- Email: [email protected]
On an alleged moral basis of vegetarianism
Applied Animal Ethology, 6 (1980) 205-209 0 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands
205
Guest Editorial ON AN ALLEGED
MORAL BASIS OF VEGETARIANISM
H.S. LEHMAN’ and J.F. HURNIK’
‘Department of Philosophy, ‘Department (Canada)
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario (Canada) of Animal and Poultry Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario
ABSTRACT We formulate an argument (called the vegetarian argument) for the conclusion that it is wrong to kill animals for food. If this argument is acceptable, then so is a parallel argument that it is wrong to kill plants for food. The parallel argument is not acceptable and thus the vegetarian argument is not acceptable. Finally we challenge one of the basic premises of the vegetarian argument.
Modern societies, in order to provide food for rapidly expanding human populations, have applied scientifically based technology in agriculture. The application of such methods in animal agriculture has resulted in considerable increases of livestock production. Attendant upon these methods, there have been extensive modifications of the environments to which animals are subject, and as more and more people become aware of the living conditions of the animals which are being raised and slaughtered for food, interest in old ethical questions has revived. One such question is: Is it morally wrong to kill animals for food? Another question is: Do modern agricultural techniques subject farm animals to unnecessary pain or discomfort? It has to be admitted that this interest reflects legitimate concerns. As in the case of any activity with social implications, in an open society the entire community has both the responsibility and the right to make rules governing social practices. Hopefully, such rules will be made with due regard for ethical standards. If such standards are ignored, then there is no limit to the degree of cruelty which may be imposed. Clearly, total disregard of all such limits is unacceptable, and it is our view that agriculturalists should enter into the debate concerning the scope of such limits. Unless agriculturalists parti. cipate in the discussion concerning the ethical implications of modem agricultural methods, those who make laws or rules pertaining to agricultural practices will probably not have sufficient knowledge to make such laws intelligently. If agriculturalists forsake their rights and responsibilities in this regard they, along with everyone else, will have to suffer the consequence. In this paper we try to make a small, but hopefully significant, contribution to the discussion of the ethical issues concerning modem agricultural practices. We believe that there is a serious flaw in certain arguments which have been used to provide a basis for the contention that we should all become vege-
206
tarians. We shall discuss the structure of these arguments and shall try to expose the flaw. Vegetarianism is the view that one should not eat parts of animals or animal products. There are more and less extreme versions of this view, but we shall not consider such distinctions here. Unless there is a moral basis or foundation for vegetarianism, such a view reflects only some gustatory or other individual preference. On the assumption that such a preference will never become very widespread, agriculturalists could ignore it. However, some people have argued that vegetarianism is not merely a reflection of individual taste. They have argued that animals have certain moral rights, such as the right to life or the right to property (Regan, 1976). The justification of the claim that animals have such moral rights would provide a foundation for vegetarianism. Actually, the claim that (A) animals have a right not to be killed for food says more than is strictly necessary to express the vegetarian position. A person who believed that we should all become vegetarians might be content with the following as an expression of his view: (B) it is wrong for human beings to kill animals for food. Clearly, of these two claims, (A) logically implies (B) but (B) apparently does not imply (A). Even if it turned out that animals do not have any moral rights (perhaps because only rational beings can possess moral rights and animals may not be rational), (B) could still be true. Further, (A) has some obviously unjustifiable implications which (B) apparently does not have. For example, if (A) were true, then strictly carnivorous animals would have no right to life. In any case, to justify continuing to eat animals that have been killed for food we must show that (B) is not justified. By showing that (B) is not justified we will be showing that (A) is not justified either. The basic argument pattern which we shall criticize is as follows: (let us call this argument “The vegetarian argument”). 