New dimensions in world shipbuilding

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47

New Dimensions in World Shipbuilding Neue GrGRenordnungen

im Welt-Schiffbau

Nouvelles dimensions dans le monde des constructions navales

W. R. STANLEY,

Columbia, S.C., and J. M. GOICOECHEA,

Orangeburg, S.C.*

Abstract: New classes of bulk carriers and general cargo vessels are becoming more specialized and larger. The trend towards containerizing cargo has spurred construction of the large cellular containership, the roll-on/roll-off vessel, and the barge carrying ship (LASH). Bulk vessels, especially tankers, have undergone tremendous increases in size until few of the newer ones can pass through the Suez Canal. Crews have not increased primarily because of greater use of shipboard automation devices. Few ports have sufficient water depths to accommodate supertankers, necessitating more off-loading at sea and construction of new deep water terminals. Japanese yards dominate world supership construction, with Scandinavian shipyards most important in Europe. Substantial supership construction is taking place in southern Europe and is an indication of the recent economic growth of Italy, Spain and Yugoslavia. Supership construction in Great Britain has declined relative to Scandinavian and Japanese production and that in the United States ispf little significance

worldwide.

~u~mmenfassung: Massengutfrachter und Frachtschiffe jeglicher Art werden zunehmsnd griiger und speziahsiert. Mit dem Behllterverkehr entwickeite sich der Bau groger Container-Schiffe, von Roli-on/roll-off-Schiffen und von (Binnenschiff-)Tragerschiffen (LASH). Massengutfrachter, vor allem Tanker, sind heute so grog dal3 nur wenige von ihnen den Suez-Kanal passieren konnten. lnfolge von starkeren Einsatzes von Automation an Bord sind die Besatzungen kaum gewachsen. Nur wenige HEfen haben ausreichende Tiefen fur Super-tanker. Folglich ist entweder das L&hen auf See oder der Bau neuer TiefwasserhZfen niitig. Japanische We&en sind fiihrend im Bau von Superschiffen, gefoigt von skandinavischen Werften. Beachtlicher Grog~hif~au befindet sich neuerdings such in Siideuropa und kennzeichnet das jiingste wirtschaftliche Wachstum Itatiens, Spaniens und jugoslawiens. Der GroEschiffbau im Vereinigten Konigreich ist im Vergleich zu dem in Skandinavien und Japan zurtickgegangen. In den USA ist er ohnehin von geringer Bedeutung.

R&sum&: De nouveaux types de navires transportant de gros volumes et les cargos ordinaires deviennent plus specialises et plus grands. La tendance i transporter les chargements dans des conteneurs a stimule la construction du grand navire conteneur cellulaire, du navire dans lequel entrent et sortent les vdhicules, et du navire transporteur de p&niches (LASH). Les navires transportant de gros volumes, et specialement les bateaux-citernes, ont considdrablement augment6 de taille de sorte que peu parmi les nouveaux peuvent passer dans le Canal de Suez. Les equipages n’ont pas augment& principalement i cause de I’utilisation plus grande d’appareils automatiques a bord des bateaux. Peu de ports ont des profondeurs d’eau suffisantes pour recevoir les super-bateaux-citernes, ce qui ndcessite plus de debarquements en mer et la construction de nouveaux bassins en eau profonde. Les chantiers japonais dominent la construction mondiale des super-navires, tandis que les chantiers navals scandinaves sont les plus importants d’Europe. Une construction importante de super-navires est en train de se developper dans le sud de P&rope et represente un indice de la rfcente croissance 6conomique de I’ttalie, de I’Espagne et de la Yougoslavie. La construction de super-navires a diminue en Grande-Bretagne par rapport aux productions scandinave et japonaise, et celle des Etats-Unis est de peu d’importance sur le plan mondial.

Merchant ship design and construction are undergoing a revoiution. Technological progress in these fields since the early 1960s is considered by the chairman of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping to be equal to all gains made in maritime commerce during the previous 200 years. One

*

Dr. William R. STANLEY, Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., USA, and Jose M. GOICOECHEA, Claflin College, Orangeburg, S.C., USA.

striking manifestation of this revolution is ship size, particularly that of the new supertanker classes. Not only has ship size increased but many new ships not in the supertanker class have been tailored to specific tasks - a custom-building comparable to that occurring in the American railroad industry, where shippers no longer have to choose from a few standardized cars, but have available a multitude of special-purpose ones. In addition to the changes in ship size and design there has been a significant change in the ranking of leading shipbuilding countries for certain types of ships. Notable has been the decline of

48

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Great Britain’s

bulk carrier construction

industry

relative

to the upsurge of such shipbuilding in Japan, Germany, Scandinavia and, until recently, southern Europe. It is wellknown that commercial

shipbuifding

in the United States

has fallen on hard times - for instance, where once there were six major shipbuilding companies on the lower Delaware River, only one is still in operation. primary

purpose of the Merchant

1970 was to re-invigorate subsidizing construction

In fact, the

Marine Act of October,

United States shipbuilding of practically

by

all commercial

vessels built in American shipyards. Subsidies available under thisact have been responsible for some increases in shipyard activity; for instance, in late 1972, the United States Marjtime Subsidy Board allowed a 42.97 per cent rate for six tankers, to be constructed in the United States, which would cost nearly $ 59 million each, or slightly more than $25 million each above the cost of construction in a typical Japanese yard. Since ships so constructed must be registered in the United States and carry American crews, the extraordinari~y high wages and fringe benefits of American crews often deter ship owners from availing themselves of these subsidies. This paper deals first with the economic aspects of new types of merchant

of cargo, brought to a high level of efficiency during World War I I, has given way to safer handijng by containers, barge-carrying aboard ship, and the unitized method of handling break-bulk cargoes by loading and discharging with forklifts through the sides of ships. These new methods in turn have required changes to be made in cargo handling equipment, on ship and on shore, such as giant gantry cranes capable of lifting loads of more than 500 tons (Figs. 1, 2). New types of ship have been developed in response to various technical and economic factors, among them being increasingly specialized cargoes, costly intermodai transfer of cargo, and the desire of ship owners to secure backhaul or return trip cargo where formerly such voyages often had to be made in ballast. The increasing popularity of OBO, OS0 (oil-slurry-ore), and oil-ore ships can be attributed to their great versatility in moving bulk commodities. Such ships can be employed in carrying.bulk cargo for which ship tonnage demand is temporarily greatest and hence most lucrative. With OBO type ships, two legs of three-leg voyages often are travelled

with cargo.

and technical

vesseis, and secondly,

in more detail, analyzes the djstribution

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of recent super-

Container Ships Container

ships provide

the ocean leg of land-sea bridges

ship construction by country and port. Deadweight tonnage has been selected as the basis for most construction comparisons, since it represents the maximum weight of cargo, fuel, and internal provisions a ship can carry at salt water, summer load line. The deadweight ton is the long ton of 2,240 pounds or 1.016 metric tons. 75,000 d. w. t.

were not introduced sooner. They have been responsible for several shipping company mergers and for the instaila-

is taken as a realistic minimum weight for categorizing superships, but even this figure fails to represent the size

ports. Use of new large capacity

of some superships currently being built; shipyards which in 1960 looked upon a 60,000 d. w. t. vessel as a supership now reserve this classification for those exceeding 250,000

d. w. t.

