic
Press.
3. 199-244.
Linde, C., 1979. Focus of attention ted.).
Academic
and non-truth-conditional
semantics.
Press. 1980. Intonation
and givcnncss in spoken discourse. Studies in Language
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