1. It is wrong to kill human beings for food. 2. There is no difference between human beings and animals which entitles human beings to treat animals differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3. If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2, and if it is wrong to kill human beings for food, then it is wrong to kill animals for food. 4. Thus, it is wrong to kill animals for food. In discussing the acceptability of this conclusion, many people focus a great deal of attention on premise No. 2. Various characteristics are considered with respect to the questions: Do human beings differ from all other animals with respect to this? and Does a difference in regard to this characteristic entitle us to treat human beings differently than we treat other animals in regard to killing for food? Vegetarians who accept the vegetarian argument argue, in regard to any such characteristic, that (i) some human beings do not
207
differ from other animals in this way or (ii) even though all human beings do differ from other animals in this way, the difference is not morally relevant, i.e. it is not the sort of difference which would entitle us to justify killing animals for food while not killing human beings for food. For example, suppose someone tried to argue that it is morally permissible to kill animals for food but not to kill human beings for food because humans differ from animals in using language. The vegetarians and their supporters might criticize this argument by pointing out that (i) some human beings are incapable of using language, (ii) some animals, e.g. gorillas or dolphins, may indeed use language and (iii) mere use of language is not morally relevant in regard to this issue. If we were to find some human child raised by a wolf, it would not be permissible to kill him and eat him simply because he had never learned to use language. There must be something wrong with the vegetarian argument, for if it is a sound argument then so is the following argument: 1’ It is wrong to kill human beings for food. 2’ There is no difference between human beings and plants which entitles human beings to treat plants differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3’ If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2’, and if it is wrong to kill human beings for food, then it is wrong to kill plants for food. 4’ Thus, it is wrong to kill plants for food. The appropriateness of this second argument in this context may be challenged by some. These people may suggest that there are relevant differences between plants and human beings. They may urge, for example, that plants are never conscious, never capable of feeling pain, never capable of responding sympathetically to their fellow creatures, etc. However, this objection is mistaken. We need only to remind ourselves that some live human beings are exactly like plants in these regards, in order to see that this argument is indeed appropriate in the present context. This argument has the same pattern as the vegetarian argument. Indeed, if the vegetarian will agree with us that it is morally permissible to kill plants for food then, by a pattern of argument essentially the same as that used in the above arguments, he will be led to the conclusion that it is per+ missible to kill human beings for food. The argument is as follows: 1” It is not wrong to kill plants for food. 2” There is no difference between human beings and plants which entitles human beings to treat plants differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3” If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2”, and if it is not wrong to kill plants for food, then it is not wrong to kill human beings for food. 4” Thus, it is not wrong to kill human beings for food. Since 3” is a logical consequence of 3’, the vegetarian cannot rationally
208
agree to 3’ and refuse to agree to 3”. Further, premises 3 and 3’ both appear to be consequences of the same basic moral principle. Rachels has stated this principle as follows: (C) “Our moral judgments are unacceptably arbitrary if we judge one way in one case and differently in another case, without there being a relevant difference between the two cases which justifies the difference in our assessments” (Rachels, 1976).