General Economic

and Technical

Considerations

When one looks at the advances in shipbuilding and design perfected during the 19605, three main features stand out: (1 f the creation of totatty different types of ship brought about by new uses developed for them; (2) the increasing application of computer technology to propulsion, navigation and cargo handling; and (3) the remarkable upward trend in individual ship tonnage.

continued

The past decade has witnessed the birth or re-emergence of such concepts in sea transport as the lift-on~lift-off (LO-LO) containership, roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) containership, liquified gas carrier (LPG and LNG), lighter aboard ship (LASH), and oil-bulk-ore (OBO) ship. Cargo handling also, which has stimulated and been stimulated by new ship design, has undergone a radical transformation. Palletization

for an increasing variety

of goods and do so with less

breakage and pilferage than are suffered with non-containerized cargo. Container ships have had great impact on world dry cargo shipping and it is surprising that they

tion of costly container

handling

equipment

in many

third generation

cellular

container ships currently under construction should cause concentration of traffic at only a few ports because of the load center concept. By this is meant the bringing together of large numbers of containers at a few major container ports SO that the largest ships can take or discharge a full load and carry it rapidly to a complementing overseas load center port. Such ports are connected by shuttle container

ships and land transport

to other centers which

handle fewer containers. Political considerations, however, may mitigate the economic advantages to be derived from load center ports, for the fact remains that no port wants to lose business to another. Faced with what they thought was an American attempt to capture their trade through the use of container ships, European shipping companies have cooperated in building and operating them; nine ships carrying 1,300 containers each have replaced about eighty conventional cargo liners trading between Great Britain and Australia. One transport analyst has suggested that: 4‘. . . one of the positive side effects of the current overgrowth of container

berths and the comparative

sirn~ijc~t~ of feeder

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49

Photo: Courtesy of Matson Steamship Company Fig. ‘I A modern ~~~~n~~~~~ff celtulnr contalnership entering Hanoi&u Harbor, Fuhy loaded, the 5.5, Howoitbn Enterprise four-foot containers, and as of December, 1970, was the Largestcontainership flying the US. ffag

can carry 1,168 twenty-

Ein modernes LO-LO Containerschiff vor der Einfahrt nach Honululu. Vollbeladen kann die S. 2 Huwoiian tragen, Im Dezember 1970 war sie das gr&%te Containerschiff unter US-Flagge

1168 7mContainer

Enferprise

Navire conteneur celiulalre moderne, charge et drSchargt i I’aidedegrues, entrant ici dans te port d’tionolulu. Avec un plein chargement, fe S. 5. ~~w~jj~n Enterprise peut transporter 1168 tonteneurs de 7 m, et en ddcembre 1970 &ah ie plus grand navire conteneur battant paviihon americain

services, is that it wilt be much easier to divert container ships in Europe if a port is strike bound, and still get the cargo

over the more traditional hoisting of break-buik cargo

delivered... Ports in the 7970s wilf become rapidty capitaiintensive. They will not be able to hold a country to ransom as they have done frequently during the last twenty years. As a. result they will become politically less important. In the next decade ports wilt become once again no more than an important link in the transport chain” (THE ECONOMIST, 1968, p. XLlj.

time-consuming and often costfy interruptions in inter-

Maritime container technoto&

has progressed rapidly

since 1956, when the McLean Trucking Company first shipped sixty’ trailers from New York to Houston on a World War ii tanker. Today, not only is the specialized cellufar ~i~ft-on~lift-0~~ container ship a frequent visitor to most major ports, but the technology the container represents is even more dramatically demonstrated by the roll-on/roll-off and LASH-type vessels. A typical lift-on/ lift-off container ship, although a substantial improvement

aboard

ship with nets and booms, stitl brings with it some

modal cargo transfer. Rapid turn-around time of ships in port is sought, since a ship is paid for goods carried from one port to another, and time spent loading, discharging, and on repairs is unproductive or lost time. The magnitude of lost time can be appreciated when one realizes that a cargo liner averages fifty per cent of its useful life in port. It is generally accepted in shipping circles that lost time in port and crews’ wages are the most costly factors in ship operation, therefore reduction of time in port should reduce operating costs. Excess time in port also is costly for bulk carriers. The managing director of She!1 international Marine noted that tankers in the Shell fleet made about 13,000 port calls in 1968, and had it been possible to reduce the time spent in port by only one hour in every

Photo: Courtesy

of Kockums

Shipyard,

Maim6

Fig. 2 LNG ship for service between Kenai, Alaska, and Japan. Commissioned in October, 1968, the PO/UP A/o_& has a capaciry of 71,000 cubic meters of liquid gas, equivalent to 1.5 thousand million cubic feet of gas. She and a sister ship were built in MalmS, Sweden,

e A modern

*

at a combined

cost of

Ein modernes

LNG-Schifffiir

$ 45 millian;

each has a width of 11 1 feet, and is 800 feet long -

den Einsatz zwischen

Kenai, Alaska, und japan.

the size of a 70,000

Seit Oktober

1968 in Dienst, hat die

van 72 000 m3 Fliissiggas, sic wurde, wie ebenso ein SchwesrerschiK, fiir zusammen 4 45 MS. 33,8 m breit *

Navire LNG 71.000

und 240 m tang, und hat die GrGBe eines 70000 moderne

pour circuler

metres cubes de gaz liquide,

entre Kenai, I’Alaska dgale h 1,s miiliard

MalmG, en Suede, pour la somme totale de 45 millions pitrolier

avant un port en Jourd de 70.000

in MlaimG gebaut.

Poior Aioska

eine Kaparitit

jedes der beiden Schiffe

ist

t Tankers

et le Japan. Mis efl service en octobre de pieds cubiques de gaz. Ce bateau,

de dollars. Chacun mesure

111 pieds

1968,

le Polar

et un deuxieme

Alusko

a une capacite de

semblable,

ont et6 constrwits a

de large et 800 pieds de long - la dimensian

d’un

tonnes

case, the time saved would have been worth approximately S;2.8 miilion (KIRBY, 1969, p. 778).