If the vegetarian accepts this moral principle as his reason for accepting premise of the vegetarian argument, then he will also have to accept 3’ for the same reason. What we have shown, we believe, is that the vegetarian position is inconsistent. In light of accepting principle (C), the vegetarian must accept premises 3, 3’ and 3”. His argument for premise 2 must lead him equally to accept 2’. If, in addition, he accepts both premises 1 and l”, then his position is selfcontradictory. We have not, of course, shown that vegetarianism is necessarily inconsistent. That is, we have not shown that a person who claims that it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food, is contradicting himself. What we have shown is that if he tries to prove his position and in so doing claims principle (C), premise 2, and that it is wrong to kill humans for food and that it is not wrong to kill plants for food, then his position is inconsistent. There are several ways to avoid this paradox. One way should be to accept the principle that humans can sometimes kill other humans for food. Another way would be to accept the principle that it is wrong for human beings to eat plants. A third way would be to find some characteristic which all living human beings share and which is not possessed by any of the plants we normally eat and then accept the principle that possession of this characteristic is morally significant with respect to the question of killing for food. And finally, the fourth way would be to reject or modify principle (C). This could be done by accepting differing moral judgements even in cases where there is no morally significant characteristic with reference to which the cases can be differentiated. In our view, the first two ways of avoiding the above paradox are unacceptable. We should not accept that it is morally permissible to kill and eat humans and we should not accept that it is wrong to eat plants. The third way of avoiding the paradox seems unpromising also. No doubt we could find some characteristic such that all living humans possessed that characteristic and no plants did (or at least no edible plants). There are many biochemical and behavioral features which could serve as such a characteristic, but the prospect of showing that any such characteristic is morally relevant with respect to the issue in question is vanishingly small. Thus, we are left with the fourth way. We must accept some degree of arbitrariness in our moral evaluations. Providing the degree of arbitrariness is sufficiently limited, this way out of the paradox seems most acceptable. The alternatives, namely killing humans for food or condemning the human race to extinction through starvation, are clearly
morally worse than accepting that some of our moral evaluations are somewhat arbitrary. Of course, by rejection of principle (C) we also undermine the vegetarian argument. We are not forced to accept the vegetarian position that it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food. Criticism of the vegetarian argument is only one small aspect of a discussion of the ethical implications of modern agricultural practices. As we have indicated in the introductory paragraph, there are other ethical issues. Even if it is permissible to kill and eat animals, certain modern agricultural practices may subject animals to “unnecessary” pain. Determining which practices are acceptable may be a difficult matter. In settling these issues, we must be careful not to accept a position which, if put into practice, would deny human beings any opportunity for physical existence. Furthermore, in light of the complex symbiotic and evolutionary relationships between people and other living organisms, it seems very likely that some of our moral judgements will depend on making distinctions that are, to some degree, arbitrary. REFERENCES Rachels, J., 1976. Animal Rights Regan, T., 1976. Animal, Rights
Do animals have a right to liberty? In: T. Regan and P. Singer (Editors), and Human Obligations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs. Do animals have a right to life? In: T. Regan and P. Singer (Editors), and Human Obligations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
205
Guest Editorial ON AN ALLEGED
MORAL BASIS OF VEGETARIANISM
H.S. LEHMAN’ and J.F. HURNIK’
‘Department of Philosophy, ‘Department (Canada)
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario (Canada) of Animal and Poultry Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario
ABSTRACT We formulate an argument (called the vegetarian argument) for the conclusion that it is wrong to kill animals for food. If this argument is acceptable, then so is a parallel argument that it is wrong to kill plants for food. The parallel argument is not acceptable and thus the vegetarian argument is not acceptable. Finally we challenge one of the basic premises of the vegetarian argument.
Modern societies, in order to provide food for rapidly expanding human populations, have applied scientifically based technology in agriculture. The application of such methods in animal agriculture has resulted in considerable increases of livestock production. Attendant upon these methods, there have been extensive modifications of the environments to which animals are subject, and as more and more people become aware of the living conditions of the animals which are being raised and slaughtered for food, interest in old ethical questions has revived. One such question is: Is it morally wrong to kill animals for food? Another question is: Do modern agricultural techniques subject farm animals to unnecessary pain or discomfort? It has to be admitted that this interest reflects legitimate concerns. As in the case of any activity with social implications, in an open society the entire community has both the responsibility and the right to make rules governing social practices. Hopefully, such rules will be made with due regard for ethical standards. If such standards are ignored, then there is no limit to the degree of cruelty which may be imposed. Clearly, total disregard of all such limits is unacceptable, and it is our view that agriculturalists should enter into the debate concerning the scope of such limits. Unless agriculturalists parti. cipate in the discussion concerning the ethical implications of modem agricultural methods, those who make laws or rules pertaining to agricultural practices will probably not have sufficient knowledge to make such laws intelligently. If agriculturalists forsake their rights and responsibilities in this regard they, along with everyone else, will have to suffer the consequence. In this paper we try to make a small, but hopefully significant, contribution to the discussion of the ethical issues concerning modem agricultural practices. We believe that there is a serious flaw in certain arguments which have been used to provide a basis for the contention that we should all become vege-
206
tarians. We shall discuss the structure of these arguments and shall try to expose the flaw. Vegetarianism is the view that one should not eat parts of animals or animal products. There are more and less extreme versions of this view, but we shall not consider such distinctions here. Unless there is a moral basis or foundation for vegetarianism, such a view reflects only some gustatory or other individual preference. On the assumption that such a preference will never become very widespread, agriculturalists could ignore it. However, some people have argued that vegetarianism is not merely a reflection of individual taste. They have argued that animals have certain moral rights, such as the right to life or the right to property (Regan, 1976). The justification of the claim that animals have such moral rights would provide a foundation for vegetarianism. Actually, the claim that (A) animals have a right not to be killed for food says more than is strictly necessary to express the vegetarian position. A person who believed that we should all become vegetarians might be content with the following as an expression of his view: (B) it is wrong for human beings to kill animals for food. Clearly, of these two claims, (A) logically implies (B) but (B) apparently does not imply (A). Even if it turned out that animals do not have any moral rights (perhaps because only rational beings can possess moral rights and animals may not be rational), (B) could still be true. Further, (A) has some obviously unjustifiable implications which (B) apparently does not have. For example, if (A) were true, then strictly carnivorous animals would have no right to life. In any case, to justify continuing to eat animals that have been killed for food we must show that (B) is not justified. By showing that (B) is not justified we will be showing that (A) is not justified either. The basic argument pattern which we shall criticize is as follows: (let us call this argument “The vegetarian argument”). 1. It is wrong to kill human beings for food. 2. There is no difference between human beings and animals which entitles human beings to treat animals differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3. If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2, and if it is wrong to kill human beings for food, then it is wrong to kill animals for food. 4. Thus, it is wrong to kill animals for food. In discussing the acceptability of this conclusion, many people focus a great deal of attention on premise No. 2. Various characteristics are considered with respect to the questions: Do human beings differ from all other animals with respect to this? and Does a difference in regard to this characteristic entitle us to treat human beings differently than we treat other animals in regard to killing for food? Vegetarians who accept the vegetarian argument argue, in regard to any such characteristic, that (i) some human beings do not
207
differ from other animals in this way or (ii) even though all human beings do differ from other animals in this way, the difference is not morally relevant, i.e. it is not the sort of difference which would entitle us to justify killing animals for food while not killing human beings for food. For example, suppose someone tried to argue that it is morally permissible to kill animals for food but not to kill human beings for food because humans differ from animals in using language. The vegetarians and their supporters might criticize this argument by pointing out that (i) some human beings are incapable of using language, (ii) some animals, e.g. gorillas or dolphins, may indeed use language and (iii) mere use of language is not morally relevant in regard to this issue. If we were to find some human child raised by a wolf, it would not be permissible to kill him and eat him simply because he had never learned to use language. There must be something wrong with the vegetarian argument, for if it is a sound argument then so is the following argument: 1’ It is wrong to kill human beings for food. 2’ There is no difference between human beings and plants which entitles human beings to treat plants differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3’ If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2’, and if it is wrong to kill human beings for food, then it is wrong to kill plants for food. 4’ Thus, it is wrong to kill plants for food. The appropriateness of this second argument in this context may be challenged by some. These people may suggest that there are relevant differences between plants and human beings. They may urge, for example, that plants are never conscious, never capable of feeling pain, never capable of responding sympathetically to their fellow creatures, etc. However, this objection is mistaken. We need only to remind ourselves that some live human beings are exactly like plants in these regards, in order to see that this argument is indeed appropriate in the present context. This argument has the same pattern as the vegetarian argument. Indeed, if the vegetarian will agree with us that it is morally permissible to kill plants for food then, by a pattern of argument essentially the same as that used in the above arguments, he will be led to the conclusion that it is per+ missible to kill human beings for food. The argument is as follows: 1” It is not wrong to kill plants for food. 2” There is no difference between human beings and plants which entitles human beings to treat plants differently from human beings with respect to the question of killing for food. 3” If there is no difference of the kind specified in premise No. 2”, and if it is not wrong to kill plants for food, then it is not wrong to kill human beings for food. 4” Thus, it is not wrong to kill human beings for food. Since 3” is a logical consequence of 3’, the vegetarian cannot rationally
208
agree to 3’ and refuse to agree to 3”. Further, premises 3 and 3’ both appear to be consequences of the same basic moral principle. Rachels has stated this principle as follows: (C) “Our moral judgments are unacceptably arbitrary if we judge one way in one case and differently in another case, without there being a relevant difference between the two cases which justifies the difference in our assessments” (Rachels, 1976).