Roil-On/RolWff

d. w. t. oil tanker

Ships

Refinements in cargo handling and consequent shortened port turn-around time also have been embodied in RORU ships. Truck cabs bring traiiers to dockside on ffatbeds as they do for ~ifr-on/~ift-off container ships. The

important difference, however, is that once uncoupled, trailers are recoupled to smaller and more maneuverable cabs which drive up ramps through the side of the ship and, using interior ramps, teave the trailers in marked parking sDaceson the wide weather deck or an interior heck. &‘this method, the container never has to leave the flat-bed, and the unloading time far the RO-RO is approximately half that of the ~jft-on/ijft-off container ship. Time in port for the RO-RO ship is reduced and shippers

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benefit from fast, convenient service. One of the more successful RO-RO ships is Trans-American Trailer Transport’s Ponce De Leon, which since 1968 has been sailing between New York and San Juan. Designed to carry 260 forty-foot

(12.2 meters) highway trailers, in addition

costs - incentive enough to reduce crew size without adversely affecting ship’s operation. Secondly, computer technology holds great promise for reducing collisions at sea by lessening the chance of human error in emergency situations. Finaity, the very size of gargantuan class vessels requires

to three hundred automobiles, the Ponce De Leon leaves

instrument docking, since no one man on board can observe

New York each Friday evening, arriving in San Juan early

the ship’s position relative to the docking facility. These

on Monday morning, thus permitting shippers to have cargoes in Puerto Rico at the start of the working week.

large vessels, too, require much more time to change course and stop than do smaller ships. For instance, the Universe lrelond (326,000 d.w. t.) has a turning diameter of approximately half a mile (0.8 km.) when fully loaded, and at a speed of fifteen knots requires seventeen minutes

More recently, a sister-ship has begun to provide a complementing service in the other direction. Since the U.S.Puerto Rico route is restricted to American vessels, innovations employed here may have to be revised for the more competitive North Atlantic trade (Figs. 3).

to come to a crash stop with all engines in full reverse. In crowded waters, navigating superships can be a nightmare, especially since speeds of up to five knots are necessary simply to keep control of the vessel. It is probably a matter of only a short time before ships at sea will be

LASH Even more remarkable than the RO-RO ship has been the development of the LASH-type vessel which, unlike the cellular container ship, may help to revive small ports lacking in sophisticated unloading facilities. The unique characteristics of this ship are its 370 d. w. t. capacity barges and its 455-ton shipboard moveable gantry crane which lifts the barges through the stern. Port charges may be minimized by the LASH, which can enter a harbor long enough to unload or load barges in protected waters without tying up at dot kside. The barges in turn do not require expensive gantry cranes for loading or unloading after having been towed to the dock. The full impact of the LASH has yet to be felt. it has come into service at a time of apparent overproduction of cellular container ships and dock facilities to serve them, as demonstrated by the fact that at least one shipbuilding company considered altering surplus but still relatively modern lift-on/lift-off container ships in order to make it possible to employ them economically in the West African trade. It is not unreasonable to anticipate some further obsolescence of certain classes of cellular container ships, once LASH-type

ships, come into widespread use (Fig. 4).

as stringently controlled by automated monitors guiding speed and course as air liners are today. These monitors probably will be situated on shore and at fixed positions on the high seas. By the mid-l 96Os, experimental shipboard automation systems had been installed and adapted to analogue and digital measuring applications. in 1969 the Swedish-built tanker Sea Sovereign, of 210,000 d. w. t., undertook her maiden voyage with a centraf computer designed to coordinate processes such as propulsion, navigation - including automatic course holding - and cargo handling. The j apanese-built tanker Seiko Muru, of 138,370 d. w. t., sailed in 1970 with an experimental computer designed to perform all the tasks carried out on the Sea Sovereign as well as others, such as collision avoidance, computerized medical examinations, and data logging of engine room machinery. Not only should greater use of the shipboard computer revolutionize numbers and qualifying standards of ships’ crews, but the control center of vessels seems destined to move from the bridge to the computer room.

Impact of Automation Although commercial shipowners have been slow in adapting computer technology to their vessels, some revolution-

Age of Superships

ary changes have begun to take place. The impetus for change has three causes. First, new classes of ships are costing more to build and operate; this in turn has led shipowners and marine engineers to reduce labor costs aboard ship by automating some of the manual tasks. This possibility exists, since a large proportion of sea-going personnel are watch standers, many of whose jobs can be

Most visible of all new developments in world shipbuilding

performed electronically. It has been suggested that the overall cost of labor on ships of all classes is somewhere

grasp, and, technically at least, there seems to be no limit to the size large bulk carriers can reach. Such restraints on

between fifty and seventy per cent of total operating

their size as may come about will probably be economic,

is the supership. So large have some vessels become that in shipping circles the biggest bulk carriers have been designated VLCCs (Very Large Commodity Carriers) or mammoth ships, which presumably is to differentiate them from mere 150,000 or so deadweight tonners. The magnitude of new ship size is disrupt for the layman to

Photo: Courtesy af Sun Shipbuilding Company

* A m~ernjst~cally designed RO-RO ship, the Ponce De &eon. tts overhanging weather deck gives it the silhouette of an aircraft carrier. Rectangutar spaces on this deck are for parking traifsrs; the black dots are where the flatbed and trailer are tied down for ocean voyages, The superstructure is tunneled to enable vehicles to drive the length of the ship *

Die Ponce de Leon, ein modernes RD/RO-Schiff. Die groBe DeckfMche verleiht ihr die Silhouette eines FlugzeugtrYgers. Die Rechtecke markieren die ParkstZnde fdr die Satteiiader, die mit ihren Fahrgestelien verankert werden jschwarze Punkte). Die Aufbauten sind untertunnelt, damit die Fahrzeuge iiber die ganze SchiffsMge fahren k6nnen

* Le Ponce De Leon, navire RO-RO aux fignes modernes. Son pont en saiitis lui donne ia sifhouette d’un Porte-avions, Les surfaces rectanguiaires sur ce pont sont pour la stationnement des remorques. Les pontiilb situent l’endroit oti semi-remorques et remorques sont attach&es pour les voyages en mer. La superstructure campone un tunnel pour permettre aux vihicules de con&ire sur la longueur du bateau

political, and environmental in nature, and not technoiogical. Consider the growth of tanker site over the last twenty-five years. The standard tanker of World War II, the T-2, of which several hundred were constructed, was 76,800 d. w.t.; these ships were the workhorses of the world petroleum trade up to the middle 1950s. Since then the size of tankers has increased rapidly - the result of obsolescence of World War Ii vessels as well as the AngloFrench-Egyptian War of 19.56 and the concomitant tempor~ closing of the Suez Canal.

The effect of the closing of the Canal on individual tanker size undoubtedly was significant. In 1956, the maximum draft allowable for a ship to negotiate the Canat was thirtyfive feet (10.7 meters), roughly equivaient r5 a ~jf~~oad~d 38,000 d. w. t. tanker. Temporary closing of the Canal at that time, combined with the obvious potential for future interruption of Suez traffic, removed hitherto critical restrictions to ship size imposed by Canai capacity. Recently, however, a combination of circumstances has led shippers to reconsider this route as a significant

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Fig. 4 l Artist’s rendition of the LASH. The first LASH vesselswere built in Japan

0 LASH-Schiffe wurden zuerst in Japan gebaut. Hier die Zeichnung eines solchen Schiffes l InterprCtation du LASH par un artiste. Les premiers navires LASH ont 6t6 construits au Japon

and the Cape of Good Hope route is great enough for element

when planning

ship size. For instance, the cost of

building large tankers has practically doubled in the past five years and construction costs may yet increase substantially once the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization’s recommendations regarding size reduction and reinforcing of individual tanks as anti-pollution safeguards are generally

adopted.

have kept pace with rising construction

Increases in insurance costs. One writer

shippers to favor the Canal if only in the one direction. Superships of more than 250,000 unloaded,

d. w. t. are unable, even

to use the Canal.

Also significant in the development of superships have been the economics of tanker size and changing patterns of tanker trading. As a rule, building and operating costs of superships do not rise in proportion to increases in size;

the Canal by larger ships going south in ballast is feasible

hence, within certain limits at least, the larger the ship the cheaper the unit cost of transporting petroleum or other bulk cargo. For the development of major oil fields in Libya and Algeria and for the rise of Japan as a great industrial country, the restraints which the size of the Canal may have had on ship beam and draft dimensions are irrelevant, since Persian Gulf oif for Japan and North African oil for Europe move over shipping routes unaffect-

and the time-mileage

ed by the Suez Canal.

has suggested that bulk shippers would welcome the reopening of the Canal, which would probably be used to the maximum extent practicable (VICKER, 1971). Many tankers of 50,000 d. w. t. (37 per cent of the world tanker fleet at the end of 1970) could still pass through the Canal, with reduced loads in some instances. Furthermore, use of difference

between the Canal route

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Photo: Courtesy

16173

of Estaieiros Navaia de Lisboa

Fig. 5 l Bantry Class tanker, prehended

Universe Portugal,

when comparing

in the Tagus River, with Lisbon in the background.

it to the smaller T-2

this scene is taking on residual petroleum l Der Tanker

Universe Portugd

l Petrolier

der T-2-Klasse

Bantry Class, Universe Portugal,

geant quand on le compare

from the larger vessel before

der Bantry-Klasse

dem Iangsseits liegenden Tanker

au petrolier

yage des reservoirs, et sur cette photo

Size of the mammoth

ship best can be com-

Class tanker tied up alongside. The smaller vessel now serves as a tank cleaning barge and in

vor Lissabon.

it goes into drydock

Die GrGBe dieses Mammutschiffes

erfassen. Das kleinere

sur le Tage, avec Lisbonne plus petit (tT2 Class)) attach6

il prend le reste de petrole

The largest type of commercial vessel completed before 1957 was the 56,000 d. w. t. tanker, of which only one, the Sinclair Petrolore, was built. Deadweight tonnage of the largest tanker was 114,000 in 1959, 130,000 in 1962, and 206,000 in 1966. By early 1973 several tankers of 326,000 d.w. t. (Bantry Class) were in service; one of 372,400 d.w. t. (Nisseki Mar-u), and one of 483,650 d. w. t. (Globtik Tokyo) had been launched in Japan with a sister ship also under construction. Furthermore, construction

has been given to building 1,OOO,OOOtonners. Another indication of increasing ship siie is that while in 1959 the world tanker fleet consisted of 3,276 ships - equivalent

h I’arriere-plan. a son c&6.

ulreste,

19Bt sich am ehesten durch den Vergleich bevor das grdBere ins Trockendock

On peut mieux

Le petit bitiment

se rendre compte sert maintenant

mit

geht

de la taille du navire

de pdniche pour le netto-

du grand navire avant le depart de celui-ci en tale s&he

Ever-IncreasingTankship Size

of 535,000 tonners is underway, technical plans for 750,000 tonners have been prepared, and consideration

Schiff tibernimmt

to 3,826 T-2s - ten years later it had increased to only 3,893 ships, but they were equivalent to 9,461 T-2s. During this same period, the average age of ships in the world tanker fleet stayed constant at seven years and six months (SUN OIL COMPANY, 1%‘0) (Figs. 5, 6).

Need for New Port Facilities It is well that gargantuan

tankers do not need the type of

berthing facilities used by cargo vessels, for there are relatively few ports in the world able to accommodate the draft of fully loaded 200,000 tonners. Such ports number anywhere from nine to twenty, and include at most eleven in the major petroleum-consuming nations. As late as 1971, there were no berthing facilities on the East and Gulf

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16173

Photos: Courtesy of Giobtik Tankers Ltd.

bi Fig. 6 The Elobtik Tokyo (483,650 d.w.t.) writing the iargest vessel afloat

in ballast (Fig. 6a) and in full load (Fig. 6b). Launched if! early 1973, she was at the time of this

Die Giobrik Tokyo in Baiiast (Fig. 6a) und in volter Ladung (Fig. 6b). Sic iief Anfang 1973 vom Stapei und war zur Zeit dieser N~eders~b~ift das grSj&te Schiff der Welt (483 650 tdwf Le GIobfik

Tokyo

(tonnage de port en Gourd, 483 650) sur lest (Fig. 6a) et avec un plein chargement (Fig. 6b). Lax6

Ctait au moment de la redaction de cet article, le plus grand navire i flot

au ddbut de 1973, if

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coasts of the United States able to accommodate even fully loaded 100,000 deadweight tonners, much less larger

farms on shore to await seaborne transshipment to European refineries near major population centers. Nevertheless,

ships. Indeed, it appears that there are only two ports in North America able to accommodate the larger classes of supertankers - Long Beach, California, and Port Hawkes-

off-loading

bury, astride Canso Strait between Cape Breton Island and southern Nova Scotia. It was here that the largest fully laden tanker to dock at a North American port, the 326,000 d. w. t. Universe /upun, berthed in February 1972 for delivery of 2.35 million barrels of crude oil from the Persian Gulf. Need for berthing facilities to accommodate the largest supertankers

currently

in service as well as those

being planned is especially acute in Western Europe, where most petroleum must be imported from overseas. Desire to handle supertankers has forced some governments to build new ports, or to construct new berthing facilities near deep-water of this magnitude

entrances of existing ports. Construction can be considered

only where petroleum

imports are greatest or where no suitable alternative berthing facilities exist. Near Marseilles the French have established a new petroleum

has considered

constructing

a protected

harbor at Heligoland to accommodate 800,000 deadweight tonners, since there is belief in some shipping circles that the next leap in tanker size will be from the 485,000535,000 to the 800,000 d. w. t. range. The situation at Bremen and Hamburg is especially critical, since both are situated up-river, and hence are severely restricted in channel depth. These two ports and Rouen in France (also situated up-river) of all major European ports have shown the least increases in tonnage handled since World

Port

An alternative to unloading in port, used in Europe by some petroleum importing companies, is the practice of bringing fully vicinity

namely ability

large tonnages directly

to carry

to port refineries

and storage fields in the major petroleum

consuming

regions.