If the vegetarian accepts this moral principle as his reason for accepting premise of the vegetarian argument, then he will also have to accept 3’ for the same reason. What we have shown, we believe, is that the vegetarian position is inconsistent. In light of accepting principle (C), the vegetarian must accept premises 3, 3’ and 3”. His argument for premise 2 must lead him equally to accept 2’. If, in addition, he accepts both premises 1 and l”, then his position is selfcontradictory. We have not, of course, shown that vegetarianism is necessarily inconsistent. That is, we have not shown that a person who claims that it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food, is contradicting himself. What we have shown is that if he tries to prove his position and in so doing claims principle (C), premise 2, and that it is wrong to kill humans for food and that it is not wrong to kill plants for food, then his position is inconsistent. There are several ways to avoid this paradox. One way should be to accept the principle that humans can sometimes kill other humans for food. Another way would be to accept the principle that it is wrong for human beings to eat plants. A third way would be to find some characteristic which all living human beings share and which is not possessed by any of the plants we normally eat and then accept the principle that possession of this characteristic is morally significant with respect to the question of killing for food. And finally, the fourth way would be to reject or modify principle (C). This could be done by accepting differing moral judgements even in cases where there is no morally significant characteristic with reference to which the cases can be differentiated. In our view, the first two ways of avoiding the above paradox are unacceptable. We should not accept that it is morally permissible to kill and eat humans and we should not accept that it is wrong to eat plants. The third way of avoiding the paradox seems unpromising also. No doubt we could find some characteristic such that all living humans possessed that characteristic and no plants did (or at least no edible plants). There are many biochemical and behavioral features which could serve as such a characteristic, but the prospect of showing that any such characteristic is morally relevant with respect to the issue in question is vanishingly small. Thus, we are left with the fourth way. We must accept some degree of arbitrariness in our moral evaluations. Providing the degree of arbitrariness is sufficiently limited, this way out of the paradox seems most acceptable. The alternatives, namely killing humans for food or condemning the human race to extinction through starvation, are clearly
morally worse than accepting that some of our moral evaluations are somewhat arbitrary. Of course, by rejection of principle (C) we also undermine the vegetarian argument. We are not forced to accept the vegetarian position that it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food. Criticism of the vegetarian argument is only one small aspect of a discussion of the ethical implications of modern agricultural practices. As we have indicated in the introductory paragraph, there are other ethical issues. Even if it is permissible to kill and eat animals, certain modern agricultural practices may subject animals to “unnecessary” pain. Determining which practices are acceptable may be a difficult matter. In settling these issues, we must be careful not to accept a position which, if put into practice, would deny human beings any opportunity for physical existence. Furthermore, in light of the complex symbiotic and evolutionary relationships between people and other living organisms, it seems very likely that some of our moral judgements will depend on making distinctions that are, to some degree, arbitrary. REFERENCES Rachels, J., 1976. Animal Rights Regan, T., 1976. Animal, Rights
Do animals have a right to liberty? In: T. Regan and P. Singer (Editors), and Human Obligations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs. Do animals have a right to life? In: T. Regan and P. Singer (Editors), and Human Obligations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.