Offshore Mooring Offshore mooring

facilities

are another alternative

to

deepening channels to ports. This means an elaborate docking platform floating on buoys, constructed in deep water and linked by flexible buoy-supported hosing to the mainland

storage facility.

First used in 1959, these mooring

platforms have been constructed as far as sixty miles (96 km.) from shore in the Persian Gulf for loading tankers and are reported unloading

to be in service for loading and

at nearly sixty locations

around the world

(YOUNG, 1971).

laden supertankers

Shipbuilding

Ports

Considerations

of national

pride have had little

upon where these large vessels are constructed. price is the deciding factor, followed

bearing Rather,

closely by adherence

to promised delivery date. Because shipbuilding is capitalintensive, the wealthy countries traditionally have been i? a better position for it than have developing or less wealthy countries (ALEXANDERSSON and NORSTRUM, 1963). The fact that Japan, Spain, Italy and to a lesser degree Yugoslavia have again become important in world shipbuilding

indicates their recent economic

growth.

Since

large bulk vessels are generally cheaper per ton to build than are general cargo ships, and usually require less

War II (BIRD, 1967, pp. 304-5). The Trans-Shipment

extraordinarily

port at Fos, which is able to handle

the largest supertankers currently afloat. It is anticipated that Fos will become the catalyst for development of a new major economic region in southern France. The German government

procedures such as these reduce the primary

advantage of the supertanker,

to the deep water

of a port, and then off-loading

enough oil into a

smaller tanker to enable the larger one to enter harbor. Shell, for instance, has had two 70,000 deadweight tonners based at Europoort (Rotterdam) for off-loading the largest tankers at sea, even though dredging at Europoort now will allow ships drawing up to sixty-five feet (19.8 meters) of water, equivalent to some fully loaded ships of 250,000 d. w. t. Gulf Oil’s use of Bantry Bay is based upon the trans-shipping idea. This harbor apparently was selected because of its depth and Western European location, since it has no major population center nearby. Gulfs chartered Universe Class ships (326,000 d. w. t.) and other mammoth vessels are brought fully laden into Bantry Bay, and then the oil is off-loaded into tank

technology, the less-industrialized states can now be competitive in supership construction. Furthermore, much VLCC and mammoth ship construction in traditional shipbuilding countries having relatively high wage scales is done at financial loss, even during a world shipbuilding boom without precedent. This seeming contradiction exists because of the time required for final fabrication of ships and because shipyards take orders at prices unrealistic in the light of spiralling wages. For the most part, only where mass production techniques have been applied to supership construction have profits been made. It is no coincidence that many of the major profit-making yards are also operators of large-scale steel works, an arrangement which provides not only the basic raw material for ship construction at lowest cost, but perhaps even more important, the capital necessary for development and expansion. Leading Japanese builders of big ships (IshikawajimaHarima, Kawasaki and Mitsubishi) are also familiar names in steel making.

Geoforum

16/73

Superships need super construction increasing tendency

facilities.

There is an

for new slips to be sited away from

established commercial ports, since shipbuilding and ship repair services for large vessels require shore space and water depths generaiiy unavailable in built-up port zones. In some instances, new supership building slips have been constructed

or are planned for “ports”

where no inter-

modal transfers of goods take place. Examples can be found at the new Arendal the outer approaches

yards built by Giitaverken

to the port of Gothenburg,

Sweden,

Company

in Denmark.

ships of less than 250,000 ships currently

nothing

Italy, Japan, the

Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. Those in Canada and the United States are of tesser significance worldwide because of the small number of ships and, perhaps more important, because of their relatively small tonnages. In 1961 and 1965 no ships with tonnages exceeding 200,000

near

and at the new8 Linda yards of A. P. Mpiller”s Udense Shipbuilding

By 1971, there were specialized ports building but superships in Canada, Denmark,

are identified,

whereas

in 1971, 311 of 550 superships were over 200,000 and were being constructed

at twenty-eight

d.w.t.,

ports (Figs. 9,

IO).

indeed, at Lind$, keels for

d.w.t.

were last laid in 1969; all

under construction

Supership

in Japan

Construction

exceed this tonnage.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, near Nagasaki, constructed what is purported to be the largest yard in the world, at

By any criterion,

Japan is the leading commercial

building

Crowded

country.

together

in southern

shipHonshu,

a cost of over $ 78 million. Because of their size, superships have fewer repair facilities to choose from, and generally seek those close to the principal trade routes. One of the most modern mammoth drydocks for superships has been constructed at Lisbon, adjacent to European tanker routes. Existence of this facility, built to accom-

and on Kyushu and Shikoku, are ports which accounted for approximately twenty-five per cent of the worid’s commercial ships under construction or on order in 197 1, and for over forty-five per cent of the world total dead-

modate ships of up to I ,~OO,~

and the ‘~ManufaGtur~ng Belt of Japan” which supports

expectation

that mammoth

will soon be plying

d. w. t., suggests the

nearly 70,000,OOO people (THOMPSON and MIYAZAKI, 1959). Japan not only leads in number of ships and total

vessels of such proportions

world petroleum

weight tonnage in 1973 (Table 1). Here is a concentrated industrial zone which has been called “Water MegaIopolis’”

trade routes.

To trace the growth of supership size and production, well as specialization among supership building ports,

as

deadweight tonnage, but perhaps not surprisingly, also leads in world supership construction, with nearly fifty per cent of the worfd’s totaaf (Table 2) Japan’s dominant position in world sh~pbujlding, and particularly its ranking in large tankers and other large bulk ships, has been some-

construction statistics from three representative years, 1961, 1965, and 1971, have been depicted for ships of 75,000 d. w. t. or more, by tonnage and type. Included in each year’s data are ships for which contracts had been

what critically evaluated by some analysts, who believe that the building of super bulk carriers may not be as remunerative

as is shipbuilding

Jet as well as those then in the process of construction.

no supership ~onst~~t~on,

Choice of these three years is based upon two considerations: first, the fact that vessels of supership size, as defined

smaher, special-purpose

in this paper, began to come into service only toward

supership construction,

the

end of the 1950s and, second, the necessity of avoiding

in countries

with little or

but with more diversified,

and cargo vessels. For instance,

from 1 January to 30 September completed

1970, Finland,

with no

160,000 gross tons of

data taken from years too close together. This shouid minimize construction tonnage carried over from one year

shipping valued at $98 million. Japan had for the same time period 7~400,000 gross tons completed, but with a value of $ 7,562 milfion. Thus, one gross ton of shipping

to the next; depending

completed

upon the yard, up to three years

in Finland

had a value of $612,

while one

may be required from the time the keel of the vessel is laid to its final fitting-out. Implicit in these figures are both the regionalization of supership construction and the fact that these ships not only are increasing in size but aJso are being constructed at ever-increasing rates. Not only is

gross ton in Japan had a value of only $ 211 (GIBNEY, 1970).

there specialization

Japan specializes significantly in ship type and tonnage categories. In 1971, five of sixteen Japanese ports building superships built nothing else. Chiba, Koyagi, Sakai, Sakaide and Tsu not only were building nothing but superships, but none of the sixty-three ships under construction

by port, and-sometimes

by nation,

in

certain types of gargantuan vessels, but it is also evident that substantial supership construction is taking place in some of the so-called less-developed countries. Specializing in a particular type of supership may reflect individual company policy where a company operates in severat ports, as in Japan, but more frequently is the result of assembly line construction where emphasis is placed upon building several vessels of identical dimensions (Figs. 7, 8).

at these ports was Jessthan 2~~~~ deadweight tons. The increasing need for new Japanese shipbuilding facilities for gargantuan vessels is shown by the fact that none of the above ports was building superships in 1961, and only

Geoforum

58

1

h

JAPAN

SUPERSHIP CONSTRUCTION,

1961

l6/73

EUROPE

,

3

-

Number cf Ships

There is only one tonnage category: 75,000 - 200,000 deadweight tons. Type of Ship a

Tanker

Cl = 100,000 deadweight tons

Fig. 7 l Supership

Sakai

construction

in 1961

in 1965. The implication

a Der Bau von Superschiffen

is clear, both from the

relative newness of the port facilities and from the remarkable concentration upon building only large superships, that these ports will probably dominate supership construction in Japan when the next leap in deadweight

1961

0 Construction

de super-navires

en 1961

solely upon tankers, whereas Tokyo and Yokohama both were building mainly tankers and OBO type vessels but also had some bulk ship construction.

tonnage

takes place.

The Japanese Success Story

Throughout Japan, a pattern of individual port concentration on certain types of superships can be discerned. For instance, three of the above named ports were building tankers only, while Sakaide and Tsu were building

The reasons for Japan’s dominance in shipbuilding and, in the context of this paper, her dominance in supership construction, have been her ability (until very recently) to build at prices among the lowest in the world. In addition to assembly line production and the corporate relationship between steel manufacturers and shipbuilding com-

primarily tankers but also some OBO and oil/ore vessels. Hiroshima, Tamano, and Tsurumi were building no tankers, and were concentrating primarily upon bulk ships. Nagasaki, where thirty of forty-three ships under construction or on order in 1971 were superships, and all but two were larger than 200,000 deadweight tons, was building only tanker and OBO ships. Sasebo was concentrating

panies, Japan’s labor force IS generally well-educated and skilled, and there has been a history of shipping and shipbuilding which has encouraged domestic as well as foreign purchases. During a worldwide depression in shipbuilding, extending

from the reopening of the Suez Canal in

Geoforum

16/73

59

EUROPE

JAPAN

Numberef Ships

May 1957 through 1962, domestic orders more than

the face of a worsening war situation,

equatled those from overseas, and were responsibfe for

method

maintaining

advanced fitting-out

much of the economic

vitality

of fapanese

yards (NAKAYAMAUI~ CHIHAYA, 1966). It should also be noted that as Japan emerged from World War II there were two conditions which shipbuilders could use to their advantage. First, bomb damage to major Japanese yards was pra~ticatiy non-existent, and even in Nagasaki, which was hit by the second atomic bomb, Mitsubishi’s shipyard was undamaged. The Kure naval yard was left intact by the Allies, and its immense drydock, where the 69,100 displacement-ton battleship )/amafo was built, and which was capable of a~~ommodatjng ‘I 50,000 tun ships, made it possibte for fapan to take the lead in building rn~mo~~ vessels. The scw~d situation is directiy attributable immense losses suffered by the Japanese merchant during the war. In crrder to speed up ship production

to ths marine in

was adopted

every conceivable jn~~ud~ng s~~-a~~~~atj~ wefding and

works. Technotogical

advances coupled

with large-scale physical facilities provided some of the ingredients for Japan’s reentry into world shipbuilding once post-war occupation restrictions were removed, and hefped M move japanese yards into the forefront of supership &onst~u~tio~. Stimulus far building supertankers and super bulk carriers stems not only from overseas sales of vessels, but also from Japan’s need to import practicaily all raw materials for her industrial ~~~surn~t~o~ and d~e~~~rn~~~ ~rn~~~~d raw rna~~rja~s are more cheapfy carried in superships, and japanese flag vessefs undoubtedly carry much of them Development of super oil/ore and OBO carriers has made it financially feasible for Japan to import iron ore from

Geoforum

60

16/73

Table 1

(2)

(1) Country

Number

of

Ships

(3)

(4)

Deadweight

Percentage

World Ship

Tonnage

World d. w. t.

Between

Total

Thousands

Total

and (4)

Percentage

of

in

of

l

Difference (2)

l

Belgium

26

1 .OJ

Brazil

44

1.81

Denmark

72

2.96

Egypt Finland

40

1.64

77 76

3.16

France (E)

165

6.78

Germany

(W)

161

6.61

29

Italy

65

a

Netherlands

63

Norway

109

Poland

132

Rumania

74

Spain

135

Sweden United

1.19 2.67 26.01 0.33 2.59 4.48 5.42 3.04 5.55 5.92 5.34 3.70 2.0 1 95.40

633

Japan Korea

144 Kingdom

130

1

United States Yugoslavia Total

1,680 6,719 259 741 8,009 1,139 11,342 558 4,603 81,374 638 3,081 7,038 2,277 419 8,261 20,384 8,746 5,107 2,886 176,167

3.12

Germany Greece

906

90 49

2,322

.51

S6

.94

.a7 +.82 1.49 2.74 +1.3a 6.14 .23 .88 .08 +19.76 +.03 .86 s2 4.14 2.80 .90 +5.54 .42 .a3 .39

3.78 .15 .42 4.50 .64 6.38 .31 2.59 45.77 .36 1.73 3.96 1.28 .24 4.65 11.46 4.92 2.87 1.62

Principal commercial building countries Die wichtigsten Lander

l

tonnage of superships*

Tonnage von Superschiffen Tonnage

under construction

Principaux en 1973

99.08

im Bau oder in Auftrag

de port en lourd des super-navires

Country

Total

Supership

d.w.t.

in 1971

or on order in 1971

1971

en construction

Total Supership d.w.t.

in 1973

and 1973

und 1973 en 1971 et 1973

ou command&

Percentage

of

Difference

in

World Super-

World Super-

Percentage

of

ship d.w.t.

ship d.w. t.

World Supership

in 1971

in 1973

d.w.t.:

Percentage

Japan

45,307,279

73,862,570

42.67

Sweden

12,603,OOO

11.87

6,717,600

19,722,100 6,680,400

6,686,920

9,933,170

6.30

France

6,334,OOO

5.97

Denmark

5,916,500

Norway

4,776,800

3.81

1.65

2.60

Spain Germany

(W)

6.33

Italy

4,320,200

Netherlands

4,046,OOO

Yugoslavia

2,765,400

1,922,200

United

1,342,OOO

3,276,OOO

1.26

1.30 2.21

None

0.37

None

Kingdom

States

4,657,500

Taiwan

394,000

Canada

240,000

Australia

78,000

240,000 None

5.57 4.50 4.39 4.07

0.23

0.16

0.07

None 0.35

Korea

None

5 18,000

None

Poland

None

315,000

None

Total

106,185,199

148,133,440

0.21

100.01

99.99 L

*

A supership is defined

here as one with a capacity

of at least 75,000

d.w.t.

1971,

+7.19 +1.44 1 .a2 +0.4 1 1.39 1.59 0.71 +0.3.5 1.44 2.16 1.30 +0.95

49.86 13.31 4.5 1 6.71 4.58 3.98 3.79 4.74 2.63

6,783,200 5,902,ooo 5,616,JOO 7,021,500 3,892,600 2,448,OOO

United

of

Schiffbau-

1973 pays de construc-

tions navales commericales

Table 2 Deadweight

ship-

in 1973

73

SUPERSHIP

CONSTRUCTION,

Number

Fig. 9

1971

01 Shups

l Supership

construction

in Europe,

1971 l Der Bau von Superschiffen

in Europa,

1971 0 Construction Europe

de super-navires

en

en 1971

Fig. 10 l Supership

construction

in Japan,

1971 l Der Bau von Superschiffen

in Japan,

1971 l Construction

-I JAPAN

en 1971

de super-navires

au Japan

62

Geoforum

16/73

more distant locations than was formerly possible. Japan as a destination appears in each of the three most dominant

The spatial pattern emphasizes Scandinavia’s leadership; the reasons for this are not difficult to understand. In

worldwide

addition to the facts that Scandinavia has important domestic shipping requirements, that it is in the forefront

iron ore trading patterns for OBO and oil/ore

carriers. These dominant combination trades are: oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and iron ore from West Africa to Japan; oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and iron ore from South America to Japan; and oil from the Persian Gulf to South America and iron ore to Japan (FEARNLEY and EGERS, 1971). Cause for Concern Some clouds have begun to appear over the unparalleled growth of Japanese commercial shipbuilding. Foremost among these has been the fact that Japanese shipbuilders, like their counterparts the world over, have been facing spiralling

wage demands, which more than likely

will

outstrip productivity gains, and which in turn will cost Japanese builders some of their international competitive edge in shipbuilding prices. Recently, Japanese builders were stunned by the economic policies delcared by the United States in August 1971, among them being the decision to allow the American dollar to float, free of gold restraints. Hitherto, most Japanese shipbuilders have been quoting prices against American dollars, and almost overnight the value of ships under construction,

on order, and

particularly many already in use but financed through long-term liberal credit, lost approximately ten per cent of

of technological

innovation,

and that Scandinavian

ship-

owners traditionally have preferred to build in their own region, there is also the important aspect of intraregional economic

cooperation.

The Customs Union of Iceland,

Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, with their generally highly productive and well-educated labor forces, has made it possible for shipbuilders to minimize construction time by moving critical

parts among these countries

as required,

and even by temporarily moving essential laborers from country to country. At least five ports in Denmark, Norway

and Sweden specialize in building

and at Lindq, ninety-one

Denmark’s

only VLCCs,

only supership building

port,

per cent of 1970’s gross tonnage launchings

were for foreign buyers, certainly

a measure of Odense

Steel Shipyard’s

Swedish construction

dominated

competitiveness.

is

by bulk carriers (Fig. 11).

United Kingdom Great Britain’s supership building industry compares poorly with that in Scandinavia, not to mention Japan. It should be noted however, that during the past several months, British yards have been receiving a substantial influx of orders, which in the aggregate can be considered

significant

their value. Cheaper dollars in Japan mean fewer yen in exchange. Large Japanese shipbuilding companies v?ere reported to have had $ 5.7 thousand million in receivables

when comparing

from abroad for ships already delivered and at sea. Thus a boost of ten per cent in the yen’s value cost the industry about 500 million dollars in lost income. The second

has been spent in modernizing its largest building dock and supporting facilities. In spite of such modernization,

devaluation further

of the American

exacerbated

dollar in February,

the problem

1973,

for Japanese builders

although, by this date, many contracts yen rather than in dollars.

were being made in

Finally, Japan’s shipbuilding success story must suffer because of its very success. At the time when ship size was rapidly increasing, building berths, unavailable elsewhere, were available in Japanese yards, whereas in 1973 it is the japanese yards which are booked

well in advance. Now it

is the turn of some of the European yards to attract orders because of available space.

Supership Building

in Selected European Ports

Scandinavia If firms in Japan dominate world supership construction, those in Europe are striving to obtain a larger share of the market. In 1971, there were twenty-nine ports in ten European countries constructing superships, of which seventeen were building vessels of more than 200,000 tons.

the 1971 and 1’973 supership construction

figures (Table 2). Primarily this industry is centered in Belfast at the Harland and Wolff works where f 15 million

domestic

orders have until recently

predominated

at the

Belfast yard. Lack of substantial foreign orders during a period of world shipbuilding expansion results partly from the reputation for late delivery acquired by British yards, and partly because of the high relative cost of their super carriers. At the root of the problem is the fact that trades unions at British yards present a hodge-podge of responsibilities with the end result of working against production efficiency and, in the broader perspective, against making British yards more competitive in the world market. The magnitude of dependence upon domestic orders and, by inference, lack of competitiveness internationally are seen from the following data. In 1970, British shipowners had twenty-three per cent of all OBO ships on order, and sixteen per cent of other bulk carriers and super tankers, but relatively few orders for these vessels had been placed with British yards (THE ECONOMIST, 1970) (Fig. 12).

Future of World Shipbuilding A major trend surfacing throughout this study has been the increasing specialization in shipbuilding, particularly in building vessels solely for containerized cargo. This

Der Schiffbau

Werftgesellschft.

Chantier

and deeper water

and by the mid-1960s

hither-

facilities

all shipbuilding

a Anlagen

profondes

installations

a cause de ses grandes modernes et de ses eaux plus

loin de 12, 2 Lind0,

Ia dirigkes a Odense se sont dkplackes non

navales jusque-

60 toutes les constructions

La production

de la ((Steel Shipyard d’odense.

de Lind0,

im tiefen Wasser bei Lind0 verlegt

Companya

der 60er Jahre in die modernen

begann 1959

der Odense Stahl- und

Die Lind0-Werft

Lind# because of its large modern

l

to carried on at Odense shifted to nearby

started here in 1959,

Ltd.

debut6 en 1955, et vers le milieu des anntes

Production

of Odense Shipyard,

in Odense selbst und wurde in der Mitte

Company.

0 Lind0 Yard of the Odense Steel Shipyard

Fig. 11

Photo: Courtesy

Photo: Courtesy of Harland and Wolff, Ltd.

Fig. 12 * Mamrn~t~ ship building docks in Belfast @ Werft fir Rierenschiffe in Belfast @ Bassins giants de constructions navales A Belfast

trend is readily seen in the RO-RO and LASH-type vessels. It appears that containerization is still in its infancy although further increases in size of container ships wit! be restricted by inadequate water depths in ports of j~dustr~a~ized nations. There are physical, financial and, in some instances, ecological limitations to continually deepening channels to harbors in order to accommodate larger and larger ships. Because of this, many ports remain a hindrance to efficient intermodaf transfers of goods and thus a handicap to international trade. Even so, there are many goods not suited to containerization because of their configuration and size, and there should always be some demand for general cargo non~~an~inerized ships. Size of bulk vessels, especially tankers, is not as restricted as that of general cargo ships by the physicai characteristics of existing ports. Bulk cargoes can be transferred from ship

to shore via flexible hosing connected to deep water offshore mooring platforms. Iron ore and coal in slurry as well as petroleum have been successfully off-loaded at deep water platforms. Some oit companies have off-foad~~g sites where crude oil is transferred from large tankers to smaller ones, either as an end in itself or to permit the larger vessels to enter port partially loaded. For ecological reasons, however, there is increasing opposition to locating petroleum off-loading sites in developed countries, as evidenced by the uproar about the proposed use of Machias Port and other sites in Maine. Whiie numerous deep water sites are available for off-loading, the greater the distance a site is from petroleum markets (primarily urban concentrations in industrialized countries), the fewer will be the economic advantages to be derived from using supertankers. With ever-increasing tank ship sire, there is

Geoforum

16173

65

the very real possibility economic

of conflict

gain and environmental

between the goals of

British Petroleum

tranquility.

CLOUT,

While there probably pany wanting

will be at least one chartering

com-

to own the largest ship afloat, gargantuan

tankers are seldom constructed Every petroleum

in Alaska. At the time of the well-publicized S. S. Munhat~un

through

Oil commissioned

the Northwest

Newport

for

field

voyage of

Passage, Humble

News Shipbuilding

and Dry

Dock Company to prepare plans for a prototype 300,000 d. w. t. ice-breaker supertanker. With Humble’s decision to forego the Northwest Passage route in favour of a pipeline to Valdez on Alaska’s south coast, use of very large tankers no longer was necessary. Rather, plans now call for a fleet of 90,000 deadweight tonners to work between Valdez and the West Coast of the United States. Construction

of superships is dominated

by Japanese yards,

and there is very little evidence to suggest significant future diminution of Japan’s dominance. Whereas overexpansion

COLLINS,

Costs of these facilities

overexpansion

shipbuilding

are substantial,

R. F. (1972):

Transport, DYMENT,

New Zealand

R. (1971):

Sea Frontiers,

seaports;

Maguzine,

243,

Ltd.,

Linda

The Place of the Smaller The Chartered Division.

Tankers

Port in

Institute

of

Wellington.

in the Alps: a school for skippers;

17, No. 2.

The Economist

(1968):

Moving goods in the 1970’s;

228,

No. 6225. The Economist

(1970):

Shipping

The Economist

(1970):

The suicidal shipyards;

The Economist

(1970):

Shipbuilding:

237,

faces the rapids; 235, 235,

No. 6607.

No. 6608.

the world’s sickest industry;

No. 6638.

Fearnley

and Egers Chartering

Fleer,

Company

Trade, Ports and Off-Hire

and the Year 1969. Fearnley

Company

Trade, Ports and Off-Hire

and the Year 1970.

countries;

(1971):

1970

Some Aspects of

of Large Tankers, January

Coastal steelworks

The Geographicul

F. W. (1970):

Pilot Chart

Some Aspects of

1971

Oslo.

D. K. (1967):

market

(1970):

of Large Tankers, January

Oslo.

and Egers Chartering

Fleet,

FRICKER,

countries.

projects for French

Odense Steel Shipyard

the Era of Containerisation.

trade, there is less likelihood

docks in the world’s

of the

The Compass, 40, No. 6.

DE LAUTOUR,

FLEMMING,

of supership building

Review

59.

Oil and water; Harper’s

M. J. (1970):

Division;

of container berths took place among many of the world’s ports in order to capitalize upon the growing container of a comparable

Expansion

econ. sot. Geogr.,

J. N. (1971):

BP Statistical

London.

No. 1458.

trade route has specific requirements

of the North Slope petroleum

(1970):

1970.

H. D. (1968):

Tijdschr. COLE,

for prestige purposes.

numbers of tankers and ship size, and some trade routes simply do not need the very large superships. A case in point was the development

Company

World Oil Industry,

No. 103,

Giant

in the common

Review,

Tankers:

57.

A Practical

U.S. Naval Oceanographic

Reality.

Office.

Washington.

and

because of the expense involved the level of competition is diminished. The real impact of diminishing competition

GIBNEY,

R. F. (1970):

in supership building berths probably will not be felt until 750,000 or larger deadweight tonners come into service.

HANSON,

$ 20,000

Investment

in new ships now exceeds

million; Seatrode. P. (1970):

Sovie: Studies, Her Majesty’s

The Soviet Union and world shipping;

22.

Stationery

Office

(1972):

British Shipbuilding.

London. JACOBS,

J. I. and Company

31st December, KIRBY,

J. H. (1969):

and Shipping KRUGER,

Society

Marine ABRAMOWSKI,

C. (1966):

ments on merchant Navigation,

marine

of

Geography

Association

J. (1967):

(1969):

Economic Section.

4, No. 8. A. (1972):

Considerations

OreJBulkJOil

Combina-

und Design Features.

and Marine

Engineers,

New York

New York. (1970):

Computerized

ships make debut

Japan; 75, No. 4.

Engineering/Log

(1971):

Trying

the shipboard

computer;

World

The container

Seaports

Committee

Merchunt

revolution

Washington.

in ocean shipping;

6.

and the European

Journal,

on Ship

Vessel Size in

Trades by the Year 2000.

Geographer,

The Geographical

Marine

ZEDLITZ,

Engineering/Log

in Sweden,

prepares for 800,000-ton

133.

MURPHY,

C. J. V. (1956):

The great tanker dilemma;

Fortune,

54, No. 5.

of Port Authorities,

G. (1968):

Pennsylvania

(1963):

of Ports and Seoborne

York.

Unired Stares Offshore

BIRD,

of the lnstifute

G. and G. NORSTRijM

An Economic

Channels and Harbors BEISHLAG,

ships;/ourna/

require-

Review,

76, No. 3.

Trode. Stockholm/New American

and personnel

13.

ALEXANDERSSON, Shipping:

Automation

Fleet

NO. 23.

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